somnath wrote:VP Menon mentions 26th and 27th in the same breath in at least a couple of places (cant remember the exact pages, will dig out)...A number of other accounts contest the 26th date more definitively with reasonable credibility..The point on the weather on the 26th, and therefore the inability for Menon to reach Jammu in the morning of the 26th (as also HAri Singh) is a well documented fact...The "neutral consensus" seems to be that the agreement was actually signed on the 27th morning, by which time troops were already at least in flight, if not landed in Srinagar. Among other sources, Peter Lyon's Conflict between India and Pakistan (page 97 - seems there is a copy in Google Books!)...
It is well documented that on 25th, Hari Singh had sent his Deputy PM with the Instrument of Accession to Nehru. Nehru did not accept that. VP Menon took the letter with him on 25th evening to Srinagar and brought it back on 26th morning. This was presented to the Defence Committee. I will again say, that FM Manekshaw whose integrity is too well known, has categorically stated that he was present at the meeting when the Instrument of Accession was presented to the Cabinet and discussed. I do not want to believe Peter Lyon or Alistair Lamb because they were simply not there but Manekshaw flew with VP Menon, was there at Srinagar as well as at New Delhi physically attending the Defence Committee meeting when all this happened. After all, those English authors could have had only second-hand information.
As for VP Menon not going to Jammu on 26th, it is true he did not go. He went to Palam around 4 PM but was turned back because it was already late in the evening and the weather at Jammu was not good. So, he flew in the next day morning by around 9 or 10 AM as Mehr Chand Mahajan, who was accompanying him from Delhi, could not come earlier than that. VP Menon was certainly carrying some papers with him. It could either have been a letter of acceptance from GoI to Hari Singh on the Instrument of Accession (which certainly was due to him) or some other paper which also needed the Maharaja's signature. In the fog of events, VP Menon might have missed the date but that is, at the most, a minor slip especially when the Defence Committee had seen the Instrument of Accession earlier that day and decided to accept it. One has to consider the enormous responsibility, travelling, discussions and meeting that VP Menon had to undertake during those days when telephones were not widely available and the transportation was rudimentary as he went about the task of gathering 360+ princely states into the Indian Union. Even while talking about the uselessness of hair-splitting, you are advancing the very same with these dates which exist in the imagination of Pakistanis and Pakistani-sponsored 'historians'.
Its interesting to see the data you posted...
8 Dakotas @ 1100 hours and 11 @ 1300 hours - so a total of 19 Dakotas from RIAF (given that the first flight couldnt have been turned around in 2 hours)...the official IAF account says that RIAF had only 7 Dakotas at that time!
I am sure that the Ministry of Defence, if it had wanted to lie about the airlift, would not have missed such a simple thing that even we can point out so easily. There are various accounts that all dakotas that landed at Delhi were commandeered for this purpose. The nomenclature of Civilian or RIAF could have been according to where they took off from or who piloted them etc. Kuldip Singh bajwa says in his book, "Jammu and Kashmir War -1947-48" that "28 sorties were flown on Oct 27 itself" though the RIAF could muster only 4 Dakota a/c immediately but all civilian a/c based at Delhi or landing there were taken over by RIAF with 'unstinted response from the airlines and the civilian crew'. He goes on to say that 'thirty Dakotas were soon gathered and 50 to 60 sorties were flown each day'. Mountbatten had said later that in all his extensive experience as Supreme Allied Commander in SE Asia during WW II, he had not seen an airlift of this magnitude being successfully undertaken with such slender resources, and at such short notice.
So we always knew that we had to to bring in troops into Kashmir, the Maharaja's signature was only a fig leaf - so what? We did it, thats what matters
somnath, no that's not accurate either. India had sent word to Maharajah Hari Singh that India wouldn't take it amiss if he decided to join Pakistan. So, it was not as though India was desperate to have J&K as part of India and devised such convoluted plans to get it. In fact, VP Menon says in his book that he was too involved with various other princely states that J&K was not in his mind at all until the situation developed there nastily.
My point is that whether we like it or not, India had been far more principled than most other nations, or how most other nations would have behaved if ever they were in such a situation, when it came to the unfortunate events surrounding the Partition.