Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

[Sanjay M]

It looks like everyone's racing to the exits in preparation for the Afghan endgame, since the American presence looks to be increasingly shaky.

When the war re-starts, Pakistan will immediately set J&K on fire again, with a full-blown terror campaign. Once hostilities get fully underway again, India should be willing to take the war directly to Pak, via the Afghan route. Since India has an overwhelming advantage in air power, it should be willing to use its airbase in Tajikistan to run combat sorties against PAF warplanes near the Durand Line. (I would love to see the first Indian PAK-FA's tested against Pak F-16s over Afghanistan. We should ask Putin for a few early deliveries just for this purpose. ) If Haqqani & Co participate in launching terror attacks against Kashmir, then IAF should strike at them across the Durand Line. We don't have to own upto any cross-border attacks, of course. If Pak accuses, we can demand they SHOW PROOF.

We should lobby the Americans for their support rather than their interference on this, as a way of teaching Pak a lesson for their clandestine support for attacks on US troops. Once America is out of Afghanistan, then they are no longer vulnerable to Pak blackmail. If India takes revenge against Pak on behalf of the US, then Americans can feel vindicated - certainly, there is no love lost between them and Haqqani. After Vietnam, America backed the Khmer Rouge to maul the Vietnamese Army. After Somalia, America backed militias who eventually killed Aideed. After Afghanistan, it's only proper that they seek some vengeance against Pak to make them suffer.

Pak's defenses are all along the border with India. They have no defense arrayed against the Afghan border. India should exploit this to the hilt and put them heat on them from that side.

[Kamboja]

My 2 paisa on Pakistan and Afghanistan -

Seems to me that Pakistan will reach the zenith of their power/influence in Afg around when the US eventually withdraws and the new government takes shape in Kabul. This is when Pak can exert maximum pressure using their proxies in Afg to shape the future Afghan government.

After that though, the Pakis will have a whole new headache to deal with. Even in the heyday of Paki-Talibani biraderhood, the Talibs refused to recognize the Durand Line and accept permanent division of Pashtunistan. Before 9/11 also, the Talibs refused to hand over OBL to the Pakis (who were relaying the request from the Americans). It is clear that the Talibs have a mind of their own, and I don't see that changing once they again become part of the official administration of Afg.

What will probably have changed though, is their view of Pakistan and the ISI. My guess is that TSPA and ISI have treated the Talibs like a mixture of honored guests and hostages during the entire Afghan war - guests because they have protected them from the wrath of the US/NATO forces by offering sanctuary in Pakiland, but hostages because they have used the threat of betraying the Talibs to the Americans as a stick to force the Talibs to act as they wanted (as Birader found out).

Nobody, especially not a proud, medieval Izlamic Pashtun, likes to be pushed around and implicitly threatened that way. Even more than threats, the Talibs will feel justifiable rage at the Paki perfidy in hosting US droneacharyas on Paki airbases and tolerating hits on the Talibs. The only reason that the Talibs put up with it today is because they have no choice - Packeeland is the only sanctuary they have. But once they are more safely ensconced in their Afghan heartland, free of the threat of a visit from droneacharya or US Special Forces, and no longer held on the leash by TSPA/ISI, I suspect the Pakis will reap what they have sown with some very angry Talibs exacting revenge. What shape that will take I have no idea, but am looking forward to finding out.

[Prem]

100,000 vs 400

That's the total number of the enemy we are asking 100,000 troops to remove from the wildernesses of Afghanistan and Pakistan, according to Obama's Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter. 400. More to the point, even a military that knows the terrain, speaks the language, and grasps the local politics is largely helpless:Months after declaring victory on several important fronts, including in South Waziristan and the Swat Valley, the army has been forced to reopen campaigns after militants seeped back in ... “The terrorists have been raised here; they can find their way around blind,” said Maj. Shahzad Saleem, as small gunfire sounded around the hills near Nawazkot where Sepoy Aziz was shot.
Surely, at some point, someone in Washington will be able to point out the obvious

http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/t ... s-400.html

[svinayak]

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... d_pakistan

US has to worry more from Pakistan than Iran
US has to worry lot more about Pakistan than Iran as Hillary Leverett has to know.
Same General McChrystal reported in his August, 2009 assessment to the President:
1. Most insurgent fighters in Afghanistan are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan that work through an alternative political infrastructure in Afghanistan.
2. The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) based in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, is the No. 1 threat to US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Mohammed Omar (Afghan Taliban Chief) announces his guidance and intent for the coming year.
3. Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups (QST, HQN and HiG) are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's lSI. Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM) based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support.
All American officers in southern Afghanistan know that they can not prevail in the ongoing military operations, unless Taliban strongholds across the Durand Line in North Waziristan and Baluchistan are neutralized. Adm Mullen and Gen Patraeus evidently do not want to acknowledge that hard options have to be considered if their soldiers are not to die at the hands of radicals, armed and trained across the Durand Line. This is where rubber meets the road for the famed General.
According to Afghan Taliban commanders’ interviews with Matt Waldman, a Harvard Professor, the Pakistani ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences the Taliban insurgency movement. The Afghan Taliban commanders also say that ISI gives sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and provides huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies. In the words of these Afghan Taliban commanders, this is ‘as clear as the sun in the sky’.
After having denied existence of Mullah Omar’s QST umpteen times on its soil, now Pakistan suddenly finds a way to bring about reconciliation between QST and Afghan government!
The most breath-taking part of this sordid saga is that US is NOT holding Pakistan responsible for sheltering, protecting and supporting Haqqani’s HQN network and Mullah Omar’s QST network all these years while those networks have been causing daily deaths of US/NATO soldiers ever since 2002 even though Pakistan was SUPPOSED to have joined US fight against same Taliban back in 2001!
The ISI is said to compensate families of suicide bombers to the tune of 200,000 Pakistani rupees, claims the report by Matt Waldman. Thus US aid to bankrupt Pakistan goes directly to finance the death of US/NATO soldiers in Afghanistan. So US it self is the silent partner of Pakistan in the death of US/NATO soldiers in Afghanistan since 2002.
All American officers in southern Afghanistan know that they can not prevail in the ongoing military operations, unless Taliban strongholds across the Durand Line in North Waziristan and Baluchistan are neutralized. Adm Mullen and Gen Patraeus evidently do not want to acknowledge that hard options have to be considered if their soldiers are not to die at the hands of radicals, armed and trained across the Durand Line. This is where rubber meets the road for the famed General.
According to Afghan Taliban commanders’ interviews with Matt Waldman, a Harvard Professor, the Pakistani ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences the Taliban insurgency movement. The Afghan Taliban commanders also say that ISI gives sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and provides huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies. In the words of these Afghan Taliban commanders, this is ‘as clear as the sun in the sky’.
After having denied existence of Mullah Omar’s QST umpteen times on its soil, now Pakistan suddenly finds a way to bring about reconciliation between QST and Afghan government!
The most breath-taking part of this sordid saga is that US is NOT holding Pakistan responsible for sheltering, protecting and supporting Haqqani’s HQN network and Mullah Omar’s QST network all these years while those networks have been causing daily deaths of US/NATO soldiers ever since 2002 even though Pakistan was SUPPOSED to have joined US fight against same Taliban back in 2001!
The ISI is said to compensate families of suicide bombers to the tune of 200,000 Pakistani rupees, claims the report by Matt Waldman. Thus US aid to bankrupt Pakistan goes directly to finance the death of US/NATO soldiers in Afghanistan. So US it self is the silent partner of Pakistan in the death of US/NATO soldiers in Afghanistan since 2002.

[Sanjay M]

Our "friend" Selig Harrison wants Washington to strongly back Karzai's latest moves:

http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/06/a-sm ... -play.html

[shyamd]

Af-Pak will have a sub-unified command with CENTCOM. The focus is less future of Afghanistan, but more the future of TSP and its nuclear arms.

[ramana]

X-post..

The most disturbing consequence for Pakistan is that these economic trends are creating conditions for a de facto partitioned Afghan state. The more stable north and west -- with international linkages, economic growth and acceptance of the Afghan central government and western troop presence -- can emerge self-sufficient and defensible while pockets of insurgency engulf the south and east.

Pakistan's support for certain Taliban elements that underwrite this territorial partition could result in a Pakhtun rump state that galvanises nationalist separatism in Pakistan's tribal frontier. Rather than providing a zone for strategic depth, this "blowback" scenario could redirect militant networks against the Pakistan state, thus compounding its security dilemmas, overstretched military and economic fragilities.

Shortsighted Pakistani strategy may eventually result in a Pakistan engulfed in militant fires while surrounded by unfriendly states after years of Pakistani complicity with militant externalities. In other words, regional economic and political trends shaped by Pakistani policy could lead to the very isolation and encirclement it most fears.

Yup, this is exactly what I've been saying.

We all remember Kissinger's original description of the insurgency dilemma:
"All the insurgent has to do to win, is to not lose. All the govt has to do to lose, is to not win."

Similar idea here. All we need to win here is for the North to not fall to Taliban, whereas if Pak cannot successfully take over the North, it will automatically lose, since Pathan consolidation would automatically occur over time. The defender has the tactical advantage over the aggressor, and the natural resistance of Northerners to Pakhtun domination also works against Pak.

The only thing Pak can do, is to resort to brainwashing the Pakhtuns with ever more copious amounts of Islamic fanaticism. Previously, this was a workable strategy, but the arrival of AlQaeda and its internationalist jihadi brigades has then thrown a wrench in Pak's game. This is Pak's own fault of course, for not seeing the risks the AlQaeda jihadis posed with their international antics, such as their propensity to seek monstrous attacks on foreign targets like 9/11. Since Pak is always solely fixated on its own needs and plans, it gave little consideration to the extreme dangers these posed to others. The very jihadi strategy that Pak thought it was conducting on the cheap has then turned out to be very expensive for it after all.

If Pak now again goes back to pursuing the jihadi brainwashing strategy full-tilt to wage war on Afghanistan, then the resulting extremist environment will allow AlQaeda to bounce back and rebuild much more quickly than before. They could again resume devastating attacks on the West while hiding out in Taliban-controlled Southern Afghanistan, and Pak would be hard-pressed to stop them. Haqqani & Co would be less cooperative than ever, and Pak would again be dependent upon them more than ever before.

But the most devastating and effective sneak-attack that AlQaeda could perform in this situation would be a decapitation strike against the Pakistani state itself, in the hopes of seizing control over Pak and its nuclear weapons. Now that AlQaeda and the international jihadi brigades have smelled the scent of the 72 nuclear virgins, they won't go back to fighting for raisins, or for peanuts - they know what the real prize is now, and their mouths are watering.
Pak for them is a temptingly low-hanging fruit, which they should have every reason to make a grab at.

If Pak embeds its troops among Taliban like the last time, then this offers up the rich possibility of self-delivered hostages. "Meals-on-wheels".

The Pak 72 are lasciviously gyrating their hips in front of the drooling jihadis. The ISI chaperone is of 2 minds on what should happen. The Paki politician-babus are busy inhaling the hookah. Unkil is sitting nervously, while voyeuristically watching it all on the security cameras.

Where is their Allah now?

Very graphic imagination but there are few minor flaws. For starters
- AlQ is not big enough to make a run for the nukes.
- The Pashtuns are not mono-lithic.

However the plus is that Pashtun consolidation will lead to break up of NA.

[ramana]

Can be x-posted in many threads...

Pioneer op-ed:

EDITS | Thursday, July 8, 2010 | Email | Print | | Back


Kayani roots for Haqqani

G Parthasarathy

There now appears to be recognition in New Delhi that direct allegations against Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism only invite bland and self-righteous denials. But the tone of India’s approach has changed after Daood Gilani aka James Headley spoke candidly to Indian investigators in the presence of ISI officials and revealed substantive details of how the plot to attack Mumbai was hatched and about the role of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, other senior members of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and serving and retired Army officials, some of whom hid their true identity.

Confronted with these details during the visit of Home Minister P Chidambaram to Islamabad, the Pakistanis have promised thorough investigations. It would be naïve to believe that given Hafiz Saeed’s close links with the ISI, Mr Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League and virtually all major Islamic parties, the Pakistani Government would have the will or the inclination to act against the real masterminds of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist outrage.

Rather than accuse Pakistan directly of complicity in the Mumbai carnage, Mr Chidambaram said, “Nobody is questioning anybody’s intentions. It is the outcome to become visible. We have agreed that there are certain outcomes we are looking forward to.”Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, normally upbeat on India-Pakistan relations, remarked, “In dealing with Pakistan our attitude should be trust, but verify. So only time will tell which way the animal will turn.”

Minister for External Affairs SM Krishna told visiting Pakistani journalists, “Mumbai is a deep scar. Pakistan must pursue those who were responsible.” He added, “Political will is needed to tackle terrorism. Does the will exist? India has it.” As a young Pakistani journalist noted, implicit in Mr Krishna’s comments was “the Indian assessment that Pakistan and more specially the Pakistani Army does not have the will”. Mr Krishna also left Pakistani journalists in no doubt that in a climate where there was a ‘trust deficit’ it would be unrealistic to expect major breakthroughs. He told the journalists, “It will take talks, lots of talks before an agreement.”

New Delhi evidently recognises that Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and his ISI chief are working overtime to get the Taliban leader Sirajuddin Haqqani, now based in Pakistan, to control southern Afghanistan through a deal they appear to be negotiating with a beleaguered Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who is beset with fears of a precipitate American withdrawal. Simultaneously the ISI intends to keep the pot boiling in Jammu & Kashmir by backing Jama’at-e-Islami leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani and target Indian interests through the LeT and the Taliban’s Haqqani network across Afghanistan and in Bangladesh. Pakistan’s assets in India like SIMI will also be used to keep Indian security agencies on edge, but a repetition of attacks like the Mumbai carnage could well be avoided for the present as any such attack will undermine Pakistani ambitions on its western borders with Afghanistan.

Both Sirajuddin Haqqani and his father Jalaluddin Haqqani have been long-term assets of the ISI. They are both members of the ruling council of the Taliban, headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar. More importantly, Jalaluddin Haqqani, together with the ISI, has helped Osama bin Laden’s jihadi network in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1988, When the Americans invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, Osama bin Laden escaped from the American bombing of the caves where he was hiding in Tora Bora. He was escorted to north Waziristan and has since been protected by the Haqqani network there.

The Haqqani network, now led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, openly claims that its support for Al Qaeda today is “at its highest limit”. It also provides haven and support to jihadis from Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, the Kurdish areas of Iran and Iraq, and even from Germany. While Gen Kayani has stonewalled and stalled American requests to crackdown on the Haqqani network on one pretext or another, the Americans are now dumbfounded to learn that behind their backs the Pakistani Army has been seeking to persuade the Afghans to give a leading role, probably involving de facto control of southern Afghanistan, to start with, for Sirajuddin Haqqani, their protégé who is an Islamic radical with demonstrably inseparable links with Al Qaeda.

The question that arises is that why is Gen Kayani, scheduled to retire in a few months, so keen on pushing ‘reconciliation’ with the Haqqani network, backed by his ISI geniuses? As well-known American analyst Jeffrey Dressler avers, “The Haqqanis rely on Al Qaeda for mass appeal, funding and training. In return, they provide Al Qaeda with shelter and protection, to strike at foreign forces in Afghanistan and beyond. Any negotiated settlement with the Haqqanis threatens to undermine the raison d'être of US involvement in Afghanistan for over the past decade.” One can only conclude that Gen Kayani and the ISI believe, like the Taliban leadership, that Taliban resistance will force an early American exit from Afghanistan, with the US willing to agree to any settlement that is “face-saving”.

Afghanistan’s neighbours and Russia have reacted with alarm to the ongoing Karzai-Kayani nexus which followed the sacking or sidelining of key officials suspicious of Pakistani intentions, like former Intelligence Chief Amrullah Saleh and Army Chief Gen Bismillah Khan by Mr Karzai. On July 1 an official spokesman of the Russian Foreign office warned: “Attempts by the Afghan leadership with the support of Western countries to establish a negotiation process with Taliban leaders to build a mechanism for national ‘reconciliation’ gives us serious cause for concern.” The spokesman added, “Work to return repentant Taliban militants to civilian life should not be replaced with a campaign to rehabilitate the entire Taliban movement.” The Chinese have noted that the Taliban have demanded unconditional American withdrawal as a precondition for any dialogue. Chinese ‘analysts’ aver, “War is prevailing and continuing (in Afghanistan) and the peace process has not started. Peace on the foundation of conditions is not possible, if the Taliban are not weakened.”

The entire Afghan strategy of Pakistan is being managed primarily by the Army establishment, with the elected Government sidelined. It is a high-risk strategy which could well flounder as it is apparent that while the Americans are confused they are hardly likely to leave Afghanistan to the mercies of an ISI-backed Sirajuddin Haqqani.

The major reason for Pakistan’s interest in having southern Afghanistan controlled by Haqqani is that it fears that the traditional Pashtun leadership in Afghanistan strongly rejects the Durand Line and supports the formation of a ‘Pashtunistan’. High-risk policies by Gen Ayub Khan, Gen Yahya Khan and Gen Pervez Musharraf, leading to conflict with India, have in the past proved disastrous for Pakistan. Will Gen Kayani lead his country to similar disaster with his ambitions in Afghanistan?

So what GP is saying is Sirajuddin Haqqani is going to get control of Southern Afghanistan ie the area that is west of Durand Line. Is this the TSPA idea to hedge the Durand Line issue?

Looks to me the TSPA goal of transforming "bad" Taliban into "good" Taliban is to hedge the Durand line. How does it advance their strategic depth goal?

It also means Karzai is accomodating the TSP by defacto freezing the Durand Line issue in order to get Taliban support for his govt.
This is sort of resolving the Durrani-Ghilzai faction fight I spoke about.



Any insights from our members?

[Sanjay M]

So what GP is saying is Sirajuddin Haqqani is going to get control of Southern Afghanistan ie the area that is west of Durand Line. Is this the TSPA idea to hedge the Durand Line issue?

Looks to me the TSPA goal of transforming "bad" Taliban into "good" Taliban is to hedge the Durand line. How does it advance their strategic depth goal?

It also means Karzai is accomodating the TSP by defacto freezing the Durand Line issue in order to get Taliban support for his govt.
This is sort of resolving the Durrani-Ghilzai faction fight I spoke about.

Any insights from our members?

Controlling Afghanistan and neutralizing the Durand Line dispute was always the plan from the moment ISI first created the Taliban. This wasn't long after even puppet#1 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar rejected Pak's request for recognition of the Durand Line.

Pak turning "bad" Taliban into "good" started happening the moment the US invaded Afghanistan. This or that group was immediately labeled a "good tribe" who could help stop Taliban/AlQaeda.

Karzai is doing a Gyanendra. Because of him the traditional monarchist establishment will be forever banished from power, never to regain it.
By the time Taliban is back to full strength in Southern Afghanistan, Karzai would have long since been sidelined by them - if not killed outright. Should Karzai actually be allowed to live, it would be because Taliban/ISI don't even find him worth bothering over, just like LTTE spared ex-PM Junius Jawardene from any assassination attacks.

As for the Ghilzai-Durrani feud, the Durranis see their power under threat from the US and its anti-corruption drive. Like Saddam's Al-Tikriti clan, the Durranis have only been able to rule Afghanistan through cronyism and coercion. Because the US threatens the cronyism, corruption, and coercion through which the Durranis have been able to maintain the position of privilege and power, and because the Northern Alliance also threatens this too, then the Durranis have to make up with the Ghilzais just to save their own skins.

The Northern Afghans are no longer as weak as they once were when the USSR existed, occupying their motherlands of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The dissolution of the USSR has created a fundamental change, unleashing the natural ethnic/fraternal ties between Northern Afghans and their motherlands. This has naturally weakened Durrani power, and thus the Durranis must reconcile with the Ghilzais.

Ironically, Durrani-Ghilzai reconciliation can lay the seeds for Pashtun reunification and re-establishment of Pashtunistan. So by trying to broker talks between Ghilzai and Durrani, the Pakis are taking their life into their own hands - walking directly into the fire - in the hope that they will come out stronger/purer on the other side. This is a moment of truth for Pak, and the tables could easily be turned on them.

If I were AlQaeda, I would see less benefit in fighting Northern Afghans on behalf of Taliban, and would instead see more merit in fighting Islamabad, which could potentially yield a nuclear cache. Fighting the Northern Afghans means some futile and interminable war with no clear benefit or end. Fighting against shaky Islamabad means potentially getting at the nukes. (This is what I've said before about Pak being "low-hanging fruit")

I'm sure that any AQ-lurkers would agree with me that turning the tables on Pak by fighting them would yield much richer dividends than fighting for Pak.
(Right AQ-lurks? Don't worry, you don't have to reply - you can just nod silently while stroking your beards thoughtfully.)

[Sanjay M]

Very graphic imagination but there are few minor flaws. For starters
- AlQ is not big enough to make a run for the nukes.
- The Pashtuns are not mono-lithic.

AlQ was potent enough to kill Masood, pull off 9/11, Madrid bombings, 7/7, 26/11, among other things. Just TSPA/ISI's desperation motivate them to be resourceful, so would AlQ's.
They are the ones with the most to lose, should Pak's gambit succeed. If Pak is successful in bringing all Pashtuns under its aegis, then it could turf out AlQ who pose an unwanted risk to Pak's agenda.
AlQ does not want to be homeless and hunted by Pak/West/etc, so they would be highly motivated more than anyone to prevent this from happening. Pak's constant waffling and flipflopping makes it suspect to many jihadis.

Pashtuns are not monolithic, but ISI will have to make them so, unless ISI plans to staff Taliban full of Pakjabis only.

However the plus is that Pashtun consolidation will lead to break up of NA.

Break of NA (Northern Alliance)? How is that a plus, and why would it be caused by Pashtun consolidation?

[Airavat]

People collect free fuel after a tanker, in a NATO supply convoy, is shot up by insurgents in Baghlan province, North Afghanistan.

[sum]

But the tone of India’s approach has changed after Daood Gilani aka James Headley spoke candidly to Indian investigators in the presence of ISI officials and revealed substantive details of how the plot to attack Mumbai was hatched and about the role of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, other senior members of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and serving and retired Army officials, some of whom hid their true identity.

Interviewed Headley in the presence of ISI????

[pgbhat]

Interviewed Headley in the presence of ISI????

I believe it is a typo....should have been see-eye-yeah.

[Pranav]

Interesting article:

A de facto partition for Afghanistan
By: Robert D. Blackwill

http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm? ... 66E50DFB3A

[RajeshA]

-- deleted --

[RamaY]

So what GP is saying is Sirajuddin Haqqani is going to get control of Southern Afghanistan ie the area that is west of Durand Line. Is this the TSPA idea to hedge the Durand Line issue?

Looks to me the TSPA goal of transforming "bad" Taliban into "good" Taliban is to hedge the Durand line. How does it advance their strategic depth goal?

It also means Karzai is accomodating the TSP by defacto freezing the Durand Line issue in order to get Taliban support for his govt.
This is sort of resolving the Durrani-Ghilzai faction fight I spoke about.

Any insights from our members?

If Haqqani's get control of southern Afghanistan I can see unification of Pakthukwa in near future. It can become Paki's cashmere

[RajeshA]

Haqqani is just one warlord amongst many, albeit one with very good finances, courtesy ISI. As long as the Taliban were fighting the Americans, the Taliban could not deny him his contribution to Jihad, but it is not certain, whether he would be allowed to lord over the whole of Southern Afghanistan, post-agreement.

If I were Karzai, I would make peace with Haqqani. Get money from somewhere and finance some rival Taliban group, and get that group to bump off Haqqani and his coterie. If Karzai wants he can pull it off. He just needs a lot of money, and some Taliban faction with a charismatic leader, whom he could sorta trust.

[CRamS]

I don't believe this interviews with William Dalrymple have been posted before. This guy is a slime ball, a typical western liberal who doles out condescending advice to India; suggesting bogus concessions to appease TSP.

First part of interview; he gives way too much hype on Talibunnies success visa vi USA: All Americans in Afghanistan know that their game is over

The second part of the interview is what got my goat. He naively asks India to cut a grand bargain with TSP; India out of Afganisthan, if TSP keeps out of Kashmir. I mean its all horse trading to prop up TSP, not the dissolution of that terrorist abomination: Indian involvement in Afghanistan was a blunder. Finally, here is a quote, reminiscent of TSP MMS bhai chara, that went unchallenged by the interviewer Aurthru Pias:

I have believed there are more things common between Delhi and Lahore than Delhi and Chennai

[svinayak]

http://seminal.firedoglake.com/diary/58871
Pakistan’s “Strategic Depth” and endless war in Afghanistan

Al-Qa’eda can fully open the entire sub-continent as a theater for jihad, and coupled with the collapse of nuclear-armed Pakistan and the presumable Indian military response, we have the Clash of Civilizations. Pakistan vs India becomes Islam vs the Hindu Superpower. And stuck right there in the middle of it is 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan, soon to be controlled by a Taliban-Karzai power-sharing government, a puppet of Pakistan’s "strategic depth." To say it will be ugly is an epic understatement

This is a fantasy and a fake. Several western analysts keep this as the end game but this is un realistic.
The western media can start this kind of slant and it has started it after Mumbai killings.

[Sanjay M]

Interesting article:

A de facto partition for Afghanistan
By: Robert D. Blackwill

http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm? ... 66E50DFB3A

Thanks for that. Partition is the best option, as it will prevent Pak from pursuing a repetition of events that led to the rise of AlQaeda.

Beware of the Atlanticists - they'll react in panic, and do everything they can to scuttle this as an option. They don't want anything to happen to their precious jihadi machine, which is vital to gore the underbelly of the Russian bear they hate.

If there is a partition, then all will have an easier time of it - except Pak.
The Pakjabis and Pashtuns would soon be locked in a life-or-death struggle for the survival or breakup of Pakistan.

[James B]

Interesting article:

A de facto partition for Afghanistan
By: Robert D. Blackwill

http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm? ... 66E50DFB3A

Thanks for that. Partition is the best option, as it will prevent Pak from pursuing a repetition of events that led to the rise of AlQaeda.

Beware of the Atlanticists - they'll react in panic, and do everything they can to scuttle this as an option. They don't want anything to happen to their precious jihadi machine, which is vital to gore the underbelly of the Russian bear they hate.

If there is a partition, then all will have an easier time of it - except Pak.
The Pakjabis and Pashtuns would soon be locked in a life-or-death struggle for the survival or breakup of Pakistan.

If ever this de facto partition happens then it will be a precursor to Pashtunistan movement. The pashtun Talibs might turn against TSP to get their portion of Pashtun lands from TSP.

[Lalmohan]

if pak-state is no longer able to guarantee the flow of oil, who should do so?
in that scenario, isnt an intact pak-state actually a liability? (even for the atlanticists)

[Sanjay M]

what oil? from afghanistan? was pak able to guarantee flow of oil to us from iran?

[Prem]

.Blunt General Appointed to Lead Forces in MideastBy THOM SHANKER
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/world ... .html?_r=1

. WASHINGTON — A four-star Marine general known equally for blunt speech, combat prowess and understanding counterinsurgency warfare will be nominated to command American forces across the Middle East, officials said Thursday. If confirmed by the Senate as the top officer of the military’s Central Command, General Mattis would be in charge of American military forces in a strategic area from Egypt through Pakistan, and from Central Asia past the Persian Gulf.
His area of responsibility would include Iraq and Afghanistan, but most of his focus would be on other trouble spots in the region, as each of those two conflicts have a four-star officer specifically in command. General Mattis would replace Gen. David H. Petraeus, whose tour at Central Command was cut short when President Obama asked him to take over the allied mission in Afghanistan after Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal was relieved for comments he made to Rolling Stone magazine. For his part, General Mattis has gotten in trouble for past observations on a life of combat. In 2005, he received an official rebuke for comments that included “it’s a lot of fun to fight.”
“You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap around women for five years because they didn’t wear a veil,” he said while speaking at a forum in San Diego. “You know guys like that ain’t got no manhood left anyway, so it’s a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them.”

[ramana]

Nightwatch wises up to Pak perfidy!


7/9/2010

Pakistan: Security. Several Chinese engineers working in Baluchistan survived an attempt on their lives when unidentified assailants fired two rockets at a five -star hotel in the provincial town, in a pre-dawn attack on Wednesday. According to reports, the Chinese engineers left the hotel elevator minutes before the attack, which damaged a portion of the hotel building.


The Chinese engineers had arrived in Gwadar recently and were reportedly working on an oil refinery. Official sources believe that they were the targets of the attack. Security officials and paramilitary forces cordoned off the area after the attack and began investigations against unidentified assailants.


Comment: Baluch hostility to foreigners is less interesting than that the Chinese are building an oil refinery in Gwadar, in western Pakistan. That provides the motive for building a railroad link to Xinjiang, China, or maybe a pipeline, if that is feasible.

China is developing lines of communication through Pakistan and Burma to complement oil pipelines in central Asia that will ensure crude supplies to China in the event of a crisis in Northeast or Southeast Asia in which US Naval forces would disrupt the maritime supply route through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Pakistan: Gratitude. The head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, said "foreign powers" were responsible for terrorism in his country, Samaa reported 8 July. During a briefing at a session of the National Security Committee, General Pasha said U.S. counterterrorism policy is being looked into and that changes will be made in accordance with Pakistan's national interest. According to Samaa, the foreign powers mentioned were specified as Western powers.

Comment:: The duplicitous, calculated comments of Pakistani politicians, such as Lieutenant General Pasha, expose the psychology of blame that infects Pakistani leaders. They do not accept responsibility for their own actions and constantly indulge in blaming those - in this case, the US -- who have provided enormous assistance to support elective, democratic government.

The US has persevered in this support despite overwhelming evidence that helping Pakistan is against the best interests of the US, Indian and Afghan governments. Even neutral international observers have concluded that Pakistani government organizations have never stopped supporting the Taliban.

Pakistani strategists are fond of accusing the US of being an inconstant ally of Pakistan against India. In the world-wide fight against terrorist groups, Pakistan is the inconstant ally. Its lack of gratitude is a world class disgrace. Pakistani political and military leaders should have the humility to appreciate they are not very clever in their initiatives to manipulate the US.

Security. Private security firms and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) working in Pakistan have been found involved in assisting the Pakistani Taliban militants financially and providing them with the human resource. The militants arrested by the law enforcement agencies in different operations disclosed the names of private security firms and NGOs, who actually have been funding the militants and providing them with human resource for activities of terrorism in the country.

After the disclosure by the militants, the Interior Ministry asked the Government of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa to provide a detailed list of those private security firms and NGOs. The Interior Ministry and the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa government have ordered an investigation.

[NRao]

CIA and Pakistan locked in aggressive spy battles

Publicly, the U.S. credits Pakistan with helping kill and capture many al-Qaida and Taliban leaders. Privately, the relationship is often marked by mistrust and double-dealing as Pakistan runs double agents against the CIA and the agency tries to penetrate Pakistan's closely guarded nuclear program.

Spying among friends is old news in the intelligence business, but the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is at the heart of Washington's counterterrorism efforts. Any behind-the-scenes trickery could undermine those efforts as well as the long-standing hunt for Osama bin Laden.

One recent incident underscores the schizophrenic relationship between the two countries. Last year, a Pakistani man approached CIA officers in Islamabad, offering to give up secrets of his country's nuclear program. To prove he was a trustworthy source, the man claimed he had spent nuclear fuel rods. But suspicious CIA officers quickly concluded that Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, was trying to run a double agent against them.

CIA officers alerted their Pakistani counterparts. Pakistan promised to look into the matter and, with neither side acknowledging the man was a double agent, the affair came to a polite, quiet end.

Bumping up against the ISI is a way of life for the CIA in Pakistan, the agency's command center for recruiting spies in the country's lawless tribal regions. Officers there also coordinate Predator drone airstrikes, the CIA's most successful and lethal counterterrorism program. The armed, unmanned planes take off from a base inside Pakistani Baluchistan known as "Rhine."

"Pakistan would be exceptionally uncomfortable and even hostile to American efforts to muck about in their home turf," said Graham Fuller, an expert on Islamic fundamentalism who spent 25 years with the CIA, including a stint as Kabul station chief.

That means incidents such as the one involving nuclear fuel rods must be resolved delicately and privately.

"It's a crucial relationship," CIA spokesman George Little said. "We work closely with our Pakistani partners in fighting the common threat of terrorism. They've been vital to the victories achieved against al-Qaida and its violent allies. And they've lost many people in the battle against extremism. No one should forget that."

Details about the CIA's relationship with Pakistan were recounted by nearly a dozen former and current U.S. and Pakistani intelligence officials, all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter.

An ISI official denied that the agency runs double agents to collect information about the CIA's activities. He said the two agencies have a good working relationship and such allegations were meant to create friction between them.

But the CIA became so concerned by a rash of cases involving suspected double agents in 2009, it re-examined the spies it had on the payroll in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The internal investigation revealed about a dozen double agents, stretching back several years. Most of them were being run by Pakistan. Other cases were deemed suspicious. The CIA determined the efforts were part of an official offensive counterintelligence program being run by Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the ISI's spy chief.

Pakistan's willingness to run double agents against the U.S. is particularly troubling to some in the CIA because of the country's ties to longtime Osama bin Laden ally Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (gool-boo-DEEN' hek-mat-YAR') and to the Haqqani network, a Pakistan-based Taliban faction also linked to al-Qaida.

In addition to its concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program, the CIA continues to press the Pakistanis to step up their military efforts in North Waziristan, the tribal region where Hekmatyar and Haqqani are based.

CIA Director Leon Panetta talked with Pasha about ISI's relationship with militants last year, reiterating the same talking points his predecessor, Gen. Michael Hayden, had delivered. Panetta told Pasha he had needed to take on militant groups, including those such as Hekmatyar and Haqqani, a former U.S. intelligence official said.

But the U.S. can only demand so much from an intelligence service it can't live without.

Recruiting agents to track down and kill terrorists and militants is a top priority for the CIA, and one of the clandestine service's greatest challenges. The drones can't hit their targets without help finding them. Such efforts would be impossible without Pakistan's blessing, and the U.S. pays about $3 billion a year in military and economic aid to keep the country stable and cooperative.

"We need the ISI and they definitely know it," said C. Christine Fair, an assistant professor at Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies. "They are really helping us in several critical areas and directly undermining us in others."

Pakistan has its own worries about the Americans. During the first term of the Bush administration, Pakistan became enraged after it shared intelligence with the U.S., only to learn the CIA station chief passed that information to the British.

The incident caused a serious row, one that threatened the CIA's relationship with the ISI and deepened the levels of distrust between the two sides. Pakistan almost threw the CIA station chief out of the country.

A British security official said the incident was "a matter between Pakistan and America."

The spate of Pakistani double agents has raised alarm bells in some corners of the agency, while others merely say it's the cost of doing business in Pakistan. They say double agents are as old as humanity and point to the old spy adage: "There are friendly nations but no friendly intelligence services."

"The use of double agents is something skilled intelligence services and the better terrorist groups like al-Qaida, Hezbollah, provisional Irish Republican Army and the Tamil Tigers have regularly done. It's not something that should be a surprise," said Daniel Byman, a foreign policy expert at the Saban Center at Brookings Institution.

Nowhere is the tension greater than in the tribal areas, the lawless regions that have become the front line in what Panetta described Sunday as "the most aggressive operations in the history of the CIA."

The area has become what's known in spy parlance as a wilderness of mirrors, where nothing is what it appears. The CIA recruits people to spy on al-Qaida and militant groups. So does the ISI. Often, they recruit the same people. That means the CIA must constantly consider where a spy's allegiance lies: With the U.S.? With Pakistan? With the enemy?

Pakistan rarely — if at all — has used its double agents to feed the CIA bad information, the former U.S. officials said. Rather, the agents were just gathering intelligence on American operations, seeing how the CIA responded and how information flowed.

Former CIA officials say youth and inexperience among a new generation of American officers may have contributed to the difficulties of operating in the tribal regions, where the U.S. is spending a massive amount of money to cultivate sources.

After the 2001 terrorist attacks, the CIA dispatched many young officers to Pakistan and Afghanistan to recruit al-Qaida spies. Young officers sometimes unwittingly recruited people who had been on Pakistan's payroll for years, all but inviting Pakistan to use their longtime spies as double agents, former CIA officials said.

The Pakistanis "are steeped in that area," Fuller said. "They would be tripping over a lot of the same people."

Many former CIA officials believe a lack of experience among agency officers led to the bombing in Khost, Afghanistan, last year that killed seven CIA employees. The CIA thought it had a source who could provide information about al-Qaida's No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was believed to be hiding in the tribal lands. But the person turned out to be a double agent wired with explosives.

Ironically, the CIA steered the source to Khost because officers were concerned ISI would spot him if they brought him to Islamabad for questioning or possibly even arrest him because he was an undocumented Arab.

But inexperience isn't always the problem.

One example of how the suspicious relationship constrains operations was the CIA's base in the remote town of Miram Shah in North Waziristan. U.S. military and CIA officers worked with the ISI together there, under the protection of the Pakistani army, which kept the base locked down.

The two intelligence agencies sometimes conducted joint operations against al-Qaida but rarely shared information, a former CIA officer said. Haqqani spies were well aware the CIA was working there, and the base frequently took mortar and rocket fire.

Two former CIA officers familiar with the base said the Americans there mainly exercised and "twiddled their thumbs." Just getting out of the base was so difficult, U.S. personnel gave it the nickname "Shawshank" after the prison in the movie "The Shawshank Redemption."

The CIA closed the base last year for safety reasons. None of that tension ever spilled into the public eye. It's the nature of intelligence-gathering.

[Sanjay M]

Oh, look - Taliban Vanara Sena:

http://english.people.com.cn/90001/9077 ... 59578.html

Maybe when ISI started telling jihadis about "gorilla warfare" something got lost in the translation

[NRao]

^^^

That report out of ........................... China!!!

[shyamd]

IOL says, Washington has okayed Kiani permission to select who is on the negotiating table. Main aim of ISI is: Control Southern afghanistan especially districts with border with TSP to prevent annexation and formation of independent paktun state. Quetta shura and Hekmatyar will send their representatives to the table for negotiation with Afghanistan, which has received Washington's support.

So they have to pacify everyone on TSP side of border and other side. They have a big budget and have got themselves shiny helicopters and light armored vehicles.

[ramana]

IOL says, Washington has okayed Kiani permission to select who is on the negotiating table. Main aim of ISI is: Control Southern afghanistan especially districts with border with TSP to prevent annexation and formation of independent paktun state. Quetta shura and Hekmatyar will send their representatives to the table for negotiation with Afghanistan, which has received Washington's support.

So they have to pacify everyone on TSP side of border and other side. They have a big budget and have got themselves shiny helicopters and light armored vehicles.

This is the stabilization of the Durand Line we talked about. If the ISI has such limited aims, aren't they fighting for survival instead of it being portrayed as gaining strategic depth. I think the TSP is on a weak wicket and the PR and dhimmi/Stockholm syndrome attitude of ours is seeing them to be strong.

India sould do whatever to support stable Afghanistan. BTW if I read the situation correctly despite Haqqani/Waqqani, Pashtun self-determination has acquired a force of its own and its matter of time for the Durand Line to be irrelevant. And this will have its own consequences.

[shyamd]

They are creating a specific Af-Pak command under centcom with Petraeus leadership. US politicians/elite on the hill are preparing for future of TSP nukes rather that Afghan future. Check mail.

They certainly are fighting for their survival.

[ramana]

My guess is in a year TSP will have Greek moment if the Western economies falter.

[putnanja]

End of the game - K. Subrahmanyam

Former US ambassador to India, former deputy national security adviser in the Bush administration and now senior fellow at the RAND Corporation, Robert Blackwill has outlined a new strategy for the US to deal with the Afghan Taliban, at minimum cost to American and allied forces. In one sense, it can be interpreted as the inexorable strategic logic that is bound to propel US action, sooner or later. Simply put, the strategy suggests that the US accept a de facto partition of Afghanistan between Pashtun and non-Pashtun areas, concentrate its forces in non-Pashtun areas, and maintain an effective air force including drones and special forces to strike relentlessly at the Taliban leadership in Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.


Blackwill is compelled to advocate this strategy, given Pakistan’s double game in dealing with the Afghan Taliban, corruption and the increasing alienation of the Karzai government, the inefficiency and combat-unworthiness of the Afghan forces being raised, and the tribal divisions in Pashtun Afghanistan. He argues that American and allied casualties are not commensurate with the results achieved, and are not likely to be, despite surges of various magnitudes. So he advocates adopting new policy goals for Afghanistan that, realistically, have a better chance of succeeding. This means accepting a de facto partition enforced by US and NATO air power and special forces, the Afghan army and international partners. The US should retain an active combat role in Afghanistan for years to come and should not accept permanent Taliban control of the south.

...
...
In the context of de facto partition, Blackwill argues, “the sky over Pashtun Afghanistan would be dark with manned and unmanned coalition aircraft — targeting not only terrorists but the new Taliban government in all its dimensions”. He accepts that “Pakistan would likely oppose de facto partition. Managing Islamabad’s reaction would be no easy task — not least because the Pakistan military expects a strategic gain once the US military withdraws from Afghanistan. Indeed, Islamabad might need to be persuaded to concentrate, with the United States, on defeating the Pakistan Taliban and containing the Afghan Taliban to avoid momentum toward a fracturing of the Pakistan state.”


The last sentence is pregnant with dark forebodings for Pakistan. A Taliban-dominated Pashtun Afghanistan and Pakistani Pashtun areas under Pakistani Taliban influence are likely to move towards their long-cherished goal of scrapping the Durand Line and uniting to form the independent Pashtunistan. If that were to happen, Baloch, Sindhi and Balti nationalist assertions cannot be far behind. The Taliban dominated Pashtunistan may conclude a deal with the US to break off with al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations. In that event, Pakistan, instead of gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan will be in danger of losing Pashtun areas of Pakistan. In the alternative theTaliban may continue its links with Al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations. In that case, their anger at being constantly hit by US airpower may turn on the Pakistan army and state with terrorist attacks on Pakistani Punjab being stepped up.
...
...
The Blackwill article is a clear warning to the Pakistan army leadership and its supporters in the government who have deluded themselves and even persuaded a large number of policy makers and analysts in US, India and the West that the Pakistan army has all the aces in this game and the US is desperately dependent on Pakistan for its Afghan strategy.The present US strategy attempts to preserve the unity and integrity of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as it is today. The US is prepared to accept some costs to itself in terms of casualties to secure the best possible result. If the Pakistani army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continue to play games with the US as they think they can and get away with it, then the US will have to secure its national security interests at the cost of Pakistani unity and integrity. That is the message of Blackwill’s article. President Obama has many options between accepting defeat and withdrawal and being compelled to accept unacceptable casualties. The Pakistan army should not repeat the blunders of 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999 through its overconfidence.

[RamaY]

^

We have a proverb in Telugu "Dongalu voollu panchukunnattu (like thieves distributing villages among themselves)".

So RB's strategy is to split a nation that they came to "supposedly" liberate, and share it with the very "Taliban" that they wanted to defeat in order to checkmate "their assistant thief" Pakistan's perfidy.

In the process he affirms the following:
- That USA failed to defeat Taliban in the first place
- That USA failed to counter Pakistani double game
- That USA's campaign of corrupt Karzai is genuine

And they sell this snake-oil with promise of
- Manned and unmanned drone clouds over Talibani-Afghanistan. The question is would it solve the problem. They how/why USA can't do the same over Pakistan while keeping Afghanistan intact?
- That this would pave way for united Pastunistan. Will Pakistan agree to part-away from its portion of Pashtunistan? What will be USA's decision if/when Pakistan fights back in such an eventuality?


The question is -
- In what way this will solve the Af-pak problem for Afghanistan, USA, Pakistan, India, and rest of the world?
- What will USA do if the Taliban pushes northwards, given the USA's overt cowardice?


And the biggest question to KS-ji is
* What are India's options?
* What were his strategies for India in the past 8 years and how far they succeed?
* What are his new recommendations?


[Added Later]

Looks like is KS-ji is resigning to a pre-9/11 scenario with one twist. He suggests a US/India alliance to support the NA II. In the process he assumes that Indo-US strategic interests align in Af-Pak area. In my humble opinion it is akin to expecting the "grandma to be grandpa" and it will lead to "if the grandma were to be grandpa, ..." scenarios.

[abhishek_sharma]

AfPak Behind the Lines: southern Afghanistan

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... fghanistan

[abhischekcc]

I had said this in early 2000's and I am saying it at the end of this decade.

KS has a one-point agenda of encouraging the idea (in front of policy makers and the public) that US interests are in fact India's interests. He projects US interests in such a light so that Indians get convinced that these are in our favour, (without saying that these are US interests).

He did the same in supporting anti missile defense, in the support for US strategy in Afghanistan, etc etc.

As RamaY said:
Looks like is KS-ji is resigning to a pre-9/11 scenario with one twist. He suggests a US/India alliance to support the NA II. In the process he assumes that Indo-US strategic interests align in Af-Pak area. In my humble opinion it is akin to expecting the "grandma to be grandpa" and it will lead to "if the grandma were to be grandpa, ..." scenarios.

US does not have a choice other than support NA-2. MMS and other Amero-philes in the gobarmund spoiled India's relations with Iran for nothing. We forgot that we live in this neighbourhood, while americans are just passing by.

America's options are even more constrained than India's, and I expect that US will finally exit South Asia as a major military player in the coming years. I just hope we do not buy American MRCAs, other wise we will just give a lifeline to a has been power.

[ramana]

Blackwill aka kala vasiyat's original article

A defacto Partition of Afghanistan

We need to discuss the article for there are a few errors of cognizance.

[RajeshA]

Blackwill must have talked to Indians before promoting this idea! He was doing lobby work for India during the IUCNA.

[ramana]

Blackwill aka kala vasiyat's original article

A defacto Partition of Afghanistan

We need to discuss the article for there are a few errors of cognizance.

Poor Kala Vasiyat(KV) has lost his marbles.

For starters he never read or grasped the Afghan history. Modern Afghanistan is a result of Abdr Rehman's efforts to consolidate the state. So there was strong central authority even in recent times let alone Abdali's time.

There is big difference between Afghan Taliban who are working for Pashtun self determination and Pakistani Taliban who are Wahabandised Islamists seeking to establish the Khilafat in TSP.

Next he does not understand Afghan demographics. The Northern Alliance consists of Tajiks and rest who are and will not be jihadised. The reason is the sanctuary for Islamist fundamentalists in Pashtun areas since before the British times that has created an environment for religious fundoos to survive in Pashtun areas. The Tajiks are the most urbanised and de-tribalised societies in Afghanistan. And they dont need US support to retain their hold. In fact US presence is preventing the NA consolidation over the Pashtuns which they should have after their victory over the Taliban in 2001. For in Afghanistan who controls Kabul rules the country. And Kabul is adjacent to NA areas of strength. Hekmatyar and all the TSP men couldn't gain Kabul.

And the Pashtuns settled in pockets rest of country are no fifth columinsts etc but well integrated population who have left the tribal culture. The ANA with Tajik majority is to ensure no Pashtun dominance. Local militias or National Guards can be from de-militarized Pashtuns operating in their area.

The biggest mistake is to understimate the malaise that will kick into US psyche if Afghanistan goes the Vietnam way. It took twenty years to get rid of that effect.

It would be better for KV to stop playing Great Games without the knowledge, commitment, sacrifices and resources. Its not for children no matter what their alma mater is.

I am sorry to say I had high opinion of him before this article, that he was wise man. But he is simply a partisan politician masquerading as a wiseman. To say its the Obama Admin policy that is failing in Afghanistan is a travesty for the policy can be traced to Bush Administration. Besides when it comes to foreign shores there is only US policy and not any administration policy.

A Chinese saying for him to contemplate:

"When small men cast big shadows its time for sunset!"

[svinayak]

It would be better for KV to stop playing great games without the knowledge, commitment, sacrifices and resources. Its not for children no matter what their alma mater is.

Do you say the same thing about Unkil