Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
I assume the latest outpouring of factual revelations are timed to coincide with Blackwill's public proposals on partition. All are aimed at stepping up pressure on Pak.
But what is the pressure intended to achieve? Keep Pak away from Karzai? Get Pak to turf out AlQaeda and/or Haqqani before US withdrawal?
But what is the pressure intended to achieve? Keep Pak away from Karzai? Get Pak to turf out AlQaeda and/or Haqqani before US withdrawal?
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
Afghanistan 'shocked' by leaked U.S. documents
: )The New York Times reported Sunday that military field documents included in the release suggest that Pakistan, an ally of the United States in the war against terror, has been running something of a "double game," allowing "representatives of its spy service to meet directly with the Taliban in secret strategy sessions to organize networks of militant groups that fight against American soldiers in Afghanistan, and even hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders."
Herawi charged that Washington needed to deal with Pakistani intelligence, known as the ISI.
"There should be serious action taken against the ISI, who has a direct connection with the terrorists," he said. "These reports show that the U.S. was already aware of the ISI connection with the al Qaeda terrorist network. The United States is overdue on the ISI issue and now the United States should answer."
But Gen. Hamid Gul, the former head of Pakistan's intelligence service and who is mentioned numerous times in the Wikileaks reports, called the accusations lies.
"These reports are absolutely and utterly false," Gul said Monday. "I think they [United States] re failing and they're looking for scapegoats."
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
There is more to the revelation of the logs than meets the eye. Here is a low down:
1. The timing of the leaks is highly circumspect, coinciding as it does with incredibly increased American pressure on Paki to toe its line. As such, the leak has unwritten offical sanction.
2. The 'intelligence' released is low level data, something that soldiers collect. Hence, if US govt wants to spin its interpretation later, that door has been left open. No long term harm done.
3. This leak is another sordid saga in the sad tale of US involvement in Afghanistan, since the late 70s.
4. The policy of 'war management' by news leaks shows how bereft of ideas AND influence the US has become. If they cannot even stand up to its vasal pakistan, you can imagine how little influence they have in that country. This is despite the billions of dollars of official bribes the US gives to that country.
5. Read this latest step from Washington as a continuation of the policy drift that also saw the axe fall on McChrystal. In that episode, the civilians took control of the war from the generals. In this episode, you see the shallowness of the understanding that US civilian leadership has of the pakistani leadership. At least, the generals had some level of understanding due to long association and similar background (paki leadership being military).
6. Towards the end of Obama's tenure, people will miss George W Bush. At the very least, he stopped the terror campaign of the Islamists cold. Obama will leave presidentship with America more insecure than when he inherited it.
7. Pakis do not know the pressure that will be brought to bear on them. They see the US troops leaving, and think they have won a victory. They are wrong, US is simply cutting its losses, and expects pakis to die for them.
8. Kiyani's extension is part of the same policy. The US likes to have generals in command in the countries that are their allies.
9. Indo Pak relations will get worse, and may lead to war or war like situation. This is because of typical Paki short term positive thinking that is induced whenever US needs them and plies them with weapons.
10. We may even see a fresh wave of terror attacks.
11. The failure of India's pro-US policies will be felt immediately in the MRCA contest. Do no expect any american firm to win. They *might* be molified with a couple of sops here and there. But the fighters are gone.
12. One thing about MMS's recent offer to mediate between Iran and US - he *may have* merely fending off the pressure by western nations to sanction Iran. Now, he can claim that his offer to mediate peace was not taken up by western countries, and India can merrily trade with Iran. If this hypothesis is true, then MMS may yet prove to be able to defend Indian interests against US.
-------------
Added later, Gul is wrong when he says US is looking for scape goats. It is looking for scrificial lambs, and you are it. Just like they supported Saddam the Hussein, and later killed him - now it is pakistan's turn. I think I will purchase a popcorn maker.
-------------
Added much later, I think I will reserve my judgement on Obama. He is trying very hard, and his inexperience in not his fault. There are still many throws of the dice still left in this game, and he may yet trun out to be a winner.
1. The timing of the leaks is highly circumspect, coinciding as it does with incredibly increased American pressure on Paki to toe its line. As such, the leak has unwritten offical sanction.
2. The 'intelligence' released is low level data, something that soldiers collect. Hence, if US govt wants to spin its interpretation later, that door has been left open. No long term harm done.
3. This leak is another sordid saga in the sad tale of US involvement in Afghanistan, since the late 70s.
4. The policy of 'war management' by news leaks shows how bereft of ideas AND influence the US has become. If they cannot even stand up to its vasal pakistan, you can imagine how little influence they have in that country. This is despite the billions of dollars of official bribes the US gives to that country.
5. Read this latest step from Washington as a continuation of the policy drift that also saw the axe fall on McChrystal. In that episode, the civilians took control of the war from the generals. In this episode, you see the shallowness of the understanding that US civilian leadership has of the pakistani leadership. At least, the generals had some level of understanding due to long association and similar background (paki leadership being military).
6. Towards the end of Obama's tenure, people will miss George W Bush. At the very least, he stopped the terror campaign of the Islamists cold. Obama will leave presidentship with America more insecure than when he inherited it.
7. Pakis do not know the pressure that will be brought to bear on them. They see the US troops leaving, and think they have won a victory. They are wrong, US is simply cutting its losses, and expects pakis to die for them.
8. Kiyani's extension is part of the same policy. The US likes to have generals in command in the countries that are their allies.
9. Indo Pak relations will get worse, and may lead to war or war like situation. This is because of typical Paki short term positive thinking that is induced whenever US needs them and plies them with weapons.
10. We may even see a fresh wave of terror attacks.
11. The failure of India's pro-US policies will be felt immediately in the MRCA contest. Do no expect any american firm to win. They *might* be molified with a couple of sops here and there. But the fighters are gone.
12. One thing about MMS's recent offer to mediate between Iran and US - he *may have* merely fending off the pressure by western nations to sanction Iran. Now, he can claim that his offer to mediate peace was not taken up by western countries, and India can merrily trade with Iran. If this hypothesis is true, then MMS may yet prove to be able to defend Indian interests against US.
-------------
Added later, Gul is wrong when he says US is looking for scape goats. It is looking for scrificial lambs, and you are it. Just like they supported Saddam the Hussein, and later killed him - now it is pakistan's turn. I think I will purchase a popcorn maker.
-------------
Added much later, I think I will reserve my judgement on Obama. He is trying very hard, and his inexperience in not his fault. There are still many throws of the dice still left in this game, and he may yet trun out to be a winner.
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
PS
Some posts ago (in another thread?) I had said that America is running out of options. This leak merely illucidates how few the options are if they have to resort to unofficial leaks to put pressure on pak.
Some posts ago (in another thread?) I had said that America is running out of options. This leak merely illucidates how few the options are if they have to resort to unofficial leaks to put pressure on pak.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
or this could be a public domain way of building a 'case for action' against pak, so that when the hellfire strikes hit something more significant then there is already a good causus belli established
how is unkil getting on with establishing his new supply lines across central asia?
how is unkil getting on with establishing his new supply lines across central asia?
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
^^ Lal mullah, since when has unkil needed causus belli to cause war? They are the only hold out that has not signed the Geneva convention.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
^^^ audit trail onlee
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
^^^^
I still dont understand the following-- why should the leaks have sanction of US.
1) if the US wants to cut losses and escape back to their homes, it need not have to give the info in the leaks and run with its tail between the legs.
2) If it wants to nail bakis in helping the taliban, it is an known event. you do not need the leaks. They could have asked their embedded reporters to mould the public opinion easily all these years and also anytime. Anyway the american public is aware of bakis to some extent. it just have to be whetted up a little more by the american press.
3) OTOH it certainly gives grist to neighbouring nations -India China Iran Russia etc that US cannot be trusted at any point of time. It will only make things difficult for US relations with all of them.
4) EU will make noises about it at least in private and may even pull back troops soon rather than late due to various factors -- economy and public pressure.
5) it is a loss of face for US troops.
6) it will be a bonanaza for the taliban to recruit more faithfools as soosai bummers.Mistrust between US and muslim world will increase. the overtures of Ombaba notwithstanding.
7) The belief that US went to fight them in Af-Pak so that they would not have to face attacks at home sounds hollow.
8)Reports of Afghanisthan has minerals, gateway of central asia etc and is the cockpit of asia or whatever it is called has gone for a toss with enormous loss.
9) If US thinks it cannot handle the bakis-taliban alone most probably it will take help of other countries directly or indirectly like India China russia even Iran. Remember there are no permanent enemies only permamanent interests.
Overall IMHO it is not a leak santioned by US.
I still dont understand the following-- why should the leaks have sanction of US.
1) if the US wants to cut losses and escape back to their homes, it need not have to give the info in the leaks and run with its tail between the legs.
2) If it wants to nail bakis in helping the taliban, it is an known event. you do not need the leaks. They could have asked their embedded reporters to mould the public opinion easily all these years and also anytime. Anyway the american public is aware of bakis to some extent. it just have to be whetted up a little more by the american press.
3) OTOH it certainly gives grist to neighbouring nations -India China Iran Russia etc that US cannot be trusted at any point of time. It will only make things difficult for US relations with all of them.
4) EU will make noises about it at least in private and may even pull back troops soon rather than late due to various factors -- economy and public pressure.
5) it is a loss of face for US troops.
6) it will be a bonanaza for the taliban to recruit more faithfools as soosai bummers.Mistrust between US and muslim world will increase. the overtures of Ombaba notwithstanding.
7) The belief that US went to fight them in Af-Pak so that they would not have to face attacks at home sounds hollow.
8)Reports of Afghanisthan has minerals, gateway of central asia etc and is the cockpit of asia or whatever it is called has gone for a toss with enormous loss.
9) If US thinks it cannot handle the bakis-taliban alone most probably it will take help of other countries directly or indirectly like India China russia even Iran. Remember there are no permanent enemies only permamanent interests.
Overall IMHO it is not a leak santioned by US.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
1. It gives a reason for why it could not win the war. It had material & men to do the job but its will was thwarted by the people aiding the insurgents.
2. The leaks are for public consumption not State leaders.
4. I ASSUME leaders of countries having a stake in the region already knew about this, so EU is not going to take the ball, bat and stumps home. But it will influence their citizens.
5. No.
Unkil might:
a) Want to go ahead with more drone attacks within TSP.
b) Is ready to alter the boundaries in the region before leaving for home.
2. The leaks are for public consumption not State leaders.
4. I ASSUME leaders of countries having a stake in the region already knew about this, so EU is not going to take the ball, bat and stumps home. But it will influence their citizens.
5. No.
Unkil might:
a) Want to go ahead with more drone attacks within TSP.
b) Is ready to alter the boundaries in the region before leaving for home.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
This is extreme impossibility. The day Pastun areas of TSP are altered in whatever the fashion they like, US will not be able to control the rest of the adjustments across the land of pure. US will not be able to hold the rest of the TSP together.SwamyG wrote: b) Is ready to alter the boundaries in the region before leaving for home.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
SwamyG wrote:1. It gives a reason for why it could not win the war. It had material & men to do the job but its will was thwarted by the people aiding the insurgents.
2. The leaks are for public consumption not State leaders.
4. I ASSUME leaders of countries having a stake in the region already knew about this, so EU is not going to take the ball, bat and stumps home. But it will influence their citizens.
5. No.
Unkil might:
a) Want to go ahead with more drone attacks within TSP.
b) Is ready to alter the boundaries in the region before leaving for home.
1) It is a "superpower"-- despite knowing the bakis it still helped both sides. By saying it was thwarted by people aiding insurgents is a bad excuse. Questions will be asked about it.

2) The leaks need not have occurred. The reporters could have launched a media blitz against the people aiding taliban. it does not make sense in making the US troops look bad in front of their own people. US citizens have high respect for their troops.It is a bad PR overall.
4) you are right -- citizens pressure and economy will make the EU to send troops home. It will leave US in even more vulnerable position with loss of allies (whatever their numbers are).
5) No country including US wants to show its troops to be shown in bad light.

The only positive one is
1) It helps Ombaba claim that it occurred before he became the president and turn the tables on republicans as they managed the show before him.

2) whatever the effect of the leaks-- plans are gaining momentum to at least think of altering boundaries is a possibility.
IMHO.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
The key question is: To do what? Running out of options from doing what? The goals are important.abhischekcc wrote:PS
Some posts ago (in another thread?) I had said that America is running out of options. This leak merely illucidates how few the options are if they have to resort to unofficial leaks to put pressure on pak.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
1. Not really. American public, publicly do not like deceit. So if Unkil points out "we were jigiri dost with TSP, look what they did"; the response is going to be different. Public in developing countries are used to deceit of politicians and the system, so they don't mind much. The Western aam Jane and Joe have been fed different diet.
2. Why is this making the troops look bad, huh?
2. Why is this making the troops look bad, huh?
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
White House memo to the public on the leak, on issues addressed in the documents.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/ ... /?ref=asia]
The President has commented on safe‐haven in Pakistan and connection to Afghanistan
3/27/09: President Obama said: “After years of mixed results, we will not, and cannot, provide a blank
check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists
within its borders.” “Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning
attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan….The future of Afghanistan is
inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan. In the nearly eight years since 9/11, al Qaeda
and its extremist allies have moved across the border to the remote areas of the Pakistani frontier. This
almost certainly includes al Qaeda's leadership: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al‐Zawahiri. They have
used this mountainous terrain as a safe haven to hide, to train terrorists, to communicate with
followers, to plot attacks, and to send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. For the
American people, this border region has become the most dangerous place in the world.”
“The terrorists within Pakistan's borders are not simply enemies of America or Afghanistan ‐‐ they are a
grave and urgent danger to the people of Pakistan. Al Qaeda and other violent extremists have killed
several thousand Pakistanis since 9/11. They've killed many Pakistani soldiers and police. They
assassinated Benazir Bhutto. They've blown up buildings, derailed foreign investment, and threatened
the stability of the state. So make no mistake: al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks
killing Pakistan from within. It's important for the American people to understand that Pakistan needs
our help in going after al Qaeda. This is no simple task. The tribal regions are vast, they are rugged, and
they are often ungoverned. And that's why we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training
and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists. And after years of mixed results, we will not,
and cannot, provide a blank check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda
and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken ‐‐ one way or
another ‐‐ when we have intelligence about high‐level terrorist targets.” {Remarks of the President,
Marcy 27, 2009}
12/1/09: President Obama said: “We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading
through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan.
That's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.” “But while we've achieved
hard‐earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. After escaping across the
border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda’s leadership established a safe haven there….We're in
Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer
has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That's why we need a strategy that works on both
sides of the border…. In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who've argued that the struggle
against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation
with those who use violence. But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from Karachi to
Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by
extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and South
Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.
{Remarks of the President, 12/1/09}
U.S. Officials Have Discussed Links Between ISI and Extremist Groups
6/29/10: Gen. Petraeus Said It Was Difficult to Determine If ISI’s Contacts With the Taliban and Other
Extremists Were to Support Those Groups or to Recruit Sources – “There Are No Questions About the
Longstanding Lenghts. Let’s Remember that We Funded the ISI to Build These Organizations When
They Were the Mujahideen and Helping to Expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. And so Certainly
1
Residual Links Would Not Be a Surprise. The Question Is What the Character of Those Links Is and
What the Activities Are Behind Them.” “Well, again, what we have to always figure out with Pakistan
center is, are they working with the Taliban to support the Taliban or to recruit sources in the Taliban?
And that's the difficulty, frankly, in trying to assess what the ISI is doing in some of their activities in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, in contacts with the Haqqani network, or the ‐‐ the Afghan Taliban.
There are no questions about the longstanding lengths. Let's remember that we funded the ISI to build
these organizations when they were the Mujahideen and helping to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan.
And so certainly residual links would not be a surprise. The question is what the character of those links
is and what the activities are behind them.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 6/29/10]
6/29/10: Gen. Petraeus Thought that Pakistan Had Recently Decided that Internal Extremists Posed a
Pressing Threat But That They Could Not Deal With All of Them Simultaneously, Noted that Many of
these Groups Were Founded With U.S. Money Through the ISI “With respect to the Pakistanis, I think
there is some reassessment that has gone on with respect to Afghanistan. I think as important has been
the reassessment of the situation within their own borders. It took place about 12 to 18 months or so
ago when the Pakistani people, the leadership, and the clerics all came to recognize that the most
pressing existential threat to their country was that posed by internal extremists who had threatened
the writ of governance for ‐‐ again, in Swat Valley and the rest of what is now called Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa, and then in a number of areas of the ‐‐ of the tribal areas. The fact is, I think they came
to recognize that the ‐‐ the concept that had been in practice, was in practice, and still may be in some
areas, that concept that you can allow poisonous snakes to have a nest in your backyard as long as they
only bite the neighbor's kids inevitably turns around and ‐‐ and ends up biting you in the backside. And I
think they have come to see the challenges of this. Now, to be fair to them, let's remember that many of
these groups were formed in the beginning with our money through the ISI when we were trying to help
get rid of the Soviets out of Afghanistan and the Mujahideen were our heroes at that time, while those
very groups put down roots and in some cases turned into transnational extremist elements, in others,
extremist elements that have threatened the idea of Pakistan being able to move forward and actually
want to turn the clock back several centuries. And I think that they have come to recognize the threat
that these groups pose to their country, but have also realized that they cannot deal with all of them
simultaneously and that their means, particularly when it comes to the holding, building, and transition
phases, is particularly ‐‐ or somewhat limited.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 6/29/10]
2/8/10: Gates Said Al Qaeda, The Taliban And Other Extremist Networks Are Working Together In
Pakistan. Gates said, “You know, just to go back to an earlier point, one of the things that I talked about
when I was in Pakistan is that al Qaeda, the Taliban in Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan are all
working together. And the al Qaeda ‐‐ al Qaeda is helping the Pakistani Taliban try to destabilize the
Pakistani government there. There is evidence that al Qaeda is helping them plan these attacks, the
targeting, the training on capabilities, and so on. These threats are all mixed together. It's a syndicate.
And trying to help the Pakistanis understand that each ‐‐ if any of the three of these, or others such as
the Haqqani network, are successful, it redounds to the benefit of the others. And so we've got to attack
this problem as a whole, rather than piecemeal. [FOX News, 2/8/10]
3/12/10: Admiral Mullen Said that ISI “Have Been Very Attached to Many of these Extremist
Organizations.” “He certainly is aware of the concerns that I have with respect to his intelligence
agency, ISI. And in fact, that they have ‐‐ they were literally created by the government of Pakistan. They
have ‐‐ they have been very attached to many of these extremist organizations. And it`s my belief that in
the long run, they have got to completely cut ties with those in order to really move in the right
direction, and that ISI fundamentally has to change its strategic approach, which has been clear to focus
2
on India as well as Afghanistan. And I don`t believe they can make a lot of progress until that actually
occurs. Now, General Kiyani has taken one of his best guys and appointed him as the new director of ISI,
General Pasha. I`m encouraged ‐‐ I`ve met with General Pasha many times, but recently since he`s been
appointed, and I`m encouraged with his views and I`m encouraged with how he sees the problem. It`s
going to take some time to get at it inside ISI.” [Charlie Rose, 3/12/09]
12/10/08: Mullen ‐ “There’s A Rich History Of ISI Fomenting Challenges.” “There's a rich history here of
ISI fomenting challenges, particularly in Kashmir, and everybody is aware of that. We're aware of
that. The Indians are aware of that. The Pakistanis are aware of that, as is the international community
writ large. And it's literally that piece of the previous strategy in Pakistan which I believe's got to shift for
the future, and without getting into the specifics of what was causal, certainly in a classified way, or
what happened here. [Transcript, DOD News Briefing, 12/10/08]
4/5/09: Admiral Mullen Said, “Do I Think the ISI Has to Change?... Absolutely. Do I Think There Are
Elements of ISI Connected to Those Militant Organizations? Absolutely. Gen. Kayani and I Talk About
This. Gen. Pasha and I Talk About this, More Than Once, But It Isn’t Going to Happen Overnight.”
“Another key U.S. concern: Will the ISI cut off its support for militant groups like the Afghan Taliban,
which it uses to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan? Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar
operates out of Pakistan's Baluchistan region. Or will the ISI end ties with Pakistani terrorists such as the
group that recently conducted an outrageous attack in Mumbai, India? The ISI trained such groups in the
past to attack Indian targets in Kashmir. ‘Do I think the ISI has to change?’ Mullen asks rhetorically.
‘Absolutely. Do I think there are elements of ISI connected to those militant organizations? Absolutely.
Gen. Kayani and I talk about this. Gen. Pasha and I talk about this, more than once, but it isn't going to
happen overnight.’ Mullen says he has ‘complete confidence that the military and civilian leadership in
Pakistan recognize the seriousness of their problem with the insurgents.’ He says that Pasha was
‘handpicked’ by Kayani to change the ISI, and that Kayani has ‘put some of his best people in key
positions in the ISI.’ But can Kayani and Pasha change the ISI's culture? ‘I've led big organizations all my
life,’ says Mullen, ‘and it takes a fairly significant time to change an organization.’” [Philadelphia
Inquirer, Rubin Column, 4/5/09]
3/31/09: Gates ‐ “The ISI’s Contacts With [Extremist Groups] Are A Real Concern To Us., And We Have
Made These Concerns Known Directly To The Pakistanis.” “The ISI's contacts with some of these
extremist groups ‐‐ with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Haqqani network, Commander Nazir (sp) and others
‐‐ are a real concern to us, and we have made these concerns known directly to the Pakistanis. And we
hope that they will take action to put an end to it.” [Transcript, Interview with Afghan TV, 3/31/09]
3/29/09: Gates ‐ “We Certainly Have Concerns About The Contacts [Between ISI] And Some OF These
[Extremist] Groups In The Past.” “Well, the way I would answer is to say that we certainly have
concerns about the contacts of – between the Pakistani intelligence service and the – and some of these
groups in the past. But the reality is the Pakistanis have had contacts with these groups since they were
fighting the Soviets 20 or 25 years ago when I first was dealing with the Pakistanis on this. And, I must
say, also helping make sure that some of those same groups got weapons from our safe haven in
Pakistan. But with people like Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and the Hakani network, the Pakistanis have had
contacts with these people for a long time, I think partly as a hedge against what might happen in
Afghanistan if we were to walk away or whatever. What we need to do is try and help the Pakistanis
understand these groups are now an existential threat to them, and that we will be there as a steadfast
ally for Pakistan, that they can count on us, and that they don’t need that hedge. [Transcript, Interview
on FOX News, 3/29/09]
3
3/27/09: Mullen Said There Were Indication that There Were Still Elements Within ISI That Were
Supporting the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda.
BLITZER: How much can you, the U.S. military, the U.S. government, trust the Pakistanis?
MULLEN: The ‐‐ the agency you're really talking about, Wolf, is their ‐‐ is their intelligence
agency, the ISI.
And I have believed for a significant period of time now, fundamentally, the strategic approach
with the ISI must change. And their support for militants, their support for militants actually on
both borders, has to fundamentally shift in order for...
BLITZER: Are there still elements in the Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, who are sympathetic or,
even worse, actually supporting the Taliban and/or al Qaeda?
MULLEN: There are certainly indications that that's the case. And fundamentally that's one of
the things that has to change. [CNN Situation Room, 3/27/09]
3/27/09: Mullen ‐ “I Have Believed For A Significant Period Of Time Now Fundamentally [That] The
Strategic Approach With The ISI Must Change…And Their Support For Militants – Actually On Both
Borders – Has To Fundamentally Shift.” “Also regarding Pakistan, Mullen stressed the need for a
fundamental shift in the role of the country's intelligence agency, known as the ISI. Mullen
acknowledged indications that confirm news reports claiming the ISI supports insurgent elements in
Afghanistan and Pakistan with money, supplies and guidance. The United States has raised the issue
with Pakistani civilian and military leadership, he added. "I have believed for a significant period of time
now fundamentally [that] the strategic approach with the ISI must change," he said. "And their support
for militants ‐‐ actually on both borders ‐‐ has to fundamentally shift. [Armed Forces Press, 3/27/09]
4/1/09: Gen. Petraeus Said It Was Difficult to Tell The Nature of an Intelligence Contact in Pakistan
and that There Were Troubling Examples of Contacts Warning The Enemy of Impending Operations –
Said He Had Discussed the Issue With the Head of Pakistani Intelligence.“How we do that has to be
done very carefully, and we will have to go through a process, I think, where we literally do build some
of the trust because there are both troubling events in the past and there are troubling accusations out
there. Some of these, frankly, when you dig into them are a bit more ambiguous than they seem to be
on the surface, although some are not. There are ‐‐ it is difficult in some cases to sort out what is an
intelligence agency contact that is trying to develop a source or, on the other hand, what is an
intelligence agency contact that is warning them of an impending operation. There have been examples
of the latter. Those are troubling. We have discussed those with the head of Pakistani intelligence, of the
ISI, Lieutenant General Pasha. I have done that, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, others. Ambassador
Holbrooke and I had a session with him together. The Pakistani military ‐‐ again, we've had these same
conversations with them.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 4/1/09]
U.S. Officials Have Discussed Pakistan as a Safe Haven for Extremists and Urged Greater Effort and
Cooperation Against Extremists in the Tribal Region From Pakistan
7/23/10: Holbrooke Said The Level Of Cooperation Between Pakistan And Allies Is “Not Yet Where We
Hope It Will Be.” “It's a very complicated relationship, but it is an indispensable one for Great Britain
and the United States and very much at the top of the U.S.‐U.K. agenda is how to work together with
4
Pakistan to make Pakistan part of the solution to the problems of the region — because without
Pakistan's participation, this war could go on indefinitely," Holbrooke said. The envoy said ties between
Pakistan and the West had greatly improved in recent months, bringing "much more co‐operation at
every level" in dealing with the Afghan conflict. "I don't want to mislead you," Holbrooke said. Levels of
co‐operation are "not yet where we hope it will be." [AP, 7/23/10]
7/19/10: Secretary Clinton Called for Greater Cooperation Between the U.S. and Pakistan in Targeting
Bin Laden and Al‐Qaida Who Have Used Pakistan as a Safe Haven. “But we’re not saying go do it alone;
we’re saying we’re doing it with you. We’re doing more and you’re doing more. So there are, I’m sure,
additional steps that each of us can and should take. The problem is that we don’t have any clear idea
about how best to get at the people we consider to be our primary enemies. Al‐Qaida, Usama bin Ladin,
those are the people who attacked us and those are the people who are at the top of our list. Now, they
are somewhere, we believe, based on our best information. Where, we don’t know. We would like to
work more closely together to go after them and to either capture or kill them, because we believe that
at the center of this syndicate of terror that is terrorizing people in Pakistan, al‐Qaida exists.” [Sec.
Clinton Roundtable with Pakistani Journalists, 7/19/10]
7/14/10: Holbrooke ‐ “We Do Not Have Enough Action Yet On The Pakistani Side Of The Border.”
“We do not have enough action yet on the Pakistani side of the border. And here is a perfect example
of why the two countries cannot be disaggregated for purposes of policy. We got what we wanted on
one side of the border, but we haven't gotten it on the other yet. And Americans are being killed and
wounded because of this. And I can assure you that we will take this up again when I go to Pakistan in
a few days and other senior officials go as well.” [Transcript, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Transcript, 7/14/10]
10/30/09: Sec. Clinton Said Al‐Qaida Had a Safe Haven in Pakistan Since 2002 and She Found It “Hard
to Believe that Nobody in Your Government Knows Where They Are and Couldn’t Get Them If They
Really Wanted to” – Urged More Cooperation in Tracking Down Al‐Qaida. “But let me ask you
something. Al‐Qaida has had safe haven in Pakistan since 2002. I find it hard to believe that nobody in
your government knows where they are and couldn't get them if they really wanted to. And maybe
that’s the case. Maybe they’re not getable. I don’t know. But that’s something that in respect for your
sovereignty, al‐Qaida has run attacks against Indonesia, Spain, Great Britain, the United States, other
countries, the Philippines, et cetera, through either direct or indirect approaches. So the world has an
interest in seeing the capture and killing of the people who are the masterminds of this terrorist
syndicate, but so far as we know, they’re in Pakistan. So I think I am more than willing to hear every
complaint about the United States. I am more than willing to do my best both to answer but also to
change where we can so that we do have better communication and we have better understanding. But
this is a two‐way street. If we’re going to have a mature partnership where we work together on
matters that really are in the best interest of both of our countries, then there are issues that not just
the United States but others have with your government and your military security establishment. So I
think that that’s what I’m looking for. I don’t believe in dancing around difficult issues, because I don’t
think that benefits anybody. And I think part of the problem that we’re facing in terms of the deficit of
trust that has been talked about is that we haven’t taken seriously a lot of the concerns. I’m here to take
them seriously. But I ask in the pursuit of mutual respect that you take seriously our concerns so that it’s
not just a one‐sided argument. And I believe that if we do that, we may still not agree or there may still
be answers like, well, I don’t know what is happening in this province of your country or I don’t know
what the reasons are that al‐Qaida has a safe haven in your country, but let’s explore it and let’s try to
5
be honest about it and figure out what we can do.” [Sec. Clinton Roundtable with Senior Pakistani
Editors, 10/30/09]
2/3/10: DNI Blair Said the Safe Haven That Afghan Insurgents Had In Pakistan Was the Group’s “Most
Important Outside Support,” and that Disrupting that Safe Haven Was Necessary to Succeed in Our
Overall Effort in Afghanistan. “The safe haven that the Afghan insurgents have in Pakistan is the group's
most important outside support. And disrupting that safe haven won't be sufficient by itself to defeat
the insurgency in Afghanistan. But disrupting that presence in Pakistan is necessary ‐ it's a necessary
condition for making overall program in Afghanistan.” [House Intelligence Committee Hearing, 2/3/10]
6/29/10: Gen. Petraeus Said Al‐Qaida Had Established New Sanctuaries in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan
Following the U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. “It was, of course, in response to those attacks that
a U.S.‐led coalition entered Afghanistan in late 2001 and defeated Al Qaida and the Taliban elements
that allowed Al Qaida to establish its headquarters in training camps in Afghanistan. In the subsequent
years, however, the extremists were able to recruit, with Al Qaida establishing new sanctuaries in the
tribal areas of Pakistan and the Taliban and its affiliates reentering Afghanistan in an effort to reestablish
the control they once had in much of the country. In light of those developments, our task in
Afghanistan is clear. Indeed, President Obama has explained America's vital national interests there. We
will not, he has stated, tolerate a safe haven for terrorists, who want to destroy Afghan security from
within and launch attacks against innocent men, women and children in our country and around the
world.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 6/29/10]
6/29/10: Gen. Petraeus Said There Were Still Extremist Elements That Had Sanctuary in the Pakistan
Tribal Areas that Were Carrying Out Operations in Afghanistan and Others That Were Transnational,
Like Al‐ Qaida. “They have sustained significant losses, as is well known, in the tribal areas. Their
freedom of action has been reduced by Pakistani ‐‐ or operations by the Pakistani army and Frontier
Corps in the former Northwest Frontier Province, Pakhtunkhwa, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and in several of
the agencies of the tribal areas ‐‐ certainly not all of them. And certainly, there are still, without
question, extremist elements there that have sanctuary there and are carrying out operations inside
Afghanistan, and others that are transnational, as is the case of Al Qaida and some other elements in
Pakistan, as well.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 6/29/10]
1/20/10: Gates Said The “Afghan‐Pakistan Border Is [Al‐Qaeda’s] Primary Home And Safe Haven.”
Gates said, “What we have in the area of the Afghan‐Pakistan border is first of all, al‐Qaida. It's its
primary home and safe haven. You also have the Taliban who are active in Afghanistan. You also have
the Tehrik‐e‐ Taliban Pakistan that are focused on Pakistan. You also have Lashkar‐ e‐Taiba, LET, that is
focused on Pakistan but also on India. And what we see is that the success of any one of these groups
leads to new capabilities and new reputation for all. A victory for one is a victory for all. What I see
happening is these groups operating under the umbrella of al‐Qaida in the Northwest Frontier Province,
probably in North Waziristan, is orchestrating attacks using one element in Afghanistan, using another
element of the Taliban in Pakistan to attack targets in Pakistan to try to destabilize Pakistan, and again,
working with al‐ Qaida, Lashkar‐e‐Taiba, planning attacks in India. I believe this operation under the
umbrella of al‐Qaida, working with all of these different groups, is intended to destabilize not just
Afghanistan or not just Pakistan, but potentially the whole region by provoking a conflict perhaps
between India and Pakistan through some provocative act or terrorist act, or provoking instability in
Pakistan itself through terrorist attacks in Pakistan. So I think it's a very complicated situation. I think it's
very dangerous for the region as a whole. I also think it's dangerous to single out any one of these
groups and say if we could beat that group that will solve the problem. Because they are, in effect, a
6
syndicate of terrorist operators intending to destabilize this entire region. That's why it is so important
for all of us to be engaged, to understand the magnitude of this threat and to be engaged in trying to
reduce the threat, and wherever possible eliminate it. And it does require a high level of cooperation
among us all.” [CQ Transcript, Press Conference in India, 1/20/10]
12/8/09: Gates Said Pakistan Should “Focus On What Has Become, In My View, A Real Existential
Threat To Pakistan Which Is These Different Terrorist Groups Operating Within It’s Territory.” “What
we [and the Indian government] talked about at some length was the syndicate of different terrorist
groups that I talked about at the outset and how they put all of the countries here in the region ‐
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India ‐ at risk because of their activities. And as we've talked about, clearly one of
the subjects of discussion for my next visit is how to allay their concerns so that they can focus on what
has become, in my view, a real existential threat to Pakistan which is these different terrorist groups
operating within its territory.” [American Forces Press Service, 12/8/09]
12/2/09: Sec. Clinton Said It Was Difficult to Parse Out the Different Groups Operating in Pakistan, All
of Whom We Thought Were Connected to Al Qaida and Partition Some Off and Go After Others, Said
Adm. Mullen Had Been Key in Making the Case to the Pakistanis That They Needed to Do More
Against the Insurgents. “It is difficult to parse out the different groups that are operating within
Pakistan all of whom we think are connected in one way or another with al‐Qaida and partition some off
and go after the others. So it will be our continuing effort. And Admiral Mullen has been instrumental in
working on this with his counterparts to make the case that the Pakistanis have to do more against all of
the insurgent terrorist groups that are threatening them, that are threatening us in Afghanistan and the
Afghan people, are threatening other neighbors in the region. And we hope that we'll be able to make
that case successfully.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 12/2/09]
12/2/09: Sec. Clinton Said We Were Asking for More Help from the Pakistanis to Go After Al‐Qaida
and the Leadership of the Afghan Taliban Inside Their Own Territory. “But that we also are asking for
more help from the Pakistanis to go after al‐Qaida and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban inside their
own territory.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 12/2/09]
9/15/09: Adm. Mullen Said It Was Clear that Al‐Qaida Was Diminished While It Was Living in Pakistan
But That They Were By No Means Dead and Was a Very Serious Threat. “It's very clear that, in fact, Al
Qaida is diminished while it's living in Pakistan. And this is a Pakistan‐ Afghanistan issue. They are by no
means dead. It's a very serious threat. And that if we allow the Taliban to ‐‐ to take control and run
Afghanistan again, I think the likelihood that they would return to that safe haven would be high.”
[Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 9/15/09]
4/1/09: Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Flournoy Said that the U.S. Strategy Required
Eliminating Al‐Qaida’s Safe Haven in Pakistan and Ensuring they Did Not Return to Afghanistan – Said
Pakistan’s Ability to Dismantle the Safe Havens in its Terrority Was Critical to Its Stability and Security.
“As the president stated last Friday, I think very eloquently, we have a very clear goal. This strategy went
‐‐ really went back to first principles about our interests and our objectives, and we clarified our goal in
this region as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaida and its extremist allies, and to do so, we
must eliminate their safe haven in Pakistan and ensure that such a safe haven does not return to
Afghanistan… Pakistan’s ability to dismantle the safe havens on its territory and defeat the terror and
insurgent networks within its borders are absolutely critical to the security and stability of that nuclear‐
armed state.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 4/1/09]
7
3/27/09: Admiral Mullen Said that Al Qaida’s Safe Haven in Pakistan Was in the FATA and He
Assumed that’s Where Bin Laden and Zawahiri Were Hiding Out.
I have been in Pakistan on multiple trips to meet with their leadership. And, in fact, in the last
year, the Pakistan army and the Frontier Corps, who are the ‐‐ the local troops on the border...
FOREMAN: And they're ‐‐ they're based where...
(CROSSTALK)
MULLEN: They're actually based here in the FATA. And when we talk about...
FOREMAN: Right here.
MULLEN: ... a safe haven for al Qaeda and the president's focus on al Qaeda, this is where they
live.
BLITZER: And that's where you assume Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al‐Zawahri are hiding out,
on the ‐‐ on the Pakistan side of this border?
MULLEN: Absolutely, and ‐‐ and they hide very well. [CNN’s Situation Room, 3/27/09]
3/27/09: Interagency Report ‐ “The Core Goal of the U.S. Must Be to Disrupt, Dismantle, and Defeat al
Qaeda and its Safe Havens in Pakistan, and to Prevent Their Return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”
“Therefore, the core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe
havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan. The ability of extremists in
Pakistan to undermine Afghanistan is proven, while insurgency in Afghanistan feeds instability in
Pakistan.” [White Paper on the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and
Pakistan, 3/27/09]
8
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/ ... /?ref=asia]
The President has commented on safe‐haven in Pakistan and connection to Afghanistan
3/27/09: President Obama said: “After years of mixed results, we will not, and cannot, provide a blank
check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists
within its borders.” “Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning
attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan….The future of Afghanistan is
inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan. In the nearly eight years since 9/11, al Qaeda
and its extremist allies have moved across the border to the remote areas of the Pakistani frontier. This
almost certainly includes al Qaeda's leadership: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al‐Zawahiri. They have
used this mountainous terrain as a safe haven to hide, to train terrorists, to communicate with
followers, to plot attacks, and to send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. For the
American people, this border region has become the most dangerous place in the world.”
“The terrorists within Pakistan's borders are not simply enemies of America or Afghanistan ‐‐ they are a
grave and urgent danger to the people of Pakistan. Al Qaeda and other violent extremists have killed
several thousand Pakistanis since 9/11. They've killed many Pakistani soldiers and police. They
assassinated Benazir Bhutto. They've blown up buildings, derailed foreign investment, and threatened
the stability of the state. So make no mistake: al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks
killing Pakistan from within. It's important for the American people to understand that Pakistan needs
our help in going after al Qaeda. This is no simple task. The tribal regions are vast, they are rugged, and
they are often ungoverned. And that's why we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training
and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists. And after years of mixed results, we will not,
and cannot, provide a blank check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda
and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken ‐‐ one way or
another ‐‐ when we have intelligence about high‐level terrorist targets.” {Remarks of the President,
Marcy 27, 2009}
12/1/09: President Obama said: “We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading
through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan.
That's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.” “But while we've achieved
hard‐earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. After escaping across the
border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda’s leadership established a safe haven there….We're in
Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer
has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That's why we need a strategy that works on both
sides of the border…. In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who've argued that the struggle
against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation
with those who use violence. But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from Karachi to
Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by
extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and South
Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.
{Remarks of the President, 12/1/09}
U.S. Officials Have Discussed Links Between ISI and Extremist Groups
6/29/10: Gen. Petraeus Said It Was Difficult to Determine If ISI’s Contacts With the Taliban and Other
Extremists Were to Support Those Groups or to Recruit Sources – “There Are No Questions About the
Longstanding Lenghts. Let’s Remember that We Funded the ISI to Build These Organizations When
They Were the Mujahideen and Helping to Expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. And so Certainly
1
Residual Links Would Not Be a Surprise. The Question Is What the Character of Those Links Is and
What the Activities Are Behind Them.” “Well, again, what we have to always figure out with Pakistan
center is, are they working with the Taliban to support the Taliban or to recruit sources in the Taliban?
And that's the difficulty, frankly, in trying to assess what the ISI is doing in some of their activities in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, in contacts with the Haqqani network, or the ‐‐ the Afghan Taliban.
There are no questions about the longstanding lengths. Let's remember that we funded the ISI to build
these organizations when they were the Mujahideen and helping to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan.
And so certainly residual links would not be a surprise. The question is what the character of those links
is and what the activities are behind them.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 6/29/10]
6/29/10: Gen. Petraeus Thought that Pakistan Had Recently Decided that Internal Extremists Posed a
Pressing Threat But That They Could Not Deal With All of Them Simultaneously, Noted that Many of
these Groups Were Founded With U.S. Money Through the ISI “With respect to the Pakistanis, I think
there is some reassessment that has gone on with respect to Afghanistan. I think as important has been
the reassessment of the situation within their own borders. It took place about 12 to 18 months or so
ago when the Pakistani people, the leadership, and the clerics all came to recognize that the most
pressing existential threat to their country was that posed by internal extremists who had threatened
the writ of governance for ‐‐ again, in Swat Valley and the rest of what is now called Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa, and then in a number of areas of the ‐‐ of the tribal areas. The fact is, I think they came
to recognize that the ‐‐ the concept that had been in practice, was in practice, and still may be in some
areas, that concept that you can allow poisonous snakes to have a nest in your backyard as long as they
only bite the neighbor's kids inevitably turns around and ‐‐ and ends up biting you in the backside. And I
think they have come to see the challenges of this. Now, to be fair to them, let's remember that many of
these groups were formed in the beginning with our money through the ISI when we were trying to help
get rid of the Soviets out of Afghanistan and the Mujahideen were our heroes at that time, while those
very groups put down roots and in some cases turned into transnational extremist elements, in others,
extremist elements that have threatened the idea of Pakistan being able to move forward and actually
want to turn the clock back several centuries. And I think that they have come to recognize the threat
that these groups pose to their country, but have also realized that they cannot deal with all of them
simultaneously and that their means, particularly when it comes to the holding, building, and transition
phases, is particularly ‐‐ or somewhat limited.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 6/29/10]
2/8/10: Gates Said Al Qaeda, The Taliban And Other Extremist Networks Are Working Together In
Pakistan. Gates said, “You know, just to go back to an earlier point, one of the things that I talked about
when I was in Pakistan is that al Qaeda, the Taliban in Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan are all
working together. And the al Qaeda ‐‐ al Qaeda is helping the Pakistani Taliban try to destabilize the
Pakistani government there. There is evidence that al Qaeda is helping them plan these attacks, the
targeting, the training on capabilities, and so on. These threats are all mixed together. It's a syndicate.
And trying to help the Pakistanis understand that each ‐‐ if any of the three of these, or others such as
the Haqqani network, are successful, it redounds to the benefit of the others. And so we've got to attack
this problem as a whole, rather than piecemeal. [FOX News, 2/8/10]
3/12/10: Admiral Mullen Said that ISI “Have Been Very Attached to Many of these Extremist
Organizations.” “He certainly is aware of the concerns that I have with respect to his intelligence
agency, ISI. And in fact, that they have ‐‐ they were literally created by the government of Pakistan. They
have ‐‐ they have been very attached to many of these extremist organizations. And it`s my belief that in
the long run, they have got to completely cut ties with those in order to really move in the right
direction, and that ISI fundamentally has to change its strategic approach, which has been clear to focus
2
on India as well as Afghanistan. And I don`t believe they can make a lot of progress until that actually
occurs. Now, General Kiyani has taken one of his best guys and appointed him as the new director of ISI,
General Pasha. I`m encouraged ‐‐ I`ve met with General Pasha many times, but recently since he`s been
appointed, and I`m encouraged with his views and I`m encouraged with how he sees the problem. It`s
going to take some time to get at it inside ISI.” [Charlie Rose, 3/12/09]
12/10/08: Mullen ‐ “There’s A Rich History Of ISI Fomenting Challenges.” “There's a rich history here of
ISI fomenting challenges, particularly in Kashmir, and everybody is aware of that. We're aware of
that. The Indians are aware of that. The Pakistanis are aware of that, as is the international community
writ large. And it's literally that piece of the previous strategy in Pakistan which I believe's got to shift for
the future, and without getting into the specifics of what was causal, certainly in a classified way, or
what happened here. [Transcript, DOD News Briefing, 12/10/08]
4/5/09: Admiral Mullen Said, “Do I Think the ISI Has to Change?... Absolutely. Do I Think There Are
Elements of ISI Connected to Those Militant Organizations? Absolutely. Gen. Kayani and I Talk About
This. Gen. Pasha and I Talk About this, More Than Once, But It Isn’t Going to Happen Overnight.”
“Another key U.S. concern: Will the ISI cut off its support for militant groups like the Afghan Taliban,
which it uses to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan? Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar
operates out of Pakistan's Baluchistan region. Or will the ISI end ties with Pakistani terrorists such as the
group that recently conducted an outrageous attack in Mumbai, India? The ISI trained such groups in the
past to attack Indian targets in Kashmir. ‘Do I think the ISI has to change?’ Mullen asks rhetorically.
‘Absolutely. Do I think there are elements of ISI connected to those militant organizations? Absolutely.
Gen. Kayani and I talk about this. Gen. Pasha and I talk about this, more than once, but it isn't going to
happen overnight.’ Mullen says he has ‘complete confidence that the military and civilian leadership in
Pakistan recognize the seriousness of their problem with the insurgents.’ He says that Pasha was
‘handpicked’ by Kayani to change the ISI, and that Kayani has ‘put some of his best people in key
positions in the ISI.’ But can Kayani and Pasha change the ISI's culture? ‘I've led big organizations all my
life,’ says Mullen, ‘and it takes a fairly significant time to change an organization.’” [Philadelphia
Inquirer, Rubin Column, 4/5/09]
3/31/09: Gates ‐ “The ISI’s Contacts With [Extremist Groups] Are A Real Concern To Us., And We Have
Made These Concerns Known Directly To The Pakistanis.” “The ISI's contacts with some of these
extremist groups ‐‐ with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Haqqani network, Commander Nazir (sp) and others
‐‐ are a real concern to us, and we have made these concerns known directly to the Pakistanis. And we
hope that they will take action to put an end to it.” [Transcript, Interview with Afghan TV, 3/31/09]
3/29/09: Gates ‐ “We Certainly Have Concerns About The Contacts [Between ISI] And Some OF These
[Extremist] Groups In The Past.” “Well, the way I would answer is to say that we certainly have
concerns about the contacts of – between the Pakistani intelligence service and the – and some of these
groups in the past. But the reality is the Pakistanis have had contacts with these groups since they were
fighting the Soviets 20 or 25 years ago when I first was dealing with the Pakistanis on this. And, I must
say, also helping make sure that some of those same groups got weapons from our safe haven in
Pakistan. But with people like Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and the Hakani network, the Pakistanis have had
contacts with these people for a long time, I think partly as a hedge against what might happen in
Afghanistan if we were to walk away or whatever. What we need to do is try and help the Pakistanis
understand these groups are now an existential threat to them, and that we will be there as a steadfast
ally for Pakistan, that they can count on us, and that they don’t need that hedge. [Transcript, Interview
on FOX News, 3/29/09]
3
3/27/09: Mullen Said There Were Indication that There Were Still Elements Within ISI That Were
Supporting the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda.
BLITZER: How much can you, the U.S. military, the U.S. government, trust the Pakistanis?
MULLEN: The ‐‐ the agency you're really talking about, Wolf, is their ‐‐ is their intelligence
agency, the ISI.
And I have believed for a significant period of time now, fundamentally, the strategic approach
with the ISI must change. And their support for militants, their support for militants actually on
both borders, has to fundamentally shift in order for...
BLITZER: Are there still elements in the Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, who are sympathetic or,
even worse, actually supporting the Taliban and/or al Qaeda?
MULLEN: There are certainly indications that that's the case. And fundamentally that's one of
the things that has to change. [CNN Situation Room, 3/27/09]
3/27/09: Mullen ‐ “I Have Believed For A Significant Period Of Time Now Fundamentally [That] The
Strategic Approach With The ISI Must Change…And Their Support For Militants – Actually On Both
Borders – Has To Fundamentally Shift.” “Also regarding Pakistan, Mullen stressed the need for a
fundamental shift in the role of the country's intelligence agency, known as the ISI. Mullen
acknowledged indications that confirm news reports claiming the ISI supports insurgent elements in
Afghanistan and Pakistan with money, supplies and guidance. The United States has raised the issue
with Pakistani civilian and military leadership, he added. "I have believed for a significant period of time
now fundamentally [that] the strategic approach with the ISI must change," he said. "And their support
for militants ‐‐ actually on both borders ‐‐ has to fundamentally shift. [Armed Forces Press, 3/27/09]
4/1/09: Gen. Petraeus Said It Was Difficult to Tell The Nature of an Intelligence Contact in Pakistan
and that There Were Troubling Examples of Contacts Warning The Enemy of Impending Operations –
Said He Had Discussed the Issue With the Head of Pakistani Intelligence.“How we do that has to be
done very carefully, and we will have to go through a process, I think, where we literally do build some
of the trust because there are both troubling events in the past and there are troubling accusations out
there. Some of these, frankly, when you dig into them are a bit more ambiguous than they seem to be
on the surface, although some are not. There are ‐‐ it is difficult in some cases to sort out what is an
intelligence agency contact that is trying to develop a source or, on the other hand, what is an
intelligence agency contact that is warning them of an impending operation. There have been examples
of the latter. Those are troubling. We have discussed those with the head of Pakistani intelligence, of the
ISI, Lieutenant General Pasha. I have done that, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, others. Ambassador
Holbrooke and I had a session with him together. The Pakistani military ‐‐ again, we've had these same
conversations with them.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 4/1/09]
U.S. Officials Have Discussed Pakistan as a Safe Haven for Extremists and Urged Greater Effort and
Cooperation Against Extremists in the Tribal Region From Pakistan
7/23/10: Holbrooke Said The Level Of Cooperation Between Pakistan And Allies Is “Not Yet Where We
Hope It Will Be.” “It's a very complicated relationship, but it is an indispensable one for Great Britain
and the United States and very much at the top of the U.S.‐U.K. agenda is how to work together with
4
Pakistan to make Pakistan part of the solution to the problems of the region — because without
Pakistan's participation, this war could go on indefinitely," Holbrooke said. The envoy said ties between
Pakistan and the West had greatly improved in recent months, bringing "much more co‐operation at
every level" in dealing with the Afghan conflict. "I don't want to mislead you," Holbrooke said. Levels of
co‐operation are "not yet where we hope it will be." [AP, 7/23/10]
7/19/10: Secretary Clinton Called for Greater Cooperation Between the U.S. and Pakistan in Targeting
Bin Laden and Al‐Qaida Who Have Used Pakistan as a Safe Haven. “But we’re not saying go do it alone;
we’re saying we’re doing it with you. We’re doing more and you’re doing more. So there are, I’m sure,
additional steps that each of us can and should take. The problem is that we don’t have any clear idea
about how best to get at the people we consider to be our primary enemies. Al‐Qaida, Usama bin Ladin,
those are the people who attacked us and those are the people who are at the top of our list. Now, they
are somewhere, we believe, based on our best information. Where, we don’t know. We would like to
work more closely together to go after them and to either capture or kill them, because we believe that
at the center of this syndicate of terror that is terrorizing people in Pakistan, al‐Qaida exists.” [Sec.
Clinton Roundtable with Pakistani Journalists, 7/19/10]
7/14/10: Holbrooke ‐ “We Do Not Have Enough Action Yet On The Pakistani Side Of The Border.”
“We do not have enough action yet on the Pakistani side of the border. And here is a perfect example
of why the two countries cannot be disaggregated for purposes of policy. We got what we wanted on
one side of the border, but we haven't gotten it on the other yet. And Americans are being killed and
wounded because of this. And I can assure you that we will take this up again when I go to Pakistan in
a few days and other senior officials go as well.” [Transcript, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Transcript, 7/14/10]
10/30/09: Sec. Clinton Said Al‐Qaida Had a Safe Haven in Pakistan Since 2002 and She Found It “Hard
to Believe that Nobody in Your Government Knows Where They Are and Couldn’t Get Them If They
Really Wanted to” – Urged More Cooperation in Tracking Down Al‐Qaida. “But let me ask you
something. Al‐Qaida has had safe haven in Pakistan since 2002. I find it hard to believe that nobody in
your government knows where they are and couldn't get them if they really wanted to. And maybe
that’s the case. Maybe they’re not getable. I don’t know. But that’s something that in respect for your
sovereignty, al‐Qaida has run attacks against Indonesia, Spain, Great Britain, the United States, other
countries, the Philippines, et cetera, through either direct or indirect approaches. So the world has an
interest in seeing the capture and killing of the people who are the masterminds of this terrorist
syndicate, but so far as we know, they’re in Pakistan. So I think I am more than willing to hear every
complaint about the United States. I am more than willing to do my best both to answer but also to
change where we can so that we do have better communication and we have better understanding. But
this is a two‐way street. If we’re going to have a mature partnership where we work together on
matters that really are in the best interest of both of our countries, then there are issues that not just
the United States but others have with your government and your military security establishment. So I
think that that’s what I’m looking for. I don’t believe in dancing around difficult issues, because I don’t
think that benefits anybody. And I think part of the problem that we’re facing in terms of the deficit of
trust that has been talked about is that we haven’t taken seriously a lot of the concerns. I’m here to take
them seriously. But I ask in the pursuit of mutual respect that you take seriously our concerns so that it’s
not just a one‐sided argument. And I believe that if we do that, we may still not agree or there may still
be answers like, well, I don’t know what is happening in this province of your country or I don’t know
what the reasons are that al‐Qaida has a safe haven in your country, but let’s explore it and let’s try to
5
be honest about it and figure out what we can do.” [Sec. Clinton Roundtable with Senior Pakistani
Editors, 10/30/09]
2/3/10: DNI Blair Said the Safe Haven That Afghan Insurgents Had In Pakistan Was the Group’s “Most
Important Outside Support,” and that Disrupting that Safe Haven Was Necessary to Succeed in Our
Overall Effort in Afghanistan. “The safe haven that the Afghan insurgents have in Pakistan is the group's
most important outside support. And disrupting that safe haven won't be sufficient by itself to defeat
the insurgency in Afghanistan. But disrupting that presence in Pakistan is necessary ‐ it's a necessary
condition for making overall program in Afghanistan.” [House Intelligence Committee Hearing, 2/3/10]
6/29/10: Gen. Petraeus Said Al‐Qaida Had Established New Sanctuaries in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan
Following the U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. “It was, of course, in response to those attacks that
a U.S.‐led coalition entered Afghanistan in late 2001 and defeated Al Qaida and the Taliban elements
that allowed Al Qaida to establish its headquarters in training camps in Afghanistan. In the subsequent
years, however, the extremists were able to recruit, with Al Qaida establishing new sanctuaries in the
tribal areas of Pakistan and the Taliban and its affiliates reentering Afghanistan in an effort to reestablish
the control they once had in much of the country. In light of those developments, our task in
Afghanistan is clear. Indeed, President Obama has explained America's vital national interests there. We
will not, he has stated, tolerate a safe haven for terrorists, who want to destroy Afghan security from
within and launch attacks against innocent men, women and children in our country and around the
world.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 6/29/10]
6/29/10: Gen. Petraeus Said There Were Still Extremist Elements That Had Sanctuary in the Pakistan
Tribal Areas that Were Carrying Out Operations in Afghanistan and Others That Were Transnational,
Like Al‐ Qaida. “They have sustained significant losses, as is well known, in the tribal areas. Their
freedom of action has been reduced by Pakistani ‐‐ or operations by the Pakistani army and Frontier
Corps in the former Northwest Frontier Province, Pakhtunkhwa, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and in several of
the agencies of the tribal areas ‐‐ certainly not all of them. And certainly, there are still, without
question, extremist elements there that have sanctuary there and are carrying out operations inside
Afghanistan, and others that are transnational, as is the case of Al Qaida and some other elements in
Pakistan, as well.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 6/29/10]
1/20/10: Gates Said The “Afghan‐Pakistan Border Is [Al‐Qaeda’s] Primary Home And Safe Haven.”
Gates said, “What we have in the area of the Afghan‐Pakistan border is first of all, al‐Qaida. It's its
primary home and safe haven. You also have the Taliban who are active in Afghanistan. You also have
the Tehrik‐e‐ Taliban Pakistan that are focused on Pakistan. You also have Lashkar‐ e‐Taiba, LET, that is
focused on Pakistan but also on India. And what we see is that the success of any one of these groups
leads to new capabilities and new reputation for all. A victory for one is a victory for all. What I see
happening is these groups operating under the umbrella of al‐Qaida in the Northwest Frontier Province,
probably in North Waziristan, is orchestrating attacks using one element in Afghanistan, using another
element of the Taliban in Pakistan to attack targets in Pakistan to try to destabilize Pakistan, and again,
working with al‐ Qaida, Lashkar‐e‐Taiba, planning attacks in India. I believe this operation under the
umbrella of al‐Qaida, working with all of these different groups, is intended to destabilize not just
Afghanistan or not just Pakistan, but potentially the whole region by provoking a conflict perhaps
between India and Pakistan through some provocative act or terrorist act, or provoking instability in
Pakistan itself through terrorist attacks in Pakistan. So I think it's a very complicated situation. I think it's
very dangerous for the region as a whole. I also think it's dangerous to single out any one of these
groups and say if we could beat that group that will solve the problem. Because they are, in effect, a
6
syndicate of terrorist operators intending to destabilize this entire region. That's why it is so important
for all of us to be engaged, to understand the magnitude of this threat and to be engaged in trying to
reduce the threat, and wherever possible eliminate it. And it does require a high level of cooperation
among us all.” [CQ Transcript, Press Conference in India, 1/20/10]
12/8/09: Gates Said Pakistan Should “Focus On What Has Become, In My View, A Real Existential
Threat To Pakistan Which Is These Different Terrorist Groups Operating Within It’s Territory.” “What
we [and the Indian government] talked about at some length was the syndicate of different terrorist
groups that I talked about at the outset and how they put all of the countries here in the region ‐
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India ‐ at risk because of their activities. And as we've talked about, clearly one of
the subjects of discussion for my next visit is how to allay their concerns so that they can focus on what
has become, in my view, a real existential threat to Pakistan which is these different terrorist groups
operating within its territory.” [American Forces Press Service, 12/8/09]
12/2/09: Sec. Clinton Said It Was Difficult to Parse Out the Different Groups Operating in Pakistan, All
of Whom We Thought Were Connected to Al Qaida and Partition Some Off and Go After Others, Said
Adm. Mullen Had Been Key in Making the Case to the Pakistanis That They Needed to Do More
Against the Insurgents. “It is difficult to parse out the different groups that are operating within
Pakistan all of whom we think are connected in one way or another with al‐Qaida and partition some off
and go after the others. So it will be our continuing effort. And Admiral Mullen has been instrumental in
working on this with his counterparts to make the case that the Pakistanis have to do more against all of
the insurgent terrorist groups that are threatening them, that are threatening us in Afghanistan and the
Afghan people, are threatening other neighbors in the region. And we hope that we'll be able to make
that case successfully.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 12/2/09]
12/2/09: Sec. Clinton Said We Were Asking for More Help from the Pakistanis to Go After Al‐Qaida
and the Leadership of the Afghan Taliban Inside Their Own Territory. “But that we also are asking for
more help from the Pakistanis to go after al‐Qaida and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban inside their
own territory.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 12/2/09]
9/15/09: Adm. Mullen Said It Was Clear that Al‐Qaida Was Diminished While It Was Living in Pakistan
But That They Were By No Means Dead and Was a Very Serious Threat. “It's very clear that, in fact, Al
Qaida is diminished while it's living in Pakistan. And this is a Pakistan‐ Afghanistan issue. They are by no
means dead. It's a very serious threat. And that if we allow the Taliban to ‐‐ to take control and run
Afghanistan again, I think the likelihood that they would return to that safe haven would be high.”
[Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 9/15/09]
4/1/09: Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Flournoy Said that the U.S. Strategy Required
Eliminating Al‐Qaida’s Safe Haven in Pakistan and Ensuring they Did Not Return to Afghanistan – Said
Pakistan’s Ability to Dismantle the Safe Havens in its Terrority Was Critical to Its Stability and Security.
“As the president stated last Friday, I think very eloquently, we have a very clear goal. This strategy went
‐‐ really went back to first principles about our interests and our objectives, and we clarified our goal in
this region as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaida and its extremist allies, and to do so, we
must eliminate their safe haven in Pakistan and ensure that such a safe haven does not return to
Afghanistan… Pakistan’s ability to dismantle the safe havens on its territory and defeat the terror and
insurgent networks within its borders are absolutely critical to the security and stability of that nuclear‐
armed state.” [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 4/1/09]
7
3/27/09: Admiral Mullen Said that Al Qaida’s Safe Haven in Pakistan Was in the FATA and He
Assumed that’s Where Bin Laden and Zawahiri Were Hiding Out.
I have been in Pakistan on multiple trips to meet with their leadership. And, in fact, in the last
year, the Pakistan army and the Frontier Corps, who are the ‐‐ the local troops on the border...
FOREMAN: And they're ‐‐ they're based where...
(CROSSTALK)
MULLEN: They're actually based here in the FATA. And when we talk about...
FOREMAN: Right here.
MULLEN: ... a safe haven for al Qaeda and the president's focus on al Qaeda, this is where they
live.
BLITZER: And that's where you assume Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al‐Zawahri are hiding out,
on the ‐‐ on the Pakistan side of this border?
MULLEN: Absolutely, and ‐‐ and they hide very well. [CNN’s Situation Room, 3/27/09]
3/27/09: Interagency Report ‐ “The Core Goal of the U.S. Must Be to Disrupt, Dismantle, and Defeat al
Qaeda and its Safe Havens in Pakistan, and to Prevent Their Return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”
“Therefore, the core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe
havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan. The ability of extremists in
Pakistan to undermine Afghanistan is proven, while insurgency in Afghanistan feeds instability in
Pakistan.” [White Paper on the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and
Pakistan, 3/27/09]
8
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
A simple pooch: Why is American MSM not covering this like crazy? Even Faux 'Fairy & lovely' Newz did not cover it this morning. Bill Hemmer, the CNN transplant on Faux, talked for a few minutes. The leaks help or distress the Obama administration. If it is a distressing thing, why the heck are they not pulling all their anal-yeasts and beating the arundotty out of this new? If it is aiding Obama, why is the MSM or other outlets not covering.
Something is not right here, the TV has been unusually silent so far. I would have expected non-stop coverage for at least 2 days now. Why did they end the coverage on Sunday (I assume they covered this on Sunday).
Something is not right here, the TV has been unusually silent so far. I would have expected non-stop coverage for at least 2 days now. Why did they end the coverage on Sunday (I assume they covered this on Sunday).
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
very simple. These documents are over a span of 5 years starting from 2004. If the Fawx news talks about it, then Dems can say "Well... Looks like this has been happening since 2004 with our al-lie. What is Georgie doing then?". The Dems definitely don't want to talk since Bama looks like a fool now. When you are not sure, silence is the best thing for both sides and hope that news papers won't dissect this too much.SwamyG wrote:A simple pooch: Why is American MSM not covering this like crazy? Even Faux 'Fairy & lovely' Newz did not cover it this morning. Bill Hemmer, the CNN transplant on Faux, talked for a few minutes. The leaks help or distress the Obama administration. If it is a distressing thing, why the heck are they not pulling all their anal-yeasts and beating the arundotty out of this new? If it is aiding Obama, why is the MSM or other outlets not covering.
Something is not right here, the TV has been unusually silent so far. I would have expected non-stop coverage for at least 2 days now. Why did they end the coverage on Sunday (I assume they covered this on Sunday).
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
A-Gupta, Can you take the lead and start a thread in the GDF on the wikileaks. The idea is to link/post those leaks of interest to India showing Tsp involvement in the terrorist attacks on India and Indian interests in Afghanistan.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
NYT Editorial:
Pakistan’s Double Game
Pakistan’s Double Game
Editorial
Pakistan’s Double Game
Published: July 26, 2010
There is a lot to be disturbed by in the battlefield reports from Afghanistan released Sunday by WikiLeaks. The close-up details of war are always unsettling, even more so with this war, which was so badly neglected and bungled by President George W. Bush.
But the most alarming of the reports were the ones that described the cynical collusion between Pakistan’s military intelligence service and the Taliban. Despite the billions of dollars the United States has sent in aid to Pakistan since Sept. 11, they offer powerful new evidence that crucial elements of Islamabad’s power structure have been actively helping to direct and support the forces attacking the American-led military coalition.
The time line of the documents from WikiLeaks, an organization devoted to exposing secrets, stops before President Obama put his own military and political strategy into effect last December. Administration officials say they have made progress with Pakistan since, but it is hard to see much evidence of that so far.
Most of the WikiLeaks documents, which were the subject of in-depth coverage in The Times on Monday, cannot be verified. However, they confirm a picture of Pakistani double-dealing that has been building for years.
On a trip to Pakistan last October, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton suggested that officials in the Pakistani government knew where Al Qaeda leaders were hiding. Gen. David Petraeus, the new top military commander in Afghanistan, recently acknowledged longstanding ties between Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, known as ISI, and the “bad guys.”
The Times’s report of the new documents suggests the collusion goes even deeper, that representatives of the ISI have worked with the Taliban to organize networks of militants to fight American soldiers in Afghanistan and hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders.
The article painted a chilling picture of the activities of Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul of Pakistan, who ran the ISI from 1987 to 1989, when the agency and the C.I.A. were together arming the Afghan militias fighting Soviet troops. General Gul kept working with those forces, which eventually formed the Taliban.
Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States said the reports were unsubstantiated and “do not reflect the current on-ground realities.” But at this point, denials about links with the militants are simply not credible.
Why would Pakistan play this dangerous game? The ISI has long seen the Afghan Taliban as a proxy force, a way to ensure its influence on the other side of the border and keep India’s influence at bay.
Pakistani officials also privately insist that they have little choice but to hedge their bets given their suspicions that Washington will once again lose interest as it did after the Soviets were ousted from Afghanistan in 1989. And until last year, when the Pakistani Taliban came within 60 miles of Islamabad, the country’s military and intelligence establishment continued to believe it could control the extremists when it needed to.
In recent months, the Obama administration has said and done many of the right things toward building a long-term relationship with Pakistan. It has committed to long-term economic aid. It is encouraging better relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is constantly reminding Pakistani leaders that the extremists, on both sides of the border, pose a mortal threat to Pakistan’s fragile democracy — and their own survival. We don’t know if they’re getting through. We know they have to.
It has been only seven months since Mr. Obama announced his new strategy for Afghanistan, and a few weeks since General Petraeus took command. But Americans are increasingly weary of this costly war. If Mr. Obama cannot persuade Islamabad to cut its ties to, and then aggressively fight, the extremists in Pakistan, there is no hope of defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan.
A version of this editorial appeared in print on July 27, 2010, on page A18 of the New York edition.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
It just dawned on me that the Taliban ie those supported by TSP are the sarkari Pasthuns settled in the region during Aurangazeb's time. These are folks who look towards Delhi Sarkar. Now TSP has co-opted them. The Pashtuns in Afghanistan are the western oriented folks ie Persians(Abdalis, Durranis etc). The odd thing is that the western Pashtuns are the ones wo look at Delhi against the Eastern Pashtuns. The historical fact is that these two groups had different outlook and orientation. Its Caroe's skulduggery that lumps all Pashtuns together as one monolithic group.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
Paging Dr. Hoyt and peerless Johaan
for their Bhashym aka discourse
please join
thanks in advance
for their Bhashym aka discourse
please join
thanks in advance
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
I had asked Johann a couple of months ago - why can't the best equipped Military in the World take on a rag-tag militia armed only with AK-47s and RPGs? Fred Reed asks the same question.
Psycopathy Legitimized
©Fred Reed
http://www.FredOnEverything.net
On Anti-War.com, I find a loutish American general, James Mattis, martial feminist, talking about the fun he has killing Afghans. Yes, fun, wheeee-oooo! and ooo-rah! too. He says, “You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women around for five years because they didn’t wear a veil,” adding “guys like that ain’t got no manhood left anyways. So it’s a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them.” What must he do with prisoners?
A joyous killer, possibly orgasmic. Note mandatory flagly background, pickle suit, and stupid colorful gewgaws so he looks like a goddam stamp collecton. Stern gaze is necessary to become a general. From defending the Constitution to the pleasre of watching Afghans die: The military has come a long way.
I’ll guess he fell just shy of graduating from third grade. He sure ain’t much of a general, no ways, I reckon. Just the fellow I want representing me in the world.
Does General Dworkin-Mattis speak of manhood? Odd, since his military is being badly outfought by the unmanly Afghans that are fun to kill. By the Pentagon’s figures the US military outnumbers the resistance several to one. The US has complete control of the air, enjoying F16s, helicopter gun-ships, transport choppers, and Predator drones, as well as armor, body armor, night-vision gear, heavy weaponry, medevac, hospitals, good food, and PXs. The Afghans have only AKs, RPGs, C4, and balls. Yet they are winning, or at least holding their own. How glorous.
Man for man, weapon for weapon, the Taliban are clearly superior. They take far heavier casualties, but keep on fighting. Their politics are not mine, but they are formidable on the ground. If I were General Dworkin, I’d change my name and go into hiding. Maybe he could wear a veil.
Perhaps the US should recognize that it has a second-rate military at phenomenal cost—an enormous, largely useless national codpiece. It is embarrassing. The Pentagon’s preferred enemies are lightly armed, poorly equipped peasants, which makes for a long war and thus hundreds of billions of dollars in juicy contracts for military industries. Yet the greatest military in history (ask it) gets run out of Southeast Asia, blown up and run out of Lebanon, shot down and run out of Somalia, with Afghanistan a disaster in progress and Iraq claimed as an American victory rather than Shiite.Do the aircraft carriers intimidate North Korea? No. Iran? No. China? No. For this, a trilliaon dollars a year?
The reasons for the mediocrity are clear enough. First, the Pentagon has become a contracting agency for buying gorgeous and elaborate arms of little relevance to the wars the US fights. (If the Martians attack, we’ll be ready.)
Second, the US is no longer a nation of hardy country boys who grow up shooting and loading hay bales into pick-ups for spare change. (For the uninitiated, hay bales are heavy.) I often see headlines such as “More than two-thirds of Texas schoolchildren flunked the state's physical fitness test this year…” If Texas has gone all soft and rubbery, you can forget about Massassachusetts. The American pool of hardy, manipulable kids without too much schoolin' isn't what it was. The lack of troops of course pushes the Pentagon toward more pricey gadgetry and greater imbalance.
Now, it is regarded as treasonous to question that Our Boys are the best trained, best armed, toughest troops in the world, and I’ll probably get punched out in bars for pointing out the awful truth. Let’s imagine an experiment. We take Killing-is-Fun General Mattis-Abzug, and a thousand GIs, and a thousand Taliban, and let them fight it out in any patch of wretched barren mountains of your choosing. On equal terms. What you think? Same weapons..
Good idea, General? You et what they eat, wear what they wear, They have no medical care, and neither do you. If they get lung-shot and die the hard way, you do too. It will come down to guts and motivation.
Motivation: It counts, general. I believe it was Bedford Forrest who said of some of his troops, “Them cane-brake boys jest plain likes to fight.” I guess there must be just a whole lot of cane in Afghanistan. The Taliban will go to any length to cut your freaking throat because you have been killing their wives and children ,fathers and brothers, and you will fight for…for…well. Uh. Big oil, AIPAC, Ann Coulter. Or a promotion for General Mathis-Abzug. Anybody want to put odds on the outcome?
Or what if they had the air power, the gun ships…?
And General, killing them might be a tad less fun when you couldn’t do it from the safety of a gunship. Just a thought, General.
A digression here. Bear with me. It’s just that General Mattis-Steinem makes killing sound like so much fun. And I guess it is, for some. You’ve seen the YouTube video of GIs machine-gunning people walking around a city street from a helicopter gunship. A hoot. But—can I offer a second opinion?
I went off to Viet Nam because I was young and dumb and adventurous and they told me that I was fighting for Apple Pie, and Mom, and White Christian Motherhood (which I spent my high-school days dreading, but never mind). Actually I was just another sucker from the small-town South. The Pentagon depends, utterly, on small-town suckers. They are brave, trainable, not real thoughtful.
Funny how things look if you think about them. Patriots talk about the tragic deaths of young Americans in Afghanistan. Well, ok. Other things being equal, young guys getting shot to death in a pointless war is not a swell idea. I’m against it. In fact, the more you see of it, and I’ve seen a lot, the worse an idea it seems. Of course, a logician might point out that if you didn’t send them to Afghanistan, they wouldn’t die there—would they?
The dead are not the only casualties. Go to aVeterans Hospital, and watch the left-overs come in. You might be surprised how much fun they didn't think it was. Or what they think of General Mattis-Firmstare. You might be very surprised.
But tell me: why is a GI’s life, mine or anyone else’s, worth more than the life of an Afghan child of three? Especially if you pretend to be a Christian, tell me. (I love this part. Military Christians are wonderfully funny frauds.)
A pretty good rule of thumb is that the attacking army is in the wrong, which would have made a Vietnamese kid’s life worth more than mine. I'll buy that, though I'm happy it didn't work out that way. But the attacking countries always believe that Their Boys are sacred.
When the Japanese attacked Pearl, they figured a Japanese pilot’s life was worth more than that of an American sailor. The Germans thought the same, mutatis mutandis, when the Wehrmacht went into Poland, as of course do Americans when they invade country after country. But why is the aggressor’s life sacred, prithee? If I leap out of a dark alley and attack your daughter with a butcher knife, is my life worth more than hers?
But it is just so much fun to kill Afghans. Excuse me, I need to puke.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
Limbaugh has a point - during the Valerie Plame "fiasco" the liberals were all hollering their heads off about national security, but when it comes to Wikileaks then the liberals are all applauding it:
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
The drug addict has his points so tightly wrapped as one would have aalu bonda batter on a sieve. The Plame Affair is known for intimidation of a couple by the war-mongers, who wanted to wage war. They turned their attention away from Afg to Iraq. We all now know how dharmic that war was. Billo the Clown forgets that important distinction.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
Sanjay M:
If you want to be taken seriously on BR, I would say eschew silly liberals Vs conservatives theater.
If you want to be taken seriously on BR, I would say eschew silly liberals Vs conservatives theater.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
The soldier who leaked all this is a true patriot and worthy of nobel peace prize if not congressional medal of Honor.
JMT
Now how much we can take this to the world around and show once for to the citizens of the world what TSP is all about...
Will GOI have the guts to say no more talks till some one is held accountable for attacks on diplomatic missions if not on Indians in Indian soil?
I doubt it
JMT
Now how much we can take this to the world around and show once for to the citizens of the world what TSP is all about...
Will GOI have the guts to say no more talks till some one is held accountable for attacks on diplomatic missions if not on Indians in Indian soil?
I doubt it

Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
Consider the implications if this was not a leak that GOTUS was unaware of. What if the leak was in fact authorised by GOTUS?
Drip, drip, drip, splash, drip, drip....
Drip, drip, drip, splash, drip, drip....

Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
Was listening to NPR about the confirmation hearings and how the Gen was the one at the flag raising in Kandahar in 2001. And the voice over was saying "he was confident then but is now more circumspect". I immediately recalled the French guy's description of the encounter with Islam and how even after a big defeat it took 200 to 300 years to clear France of rvoing bands of miscreants. And finally about a millennium to take the fight to Algeria in 1830. Again it took similar amount of time for reconqusita in Spain.
I think they don't know what they are fighting. Modern mercantile capitalists don't have the staying power. The problem is one has to keep winning every battle, for to lose the final one will finish you off as the Persians, Byzantines, Chauhans all found. And you don't know which is the final one as the Austrians fond in 1680.
I think they don't know what they are fighting. Modern mercantile capitalists don't have the staying power. The problem is one has to keep winning every battle, for to lose the final one will finish you off as the Persians, Byzantines, Chauhans all found. And you don't know which is the final one as the Austrians fond in 1680.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
ramana wrote:Was listening to NPR about the confirmation hearings and how the Gen was the one at the flag raising in Kandahar in 2001. And the voice over was saying "he was confident then but is now more circumspect". I immediately recalled the French guy's description of the encounter with Islam and how even after a big defeat it took 200 to 300 years to clear France of rvoing bands of miscreants. And finally about a millennium to take the fight to Algeria in 1830. Again it took similar amount of time for reconqusita in Spain.
I think they don't know what they are fighting. Modern mercantile capitalists don't have the staying power. The problem is one has to keep winning every battle, for to lose the final one will finish you off as the Persians, Byzantines, Chauhans all found. And you don't know which is the final one as the Austrians fond in 1680.

Supreme has blessed us with huge responsibilty. There never have been a time or race beside Indics who has periodically finished off the Adhrama to provide relief for Srishti. No one else can fight millenium long battle/s.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
And suppose the leak is engineered by ISI hoping for US exit immediately.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
The reaction in Afghanistan following WikiLeaks disclosure of classified US Intelligence documents showing the malign role of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in fomenting Islamic Terrorism in Afghanistan.
The Afghan’s do not seem to be assumed with the policy of the US and its Allies of rewarding the Islamic Republic of Pakistan with large wads of cash even as the Pakistani’s foment Islamic Terrorism in Afghanistan.
Reuters on the reaction of Afghanistan‘s National Security Council and that of Rangeen Dadfar Spanta :
Afghanistan questions U.S. silence over Pakistan's role
More on the Afghan reaction from AFP:
Kabul urges West to review Pakistan policy after leaks
Well said Mr. Spanta
:
The Afghan’s do not seem to be assumed with the policy of the US and its Allies of rewarding the Islamic Republic of Pakistan with large wads of cash even as the Pakistani’s foment Islamic Terrorism in Afghanistan.
Reuters on the reaction of Afghanistan‘s National Security Council and that of Rangeen Dadfar Spanta :
Afghanistan questions U.S. silence over Pakistan's role
More on the Afghan reaction from AFP:
Kabul urges West to review Pakistan policy after leaks
Well said Mr. Spanta

"It's not justifiable for Afghans to see a country given 11 billion dollars in reconstruction aid and to support its security forces, and then see those same forces training terrorists," said Spanta.
"At least we Afghan politicians are not able to explain this to the Afghan people,"
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
X Posted from the TSP Thread.
Excerpt dealing with the impact of the WikiLeaks incident and on the inability of the US to take a firmer stand against the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s fomenting of Islamic Terrorism in Afghnistan from the interview of Fareed Zakaria by CNN:
Excerpt dealing with the impact of the WikiLeaks incident and on the inability of the US to take a firmer stand against the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s fomenting of Islamic Terrorism in Afghnistan from the interview of Fareed Zakaria by CNN:
Reaction to WikiLeaks 'vastly overdone'
July 27, 2010 -- Updated 2211 GMT (0611 HKT) ………………………..
CNN: What's the impact of the release going to be?
Zakaria: I think the most specific impact is the issue of Pakistan ... the reality is that Pakistan's interest and America's interest are not the same. Pakistan has been maintaining its contact with these militant groups.
The one thing that this report did is to provide enough detail on this set of problems that it's essentially pretty undeniable and it also is very difficult now for the administration to deny that there is a huge problem here -- that the Pakistanis have been playing a double game. That part of it seems to shed light very centrally on the role of Pakistan.
Again to be fair, the Obama administration came into power arguing that Afghanistan needed to be thought of as "Afpak," that Pakistan is very much part of the problem and part of the solution. And they have been working on that. It's not an easy problem because we have limited leverage with Pakistan.
CNN: Why can't the United States take a firmer stance with Pakistan?
Zakaria: If you were to shun and isolate them, it would probably strengthen even further their contacts with the militants. So I recognize that this is a thorny problem for any administration. But I do think it centrally highlights this problem, that you're really never going to solve the Afghanistan problem as long as you have not just a safe haven across the border, but a safe haven in which the government on the other side is playing footsie with the terrorists.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
What if we could phrase it in the following way?
"Since Pakistan is supporting the Taliban in order to gain control over Afghanistan, then let's meet Pakistan half-way by allowing it to control Southern Afghanistan and incorporate it into Pakistan, with the caveat that Pashtuns get normal laws and voting rights like the rest of Pakistan proper"
This still permits Pashtun reunification and the formation of Pashtunistan, with the subsequent breakup of Pakistan, a la 1971. Because Pashtuns are too big for Pakjabis to swallow, and would get stuck like a bone in their throat.
"Since Pakistan is supporting the Taliban in order to gain control over Afghanistan, then let's meet Pakistan half-way by allowing it to control Southern Afghanistan and incorporate it into Pakistan, with the caveat that Pashtuns get normal laws and voting rights like the rest of Pakistan proper"
This still permits Pashtun reunification and the formation of Pashtunistan, with the subsequent breakup of Pakistan, a la 1971. Because Pashtuns are too big for Pakjabis to swallow, and would get stuck like a bone in their throat.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
SanjayM< I used to go along with that idea under the Caroe's crap that all Pashtuns are one. Reading history again, they are quite different. The Eastern Pashtuns, aka Ghilzais are India oriented and ruled till they were suppressed by the Western Pashtuns aka Durranis or the Popalzais. The Western Pashtuns looked towards Persia.
Yes the Soviet intervention and the Taliban years kind of suppressed the historic memories, however if the Eastern Pashtuns get primacy they will spend their time normatizing the Western Pashtuns and our goal of Pasthunistan being formed leading to TSP fissure might not happen. On the contrary it might strengthen TSP.
Yes the Soviet intervention and the Taliban years kind of suppressed the historic memories, however if the Eastern Pashtuns get primacy they will spend their time normatizing the Western Pashtuns and our goal of Pasthunistan being formed leading to TSP fissure might not happen. On the contrary it might strengthen TSP.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
That's like arguing that Biharis could "normatize" East Bengalis into accepting subjugation by West Pakistanis.
Pashtuns don't have the temperament to be assimilated by the Punjabis, no matter which intermediary tries to abet it. At a minimum they would demand right to political representation in Islamabad commensurate with their size. This itself would put strains on Pak politics that Pak would not be able to bear.
Pakjab hogs everything in Pakistan, and they won't give yield any political/economic space for Pashtuns no matter what. Pak is not built on that spirit of accommodation.
Pashtuns don't have the temperament to be assimilated by the Punjabis, no matter which intermediary tries to abet it. At a minimum they would demand right to political representation in Islamabad commensurate with their size. This itself would put strains on Pak politics that Pak would not be able to bear.
Pakjab hogs everything in Pakistan, and they won't give yield any political/economic space for Pashtuns no matter what. Pak is not built on that spirit of accommodation.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
worth reading cameron's quotes in detail... quite specific... lets see if this now translates to action...
Pakistan must not be allowed to promote export of terror, says David Cameron
Pakistan must not be allowed to promote export of terror, says David Cameron
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
Interesting times ahead:
Democrats abandon Obama on Afghanistan
Democrats abandon Obama on Afghanistan
Wiki Leak is having its impact whether its noted or not....
There were 102 Democrats voting against the $33 billion in war funding.That's more than three times the number of Democrats (32) who voted against a similar funding bill in June 2009. (This year's war funding bill passed, 308-114.)
Among those voting "no" this time: prominent liberals such as Henry Waxman of California and Ed Markey of Massachusetts, and many members of the Congressional Black Caucus, including Jesse Jackson Jr. of Illinois and Maxine Waters of California.
....
Rep. Xavier Becerra, D-Calif., vice chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, said he voted against war funding this year because it would involve using borrowed money.
"This war, which has run longer than the Revolutionary War, longer than the Civil War, longer than the World Wars or Vietnam, is not a candidate for 'emergency' deficit spending. If Afghanistan is worth fighting for, it must be worth paying for," he said in a statement.
AS USA TODAY's Richard Wolf reported yesterday, one of the "no" votes came from House Appropriations Committee Chairman David Obey, the man charged with shaping the measure and bringing it to the floor. Obey, who is retiring this year, said he believes it's a mistake to increase troops in Afghanistan. Like Becerra, Obey also believes the war has dragged on for too long.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
Taliban has two fathers - Pakistan and Al Qaeda. USA wants to be Pakistan patron, at the cost of India. IMVHO, India should have open channels to the other father.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
It is all about the money. As long as the money was there to buy the geo political advantage with Pakistan it was fine but once it became expensive to maintain Pakistan as a client state then it cannot get support.ramana wrote:Interesting times ahead:
Democrats abandon Obama on Afghanistan
Wiki Leak is having its impact whether its noted or not.
Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
today's ISI, yesterday's ISI, official ISI, former ISI, this ISI, that ISI...
and of course the obligatory advisory by Russell Peters on how to pronounce Paaah-kiss-stan, which the above 'Floridian' duly complies with:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XfcZxygstjc
and of course the obligatory advisory by Russell Peters on how to pronounce Paaah-kiss-stan, which the above 'Floridian' duly complies with:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XfcZxygstjc
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Re: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
About the Stingers
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... e_Stingers
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... e_Stingers
Today, however, there is nothing comparable to the "Stinger effect" in Afghanistan. Open-source accounts of the Taliban's weapons suggests that, in recent years, the group has had access to limited numbers of first- and second-generation anti-aircraft weapons, including Soviet SA-7s, Chinese HN-5s, and perhaps a few early model Stingers. (It is difficult to tell from the WikiLeaks documents if the devices used were, in fact, Stingers, but they likely were not.) In 2009, London's Telegraph newspaper reported that Soviet SA-14s -- a second-generation heat-seeking missile introduced in the 1970s -- had been smuggled into Afghanistan across the Iranian border. While loose missiles of any type are worrisome, none of those reportedly acquired by the Taliban have the game-changing potential that the Stinger had in the 1980s. This assessment is supported both by open-source reporting on insurgent missile attacks in Afghanistan and the classified documents obtained by Wikileaks. Those files contain numerous reports of suspected missile attacks but very few reports of downed aircraft. One assault recounted in the war logs, for example, succeeded in downing a Chinook helicopter in 2007. But a single downed helicopter -- or even 10 or 20 downed helicopters -- over nine years hardly qualifies as a successful insurgent anti-aircraft campaign.