Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -II
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
What Mananyia PM ji is saying is important for the indirect implications as he will reflect not only the Indian POV but also in an economically-shared-world-view with the "west". But in two years time the Indian leadership may change too. What about that?
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Recently, there was a news report stating that POTUS has the power to "kill off" conventional energy if a bill/motion authorising thorium based nuclear power plants could be passed at the Senate. The tone of that report was diagonally opposite to the above, leading me to believe that China, but more importantly India should go ahead with indigenous R&D and innovation of its nuclear industry, regardless of the situation with the 123 agreement. The strategic community should envision the IN operating thorium powered battle cruisers in the IOR.brihaspati wrote: I am posing the counter-question : instead of peak-oil fears driving political expediency - was the leak timed to justify political expediency to raise fears of peak-oil?
What should the tactic imply for Indian and Chinese behaviour around the subcontinent?
I am not sure if any geological surveys have been conducted by any company in Gilgit-Baltisthan, if there has been any such survey I hope the GOI gets its hands on it as soon as possible. The Chinese presence there is related to the field of discovery of new materials/metals for their defense/space/aerospace industries. The Chinese are at that stage where the US was post WW2, with new elements being added to the periodic table almost every second month. Exotic materials are needed to develop composites which will be used in next gen military hardware. A thorium based nuclear industry will neccesitate such innovation for basic energy needs.
The situation with Reliance discovering new shale beds off the Godavari basin is a valuable strategic boost for India. Valuable finds like this more than effectively cancel out negative tactics and propaganda.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Brihaspati Ji, regarding our conversation about the oil crisis a few days/weeks back?, not the one that is posted on this page.I have had let us say 'not unreliable' source telling me that certain western hopefuls are expecting it in the last week of N.The crisis and pangs 'at least' would be apparent by then.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Going back to your article on the sapta-sindhu in the Alternative Budget scenarios, there are two river basins which are capable of forming a core, with or without the Deccan.Atri wrote: The classic confusion seen in the action so Pune Darbar while dealing with people from Ganga and Indus consistently for 100 years is example of the effect that this Sindhu-Ganga dichotomy leads to. Whom to liberate first Ganga OR Sindhu is the age old question which has been in the minds of any body who is in trying to think of conducting the "clean-up". Ultimately both Ganga and Sindhu screwed deccan and refused to cooperate. Sindhu at least became sustainable after Deccan gave up on it (Sikhs). Ganga did not.
This confusion is still seen in many discussions here as well. What to go for first - Sindhu OR Ganga? they are like evil twins and without cleaning both, India won't be liberated. People from both the valleys should understand this and try and cooperate with Deccan and the indic DI Axis which has been activated since past 300 years.
Please lets focus the discussion on "what is that something which both of these power-houses have lost" and then "how to find it and instil it again in the minds of both these houses".
Taking the Narmada-Tapti and the Mahanadi basins as one (I mean combining them within a provincial level government), a provincial type government in West-Central India can effectively become the Indic core and take on and cleanse both GV and Sindhu at the same time. Now, before all of you jump me on this, allow me to explain.
The Narmada-Tapti basin hinterland is not as developed as its peninsula, the Mahanadi for most of its length is the industrial backbone of central India. The states which could come under the West-Central province which I am suggesting are Gujarat, MP, Chattisgarh, Telengana and Orissa. There is also a reason why I'm leaving out Maharashtra while including Telengana which I will explain.
The formation of Telengana should be taken as a strategic advantage (after all strategy is about converting your setbacks to your advantage). The modelling of state systems wherein large states with maritime advantages sooner or later get split into two or more portions based on geography, economy and freshwater/riverine distribution. Language plays a part but I am not going into it. Telengana has the Godavari flowing through it but the geography makes sure that AP gets the benefit of being called the lower riparian state. In all probablity, Telengana is going to get little water sharing rights of the Godavari, which is going to make it depend on supply from Chattisgarh and Maharashtra.
This division of states in central India results in a number of landlocked and still relatively large states which eventually will turn to industry to modernize and keep up with the rest of the country. The only exception to this rule would be the Vidharbha region of Maharashtra. If they also succumb to the same temptations as Telengana, then we might have a much more complete economic model on our hands as far as this West-Central province is concerned. But it has not happened so far and that is why I have left Maharashtra out of this model.
Now these 5 states (Gujarat, MP, Chattisgarh, Telengana and Orissa) form a new model of governance as a Provincial level Government of West-Central India. This province is only answerable to ND in defence and security matters. What do these 5 states bring to the table for the provincial government?
Gujarat is the economic powerhouse of the province. Both Orissa and Gujarat provide coastal and maritime access. Orissa definitely lags behind Gujarat economically. MP, Chattisgarh and Telengana are the hinterlands. Telengana being a new state, it is assumed that its people will be hugely motivated to perform well in all walks of life. MP being upstream of Gujarat on the Narmada-Tapti system, economic progress can flow upstream like how it has in Tamil Nadu Kaveri basin. Ditto for the Chattisgarh-Orissa Mahanadi system. The Gujarat-MP and Chattisgarh-Orissa can actually act as competing entities within the framework. The dynamic of this province would be unprecedented in modern Indian history. The leadership of this province could be taken up by modern day Dwarikadheesh and inspiration to rival Vikramaditya's Ujjain empire could be given to one and all, holistically of course. There is a chance that Vidharbha may sooner or later see the light and break away from Maharashtra and join the Province, which is good if it happens, nobody will force their hand on the issue.
A realistic timeline for the formation of the Dwaraka-Ujjain-Kalinga axis is 12 years from present.
The Dwaraka-Ujjain-Kalinga axis will be formed and this will have composite strategic depth with the K-G basin, Deccan plateau and Kaveri Basin. This axis with backup from south India can take on and cleanse all malicious elements in the GV and Sindhu river systems. Timeline for this project is 22-24 years.
Atri ji, I hope I have been able to address most of the issues you have raised. There might be something that I might have missed by failing to read between the lines, this is JMHO and please take it FWIW with a large dose of salt.
I hope that esteemed posters and lurkers alike realize that this is a hypothetical but workable model. I have made a lot of concessions by assuming that people will put petty regionalism and language issues away for the greater strategic betterment of Indic and Dharmic society.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
MMS did lots of loose talking in that meet with editors...MMS AFAIK is not known for this kind of talk....something made him talk like that...beyond this is OT.brihaspati wrote:What Mananyia PM ji is saying is important for the indirect implications as he will reflect not only the Indian POV but also in an economically-shared-world-view with the "west". But in two years time the Indian leadership may change too. What about that?
an excerpt from an old article....
link
If not today...in couple of decades down the line....Can we see a PM with this kind of vigor? both from INC or BJP? a probable or prospective candidates from these national parties? is there an analysis on this front done by gurus here?Prime Minister Gandhi(IG) told Union Cabinet that apart from liberating Bangladesh, India intended to take over a strategically important part of the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and go for the total annihilation of Pakistan’s armed forces so that Pakistan “never attempts to challenge India in the future.”
Kindly give pointers to such analysis.
TIA
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Klaus ji and Atri ji,
One way of lookimng at this is to try and identify the "clubs of states" or region-belts that seem to appear to persist in their trends of development or stagnation. As far as I remember, studies seem to indicate a NW-SE banded pattern. Its almost like a wave coming from the Arabian sea along an inclined NW-SE axis with peaks on the west coast , and troughs immediately after and then reaching another peak [lower] along the lower GV.
One way of lookimng at this is to try and identify the "clubs of states" or region-belts that seem to appear to persist in their trends of development or stagnation. As far as I remember, studies seem to indicate a NW-SE banded pattern. Its almost like a wave coming from the Arabian sea along an inclined NW-SE axis with peaks on the west coast , and troughs immediately after and then reaching another peak [lower] along the lower GV.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Brihaspati ji,
One of the reason for viewing India in terms of "river-systems" was to club the provinces. In long run, I feel this linguistic reorganization needs to alter slightly. There is necessity to mix and match the provinces and people so that new diverse culture evolves. But all that in good time and deals with "soft-power" onlee.
Klaus ji,
Wonderful post. I had this in mind when I was drawing those circles. I drew Narmada-Mahanadi in same colour because of this continuity I had in mind. Vidarbha has to separate from MH if the region has to act as the launchpad of Dharma. I had investigated the historicity of Vidarbha based power-centres in dealing with rulers in today's maoist infested area. They have had tremendous success in recent pre-british past. Vidarbha is hostage of sugar-lobby of the western MH which is more or less deracinated. To be honest, this lobby (and their elite ancestors) always have been deracinated since fall of Seuna-Yadavas of Devagiri in 14th century. The elite of Sugar-Lobby represent the "powerful compromisers" of Krishna-Godavari basin. Many of these (not the majority) were the "principle" traitors and non-cooperators against the movement of Shivaji. Few descendants of these were non-cooperative in Maratha expansion post death of Aurangzeb. This has to be kept in mind.
Vidarbha is also separated from rest of MH by a crescent arc from Burhanpur to Hyderabad which is rich in population-droplets of followers of one true god passing through Marathwada region. This further isolates Vidarbha from rest of MH in one way. The behaviour of Western MH has been opportunistic since demise of Lokmanya Tilak in 1920. Hence, it will indeed be helpful for rejuvenation process if Vidarbha manages to segregate. There is tremendous promise in Dwarika-Ujjain-Kalinga axis.
There are many good things happening in DUK axis which are not seen on the radar of national media. The problem with Dwarika end is too much attention of media and probable sell-out to multinational interests in exchange of the meteoric rise of Dwarika post Godhra-kaand. Rahul Mehta used to allude to this possibility during his stay in BRFATA. This can potentially further the complications. I am not fearing the sell-out. What I am afraid of is premature exposure of the rejuvenating elements in this region to AESA radar of global interests thereby stunting their growth. The process in this region mostly Top-bottom hierarchy which is susceptible to manipulation by corruption and/or murder of key people. For the region to be a sustainable perpetrator of Dharma, the understanding has to seep in. I would rather like some more ground-building by local saints there. The penetration of EJs is another important problem which infests few parts of this region. This gives a leeway to the interests of the "Dynasty".
Barring the sugar-elite of KG basin, rest of the society will be highly supportive of this new region. Interestingly, even the coastal region of MH has tremendous potential to contribute here. It can form a continuous region from Konkan (barring 100 km Mumbai)-Gujarat-MP-CGH-Telangana-Vidarbha-Jharkhand-Orissa. This belt will then have everything required to act as a launchpad. Huge enough population base, 2-3 perennial rivers, long access to sea on both sides. However, in the time-scale you are proposing, Konkan is too much to ask for. It remains an uncharted and promising avenue, nonetheless. What about Rajasthan? What are your views? In changing times, RJ might be the energy-basket of India, if harnessed cleverly. The problems of RJ are in weird way similar to Western MH, though.
In case the rivers in this basin are linked with GV and IV, this region will be extremely prosperous in all aspects. But that is quite far ahead. This, IMO, will be the first step towards emancipation of Ganga and later Sindhu.
One of the reason for viewing India in terms of "river-systems" was to club the provinces. In long run, I feel this linguistic reorganization needs to alter slightly. There is necessity to mix and match the provinces and people so that new diverse culture evolves. But all that in good time and deals with "soft-power" onlee.
Klaus ji,
Wonderful post. I had this in mind when I was drawing those circles. I drew Narmada-Mahanadi in same colour because of this continuity I had in mind. Vidarbha has to separate from MH if the region has to act as the launchpad of Dharma. I had investigated the historicity of Vidarbha based power-centres in dealing with rulers in today's maoist infested area. They have had tremendous success in recent pre-british past. Vidarbha is hostage of sugar-lobby of the western MH which is more or less deracinated. To be honest, this lobby (and their elite ancestors) always have been deracinated since fall of Seuna-Yadavas of Devagiri in 14th century. The elite of Sugar-Lobby represent the "powerful compromisers" of Krishna-Godavari basin. Many of these (not the majority) were the "principle" traitors and non-cooperators against the movement of Shivaji. Few descendants of these were non-cooperative in Maratha expansion post death of Aurangzeb. This has to be kept in mind.
Vidarbha is also separated from rest of MH by a crescent arc from Burhanpur to Hyderabad which is rich in population-droplets of followers of one true god passing through Marathwada region. This further isolates Vidarbha from rest of MH in one way. The behaviour of Western MH has been opportunistic since demise of Lokmanya Tilak in 1920. Hence, it will indeed be helpful for rejuvenation process if Vidarbha manages to segregate. There is tremendous promise in Dwarika-Ujjain-Kalinga axis.
There are many good things happening in DUK axis which are not seen on the radar of national media. The problem with Dwarika end is too much attention of media and probable sell-out to multinational interests in exchange of the meteoric rise of Dwarika post Godhra-kaand. Rahul Mehta used to allude to this possibility during his stay in BRFATA. This can potentially further the complications. I am not fearing the sell-out. What I am afraid of is premature exposure of the rejuvenating elements in this region to AESA radar of global interests thereby stunting their growth. The process in this region mostly Top-bottom hierarchy which is susceptible to manipulation by corruption and/or murder of key people. For the region to be a sustainable perpetrator of Dharma, the understanding has to seep in. I would rather like some more ground-building by local saints there. The penetration of EJs is another important problem which infests few parts of this region. This gives a leeway to the interests of the "Dynasty".
Barring the sugar-elite of KG basin, rest of the society will be highly supportive of this new region. Interestingly, even the coastal region of MH has tremendous potential to contribute here. It can form a continuous region from Konkan (barring 100 km Mumbai)-Gujarat-MP-CGH-Telangana-Vidarbha-Jharkhand-Orissa. This belt will then have everything required to act as a launchpad. Huge enough population base, 2-3 perennial rivers, long access to sea on both sides. However, in the time-scale you are proposing, Konkan is too much to ask for. It remains an uncharted and promising avenue, nonetheless. What about Rajasthan? What are your views? In changing times, RJ might be the energy-basket of India, if harnessed cleverly. The problems of RJ are in weird way similar to Western MH, though.
In case the rivers in this basin are linked with GV and IV, this region will be extremely prosperous in all aspects. But that is quite far ahead. This, IMO, will be the first step towards emancipation of Ganga and later Sindhu.
Last edited by Atri on 08 Sep 2010 08:18, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Manishw ji,
yes many pointers to a target date of late autumn this year. I keep an eye out for a pattern of information leaks and releases and their timing.
Question : what if those whom we are attributing superior knowledge and insight and insider informations, and therefore we reassure ourselves that they are acting in our best interests - are not actually that well-informed, or even if well-informed not capable of devising solutions that are in our interest? There is a tendency to dismiss any criticism or critical analysis of the motives or acts or words of those who are officially post-holders, by the rather sublime observation that these post-holders did manage to get hold of the post whereas his critic didn't. This is a version of the ancient Chinese or Egyptian theory - that apparent success meant divine will and therefore beyond questioning. Neville Chamberlain was successsful after all - but should that make us cease questioining his "insider info", and his capability to look into the future and take the right decisions?
I think it is better to model existing successful "leadership" as limited by the same capacity handicaps as non-leaders, but burdened in addition with ambitions for personal power and the need to satisfy the interests of a wide spectrum of client-leaders in various spheres both inside and outside the country.
The future is uncertain. SS is too "good" and too deferent. Moon may need to be supplanted by the sister around whom probably the party is going to make its last stand before it goes down completely. Saurashtradhish has a very difficult road ahead. The skygod is under the shadow and curse of the family name. Completely unknown character perhaps or an oligarchy - which latter in fact would perhaps again be better for a transition.
But this will go OT here perhaps and borderline politics-discussion. Those interested can take into "leadership thread" or "Indian interests".
Crucially, big-biz interests are probably beginning to get hurt - especially in the value-addition sectors like steel etc while raw-material resources are pumping exporter pockets as already pointed out by posters. That is almost always a most interesting precursor for political earthquakes in modern capitalist systems.
yes many pointers to a target date of late autumn this year. I keep an eye out for a pattern of information leaks and releases and their timing.
Question : what if those whom we are attributing superior knowledge and insight and insider informations, and therefore we reassure ourselves that they are acting in our best interests - are not actually that well-informed, or even if well-informed not capable of devising solutions that are in our interest? There is a tendency to dismiss any criticism or critical analysis of the motives or acts or words of those who are officially post-holders, by the rather sublime observation that these post-holders did manage to get hold of the post whereas his critic didn't. This is a version of the ancient Chinese or Egyptian theory - that apparent success meant divine will and therefore beyond questioning. Neville Chamberlain was successsful after all - but should that make us cease questioining his "insider info", and his capability to look into the future and take the right decisions?
I think it is better to model existing successful "leadership" as limited by the same capacity handicaps as non-leaders, but burdened in addition with ambitions for personal power and the need to satisfy the interests of a wide spectrum of client-leaders in various spheres both inside and outside the country.
The future is uncertain. SS is too "good" and too deferent. Moon may need to be supplanted by the sister around whom probably the party is going to make its last stand before it goes down completely. Saurashtradhish has a very difficult road ahead. The skygod is under the shadow and curse of the family name. Completely unknown character perhaps or an oligarchy - which latter in fact would perhaps again be better for a transition.
But this will go OT here perhaps and borderline politics-discussion. Those interested can take into "leadership thread" or "Indian interests".

Crucially, big-biz interests are probably beginning to get hurt - especially in the value-addition sectors like steel etc while raw-material resources are pumping exporter pockets as already pointed out by posters. That is almost always a most interesting precursor for political earthquakes in modern capitalist systems.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Excellent article Brihaspati Ji. 

Last edited by Manishw on 08 Sep 2010 16:35, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The hierarchy and assassination can happen because there is no alternative social philosophical network that can socially penalize such things. A network of "cultural" leaders (as you mention - I am just giving them a more technical name) can provide the beginnings of such an alternative. But remember that others have gamed this long ago - and hence the long academic and ideological campaign to disjunct anything that resembles meddling in the political pie away from such "cultural leadership" only for a certain belief system. Which means they will be delegitimized intensively as soon as they start saying things that interevene in existing power monopolies.Atri wrote
The process in this region mostly Top-bottom hierarchy which is susceptible to manipulation by corruption and/or murder of key people. For the region to be a sustainable perpetrator of Dharma, the understanding has to seep in. I would rather like some more ground-building by local saints there.
Barring the sugar-elite of KG basin, rest of the society will be highly supportive of this region. Interestingly, even the coastal region of MH has tremendous potential to contribute here. It can form a continuous region from Konkan (barring 100 km Mumbai)-Gujarat-MP-CGH-Telangana-Vidarbha-Jharkhand-Orissa. This belt will then have everything required to act as a launchpad.
Another crucial aspect of the region you have outlined is a "valve" or controller of flows of resources, ideas and people - between the north and the south. If we take lesons from the ME, and how it used the geo-strategic advantages to change the course of history - that could be an useful indicator for the future.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Those whom we entrust or attribute greater power to are aware but IMO are in no position to influence the new version of G.game?brihaspati wrote: I am posing the counter-question : instead of peak-oil fears driving political expediency - was the leak timed to justify political expediency to raise fears of peak-oil?
What should the tactic imply for Indian and Chinese behaviour around the subcontinent?
B Ji wrote
quote:
Crucially, big-biz interests are probably beginning to get hurt - especially in the value-addition sectors like steel etc while raw-material resources are pumping exporter pockets as already pointed out by posters. That is almost always a most interesting precursor for political earthquakes in modern capitalist systems.
Unquote
Kondr.. wave?
Olig. is the only answer in my mind too.Was trying to get it across to Atri Ji previously when I posted that not a mew was to be expected from S.V.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Heard on NPR yesterday: Maommar Gaddafi called on whole of Italy & Europe to convert to Islam. The Italians and the Vatican found that statement to be extremely offensive, the NPR report said.
It suddenly struck me that the Pope, and whole bunch of Evangelists of US, call on India to convert en mass to Xtianity. Why do they find calls for their own conversion offensive, but not their own call for India to convert? Are the Indians not humans beings just like them with similar set of feelings for their own faith?
I think Hindu/Indian organizations should be raising the voice against Evangelism in India. They should raise issues such as these to force the Europeans and American Xtians to abandon plans on Evangelizing India. There is a polemelical & intellectual battle that Hindus should fight effectively to make the Xtian Evangelists back down.
It suddenly struck me that the Pope, and whole bunch of Evangelists of US, call on India to convert en mass to Xtianity. Why do they find calls for their own conversion offensive, but not their own call for India to convert? Are the Indians not humans beings just like them with similar set of feelings for their own faith?
I think Hindu/Indian organizations should be raising the voice against Evangelism in India. They should raise issues such as these to force the Europeans and American Xtians to abandon plans on Evangelizing India. There is a polemelical & intellectual battle that Hindus should fight effectively to make the Xtian Evangelists back down.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Surinder,
EJ-ists of all colour pose themselves as the one and only truth. From there it is a logical step to claim the right to intervene in every culture to implant the truth - since that truth propagation has apparently also been ordered by the unquestionable supra-human authority. Allowing others to intervene among themselves is therefore also logically tantamount to allowing the "truth" to be replaced. They are actually consistent in getting enraged at Gaddafi while at the same time claiming the right to convert all of India.
The essential thing to remember here is that both the two proselytizing branches of the Abrahamic in their practical form are inseparable from imperialism. They were shaped by imeprialist needs and they left their stamp on imperialism. Imperialism and these two branches are made for each other. Hence they will always remain attractive to those whose capacity or capabilities are far less than their desires or greed. They justify misappropriation of others labour and productivity with a theological twist. They need to constantly bring people independent of them - under their subjugation, and control is their core, paranoid obsession.
Naturally they would be comepting with each other and admire each other. Their fights are never going to be completely mutually destructive, since subgroups within each will always find elements of the other attractive as a tool. Both of their elite will look at the members of the other branch as potential swellers of their army of truth.
You can see that conversion calls from the EJ are really aimed at non-Muslim Indians, and almost no conversion activity are aimed at IM. It is this aspect of "calls to be saved" thats hould be highlighted. The great Sikh guru's challenge to Azeb in a slightly modified form - come to conv non-IM after you have conv the IM. They don't do this because they know that then GOI will shed all its "non-intervention" posturing and solidly come in to protect the IM structures and membership.
I would say getting these two forced to head-on collision over conversion in India would be the best tactic.
This is not anything about religion - it will be a great way of tying down two forms of imperialism - the ME and European types.
EJ-ists of all colour pose themselves as the one and only truth. From there it is a logical step to claim the right to intervene in every culture to implant the truth - since that truth propagation has apparently also been ordered by the unquestionable supra-human authority. Allowing others to intervene among themselves is therefore also logically tantamount to allowing the "truth" to be replaced. They are actually consistent in getting enraged at Gaddafi while at the same time claiming the right to convert all of India.
The essential thing to remember here is that both the two proselytizing branches of the Abrahamic in their practical form are inseparable from imperialism. They were shaped by imeprialist needs and they left their stamp on imperialism. Imperialism and these two branches are made for each other. Hence they will always remain attractive to those whose capacity or capabilities are far less than their desires or greed. They justify misappropriation of others labour and productivity with a theological twist. They need to constantly bring people independent of them - under their subjugation, and control is their core, paranoid obsession.
Naturally they would be comepting with each other and admire each other. Their fights are never going to be completely mutually destructive, since subgroups within each will always find elements of the other attractive as a tool. Both of their elite will look at the members of the other branch as potential swellers of their army of truth.
You can see that conversion calls from the EJ are really aimed at non-Muslim Indians, and almost no conversion activity are aimed at IM. It is this aspect of "calls to be saved" thats hould be highlighted. The great Sikh guru's challenge to Azeb in a slightly modified form - come to conv non-IM after you have conv the IM. They don't do this because they know that then GOI will shed all its "non-intervention" posturing and solidly come in to protect the IM structures and membership.
I would say getting these two forced to head-on collision over conversion in India would be the best tactic.
This is not anything about religion - it will be a great way of tying down two forms of imperialism - the ME and European types.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
AoA.. Mujahids vijited thij bost... yanjaaying with 72..
Last edited by Atri on 08 Sep 2010 20:09, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Manishw ji,
Any relative competition for natural resources or raw material between "finshers" and "raw material exporters" typically is resolved in a bid by "finishers" trying to buy up and control the sources of raw material. This naturally is manifested in an open struggle in the political domain where different political groups are bought by the competing business interests.
With further growth in industrial sector and "value addition" sector, the "value addition" sector will increasingly determine political alignments.
The dilemma of the current grouping in power comes from the balancing act it has to maintain between these rising "value adders" and the non-value-adders. This is why it is perhaps leaning more and more towards the agricultural sector interests, [which is included in the "raw materials exports" category] and mining interests.
But this also means an impossible stress within the grouping itself. So more and more factions will emerge leaning towards or championing one or the other of both sides - directly or indirectly.
Any future transition that takes into account this realignment of business forces has a great opportunity to achioeve its own ends.
Any relative competition for natural resources or raw material between "finshers" and "raw material exporters" typically is resolved in a bid by "finishers" trying to buy up and control the sources of raw material. This naturally is manifested in an open struggle in the political domain where different political groups are bought by the competing business interests.
With further growth in industrial sector and "value addition" sector, the "value addition" sector will increasingly determine political alignments.
The dilemma of the current grouping in power comes from the balancing act it has to maintain between these rising "value adders" and the non-value-adders. This is why it is perhaps leaning more and more towards the agricultural sector interests, [which is included in the "raw materials exports" category] and mining interests.
But this also means an impossible stress within the grouping itself. So more and more factions will emerge leaning towards or championing one or the other of both sides - directly or indirectly.
Any future transition that takes into account this realignment of business forces has a great opportunity to achioeve its own ends.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Friends, if you want, please take the EJ-IM line to "Indian Interests" or within GDF. Not everyone may choose to note the point about "imperialism". "Imperialism" of the theologian type usually quickly jumps to seeking a gag-order on anything seen as opposition.

Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Brihaspati, I did not mean to derail the thread. I know EJ discussion on BRF are prohibited, if not outright banned. So we can drop it. Most of what your wrote is spot on: "... inseparable from imperialism. They were shaped by imeprialist needs and they left their stamp on imperialism. ... They justify misappropriation of others labour and productivity with a theological twist."
One correction, EJ have not only left IM's out, they have also abandoned ROP states. EJ's have faced violent retaliation at attempts to convert ROP states. EJ's in those places have been eliminated without even an apology or even a pretense of one. EJ's are practical. They will go for easy fruits first. Secondly, they have left Jews out, that is the result of Jewish efforts to force the EJ's to abandon this effort. Hindu organizations in the West can do enormous work with regard to polemelical fights with the EJ's, which sadly I cannot see happening. [and you are right, the Hindu organizations can put that challenge to them: convert the ROP of the world, then come to India. We will gladly accept Xtianity if you are successfull in converting KSA & the entire ROP humankind first.]
I am sorry if I spoiled the thread. I should stop and would request others to stop as well.
One correction, EJ have not only left IM's out, they have also abandoned ROP states. EJ's have faced violent retaliation at attempts to convert ROP states. EJ's in those places have been eliminated without even an apology or even a pretense of one. EJ's are practical. They will go for easy fruits first. Secondly, they have left Jews out, that is the result of Jewish efforts to force the EJ's to abandon this effort. Hindu organizations in the West can do enormous work with regard to polemelical fights with the EJ's, which sadly I cannot see happening. [and you are right, the Hindu organizations can put that challenge to them: convert the ROP of the world, then come to India. We will gladly accept Xtianity if you are successfull in converting KSA & the entire ROP humankind first.]
I am sorry if I spoiled the thread. I should stop and would request others to stop as well.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Xposting here since this area (POK) is the place where a lot of action is taking place
BJP Yuva Morcha wants Pakistan-occupied Kashmir returned to India
http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_b ... ia_1435036
BJP Yuva Morcha wants Pakistan-occupied Kashmir returned to India
http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_b ... ia_1435036
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
That only helps the current regime to negotiate for concessions in other areas. They can show to the Chinese - that look if you don't deal with us and come to a compromise, then these are the future more hardcore alternatives you may have to deal with. But this does not necessarily help in achieving the objective of return of the POK.
It all depends on how important does POK appear in the calculations by the various factions behind the GOI. JLN's extra special initiative for J&K in sharp contrast to the pious platitudes of self-sacrifice he heaped upon the refugees and traumatized of the Punjab and Bengal - which also had like Kashmir Muslim predominance - is not explained by a sudden strategic insight that at the same time agrees to surrender Chittagong.
Secularist claims do not match with any unexpressed desire to preserve one of the earliest sites of "Hindu" religious development and continued pilgrimage.
So what really remained inconsistent in the motivations behind India's elite who came to power after the British handed it to them - still remains the fundamental mystery behind the continued stance over POK.
Why is POK important to Indian regimes - especially of the current type, and how important is it? If everything is determined by "valuation" of non-ideological kind - as claimed and demanded by a certain position of thought - [there cannot be any hard nad fast fixed "values" where national interests are concerned - implying everything has a monetary price], then what is the material value of POK to regimes in ND? That is a crucial question that has remained unanswered.
It all depends on how important does POK appear in the calculations by the various factions behind the GOI. JLN's extra special initiative for J&K in sharp contrast to the pious platitudes of self-sacrifice he heaped upon the refugees and traumatized of the Punjab and Bengal - which also had like Kashmir Muslim predominance - is not explained by a sudden strategic insight that at the same time agrees to surrender Chittagong.
Secularist claims do not match with any unexpressed desire to preserve one of the earliest sites of "Hindu" religious development and continued pilgrimage.
So what really remained inconsistent in the motivations behind India's elite who came to power after the British handed it to them - still remains the fundamental mystery behind the continued stance over POK.
Why is POK important to Indian regimes - especially of the current type, and how important is it? If everything is determined by "valuation" of non-ideological kind - as claimed and demanded by a certain position of thought - [there cannot be any hard nad fast fixed "values" where national interests are concerned - implying everything has a monetary price], then what is the material value of POK to regimes in ND? That is a crucial question that has remained unanswered.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Brihaspati, You probably know this history very well, but some of us might know the background, especially the angles that you are referring to. Could you very briefly give a background on:
What exactly are you referring to, that will get us all ont he same page. Thanks very much.JLN's extra special initiative for J&K in sharp contrast to the pious platitudes of self-sacrifice he heaped upon the refugees and traumatized of the Punjab and Bengal - which also had like Kashmir Muslim predominance - is not explained by a sudden strategic insight that at the same time agrees to surrender Chittagong.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Surinder,
The spoils of partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967, Joya Chatterji, Cambridge University Press.
p 129.
[The ref is to the infamous letter justifying discriminatory attitudes against "Bengali refugees" as that while 'there was something elemental' about the situation in West Pakistan, "where practically all Hindus and Sikhs have been driven out", whereas in the East it was more gradual, and many Hindus had been able to remain (Jawaharlal Nehru to B C Roy, 2 December 1949, cited in Saroj Chakrabarti, With Dr B C Roy, p 143) ]
Further :
"I have been quite certain, right from the beginning that everything should be done to prevent the Hindus in East Bengal from migrating to West Bengal. If that happened on a mass scale it would be a disaster of the first magnitude. Running away is never a solution to a problem. To the last I would try to check migration even if there is war" [Same book as above - p 109]
He did sign the Nehru-Liaqat pact in 1950 to prevent any further exchange of populations. At this stage without having mechanism for enforcing compliance on Pak part - it simply meant that Bengal and centre was handicapped severely to help the refugees in continued intensifying rioting while all government machinery was put to protecting counterpart Muslim property and life within India.
Compare this with the following from JLN on December 20, 1947 about Kashmir :
"Are we to allow Pakistan to continue to train new armies for invasion and to allow its territory to be used as a base for these attacks? The obvious course of action is to strike at these concentrations and lines of communications in Pakistan territory. From a military point of view this would be the most effective step. We have refrained from taking it because of political considerations. We shall have to reconsider this position because a continuation of the present situation is intolerable. If Pakistan is not prepared to help in putting an end to this war or even to try to withdraw these invaders then we should help ourselves, even by crossing some part of Pakistan territory and hitting at their concentrations. This involves a risk of war with Pakistan. We wish to avoid war, but it is merely deluding ourselves to imagine that we are avoiding war so long as the present operations are continuing on either side."
Compare this with Chittagong : http://www.angelfire.com/ab/jumma/bground/blunder.html The author was a career diplomat in IFS of Chakma descent.
These three brief quotes is just a pointer to what I was trying to say :
Such an intense interest about "Kashmir" could not have come from strategic consideration because getting Chittagong would have appeared equally important for someone with strategic vision about the future.
Such an intense interest about "Kashmir" could not have come from religious considerations in favour of Hindu shrines and holy spots since Nehru had declared himself to be secular, and did not take any concrete steps to pressurize Pakistan when temples were being continuously destroyed in East Pak. As far as I know he was strongly against Sardar's participation in the inauguration of the reconstructed Somnath temple.
However this will go OT and perhaps will be deemed fitter for the Partition thread.
But my question was : is there really any transparency and clarity about what, why and how much is POK worth to GOI? It does not appear clearly in the 1947-48 crisis. It still is not clear except legalese. By that criteria many things were done post Radcliffe that were not entirely based on "legal" criteria [Hyderabad/Goa...]- but then even in such ventures - Chittagong remained out of "consideration".
The spoils of partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967, Joya Chatterji, Cambridge University Press.
p 129.
Nehru himself remained convinced that conditions in East bengal did not constitute a grave and permanaent danger to its Hindu minorities. He regarded their flight westwards as the product of largely imaginary fears and baseless rumours, not the consequence of palpable threats to Hindu life, limb and property. Long after the exodus from the east had begun, Nehru continued to delude himself that it could be halted, even reversed, provided government in Dacca could somehow be persuaded to deploy 'psychological-measures' and restore confidence among the Hindu minorities who were leaving in droves.
[The ref is to the infamous letter justifying discriminatory attitudes against "Bengali refugees" as that while 'there was something elemental' about the situation in West Pakistan, "where practically all Hindus and Sikhs have been driven out", whereas in the East it was more gradual, and many Hindus had been able to remain (Jawaharlal Nehru to B C Roy, 2 December 1949, cited in Saroj Chakrabarti, With Dr B C Roy, p 143) ]
Further :
"I have been quite certain, right from the beginning that everything should be done to prevent the Hindus in East Bengal from migrating to West Bengal. If that happened on a mass scale it would be a disaster of the first magnitude. Running away is never a solution to a problem. To the last I would try to check migration even if there is war" [Same book as above - p 109]
He did sign the Nehru-Liaqat pact in 1950 to prevent any further exchange of populations. At this stage without having mechanism for enforcing compliance on Pak part - it simply meant that Bengal and centre was handicapped severely to help the refugees in continued intensifying rioting while all government machinery was put to protecting counterpart Muslim property and life within India.
Compare this with the following from JLN on December 20, 1947 about Kashmir :
"Are we to allow Pakistan to continue to train new armies for invasion and to allow its territory to be used as a base for these attacks? The obvious course of action is to strike at these concentrations and lines of communications in Pakistan territory. From a military point of view this would be the most effective step. We have refrained from taking it because of political considerations. We shall have to reconsider this position because a continuation of the present situation is intolerable. If Pakistan is not prepared to help in putting an end to this war or even to try to withdraw these invaders then we should help ourselves, even by crossing some part of Pakistan territory and hitting at their concentrations. This involves a risk of war with Pakistan. We wish to avoid war, but it is merely deluding ourselves to imagine that we are avoiding war so long as the present operations are continuing on either side."
Compare this with Chittagong : http://www.angelfire.com/ab/jumma/bground/blunder.html The author was a career diplomat in IFS of Chakma descent.
So the strategic significance of Chittagong paled in comparison with Kashmir in JLN's mind [he did not take steps of equal magnitude to get it back].The Radcliffe Commission submitted its Report on the 9th of August 1947. At the Staff Meeting on August 12, there was a virtual explosion and V.P. Menon, who was a confidant of Sardar Ballav Bhai Patel, reacted most violently when it came to be known that the Chittagong Hill Tracts was going to be given to Pakistan. The following day, on August 13th, the All India Congress Committee issued a declaration alleging that the award "lacked all sense of justice, equity and propriety" and, therefore, it was "ineffective, infurctuous and incapable of execution in international consciousness". Sardar Patel wrote an angry letter to Mountbatten expressing his indignation, calling the Radcliffe award "monstrous and a blatant breach of the terms of reference". He warned that "I am urging the tribesmen to resist amalgamation with Pakistan by force, if necessary". He was indeed a great patriot and a staunch nationalist.
Originally, the award of the Boundary Commission was to be made public on the 13th of August. But Mountbatten was reluctant to spill the beans. According to Philip Zeigler, the author of Mountbatten's official biography, the case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts was uppermost in Mountbatten's mind. "He (Mountbatten) foresaw an Independence Day marred by rancour, Nehru boycotting the ceremonies, India born in an atmosphere not of euphoria but of angry resentment. So Mountbatten decided to announce the award only on the 16th of August when the celebrations were over. As Zeigler writes, "India's indignation at the award of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to Pakistan may have been a factor in making up Mountbatten's mind to keep the reports to himself till after independence".
Mountbatten was himself surprised by the ferocity of Sardar Patel's reaction to the issue. In his memoirs he wrote: "The one man I had regarded as a real statesman with both his feet firmly on the ground, and a man of honour whose word was his bond, had turned out to be as hysterical as the rest. Candidly I was amazed that such a terrific crisis should have blown up over so small a matter. However, I have been long enough in India to realise that major crises are by no means confined to big matters." It may have been a small matter for Mountbatten in that exulted position as the Viceroy of India but what about the poor people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts? When wanton children throw stones at the frogs in sport, the frogs do not die in sport, they die in earnest. As Leonard Mosley in his book The Last Days of the British Raj puts it succinctly: "This is a matter for Mountbatten's conscience.
The award of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to Pakistan was so unexpected that even Justice Mohammad Munir, a Muslim member of the Boundary Commission. said: "I was certain from the start that the Chittagong Hill Tracts would be awarded to India." Obviously, it was against all principles of justice, equity and fair play.
Mr Jaipal Singh, who was member of the Sub-Committee of the Constituent Assembly of India dealing with the Excluded Areas, recorded a minute of dissent in which he wrote: "The Chittagong Hill Tracts must be claimed back to India". Soon afterwards, in a public speech in Calcutta, Nehru himself said that gross injustice had been done in regard to the Chittagong Hill Tracts. He also declared that the matter would be taken up with Pakistan. But nothing was done.
With a deep sigh full of pathos Mohit Chakma lamented, "There was no one to listen to our appeal or champion our cause. We sent a delegation of our leaders to New Delhi to plead our cause. They were received by Sardar Patel who gave a sympathetic hearing and advised them to resist with all their might. He did not hesitate to tell the members of the delegation, 'At the moment my hands are too full with Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh. Once these problems are solved, I assure you categorically that I will come to your rescue.' It was most unfortunate for the Chakmas that he did not live long enough. With the death of the indomitable Sardar on 15th December, 1950 all our hopes were dashed to the ground.
These three brief quotes is just a pointer to what I was trying to say :
Such an intense interest about "Kashmir" could not have come from strategic consideration because getting Chittagong would have appeared equally important for someone with strategic vision about the future.
Such an intense interest about "Kashmir" could not have come from religious considerations in favour of Hindu shrines and holy spots since Nehru had declared himself to be secular, and did not take any concrete steps to pressurize Pakistan when temples were being continuously destroyed in East Pak. As far as I know he was strongly against Sardar's participation in the inauguration of the reconstructed Somnath temple.
However this will go OT and perhaps will be deemed fitter for the Partition thread.
But my question was : is there really any transparency and clarity about what, why and how much is POK worth to GOI? It does not appear clearly in the 1947-48 crisis. It still is not clear except legalese. By that criteria many things were done post Radcliffe that were not entirely based on "legal" criteria [Hyderabad/Goa...]- but then even in such ventures - Chittagong remained out of "consideration".
Last edited by brihaspati on 09 Sep 2010 01:24, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The actual reasons for being so desperate about the Valley and POK realistically can be any one of the following:
(1) the geostrategic importance of the area for preventing Chinese meddling, reaching CAR and having border with AFG, and cutting off the Islamists in Pakjab from terrorist help given on the sly by PRC.
(2) the presence of Hindu and Buddhist shrines and traditional cultural sites in the Valley and occupied territories [though many are and being destroyed by the Islamists - effectively suppressed in the media reports ]
(3) from legal claims which of course has been complicated by JLN's acceptance of the two key surrender clauses - the UN supevised plebiscite and articles in the Constitution.
(4) economic and de-facto causes - any abandonment means the complete wastage of all that has been spent and all security forces and Islamist genocide victims lives.
(5) any other hidden agreements with one or more powers and goups
Each of these factors have their own consequences and supporting ideological justifications. But if a sufficiently strong core belief and target is lacking - it can reflect in policy indecision and pandering, with ad hoc measures.
(1) the geostrategic importance of the area for preventing Chinese meddling, reaching CAR and having border with AFG, and cutting off the Islamists in Pakjab from terrorist help given on the sly by PRC.
(2) the presence of Hindu and Buddhist shrines and traditional cultural sites in the Valley and occupied territories [though many are and being destroyed by the Islamists - effectively suppressed in the media reports ]
(3) from legal claims which of course has been complicated by JLN's acceptance of the two key surrender clauses - the UN supevised plebiscite and articles in the Constitution.
(4) economic and de-facto causes - any abandonment means the complete wastage of all that has been spent and all security forces and Islamist genocide victims lives.
(5) any other hidden agreements with one or more powers and goups
Each of these factors have their own consequences and supporting ideological justifications. But if a sufficiently strong core belief and target is lacking - it can reflect in policy indecision and pandering, with ad hoc measures.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
B-ji
Could the soft peddling on J&K be due to JLN's secular credentials and an assertive approach on JK would require JLN to assert Hindu-civilizational roots in contrast to a Islamic Pakistan? I say this on the basis that Punjab and Bengal were divided between Bharat and Pak where as JK was not in 1947. Perhaps he wanted it to be split like the others?
Is this the reason why all subsequent administrations also showed a blind-eye w.r.t POK?
Could the soft peddling on J&K be due to JLN's secular credentials and an assertive approach on JK would require JLN to assert Hindu-civilizational roots in contrast to a Islamic Pakistan? I say this on the basis that Punjab and Bengal were divided between Bharat and Pak where as JK was not in 1947. Perhaps he wanted it to be split like the others?
Is this the reason why all subsequent administrations also showed a blind-eye w.r.t POK?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
RamaY ji,
there really is no clear indication as to why the strange discriminatory thinking appeared in 1947-48 communications. I do not want to veer into "personal angles" to the crisis which descend into tabloid mania as concrete proof will be difficult to procure. I am sure you, just as I , have had such dirt being shared with ourselves. But remaining strictly within what is officially and documentarily available - almost nothing.
Only negative thing that one could think of is a hidden fear of the tribes of POK, some of whom were parts of the invading formations from PAK at the time. But by that token even the ex-Razakars and their networks in Hyderabad should have been under a huge cloud of suspicion. It has been pointed out however that Owaisi's mentor was rehabilitated post independence and their religion-based political grouping uncannily seemed to be effective "displacers" of growing CPI influence who were in turn growing at Congress expense.
there really is no clear indication as to why the strange discriminatory thinking appeared in 1947-48 communications. I do not want to veer into "personal angles" to the crisis which descend into tabloid mania as concrete proof will be difficult to procure. I am sure you, just as I , have had such dirt being shared with ourselves. But remaining strictly within what is officially and documentarily available - almost nothing.
Only negative thing that one could think of is a hidden fear of the tribes of POK, some of whom were parts of the invading formations from PAK at the time. But by that token even the ex-Razakars and their networks in Hyderabad should have been under a huge cloud of suspicion. It has been pointed out however that Owaisi's mentor was rehabilitated post independence and their religion-based political grouping uncannily seemed to be effective "displacers" of growing CPI influence who were in turn growing at Congress expense.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
There is an obscure ref that JLN asked for the ceasefire as he was assured by the National Conference leadership that the people in the POK areas were not those whom the NC considered as their own. IOW, they were thrown to the Paki hyenas on counsel. People keep saying JLN did this and that but on whose advice?
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Should be in the J&K thread too.
Frontline article on J&K period between Independence and accession by AG Noorani:
Kak and Sheikh
Frontline article on J&K period between Independence and accession by AG Noorani:
Kak and Sheikh
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Noorani sahab strangely stops just short of analyzing the then ideological underpinnings of NC. What about the strange undercurrents of "Bolshevism" and possible aims of authoritarian rule under Sheikh's leadership?
They were each trying to carve out personal fiefdoms - the Royalists, Sheikh and NC, Jinnah. JLN's moves still appear inexplicable in the key question of "why Kashmir". From the very beginning, we are still not clear about the essential motivations behind the drive from the Indian side. A clear acknowledgment of the actual motivations even now would help a lot.
my take on this is as follows:
Somehow, lets say "force X", was able to raise the spectre of a semi-independent Kashmir as being able to play around with enemies of X, say USSR. A Nehru with known socialist leanings and admiration for Soviets, and a Sheikh who gave hints of leaning the same way would then be dangerous if they had hold of entire J&K. But could Jinnah and his successors be trusted either not to play around if they got Kashmir?
So the best method would be to allow it to be divided up and the division kept hanging and undecided at the UN which would be under X's control - at least veto wise if it came to that. Each side could then be led on by their nose to keep the other in check - and none of the three on-ground interests could then play independently.
But if someone was the PM of India, then we would expect that person to see through such "machinations". Moreover, the same motivations can still be there.
They were each trying to carve out personal fiefdoms - the Royalists, Sheikh and NC, Jinnah. JLN's moves still appear inexplicable in the key question of "why Kashmir". From the very beginning, we are still not clear about the essential motivations behind the drive from the Indian side. A clear acknowledgment of the actual motivations even now would help a lot.
my take on this is as follows:
Somehow, lets say "force X", was able to raise the spectre of a semi-independent Kashmir as being able to play around with enemies of X, say USSR. A Nehru with known socialist leanings and admiration for Soviets, and a Sheikh who gave hints of leaning the same way would then be dangerous if they had hold of entire J&K. But could Jinnah and his successors be trusted either not to play around if they got Kashmir?
So the best method would be to allow it to be divided up and the division kept hanging and undecided at the UN which would be under X's control - at least veto wise if it came to that. Each side could then be led on by their nose to keep the other in check - and none of the three on-ground interests could then play independently.
But if someone was the PM of India, then we would expect that person to see through such "machinations". Moreover, the same motivations can still be there.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
B, thanks for the explanation.
Reading Partition & INC history, one things that always strikes me is that there are always holes in the sequence of events. These are just events/statements/attitudes that don't make sense and are out of order and require a suspension of practical sensibilities.
Often the cause of such gaps is either the British force at the back of INC, using its personal or coercive power. Or, the INC's inherent dishonesty unexpectedly surfacing. Usually a combination, since British played on the dishonesty of INC, and its leaders by extension.
My take on is the following, obviously without air-tight citations to back it: British needed TSP to be a viable nation, strong enough to balance India, and also do its bidding. The realized that Kashmir being Muslim Majority must go to TSP, but the principles of partition aggreed upon put the decision with "ruler" of the state, in this case the Dogra King. The Maharaja, being Hindu, was unlikely to go to TSP. So they got Brown to stage a rebellion (keeping deniablity option alive). But later gave him MBE, so that shows their hand and that Brown was not acting on his own initative. CHT, on the other hand were 98% non-ROP. But the British realized the importance of denying CHT to India, and used Radcliffe to award that to TSP. Most likely, behind the scenes Mountbatten worked on JLN, MKG to make them not raise the CHT issue. Being practical, they understood that Hyderabad stood no chance of joining TSP, or being independent. So it was thrown as a crumb to the Sardar. But with regard to CHT, the British used their pull to quiten JLN, MKG. JLN was Kashmiri, so that could be a pull for him towards J&K. Also, he and Shekh were close, both due to their kashmiri origins but also because Sheikh and JLN shared the same anti-maharajah feelings along with pro-Socialist leanings. British understood that JLN was harder to work on in the case of Kashmir so they arranged & helped & organized the tribal Lashkars to gain that state for TSP. Since they controlled the armies on both India & TSP side, they ensured that India was unable to go forward and win territory back, even though it had the capability to do so.
Reading Partition & INC history, one things that always strikes me is that there are always holes in the sequence of events. These are just events/statements/attitudes that don't make sense and are out of order and require a suspension of practical sensibilities.
Often the cause of such gaps is either the British force at the back of INC, using its personal or coercive power. Or, the INC's inherent dishonesty unexpectedly surfacing. Usually a combination, since British played on the dishonesty of INC, and its leaders by extension.
My take on is the following, obviously without air-tight citations to back it: British needed TSP to be a viable nation, strong enough to balance India, and also do its bidding. The realized that Kashmir being Muslim Majority must go to TSP, but the principles of partition aggreed upon put the decision with "ruler" of the state, in this case the Dogra King. The Maharaja, being Hindu, was unlikely to go to TSP. So they got Brown to stage a rebellion (keeping deniablity option alive). But later gave him MBE, so that shows their hand and that Brown was not acting on his own initative. CHT, on the other hand were 98% non-ROP. But the British realized the importance of denying CHT to India, and used Radcliffe to award that to TSP. Most likely, behind the scenes Mountbatten worked on JLN, MKG to make them not raise the CHT issue. Being practical, they understood that Hyderabad stood no chance of joining TSP, or being independent. So it was thrown as a crumb to the Sardar. But with regard to CHT, the British used their pull to quiten JLN, MKG. JLN was Kashmiri, so that could be a pull for him towards J&K. Also, he and Shekh were close, both due to their kashmiri origins but also because Sheikh and JLN shared the same anti-maharajah feelings along with pro-Socialist leanings. British understood that JLN was harder to work on in the case of Kashmir so they arranged & helped & organized the tribal Lashkars to gain that state for TSP. Since they controlled the armies on both India & TSP side, they ensured that India was unable to go forward and win territory back, even though it had the capability to do so.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Any prizes for guessing X = ????brihaspati wrote:Somehow, lets say "force X", ....

Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
X-pOsted...
Gives good details of the TSP plan during the 1980s to create a new Khilafat type confederation using the CA states as tributaries.
Brad Goodman wrote:Regional Scenario: Central Asian ‘Muslim’ states fear Pakistan – by Shiraz Paracha
pretty long but interesting article. Talks about image of pakis in the eyes of Central Asian states. Breaks the myth that pakis carry that they C Asians. Sorry Taimur might have left behind few seeds after his conquest but unfortunately there is no love here from the master. Another interesting point was paki foreign office babus look down upon posting in C Asia as demotion and indulge in activities they are not allowed to do (figure out what)
Gives good details of the TSP plan during the 1980s to create a new Khilafat type confederation using the CA states as tributaries.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
I still do not see much happening on the ground to allow me to drop my earlier hypothesis that Obama/US forces will have to virtually abandon AFG in a period beginning coming winter - if it decides to postpone formal withdrawal. The US may protest that it is not "really" withdrawing, but if it wants to stay on in some form - it will be forced to face a Nam like situation.
The US was never really in control of AFG politics. It intimidated and bought temporary allegiance of AFG factions, but it was never really in control over the politics. It could not bring itself to destroying the actual political institution in AFG - the Islamist network which replaces all other forms of politics and political expression in any Islamist society. Since that base was preserved, it was only a matter of time for the Islamist networks to reassert their control after using the influx of resources from the US invasion.
The AFG Islamists can get supplied from a host of sources - including the Sunni theologian underbelly of KSA led states, sections of Chinese establishment who would like to play around with neo-Maoist sympathies for Islamism, and even Iran. It may not be that surprising if it comes out in the future that USA has carried out secret negotiations with the Chinese - in the way they cut deals with Mao prior to abandonment of Nam - by which USA would eventually retreat from AFG.
What would be crucial to filter is which one of the several possible deals or bargains that USA plans to or has already gained.
But even if such deals have been cut, the spoiler in the broth are the Talebs and the Islamist network all around AFG. Even if the Chinese put up PLA to shore up POK, as more time passes in the hands of USA/UK and PRC joining hands to keep India out of the picture - both will be roundly kicked out from the north. Problem is that the Chinese typically submit to "barbarians" rather quickly while USA flies if the enemy shows sufficient Sadism - and the two will vacate the place yielding it up to the Islamists to dance around on northern India. Here the Uyghur example is not a counterexample - they were within PRC borders. AFG Islamists are beyond borders, and the CAR is descending into chaos and fractionation allowing Islamists to eventually make it a free corridor for their free movements.
I am not saying that the Islamist forces are invincible. Only that we have handicapped ourselves by restricting battle practices for ourselves that are freely used by Islamists everywhere. This so-called civilizational restrictions ultimately give absolute power to Islamists who care a fib for such civilizational values. All wars are extensions of politics, and no one can win wars by losing the politics.
The US was never really in control of AFG politics. It intimidated and bought temporary allegiance of AFG factions, but it was never really in control over the politics. It could not bring itself to destroying the actual political institution in AFG - the Islamist network which replaces all other forms of politics and political expression in any Islamist society. Since that base was preserved, it was only a matter of time for the Islamist networks to reassert their control after using the influx of resources from the US invasion.
The AFG Islamists can get supplied from a host of sources - including the Sunni theologian underbelly of KSA led states, sections of Chinese establishment who would like to play around with neo-Maoist sympathies for Islamism, and even Iran. It may not be that surprising if it comes out in the future that USA has carried out secret negotiations with the Chinese - in the way they cut deals with Mao prior to abandonment of Nam - by which USA would eventually retreat from AFG.
What would be crucial to filter is which one of the several possible deals or bargains that USA plans to or has already gained.
But even if such deals have been cut, the spoiler in the broth are the Talebs and the Islamist network all around AFG. Even if the Chinese put up PLA to shore up POK, as more time passes in the hands of USA/UK and PRC joining hands to keep India out of the picture - both will be roundly kicked out from the north. Problem is that the Chinese typically submit to "barbarians" rather quickly while USA flies if the enemy shows sufficient Sadism - and the two will vacate the place yielding it up to the Islamists to dance around on northern India. Here the Uyghur example is not a counterexample - they were within PRC borders. AFG Islamists are beyond borders, and the CAR is descending into chaos and fractionation allowing Islamists to eventually make it a free corridor for their free movements.
I am not saying that the Islamist forces are invincible. Only that we have handicapped ourselves by restricting battle practices for ourselves that are freely used by Islamists everywhere. This so-called civilizational restrictions ultimately give absolute power to Islamists who care a fib for such civilizational values. All wars are extensions of politics, and no one can win wars by losing the politics.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
PRC Constitution restricts President to two consecutive terms - implying that Hu Jintao has to be replaced in 2012. Typically the candidate needs to simultaneously hold three positions: CCP General Secretary, PRC President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Usually the process starts by appointment to the CCP’s nine member Standing Committee of the Politburo - a kind of Indian Cabinet, both houses of the Parliament, and the AICC, and (AI)CWC all rolled together - in role. A rubber-stamp election as PRC Vice-President by the formal puppet legislature follows next. Third and final preparatory step is an appointment as the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission by the party. The CMC is supreme authority for everything regarding the PLA, and the same members grace both versions of the CMC - the government as well as the party one - and is answerable to party.
Xi Jinping, was appointed to the Politburo in 2007, and VP in 2008, but was not appointed the VC of CMC in 2009. There are various theories about this - with one more favourable to Xi as him being reluctant to take up the post before attending to more "urgent" tasks. However, given that formal rhetoric in communist parties often mask real factional infighting and communist statements are almost entirely a matter of subterfuge when dealing with party politics - such a step of delaying the "inevitable" implies that the succession of Xi is actually being contested.
Hu’s preferred protégé has been estimated as Li Keqiang, a disciple from his Chinese Communist Youth League days. Li was appointed to the Politburo at the same time as Xi but was ranked lower [intimated to the "outsiders" by the serial number of the person in the list]. In 2008, when Xi was elected as VP Li was elected as Vice-Premier. So in China-watching circles terminology, Li is a member of President Hu’s faction of “Youth Leaguers,” while Xi is a member of former President Jiang Zemin’s “Shanghai Clique.”
The "Youth Leaguers" are supposed to be more obsessed about growing income and status inequities. The "Shanghai Clique" on the other hand is focused on the radical capitalist or state capitalist route. The "youth leaguers" have been accused of supporting the "neo-Maoists".
The question is who is stronger now, and who will grow stronger in the future? It could come to a head around the 2012 change of leadership. Xi is supposed to be a hardliner projecting the pugnacious "nationalist" facade rather more strongly than the more diplomatic Hu.
One of the consequences of this potential internal fight within CPC is using external war to liquidate internal party opposition. For both factions war with India could be a tempting way out. However if somehow China loses out or faces a stalemate in such a war with India, the blame could wipe out the faction that had initially won the internal party struggle.
There has been some discussions on forum threads that India needs at least 6-8 years to even think of matching or overpowering Pak forces in POK and tackle PLA intervention at the same time. Does not that imply that, since as many claim that Pakis or PRC leadership are no fools either - that they can game this time window of opportunity and push for expansion before India is ready?
In fact a campaign against India could actually help clarify the internal policy shifts that China wants to carry out and decide one way or the other.
Xi Jinping, was appointed to the Politburo in 2007, and VP in 2008, but was not appointed the VC of CMC in 2009. There are various theories about this - with one more favourable to Xi as him being reluctant to take up the post before attending to more "urgent" tasks. However, given that formal rhetoric in communist parties often mask real factional infighting and communist statements are almost entirely a matter of subterfuge when dealing with party politics - such a step of delaying the "inevitable" implies that the succession of Xi is actually being contested.
Hu’s preferred protégé has been estimated as Li Keqiang, a disciple from his Chinese Communist Youth League days. Li was appointed to the Politburo at the same time as Xi but was ranked lower [intimated to the "outsiders" by the serial number of the person in the list]. In 2008, when Xi was elected as VP Li was elected as Vice-Premier. So in China-watching circles terminology, Li is a member of President Hu’s faction of “Youth Leaguers,” while Xi is a member of former President Jiang Zemin’s “Shanghai Clique.”
The "Youth Leaguers" are supposed to be more obsessed about growing income and status inequities. The "Shanghai Clique" on the other hand is focused on the radical capitalist or state capitalist route. The "youth leaguers" have been accused of supporting the "neo-Maoists".
The question is who is stronger now, and who will grow stronger in the future? It could come to a head around the 2012 change of leadership. Xi is supposed to be a hardliner projecting the pugnacious "nationalist" facade rather more strongly than the more diplomatic Hu.
One of the consequences of this potential internal fight within CPC is using external war to liquidate internal party opposition. For both factions war with India could be a tempting way out. However if somehow China loses out or faces a stalemate in such a war with India, the blame could wipe out the faction that had initially won the internal party struggle.
There has been some discussions on forum threads that India needs at least 6-8 years to even think of matching or overpowering Pak forces in POK and tackle PLA intervention at the same time. Does not that imply that, since as many claim that Pakis or PRC leadership are no fools either - that they can game this time window of opportunity and push for expansion before India is ready?
In fact a campaign against India could actually help clarify the internal policy shifts that China wants to carry out and decide one way or the other.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Self delete.
Thanks for the foresight Jupiter!
Thanks for the foresight Jupiter!
Last edited by Klaus on 11 Sep 2010 20:37, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Maybe it will help to keep in mind that not only your friends but also your "enemies" are looking out to get a glimpse of your mindset. Maybe it is time to confuse the "outsiders" in the open thread and take the details to GDF? Or P2P? 
added : started a GDF version for such explicit "campaign" plans. Please happily fire away there!

added : started a GDF version for such explicit "campaign" plans. Please happily fire away there!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Did a CIA mole compromise India’s 1971 war plans?
http://canarytrap.in/2009/01/02/did-a-c ... war-plans/
For war situations and campaign plans, it is better to have all power concentrated in only one person from the political side who interacts and decides with the armed forces command and does not share such plans with the cabinet or rest of the political grouping in the regime in power.
http://canarytrap.in/2009/01/02/did-a-c ... war-plans/
This is another risk in the democratic process of deciding on crucial tactical details. What prevents moles of similar nature not being there in the current cabinet? Such moles would be the perfect explanation for crucial failures in foreign policy initiatives by leaking strategic plans to USA or China or to a third party that supplies both. Some European countries would be the perfetc kissers of both pairs of cheeks. Not sure whether the string of losing bids by India's corporations in energy field abroad stems from a similar process.Posted by CT on Friday, January 2, 2009 · Comments (36)
Every time I have a conversation with friends and colleagues about India-Pakistan, most of them complain about what they think as India’s failure to teach Pakistan a lasting lesson during the 1971 war.
I often wondered as to why did Indira Gandhi’s government let Pakistan off despite being in a dominant position during the war, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. Available archival material suggest international pressure on India was one of the reasons why Prime Minister Gandhi could not take any decisive action against West Pakistan (today’s Pakistan).
A recent blog post by Anuj Dhar revealed damning details of India’s war objectives during the 1971 war. Anuj’s new book, CIA’s eye on South Asia, has a detailed account of what happened in 1971 and why India did not (or could not) take decisive action against West Pakistan. The book compiles declassified CIA records regarding South Asia and also reveals the reason behind the abrupt end of the Bangladesh war. I had downloaded these declassified documents last year but never read them entirely. But after reading Anuj’s blog, I decided to dig into the old records.
The declassification of vital CIA and US State Department documents relating to South Asia reveals that the American spy agency (CIA) had a vital source in Mrs Gandhi’s cabinet. CIA’s ‘reliable source’ leaked India’s war objectives to the US, thereby compromising India’s plan to teach Pakistan a lasting lesson.
The details of Mrs Gandhi’s Cabinet briefings were also known to the CIA within hours. The minutes of the National Security Council meeting in Washington on December 6, 1971 ( See page 672 of the document) sheds some light on this. The CIA director Richard Helms informed the meeting that: “We have a report which covers Madam Gandhi’s strategy as delivered to her Cabinet at 11 pm on December 3, 1971……The objectives in the west (Pakistan) are to destroy Pakistan’s armour and in the east to totally liberate the area.”
An information cable of the CIA dated December 7, 1971 ( See page 686 of the document) reveals details of Mrs Gandhi’s briefing to her Cabinet on the India-Pakistan war. The information, attributed to a reliable source, includes India’s war objectives as reiterated by Mrs Gandhi. They were:
1. The quick liberation of Bangladesh
2. The incorporation into India of the southern part of Azad Kashmir for strategic rather than territorial reasons (because India has no desire to occupy any West Pakistan territory)
3. To destroy Pakistani military striking power so that it never attempts to challenge India in the future
The CIA report also added that the Indian Prime Minister had informed her Cabinet that India would not accept any ceasefire till Bangladesh was liberated.
Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani political and strategic analyst, in his book Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, says: “Mrs Gandhi asked her defence chiefs to be ready to drive into Sialkot and then proceed as deep as possible even upto Rawalpindi with the aim of destroying Pakistan. The CIA managed to get actual minutes of the meeting and passed them to Washington urgently.”
The author, however, does not mention the source of the information he has revealed in his book.
In another disclosure, the CIA director informed the Washington Special Actions Group in a meeting on December 8, 1971 ( See page 694 of the document) that Mrs Gandhi had told her Cabinet that “she had expected a more balanced view from the Chinese. She expressed the hope that the Chinese would not intervene physically in the north, but said that the Soviets had said the Chinese would be able to ‘rattle the sword.’ She also said that the Soviets have promised to counterbalance any such action.”
The disclosure of India’s war objectives by the mole resulted in an aggressive policy by the US to save West Pakistan from the Indian assault.
In a meeting with the Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN (Ambassador Huang Hua) on December 10, 1971 ( See page 757 of the document), Henry Kissinger (President Nixons’s NSA) said, “we have an intelligence report according to which Mrs Gandhi told her cabinet that she wants to destroy the Pakistani army and air force and to annex this part of Kashmir, Azad Kashmir, and then to offer a ceasefire. This is what we believe must be prevented and this is why I have taken the liberty to ask for this meeting with the Ambassador.”
For war situations and campaign plans, it is better to have all power concentrated in only one person from the political side who interacts and decides with the armed forces command and does not share such plans with the cabinet or rest of the political grouping in the regime in power.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
US wants report on SL
http://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&source ... JG4qvkFBaQ
First the chinese, now the yank's all seem to be playing in our backyard.
Question is What is G.O.I doing behind the scenes?
http://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&source ... JG4qvkFBaQ
First the chinese, now the yank's all seem to be playing in our backyard.
Question is What is G.O.I doing behind the scenes?
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Bji, Sometimes one wonders if such reports are psy-ops. After failing to stop Mrs G from detaching East Pakistan, it would be in US interests to claim to have saved rest of Pakistan especially to the drunken leaders like Yahya Khan. The real proof of pudding is did India have the armed forces to fight two offensive wars at same time. To me it was more like one offensive and another defensive war was the capability. If India had the offensive capability we couldn't have lost Chaamb in J&K nor would Battle of Longewala have occurred!
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Xposting the link
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home ... 541291.cms
From the link:
Quote
With so much invested in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Americans are not paying enough attention to East Asia and the global commons. China is steadily on the rise. This is not altogether bad: a better balance of power is stabilising for the international system. But the key is balance. In Asia, the balance will be hard to preserve given China's enormous size and potential. The US could wake up very soon to find that Beijing is the hegemon of Asia. Before Washington reacts, the Chinese, who are driving deep into Africa, will also be ensconced in Latin America.
Unquote
Quote
A rampant America, after the Cold War, was not always a progressive force, but at least it provided global leadership. Today, the world faces the possibility of an America riven politically, battered economically and shaken militarily, its forces rattled by the experience of asymmetric warfare. An unconfident America, with a waning sense of power and purpose, fighting an unwinnable war in Afghanistan, is not in India's or the world's interest.
unquote
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home ... 541291.cms
From the link:
Quote
With so much invested in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Americans are not paying enough attention to East Asia and the global commons. China is steadily on the rise. This is not altogether bad: a better balance of power is stabilising for the international system. But the key is balance. In Asia, the balance will be hard to preserve given China's enormous size and potential. The US could wake up very soon to find that Beijing is the hegemon of Asia. Before Washington reacts, the Chinese, who are driving deep into Africa, will also be ensconced in Latin America.
Unquote
Quote
A rampant America, after the Cold War, was not always a progressive force, but at least it provided global leadership. Today, the world faces the possibility of an America riven politically, battered economically and shaken militarily, its forces rattled by the experience of asymmetric warfare. An unconfident America, with a waning sense of power and purpose, fighting an unwinnable war in Afghanistan, is not in India's or the world's interest.
unquote
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The author of the article should be asked why isn't it in India Interest? And why does a strong US have to be in India's interest?Manishw wrote: .........
Quote
A rampant America, after the Cold War, was not always a progressive force, but at least it provided global leadership. Today, the world faces the possibility of an America riven politically, battered economically and shaken militarily, its forces rattled by the experience of asymmetric warfare. An unconfident America, with a waning sense of power and purpose, fighting an unwinnable war in Afghanistan, is not in India's or the world's interest.
unquote
The way history has played out in the sub-continent, seems to suggest that US has not been a source of solace or help in any dependable form for India. Rather it has been an immense impediment, whose actions have harmed us immensely (think about arming the afghan mujaheddin, NSG/NTP sanctions till recently, etc.)
America's wounds in Afghanistan are self-inflicted. They bought this on themselves, by focusing on Iraq and not Afghanistan. If Iran is liberated from the box that it found itself in, Fanatic Taliban on East and nemesis Saddam on West, it is due to America. They have been unable to prevent the Taliban from crossing Afghanistan's borders. They have failed in 9 years to build institutions and forces in Afghanistan which might help them. Frankly Afghanistan has shown how poorly Americans are on strategic, tactical and implementation front. Taliban is a ragtag motley group, not even an army by any yardstick, which is running a parallel government right under the noses of the yanks.
We should not shed a tear, if America declines or falters. Rather its experience in Afghanistan should be an eye opener for its capability and intent.