Afghanistan News & Discussion

[Gus]

Thanks Muppalla for that article. I just wish to highlight this part for future reference.

Milt Bearden, the former CIA officer affiliated with the company, wouldn't speak with me either. There's nothing wrong with Bearden engaging in business in Afghanistan, but disclosure of his business interests might have been expected when testifying on US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After all, NCL stands to make or lose hundreds of millions based on the whims of US policy-makers.

few weeks back, there was a discussion on McChrystal report where Milt Bearden had defended the Paki line that Indian influence is causing Pakis to do what they do in Afg. Milt Bearden was station chief in Isloo during the peak of the original Afg jihad...he must have made a LOT of money back then itself using his Paki connections.

[chanakyaa]

Where is ONGC? HP? Reliance? Essar?

The First Afghan Hydrocarbon Bidding Round

On the basis of further information and documents received, the Ministry of Mines’ decision 28 June 2009 related to Nations Petroleum is amended and Nations Petroleum is qualified to bid for the Jangalikalan, Juma-Bashikurd and Kashkari blocks on offer during this First Afghan Bidding Round. The list of pre-qualified companies is updated as follows:

Addax Petroleum (Swiss, but acquired by Chinese Sinopec)
Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. (OGDCL) (Pakistan)
Orient Petroleum International INC's (OPII) (UAE)
Redwood Petroleum Co. Ltd. (China)
Sinochem Petroleum Exploration & Production Co. Ltd. (China)
TOTAL Exploration & Production (France)
Turkiye Petroleum A.O. Genel Mudurlugo (Turkey)
Nations Petroleum Calgary (Canada)

[Airavat]

Despite his victory, the electoral fraud will haunt President Karzai during his next five-year term in office. In fact, he has emerged bruised and weaker from the election. His Western backers, who not long ago were charmed by his English-speaking ability, his traditional Afghan robes and his relatively clean past compared to the other Afghans in power, are now determined to make him accountable for his actions. From President Barack Obama to Prime Minister Gordon Brown and from UN special representative in Afghanistan Kai Eide to the leaders of all Western nations with troops in the country, the message to President Karzai is loud and clear: rid your government of warlords and drug-runners and clean up corruption if you want our continued support.

It is strange that an Afghan president dependent on NATO forces and Western money for survival is being tasked to do things beyond his power. It is the Western powers which brought back to power the Afghan warlords who had been defeated by the Taliban and discredited due to their corrupt practices and their excesses against the Afghan people.

Out of fear of making more enemies the U.S. and its allies, with 103,000 troops in Afghanistan, are also primarily responsible for the record rise in opium-poppy production and drug-trafficking as well as for their failure to take action against drug barons [most of whom] are part of the Afghan government. But their wrath is directed against Mr. Karzai, who on his own cannot do much to curtail the power of the drug-runners and warlords.

Rahimullah Yusufzai

[ramana]

I really dont understand their strategy of weakening Karzai ulness its to appease the TSP thugs. I see no one else who benefits from weakening Karzai. As I said before Karzai has stitched a coalition of Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras. And given half a chance can bring in stability. To me it looks like a re-run of South Vietnam's Diem who was hounded by US charges of corruption etc and killed by those who got the message.

Also I think the Taliban attacks in Northern Afghanistan -Kunduz etc are due to NATO convoys taking the northern route.

Meanwhile Nightwatch says

Afghanistan: For the record. Aaj News Television in Karachi on 9 November broadcast a video message by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the anti-Afghan government group Hezb-e Islami, in which he asserted that Osama bin Ladin is alive.

In the video, Hekmatyar said Al-Qa'ida's flawed strategy led to the end of the Taliban government. He said he was not in favor of killing 10 Muslims for the sake of killing one person of the enemy. If the United States announced withdrawal from Afghanistan, we would consider giving safe passage to it.

The rest of Hekmatyar’s claims in the video, such having a nationwide network and not receiving any assistance from Pakistan, are false. But liars sometimes tell the truth, just as truthful people sometimes lie. Reported as received.

Hekmatyar is a ruthless pragmatic political killer, always willing to jump to the side he thinks is winning. He was prime minister when the Taliban took power in Kabul, now he fights on their side.

Nevertheless, he says in the video that he is not a Taliban, not al Qaida and not an ally of the Haqqani anti-government forces. Those denials suggest the video is a form of outreach to the Karzai government or the US that he could be persuaded to switch sides. The bait is his purported knowledge about the status of bin Laden.

So he is jocking for label of "good" Taliban and we know he is baad! So TSPA is playing the OBL gambit to get their guy into power in post Karzai scheme.

[Rudradev]

I really dont understand their strategy of weakening Karzai ulness its to appease the TSP thugs. I see no one else who benefits from weakening Karzai. As I said before Karzai has stitched a coalition of Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras. And given half a chance can bring in stability. To me it looks like a re-run of South vietnam's Diem who was hounded by US charges of corruption etc and killed by those who got the message.

Karzai was doomed from the beginning. The Americans demanded that he build a stable house but instead of bricks, mortar and equipment they gave him paper and matchsticks. Now they have kicked down the structure he did his best to build and accuse him of "incompetence".

These days, we're hearing open admissions to the effect that America regards the War on Terror to be centered in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. However, this was *always* the perception... they simply couldn't admit it to the American people too soon after 9/11 or people would have been outraged that the terrorist state of Pakistan was being approached by bribery and placation rather than subjected to the punishment it deserved.

But in today's enlightened, moderate Obama-world, the leftist American media considers its people "mature and pragmatic" enough to tell them the truth... that Pakistan is the key to ending Islamist terrorism against the West, and that the method of influencing Pakistan must be through bribes and payoffs and pandering because any other approach would stretch the precepts of the guidebook America inherited from the Auld British Empyre, stranding Washington in unfamiliar territory that it is completely clueless about. No matter what the cost to Afghanistan, India or any other country... Pakistan will be handled by appeasement and appeasement alone.

Afghanistan was always a sideshow, a proxy theatre. Karzai was a figurehead of convenience whom the Americans expected to follow their instructions to the letter. The more independence he ended up showing, the more he articulated the genuine interests of Afghanistan rather than Washington, the more they sabotaged him. Initially through neglect and now through slander.

Appeasing the thugs in Pakistan is far, far more critical to Washington than any of the rhetoric about building a "strong, stable Afghanistan". After all a weak, chaotic Afghanistan managed by Pakistan was just fine by the Americans for almost a decade following the Soviet retreat. A leader like Karzai who insists on a strong, independent Afghanistan and refuses to appease Pakistan cannot be tolerated.

[V_Raman]

question to guru log here -- can karzai request for IPKF v2 and will india accept the request?

[ramana]

But the force of history is with the Afghanistani people. Afghanistan is the buffer zone for three regions: Persia, Mughal India and Central Asia. It emerged in the time of weakness of two Empires: Safavid and Mughal. The Central Asian Khanates were also being swallowed by Tsarist Russia. If you take the essence of this, it is that there is a core nationalism in the Afghan people and no amount of shenanigans by trans-Indus/Persians or Central Asian people let alone far away powers will subsume this. The Durand Line was a stop gap in this history.

[kshirin]

I really dont understand their strategy of weakening Karzai ulness its to appease the TSP thugs. I see no one else who benefits from weakening Karzai. As I said before Karzai has stitched a coalition of Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras. And given half a chance can bring in stability. To me it looks like a re-run of South Vietnam's Diem who was hounded by US charges of corruption etc and killed by those who got the message.

Also I think the Taliban attacks in Northern Afghanistan -Kunduz etc are due to NATO convoys taking the northern route.

Nevertheless, he says in the video that he is not a Taliban, not al Qaida and not an ally of the Haqqani anti-government forces. Those denials suggest the video is a form of outreach to the Karzai government or the US that he could be persuaded to switch sides. The bait is his purported knowledge about the status of bin Laden.

So he is jocking for label of "good" Taliban and we know he is baad! So TSPA is playing the OBL gambit to get their guy into power in post Karzai scheme.[/quote]

Excellent observation, regarding shift of battleground to north. Regarding weakening Karzai, they want any excuse to reduce their commitment to Afghanistan, and litany of complaints against him are timed to help form opinion for the exit strategy.

[Rudradev]

But the force of history is with the Afghanistani people. Afghanistan is the buffer zone for three regions: Persia, Mughal India and Central Asia. It emerged in the time of weakness of two Empires: Safavid and Mughal. The Central Asian Khanates were also being swallowed by Tsarist Russia. If you take the essence of this, it is that there is a core nationalism in the Afghan people and no amount of shenanigans by trans-Indus/Persians or Central Asian people let alone far away powers will subsume this. The Durand Line was a stop gap in this history.

The Americans would rather have a strong Persia or "Mughal India" (which, thanks to their Anglo-Islamo-philia they see manifested in Pakistan) than a strong Afghanistan.

Developing countries with expansionist designs and inflated opinions of themseves are more easy to turn into client states than pragmatic, stable democracies which care about their people. Their ambitious, autocratic ruling classes... especially if they are military classes... are more willing to become your proxy governors than the modern government of an independent, democratic nation might be to follow your lead.

"Persia" was doing fine until 1979 but is no use to the Americans anymore. They have only the new legates of "Mughal India" to be their local frontman. Yes there is a core nationalism among the Afghan people but inertia stopped the Americans from recognizing and taking advantage of this for sixty years, and utter chaos/absence of national institutions makes it too expensive and unrealistic a prospect for them now. Especially when their "Mughal India" proxies will fight tooth and nail to avoid being displaced in favour of anyone else.

[ramana]

Rudradev, Irish nationalism has its roots in Oliver Cromwell's suppression! He and his ilk quelled it for three centures but in end had to give in. So who knows the long force of history. I think similarly the fracturing of the Mughal and Persian frontiers leading to the Afghan state are also due to force of history.

[Paul]

Independent state of Afghanistan is not in Indian interests.

This state will be landlocked and will use predatory tactics in neighbouring areas thus causing instability. Will also give scope for outsiders to cause trouble here. It does not have resources to run a country on it's own.

Outside of the Shomali plains, is there any other region that produces grain in the country?

It is best if India and Persia as age old neighbours come to an agreement on managing this region.

[svinayak]

But the force of history is with the Afghanistani people. Afghanistan is the buffer zone for three regions: Persia, Mughal India and Central Asia. It emerged in the time of weakness of two Empires: Safavid and Mughal. The Central Asian Khanates were also being swallowed by Tsarist Russia. If you take the essence of this, it is that there is a core nationalism in the Afghan people and no amount of shenanigans by trans-Indus/Persians or Central Asian people let alone far away powers will subsume this. The Durand Line was a stop gap in this history.

What do you think of this. Especially Pakjabis taking control of the Pusthun areas

http://pakhistorian.com/
Current Pakistan Now Step one: Current day Pakistan


Step two: Take control of Pashtun areas


Step 3: Confederation of Afghanistan and Pakistan.


Step 4: Work with the Muslim world


Step 5: Grow the Muslim world

[ramana]

Its a wet dream and goes against Afghan force of history. On the other hand its the Afghan who might actualize the Paki dreams.
They almost did twice in Islamic history: Mahmud Ghazni and his short lived Ghazni sultanate and Nadir Shah and his conquest of Persia. If Pakiban consolidate west of Indus then they can make a grab for Pakjab which is full of cowards. US will take away nukes but they dont need them for they have the book with them and their own Zulfiqar.

[Rudradev]

I am going to go out on a limb and throw out a controversial possibility.

There is a concerted effort by the "left" in America to demand that Obama withdraw from Afghanistan. The propaganda reaches new levels of shrillness every day. The most recent spate of reports have been about the US ambassador in Kabul specifically advising Obama not to send any more troops in response to McChrystal's request unless "Karzai proves he is committed to ending corruption"

Today Obama finds himself besieged. Republicans seem to be showing signs of a comeback following the VA and NJ gubernatorial elections. The economy is still in the doldrums, unemployment still high. And it seems that Obama will have to compromise with the right on healthcare, foregoing the public-option plan that the left wing of the democratic party wants to include.

If Obama compromises on a public option in the healthcare bill, he will have to appease the left wing of his voter base by throwing them something. I am sure that will be withdrawal from Afghanistan, cheered on by Joe Biden, Jim "Kool Aid" Jones and the entire "let Pakistan handle Afghanistan" brigade.

Therefore India is looking at the very likely possibility of Amirkhani withdrawal. Between the two options of (1) Continued American involvement that is centered around appeasement of Pakistan and (2) Amirkhani withdrawal it is obvious that the Amirkhans are absolutely useless to us as a strategic partner. Nothing they do in Afghanistan, can end up doing us any good.

I am going to propose that India hedge its bets by tying up with the SCO and developing a collective, mutually beneficial agreement on the post-WOT dispensation of Afghanistan before that happens.

India is already capable of reaching an understanding with two SCO members, Iran and Russia about the preferred dispensation of a post-WOT Afghanistan. Russia would have its sphere of influence in the North among the Uzbeks and Tajiks, and Iran in the West among the Hazaras. Both would share an interest, along with India, in preventing Wahhabi fundamentalism from using Afghanistan as a political base.

The problem is China and by extension Pakistan.

So I'm going to ask: is it possible to arrive at a consensus with China, Iran and Russia that, even if it isn't optimal, would better secure our interests in Afghanistan than investing as partners in a US strategy which is doomed either way?

China would be hostile to us of course, but with Iran and Russia pressuring them they may be convinced to accommodate our concerns in the greater common interest of preventing India from becoming America's ungli in SCO Asia.

In effect we would have to swallow our pride and make concessions to the Chinese, but we would have substantial leverage (the threat of becoming America's bridgehead in Asia) to try and minimize those concessions. We might have to give up Aksai Chin and Ladakh to the Chinese. In return, we would get guarantees backed up by Russia and Iran as leading SCO nations, that China would cease all military cooperation with Pakistan and all manner of support for the Pakistani position on J&K. China would also commit to refrain from interfering in Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan as long as we fully acknowledged the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and retracted all official recognition to the "Tibetan Government In Exile". China would commit to restricting its naval presence to east of the Straits of Malacca and we would restrict ourselves to its west. Iran and Russia would stand guarantor for any Chinese energy supply routes through the Indian Ocean, in the event of any future India-China dispute.

That sounds terrible, especially the part about giving up Aksai Chin and AP. But is it really more terrible than some hare-brained Manmohan-Musharraf Kashmir Plan of 2007, mandated by Amirkhan, which gives the terrorists of Mirpur and Punch and Neelam Valley full access to J&K state while forcing India to pull out our troops so that the remaining Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs of J&K will have no protection whatsoever from the inevitable holocaust? What will we gain by paying that price... abandonment of AfPak by Amirkhan, and a re-establishment of Paki strategic depth in Afghanistan? Or more billions of dollars in cash to the Pakis so that they can continue to arm themselves against us?

Anyway, if bilateral problems between India and China could be solved under the aegis of the SCO as described above, could we hope for an Afghan solution that involved

1) Russian sponsorship of the Uzbek and Tajik homelands
2) Iranian sponsorship of the western Hazara homelands
3) A guarantee to China that no activity by Uighur separatists will be permitted.
4) Indian sponsorship of the Pakhtun regions, effected via the Zaranj-Delaram highway, Chahbahar port and overflight rights through Iran.

Pakistan, which is now milking every moment of its role as an indispensible Amirkhani asset, would then become Amirkhan's liability. The SCO plus India would join forces to ensure that it was shut out of Afghanistan. The Amirkhans could keep pouring money into the Pakistan hole and find that money sponsoring more Headleys and Padillas and Reids, until the futility of financing Pakistan becomes too obvious even for the Amirkhan junta to ignore.

Finally the TSPA would be abandoned to deal on its own with an endless civil war which limits its utility as a client state for either China or Amirkhan.

I'm not necessarily pushing the above scheme, in fact I'm still in the process of thinking it through and would welcome the collaboration of others. Please let me know what you think.

[Johann]

China would commit to restricting its naval presence to east of the Straits of Malacca and we would restrict ourselves to its west. Iran and Russia would stand guarantor for any Chinese energy supply routes through the Indian Ocean, in the event of any future India-China dispute.

Neither Russia nor Iran have the means to protect Chinese maritime energy/trade flows in the IOR from India or the US. Nor will they have that ability for the forseeable future.

As an alternative the Chinese are interested in overland trade/energy access to the IOR via Iran/Pakistan/Burma/Thailand, but they will probably still want to secure the routes to those ports from Sudan or Suez.

[ramana]

Rudradev, Another window on US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan is thru religious angle. Consider that the move into region was from the neo-cons and the additional troops would be to preerve the bridgehead for future counter EJ from there. BO's angst could be if he should go with that plan to take back the Asian Church lands when the home is bankrupt . Corruption charges etc are nice but not at the core of the issue.


Recall the first comments of the 'modern' David Lloyd George on Gen. Allenby taking Jerusalem.

[brihaspati]

The TSP civilian state will be forced to virtually withdraw from Pakjab and move south within the next 2-5 years. The pro-Jihad portion of the TSPA and ISI will merge with the Talebs to form a virtual independent gov for the Pakjab+POK+Southern AFG. Their stability will come from their claimed control over the nukes which they can cleverly use as a bargaining tool for existence. Don't be surprised if USA actually is forced to accept this arrangement so that PRC cannot increase its handle. Ultimately this entity will be out of control of both the USA and PRC, and they will try to tackle this by pushing the entity on to India.

[V_Raman]

maybe thats why missile defence tech is being so freely shared with india to build our own. i guess we will be forced to fight for our lands eventually and becomd truly industan again...

[Rupesh]

In effect we would have to swallow our pride and make concessions to the Chinese, but we would have substantial leverage (the threat of becoming America's bridgehead in Asia) to try and minimize those concessions. We might have to give up Aksai Chin and Ladakh to the Chinese. In return, we would get guarantees backed up by Russia and Iran as leading SCO nations, that China would cease all military cooperation with Pakistan and all manner of support for the Pakistani position on J&K. China would also commit to refrain from interfering in Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan as long as we fully acknowledged the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and retracted all official recognition to the "Tibetan Government In Exile". China would commit to restricting its naval presence to east of the Straits of Malacca and we would restrict ourselves to its west

What is India?.. are we only the people of the plains..do you mean to say the people of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh do not matter and they can be bartered away. Next some one may say UP and Bihar is pulling the rest of India down by the poor governance in those states, Tribal India can as well be handed over to Naxals for city dwellers to live in peace with the agreement that they stay happy in the forests.
long term peace can never be attained by weakness or bending in front of thugs.

[KLNMurthy]

...


In effect we would have to swallow our pride and make concessions to the Chinese, but we would have substantial leverage (the threat of becoming America's bridgehead in Asia) to try and minimize those concessions. We might have to give up Aksai Chin and Ladakh to the Chinese.

...

Just one problem...

With respect to India, both TSP and China will behave as rogue states that would never abide by any agreement that gives anything to India. There isn't enough leverage to make it happen.

Rather than throw Arunachalis and Ladakhis to the wolves (what an idea!) we could change the game by showing our rogue elephant side--just scare the s*it out of everyone by testing a few thermonukes, kicking up the anti-missile prog up a notch, starting an ICBM program, and start building deep-down bunkers under every city, prep for a nuke holocaust (which we should be doing anyway).

[Rudradev]

What is India?.. are we only the people of the plains..do you mean to say the people of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh do not matter and they can be bartered away. Next some one may say UP and Bihar is pulling the rest of India down by the poor governance in those states, Tribal India can as well be handed over to Naxals for city dwellers to live in peace with the agreement that they stay happy in the forests.
long term peace can never be attained by weakness or bending in front of thugs.

I'm not recommending that we *should* do that, I'm only speculating if that would necessarily be the price of hedging our bets w.r.t Afghanistan by engaging with the SCO rather than Unkil. If it is, I too believe it would be too high a price to pay. But what leverage could we bring to the SCO in lieu of this? Is it even possible? That's what I want to begin a discussion about.

[Rudradev]

... we could change the game by showing our rogue elephant side--just scare the s*it out of everyone by testing a few thermonukes, kicking up the anti-missile prog up a notch, starting an ICBM program, and start building deep-down bunkers under every city, prep for a nuke holocaust (which we should be doing anyway).

Interesting, but what specific message would we be trying to send by these actions, and aimed at whom? Also, how to make sure that only the right people get the right message, and how would we translate that into leverage given the emerging scenario of a US pullout from AfPak?

[Philip]

A new effort to rope in the "god" Talinb to placate Pak and open an oil pipeline route from the Caspian Sea.

UK pressing Karzai to negotiate with Taliban, says leaked memoForeign Office and MI6 are backing efforts to remove 'reconciled Talibs' from UN sanctions list
Richard Norton-Taylor
guardian.co.uk, Friday 13 November 2009 18.02 GMT

Taliban fighters detain a man for campaigning in the Afghan elections. British envoys want Karzai to reach a settlement with militant leaders. Photograph: Reuters

British officials are increasing pressure on the Afghan government to talk to Taliban leaders as part of a major attempt at reconciliation, it emerged today.

The move is strongly backed by the Foreign Office – notably Sherard Cowper-Coles, the government's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan – by MI6, and by Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, former head of the SAS and Britain's senior military officer in Kabul, the Guardian understands.

Lamb was deployed to Afghanistan with the task of persuading insurgents to give up their arms. He believes many young and rank-and-file Taliban fighters carry a sense of "anger and grievances that have not been addressed".

British officials are now proposing that "reconciled Talibs" should be removed from the UN sanctions list, according to a leaked FO memo. "We must weaken and divide the Taliban if we are to reduce the insurgency to a level that can be managed and contained by the Afghan security forces," it says. "This can be achieved by a combination of military pressure and clear signals that the option of an honourable exit from the fight exists," it adds.

The memo, which is believed to have been sent to the Afghan government, goes further than past proposals by suggesting what it calls a "strategic initiative" – a settlement with Taliban leaders directing the counter-insurgency from across the border in Pakistan.

The memo calls for an Afghan-led, internationally backed process that works on three levels – firstly "tactical", involving reintegrating foot soldiers and their immediate commanders; secondly, "operational", involving the reintegration of the Taliban's "shadow governors", senior commanders and their forces; and thirdly: "strategic".

Cowper-Coles and British military chiefs have also called for political power devolved back to tribal elders. Unlike the FO, however, military commanders say that aid should be channelled through local and district governors rather than through the Karzai government in Kabul.

Gordon Brown said today he believed he could secure commitment for 5,000 extra troops for Afghanistan from Nato and other allies.

In an interview on BBC Radio 4's Today programme, the prime minister dismissed reports that he was planning to "talk to the Taliban", although he raised the prospect of "mercenaries" fighting for the Taliban being reintegrated into Afghan society.

[Atri]

... we could change the game by showing our rogue elephant side--just scare the s*it out of everyone by testing a few thermonukes, kicking up the anti-missile prog up a notch, starting an ICBM program, and start building deep-down bunkers under every city, prep for a nuke holocaust (which we should be doing anyway).

Interesting, but what specific message would we be trying to send by these actions, and aimed at whom? Also, how to make sure that only the right people get the right message, and how would we translate that into leverage given the emerging scenario of a US pullout from AfPak?

I think the current drive to build metro railways in all the major metropolitan cities is somewhere linked with increasing threat of nuke war in 2020's. I guess, this should be hastened. However, it is not very potent as most of the metro tracks in major cities are not underground but over-bridged.

The nuke bunkers should be built under guise of something else, civilian drills can be conducted on the notice of 5-6 months once the shelters are built, anti-BM project should continue along with building up of naval prowess. Testing some new designs will be enough to show the rogue side of the elephant. That is intricately linked with US pull-out. I guess Bhaarat will show the rogue elephant side when US decides to pull out permanently.. They of course will not do it in one go, they will show Salami tactics - slice by slice.. What is the threshold before India can display the rogue-side of the elephant by testing some more designs?

[Jarita]

We should be looking to get back our territory and not cede an inch. Nations who think of giving up territory keep losing more. People from ladhak and AP are our people
What has happened to Rudradev? I see him introducing this idea sneakily across all boards. The option you are proposing is not an option at all. Its gallingly adharmic. Better to die than to give in to bullys and looters

[A_Gupta]

New Video of Wanat Attack from Taliban Perspective
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/11/new-video-of-wanat-attack-from/

[a_kumar]

China would be hostile to us of course, but with Iran and Russia pressuring them they may be convinced to accommodate our concerns in the greater common interest of preventing India from becoming America's ungli in SCO Asia.

First of all, I understand it is a trial ballon. Pardon the outburst, but this is as outrageous as it gets...

Are we back to the times where we ask others to fight our wars.

While at that, maybe India should ask the USSR to help us in the China issue.. I mean USSR stood by India in several incidents?
- Sorry there is no USSR anymore, just like there are no permanent friends.
And ofcourse we can depend on the US govt for support since they want to build India against China.
- Ooopss.. sorry, US is busy kissing Chinese a$$.
We can ask Iran to support us
- Sorry Iran is pissed off that India voted against it.

Do you think once US-Iran relations improve, Iran will even care about India? Persians are the perfect partners for Americans if they get along well, so even US will probably not care so much for India. US would have gotten all it needs to keep the region (including Pakistan) in check. So, good luck finding God Fathers.

In effect we would have to swallow our pride and make concessions to the Chinese, but we would have substantial leverage (the threat of becoming America's bridgehead in Asia) to try and minimize those concessions. We might have to give up Aksai Chin and Ladakh to the Chinese. In return, we would get guarantees backed up by Russia and Iran as leading SCO nations, that China would cease all military cooperation with Pakistan and all manner of support for the Pakistani position on J&K. China would also commit to refrain from interfering in Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan as long as we fully acknowledged the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and retracted all official recognition to the "Tibetan Government In Exile". China would commit to restricting its naval presence to east of the Straits of Malacca and we would restrict ourselves to its west.

India recognized that Tibet was part of China more than half a century back... show me what India got in return.

Lets say China agrees to it to all your conditions. Do you want to bet your life they will keep their end of the bargain. If they don't, do you think Russia and Iran will go to war with them?

Nobody wins friends or peace by giving up their territory. period. If after loosing so much territory throughout history, if we still haven't learnt that, then we deserve what we got.

That sounds terrible, especially the part about giving up Aksai Chin and AP. But is it really more terrible than some hare-brained Manmohan-Musharraf Kashmir Plan of 2007, mandated by Amirkhan, which gives the terrorists of Mirpur and Punch and Neelam Valley full access to J&K state while forcing India to pull out our troops so that the remaining Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs of J&K will have no protection whatsoever from the inevitable holocaust?

So you are saying, we have to pick between the two. That plays right into their hands. Create 3 or 4 issues instead of 1. That way , they will be forced to yeild on atleast one issue. They might even send you a thank you note.

I understand grand bargains and all that cr@p, but whatever you give in those bargains are either not your own or are not important to you.

Finally the TSPA would be abandoned to deal on its own with an endless civil war which limits its utility as a client state for either China or Amirkhan.

It is preposterous to think that "Indian territorial sacrifices" are a requirement for Pakistan to wallow in its creation. You harp on Uncle leaving Af-Pak, but this idea makes Uncle choices look in better light. Uncle is only considering leaving territory that is not their own.

Its pointless, but curious to find if there is basis for this mode of thinking. Did I miss something in recent past, Did India "relinquish territory" to make Pakistan push itself into the current mess?

I'm not necessarily pushing the above scheme, in fact I'm still in the process of thinking it through and would welcome the collaboration of others. Please let me know what you think.

I have respect for your perspectives in the various threads. Sadly, that is not the case here.

Honest request : Maybe you can look at how India can earn bargaining chips first so we can barter them later for peace.

[Rudradev]

We should be looking to get back our territory and not cede an inch. Nations who think of giving up territory keep losing more. People from ladhak and AP are our people
What has happened to Rudradev? I see him introducing this idea sneakily across all boards. The option you are proposing is not an option at all. Its gallingly adharmic. Better to die than to give in to bullys and looters

Please look at the other boards again, you'll find that I was not the one who introduced this idea on any other board. One line of my post was cross-posted in the "Deterrence" thread out of context, by another poster trying to misrepresent my views because that is the only form of argument his limited intellect can come up with.

I have introduced the idea, only in the Afghan thread as part of a scenario specifically relevant to Afghanistan.

Please do not lecture me on the people of AP and Ladakh. People from POK and the Northern Areas are our people too. People from Tibet, are also our people by civilizational right as far as I'm concerned. But they all reside in territories that our enemies control right now.

For many reasons it is obvious that we cannot help them, or liberate their homelands right now. That does not mean I want to give up forever on the possibility of liberating them... do you?

However, I do recognize that liberating them is impossible in the short term. The present status quo is a stalemate in which we have become stuck, and which does not bring us any closer to the point where we could possibly liberate them or even protect ourselves from further threats to our security. So, other options must be explored no matter how distasteful they may seem. Proscribing entire lines of thought and clinging to dogmatic notions has only brought us to this point of stalemate, and will not get us out.

Right now we claim Aksai Chin, Gilgit, Mirpur, Punch and everything else that the Pakis and Chinese have illegally occupied... but we have no way of getting it back. The Chinese are surely not going to give back Aksai Chin unless they could gain something more out of the bargain, and of course we do not have the capacity to take it from them by force right now.

Our approach so far has been to try and confront the Chinese, so we have tried to cultivate a strategic partnership with the Americans instead. But it looks obvious that this approach, too, is failing. The Americans seem to want to pull out of Afghanistan and restore the "strategic depth" of 1996 to Pakistan. They are very keen to placate and appease China because of their economic troubles. And they want us to enter into talks with Pakistan based on the ridiculous "Manmohan-Musharraf" plan of 2007 whereby we would dissolve the LOC and allow Pakistani terrorists free access to Kashmir. Worse still, Manmohan Singh actually seems willing to put this plan into effect at a politically opportune moment.

If we cooperate with the Americans to the extent demanded, isn't that a total betrayal of the Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists of Kashmir who rely on India for protection? Are those not "our people" also? The Americans do not respect our claim even on territories disputed with Pakistan... would they respect our claim on territories disputed with China?

The fact is, America's plan for our region will not serve our interests at all. If America pulls out of Afghanistan and we are left executing the Manmohan-Musharraf plan in Kashmir, we will find ourselves in serious trouble. Jihadis from Pakistan-controlled Afghanistan will be pumped into the newly "demilitarized" Kashmir and then spread out easily into the rest of India. Afghanistan will provide Pakistan with an endless supply of armed mujahedin for this purpose. It seems that continuing to rely on a strategic partnership with the Americans to secure our regional interests is a sure recipe for disaster.

So what is the alternative? We can, and will fight tooth and nail on our own to defend our borders and preserve our internal security. But what if the newly energized Pakistan (with its Afghan strategic depth restored), gets together with China to fight a two-front war? The Future Strategic Scenario thread has considered this prospect many times.

At this point we cannot afford to ignore any possible course of action simply because we are dogmatically averse to it. Of course our ultimate objective is to get back everything that was taken away from us. But given the situation right now, with US disengaging from Afghanistan and pandering to China, we must think of how to secure what we still have.

If there is some way to divide our two most pressing enemies, China and Pakistan (of which the latter may end up having Afghanistan as a satellite state), then it must be explored. So far I can only see the SCO as a possible avenue for accomplishing this. Therefore the question must be asked: what would it take to evolve a relationship with the SCO whereby China compromised its hostility to us, whereby such a compromise was guaranteed by the good offices of Russia and Iran? Then we could shut out Pakistan from Afghanistan, alienate Pakistan from China, and take care of the Pakistan problem first. Then the China problem could be handled at a later stage.

That is the aim. To achieve that aim we must consider what the possible costs might be. The costs can be rejected if found too high, but blindly proscribing a line of thought does not help us in any way.

Otherwise we are just sitting on this forum talking about what is dharmic and what is adharmic, insisting that PoK and CoK are our territory while not being able to do a damn thing about getting them back, and in fact facing a very real danger of losing more than that.

[Rudradev]

China would be hostile to us of course, but with Iran and Russia pressuring them they may be convinced to accommodate our concerns in the greater common interest of preventing India from becoming America's ungli in SCO Asia.

First of all, I understand it is a trial ballon. Pardon the outburst, but this is as outrageous as it gets...

Are we back to the times where we ask others to fight our wars.

While at that, maybe India should ask the USSR to help us in the China issue.. I mean USSR stood by India in several incidents?
- Sorry there is no USSR anymore, just like there are no permanent friends.
And ofcourse we can depend on the US govt for support since they want to build India against China.
- Ooopss.. sorry, US is busy kissing Chinese a$$.
We can ask Iran to support us
- Sorry Iran is pissed off that India voted against it.

Do you think once US-Iran relations improve, Iran will even care about India? Persians are the perfect partners for Americans if they get along well, so even US will probably not care so much for India. US would have gotten all it needs to keep the region (including Pakistan) in check. So, good luck finding God Fathers.

I think you have it backwards.

It is our *present* predicament that has emerged from a desire to find a Godfather... namely, Unkil... and put all our eggs in that basket. After 9-11 we were so eager to enter that strategic embrace that we bought all that nonsense about Washington "helping us to become a superpower", hook line and sinker.

"Finding someone to fight our wars" is not what I am proposing at all... it is cause of our problems today, and cannot be a solution. I am proposing the opposite... engaging more deeply with the SCO and balancing that relationship against what we have with Unkil, so that we are not left with the short end of the stick if Unkil decides to take his bat-ball and go home.

In effect we would have to swallow our pride and make concessions to the Chinese, but we would have substantial leverage (the threat of becoming America's bridgehead in Asia) to try and minimize those concessions. We might have to give up Aksai Chin and Ladakh to the Chinese. In return, we would get guarantees backed up by Russia and Iran as leading SCO nations, that China would cease all military cooperation with Pakistan and all manner of support for the Pakistani position on J&K. China would also commit to refrain from interfering in Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan as long as we fully acknowledged the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and retracted all official recognition to the "Tibetan Government In Exile". China would commit to restricting its naval presence to east of the Straits of Malacca and we would restrict ourselves to its west.

India recognized that Tibet was part of China more than half a century back... show me what India got in return.

Lets say China agrees to it to all your conditions. Do you want to bet your life they will keep their end of the bargain. If they don't, do you think Russia and Iran will go to war with them?

Nobody wins friends or peace by giving up their territory. period. If after loosing so much territory throughout history, if we still haven't learnt that, then we deserve what we got.

I do agree that giving up any more of our territory would be too high a price for an accommodation with the SCO. I have said that before on this very thread... even if my original, speculative post did not make my personal position clear.

But my personal position hardly matters. Instead of spending your effort on venting outrage at a proposition which I haven't even made, why don't you consider what we could actually offer the SCO in lieu of territorial compromises to China, so as to gain the amount of leverage we want?

That sounds terrible, especially the part about giving up Aksai Chin and AP. But is it really more terrible than some hare-brained Manmohan-Musharraf Kashmir Plan of 2007, mandated by Amirkhan, which gives the terrorists of Mirpur and Punch and Neelam Valley full access to J&K state while forcing India to pull out our troops so that the remaining Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs of J&K will have no protection whatsoever from the inevitable holocaust?

So you are saying, we have to pick between the two. That plays right into their hands. Create 3 or 4 issues instead of 1. That way , they will be forced to yeild on atleast one issue. They might even send you a thank you note.

I understand grand bargains and all that cr@p, but whatever you give in those bargains are either not your own or are not important to you.

Now we're getting somewhere! So what other issues could we create, and how would we go about it?

See, I'm just trying to spark discussions on these sort of things. Otherwise all the Afghanistan threads end up going in circles... "oh my god, America is talking to the "good Taliban", the Islamists will win, India will lose, we are so helpless".

Finally the TSPA would be abandoned to deal on its own with an endless civil war which limits its utility as a client state for either China or Amirkhan.

It is preposterous to think that "Indian territorial sacrifices" are a requirement for Pakistan to wallow in its creation. You harp on Uncle leaving Af-Pak, but this idea makes Uncle choices look in better light. Uncle is only considering leaving territory that is not their own.

Its pointless, but curious to find if there is basis for this mode of thinking. Did I miss something in recent past, Did India "relinquish territory" to make Pakistan push itself into the current mess?

I agree, it is preposterous. So what are we bringing to the table instead? Or what issues can we "create" instead (as you have proposed), which we can then offer to back down on so as to gain the leverage we want?

I'm not necessarily pushing the above scheme, in fact I'm still in the process of thinking it through and would welcome the collaboration of others. Please let me know what you think.

I have respect for your perspectives in the various threads. Sadly, that is not the case here.

Honest request : Maybe you can look at how India can earn bargaining chips first so we can barter them later for peace.

[/quote]

My perspectives are going to be respected by some and resented by others, and if I were going to take it personally I wouldn't be posting here. Still, I am going to keep offering what I can think of, not because I have all the answers, but because I think more questions need to be asked than the few being explored (circularly) at present.

As to your honest request, I will look at that, but why put the onus entirely on me? You look at it too, and post your thoughts on here. I hope others will too. Then maybe we can discover some ways out of the helpless rut in which our Afghan policy currently resides.

[Johann]

Rudradev,

The issue that makes the post-Mao CPC think of any country as a dangerous threat is any connection to domestic unrest against the Party and/or separatism.

In particular they're sensitive about the three Ts - Taiwan, Tibet and East Turkestan.

In the case of the US and Japan (Taiwan), and eventually India (Tibet), the freedom to act from that hostility is offset by economic interdependency.

Pakistan, more than any other country in the world is the source of danger in East Turkestan. Pakistan's promotion of jihad in Afghanistan ever since the late 1970s has unintentionally continued to stir the Uighur pot. The PA has always attempted to keep that element in check in order to maintain Chinese support.

Pakistan's economic relevance to China is weak - the potentially very valuable plans for a Gwadar-Urumqi link are threatened by Pakistan's own internal instability, which with the fragmentation of PA consensus under pressure is spilling out in to China, and against Chinese interests in Pakistan.

Ultimately, China's relationship with Pakistan is likely to be transformed in the way that the US-Pakistani relationship was transformed - from mutual trust and cooperation against common external threats, to mutual distrust and financially extortive but reluctant Pakistani cooperation against Pakistani-bred threats.

If you want the China-Pakistan link to completely break, the PA's cohesion and control within Pakistan has to break, and *stay* broken.

Any open, formal union of the openly hostile Pakjabi Taliban and the PA to end the PA's internal conflict and allows the regime to reconsolidate power will be ideologically anti-Western. It will not necessarily be anti-Chinese, and may well be able to return to the earlier working relationship when Mullah Omar sent greetings and congratulations on Radio Sharia to the CPC on the anniversary of the establishment of the PRC.

[Muppalla]

Afghanistan: British troops in Helmand kill 80 Taliban in 10 days of fighting

British troops in Helmand have killed up to 80 insurgents in 10 days of bloody fighting, The Sunday Telegraph can disclose.

The battles occurred in two separate areas of Nad e'Ali in central Helmand, where the 1st battalion the Grenadier Guards Battle Group are based.

More than 60 insurgents are thought to have been killed close to Patrol Base Waheed after the Taliban launched a series of "Kamikaze-style" attacks against British troops.

In the southern area of the district, which is also controlled by the Grenadier Guards, soldiers from the battalion's reconnaissance platoon killed an estimated 16 fighters in a carefully planned ambush last Saturday, although it is difficult for the British Army to be precise about enemy casualties.

The attacks follow the deaths of five members of the battle group who were shot dead by a rogue Afghan policeman 12 days ago. Although the Taliban claimed that the policeman was an insurgent agent, there is a growing belief among British commanders that he was probably acting alone.

The first battle began last week when soldiers from the Grenadier Guard's No2 Company, commanded by Major Richard Green, ambushed Taliban fighters, who had been launching a series of "shoot and scoot" attacks against the British base.

Troops lured the Taliban towards their positions. Lying in wait were two teams of snipers, who immediately shot dead four Taliban gunmen as they approached the scene. A further four insurgents were killed as they attempted to attack the British base.

The following day another battle erupted when British troops patrolling in the area were attacked. As the troops withdrew to their base, around 20 Taliban mounted a daring attack but virtually all were killed or injured in the assault.

The Taliban continued to attack the base every day for most of last week but each assault was repelled, with the Taliban suffering heavy casualties.

In one incident, several Taliban fighters were killed in a Javelin missile strike, while the insurgent leaders were holding an attack Shura (meeting) prior to an assault.

It is understood that citations for gallantry awards for several members of the Grenadier Guards who fought in the battles have been submitted.

Lieutenant Colonel Roly Walker, the commanding officer of the Grenadier Guards Battle Group, said that his men were acting responsibly and had little choice but to open fire given the Taliban were attempting to overrun the base.

He said: "The Taliban have achieved nothing except send many of their number to their deaths. It is an absolute waste and it has happened night after night. I would dearly love to sit down and talk to these people and ask them what they think they are doing. It is serving no useful purpose at all but we must protect ourselves."

In the south of the battle group's area, soldiers from the reconnaissance platoon ambushed a large insurgent force who were attempting to infiltrate into the village of Shesh Kalay.

The battle was initiated just after dawn on Saturday November 7th by two snipers who killed four heavily armed Taliban fighters as they moved towards the village. The fighting continued for most of the days and into the early evening before the Taliban retreated.

Captain James Young, 30, the reconnaissance platoon commander, said that the battle, which lasted 13 hours, had dealt a major blow to the Taliban force operating in the area.

He said; "It was a very surgical operation. We set the trap and the Taliban walked into it. The battle went very well from our point of view. There was not a single point when we were being controlled by the Taliban.

"This was a classic operation. We moved in, 'recced' the area, studied the approaches and waited. We had the Afghan National Army and Afghan Police embedded with us and they were fantastic.

"They are our eyes and ears. They see the things we miss and they know when the atmospherics are right. The Taliban were trying to impose their influence upon the local elders and our job is to stop them. We are here to allow the villagers to live in peace and get on with their lives. The locals don't want the Taliban here. Many of them are from Pakistan and are loathed by the people in Nad e'Ali."

[Malayappan]

This has not been posted so far!

Again since it is from Pioneer, posting in full. A brilliant, well articulated piece from MJ.

http://www.dailypioneer.com/215733/Dema ... Kabul.html

Demanding unicorns in Kabul

MJ Akbar

At 11 am on 11.11 a cannon boomed in London. For the uninitiated it was a puzzle edged with apprehension. For the British the moment was 91 years old. It marked the end of the bloodiest — till then — conflict in history. The last soldier died only seconds before truce as officers continued to waste ‘inferior’ lives till the last gasp. War can become an addiction.

Enemies change; war never seems to end. The British this week mourned past and present, as coffins arrived from the opium fields of Afghanistan. This Afghan war had nothing to do with the British Raj. Empire had dribbled away after 1945, for the Second World War exhausted victor as surely as it obliterated the vanquished. But the victors barely paused before investing blood and treasure on a Cold War which also ended on November 9, two decades ago, when a popular uprising brought down the hated Berlin Wall.

The Afghan war of 2001 has been a war in search of an enemy. It began as a legitimate hunt for Osama bin Laden. When the combined skills of the Pentagon, the CIA and satellite science failed to find a six-foot-plus terrorist with a two-foot beard, the focus moved a few degrees. The Taliban, who had spread into nationalist space by challenging the foreign military presence, became the new reason for the military occupation of a rugged nation. Since the Taliban has refused to keel over, a supplementary logic is being disseminated in a bid to shore up ebbing public support: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (estimated at between 80 to 100 bombs) must be protected from capture by ‘Islamists’. The proposition begs an obvious question: Can a state which cannot protect its nuclear weapons be trusted to keep them?

The fog of war is being compounded by a mist of confusion over its rationale and finale. The Guardian warns, in a page-wide headline, that it could degenerate into a fiasco of Suez 1956 proportions. US President Barack Obama seems keener on an exit strategy than an arrival plan. He dithers about whether to send 36,000 more troops or 40,000, as if 4,000 will convert potential humiliation into a historic victory. The US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Gen Karl Eikenberry, cables the State Department that he wants no extra troops until Mr Hamid Karzai has ended corruption. The officer-diplomat has a powerful friend in Washington, for his secret missive is leaked to the Washington Post. We soon know who the friend is, for a jet-lagged Hillary Clinton echoes this view during an ASEAN summit in Singapore.

If America is waiting for corruption to end, these troops will arrive in 2109 or Judgement Day, whichever comes first.

I have no idea whether Mr Obama and Ms Clinton have managed to instil some fresh fighting spirit into the Afghan armed forces, but they have certainly aroused the warrior in Mr Hamid Karzai, who seems to have launched a vigorous offensive against Washington. Mr Karzai publicly accused Britain of ferrying Taliban elements by helicopter from their base in the south to the northern provinces of Baghlan, Kunduz and Samangan, attributing this knowledge to his intelligence agencies. The fecund tribe of conspiracy theorists in Kabul, and elsewhere, eagerly linked this to the good-Taliban-bad-Taliban manoeuvre floated by no less a personage than Mr Obama, near the start of his presidency. Mr Obama refuses to fight a war which Mr George W Bush knew how to begin but no one knows how to end.

The perfect end from the Pakistani perspective is the replacement of Mr Karzai by a non-Mullah Omar Taliban, which could declare peace through a bearded mutter and let America leave Kabul at a stately pace rather than via the rooftop helicopters of Saigon. In the absence of any other proposal, this must seem to have some merit. The ‘good Taliban’ would send Afghan women back centuries and the country into puritan coma, but they would be allies of Islamabad and, by implication, its mentors in Washington and London. At least, that would be the theory. Of course Islamabad might have sounded more persuasive if a domestic Taliban had not been detonating its backyard.

Let us leave the last word to a warlord who has never been disturbed by sentiment. I have met the Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostum once, in Mazar-e-Sharif; his views are always forthright even if they are not necessarily right. But he had valid points to make in an interview with Dean Nelson and Ben Farmer of the Daily Telegraph (published on November 13 ):


* Not one Afghan officer of the rank of Captain or Major has been killed in battle in six years, since Afghans do not consider this their war;


* Western leaders are mistaken if they believe that Taliban soldiers will defect, or betray Osama;


* Western aid has not touched poverty, but only killed local initiative and enriched the political elite;


* Taliban can only be defeated by a pragmatic military strategy that avoids categories like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and involves local communities.


Dostum dismissed the anti-corruption sanctimoniousness in a classic sentence: “They are demanding unicorns in Kabul.” Touché.

[Muppalla]

... we could change the game by showing our rogue elephant side--just scare the s*it out of everyone by testing a few thermonukes, kicking up the anti-missile prog up a notch, starting an ICBM program, and start building deep-down bunkers under every city, prep for a nuke holocaust (which we should be doing anyway).

Interesting, but what specific message would we be trying to send by these actions, and aimed at whom? Also, how to make sure that only the right people get the right message, and how would we translate that into leverage given the emerging scenario of a US pullout from AfPak?

There is a solution without giving an inch of land if India really plays chanikian. May be India is already doing it. Here are steps that needs to be done:
1) India tells firmly to Uncle that you exit from AFPak then we are going full blown Nuke country with allround tests of Air/space and land and we are going to mark an Island either in Lakdeep or Andaman to show to the world of poweress. We will then followup with a bunch of anti-balastic ones along with Agni-4. However, we needs to clearly tell that this nothing against west but to take care of China. (May be this is being the dialog with US at this time. Read the MMS comment about asking west to stayput in AfPak)
2) If Amrikhan exits and we test again then declare a stockpile of 1243 Nukes (50Kil tons) and 75 ( TNs of 1MT) and 7453 Tacticals. Sign the CTBT a la France.
3) Anyone venturing against India's Territorial integrity will be attacked with Nukes and we are out of no-First use crap.(May be this is what Army Cheif Deepak Kapoor was aluding to)


CTBT, Indo-US Nuke deal may be a hedge afterall to keep Amrikhan focussed in AfPak. The cost of not Testing and signing CTBT is making the area Nuke nood and destroying TSP forever with a clearly demarcated Pasthunistan. In addition India can offer itself as a hedge to China's super power ambitions. No land from the divided TSP will be allowed to be transferred to China.

In the short run, whoever is doing this looks like a selloff to US and west but if clearly played India gets a foothold to Central Asia without losing an inch. We may be in the game of hedges.

[Airavat]

We have no long-term stake in Afghanistan

"We're not interested in staying in Afghanistan. We have no long-term stake there. We want that to be made very clear," Hilary Clinton told ABC news. "We agree that our goal here is to defeat Al-Qaeda. That has been a clear goal and a mission from the president ever since he made his commitment of additional troops back in the spring."

Clinton provided a reminder that Obama was taking a very different approach than his predecessor, former president George W. Bush, whose administration pledged to spread democracy in troubled regions of the world.

"This is not the prior days when people would come on your show and talk about how we were going to help the Afghans build a modern democracy and build a more functioning state and do all these wonderful things," she said. "That could happen, but our primary focus is on the security of the United States of America. How do we protect and defend against future attacks? We do not want to see Afghanistan return to being a safe haven and a staging platform for terrorism as it was before. That is what is driving the president to make the best decision he can make."

Differences have also emerged between key US figures on how to proceed with US ambassador to Kabul Karl Eikenberry expressing serious doubts about sending more troops before Karzai's government gets to grips with the corruption. The ambassador's position apparently put him at odds with Afghan war commander General Stanley McChrystal, who wants more than 40,000 extra US troops and has warned that without them the mission is likely to fail.

[KLNMurthy]

... we could change the game by showing our rogue elephant side--just scare the s*it out of everyone by testing a few thermonukes, kicking up the anti-missile prog up a notch, starting an ICBM program, and start building deep-down bunkers under every city, prep for a nuke holocaust (which we should be doing anyway).

Interesting, but what specific message would we be trying to send by these actions, and aimed at whom? Also, how to make sure that only the right people get the right message, and how would we translate that into leverage given the emerging scenario of a US pullout from AfPak?

[I do appreciate the astuteness of your analysis Rudradev and the spirit in which you posed the challenge; likewise I assume you expected nothing less than a strong response on this forum?]

Primarily I should think it should be a message of unflinching and brutal resolve to defend what is ours at all costs. Right now, none of the parties concerned have any real belief that India will fight to the finish if there is to be a final reckoning. Lacking this assurance on India's part, we find Pakistan arbitrarily pushing boundaries with India, China probing in various ways, and America concluding that it is not worth its while to have India as a partner that will defend itself, let alone its partner, therefore its best bet is to keep appeasing Pakistan at the expense of India. China / Pak will never respect any treaty they make with India, because they don't have any assurance that the cost of breaking the treaty will be made unacceptable to them.

Making a gesture that is the equivalent of the fearsome trumpeting of an enraged bull elephant would have the effect of focusing the minds of these various powers on what it is they are dealing with in India. On the contrary, without this kind of clear message, we keep running the risk that no one really knows where India's red line is, or to what lengths India is prepared to go; hence there is a likelihood that they will miscalculate, and we'll actually end up with a global nuclear holocaust.

I am not seriously advocating becoming an actual rogue state like Iran or NKorea--rather, following a powerful gesture, we can continue with normal diplomatic engagement and process (there will be the usual enraged and frustrated noises but US today is far weaker than it is 1998, and we should make it our job to send the message that we were driven to this move by continuing US perfidy and appeasement of Pak; a target date of Nov 26, 2010 would send the message nicely), and hope to make better progress with the give-and-take of negotiations, with better assurance that there will be real stability and good behavior by our adversaries.

As to the specific question of leverage in the face of a US pullout from Af/Pak, I think a big part of it is psychological--Pakis as well as Afghans (for that matter anyone who is a fighter) have a way of respecting and stepping back in the face of an adversary / interlocutor who they believe is capable of, and wiling to, do serious damage to them. I think the Afghans like what we are doing with their infrastructure etc., and would stay on our side for what they can gain in that direction, if they knew that we have the independent wherewithal to stay put, and punish on our own anyone who interferes with our presence. We have no enmity with any of the Afghan factions as such, except for those that are creatures of Pakistan, so we should be building a pro-India consensus in Afghanistan (which wouldn't include the paki faction, obviously) that is hostile to Pakistan, and will, in time, reduce the paki element to a marginal terrorist nuisance that will be dealt with in KPS Gill fashion over time.

It is obvious Pakistan sees and is terrified of this exact scenario. I hope that this has been our strategic goal all along; the only missing element being India's credibility as a determined defender of its own interests.

Without this element, I don't see how we can make any kind of arrangement stick. In any case, our present passivity is untenable, and something has to be done to break out of it.

I see that I didn't say anything about the SCO scenario--I am not really sure what its future importance really is, but I see it as primarily a Chinese show (on the lines of the WWII Japanese "Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" thingy) , with Russians & ex-Soviets being second-fiddle right now. China will grab as much as it can; I don't see any meaningful leverage accruing to India with the status quo. Any leverage we have has to be with China and no one else.

Other moves we can make for leverage, besides the thermonuke one are to pass a unanimous Parliamentary resolution affirming our fraternal cultural ties with the Tibetan people, cozying up to the outer Mongolians, getting good ol' dar-ul-uloom guys to set up a branch office in Urumqui or at least offering AMU / JNU scholarships to Uighurs (a bit of a risky move in that the Ulema might get ideas above their aukat, but I assume that we can more or less control these sarkari maulana-types, and it is time all the toadying to the left and to the Muslim ulema paid off) etc.

We have a lot of "soft power" in the ex-soviet bloc and in Africa and so on, as a people that have a good handle on technology and education, our multicultural, multi-ethnic society, and are relatively easygoing and accommodative of local people and cultures, w/o superiority complex etc. (last two qualities distinctly absent with Chinese). What is lacking is the kind of respect and credibility that comes when people know you are a perfectly nice, decent and fairminded nation, but there is a steel core at the center. We know India does have this steel, it is not for nothing that Akbar decided to turn over a new leaf and build an empire based on compromise rather than overrunning the land like was done to Iran.

Providing evidence of this steel is vital; it will tip the balance of strength in our favour vis-a-vis China. and without such evidence, anything we offer to the SCO or whoever else will be meaningless.

What worries me is that we are still struggling to rediscover our inner steel.

[KLNMurthy]

...

I think the current drive to build metro railways in all the major metropolitan cities is somewhere linked with increasing threat of nuke war in 2020's. I guess, this should be hastened. However, it is not very potent as most of the metro tracks in major cities are not underground but over-bridged.

The nuke bunkers should be built under guise of something else, civilian drills can be conducted on the notice of 5-6 months once the shelters are built, anti-BM project should continue along with building up of naval prowess. Testing some new designs will be enough to show the rogue side of the elephant. That is intricately linked with US pull-out. I guess Bhaarat will show the rogue elephant side when US decides to pull out permanently.. They of course will not do it in one go, they will show Salami tactics - slice by slice.. What is the threshold before India can display the rogue-side of the elephant by testing some more designs?

As far as I am concerned, that threshold was breached on Nov 26, 2008 if not before. We are, or should be, in the "at a time of our choosing, in a manner of our choosing" phase right now.

I favor overt preparations for nuclear defense rather than hiding it; we have a lot of ground to make up to convince everyone that we take things seriously.

[KLNMurthy]

We should be looking to get back our territory and not cede an inch. Nations who think of giving up territory keep losing more. People from ladhak and AP are our people
What has happened to Rudradev? I see him introducing this idea sneakily across all boards. The option you are proposing is not an option at all. Its gallingly adharmic. Better to die than to give in to bullys and looters

At least, that is the message we should be sending to all parties concerned. I don't think dying itself would be a desirable goal. Remember what Gen. Patton said about making the other dumb ba**rd die for his country.

[ShauryaT]

RD: I will take the help of Bharat Karnad to illustrate a simple point, which is the cause of the issues we face, resulting in our seeking one alliance or the other.

Alas, over the 60-odd years of its independent existence, India has become habituated to relying on one great power or the other for its security......

There is a god-awful tendency – almost a constant in Indian strategic culture – prompting Indian rulers regularly to draw defeat from the jaws of victory. ......

Fast-forwarding in time, Indira Gandhi stopped full-fledged weaponization in its tracks after the first Pokhran blast in 1974. Had she not choked, by the then American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s own account, India’s admission into the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nuclear weapon state, alongside the ‘Big Five’ – the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China, was a certainty. Vaulting into an expanded UN Security Council as permanent member with veto rights, and easing the country’s passage into the great power ranks would then have been a mere formality.......

Again in 1998, Atal Bihari Vajpayee resumed nuclear testing, including of a thermonuclear design, and rather than have open-ended testing of higher yield weapon designs and hydrogen warheads for various missiles with different nose-cone geometries eventuating in a proven thermonuclear deterrent, announced a ‘voluntary’ test moratorium, leaving India strategically, once again, between and betwixt – neither a full-scale nuclear power nor a non-nuclear weapon state, and well short of great power status. It is this test moratorium, moreover, that Washington froze into a non-testing premise – the foundation for the nuclear deal.....

The debilitating historical penchant aside, the fact is the Indian ruling class has always been enamoured by the prospect of the country becoming a great power on the cheap. .....

But the building blocks of soft or smart power, as Nye, President Bill Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of Defence, emphasized, rested on the US’ unchallenged military might. It is this last aspect that the Indian analysts within and without the Indian government never paid attention to; presumably because they were so enthralled by these ‘politically correct’ sounding concepts, they did not bother to study what Nye had said. Nye postulated that soft power is best wielded in conjunction with the discriminate use of the country’s hard power (strategic nuclear and conventional military capabilities, bases with pre-positioned stores all over the world, and forwardly deployed military units), and that this would make the US a ‘smart power’.....

The ‘smart’ use of its undoubted soft power will require that India first procure the elements of ‘hard power’ and the willingness to use it. If this is done, there will be no need for India to free-ride on security. ....

China in the 21st century remains India’s main Asian rival and competitor, except it is now so powerful an entity that even the United States would quail to take it on militarily, less so on some other country’s behalf. ....

When Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, in order to dissuade Beijing from building its own nuclear-powered submarines, offered China the deterrent use in 1956 of a fleet of Chinese port-based Soviet submarines with nuclear missiles, Mao declined, asking rhetorically, ‘Whose finger will be on the trigger?’

Other states were in no position to protest and avoid the consequent diminishment. This happened with all the countries of Western Europe after joining NATO and to countries in Eastern Europe after being coerced into the Warsaw Pact. It happened to Japan and South Korea after coming under the extended US military cover, and to Israel and the Arab states, all of whom are American protectorates. And, nearer home, Pakistan became an expendable cog in the US foreign policy machine, its value up one day, down the next, and never far from being jettisoned for not complying with US diktat. If India does not mend its strategic outlook, policy and posture, this is the denouement India faces.

Full article is here.

There is one more issue with the idea you propose.

Alliances formed for purely tactical reasons do not last, as proven by the US-Pakistani relationship. It is the PRC-TSP relationship that will last longer, due to the common opponent they face. PRC has the bulk of Tibet and Xinjiang, they act as a large buffer directly under her control. Ceding a few more 100,000's sqKM of territory will not make much of a difference. Also, in the north all Ladakh will do allow PRC to join with the rest of the Karakoram range, allowing her complete domination of all of our mountains, eventually including Siachen.

The PRC much like the US is looking for pawns with TSP, BD and Myanmar as its string of pearls to choke India. Mimicking what PRC perceives of India, not as the main threat but as a claw of a crab. The crab being the US.

On an ideological basis, our values for a society and nation-state are far closer to the US than the PRC. Our fight is not with the Chinese but with the CPC led PRC.

What the US will not do and should not be expected to do is to fight India's battles. If India refuses to make the necessary investments in her capabilities then it is moot to complain of US funding the Pakjabi army or wreck Afghanistan to serve her immediate interests, regardless of unintended casualties.

Even if the idea you have speculated was plausible, the secret to Afghanistan lies in the demographics and geography of the greater Afghanistan region and no geo-political game changers will affect that in the medium term. Paul's prognosis is more closer to the truth, IMO.

The best that we can hope to achieve is for this "state" of affairs to continue for a decade or two but most critically, we can hope to milk it, only and only if India invests in her capabilities and hard power and to use the same, to truly control the region from the Hormuz to the Malacca.

[a_kumar]

Rudradev, I see the message I think ("Lets be pragmatic?"). What I object to is the suggestion of ceding territory. For example, Aksai Chin is one example. But, Ladakh is undisputed with China. And ArP? what kind of message are we giving to the Indian citizens in NE? I believe that even a mention of such a solution is a Lakshman Rekha no country which wants to be intact should cross.

With no dearth of Chindus ready to kiss PRC's feet, any suggestion of giving up on our own citizens is irresponsible at best.

I am proposing the opposite... engaging more deeply with the SCO and balancing that relationship against what we have with Unkil, so that we are not left with the short end of the stick if Unkil decides to take his bat-ball and go home.

This I second. Infact I take an even long-term view of this. My prophecy is that, for nations to survive in this century they will have to be less fractured and more grouped.

A long time back various states in the Indian subcontinent came to be referred to as desh of bharat. These states have become one nation. Similarly, after working with each other under the flag of NATO for almost half a century, various nation states in the continent are moving towards becoming one nation under the EU flag. Who would have believed in 1910 or 1940 that all of Europe would become one nation?

SAARC, ASEAN and SCO are similar seeds that "could" lead to coagulation of nations. Unfortunately, our brothers on west have done everything in their power to bring down SAARC, and succesfully so. On the other hand, ASEAN is florishing well and there is hope for SCO.

Bottomline : There is something to be learned from historical India, current Europe and SAARC experience.
Questions relevant : What brought the states under one flag? How were the disparities managed or offset? Why didn't "Pakistan syndrome" plague Europe?

IMO, none of the answers as I see them provide a bright picture for India right now. And to add to that, India would be going in from a position of weakness.

Instead of spending your effort on venting outrage at a proposition which I haven't even made, why don't you consider what we could actually offer the SCO in lieu of territorial compromises to China, so as to gain the amount of leverage we want?

....
See, I'm just trying to spark discussions on these sort of things. Otherwise all the Afghanistan threads end up going in circles... "oh my god, America is talking to the "good Taliban", the Islamists will win, India will lose, we are so helpless".
...

So what are we bringing to the table instead? Or what issues can we "create" instead (as you have proposed), which we can then offer to back down on so as to gain the leverage we want?

....

As to your honest request, I will look at that, but why put the onus entirely on me?

You claim credit for kick starting this discussion.. rightfully so..Nevertheless, I would have placed the onus on anybody who brought the aforementioned suggestion.

You look at it too, and post your thoughts on here. I hope others will too. Then maybe we can discover some ways out of the helpless rut in which our Afghan policy currently resides.

Fair enough. To add to above comments,
(1) The only way India can play an unhindered role in SCO or any of the organization is by loosing the albatross on its neck.. Pakistan.
(2) China is unlikely to give any value to India, unless it is dependent on India. Be it trade or access to IO. So got to work on it.
(3) Northern Areas are China's weak link and they are reinforcing them with all sorts of projects while India is twiddling its thumbs.. yeah.. I heard the comment on projects in PoK, but that was only a reaction to China's belligerence on ArP, rather than on policy. (Thank You China!)
(4) Start a new org for India/SL/Bangladesh/Nepal/Bhutan/Burma. Afghanistan may be added as an observer to start with and later on expand.
(5) Lastly, invest heavily on future technologies and leapfrog to next generation. For god sake, where are we on GREEN?

[ramana]

M. K. Bhadra Kumar in Hindu

US goofs up Afghan Elections

The West’s claim that there should be a runoff and that Hamid Karzai’s shortfall by 0.3 per cent votes in the first round made him "illegitimate" in the eyes of the Afghan people turned out to be a first-rate farce.

The victory of Hamid Karzai in the Afghan presidential election is a watershed event. Mr. Karzai showed the door to western sponsors who approached him for a last-minute “deal” to scrap the runoff by having his opponent Abdullah Abdullah, former Foreign Minister, accommodated in some position in the future administration. Mr. Karzai refused to deal and instead chose to call the West’s bluff, which left the latter with no option but to back off. Mr. Abdullah too abdicated from the political scene, making the runoff redundant. In short, Mr. Karzai chose to “Afghanise” his power base, ignoring western protestations. He calculated that he would continue to enjoy strong support from within the major non-Pashtun groups as well so long as his partnership with Mohammed Fahim, Karim Khalili, Ismail Khan, Rashid Dostum and Mohammed Mohaqiq remained intact.

No doubt, a new power alignment is taking shape. Afghan-style politics is resuming after very many years. At the centre stage of the political theatre stands Mr. Karzai. He has turned the table squarely on the western powers. But he will not easily forget the sustained attempts over the past year and more to ridicule him and pull him down. There has been some attrition. The attacks on him and his family members have been on very personal terms at times. Afghans are not used to western-style character assassination in the name of democracy.

The latest broadside in the New York Times portraying his brother Wali Karzai as a drug trafficker and CIA agent has taken matters to a point of no return. The American officials who spoke out of turn have done colossal damage to the U.S. interests in Afghanistan. Washington must seriously note that the response to the New York Times report has come from none other than the Afghan Minister of Counter Narcotics, General Khodaidad Khodaidad. The Minister has brought on to public debate Afghanistan’s best-kept secret: the role of foreign troops in drug-trafficking.

Gen. Khodaidad is a highly trained professional with acute political instincts, who knows what he is talking about. Indians knew him, so did Russians. He passed out of the prestigious Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun and was a product of the famous Fronze Military Academy in Moscow. He had a proven record in the communist regime in Kabul as a highly decorated general; he led the crack paratrooper brigades in the war in the early 1980s and served as army commander in the Kunduz-Takhar frontline facing the legendary “Lion of Panjshir,” Ahmed Shah Massoud. Britain, where he lived in exile for a decade, knows him too.

Therefore, when Gen. Khodaidad said early this month that the NATO contingents from the U.S., the U.K. and Canada are “taxing” the production of opium in the regions under their control, he actually carried a stern warning on behalf of Mr. Karzai. It is a direct message: don’t throw stones while sitting in a glass cage. The western powers have systematically, through countless acts of plain idiocy, paying no heed to the culture and traditions of the Afghan people, brought things to this sorry, deplorable pass. Now onward, they will have to give up the doublespeak regarding “warlords” and “warlordism” and learn to perform the way Mr. Karzai wants or at least in consultation with him. The point is, he is staying in power for a second term on his own steam, defying the wishes and frustrating the designs of the western powers.

The U.S. should quickly move to bury the rift and do some cool introspection. Perilous times lie ahead. The Barack Obama presidency is on the firing line. The western powers cannot afford any more goof-ups. In institutional terms, the White House and the U.S. State Department have an uphill task in rebuilding ties with Mr. Karzai. From all accounts, the equations between President Obama and Mr. Karzai remain very poor. Apparently, they don’t even use satellite phones to talk. This should never have happened between two gifted politicians. Equally, Special Representative Richard Holbrooke has become persona non grata in Kabul. John Kerry, the powerful chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who did the famous arms-twisting act on Mr. Karzai two weeks ago has also become a burnt-out case. Afghanistan is living up to its reputation as the graveyard of foreigners.

On balance, Mr. Obama’s dependence on the Pentagon has increased. U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates kept his nails clean. Enormously experienced in the business of statecraft and bureaucratic dogfight alike, he could make out from 10,000 miles away that he should steer clear of the sordid skirmishes in the Hindu Kush that Washington was pitting against the obstinate Afghan leader. He knew such things could only end up messily and, more important, there would be a critical need for Mr. Obama to still deal with Mr. Karzai in the aftermath of the foul-up.

The tumultuous phase of the past few months, centred around the Afghan presidential election, will peter off sooner than most people in the West might have thought. Actually, too much was made — quite needlessly — of the “legitimacy” factor of the Afghan election. Legitimacy was never an issue insofar as the Afghan people’s real concerns at this juncture lie elsewhere — peace and security, livelihood and predictability in day-to-day life. As for the international community, that is, the non-western world, it was quite used to dealing with Mr. Karzai and it never mixed that up with the state of democracy in Afghanistan. The broad perception in the world community was that a few motivated western capitals were deliberately making an issue of the “legitimacy” of the election to “soften up” Mr. Karzai politically and if he still resisted, to get rid of him from power. Thus the world community mutely watched when the West began chanting in unison that there should be a runoff and that Mr. Karzai’s shortfall by 0.3 per cent votes in the first round made him “illegitimate” in the eyes of the Afghan people. It has turned out to be a first-rate farce.

Mr. Abdullah’s abdication from the political arena is not going to set the Kabul River on fire. There isn’t going to be any war between the Pashtuns and Tajiks, either. In overall terms, Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries (except Pakistan perhaps, to an extent) will find Mr. Karzai’s new team easy to work with. The new set-up will include personalities who are familiar figures to key regional capitals such as Moscow, Tehran, Tashkent and Dushanbe. The emergence of such a pan-Afghan team in Kabul will be reassuring for these regional capitals. Arguably, with a regime shaping up in Kabul that is high on its “Afghan-ness,” the U.S. will also come under greater pressure to evolve a consensus approach to the war strategy and the search for a settlement.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov summed up the paradigm when he said last week: “The Bush administration sinned by a lopsided interpretation of collective efforts … Obama has announced a different philosophy — that of collective action, which calls for joint analysis, decision-making and implementation … So far, inertia lingers at the implementers’ level in the U.S. who still follow the well-trodden track, trying to decide anything and everything beforehand for others. But as we felt during the contacts, President Obama has an absolutely clear understanding that it is necessary to enlist intellectual resources from all the states that can contribute to devising a strategy.”

The big question, however, is how the Taliban will view the Afghan political developments. A complex picture is emerging. The U.S. is inching closer to discussing a modus vivendi with the Taliban, while Mr. Karzai has partners who have dealings with the Taliban. (Ironically, Mr. Wali Karzai is one such skilled politician who is deeply immersed in the Taliban folklore.) It will not be surprising if a political accommodation is reached with the powerful Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. It is foolhardy to assess that old war horses of the Northern Alliance have a closed mind on the Taliban — or, for that matter, on Pakistan. Simply put, that is not how the Afghan political culture works. What the outside world — including neighbouring capitals like New Delhi — often fails to realise is that the battle lines are never really clear-cut in the Hindu Kush. In fact, they never were. This is only to be expected in a civil war that is essentially rooted in a fratricidal strife.

If Mr. Hekmatyar walks over, a virtual polarisation of the Mujahideen will have taken place. We will then find ourselves in a priori history, lodged somewhere in the early 1990s after the famous U.N. diplomat Diego Cordovez and the Red Army had departed from the Hindu Kush and before the Taliban poured out of the Pakistani madrasas to fill in the power vacuum. If Mr. Hekmatyar chooses politics to war, a major hurdle will also have been crossed in isolating the hardline elements within the Taliban — the so-called Quetta shura and the Haqqani network.

( The writer is a former diplomat.)

So what he is saying is Hekmatyar is the key figure to watch. The real question is who is Hekmatyar dealig with US or Karzai or both?