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Pakistan continues to perceive that, while socio-economic progress and combating extremism constitute core objectives, its main existential threat continues to emanate from India. An India in which core policy makers and influential segments continue to regard the creation of Pakistan from "mother India" as a historical mistake, which at best may still be undone and till then Pakistan should be dealt with so that it gives up its support for Kashmiri self-determination and acquiesces to a subordinate role in South Asia.
Pakistan, though a significant middle order country, has always faced an asymmetrical imbalance and threat in the conventional field from a much larger India. Pakistan's hard won nuclear capability has kept the peace by providing, through a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, strategic stability in South Asia.
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As part of the composite dialogue expert level talks were initiated on both nuclear and conventional CBMs. In the first Nuclear CBMs meeting in June 2004, both sides agreed that the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national security imperatives, constitute a factor for stability. Two main agreements on pre-notification of ballistic missile tests and reduction of risks of accidents related to nuclear weapons were signed. Even before India broke off the peace process after the Mumbai incident, the peace process had slowed down. There was no concrete movement on the core issue of Kashmir and no promise of movement on Siachin, Sir Creek and the Indus Waters which provide Pakistan's life blood. While the nuclear CBMs agreements continue to hold, there was no forward movement and India wanted to de-link itself from Pakistan even in this nuclear CBMs field in which India reversed the maxim of thinking globally and acting locally.
In this India has been encouraged by a number of developments. The US-Indo nuclear deal was the high water mark of this bilateral strategic partnership. The United States lost the opportunity of encouraging nuclear restraint in South Asia while providing civil nuclear power to both fossil fuel deficit countries. The agreement enhanced India's strategic capability, freeing its limited uranium reserves for military use and keeping eight reactors out of safeguards with the ability to produce fissile material for 280 nuclear weapons annually, apart from its equally un-safeguarded 13 breeder reactors programme.
The US, Israel and Russia agreed to cooperate with India for its ABM programme which would further destabilise the strategic balance and force Pakistan to increase its missile throw weight.
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India justifies this build-up as it claims that it faces potential threats from China as well as from Pakistan. While US wants to build up India as a counter to China's growing influence, and Russia may wish to do so to a lesser degree apart from maintaining its strategic partnership with India in the face of growing American influence, given the growing economic and political relationship between India and China, no objective strategist has been able to postulate any credible conflict scenario between the two countries.
On the other hand, 95 percent of India's military potential is targeted against Pakistan. The planned nuclear submarine fleet with its short range ballistic missiles or cruise missiles is Pakistan-specific
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Pakistan's response has been that it will take all steps to safeguard its security and to maintain strategic balance in the region. What should Pakistan do? First of all develop its own second strike nuclear submarine based capability on which it must have given some thought having been long aware of the Indian programme. Secondly, equip its conventional submarines with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Thirdly, as the Russian assistance to India for this project, and the lack of any objection from the US or any other party has shown that both leasing of nuclear submarines and technology for their production are completely compatible with the global non-proliferation regime, Pakistan should explore such possibilities. Fourthly, the most important lesson for Pakistan, a latecomer by necessity as a nuclear state, is that while it does not have to match India, nuclear weapon by nuclear weapon, even so, to maintain strategic stability in these changing and adverse ground realities, it will need to continue its modest fissile material production in the foreseeable future and cannot brook any developments or negotiations counter to this vital national security requirement. Hence, faced with these escalating threats Pakistan must oppose the initiation of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which countries, with their own comfortable fissile material stockpiles and who have also helped arm India, want to begin and prioritise in the conference on Disarmament in Geneva, specifically at Pakistan's expense, and if negotiations begin, not to accept any outcome detrimental to Pakistan' strategic and energy security. If our policy makers and negotiators in Geneva do not live up to this task they will never be forgiven by the nation.
The writer, a former diplomat, headed Pakistan's delegation in talks with India on nuclear and conventional CBMs (2004-2007). Email: ambassador.tariqosmanhyder@ gmail.com
from Strobe Talbott's book
Another difference was personal. In India, my designated counterpart was a senior figure who was lose to the prime minister and who had standing of his own in the eyes of the parliament, the press, and the public. In Pakistan I was to deal with Shamshad Ahmad, the foreign secretary, whose primary role in May had been to blame the Indian test—and therefore the Pakistani one as well—on the United States. He was not just below Jaswant in the pecking order but in a different category—a civil servant rather than a member of the leadership. While Jaswant’s team was highly disciplined in every respect, some of Shamshad Ahmad’s colleagues tended to be querulous, surly, and sometimes abusive. On one occasion, early in our dealings, a member of the Pakistani delegation exploded at our observation that his country seemed always to react in knee-jerk fashion to Indian moves. He rose out of his chair and lunged across the table as though he were going to strangle either Bruce Riedel or me, depending on whose neck he could get his fingers around first. He had to be physically restrained.
A nuclear submarine is an extremely expensive project. The Indians have managed to do it because they had more cash and a lot of Russian help. Pakistan, that had toyed with the idea of hiring nuclear submarines during the 1980s in response to India’s action and had failed to get one, might want to buy one from China. It does not seem likely that Beijing would give this technology to Pakistan at this stage.
TSP's only hope will be a SeS like capitulation by chankian GOI.
. A doctor from a well off family of Swat while talking to this correspondent said that his house was located on the main road leading to Mingora city and after the operation when he returned he found that jewellery, expensive carpets, imported furniture, licensed weapons and other household items were missing 