A look back at the partition

[Yayavar]

Gandhi did not 'agree' to partition..he was ok with civil war if it came to that. He, whether we agree with the sentiment or not, even proposed making Jinnah the PM of the undivided nation but congress demurred. Patel also agreed to the view that partition was to be accepted and then Gandhi finally gave in.

In our hind-sight we blame him and criticize him not supporting the violent revolutionaries (earlier threads). Would that not have given rise to the possibility of multiple regions -some with British some against, some cooperating others looking for themselves? In other words, reverting to the anarchic times that led to foreign occupation.

More research is certainly necessary. It is too naive to claim Nehru/Gandhi/Patel etc. did not care for the lives of people of India. The only one who did not care was Jinnah (Direct Action is one such example).

[member_19686]

The collected works of Gandhi contradict your claim, look up his statements.

He categorically states that if Muslim "brothers" wanted Pakistan then better for the Hindus to bend over.

He even tells Hindus that if everyone of them get killed by Muslim "brothers" then it will be better than Hindus retaliating and asks them to die cheerfully.

All these are from his speeches during that time.

Nehru and Gandhi's uncaring attitude about Hindu-Sikh lives is evident when Congress leaders kept telling them to a) stay put b) once violence began then blame Hindus and Sikhs, even seek to air bomb them c) refusing orderly population exchange d) Nehru washing his hands off those whom he and his party delivered to the Jihadis by signing the pact with Liaqat in 1950 which disgusted Shyama Prasad Mukherjee.

Which of these demonstrate a caring attitude for peoples lives?

Gandhi had even demanded that Hindu-Sikh refugees evacuate the Delhi mosques they had occupied in the middle of winter, this is one of the things which goaded Godse to the conclusion that he had to put an end to his life.

Real "caring" attitude on display here:

During his prayer meeting on 1 May 1947, he prepared the Hindus and Sikhs for the anticipated massacres of their kind in the upcoming state of Pakistan with these words: "I would tell the Hindus to face death cheerfully if the Muslims are out to kill them. I would be a real sinner if after being stabbed I wished in my last moment that my son should seek revenge. I must die without rancour. (*) You may turn round and ask whether all Hindus and all Sikhs should die. Yes, I would say. Such martyrdom will not be in vain." (Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol.LXXXVII, p.394-5) It is left unexplained what purpose would be served by this senseless and avoidable surrender to murder.

Even when the killing had started, Gandhi refused to take pity on the Hindu victims, much less to point fingers at the Pakistani aggressors. More importantly for the principle of non-violence, he failed to offer them a non-violent technique of countering and dissuading the murderers. Instead, he told the Hindu refugees from Pakistan to go back and die. On 6 August 1947, Gandhiji commented to Congress workers on the incipient communal conflagration in Lahore thus: "I am grieved to learn that people are running away from the West Punjab and I am told that Lahore is being evacuated by the non-Muslims. I must say that this is what it should not be. If you think Lahore is dead or is dying, do not run away from it, but die with what you think is the dying Lahore. (*) When you suffer from fear you die before death comes to you. That is not glorious. I will not feel sorry if I hear that people in the Punjab have died not as cowards but as brave men. (*) I cannot be forced to salute any flag. If in that act I am murdered I would bear no ill will against anyone and would rather pray for better sense for the person or persons who murder me." (Hindustan Times, 8-8-1947, CWoMG, vol. LXXXIX, p.11).

So, he was dismissing as cowards those who saved their lives fleeing the massacre by a vastly stronger enemy, viz. the Pakistani population and security forces. But is it cowardice to flee a no-win situation, so as to live and perhaps to fight another day? There can be a come-back from exile, not from death. Is it not better to continue life as a non-Lahorite than to cling to one's location in Lahore even if it has to be as a corpse? Why should staying in a mere location be so superior to staying alive? To be sure, it would have been even better if Hindus could have continued to live with honour in Lahore, but Gandhi himself had refused to use his power in that cause, viz. averting Partition. He probably would have found that, like the butchered or fleeing Hindus, he was no match for the determination of the Muslim League, but at least he could have tried. In the advice he now gave, the whole idea of non-violent struggle got perverted.

http://koenraadelst.bharatvani.org/arti ... stake.html

[devesh]

how would the revolutionaries have lead to "anarchic" times of "one against another"? this is a huge claim. none of the revolutionaries wanted India broken into parts. in fact, we find that it was revolutionaries who were most radically against even the idea of Pakistan, something that MKG himself helped spawn. this notion that Gandhi didn't accept Partition is hogwash. what was Gandhi thinking when he supported and gave the Khilafat Movement worldwide publicity? There were a bunch of other people, the "radicals" and "revolutionaries" like Tilak, who warned him that he was playing with fire. Bipin Chandra Pal, another "radical", understood the consequences of caving in to Islamist claims of separatism. it was these "radicals" who were most fervently against "partitions" of any kind. when there were contemporaries of Gandhi who had seen practically and experienced the hunger of Islamists, and were warning the rest of the country not to fall for these ploys, how can Gandhi be insulated from this environment by historians. this claim that Gandhi "never accepted" partition but "gave in" is ridiculous. his actions, contrary to those of the people who fought against partitions, should clearly show that perhaps Gandhi considered the areas populated my Muslim majorities to be not worthy of his attention.

[Yayavar]

I'm only going by the statements I've seen in various description of independence movement and the last days of British rule. What makes you think he or anyone wanted Partition? Did they ever ask for it? Yes, Khilafat support did not help but the idea was to get the Muslim leadership into mainstream. It did not work out. It does not mean there was a desire for partition. Gandhi opposed partition has been stated and referred to in multiple memoirs and descriptions. I did a quick google search and here are a couple of examples:

http://www.kamat.com/mmgandhi/gandhi.htm
http://www.xtimeline.com/evt/view.aspx?id=72462

Now, one could argue that this is manufactured history that everyone repeats. If so, more research and authentic first person reports are required. The above is also the view of my family members who lived through those times and actually suffered in partition trudging over from what is now Pakistan.

The point of anarchy is my reading. See what is happening even in co-ordinated 'liberation' in middle-east nowadays. They are already fighting among themselves. Bose's INA had a pan-India view but the others were small scale operations. It would lead to power struggle as well as give good cause to Churchill/others (with the full WW-2 might) to use full military force. This certainly is speculation but then so is much of what we are discussing.

I'm happy to be corrected and will follow Bj ji's links above. I also have Maulana Azad's 'india wins freedom'. Reading that slowly. Certainly finds Nehru in the wrong many a times.

[Virupaksha]

Gandhi did not 'agree' to partition..he was ok with civil war if it came to that. He, whether we agree with the sentiment or not, even proposed making Jinnah the PM of the undivided nation but congress demurred. Patel also agreed to the view that partition was to be accepted and then Gandhi finally gave in.

In our hind-sight we blame him and criticize him not supporting the violent revolutionaries (earlier threads). Would that not have given rise to the possibility of multiple regions -some with British some against, some cooperating others looking for themselves? In other words, reverting to the anarchic times that led to foreign occupation.

More research is certainly necessary. It is too naive to claim Nehru/Gandhi/Patel etc. did not care for the lives of people of India. The only one who did not care was Jinnah (Direct Action is one such example).

viv,

Gandhi did say that partition will be over his dead body. He had done many fast unto deaths for everything under the sun, but never for stopping partition. He was a calculating politician, notice he never fasted against the muslims. He understood intuitively some things and played his cards accordingly.

Viv, if that was the case does that mean he was ok with India rising all at the same time? and that the "man of peace" was only a political tool.

Do you mean to say only Jinnah created the events while Nehru/gandhi/Patel always only reacted to them. That is intellectual dishonesty at its core. Did they really care about all the people of India equally or were they playing favorites according to their networks and ideological commitments?

[Yayavar]

Virupaksha: that I can agree. He tried but the world (of Congress/Muslim league/ British/others) had passed him by and skirted him. He had to choose between 'going to masses' and causing further chaos or giving in. He gave in finally. This is a far cry from agreeing or supporting partition.

Virupaksha: You edited and added more to your comment..I'll respond to that later. Just adding a comment here that I responded to your comment about Gandhi having opposed partition ('over my dead body').

[brihaspati]

Gandhi did not 'agree' to partition..he was ok with civil war if it came to that. He, whether we agree with the sentiment or not, even proposed making Jinnah the PM of the undivided nation but congress demurred. Patel also agreed to the view that partition was to be accepted and then Gandhi finally gave in.

In our hind-sight we blame him and criticize him not supporting the violent revolutionaries (earlier threads). Would that not have given rise to the possibility of multiple regions -some with British some against, some cooperating others looking for themselves? In other words, reverting to the anarchic times that led to foreign occupation.

More research is certainly necessary. It is too naive to claim Nehru/Gandhi/Patel etc. did not care for the lives of people of India. The only one who did not care was Jinnah (Direct Action is one such example).

MKG said different things at different points specifically over the issue of Partition. At one stage he did "not" and at another stage he "did". It is perhaps misleading to say that he did "not' accept Partition, and moreover misleading to say that he accepted it "after" Sardar "accepted" it. I find it curious that in none of these, JLN's "acceptance" or non-acceptance seems to be a swinger of MKG opinion. JLN did not have any opinion on this at any point? On how many points did MKG ever submit to Sardar's "will"? How many occasions did Sardar submit to MKG? Why do we see this overwhelming urge to associate Sardar alone with favouring Partition/opposing CMP etc [with a view towards not wanting to concede to Jinnah demands] together with MKG - completely removing JLN from having influence or role in the decision making process? Why does MKG submit to Sardar apparently whenever by hindsight the decision appears to be shady/negative/dubious consequences?!!!

I only used Azads' censored portion, and reluctantly too the selection of material attributed in connection to MKG from the website which is supposed to be clearing up a lot if not all of truth about CMP - specifically to show that Sardar was not aligned to MKG's opposition to the CMP until at least 24th June. The website does not give any docs - letters etc, that indicate JLN's attitudes towards CMP in the same crucial period. Sardar did not like the idea of concessions - grouping/parity etc. But Sardar is reported even in one doc quote don the site - and which I have analyzed in detail - to show that Sardar was even agreeable to the "short term" part of CMP and pointed the solution in putting Jinnah and Nehru on a one-on-one basis to settle the "gov" sharing bit.

I had quoted earlier material to show that JLN had already swung towards an opposition to any power sharing with Jinnah as representative/claimant of Muslims. I had added Menon's claims about "converting Sardar" in this connection too. Menon was close to JLN. Menon does not talk of having to "convert JLN". Menon's statements, JLN's own casual droppings from much earlier than June 1946, Azad's statements - and even the selection of docs quoted on the website - all showed Sardar cannot be bracketed with MKG and JLN's opposition to the CMP - until at least late June, and perhaps even 7th July.

Sardar and Rajendraprasad never made any secret of their assessment of Islamism, and were ideologically opposed to Islamic "separatist political self assertion", and opposed any "plans" on that basis. But when they compromised, they at least showed the honesty and integrity of following through on what they had openly committed to and not taken recourse to obfuscation about what their real thoughts/motivations and intentions were.

MKG and JLN however, had consistently refused to see the danger and violence within Islamism as an ideology, had always whitewashed Islamist records in India, and MKG in particular had been singularly responsible to start the process legitimizing separate islamist political assertion through the Khilafat movement. They therefore had to focus on individuals like Jinnah - and it becomes personal then. Muslims and Islamism as a societal ideological franework in general is good - Jinnah is bad. This is why then we need to edit out the issue of how Jinnah went out of the congrez, and which part of Islamism invited him back in - and what Jinnah's official position was until this period vis-a-vis the other strand of islamism [which he hijacked or which hijacked him - lets indulge in this hypothesis - after all it seems all the great leaders then were onlee acting reluctantly after others foisted decisions and fait accompli-s on them - it seems only Sardar was the true leader, because he alone was acting independently - with all others, including MKG, merely submitting to him!]

When we deny opposition on ideological grounds, and there seems to be greatest discomfort on the issue of power-sharing with individuals - does it not support "personal power hunger" then? Sardar at least seems to have had no problem if Jinnah and JLN agreed to "sharing" the gov! Moreover everyone seems to be trying to convince Sardar - does it imply that JLN needed no convincing?

Think gentlemen. Just think.

[Virupaksha]

Virupaksha: that I can agree. He tried but the world (of Congress/Muslim league/ British/others) had passed him by and skirted him. He had to choose between 'going to masses' and causing further chaos or giving in. He gave in finally. This is a far cry from agreeing or supporting partition.

He had played his veto card on congress MANY MANY times, why not this time at the most important juncture?

or perhaps it was not.

[Airavat]

I had quoted earlier material to show that JLN had already swung towards an opposition to any power sharing with Jinnah as representative/claimant of Muslims. I had added Menon's claims about "converting Sardar" in this connection too. Menon was close to JLN. Menon does not talk of having to "convert JLN".

VP Menon wasn't close to JLN at all. From HG Hodson's biography of VP Menon: "Yet he died, in retirement in Bangalore, where I spent many hours with him recording on tape his recollections both of the run-up to independence and of the integration of the princely states, a disappointed man; for Nehru, who was not temperamentally in tune with him, denied him the promotion to a provincial governorship which was his final ambition and which his great services before and after independence had made his due. I salute his memory."

When we deny opposition on ideological grounds, and there seems to be greatest discomfort on the issue of power-sharing with individuals - does it not support "personal power hunger" then? Sardar at least seems to have had no problem if Jinnah and JLN agreed to "sharing" the gov!

One month after the Calcutta killings by the Muslim League, Viceroy Wavell convinced Nehru to include the Muslim League ministers in the executive council "in the interest of communal peace and harmony". So it was Nehru who was willing to share power as long as India remained united!

The Cabinet Mission plan envisaged a weak center, with the grouping scheme and the secession clause, but Patel became convinced for a strong center when he saw how the Muslim League ministers created roadblocks in the functioning of the govt, even as they continued "direct action" in Noakhali and Tripura (Nov 1946).

VP Menon's proposal took away the option of secession for the provinces and princely states, in exchange for the INC accepting partition. The India that we live in today, with a strong center, is the creation of Menon and Patel.

[Sanku]

One month after the Calcutta killings by the Muslim League, Viceroy Wavell convinced Nehru to include the Muslim League ministers in the executive council "in the interest of communal peace and harmony". So it was Nehru who was willing to share power as long as India remained united!

Actually, this is more like giving your sisters rapist a place inside your house so that he does not rape your family members outside. Had the sharing power been true, it would have been done before the incident, and also done in a way to bypass the primary genocide against Hindus'.

Muslim League ministers created roadblocks in the functioning of the govt, even as they continued "direct action" in Noakhali and Tripura (Nov 1946).

The Muslim League was indeed allowed to do what it wanted to, and no strong actions were taken -- JLN was busy worrying about majority communal-ism while the Islamists were carving out India.

VP Menon's proposal took away the option of secession for the provinces and princely states, in exchange for the INC accepting partition. The India that we live in today, with a strong center, is the creation of Menon and Patel.

Those are false choices, there was a third choice, of a Independent India which, after the British left, decided on the political structure that worked for the independent nation.

[JE Menon]

>>for Nehru, who was not temperamentally in tune with him,

Absolutely correct. While Menon was an ICS and essentially until then a bureaucrat working for the British Empire, he was much closer to Sardar, so much so that the latter entirely trusted him to collect the states like "apples for Patel's bag" - which he did with quite some skill. Both his voluminous books (out of three I know) on the subject put this in great detail. He literally acted as Patel's right arm, and his eyes and ears into the various circles he had access to as a "civil servant of the empire".

Having read his writings some time ago, I personally felt that he was very much in favour of partition. Once the matter was decided, and he worked like a lunatic to get the maximum that India could. The machinations involved, often from hour to hour, need to be read to be believed. He eventually joined the Swatantra Party.

The man led a very unusual life... From a poor background, IIRC he even spent some time as a coal miner, and a boxer!!! Can't confirm the boxer part though I read it somewhere for sure. There is not much about his personal life in the public domain.

For those who are interested, read this which contains some detail:

http://maddy06.blogspot.com/2010/12/vp- ... india.html

(Like many with the surname Menon, I'm from right there, ancestral house very close to Bharatha Puzha (river), and the places mentioned there are crammed with direct and distant family. Strange that this little town of Ottapalam in Palakkad district has thrown up so many national level figures - mainly bureaucrats in the foreign ministry and intelligence set up - including of course Sankaran Nair. I'm sure this is the case for most of the Nairs on the forum, and there are a few).

[harbans]

"I would tell the Hindus to face death cheerfully if the Muslims are out to kill them. I would be a real sinner if after being stabbed I wished in my last moment that my son should seek revenge. I must die without rancour. (*) You may turn round and ask whether all Hindus and all Sikhs should die. Yes, I would say. Such martyrdom will not be in vain." (Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol.LXXXVII, p.394-5)

Sorry to say, but i doubt this man even read the Bhagavad Gita..here is Arjuna's dilemna as expressed in Chapter 1 (Edwin Arnold translation):

Better I deem it, if my kinsmen strike,
To face them weaponless, and bare my breast
To shaft and spear, than answer blow with blow.

Krishna then blasts that weakness of Arjuna to shreds. Looks Gandhi never got past Chapter 1 of the Gita itself. Krishna got a name for the sort of weakness that Gandhi was extolling: Adharma.

[brihaspati]

I had quoted earlier material to show that JLN had already swung towards an opposition to any power sharing with Jinnah as representative/claimant of Muslims. I had added Menon's claims about "converting Sardar" in this connection too. Menon was close to JLN. Menon does not talk of having to "convert JLN".

VP Menon wasn't close to JLN at all. From HG Hodson's biography of VP Menon: "Yet he died, in retirement in Bangalore, where I spent many hours with him recording on tape his recollections both of the run-up to independence and of the integration of the princely states, a disappointed man; for Nehru, who was not temperamentally in tune with him, denied him the promotion to a provincial governorship which was his final ambition and which his great services before and after independence had made his due. I salute his memory."

When we deny opposition on ideological grounds, and there seems to be greatest discomfort on the issue of power-sharing with individuals - does it not support "personal power hunger" then? Sardar at least seems to have had no problem if Jinnah and JLN agreed to "sharing" the gov!

One month after the Calcutta killings by the Muslim League, Viceroy Wavell convinced Nehru to include the Muslim League ministers in the executive council "in the interest of communal peace and harmony". So it was Nehru who was willing to share power as long as India remained united!

The Cabinet Mission plan envisaged a weak center, with the grouping scheme and the secession clause, but Patel became convinced for a strong center when he saw how the Muslim League ministers created roadblocks in the functioning of the govt, even as they continued "direct action" in Noakhali and Tripura (Nov 1946).

VP Menon's proposal took away the option of secession for the provinces and princely states, in exchange for the INC accepting partition. The India that we live in today, with a strong center, is the creation of Menon and Patel.

Actually : there are counter critics to what V.P.Menon says in his two major (and a third) volumes. Hodgson's remarks are again based on primarily V.P.Menon's own versions - which are no doubt largely accurate.

But in the context of my post, we were talking of the CMP. There is a passage in Menon's own writing where he talks of meeting Sardar directly for the first time in August, 1946. Added to that he notes that the position of his working relationship lay as adviser to the vicregal counsel, and that even if he "discussed" with Sardar, the advises given were his "own".

Menon no doubt played an instrumental role in getting accessions. On the other hand we should not forget that he perhaps played a significant role in the formulation of the partition plans from the British side before it was modified or adjusted according to supposedly congrez demands.

This process happened on the so-called "map-showing" meeting - where it was not Sardar who was present in the house but, yes, JLN and Menon. Apparently JLN had burst into Menon's room and in his passionate nager given out his rage and frustration at the way the dismemberment had been planned from London. At least one author calls Menon JLN's "confidant" at this stage. Following this JLN's anger was conveyed to Mountbatten both by JLN himself [in his famous note] and perhaps also by others, including Menon - who has been acknowledged to have been close to and handpicked for the transitional arrangement advisory job - by Mountabtten. We know that this picking had actually happened under Wavell - and that until a later stage Menon was held to be utmost loyal to the "Raj". This is not about questioing Menon's patriotism or commitment. But that he was a career administrator who had risen by sheer merit but who could not have risen under the Brits to the position he obtained and be entrusted with the job - if he had not been more than 100% loyal to the British.

On the news of the JLN reaction, it was Mountbatten who ordered Menon to rewrite the "draft" - which according to different claims - was done from within 2-4 hours. To do this at such short notice does not only require supreme constitutional genius - but given the situation - also prior knowledge of "what would be acceptable" to JLN. Did Menon consult Sardar within that 2-4 hours for "redrafting" ? Who from the "angered side" was he most likely to consult - if he had already not been in touch with the "angered side" from before - not someone who had shown the anger and been available on spot but someone far away? if he had already been in touch and discussed potential items to be angered on - was there any reason for JLN to be so shocked on reading through the text and the map?

There are some peculiar statements from both Dickie Birdie as well as Mathai - who otherwise might be reasonably and justifiably be suspected for possible motivational biases in narratives - but who claim in their own way that all that Menon writes need not be taken at face value where no third party verification is possible [or where there are more than one "third-parties" claiming slightly otherwise and each similarly unreliable or unverifiable]. Dickie claims that V.K.K. and V.P. were both "his" men - not amounting to "spies" - but without whom [convincing the two key figures apparently opposed but whom Dickie hoped to turn around if only he could keep the "old man" away until the very last moment] he would have a very hard time to pull it [partition] off. Mathai openly accuses Menon of several faults - which might have been attributable to his belonging to the JLN pool, [and therefore assumedly envious of Sardar pool], or loose talk, or pointers that can be explored - given that he has not spared his own mentor either.

However these came in the following year mostly - not at the June, 1946 period we were trying to analyze for possible convergence or divergence between Sardar and MKG and JLN over the initial forms of the CMP.

[JE Menon]

>>This is not about questioing Menon's patriotism or commitment. But that he was a career administrator who had risen by sheer merit but who could not have risen under the Brits to the position he obtained and be entrusted with the job - if he had not been more than 100% loyal to the British.

Perhaps. On the other hand, he was also handpicked by Sardar Patel, and VPM rushed to finish off the partition plan and collect all the "apples" before the great man passed away so that he wouldn't have to deal with his successor. Patel too would not have worked with someone who he didn't think was 100% loyal to India. And the fact that Menon joined the Swatantra Party, rather than the Congress which he could have I suppose, suggests something.

But it's hard to pin the guy down. Hard to say what made him tick. What is clear, however, is that both Mountbatten and Patel trusted him totally. He is said to have once barged into Mountbatten's bedroom to wake the bugger up and tell him to get cracking. There were decisions he apparently took on his own, on the fly, that he did not have to check back on with Patel simply because the latter was confident that if VPM took it, it was fine with him... although Menon reported back to him twice a day, according to his own words. Like I said, an unusual chap, with an unconventional personal life as well. And a class VII drop-out!

[brihaspati]

^^^well, hypothetically speaking - Sardar could have knowingly used him - if he thought that the "man" would be implicitly trusted by the Brit bosses. Sardar was an organization man. He need not have needed to trust completely to get things done. Or he might also be privy to info that made him compelled to use the bosses-trusted-man. Such info need not have been true or real - but if the diarchy from the Indian side were forced to rely on the Brits to a certain extent [to a great extent actually - which in itself is worthy of exploration as to what exactly the Anglo-India admin interface fed the Indians], then what exactly paralyzed the congrez leadership into passively to fall into the Brit trap -as per the Brit responsible entirely theory -is worthy of digging into.

Information, intel about supposed behaviour/intention in the "other side" appears to have been interfaced and disseminated through people one way or another - a long time connected to the Brits, accessible to the Brit manipulation machinery - long before the overt proposals for Partition were surfacing.

The ideal person to disseminate such calculated semi-disinfo would be people seen to have access to the inner world of Brit statecraft and politics, [hence their info to be plausible] as well as personally by background or otherwise, to be trustable by the Indian side.

Both the key Menons are perhaps key. Whatever they did - they perhaps did in the belief that they were acting on the best possible interests of their respective constituencies. Now these constituencies might have been different in their imagination - but they might simply have been serving their own ideal constituencies. We can start with a model - of Brit intel/admin selecting the two men likely to gain the trust of the two leaders they thought would be manipulable - by raising scenarios each leader abhorred, towards their own long term strategic objectives for the subcontinent. By background, V.P would be trusted by Sardar, and V.K.K by JLN.

Its standard political manipulation practice to try and wean away junior followers of a "great leader" to sideline and bypass the "great leader". MKG had sealed his fate in Brit eyes - by his 1942 secret/private statements. By 1943, British intel would have the impression that MKG was getting restless and impatient - and that he might, just might be tempted to allow the movement to deviate from the non-violent "path" towards a "civil-war type" assertion of Indian nationalism. The Brits desperately try to preserve a reputation of never being militarily kicked out by people they militarily conquered. They would like to be the "giver/the reliquisher/the gifter" because that would be a double edged sword to both use a military superiority myth as well as create "clients" who would remain grateful to an extent in the setups gifted.

If people research the two Menons, they might just be surprised to learn that there are certain surprising commonalities between the two. A few of them centre around actually a Mountbatten, and prior-to-actual-proposal-Partition plan centric initiative, that leans towards a possible connection between JLN and Mountbatten before Mountbatten landed up as viceroy.

The fact of later relations between V.P. and JLN not being that great to have fulfilled an alleged ambition of position, is not that surprising. V.P. would be knowing too much and would have too many pressure points, by this alternative viewpoint.

[JE Menon]

Boss, hypothetically speaking... pretty much anything goes.

VKKM and VPM disliked each other and were in different camps (or perhaps I should say had different perspectives on things) VPM was not a socialist type guy, and we all know about VKKM. Now, if you are suggesting both were British spies of some sort, what I would ask is who was definitely not, even hypothetically speaking?

Sardar himself could have been. Or Veer Savarkar. Or Ambedkar. Or MKG or JLN, and suitable justifications can be drudged out from one writing or another. Given the amount of access and control the Brits had in those days, any one of those currently revered could well have been compromised in one way or another. Virtually each and every one of our key leaders had direct and personal contacts with some ranking British bureaucrat or viceregal staff member.

All we can see today is what they actually did, and we can disagree or agree now with much clearer hindsight with what they did - usually through political lenses relevant to the situation today. Still, it's good timepass. Some interesting stuff posted in the thread.

[brihaspati]

JEM, interesting timepass indeed. All of this spiralled out of just a hypothesis of power-hunger in two rival indivduals shaping up the course of Partition. Simply because one of those individuals was mentioned to be JLN. Then quotes and references of actual statements from JLN/MKG were cited - to show that the idea of Partition was latent in JLN/MKG before the actual proposals surfacing from Brit side.

This was then became imere timepass and to be entirely avoided and claimed that there was a website which gives the real picture.

Well from that website - by timepass again - documents were excerpted to raise some questions [and answers to find consistent solution to the conundrum] to show that the supposed equal equal done to get JLN == Sardar on eagerness for partition/concessions to Muslims/Jinnah in backdrop of CMP is actually not supported by the record of the initial phases. By timepass it was again shown that Sardar was NOT against the cmp short-term/long term plan and suggested that the short-term plan would work if JLN/Jinnah could be locked up on a one-on-one power negotiation session.

Then by mere timepass Sardar's divergence from MKG, and AICC/WCC acceptance of the CMP were highlighted and Sardars favouring position noted - in contrast to MKG, and the sudden changeover overtly in JLN after he took over presidency - all were brought up merely in timepass. Since these were all brought up in timepass, all of these questions had to be ignored - as if these glaring incidents never existed. Therefore since they never existed they need not be acknowledged - because acknowledging these pointers amounts to shadows falling on JLN.

Now we will have to trivialize the whole thing - so that people do not look up whether or not there is any indication that V.P. had been working on a Partition plan long before the possibility arose officially. We have to ignore the fact of V.P.M not really "charming" Sardar before August, 1946 - and forget that until 7th July, Sardar seems to have been of opposite position overtly at least to that of JLN and MKG. We have to ignore a lot of circumstantial evidence.

It is also wonderful tactics to find attribution of "spies" where only being manipulated on the basis of shrewd assessment of character/inclination/ideological leanings had been proposed.

No problem. I did not want to bring up these other sort of explorations. I will do then.

[surinder]

The collected works of Gandhi contradict your claim, look up his statements.
...
He even tells Hindus that if everyone of them get killed by Muslim "brothers" then it will be better than Hindus retaliating and asks them to die cheerfully.

All these are from his speeches during that time.


Real "caring" attitude on display here:

During his prayer meeting on 1 May 1947, he prepared the Hindus and Sikhs for the anticipated massacres of their kind in the upcoming state of Pakistan with these words: "I would tell the Hindus to face death cheerfully if the Muslims are out to kill them. I would be a real sinner if after being stabbed I wished in my last moment that my son should seek revenge. I must die without rancour. (*) You may turn round and ask whether all Hindus and all Sikhs should die. Yes, I would say. Such martyrdom will not be in vain." (Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol.LXXXVII, p.394-5) It is left unexplained what purpose would be served by this senseless and avoidable surrender to murder.

Even when the killing had started, Gandhi refused to take pity on the Hindu victims, much less to point fingers at the Pakistani aggressors. More importantly for the principle of non-violence, he failed to offer them a non-violent technique of countering and dissuading the murderers. Instead, he told the Hindu refugees from Pakistan to go back and die. On 6 August 1947, Gandhiji commented to Congress workers on the incipient communal conflagration in Lahore thus: "I am grieved to learn that people are running away from the West Punjab and I am told that Lahore is being evacuated by the non-Muslims. I must say that this is what it should not be. If you think Lahore is dead or is dying, do not run away from it, but die with what you think is the dying Lahore. (*) When you suffer from fear you die before death comes to you. That is not glorious. I will not feel sorry if I hear that people in the Punjab have died not as cowards but as brave men. (*) I cannot be forced to salute any flag. If in that act I am murdered I would bear no ill will against anyone and would rather pray for better sense for the person or persons who murder me." (Hindustan Times, 8-8-1947, CWoMG, vol. LXXXIX, p.11).

So, he was dismissing as cowards those who saved their lives fleeing the massacre by a vastly stronger enemy, viz. the Pakistani population and security forces. But is it cowardice to flee a no-win situation, so as to live and perhaps to fight another day? There can be a come-back from exile, not from death. Is it not better to continue life as a non-Lahorite than to cling to one's location in Lahore even if it has to be as a corpse? Why should staying in a mere location be so superior to staying alive? To be sure, it would have been even better if Hindus could have continued to live with honour in Lahore, but Gandhi himself had refused to use his power in that cause, viz. averting Partition. He probably would have found that, like the butchered or fleeing Hindus, he was no match for the determination of the Muslim League, but at least he could have tried. In the advice he now gave, the whole idea of non-violent struggle got perverted.

http://koenraadelst.bharatvani.org/arti ... stake.html

JLN went to NWFP. He was boooed and chased by an angry crowd. They pushed, showed. Police had to fire in air to disperse the thread. He rushed back to Delhi. Is there any record of Gandhi raising hell as to why JLN did not allow the crowd to kill him? Did MKG raise a stink as to why weapons were used to keep JLN safe?

MKG was protected by police, using weapons. Why did he not renounce all weapons? Did *any* INC leader refuse to protected by weapon weilding police?

It is easy to ask the hapless Hindus/Sikhs to die. Why did MKG not go there and die? Easy to ask others to die for your principles. Easy to criticise those who did become martyr's (Bose, Bhagat etc.)

[surinder]

There is a fundamental flaw in the whole Partition narrative. A foundational flaw.

INC foreswore *any* use of violence. That meant that all they could do was negotiate, and if they did not get what they wanted, they had to just negotiate harder. They had lost all leverage. INC then went ahead and opposed any indians using strong muscular techniques, neutralizing & deligitimizing their work. They basically cut their hands and handed them to the British.

Now, at the time of British departure, the British basically could force their agenda and INC had really no chip left, since they had foresworn all their options. They were left as beggars, basically begging and pleading. British could beat INC with ML in any way they wanted.

To hide their capitulations and myopia and lack of any vitality, the INC has to now weave tales of ML savagery, British deception, and their own innocence.

Their past choices had cast the dice.

[Airavat]

In our hind-sight we blame him and criticize him not supporting the violent revolutionaries (earlier threads). Would that not have given rise to the possibility of multiple regions -some with British some against, some cooperating others looking for themselves?

Excellent question. The British had a backup in the event of negotiations failing completely. This was the "Breakdown Plan" that Viceroy Wavell proposed in May 1946: calling for the withdrawal of British civil and military assets into NW India and NE India, leaving the Congress provinces independent, and only offering to aid the latter in external defence.

1. In the event of an armed revolt, this Breakdown Plan would proceed in an atmosphere of hostility and open war, ending with the loss of the greater part of the land army, and almost the entire naval and air assets and infrastructure. The latter two services were even more British-dominated than the land army, and what the Brits could not carry away they would destroy.

2. The rupee was pegged to the pound sterling; this financial support would be withdrawn sending the rupee into a tailspin. Moreover India's gold reserves would be confiscated by the UK. Consequences would be hyper inflation, followed by begging for loans internationally.

3. Would the armed revolt spread into NW India? The Brits encouraged communal riots in a united India....but in NW India they would be free of the Congress threat. They would thus crush any attempts at riots by the Muslim League, which would actually become insignificant in NW India. The Unionist Party had members from the Hindu Jat community and was in alliance with the Sikh parties like the Akali Dal....the Punjabis would have no motivation to vote for a party like the ML which had leaders from UP-Bihar.

4. With the British Indian Army providing protection against Muslim League rioting, the Sikhs and Hindu Jats would continue to serve in the BIA. The Gorkhas were inhabitants of Nepal and would also continue to serve. The Dogra territories of JK and Himachal were mostly princely states, which were assured of British protection under the breakdown plan.

5. This would leave the INC with the onerous task of recruiting soldiers to compensate for the above losses. Then the even more onerous task of obtaining foreign exchange to buy the equipment and fuel supplies for this army. Forget the air force and navy for the time being.

6. The British would also ensure that the bigger princely states outside their NW and NE territories remain independent, and the smaller ones form leagues. A Congress without any military and financial resources would in fact have to turn to the Soviet Union just to hold the country together. And in that period they would have no option but to embrace communism to get Soviet support!

[Sanku]

Airavat, if the British could have done the above with any degree of ability, they would already have. They certainly would have tried their best to work in way that would be most damaging for India.

Your narrative in the above assumes that the British had a substantial leeway in what they could do. They did not -- the naval ratings uprising followed by the need for the British to beg Patel to influence the protesters in itself puts a upper bound of what they could really do.

What is also missing is the HUGE support that Gandhi-Nehru had -- repeatedly often the explanations for Nehru often comes out as a "babe in the woods" defence. -- That is "oh what could he do onlee, onlee one guy, big bad british empire, big bad ML" etc.

Nehru did not get to where he was by being a "babe in the wood" -- the British were most comfortable with him because he was the weakest (testicular fortitude wise) of the Congress leadership -- however -- he was the Congress leadership -- a HUGE support base existed behind them which had forced the British to use them to act as go between.

The same support that MKG-Nehru used in having the Indians look the other way as the country was divided --could have easily be channelized to make Indians look at British in a more non-friendly way.

However Nehru consistently batted for the "other" side as far as partition was concerned -- despite knowing full well what was going on, he made no effort whatsoever to cut down the effect of ML's goon like tactics, abdicating responsibility totally at crucial juncture.

In this Nehru and MMS are most alike "main kar hee kya sakta hoon" (what can I do onlee) -- well you can certainly stop hankering for leadership position if all the leading you are doing is cutting deals with others for personal office.

[ramana]

There is a fundamental flaw in the whole Partition narrative. A foundational flaw.

INC foreswore *any* use of violence. That meant that all they could do was negotiate, and if they did not get what they wanted, they had to just negotiate harder. They had lost all leverage. INC then went ahead and opposed any indians using strong muscular techniques, neutralizing & deligitimizing their work. They basically cut their hands and handed them to the British.

{They did the same with the nuclear issue. Indians contributed to the science and technology of the bomb from the begining. In the 50s the question was when would India test and not if? Yet the world saw India was the last power to test in 1998. I say this as the 1974 was a PNE and TSP had already tested in 1990 in China. Even to weaponize the Indian Hamlet had to agree only after full evidence of TSP acquisition of nukes in 1986!
After UPA came to power they browbeat and did their best to muzzle any who opposed the ramming of the IUCNA even on the forum! The foundational flaw is in the sham secular folks. They have half formed brains.}

Now, at the time of British departure, the British basically could force their agenda and INC had really no chip left, since they had foresworn all their options. They were left as beggars, basically begging and pleading. British could beat INC with ML in any way they wanted.

{Same way with US after the INC came to power via UPA!!}

To hide their capitulations and myopia and lack of any vitality, the INC has to now weave tales of ML savagery, British deception, and their own innocence.

{Big bad NPA !}

Their past choices had cast the dice.

[Prem]

Testimonial 1947 Partition Survivors
[youtube]M1oKfJjT6mw&feature=related[/youtube]

[Prem]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Homg5No ... re=related

(A paki, notice his face glowing when he tells the killing of 2 sikhs)

[devesh]

Airavat,

if Indian rupee was taken off the sterling peg, the consequences would have been disastrous for Britain, not India. whatever consequences India faced would only be peripheral compared to the tailspin that the British Empire would have gone into. I don't think you really understand how taking the rupee off the peg would effect Britain. the value of the parity between the Sterling and Rupee was decided by Britain, not by India. so, inherently it was designed to profit UK, even if it meant a disadvantage to India. if the rupee was taken off the peg, British economy would have collapsed overnight. this is not an exaggeration. the Empire depended on the ability of Indian economy to continue to provide profits. Britain relied on the rupee peg to keep its industries profitable. if Indian rupee was off the peg, Britain's economy would have faced a massive depression. India would not have faced any hyperinflation. this is hogwash. what hyperinflation when a more balanced parity between India and Britain and consequently with other world economies would have made Indian industries more competitive, and not dependent on Britain's mercy.

the notion that Britain would force India off the peg is comical. if imperial suicide was their goal, then surely it makes sense. otherwise, a ridiculous notion.

[A_Gupta]

The claim was made by Brihaspati on the TSP thread that it was Jawaharlal Nehru's hunger for power that led to Partition.

My riposte was that in that case Sardar Patel was also hungry for power, for he too, ultimately pushed for Partition.

{Brihaspati turned that into "Sardar Patel's power-hunger (plus JLN's) precipitated Partition, which is, like Brihaspati's history, a distortion of the facts.}

I can see, that A_Gupta's hyperfine sense of logic has landed him into saying that "Sardar Patel was also hungry for power since he also pushed for partition just as JLN did" is not equal to "Sardar Patel's power hunger plus JLN' precipitated partition" - even if the latter is not a statement I set out to briefly prove.

What you wrote and what I wrote is there for anyone to read.

Actually, just as the congrezite spin on the Partition process has constructed a so-called "nationalist" (essentially Nehruvian) version of Partition historiography which in a sense A_Gupta is trying to re-promote - there is a similar spin by the "nationalist" (essentially Jinnahian) Paki historiography.

There is no "Congressite" spin on the Partition process. Given the huge controversies about it, we acquired primary sources and studied them ourselves. Just as "truth has a liberal bias" in American politics, in this case - about Partition - it turns out truth has a Congressite bias.

In the need to clear JLN's name, A_Gupta had to cherry pick as he typically does in his own version of distortion of history - beginning with the original post of mine in the TSP thread where I had clearly mentioned that JLN was just one of the two individuals between whom a contest for personal power precipitated the Partition process. Since the post was about the consistent historical record of the congrez platform in the creation and preservation of Pakistan - from the congrez side. I never made any statement that it was done in a vacuum, and I explicitly stated that facilitators - Brits. When I had mentioned two individuals - obviously I was mentioning the other of the pair - Jinnah. But there has never been any derying or denying on my part, of the secessionist, Islamist role of the theocratical Islamic society substructure - and hence whatever be the role of Jinnah, has never been denied by me.

Here you are guessing motives and intentions, again. You can read the mind of PM Manmohan Singh, and of Jawaharlal Nehru, so of course, you can read my mind, isn't it?

The question may arise, now as to how can then JLN's role be discussed separately from Jinnah. This innocent looking question is actually a very old "congrezite" version of nationalist historiographical trick : it is moving the goalposts subtly towards Jinnah as the initiator - against whom JLN was merely, oh merely "reacting"! This then removes any personal inclination or motivation from JLN.

I do not claim to be able to read minds. Let me be clear here, first by defining terms.

1. "Motive" - a motive is the incentive to act in a certain way or to want a certain outcome. For instance, once a rich uncle puts me as the beneficiary of his will, thereafter I have a motive for wanting him to die. That is the meaning of motive - I benefit from the rich uncle's death. (For concerned people here, I have no such uncle. )

2. "Intention" - However, I may have absolutely abhor that motivation, I love my uncle and want him to have a long life. i.e., though the motive is there, the intention is not there.

How does a historian record motive and intention? Motives may be judged from the situation. What is infinitely harder - and that may require mind-reading - is intention.

So, when you ask - what possible motives did JLN (or Jinnah or Patel or anyone else) have, you can try to list out what possible anticipated positive outcomes for JLN (or Jinnah or Patel, etc.) could there have been? So yes, becoming the Prime Minister is a positive outcome for JLN, and could have been a motive.

But what was JLN's intent? Unless you have rather explicit statements of that, the historian has to resort to reading minds. It is possible to demonstrate that some of them, e.g., Stanley Wolpert, make up things out of pure imagination. Others speculate, but acknowledge their speculation.

As to how difficult it is to know someone's intent - here is a prima facie case of Jinnah's power-hungriness - namely wanting his powers in Pakistan to be based on the Ninth schedule of the 1935 Gov. of India Act.
http://observingliberalpakistan.blogspo ... owers.html
But there is a case to be made that Jinnah was doing what was necessary for Pakistan for its survival, and not acting out of power-hunger.

Not being a mind-reader like Brihaspati, and not wanting to make up stuff like the professional historians, all I can do is note acts and statements, and ask do they make objective sense, are these actions rational and consistent with the stated objectives? Consistent with what the person did before and after?

So, e.g., someone can play the mind-reading game - Mrs. Indira Gandhi's motive and intent in liberating Bangladesh was personal glory. How can one disprove this? Perhaps in this particular example it is possible to find some evidence one way or the other (not having studied the material, I cannot say). But in general it is impossible. One can simply ask whether Mrs. Gandhi's actions March-December 1971 were consistent with improving India's strategic position at each step. If they were, while one can never rule out that she did all that she did for personal glory, one can state objectively whether she nevertheless acted in India's best interests.

So, what one can do is ask about the events in 1946 - given the information available to the Congress, their objectives, and their particular concerns (e.g., they were very conscious of the problem of 600 princely states, and how it was the tussles between the ancestors of these princes that led to India losing political independence in the first place), were their actions consonant with those objectives?

The answer is, generally, yes. And so it holds for each of the major leaders of the Congress as well. So, while it is impossible to rule out that some or all of Gandhi, Patel, Nehru, Azad, etc., had the intent of self-aggrandization - because we are not mind-readers - we can pronounce on whether their actions and statements were in the interests of India or not.

This is how there is now an impressive pseudo-nationalist historiography on both sides of the border - each trying to absolve its icon's roles of the initiative or personal motivation. Each side blames the "other" for initiating partition. The following is exactly a representation of this reconstructive attempt and spin :

Yes, I have no doubt of this historiography. Unfortunately, it does not preclude that one side has the truth.

The fact is that "short of suicide" (Gandhi's phrase), the Congress did everything it could to work with Jinnah, but ultimately it gave up and faced the inevitable. What was the reason for one-by-one, everyone in the A.I.C.C. to be convinced that Partition was unavoidable, necessary?

As in most of A_Gupta's selective quoting, his lambasting of JLN/congrez -critical positions are based on "opinions" and "summaries" and impressions. It is repeatedly claimed that congrez and JLN did everything possible to "work with Jinnah". Really? It can be shown that congrez under MKG's influence tried to work with Islamism and Islam, but not with Jinnah.

It can be shown that the Congress worked with those Muslims who would agree not to reduce the majority community in India to a minority.

In the process they began the process of buttering up and conceding to Islam itself a space in Indian politics that would ultimately lead to provincial hardcore Islamist elite getting legitimized in politics. In the 1920's, the selective whitewashing and blackwashing of the type A_Gupta does - suppresses the detailed evidence of Jinnah's overt position against the overt Islamists - whom the congrezites were pampering ignoring protests even from within. Will A_Gupta have the courage to put up the process by which Jinnah left the congrez? Even the Nehruvian spinning historiography version of it?

Certainly. I know Brihaspati will find fault in the summarizing of a decade of history in a sentence, but essentially, the Congress rejected Jinnah's demands for parity, which he had in the 1920s.


Multiple nested quotes

This is how Sardar Patel put it:

A little before he was sacked in early 1947, N.P.A. Smith, the powerful director of the Intelligence Bureau, submitted a note to Wavell. This note gives a flavour of the easy relationship that Patel[Home Minister in the Interim Government] could establish with his English subordinates, even with those who knew that he wanted them to go, as Smith did: I told him [Sardar Patel]...that any attempt to force the Muslim would result, through the disintegration of the police and Army in the loss of NW India. His reply was that, if I thought that generosity would placate the Muslim Oliver Twist, I did not understand either the Muslim mind or the situation. With which statement I am tempted to agree...

No one, including me, has ever tried to portray Sardar as an islamophile. A_Gupta simply quotes a statement that actually confirms Sardar's correctly negative understanding of Islamism - but ironically confirms something A_Gupta has chosen to ignore, that Sardar's statement here is showing simply his uncompromising stance on secession. He is unconcerned about the fallouts of "forcing" the Muslim.

Good spin on this. Sardar Patel is saying here that Pakistan cannot be averted by giving in to Muslim League demands for parity and more. This is not his uncompromising stand on secession. You can read the full context here.
http://observingliberalpakistan.blogspo ... -said.html

Now the types of A_Gupta spinning of history will not stop to think - that if Sardar here is trying to promote secession, why would he counter the Brit's claim that "NW India" would be "lost" if Muslims are "forced" by "not placating them" - by saying that "placating" will not change Muslim behaviour? What was this "forcing" about being referred to? Obviously it was the Sardarian line of "integration" - by "force" if necessary. Some minimal basic historical honesty and integrity should force Nehruvians to acknowledge the evidence for this position in Sardar - almost uncompromisingly until June -in Sardar.

There is no need for this forced interpretation. The full context is provided in the link above.

As I've previously mentioned, Patel worked with V.P. Menon over December 1946-January 1947 on a partition proposal.

I will wait for A_Gupta to bring up the ubiquitious "sequence" of pronouncements from Sardar and Nehru on the issue of secession. Who started when talking about what. That would be most illuminating.

For that it is necessary to examine the series of Muslim League demands, beginning as early as the 1920s. It is obviously complicated, but if it could be put in one sentence it would be the demand for absolute parity. What this meant is that Muslims - Muslim League - would get 50%, Hindus would get 50%, and the place for Sikhs, Christians, Jains, tribals, nationalist Muslims, etc., would be taken from the Hindu 50%. This was obviously unworkable, and acceptance of it would constitute the suicide that Gandhi mentioned.

The sleight of hand Brihaspati does in his long series of quotes is the same as that of the Seervai-Noorani school of history of the Partition, and that is to focus solely on Congress actions and not what the Congress was reacting to - the Muslim League demands (and the British support thereof). That is the only way of making the Congress to be culpable for Partition.

Actually, it is not taken from Seeravai-Noorani school of history. It is from actual statements which are usually and strangely not found quoted in the Nehruvian version that A-Gupta is promoting. Once again, A_Gupta's sleight of hand is again trying to show the standard Nehruvian justification based on the so-called "reactive" principle - that everything congrez and JLN did was in reaction to ML. This is partial truth if the other sides' parallel claims are then dismissed that Jinnah was reacting to congrez and JLN. Both then should be taken together and analyzed for reality - without accepting claims on any one side as sacrosanct. I have not done anything like this - and not claimed that I am accepting Jinnahian history! But of course defenders of JLN's image needs to ignore my specific proposition that we assume that "Jinnah was doing continuous Taqyia" and "he never really meant what he said". In the eagerness to serve the Nehruvian cause A_Gupta of course has to ignore such lines.

No, actually, the problem is that if one wants to believe that after 1939, Jinnah wanted some form of political unity of India, then one has to believe he was doing Taqiya. There is no public statement of his showing a willingness to compromise on a sovereign Pakistan. There is no private statement of his, either to his Muslim League confidants, or to the British, that he was willing to compromise on a sovereign Pakistan. In the absence of any such, you have to do this "mind-reading" trick, that he really wanted this or that.

In contrast, the Congress and A.I.C.C. speeches were generally published in the newspapers and are consistent. In particular, in the press conference of July 10, 1946, in substance, JLN said nothing that he had not already said in the A.I.C.C. session of July 6-7th and that had not been published by the newspapers in summary.

As to the reactive part - yes, Congress was by and large reacting to the British proposals, and as Sardar Patel said on one occasion "He (Patel) wanted them to understand that the British Government was on the Muslim League side. The British and Muslim League were friends in need and now that the British knew they could not possibly stay here longer, they wanted to help their friends, the Muslim League."

Once again, I have omitted Jalal's work from my post - so Nehruvian spinner's hatred of Jalal doesn't really apply to what I wrote. I look upon her as similar to the reconstructive spin that A_Gupta is giving.

However, all the quotes I quoted - are typically not placed in a sequence that I placed - from the Nehruvian apologists. As is the typical tendency with such apologists - everything "negative" associated with activities/statements/positions of JLN have to be "shared" by others, typically Sardar because errors cannot be blamed on one single person - while everything "positive" is JLN's credit alone in which case apparently the former logic of things not happening onlee on individual initiative is not to be applied.

Actually, please go through what I've written and tell me what is "credited to JLN". I actually haven't credited JLN with anything. Go back through this thread, and take a look. As to what is on the Cabinet Mission Plan site, you have said it omits JLN, so it too doesn't credit JLN with anything.

Your real problem is that neither I nor the Cabinet Mission Plan website **blames** JLN for anything either, and that is what riles you up.

But what is more interesting is the sleight of hand by which A_Gupta ignores my specific questions - since he was so insistent on formal statements form stalwarts representing their true inner "minds" -
(1) if parity was so much an obsession - why did Jinnah accept only on the "hope" of achieving this?

Jinnah and the Muslim League made it clear that they accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan with the understanding that it contained the seeds of Pakistan and that they could, after ten years, secede. In the meantime, they would have absolute parity with the non-Muslims in the interim Government and in the Constituent Assembly. The compulsory grouping plan would enable slender Muslim majorities in the B&C sections to carry off all of Bengal, Assam and Punjab into Pakistan.

(2) more importantly, what changed between the initial acceptance of the plan by congrezz AICC in July and then the sudden volteface after JLN took over the presidency?

Nothing. First of all, the very same session of AICC where Congress accepted the Plan was the one in which JLN became president (July 6-7, 1946). Secondly, you can read all the speeches of Azad, Patel and Nehru made on that occasion. They all say essentially, but in not so many words, that the Congress does not intend to honor the Muslim League grouping provisions, that provinces can opt out of the groups.

In particular, they expected NWFP and Assam to opt out of groups B & C respectively.

I will reproduce what was reported of those speeches by-and-by.

Here is a brief excerpt of what Maulana Azad said in that session: "The Working Committe has therefore made it clear that the should be no compulsion in the matter of grouping. The provinces should be free to decide whether they wish to join a particular group or not. We are confident that the interpretation we have put on the grouping clause is the correct interpretation."

Patel, speaking after Azad: "The most dangerous proposal in the Constituent Assembly scheme is one realted to grouping. Our interpretation of the relevant paragraph in the State Paper is that the provinces are free to decide at the initial state whether they wish to join a particular group in which they have been placed. No province can be compelled to join any group against its own wishes."

--
In calling the July 28-29th meeting of the Muslim League announced by Liaqat Ali Khan on July 9th, it is reported [Annual Register 1946] "The immediate occasion, however, for summoning the League Council is the nature of references to the Constituent Assembly plan made by prominent members of the Congress Working Committee at the recent AICC meeting. It will be recalled that on May 25 the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy....added that the interpretation put by the Congress resolution on para 15 of the statement to the effect that the provinces can, in the first instance, make the choice of whether or not to belong to the Section in which they are placed, does not accord with the Delegation's intentions' Despite this categorical pronouncement, the Congress has continued to maintain, with the aid of legal opinion that the provinces have the right ot opt out of their Section at the very beginning. The Muslim League on the other hand, regards the grouping of provinces laid down in the statement of May 16 as the "corner-stone of the long-term scheme" to use Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan's words....The speeches at the AICC meeting as reported were not such as to allay the League's misgivings."

Specifically to A_Gupta's "co-sharing-of-initiative" tactics - Sardar was present both "before" and "after" : but the sudden public statements by JLN (for which he was criticized from within his party - which in turn implies that he did this without consulting his senior colleagues - which in turn shows that they did not share his views to the extent he articulated them) seems to have started the ball rolling.

You should really read the speeches of July 6-7th AICC session and compare them with what JLN said in his press conference of July 10th. The Muslim League in calling its July 28-29th session specifically referred to the press reports of the speeches giving in the July 6-7th AICC session.

Why was Menon claiming that he "brought Sardar" around from his uncompromising stand in May? Who was Menon most closely associated with?

??

We do have the Viceroy saying in late 1946 that Sardar Patel has made Menon into his spokesman.

All of this points to JLN's specific initiative preceding Sardar's. Sardar was for integration by force if necessary - which shows through in all his subsequent actions and moves.

All my quotes are from documentary evidence typically not cited by the likes of A_Gupta in a sequence, because they then start revealing a disturbing pattern perhaps. Combined with this, I have already shown the callous statements and attitude shown by JLN in his ethically perverse selective application of legal and other excuses in behaving completely differently when it came to intervention to save Hindu lives and Muslim lives [ahimsa "for Bengali hindu suffering from Muslims in Noakhlai" and "bullets for Bihari hindus rioting on muslims" ] - points to his personal panic at the possibility of having to share personal dominance with Jinnah.

But in contrast to Sardar, he neither showed Sardar's grasp of the dynamics of Islamism, and Islam nor Sardar's primary desire to unite by force if necessary. His attitudes towards Bengal and Punjab throughout the Partition years confirm this personal angle further.

I am not an apologist for Jinnah, and even less an apologist for Islamism. That should not prevent us from looking up the actual documents - and claims from both sides [because each side suppresses documents that do not fit into their whitewashing campaigns] and coming to our own conclusions.

I'll give you an analogy as to what is going on here.

Suppose Musharraf says India is ready to solve Kashmir on Pakistan's terms. There is a publicly reported-on Indian cabinet meeting where the various senior ministers all say, this is not our interpretation of what has been agreed to. This is reported in the newspapers. Three days later, the Prime Minister of India in a press conference says, that Kashmir on Pakistan's terms is not part of any deal India is agreeing to. Then Musharraf walks off in a huff, blaming the Indian PM for scuttling the peace talks. And then 60 years later, a Brihaspati comes and asks - why did the Indian PM scuttle the deal with Musharraf?

The analogy is quite perfect in that the Congress was pretty unanimous in rejecting the compulsory grouping (that is, Azad, Patel, Nehru, in arguing for accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan, argued that the compulsory grouping did not apply; and the opposition to the motion to accept the CMP argued that the compulsory grouping was a major defect and a trap); compulsory grouping was against the Indian interests; all this was reported in the papers. Three days later, JLN made it explicit. Jinnah walks off in a huff, and 60 years later, Brihaspati is asking why did JLN reject this?

[harbans]

There is a fundamental flaw in the whole Partition narrative. A foundational flaw.

INC foreswore *any* use of violence. That meant that all they could do was negotiate, and if they did not get what they wanted, they had to just negotiate harder. They had lost all leverage. INC then went ahead and opposed any indians using strong muscular techniques, neutralizing & deligitimizing their work. They basically cut their hands and handed them to the British.

Absolutely correct. That fundamental flaw is completely contrary to Dharma. You don't get to the values of Peace, Compassion, Truth by not fighting the adharma inside or outside oneself. That's why i posted Arjuna's dilemma Chapter 1 of the BG. Krishna of course rips apart that weakness to shreds in the subsequent chapters. That fundamental flaw is reflected in JLNs approach to the armed forces, his penchant not even having an Army. We have lost heavily on account of that weakness. Krishna was absolutely right in the BG that that approach of Arjuna..

Arjun: Better I deem it, if my kinsmen strike,
To face them weaponless, and bare my breast
To shaft and spear, than answer blow with blow. (BG, Ch 1)

is cowardice and not worthy an attitude. Appreciate Surasena bringing that statement by Gandhi up on this topic. It brings a lot of clarity to what kind of thinking went on during those days, and why we got bullied too through Direct Action day and such continuing till this day and age.

[JE Menon]

>>people do not look up whether or not there is any indication that V.P. had been working on a Partition plan long before the possibility arose officially.

Actually people should look it up, but it will not serve much purpose now. My personal view is that as soon as he saw what the Brits were up to, VPM decided and proposed a partition plan, which is what broadly speaking eventually came to be implemented.

I have no issues with inquiry. We should thrash out every possible scenario. Including who all were compromisable, and whether they were in fact compromised. Circumstantial evidence is good, but much of this circumstance is based on clearer hindsight. No one can be blamed for it, that's just how it is.

[member_19686]

There is a fundamental flaw in the whole Partition narrative. A foundational flaw.

INC foreswore *any* use of violence. That meant that all they could do was negotiate, and if they did not get what they wanted, they had to just negotiate harder. They had lost all leverage. INC then went ahead and opposed any indians using strong muscular techniques, neutralizing & deligitimizing their work. They basically cut their hands and handed them to the British.

Absolutely correct. That fundamental flaw is completely contrary to Dharma. You don't get to the values of Peace, Compassion, Truth by not fighting the adharma inside or outside oneself. That's why i posted Arjuna's dilemma Chapter 1 of the BG. Krishna of course rips apart that weakness to shreds in the subsequent chapters. That fundamental flaw is reflected in JLNs approach to the armed forces, his penchant not even having an Army. We have lost heavily on account of that weakness. Krishna was absolutely right in the BG that that approach of Arjuna..

Arjun: Better I deem it, if my kinsmen strike,
To face them weaponless, and bare my breast
To shaft and spear, than answer blow with blow. (BG, Ch 1)

is cowardice and not worthy an attitude. Appreciate Surasena bringing that statement by Gandhi up on this topic. It brings a lot of clarity to what kind of thinking went on during those days, and why we got bullied too through Direct Action day and such continuing till this day and age.

Such insane statements are found through out his collected works.

People should read those instead of what Maulana Azad said about Gandhi, what their family members told them or what what Churchill said and then forming opinions on Gandhi.

Here is more:

Not only was he not self-realized, the ideas that Gandhi propagated -- especially his version of ahimsa -- were based on Christian ideas (view the satyagraha article for more details). In Gandhi's version, non-violence was something that one should practice in all stages and events of life, even if your own mother was being raped right in front of you, as Gandhi told the Khudai Khidmatgars on October 31, 1938:

If in your heart of hearts there is the slightest inclination to regard your non-violence as a mere cloak or a stepping-stone to greater violence as suggested by this friend, nay, unless your are prepared to carry your non-violence to its ultimate logical conclusion and to pray for forgiveness even for a baby-killer and a child-murderer, you cannot sign your Khudai Khidmatgar's pledge of non-violence. To sign that pledge with mental reservations would only bring disgrace upon you, your organization and hurt him who you delight to call the Pride of Afghans.

But what about the classical instance of the defenseless sister or mother who is threatened with molestation by an evil-minded ruffian, you will ask. Is the ruffian in question to be allowed to work his will? Would not the use of violence be permissible in such a case? My reply is 'no'. You will entreat the ruffian. The odds are that in his intoxication he will not listen. But then you will interpose yourself between the intended victim and him. Very probably you will be killed but you will have done your duty. Ten to one, killing you unarmed and unresisting will assuage the assailant's passion and he will leave his victim unmolested. But it has been said to me that tyrants do not act as we want or expect them to. Finding you unresisting he may tie you to a post and make you watch his rape of the victim. If you have the will you will so exert yourself that you will break yourself in the attempt to break the bonds. In either case, you will open the eyes of the wrongdoer. Your armed resistance could do no more, while if you were worsted, the position would likely be much worse than if you died unresisting. There is also the chance of the intended victim copying your calm courage and immolating herself rather than allowing herself to be dishonoured.

Not only is this reminiscent of Christ's injunction to "turn the other cheek”, it is also indicative of how useless Gandhi's policy of nonviolence was towards colonial rule. Viewing India as the mother being -- metaphorically -- raped by British colonial rule, one can begin to understand the foolishness of Gandhi's idea that solely nonviolence would free India...

Gandhi's advice for Hindu refugees from present-day Pakistan was the following:

[Before October 24, 1947]

My advice is unalterable. They should remain where they are, if they are brave enough to die and even in the act of dying forgive the enemy. If they have not assimilated this truth they should of course come away as soon as they can.

Telling Hindus that they should let Muslims kill them, without any sort of fight-back, was a main theme in Gandhi's post prayer speeches during partition.

For instance, in his prayer speech on May 1, 1947, Gandhi said the following:

...Jinnah Saheb presides over a great organization. Once he has affixed his signature to the appeal, how can even one Hindu be killed at the hands of the Muslims? I would tell the Hindus to face death cheerfully if the Muslims are out to kill them. I would be a real sinner if after being stabbed I wished in my last moment that my son should seek revenge. I must die without rancour. But why in the first place would a Muslim kill at all when he has been asked not to do it?
But the thing is that they have still to realize that in politics force cannot avail...
As it is, there are too many people in the world who meet force by force. They even talk about killing two for one, let alone one for one. But, I say there will never be any peace even if you kill not ten but a hundred for one. There is nothing brave about dying without killing. It is an illusion of bravery. The true martyr is one who lays down his life without killing.
You may turn round and ask whether all Hindus and all Sikhs should die. Yes, I would say. Such martyrdom will not be in vain....

More partition statements will be examined in a later article.

http://voiceofthenation.blogspot.com/20 ... hatma.html

My personal view is that, since numerically Hindus are
in a great majority, and are, as they themselves
believe, better-placed educationally, they should
cheerfully concede to their Muslim brethren the utmost
they can. As a satyagrahi, I am emphatically of the
view that the Hindus should give to the Muslims
whatever they ask for, and willingly accept whatever
sacrifice this may involve. Unity will be brought
about only through such mutual generosity. If the
Hindus and Muslims observe, in their dealings with one
another, the same principles that govern the relations
of blood-brothers, there will be unbroken harmony
[between the two communities], and then alone will
India prosper. 10 - (said Gandhi)

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ignited-mind/message/582

Hope all the Gandhi lovers put that into practice if they were ever in such a situation.

He would say similar nonsense through out those times as Hindus and Sikhs were being massacred, women being raped by Muslims.

[harbans]

Right. What Gandhi is doing is asking Dharma to not resist Adharma. He is asking Dharma to die cheerfully. While Krishna too extols Non Violence, compassion as a virtue, he is adamant on the defense of Dharma. Rama too fought for the honor of Sita. Again Christianity with it's excluvism, condemns the 'unbeliever'. Jesus is on record saying 'i Come not in Peace..but with a sword', the evil of complete surrender is just that Plain Evil on par with supporting Adharma/ injustice..

Humbleness, truthfulness, and harmlessness, Patience and honor, reverence for the wise, Purity, constancy, control of self,

Ch 13 BG

Yes all that is good and qualities that are extolled in that Dharmic book.. Gandhi if he really read the Gita, would have realized he was harping up the age old dilemma of Arjuna. (I doubt he even read the Koran or Hadith for that matter) We continue in not defending Dharma and continue to pander to the unjust, because of this fundamental flaw that should not exist. Christians have never really turned the other cheek. The Church's violent exploits to further their doctrine through inquisitions lays bare to them proffesing non violence.

Society indeed must cherish the principles of non violence and compassion, but certainly in no way at the expense of doing nothing while ones family is raped and murdered. Non violence can be a quality not a guaranteed governing principle of a state.

[surinder]

Hope all the Gandhi lovers put that into practice if they were ever in such a situation.

Even Gandhi did not put his Gandhianism into practice.

He would say similar nonsense through out those times as Hindus and Sikhs were being massacred, women being raped by Muslims.

This is the second mistake that MKG made: he is preaching what he did not practice.

In 1947 10 million were uprooted, and one million were killed. About 1/3 million women were dishonored, and tens of thousands of them were abducted and forcibly converted. Surely, it must be easy for him to find a mob and offer himself and his family & wife to be beaten, killed, dishonored and forcibly converted. Could he have not found such a mob? Entire Punjab was burning, all he had to do was take a train to TSP hop off at Lahore or Rawalpindi. Any reason why he did not do that?

[harbans]

^ Obviously MKG did not even take being kicked out of a train cheerfully. He was hurt really bad. Something must have been really screwed up to suggest folks get murdered and raped cheerfully. That's the fundamental flaw in the tragedy of partition and beyond. That belief system amongst some of our leaders.

[brihaspati]

So in the long reply of A_Gupta, there was time and scope for multiple nested quotes : but still no space and time to address

(1) Sardar's proposal as quoted on the truth establishing website - that he had no problem with the "gov" bit of the proposal, if JLN and Jinnah sat down and thrashed out the question of exact division of government powers. Further he cares to mention - that onlee the two should be put together in the absence of a third person.

(2) Sardar's running dispute and dissent - again as quoted from extracts on the site - with MKG and the exact issues of dissent - from advent of CMP until late June.

These two aspects have to be ignored in any reply, obviously. It seems that no material could be found to make up a page on "behind the scenes Nehru", although materials could be found for others. JLN was silent in the period Sardar was apparently so garrulous.

Maybe the reasons for highlighting Sardar's interactions is to fill up the space with Sardar, while keeping JLN in the background. By that it may just be possible to create the impression that all this activity leading towards avid rush towards "partition" was after all a game played between Wavell/Mountbatten/Jinnah/Sardar/MKG.

Yes, I will wait for the "by and by" quotation of AICC "speeches". Also for the fascinating account of "grouping" demands arising in 1920's Jinnah. The fascinating account of how claims of Sardar and V.P.M working together over winter to file a complete Partition plan [again others are silent and innocent] prove that VPM did not work on the Partition plan before. The initiative from the congrez side must rest with Sardar if at all with anyone from congrez.

Meanwhile maybe I will start quoting the complementary stuff to the fascinating AICC story of heroic resistance by and by. Well and the complementary stuff will not come from "guilty" side.

By the way - if Mountbatten's comments about VPM are kosher - just a small question, was this the only comment that Mountbatten had made about VPM? Just....curious.

[A_Gupta]

FYI, regarding these dark speculations that Sardar Patel was thinking of holding an undivided India together by force - one can check the record that Sardar Patel very much subscribed to the Congress idea that no part of British India could be coerced into the Union of India if the people were unwilling.

However, Sardar Patel was also very clear that just as the Congress would not coerce anyone, it would not be coerced. The Congress passed resolutions that any area - any province or part of a province - that wanted to join the Indian Union must be allowed to join; and Sardar Patel was clear that in this cause he was willing to use force, if necessary. That is, nothing would be allowed to break the unity of the people who wanted to part of India, even at the cost of discarding ahimsa.

[Airavat]

the value of the parity between the Sterling and Rupee was decided by Britain, not by India. so, inherently it was designed to profit UK, even if it meant a disadvantage to India. if the rupee was taken off the peg, British economy would have collapsed overnight. this is not an exaggeration. the Empire depended on the ability of Indian economy to continue to provide profits.

Yeah, India and UK were the only factors in the global economy.

As soon as England was pushed off the Gold Standard in September 1931, several countries also threw off the Gold Standard and linked their currencies to paper Sterling. These countries formed a wide area of exchange stability known as the Sterling Area. The countries which formed the Sterling Area were prominently the following:

(1) The British Commonwealth of Nations, with the important exception of Canada, whose currency took a middle course with the Pound and the Dollar of the United States of America.

(2) Some non-British countries comprising Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Esthonia, Latvia, Finland, Egypt, Thailand, Palestine and Japan.

To India, in particular, the Sterling link was economically very necessary at the time. Since India's external trade with countries which were expected to join the Sterling link was nearly 75 per cent, of her total external trade, it was imperative that, if these markets were not to be lost to her, the country's currency should be linked to Sterling. With more than half of India's total sea-borne trade with the British Empire countries and more than three-fourths with all the Sterling Area countries, it was wise to have linked the Rupee to Sterling. It was some anchor to which the Rupee could be linked in order to obtain the advantage of maintaining stable exchange so necessary for maintaining such a large proportion of the country's external trade, particularly at a time when the great depression had taken root.

The Monetary System Of India

Moreover, under the Breakdown Plan there would actually be two Indias, and only one would remain part of the Sterling Area and that one would claim the legitimate succession to all past treaties and financial agreements between the UK and the British government in India. The Congress-ruled provinces would have to start from scratch, adopt a new currency, sign new agreements, etc.

[devesh]

what nonsense? by that time, US was already well into its plans for laying down Dollar hegemony. US had already reached an understanding to anchor Oil to the USD and US system. Britain was bankrupt. the point about India having Sterling area countries as major trade partners is a double-edged sword. If Nehru and others were so scared about the de-peg, then what stopped them from looking for alternatives. even the mere threat of India opening close dialogues with the rising US would have terrified Britain. Britain in 1946 was in no position to make any kind of grandstanding threats to India if the Indian leadership was committed to have their way.

India was the pivot of the Empire. if India was forcefully de-pegged from Sterling, it would have unraveled the Empire. the British system depended on India's inclusion in the system. without India, the empire would have collapsed, especially considering that Britain was bankrupt by 1946. if a forced de-peg had happened, it would have given the impetus for India to take stock of the Gold present in the country and directly go to the US and make a deal with them to link Indian Gold and the economy with USD. the idea that Britain could even think of forcing India to de-integrate from the Empire is comical when we consider they were trying their best to hold on to whatever influence they could over India....why would they commit acts which would absolutely make sure that Indian leadership would take a much stronger stand against the Empire and Britain specifically????

and as for Jat Hindus and Sikhs joining a British supported federation, that is a pipe-dream. that conveniently forgets the radicalism of the area against British interests for several generations. whatever issues Jat Hindus and Sikhs had with "purbiyas" would not have been enough for them to accept British lordship. if INC had taken a more violent stand against ML, that would have been in line with the wishes of non-Muslims in Punjab area. why would they accept British mastery if the Purbiyas agreed with them on the right to retain land by violent means, if its necessary?

[Airavat]

if a forced de-peg had happened, it would have given the impetus for India to take stock of the Gold present in the country and directly go to the US and make a deal with them to link Indian Gold and the economy with USD.

So the part of India which was at war with Britain, would magically make a deal with Britain's wartime ally, financial partner, not to mention future NATO partner and ally against Communism??????

[surinder]

So the part of India which was at war with Britain, would magically make a deal with Britain's wartime ally, financial partner, not to mention future NATO partner and ally against Communism??????

Airavat, you don't get it. quit while you are ahead.

"Britain's wartime ally, financial partner, not to mention future NATO partner and ally against Communism", i.e. the United States of America, was both partnering and cutting UK to size. Making Britain get out of India was a strategic goal.

[Airavat]

quit while you are ahead.

Thanks for your concern, but actual data is preferred to empty rhetoric.

[Yayavar]

my comments inserted with underscore

There is a fundamental flaw in the whole Partition narrative. A foundational flaw.

INC foreswore *any* use of violence. That meant that all they could do was negotiate, and if they did not get what they wanted, they had to just negotiate harder. They had lost all leverage. INC then went ahead and opposed any indians using strong muscular techniques, neutralizing & deligitimizing their work. They basically cut their hands and handed them to the British.

Where was a co-ordinate force that could take the British on? There were a lot of divisions with the BIA full of Indians. Bose had to get help from JApan during WW2 and even then it was very limited. See the difficulties and small scale operations the revolutionaries were able to mount.

{They did the same with the nuclear issue. Indians contributed to the science and technology of the bomb from the begining. In the 50s the question was when would India test and not if? Yet the world saw India was the last power to test in 1998. I say this as the 1974 was a PNE and TSP had already tested in 1990 in China. Even to weaponize the Indian Hamlet had to agree only after full evidence of TSP acquisition of nukes in 1986!
After UPA came to power they browbeat and did their best to muzzle any who opposed the ramming of the IUCNA even on the forum! The foundational flaw is in the sham secular folks. They have half formed brains.}

No disagreement wrt the above but do not agree with the tie in to pre-independence India.

Now, at the time of British departure, the British basically could force their agenda and INC had really no chip left, since they had foresworn all their options. They were left as beggars, basically begging and pleading. British could beat INC with ML in any way they wanted.

{Same way with US after the INC came to power via UPA!!}

INC and other leaders worked in a broad-based manner. They did not want, in any way a balkanization. They wanted social issues removed while continuing to work for independence. Not a Jomo Kenyata independence that collapsed due to internal fissures. Even after it all there were a lot of fissures. Some dealt quite well and some not. Partition was a failure and we can look at how it came about. Note that Ataturk has lost all 'turk'ness and made the country a clone of Europe when Turks were an equal empire till a few years before.. There is/was enough of Indic left in India even after 200 years of rule. I agree with Airavats reading ....this thread has a lot ..need to read it slowly...

To hide their capitulations and myopia and lack of any vitality, the INC has to now weave tales of ML savagery, British deception, and their own innocence.

{Big bad NPA !}

Their past choices had cast the dice.