Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

[ramana]

YouTube is agog that Xi had a stroke and was operated on.
Wish him good health.

[Rakesh]

Analysis: Elders stay faithful to Deng over 'reformer Xi Jinping'
https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/ ... Xi-Jinping
29 August 2024

[ricky_v]

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/st ... num-212412

External observers keenly anticipated the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) third plenary session of the twentieth Central Committee. Third plenums—the third plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP elected at the last Party Congress (in this instance in November 2022)—have, in the post-Mao era, traditionally been where the Central Committee issues “authoritative” decisions on the direction of continued “reform and opening” policies.

The July 18 Third Plenum resolution, however, was notable for the fact that it introduced little that was substantively new in terms of policy. Instead, it served to reiterate the Party’s commitment to the hallmarks of Xi’s policy agenda: state-led efforts to gird the economy for self-sufficiency and resilience against external shocks, firm ideological control, and the linkage of national security and “development” as interdependent conditions necessary for China’s continued rise.

Herein may lie the plenum’s significance: to signal that Xi remains firmly in the driver’s seat.

The plenum resolution thus “unanimously agreed that in the face of a grave and complex international environment,” advancing “reform and development and ensuring stability at home” would be achieved by “promoting high-quality development” and “strengthening full and rigorous [Party] self-governance.”

The emphasis on “high-quality development” spruiked at the plenum had been prefigured by a “study session” of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) in January, which identified the harnessing of “new qualitative productive forces” as central to the achievement of this goal. “New productive forces” are short-hand for the application of innovation to the cutting-edge “frontier” of technology (e.g., Artificial Intelligence, quantum computing) that will make China self-reliant in the “fourth industrial revolution,” as well as to traditional manufacturing industries.

Indeed, Xi’s explanatory note on the plenum’s decision demonstrates both dynamics. The section on “national security” underscores the objective of “modernizing” the “national security system” through the establishment of “a unified national population management system” and improvement in “the overall prevention and control system for public security,” as well as noting that the “integration of development and security” will enable the Party-state to improve “Mechanisms for countering foreign sanctions, interference, and long-arm jurisdiction…” (i.e. enable it to overcome U.S.-led economic and diplomatic sanctions).

The plenum’s commitment to ensure ideological “self-governance” and discipline within the Party is not surprising. However, the tone and substance of that statement, as well as some lengthier associated official explanations of how the plenum’s resolution was arrived at, provide some indication of the nature of contemporary elite politics and decisionmaking.

The resolution noted that the Party had to “follow the leadership core,” “keep in alignment with the central Party leadership,” “stay confident in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” and “uphold Comrade Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee…and the Central Committee’s authority and its centralized, unified leadership.” This is consistent with major ideological directives since the 2022 Party Congress that have sought to consolidate Xi’s role as the fountainhead of political and ideological authority.

[ricky_v]

the following article is just hints and insinuations, very low on names, might just be a trial balloon
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/th ... ing-212888

Over the course of three Chinese Communist Party Congresses—the eighteenth in 2012, the nineteenth in 2017, and the twentieth in 2022—Xi Jinping has cemented his position atop the CCP pyramid, eschewing old norms and rules governing elite politics in favor of his preferences. Pundits and politicians alike have been left to grapple with myriad new questions regarding the future trajectory of the regime’s power dynamics, policy priorities, and its role on the global stage. The ripples of these changes extend far beyond the Great Wall, threatening to reshape the contours of great power competition in the years to come.


A clear lesson from the nineteenth and twentieth Party Congresses is that personal loyalty to Xi is now a key factor—perhaps the weightiest factor—in the Party’s leadership ascension playbook, but even as personal allegiance has grown increasingly important, it has not completely supplanted the influence of legacy factors in leadership selection. Age, experience, and regional origins still play roles—to varying degrees—in determining who rises to the Party’s senior ranks. These long-standing criteria remain significant at more junior levels, even as loyalty takes center stage at the pinnacle of the CCP power structure. Aspiring leaders must navigate a complex terrain where demonstrating loyalty is crucial, but not at the expense of neglecting other, traditionally required qualifications.

The upcoming Twenty-First Party Congress in 2027 will be a critical juncture, with Xi’s performance and the prevailing power dynamics determining the extent to which he can shape the next generation of leaders.

Factional rivalry has long characterized Chinese politics. The two factions that had dominated the period between Deng’s passing and Xi’s ascendence—the Chinese Communist Youth League faction and the “Shanghai Gang”—are no longer major players. In their place, a handful of new factions have risen. However, unlike their predecessors, each of these new factions is loyal to the same senior leader: Xi Jinping. This may bind inter-factional competition in novel ways. Even though Xi has seized the helm of political decision-making, the intense focus on the general secretary himself—while necessary—has inadvertently exposed gaps in our understanding of the broader Chinese political system. What resources and prerogatives do these factions compete over? How do they compete? What role does Xi play in directing, managing, or channeling that competition? These are all open questions.

Indeed, this new network of Xi-centered factions may have within it the seeds of future disorder. Eventually, Xi will depart the scene. With no one atop the superstructure to manage rivalries and with the old rules of elite politics long since jettisoned, vicious competition for control of the Party—and of China—may result. Before Xi, there was inherent stability in a two-faction system. But now, there is the possibility that a unipolar party may transform into a multipolar party virtually overnight.

[Cyrano]

China's population might be more like 900m
which has very serious implications

[ricky_v]

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/china ... -strategy/

In recent years, discussions about China’s grand strategy have dominated international security journals, think tanks, and policy discussions across the globe. As China continues its meteoric rise, scholars and policymakers have been asking: Is China pursuing a strategy of global primacy, or is it more focused on balancing the international system?

These questions reflect not only concerns about China’s growing power but also its future trajectory. Will China remain an ambitious yet cautious player in world affairs, or will it pursue outright dominance, fundamentally reshaping global governance?

China’s grand strategy is undoubtedly shaped by history, geography, systemic pressures, and its relative power, often quantified as “comprehensive national power” or CNP. To understand whether China is moving toward a strategy of primacy or balancing, we must explore these factors through a classical realist lens that accounts for both systemic constraints and domestic considerations.

The evolving nature of China's strategy can be framed in several key phases: survival (Mao and Deng), rejuvenation (Deng and Jiang), maximization (Hu and Xi), and balance (potentially in the future).

Xi Jinping and the China Dream: A Strategy of Maximization?
Xi Jinping’s era has ushered in an even more ambitious phase of China’s grand strategy. Xi’s articulation of the “China Dream” embodies a vision of national rejuvenation that encompasses not just economic strength but also global leadership. Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), growing military assertiveness in the South China Sea, and his efforts to reform global institutions to better reflect China’s interests signal a strategy of maximization.

This strategy does not suggest outright global hegemony, but it points toward an effort to maximize China’s influence within a multipolar international system. Xi’s China is no longer content with simply rising peacefully; it seeks to actively shape the global order in its favor.

Avery Goldstein, in his 2020 analysis “China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance,” highlights three core elements of Xi’s strategy. China reassures neighbors of its peaceful intentions, seeks to reform global governance structures (e.g., the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank), and resists efforts by other powers — especially the United States — to constrain its rise. This multifaceted approach reflects a delicate balancing act between maximizing China's power and avoiding direct confrontation with established powers, particularly the U.S.

While Xi’s strategy seems focused on maximization, there is growing speculation that China may eventually shift toward a more explicit strategy of balancing. In international relations theory, balancing refers to efforts by a state to prevent any one power from becoming dominant, either by building up its own power (internal balancing) or by aligning with other states (external balancing).

China’s current strategy, though ambitious, does not appear to seek global hegemony in the way that the United States did after World War II. Instead, China’s actions may suggest a form of balancing. For instance, China has been careful to forge closer ties with Russia, establish regional economic institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and create a vast network of partnerships through the BRI.

These actions can be seen as a form of offshore balancing, where China strengthens its regional influence while preventing the U.S. from becoming too dominant in the Asia-Pacific.

Elbridge Colby’s notion of the “best strategy” may offer insights into China’s next steps. Colby, a prominent advocate of realist balancing within U.S. strategy circles, argues that states must often choose strategies that best align with their material capabilities and the geopolitical environment. Applying this framework to China, one could argue that Beijing’s best strategy in the coming decades might be one of offshore balancing with Chinese characteristics — a strategy that seeks to maintain a stable regional environment while avoiding overextension and direct confrontation with the U.S.

and this must not be allowed to happen, it is quite apparent for some time now that china is heading into its consolidation + consolation phase of their rule, now is the time to increase more and more pressure on all fronts particularly the border; their optimum solution is to let the neighbourhood slumber till the chinese again switch into the aggressive phase a decade before 2047, and the barking wolf warriors again appear in popular discourse as the harbinger of the return of the chinese aggression, strengthen their systems, gather resources, they must be dismayed in this effort in all instances

As China faces both internal and external challenges, it may indeed settle into a strategy of balancing, recognizing that it has peaked and must now manage its power carefully. Some scholars, such as Joshua Shifrinson, have suggested that China’s grand strategy has always been more about balancing than achieving outright primacy, especially given the constraints posed by U.S. dominance and China’s economic vulnerabilities.

a comment on their maximisation strategy, as the saying goes, the chinese system is like a tree that grows just once a year (short duration of time), and thus must grow vigorously in all directions in this short time, before it goes back into peaceful coexistence / resource gathering phase; this phase must be lengthened for them and bleed their resources dry so that the optimum system for them is never allowed to take root

[ramana]

Confucianism updated

https://x.com/Vermeullarmine/status/1856366809613517047



Full article link:
https://thenewdigest.substack.com/p/whi ... utionalism

[ramana]

Statement by Dr S Jaishankar

Link: https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?d ... +Lok+Sabha

Hon’ble Speaker,

I rise to apprise the House of some recent developments in the India China border areas and their implications for our overall bilateral relations. The House is aware that our ties have been abnormal since 2020, when peace and tranquility in the border areas were disturbed as a result of Chinese actions. Recent developments that reflect our continuous diplomatic engagement since then have set our ties in the direction of some improvement.

2. The House is cognizant of the fact that China is in illegal occupation of 38,000 Sq. kms. of Indian territory in Aksai Chin as a result of the 1962 conflict and the events that preceded it. Furthermore, Pakistan illegally ceded 5180 Sq. kms. of Indian territory to China in 1963, which had been under its occupation since 1948. India and China have held talks for multiple decades to resolve the boundary issue. While there is a Line of Actual Control (LAC), it does not have a common understanding in some areas. We remain committed to engaging with China through bilateral discussions to arrive at a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable framework for a boundary settlement.

3. Hon’ble Members would recall that the amassing of a large number of troops by China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh in April/May 2020 resulted in face offs with our forces at a number of points. The situation also led to disruption of patrolling activities. It is to the credit of our armed forces that despite logistical challenges and the then-prevailing Covid situation, they were able to counter-deploy rapidly and effectively.

Hon’ble Speaker sir,

4. The House is well aware of the circumstances leading up to the violent clashes in Galwan Valley in June 2020. In the months thereafter, we were addressing a situation that had not only seen fatalities for the first time in 45 years, but also a turn of events serious enough for heavy weaponry to be deployed in close proximity to the LAC. While a determined counter deployment of adequate capability was the Government’s immediate response, there was also the imperative of a diplomatic effort to defuse these heightened tensions and restore peace and tranquility.

Hon’ble Speaker sir,

5. The contemporary phase of our ties with China dates back to 1988, when there was a clear understanding that the Sino-Indian boundary question will be settled through peaceful and friendly consultations. In 1991, the two sides agreed to maintain peace and tranquility in the areas along the LAC pending a final settlement of the boundary question. Thereafter, in 1993, an Agreement was reached on the maintenance of peace and tranquility. Subsequently in 1996, India and China agreed on confidence building measures in the military field.

6. In 2003, we finalized a Declaration on Principles for our Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation, which included the appointment of Special Representatives. In 2005, a protocol was formulated on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures along the LAC. At the same time, the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the settlement of the boundary question was agreed to.

7. In 2012, a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) was established. And a year later in 2013, we reached an understanding on border defense cooperation as well. The purpose of my recalling these agreements is to underline the elaborate nature of our shared efforts to ensure peace and tranquility. And to emphasize the seriousness of what its unprecedented disruption in 2020 implied for our overall relationship.

8. The situation arising after our counter-deployment in 2020 called for multiple set of responses. The immediate priority was to ensure disengagement from friction points so that there would be no further untoward incidents or clashes. This Sir, has been fully achieved as I will explain. The next priority will be to consider de-escalation, that would address the massing of troops along the LAC with associated accompaniments. It is also evident that the management of the border areas will require further attention in the light of our recent experiences.

9. In all of this, we were and we remain very clear that the three key principles must be observed in all circumstances: (i) both sides should strictly respect and observe the LAC, (ii) neither side should attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo, and (iii) agreements and understandings reached in the past must be fully abided by in their entirety.

10. Hon’ble Members would appreciate that as a result of the sustained tension and specific developments in the border areas, our overall relationship with China was bound to be impacted adversely. In the new circumstances, it was obviously not possible to continue the normal exchanges, interactions and activities as in the past. In this regard, we made clear that the development of our ties were contingent on the principles of mutual sensitivity, mutual respect and mutual interests.

11. Throughout this period, Hon’ble Members would also be aware that Government has maintained that India-China relations cannot be normal in the absence of peace and tranquility in the border areas. The combination of a firm and principled stance on the situation in the border areas as well as our clearly articulated approach to the totality of our ties have been the foundation of our engagement with China for the last four years. We have been very clear that the restoration of peace and tranquility would be the basis for the rest of the relationship to move forward.

12. Since 2020, our engagement was therefore focused on that objective. This took place at various levels, involving different arms of the government. I myself have had meetings with my Chinese counterpart, as indeed has my senior colleague, Raksha Mantri ji. Our NSA has also engaged his Chinese counterpart, both being the Special Representatives on the boundary question.

13. More detailed discussions were conducted by the Working Mechanism for Cooperation and Coordination (WMCC) at the diplomatic level. Its military counterpart was the Senior Highest Military Commanders meeting (SHMC) mechanism. The interactions were naturally very tightly coordinated with the combined presence in the negotiations of both diplomatic and military officials. Since June 2020, 17 meetings of the WMCC and 21 rounds of SHMC have taken place.

Sir,

14. In this background, I would like to inform the House today about the agreement reached on 21 October, 2024 regarding Depsang and Demchok. The twin considerations of an unstable local situation and an impacted bilateral relationship were clearly the drivers for these recent endeavors. These two areas have been the focus of our discussions in both WMCC and SHMC with the Chinese side since September 2022, when the last disengagement agreement was concluded at Hot Springs area.

15. In the lead up to the October 21 agreement, I had discussed both the specific disengagement issue as well as the larger relationship with my Chinese counterpart in Astana on 4 July and Vientiane on 25 July. Our National Security Advisor and his Chinese counterpart also met in St. Petersburg on 12 September. The problem in these two areas pertained primarily to obstructions of our long-standing patrolling activity. In Demchok, there was also the question of access by our nomadic population to traditional grazing grounds, as well as to sites of significance to the local people.

16. As a result of this recent understanding arrived at after intensive negotiations, resumption of patrolling to the traditional areas is underway. It was initially tested by sending out patrols for verification of disengagement on the ground and is being followed up by regular activities as per the agreed understanding.

17. Following the October 21 understanding, Prime Minister and President Xi Jinping had a meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan on October 23. They welcomed the understanding and directed the Foreign Ministers to meet and stabilize and rebuild the relationship. The Special Representatives are also to oversee the management of peace and tranquility besides exploring a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question.

18. In pursuance of that, I recently held discussions with FM Wang Yi again on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 18, 2024.

19. Raksha Mantri has also met the Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun at the ASEAN Defence Ministers (ADMM+) meeting in Vientiane on November 20, 2024. The two Ministers discussed progress on the recent agreement on disengagement, the need to address de-escalation and the requirement of strengthening confidence building measures. They agreed on the importance of continuing meetings and consultations at various levels.

Sir,

20. The House will remember that the October 21, 2024 agreement is the latest in the series of understandings in regard to the resolution of the situation at various friction points in Eastern Ladakh. In the aftermath of events in May/June 2020, and the initial disengagement in Galwan Valley in July 2020, there was a Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow on 10 September, 2020.

21. The Government’s position at that time was that the immediate task was to ensure a comprehensive disengagement of troops in all the friction areas. It was also emphasized that the large concentration of troops along the LAC was not in accordance with the 1993 and 1996 Agreements. The Indian side, it was made clear, would not countenance any attempts to change the status quo unilaterally. We also expected that all agreements and protocols pertaining to the management of the border areas would be scrupulously followed.

Sir,

22. Through you I would like to inform the House, that disengagement has now been achieved in full in Eastern Ladakh through a step by step process, culminating in Depsang and Demchok. With the task of disengagement completed, it is now our expectation that discussions would commence in regard to the remaining issues that we had placed on the agenda.

23. For the benefit of Hon’ble Members, I would also flag for your attention the previous positions articulated by the Government in Parliament previously on this issue. On 15 September, 2020, Raksha Mantri ji had made a detailed statement on Chinese attempts to transgress the LAC and the appropriate response given by our armed forces. On 11 February, 2021, Raksha Mantri ji again briefed the House about our disengagement agreement in the North and South banks of the Pangong Lake.

24. Thereafter, in August 2021, a third phase of disengagement took place in the area of Gogra, whereby troops would henceforth be in their respective bases. The next step took place in September 2022, pertaining to the Hot Springs area. Again, forward deployments ceased in a phased, coordinated and verified manner, resulting in the return of troops to their respective areas. The most recent October 21, 2024 agreement comes in the wake of the earlier ones. It completes the first phase of what we had agreed to in Moscow in September 2020.

25. As Members are aware, there is a long history of frictions, transgressions and face offs in several sectors of the India-China border. This goes back to Barahoti from 1954, to Longju in 1959, to Sumdorong Chu from 1986-1995 and Depsang in 2013, amongst others. In the past, earlier Governments have agreed to a range of steps to defuse situations that have arisen at different times, including offers on our side to create de-militarized zones, limited non-patrolling zones, relocation or withdrawal of posts, disengagement of troops and dismantlement of structures. Different locations have seen different solutions being examined.

26. Where the October 21 understanding is concerned, our objective has been to ensure patrolling as in the past to the relevant patrolling points, as well as resumption of grazing by our civilians as per longstanding practice. This is indeed what we have agreed upon in regard to Depsang and Demchok.

27. In a few other places where friction occurred in 2020, steps of a temporary and limited nature were worked out, based on local conditions, to obviate the possibility of further friction. This, I must stress, applies to both sides and can be revisited as the situation demands. In that sense, our stance has been resolute and firm and serves our national interest fully.

28. The ensuring of our national security in this manner is the result of cumulative and coordinated endeavors of many parts of the Government, obviously centered around our defense and security forces. The competence and professionalism of our services in this period was displayed in our speedy and effective counter-deployment. In the negotiations with China, the defence and diplomatic arms worked in lockstep to ensure that our national interests were comprehensively met.

Sir,

29. In that context, the House would also recognize that there has been a significant improvement in the border infrastructure which has made such effective counter-deployment possible. This is reflected, amongst others, in the increase of border infrastructure allocations in the last decade. The Border Roads Organization (BRO) alone has incurred three times the expenditure level of what it was a decade ago. Whether it is the length of the road networks, of bridges or of the number of tunnels, there has been a substantial increase over the earlier period.

30. Notable milestones in recent years include the Atal Tunnel to Lahul Spiti, the Sela and Nechiphu Tunnels to Tawang, the Umlingla Pass road in Southern Ladakh and the extended opening of the Zojila Axis. Work is progressing on some strategically important roads and air fields in Ladakh. The adoption of new technologies in high altitude, remote, inaccessible and permafrost areas has also been significant. All of this reflects the Government’s firm commitment to protecting our borders and ensuring that our armed forces get the facilities and the logistical support that they deserve.

31. Finally Sir, let me share with Hon’ble Members our expectation regarding the direction of our ties with China in the near future. Our relationship had progressed in many domains, but was obviously negatively affected by recent events. We are clear that the maintenance of peace and tranquility in border areas is a pre-requisite for the development of our ties. In the coming days, we will be discussing both de-escalation as well as effective management of our activities in the border areas.

32. The conclusion of the disengagement phase now allows us to consider other aspects of our bilateral engagement in a calibrated manner, keeping our national security interests first and foremost. In my recent meeting with FM Wang Yi, we reached an understanding that the Special Representatives and the Foreign Secretary level mechanisms will be convening soon.

33. I thank you Sir and the Hon’ble Members for their attention and am confident that the Government has their full support in addressing the complexities of this important relationship.

[ramana]

Statement by Dr S Jaishankar

Link: https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?d ... +Lok+Sabha

Hon’ble Speaker,

I rise to apprise the House of some recent developments in the India China border areas and their implications for our overall bilateral relations. The House is aware that our ties have been abnormal since 2020, when peace and tranquility in the border areas were disturbed as a result of Chinese actions. Recent developments that reflect our continuous diplomatic engagement since then have set our ties in the direction of some improvement.

2. The House is cognizant of the fact that China is in illegal occupation of 38,000 Sq. kms. of Indian territory in Aksai Chin as a result of the 1962 conflict and the events that preceded it. Furthermore, Pakistan illegally ceded 5180 Sq. kms. of Indian territory to China in 1963, which had been under its occupation since 1948. India and China have held talks for multiple decades to resolve the boundary issue. While there is a Line of Actual Control (LAC), it does not have a common understanding in some areas. We remain committed to engaging with China through bilateral discussions to arrive at a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable framework for a boundary settlement.

3. Hon’ble Members would recall that the amassing of a large number of troops by China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh in April/May 2020 resulted in face offs with our forces at a number of points. The situation also led to disruption of patrolling activities. It is to the credit of our armed forces that despite logistical challenges and the then-prevailing Covid situation, they were able to counter-deploy rapidly and effectively.

Hon’ble Speaker sir,

4. The House is well aware of the circumstances leading up to the violent clashes in Galwan Valley in June 2020. In the months thereafter, we were addressing a situation that had not only seen fatalities for the first time in 45 years, but also a turn of events serious enough for heavy weaponry to be deployed in close proximity to the LAC. While a determined counter deployment of adequate capability was the Government’s immediate response, there was also the imperative of a diplomatic effort to defuse these heightened tensions and restore peace and tranquility.

Hon’ble Speaker sir,

5. The contemporary phase of our ties with China dates back to 1988, when there was a clear understanding that the Sino-Indian boundary question will be settled through peaceful and friendly consultations. In 1991, the two sides agreed to maintain peace and tranquility in the areas along the LAC pending a final settlement of the boundary question. Thereafter, in 1993, an Agreement was reached on the maintenance of peace and tranquility. Subsequently in 1996, India and China agreed on confidence building measures in the military field.

6. In 2003, we finalized a Declaration on Principles for our Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation, which included the appointment of Special Representatives. In 2005, a protocol was formulated on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures along the LAC. At the same time, the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the settlement of the boundary question was agreed to.

7. In 2012, a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) was established. And a year later in 2013, we reached an understanding on border defense cooperation as well. The purpose of my recalling these agreements is to underline the elaborate nature of our shared efforts to ensure peace and tranquility. And to emphasize the seriousness of what its unprecedented disruption in 2020 implied for our overall relationship.

8. The situation arising after our counter-deployment in 2020 called for multiple set of responses. The immediate priority was to ensure disengagement from friction points so that there would be no further untoward incidents or clashes. This Sir, has been fully achieved as I will explain. The next priority will be to consider de-escalation, that would address the massing of troops along the LAC with associated accompaniments. It is also evident that the management of the border areas will require further attention in the light of our recent experiences.

9. In all of this, we were and we remain very clear that the three key principles must be observed in all circumstances: (i) both sides should strictly respect and observe the LAC, (ii) neither side should attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo, and (iii) agreements and understandings reached in the past must be fully abided by in their entirety.

10. Hon’ble Members would appreciate that as a result of the sustained tension and specific developments in the border areas, our overall relationship with China was bound to be impacted adversely. In the new circumstances, it was obviously not possible to continue the normal exchanges, interactions and activities as in the past. In this regard, we made clear that the development of our ties were contingent on the principles of mutual sensitivity, mutual respect and mutual interests.

11. Throughout this period, Hon’ble Members would also be aware that Government has maintained that India-China relations cannot be normal in the absence of peace and tranquility in the border areas. The combination of a firm and principled stance on the situation in the border areas as well as our clearly articulated approach to the totality of our ties have been the foundation of our engagement with China for the last four years. We have been very clear that the restoration of peace and tranquility would be the basis for the rest of the relationship to move forward.

12. Since 2020, our engagement was therefore focused on that objective. This took place at various levels, involving different arms of the government. I myself have had meetings with my Chinese counterpart, as indeed has my senior colleague, Raksha Mantri ji. Our NSA has also engaged his Chinese counterpart, both being the Special Representatives on the boundary question.

13. More detailed discussions were conducted by the Working Mechanism for Cooperation and Coordination (WMCC) at the diplomatic level. Its military counterpart was the Senior Highest Military Commanders meeting (SHMC) mechanism. The interactions were naturally very tightly coordinated with the combined presence in the negotiations of both diplomatic and military officials. Since June 2020, 17 meetings of the WMCC and 21 rounds of SHMC have taken place.

Sir,

14. In this background, I would like to inform the House today about the agreement reached on 21 October, 2024 regarding Depsang and Demchok.The twin considerations of an unstable local situation and an impacted bilateral relationship were clearly the drivers for these recent endeavors. These two areas have been the focus of our discussions in both WMCC and SHMC with the Chinese side since September 2022, when the last disengagement agreement was concluded at Hot Springs area.

15. In the lead up to the October 21 agreement, I had discussed both the specific disengagement issue as well as the larger relationship with my Chinese counterpart in Astana on 4 July and Vientiane on 25 July. Our National Security Advisor and his Chinese counterpart also met in St. Petersburg on 12 September. The problem in these two areas pertained primarily to obstructions of our long-standing patrolling activity. In Demchok, there was also the question of access by our nomadic population to traditional grazing grounds, as well as to sites of significance to the local people.

16. As a result of this recent understanding arrived at after intensive negotiations, resumption of patrolling to the traditional areas is underway. It was initially tested by sending out patrols for verification of disengagement on the ground and is being followed up by regular activities as per the agreed understanding.

17. Following the October 21 understanding, Prime Minister and President Xi Jinping had a meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan on October 23. They welcomed the understanding and directed the Foreign Ministers to meet and stabilize and rebuild the relationship. The Special Representatives are also to oversee the management of peace and tranquility besides exploring a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question.

18. In pursuance of that, I recently held discussions with FM Wang Yi again on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 18, 2024.

19. Raksha Mantri has also met the Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun at the ASEAN Defence Ministers (ADMM+) meeting in Vientiane on November 20, 2024. The two Ministers discussed progress on the recent agreement on disengagement, the need to address de-escalation and the requirement of strengthening confidence building measures. They agreed on the importance of continuing meetings and consultations at various levels.

Sir,

20. The House will remember that the October 21, 2024 agreement is the latest in the series of understandings in regard to the resolution of the situation at various friction points in Eastern Ladakh. In the aftermath of events in May/June 2020, and the initial disengagement in Galwan Valley in July 2020, there was a Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow on 10 September, 2020.

21. The Government’s position at that time was that the immediate task was to ensure a comprehensive disengagement of troops in all the friction areas. It was also emphasized that the large concentration of troops along the LAC was not in accordance with the 1993 and 1996 Agreements. The Indian side, it was made clear, would not countenance any attempts to change the status quo unilaterally. We also expected that all agreements and protocols pertaining to the management of the border areas would be scrupulously followed.

Sir,

22. Through you I would like to inform the House, that disengagement has now been achieved in full in Eastern Ladakh through a step by step process, culminating in Depsang and Demchok. With the task of disengagement completed, it is now our expectation that discussions would commence in regard to the remaining issues that we had placed on the agenda.

23. For the benefit of Hon’ble Members, I would also flag for your attention the previous positions articulated by the Government in Parliament previously on this issue. On 15 September, 2020, Raksha Mantri ji had made a detailed statement on Chinese attempts to transgress the LAC and the appropriate response given by our armed forces. On 11 February, 2021, Raksha Mantri ji again briefed the House about our disengagement agreement in the North and South banks of the Pangong Lake.

24. Thereafter, in August 2021, a third phase of disengagement took place in the area of Gogra, whereby troops would henceforth be in their respective bases. The next step took place in September 2022, pertaining to the Hot Springs area. Again, forward deployments ceased in a phased, coordinated and verified manner, resulting in the return of troops to their respective areas. The most recent October 21, 2024 agreement comes in the wake of the earlier ones. It completes the first phase of what we had agreed to in Moscow in September 2020.

25. As Members are aware, there is a long history of frictions, transgressions and face offs in several sectors of the India-China border. This goes back to Barahoti from 1954, to Longju in 1959, to Sumdorong Chu from 1986-1995 and Depsang in 2013, amongst others. In the past, earlier Governments have agreed to a range of steps to defuse situations that have arisen at different times, including offers on our side to create de-militarized zones, limited non-patrolling zones, relocation or withdrawal of posts, disengagement of troops and dismantlement of structures. Different locations have seen different solutions being examined.

26. Where the October 21 understanding is concerned, our objective has been to ensure patrolling as in the past to the relevant patrolling points, as well as resumption of grazing by our civilians as per longstanding practice. This is indeed what we have agreed upon in regard to Depsang and Demchok.

27. In a few other places where friction occurred in 2020, steps of a temporary and limited nature were worked out, based on local conditions, to obviate the possibility of further friction. This, I must stress, applies to both sides and can be revisited as the situation demands. In that sense, our stance has been resolute and firm and serves our national interest fully.

28. The ensuring of our national security in this manner is the result of cumulative and coordinated endeavors of many parts of the Government, obviously centered around our defense and security forces. The competence and professionalism of our services in this period was displayed in our speedy and effective counter-deployment. In the negotiations with China, the defence and diplomatic arms worked in lockstep to ensure that our national interests were comprehensively met.

Sir,

29. In that context, the House would also recognize that there has been a significant improvement in the border infrastructure which has made such effective counter-deployment possible. This is reflected, amongst others, in the increase of border infrastructure allocations in the last decade. The Border Roads Organization (BRO) alone has incurred three times the expenditure level of what it was a decade ago. Whether it is the length of the road networks, of bridges or of the number of tunnels, there has been a substantial increase over the earlier period.

30. Notable milestones in recent years include the Atal Tunnel to Lahul Spiti, the Sela and Nechiphu Tunnels to Tawang, the Umlingla Pass road in Southern Ladakh and the extended opening of the Zojila Axis. Work is progressing on some strategically important roads and air fields in Ladakh. The adoption of new technologies in high altitude, remote, inaccessible and permafrost areas has also been significant. All of this reflects the Government’s firm commitment to protecting our borders and ensuring that our armed forces get the facilities and the logistical support that they deserve.

31. Finally Sir, let me share with Hon’ble Members our expectation regarding the direction of our ties with China in the near future. Our relationship had progressed in many domains, but was obviously negatively affected by recent events. We are clear that the maintenance of peace and tranquility in border areas is a pre-requisite for the development of our ties. In the coming days, we will be discussing both de-escalation as well as effective management of our activities in the border areas.

32. The conclusion of the disengagement phase now allows us to consider other aspects of our bilateral engagement in a calibrated manner, keeping our national security interests first and foremost. In my recent meeting with FM Wang Yi, we reached an understanding that the Special Representatives and the Foreign Secretary level mechanisms will be convening soon.

33. I thank you Sir and the Hon’ble Members for their attention and am confident that the Government has their full support in addressing the complexities of this important relationship.

[ricky_v]

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china ... -contract/

And what struck me above all was not evidence of China’s global rise, but rather the country’s internal dynamics—in particular, the shifting provisions of the social contract that underpins the party’s rule.


For decades, China’s social contract amounted to a straightforward bargain: the state delivers strong economic growth—with the associated opportunities—and the people accept curbs on their civil liberties and political freedom. This contract emerged under Deng Xiaoping, who initiated China’s ‘reform and opening up’, and whose gospel of wealth—‘to get rich is glorious’—shaped China’s meteoric rise.

But China’s economy has suffered a series of blows in recent years. The Covid-19 pandemic—and the draconian lockdowns the government imposed in response—caused growth to fall sharply, as it did elsewhere in the world. China’s economy, however, never fully recovered. Instead, it endured a real-estate crisis, a sharp decline in foreign investment and falling consumer and business confidence, owing partly to unpredictable, ideology-driven macroeconomic and regulatory policies.

The party is taking steps to accelerate economic recovery. After third-quarter data revealed that growth had again fallen short of the government’s 5 percent target, China’s leaders signaled a shift, for the first time in 14 years, from a prudent monetary policy to a moderately loose one, and suggested that 2025 will bring a more proactive fiscal policy. This approach aims to boost domestic demand, which has been sluggish; but exports—not least to Europe—remain essential to keep the economy afloat.

Even if China overcomes its immediate challenges, however, its economy has developed past the point where double-digit growth can form the basis of the social contract. This is not lost on Chinese President Xi Jinping—the self-proclaimed ‘pilot at the helm’ (a thinly-veiled reference to the ‘Great Helmsman’, Mao Zedong)—who has increasingly sought to shift the foundations of his regime’s legitimacy from growth to security. Now, China’s government is promising to ensure citizens’ wellbeing, such as by protecting the environment, and to foster common prosperity, for example by strengthening support for rural workers flocking to cities.

This approach is not only central to Xi’s so-called Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation; it also supports China’s bid to enhance its international standing by positioning itself as a global climate leader. At this year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference, China’s leaders touted the US$24.5 billion in climate finance that, according to its own opaque calculations, it has delivered to developing countries since 2016.

Green investment is also happening at home. China accounts for about two-thirds of the solar and wind projects under construction worldwide, and the country reached its 2030 target for installed renewable-energy capacity six years ahead of schedule. To be sure, China was also responsible for 95 percent of the world’s new coal-power construction last year. But, while the party is under pressure to deliver sufficient energy to support its growing economy, its incentive for climate action should not be underestimated.

Beyond geopolitical considerations, China’s climate leadership is a response to the demands of the country’s citizens, who have grown increasingly anxious about the environmental damage that accompanied rapid development. Air pollution is responsible for around 2 million deaths in China each year, and the water supply is both limited and polluted. When Xi speaks of ‘blue skies, green fields, and clean water’, he is doing so for foreign and Chinese audiences alike.

Chinese also expect their leaders to deliver on their promise of economic security. Since Xi introduced the idea of common prosperity in 2021, inequality in China—especially between regions—has increased. This helps to explain why so many people are eager to leave their less prosperous rural hometowns in search of opportunities in China’s dynamic cities. With the urbanisation rate expected to approach 70 percent over the next five years, supporting the wellbeing of city residents will be a key challenge for Xi’s government.

Seeing all of this firsthand—catching glimpses of people’s shifting expectations and the government’s priorities—enriched my understanding of China and reminded me why engagement remains crucial. At a time of heightened competition and growing antagonism between China and the West, there can be no more important pursuit.

[ramana]

XJP is Sinicizing Chinese Communism.
That means Mandate Of Heaven also comes with it.
Of course the components will be different now.
Basically it's the well being of the subjects which bestows the Mandate of Heaven.

[ramana]

It's nearly six months since the 2020 Galwan crisis was resolved in October 2024.
I am asking the large China Studies interest groups if there has been a study examining the timeline and what steps India and China took to resolve the neo Cuban Missile Crisis of the 21st century.
Please I want thoughtful replies. No one liners or flippant replies.

[ramana]

Councillor Wang Huning reemerges:

http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2025-02/27/c_1073178.htm

BEIJING -- Wang Huning, a senior official of the Communist Party of China (CPC), has stressed the importance of maintaining the initiative and the ability to steer in relations across the Taiwan Strait.

Addressing a work conference on Taiwan affairs held in Beijing from Tuesday to Wednesday, Wang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, called for resolute efforts to advance the cause of national reunification.

Stressing the importance of upholding the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, he called for standing closely with Taiwan compatriots, giving firm support to patriots in Taiwan who desire reunification, and resolutely combating provocations aimed at "Taiwan independence."

Wang urged efforts to facilitate cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, expand personnel exchanges, support the development of Taiwan-funded businesses on the mainland, and create favorable conditions for young people from Taiwan to pursue and fulfill their dreams on the mainland.

The integrated development of the two sides should be deepened to allow Taiwan compatriots to share development opportunities and outcomes of Chinese modernization, he said.

Wang also called for firm opposition to external interference and stressed efforts to consolidate the international community's commitment to the one-China principle.

He emphasized implementing the Party's overall policy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era and strengthening the centralized, unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee over work related to Taiwan.

Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee, presided over the meeting.

[ramana]

Foreign Minister Wang Yi uses metaphor of elephant and dragon dance
https://x.com/sidhant/status/1897891622849069540







Please read and analyze.

[sanjaykumar]

Yeah, with one eye on the eagle.

[ricky_v]

article talks about eroding control of xjp over the pla

https://jamestown.org/program/pla-facti ... -military/

A year-long anti-corruption campaign has purged major senior personnel from the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While graft is endemic to the Chinese military, purges in Leninist regimes also serve a political purpose. Fierce internal power struggles are another feature of such regimes, with control over the military seen as vital to consolidating power. In the Chinese military system, Xi Jinping is not the only person who has power over personnel. Recently, some observers have suggested that his vice chair on the Central Military Commission (CMC), Zhang Youxia (张又侠), may have ordered recent purges in the PLA Navy. If this is true, it could suggest that Xi Jinping’s traditional bases of support in the PLA are weakened and that his authority over the PLA is far from absolute (People’s Report, October 11, 2024; X/@yanmingshiping, November 28, 2024).

Two Purges Have Targeted Two Xi Factions

The current CMC consists of five men besides Xi, according to the Ministry of National Defense website. These individuals are pulled from Xi’s two major bases of support in the PLA, the Shaanxi Gang (陕西帮) and the Fujian Clique (福建系). The former stems from Xi’s family connections as a princeling—both Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin (张升民) hail from Shaanxi Province. Zhang Youxia also has close familial ties to Xi, as the two men’s fathers served in the same unit during the civil war. The latter group is composed of He Weidong (何卫东) and Miao Hua (苗华), who worked with Xi when he was an official in Fujian Province. This leaves Liu Zhenli (刘振立), who is more aligned with the Shaanxi Gang by virtue of his relationship with Zhang Youxia, under whom he served during the Sino-Vietnamese War (VOA Chinese, October 24, 2022; MND, accessed March 3).

The current anti-graft campaign in the PLA can be divided into two distinct waves, the first beginning in 2023 and ending in mid-2024, and the second beginning in November 2024 and continuing to the present. Officials connected to the Shaanxi Gang and the Fujian Clique, respectively, were caught up in these two waves, likely resulting in an erosion of Xi Jinping’s base of support.

[1]

The first wave primarily targeted the PLA’s aerospace apparatus, eliminating key leaders in the PLA Rocket Force, Air Force, Strategic Support Force, and the aerospace industry. Those who were purged often had ties to Shaanxi Gang leaders via superior-subordinate relationships. This wave centered around Defense Minister Li Shangfu (李尚福) and his predecessor Wei Fenghe (魏凤和). The probes traced Li’s misconduct to the Equipment Development Department, where he succeeded Zhang Youxia as director. In December 2023, the National People’s Congress announced the removal of nine senior military officials. Of these, five were associates of Li in the Rocket Force, and two, Zhang Yulin (张育林) and Rao Wenmin (饶文敏), were officials in the Equipment Development Department (Xinhua, December 29, 2023). They likely had a hand in the misconduct that also ensnared Li (Lianhe Zaobao, July 29, 2023, December 29, 2023). While Zhang Youxia himself was not implicated, the removal of his former subordinates damaged the standing of the Shaanxi Gang. Li was replaced by a member of the Fujian Clique, Dong Jun (董军), confounding months of speculation that he would be succeeded by the more closely aligned Liu Zhenli (Lianhe Zaobao, October 12, 2023; Radio Free Asia, November 24, 2023). This suggests that factional interests were at play in the personnel reshuffle.


Following a brief hiatus, the purges ramped up again in November 2024 with rumors that Dong Jun was under investigation and the announcement that Miao Hua was suspended. The PLA Navy became the principal focus of investigations, with suggestions that Miao was the patron of all those under scrutiny (China Military Online, November 28, 2024; National People’s Congress, December 25, 2024). [2] The Fujian Clique, the beneficiary of the previous round of purges, now finds itself in the probes’ crosshairs. Speculation abounds that Zhang Youxia is flexing his political muscle following the downfall of his supporters. This is supported by a series of meetings Zhang hosted with senior PLA officers in late 2024, from which Xi was conspicuously absent (MND, September 13, 2024, October 22, 2024; China Brief, December 3). Even if this analysis is correct, however, it remains unclear what Zhang’s motives might be.

Whose Authority? Xi Versus the System

Party literature hints at this unfolding PLA power struggle. In December 2024, Xi penned an article in the Party’s theory journal Qiushi, emphasizing that the first step of revolution is to “adhere to the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee as the fundamental guarantee” (以坚持党中央集中统一领导为根本保证) (Qiushi, December 16, 2024). By contrast, other parts of the PLA leadership have been advocating for collective decision-making. In other words, control should remain within the Party but not under a particular apparatus (such as the central committee) that Xi directly controls.

Several commentaries published in 2024 in the PLA Daily newspaper stressed the importance of “adhering to collective leadership” (坚持集体领导) and maintaining “democratic centralism” (民主集中制). These include an article from July and a series of five further pieces published in September and December (PLA Daily, July 9, 2024, September 13, 2024; December 9, 2024, December 11, 2024, December 16, 2024, December 18, 2024). A majority of the authors can be traced back to organizations Zhang Youxia’s faction previously had ties to, including three connected to the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) and one from the Aerospace Force. [3]

The article from July emphasizes collective leadership under “each level of party organization” (各级党组织). It states that “only if secretaries and deputy secretaries adhere to collective leadership and focus on developing democracy will they extract the correct views on how to conform to the laws of development and to the basic interests of the masses and create scientific policy” (书记、副书记只有坚持集体领导，注重发扬民主，才能把符合事物发展规律、符合广大人民群众根本利益的正确意见提炼出来，作出科学决策). It goes on to discuss the need for “multiple voices” (多种声音) in any debate, saying that this is the basis for adhering to collective leadership and scientific decision-making, especially during the current phase of military modernization where such decision-making is becoming increasingly complex.


The September 13 piece is the first in a five-part series and is titled “Consciously Set an Example of Upholding Democratic Centralism” (自觉做坚持民主集中制的表率)—a phrase that also serves as the subtitle of the subsequent articles. The main titles of the other four articles all take the form of exhorting readers to “Take the Lead and …” (带头 …), which is followed by “Uphold Collective Leadership” (坚持集体领导), “Develop Democracy Within the Party” (发扬党内民主), “Protect Group Unity (维护班子团结), and “Seek Reality, Deal With Reality, and Implement Based on Reality” (求实务实落实), respectively. Several themes emerge across these pieces.

First, the articles often emphasize the importance of the “democratic” side of the “democratic centralism” equation. One article writes, “in a system of democratic centralism, first comes democracy, then comes centralism” (民主集中制，先有民主，后有集), while another similarly argues that “democracy comes first and then centralism” (先民主后集中). A third notes that intra-party democracy is “the life of the Party; it is the important basis for the Party’s positive and healthy internal political life” (是党的生命，是党内政治 生活积极健康的重要基础). In this context, democracy refers to ensuring collective decision-making, deemphasizing the power of individuals, and encouraging internal debate.

Collective leadership and decision-making are mentioned in three of the articles. One describes the former as “the core and basis” (核心和本质) of democratic centralism and “one of the highest principles of the Party’s leadership” (党的领导的最高原则之一). It goes on to note that “Party leadership is the leadership of the party committee collective” (党的领导是党委集体的领导). Another argues that “Collective leadership should give prominence to the roles of team members” (‘集体领导’要突出发挥班子成员作用), while a third piece notes that, “when discussing issues, everyone must have an equal voice and decision-making power” (在讨论决定问题时具有平等的发言权和表决权).

The series is intended, at least in part, as a rebuke of Xi Jinping’s leadership style. Xi himself is mentioned in each article and is sometimes quoted, but only briefly, and only by the title “general secretary” (主席), with no additional epithets or descriptors. By contrast, other former leaders are quoted and praised. Two of the articles refer to Deng Xiaoping. One in particular praises his close relationship with military strategist Liu Bocheng (刘伯承) as an example to show that “whether a team works or not depends on the top two people” (班子行不行，就看前两名). The piece uses a language pun—that the term “comrades” (同志) comes from having a “common” (共同) “ambition” (志向)—to suggest that unity does not derive from a single person but rather a common goal under the ideology of the Party. Another phrase, which implies that Xi’s position today depends on the work of numerous others and advocates for listening to diverse voices, comes from a Qin dynasty advisor: “If Mount Tai does not accept small soil hills, how can it grow bigger? If the river and sea do not accept small streams, how can they become deeper?” (泰山不让土壤，故能成其大；河海不择细流，故能就其深). This is perhaps the closest the series comes to a direct critique of Xi. Mao is also quoted as saying that “the secretariat are the equals of the commission members” (书记是党的委员会中平等的一员)—a stark contrast with Xi’s Qiushi piece, which emphasizes Party-CMC unity but omits discussion of the necessity of avoiding a single decision-maker or the commission’s equal role.

This line of criticism signals a narrative shift from the period just before the purges and through their first wave. In speeches delivered in April and September 2023, respectively, Zhang Youxia and He Weidong discussed understanding and implementing various tenets of Xi’s ideological formulations. [4] However, as the second wave of purges began in late 2024, both leaders began placing greater emphasis on rooting out corruption and political loyalty, but with diverging undertones. In a speech given on January 10, 2025, He Weidong explicitly identified loyalty with adherence to Xi’s directives while calling for efforts to fight corruption (Xinhua, January 10). Soon after, Zhang made a similar speech but instead emphasized the need to “ensure obedience to party directives and loyalty to the Party” (进一步铸牢听党指挥、对党忠诚的政治品格) (Xinhua, January 26). In other words, Zhang focused on acting in accordance with the CCP itself, without mentioning Xi. These statements coincided with purges affecting leaders within Zhang’s and He’s circles, weakening the Shaanxi Gang and the Fujian Clique, respectively. However, the language used could indicate growing tension between senior PLA leaders and Xi Jinping as well as among PLA officers. While both Zhang and He have made public statements in support of anti-corruption campaigns spearheaded by Xi, Zhang Youxia’s remarks, in particular, appear to align with a sentiment espoused by the PLA Daily articles that emphasizes the importance of collective leadership in the Party over Xi Jinping’s personal authority.

[ramana]

The long view of Chinese history shows while scholars slogged long hours memorizing Confucius,HanFei, Meniscus etc, Chinese Emperor consorts wielded enormous power with wisdom sometimes disastrously but over all quite well.

I haven't seen any studies on these Dragon* Ladies.
* Dragon is the protector of Chinese state.

[ramana]

Looks like Xi has done more corruption purges.

https://deccancouncil.in/about-us/

Looking at the frequency of these purges, corruption has become endemic to CPC. Now it's affecting the PLA.

Earlier it looked like he was getting rid of rivals under corruption rubric.

It might be something deeper that could threaten the existence of the Communist dynasty.

[ramana]

History of the Taping Rebellion in Qing China 1850-1864

https://libguides.library.albany.edu/c. ... 0rebellion

[VinodTK]

The Uyghurs Tragedy: Inside China's quiet Genocide | Investigate Asia

China’s repression of the Uighur population and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang is akin to genocide: more than a million people are being arbitrarily detained in camps where they undergo torture, re-education, forced labour and are banned from speaking their own language. Children are also being re-educated in so-called “orphanages” while women are subjected to forced sterilization. Uighur culture is being systematically destroyed.

Under the pretext of fighting Islamic radicalism and poverty, the Chinese Communist Party secretly built 1,400 internment camps and set about eradicating Uighur culture and its entire intelligentsia. It took many years for the international community to start to take notice, but Beijing persists in disguising the reality, claiming to be simply offering the Uighur population vocational training to combat poverty.

What are the real reasons behind this relentless repression? How does the past shed light on the present situation? We examine the forces at play and reveal the stakes behind this crime against humanity.

[uddu]

China is doing it to protect their population from Violence. The indoctrination of the Jihadis cannot be cured. You cannot reform them. Very few who could think of their own become Ex-Muslims. The violent ones control the society. Even the so called Secular Turkey turns out to become Islamic nation quickly. Secular, revolutionary Bangladesh is another example. It needs one more fanatic at the top to turn it into an Afghanistan. Even Gulf states will crumble the moment the gulf ruling elites are removed. Gulf states are also controlling the more lunatics in the same manner as does China.

[uddu]

Foreign Minister Wang Yi uses metaphor of elephant and dragon dance

China seems to be vary of the Metaphor Tiger and Dragon. Elephant is seen more as harmless giant and slow compared to the Tiger that is aggressive and ferocious and take no nonsense. Tiger being the National Animal and Lion being in the national symbol are hidden deliberately. Every nitty gritty things are part of psy ops. Few articles comparing India to Elephant and Indians themselves start using it rather than Tiger and Lion against the Dragon.
Take for Instance the term "Land of Gandhi" is especially Western Journals instead of Land of "Gautama Buddha". When using that term it brings great significance to the nation being the birth place of Buddhism. So usually our history is limited to Gandhi and mindsets sees a nation that is just independent compared to the 2000 years of legacy when using Buddha. Our leaders fall for this trap too and every time, they go abroad its statue of Gandhi and not Gautama Buddha or sages at that time. Can only hope this changes and reclaim our legacy and history especially our leaders be told from now on to start respecting statue of Gautama Buddha in foreign countries.

[Manish_P]

China is doing it to protect their population from Violence. The indoctrination of the Jihadis cannot be cured. You cannot reform them.
...

Clarity of thought usually leads to clarity of purpose. Action follows.

[ricky_v]

https://jamestown.org/program/personnel ... i-jinping/

Purges of Xi’s allies have extended to the state apparatus, most notably with Li Ganjie (李干杰) losing control of the Organization Department after just two years at the helm, and possibly to the domestic security apparatus, following the rise of Qin Yunbiao (秦运彪), who is not tied to Xi, as Beijing’s deputy major and head of its police department.

Political developments among the elite are beginning to point to a dramatic truncation of the power of the “core of the party center” (党中央的核心), Xi Jinping. A recent article from the official mouthpiece of the military, the PLA Daily, reminds readers that “our principle is that the Party commands the gun”


Xi, a 71-year-old princeling, is currently serving his third five-year term as head of the party, the military, and the government. He still seems destined to remain at least nominally at the helm until the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 21st National Congress convenes, likely in late 2027. At that point, he may garner a fourth five-year term. If so, his top-dog status will be maintained until the 22nd Party Congress in late 2032. However, it is unlikely he will be given the latitude to pursue his personal program in the way he has been in years past.

The high-profile removals began in the second half of 2023 with the investigation of former Defense Minister General Li Shangfu (李尚福), whom Xi apparently accused later that year of “betraying” him (China Brief, September 20, 2023, January 5, 2024). Li’s predecessor, Wei Fenghe (魏凤和), was embroiled in the investigation and both men were finally expelled from the Party for “severe disciplinary violations” (严重政治纪律) the following June (Xinhua, June 28). The wider investigation also led to the dismisslas of both the Commander and Political Commissar of the PLA Rocket Force, Li Yuchao (李玉超) and Xu Zhongbo (徐忠波), as well as at least nine other officers from the Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department (China Brief, March 15).

Xi’s appointment of new officers to lead the Rocket Forces have raised eyebrows. Instead of following the long-standing PLA tradition of naming experts to head technology-heavy departments, the new commander and political commissar of the Rocket Forces, Admiral Wang Houbin (王厚斌) and General Xu Xisheng (徐西盛), respectively, made their careers in the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force. As such, they have minimal specialist knowledge about missiles or spacecraft (BBC August 1, 2023; The Guardian, June 27, 2024; South China Morning Post [SCMP], July 10, 2024).


Other parts of the defense and aerospace research and development establishment have been ensnared in the wider anticorruption dragnet. In the space of two months—December 2023 and January 2024—senior personnel such as President of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Co. (CASC) Wu Yansheng (吴燕生); President of the China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (Norinco) Liu Shiquan (刘石泉); Deputy General Manager of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp (CASIC) Wang Changqing (王长青); Head of a research institute under CASC Wang Xiaojun (王小军) were hauled in for investigations and sacked. Defense authorities in April 2024 further shook the country by sacking CASIC President Yuan Jie (袁洁) and President of the China South Industries Group (also known as China Ordnance Equipment Group) Chen Guoying (陈国瑛) (Radio Free Asia, April 15, 2024; CNN, June 27, 2024).

A second wave of purges began in late 2024. Admiral Miao Hua (苗华) was suspended from his post as Director of the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department, along with senior officials who had also worked in the former 31st Group Army (now the 73rd Group Army). Director of the Eastern Theatre Command General Lin Xiangyang (林向阳) was arrested in early March, according to rumors on the Chinese internet (World Forum, November 25, 2024; New York Times Chinese Edition, November 29, 2024; Creaders.net, March 25).

The recent disappearance of the second-ranked vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and third most powerful member of the military apparatus, General He Weidong (何卫东), suggest that he, too, is under investigation. He has not appeared in public since the “Two Sessions” meetings in March and was notably absent from a conference held on April 8–9 on the PRC’s relations with neighboring countries attended by all 23 other Politburo members, as well as from an annual tree-planting event in Beijing (Xinhua, April 10; China Brief, April 11).

All along, the assumption has been that Xi has been steering the housecleaning to get rid of real and potential enemies among the top brass. The recent spate of personnel changes, however, has lent credence to the argument that Xi’s military foes are gunning down his protégés to weaken the base of the “party core.” He Weidong was known as a key supporter of Xi’s within the armed forces, frequently professing his loyalty in public statements. The removals of generals under He, such as Li Zhizhong (李志忠), Li Pengcheng (李鹏程), and—possibly—Tang Yong (唐勇), who were also seen as Xi allies, suggest that Xi has been unable to make good on his desire to root out corruption within the military and is losing support as a result (China Brief, April 11).

Beyond the military, Xi’s grip appears to be slipping on the “knife handle”—the apparatus of state control that includes the police (under the Ministry of Public Security), the spies (the Ministry of State Security) and the People’s Armed Police, a two million-strong para-military force whose remit is supporting “stability maintenance” operations (China Social Sciences Net, May 16, 2024; VOA, March 11). In late 2024, Qin Yunbiao (秦运彪) was appointed as both Beijing’s deputy major and the head of its police department. While his predecessor Qi Yanjun (亓延军) enjoyed the patronage of current Minister of Public Security and key Xi ally Wang Xiaohong (王小洪), Qin spent the bulk of his career as a professional police officer and had no personal links with Xi or Xi’s protégés (SCMP, October 12, 2023; Caixin, December 31, 2024). Speeches Xi has made in recent months also suggest that he is worried about losing control over this system, such as the one in January quoted above at which he emphasized ensuring that the “knife handle” remains firmly in the hands of the Party and the people (VOA, January 27).

Xi’s personnel issues have also manifested in the state apparatus. Most notably, Foreign Minister Qin Gang (秦刚) was removed in 2023, while in April 2025, Li Ganjie (李干杰), who had headed the Organization Department for just two years, switched jobs with the Director of the United Front Work Department Shi Taifeng (石泰峰). Li is a member of the so-called Tsinghua University Faction under Xi’s overall political umbrella and was considered a shoo-in for a politburo standing committee slot at the 21st Party Congress. His transfer from the Organization Department—which controls personnel and staffing for the entire CCP—could entail a further diminution of Xi’s power over hiring and firing within the party bureaucracy (SCMP, April 2, Lianhe Zaobao, April 2). Although this was framed as a lateral transfer, in practical terms this constitutes a demotion for Li.

It is difficult to estimate the duration of this murky situation with the CCP’s elite politics. Despite Xi’s apparent loss of authority, no rival or contender is in sight to replace him as supreme leader among four sets of challengers, who include the military, princelings, retired elders, and parts of the dissenting middle and entrepreneurial classes. Within the PLA, the second-ranked officer General Zhang Youxia (张又侠) seems to have arrogated to himself significant power over personnel and policy. But, at nearly 75 years old, he likely does not have either the ambition or the wherewithal to extend his grip beyond the military arena. Most of the fellow princelings who could eclipse Xi, such as the retired generals Liu Yuan (刘源), son of the PRC’s first state president Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇), and Liu Yazhou (刘亚洲), the liberal son-in-law of former president Li Xiannian (李先念), have long been elbowed aside by Xi (BackChina.com, November 26, 2024; China Brief, January 14).

[SSridhar]

Chinese Emperor consorts wielded enormous power with wisdom

That’s true of the Mongol Yuan dynasty that ruled China as well.

[ramana]

Foreign Minister Wang Yi uses metaphor of elephant and dragon dance

China seems to be vary of the Metaphor Tiger and Dragon. Elephant is seen more as harmless giant and slow compared to the Tiger that is aggressive and ferocious and take no nonsense. Tiger being the National Animal and Lion being in the national symbol are hidden deliberately. Every nitty gritty things are part of psy ops. Few articles comparing India to Elephant and Indians themselves start using it rather than Tiger and Lion against the Dragon.
Take for Instance the term "Land of Gandhi" is especially Western Journals instead of Land of "Gautama Buddha". When using that term it brings great significance to the nation being the birth place of Buddhism. So usually our history is limited to Gandhi and mindsets sees a nation that is just independent compared to the 2000 years of legacy when using Buddha. Our leaders fall for this trap too and every time, they go abroad its statue of Gandhi and not Gautama Buddha or sages at that time. Can only hope this changes and reclaim our legacy and history especially our leaders be told from now on to start respecting statue of Gautama Buddha in foreign countries.

The dragon in Chinese parlance is a protector. The first Shan Dynasty claimed descent from the mythical dragon. Yellow robes were for royalty.
Qin Huang Di, the first emperor title translates to Qin Yellow Emperor.
Elephant is a stately royal symbol.

Tiger is a predator.

[VinodTK]

Donald Trump 1, Xi Jinping 0? China 'evaluating' US offer to talk tariffs

It has taken almost 100 days. In fact, it has taken nearly seven years, but US President Donald Trump may have finally landed a body blow in his long-running trade confrontation with Chinese President Xi Jinping. This week, a subtle but unmistakable signal emerged from Beijing: China is "evaluating" overtures from the US to begin trade negotiations. It’s the first time Chinese officials have publicly acknowledged Washington’s request to talk tariffs since Trump hiked duties to historic levels—145% on some
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[Hriday]

https://x.com/dwarkesh_sp/status/192784 ... b5APQ&s=19

I asked one of the leading scholars on China's political system, Victor Shih (@vshih2), how likely is it that China invades Taiwan this decade:

"Clearly [Xi's] desire to achieve [reunification] is not so strong that he would take a very risky gamble.

Because if that were the case, he would have done it already.

He's been in power for 12 years.

From his other policymaking we know that he's not a reckless policymaker."

I pushed back, and asked whether Zero-COVID indicates that Xi is in fact recklessness. Perhaps the reason Xi hasn't done it yet is that he wants to consolidate the self-sufficiency he's been pursuing over recent years.

Full episode out tomorrow.

See the 1.30 hour video in the below link. Topic with timestamps given in the below post.

https://x.com/dwarkesh_sp/status/192812 ... RG8ug&s=19

China expert Victor Shih @vshih2 breaks down how the party-state works

00:00:00 – How the Politburo makes decisions
00:21:54 – Xi’s right hand man in charge of AGI/DeepSeek
00:46:22 – Local government debt crisis
00:50:47 – BYD, CATL, & financial repression
01:11:33 – Taiwan invasion probability
01:19:43 – Succession after Xi
01:25:57 – Future growth forecasts

Up on YouTube, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, etc. Enjoy!

[Anujan]

They are building the world's largest underground military control center

https://www.newsweek.com/china-beijing- ... os-2026545

And building barges for beach landing of mechanized forces

https://www.twz.com/sea/our-best-look-y ... ion-barges

All indications show that president 11 wants China to be the world's pre-eminent power (and not merely satisfied with good standard of living for its citizens, which is what countries like India want for herself). President 11 cannot do that by being bottled up, without free access to world's oceans. Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines etc are in the way

[williams]

They are building the world's largest underground military control center

https://www.newsweek.com/china-beijing- ... os-2026545

And building barges for beach landing of mechanized forces

https://www.twz.com/sea/our-best-look-y ... ion-barges

All indications show that president 11 wants China to be the world's pre-eminent power (and not merely satisfied with good standard of living for its citizens, which is what countries like India want for herself). President 11 cannot do that by being bottled up, without free access to world's oceans. Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines etc are in the way

You cannot survive as an omnipotent dictator by just providing good standard of living. Also I am not sure what is this obsession with the Chinese to build barges (and building underground bunkers ). I remember reading some strategy document 20 years back on the same idea of building barges for beach landing.