Deterrence

[Austin]

^^^ ABM against Non Nuke state has good value , considering many have some or the other rudimentary to relatively sophisticated BM.

Remember the calming effect that Patriot had on the people during GW 1 , though Patriot then managed to do nothing but during the war most people believed that it destroyed the scud.

[Austin]

Takes you back to Cold War Era Mindset but an interesting documentary on Nuclear Deterrence.

First Strike ( youtube video )

Part-1
Part-2
Part-3
Part-4

[dinesha]

The Next Nuclear Arms Race
China and India are raising the stakes by modernizing and deploying more forces along their shared border.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... 38530.html

By TIM SULLIVAN AND
MICHAEL MAZZA
India and Pakistan are the two countries most likely to engage in nuclear war, or so goes the common wisdom. Yet if recent events are any indication, the world's most vigorous nuclear competition may well erupt between Asia's two giants: India and China.

Both countries already house significant and growing arsenals. China is estimated to have approximately 450 warheads; India, roughly 100. Though intensifying as of late, Sino-Indian nuclear competition has a long history: India's pursuit of a weapons program in the 1960s was triggered in part by China's initial nuclear tests, and the two have eyed one another's arsenals with mounting concern ever since. The competition intensified in 2007, when China began to upgrade missile facilities near Tibet, placing targets in northern India within range of its forces.
Yet the stakes have been raised yet again in recent months. Indian defense minister A.K. Antony announced last month that the military will soon incorporate into its arsenal a new intermediate-range missile, the Agni-III, which is capable of reaching all of China's major cities. Delhi is also reportedly considering redeploying survivable, medium-range Agni-IIs to its northeastern border. And just last month, India shifted a squadron of Su-30MKI fighters to a base just 150 kilometers from the disputed Sino-Indian border. An Indian Air Force official told Defense News these nuclear-armed planes could operate deep within China with midflight refueling.

For its part, China continues to enhance the quality, quantity and delivery systems of its nuclear forces. The Pentagon reported last month that the People's Liberation Army has replaced older, vulnerable ballistic missiles deployed in Western China with modern, survivable ones; this transition has taken place over the last four years. China's Hainan Island naval base houses new, nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and affords those boats easy access to the Indian Ocean. China's military is also developing a new, longer range submarine-launched ballistic missile which will allow its subs to strike targets throughout India from the secure confines of the South China Sea.

No single event has stoked this rise in tensions. China, already concerned about India's growing strength and its desire to play a greater role in Asia, is even less enthused about the burgeoning strategic partnership between Delhi and Washington. While Beijing has learned to live with American forces on its eastern periphery, the possibility of an intimate U.S.-India military relationship has generated fears of encirclement. The ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute, as well as India's position astride China's key maritime shipping lanes, has made the prospect of a Washington-Delhi axis appear particularly troubling.

India likewise feels encircled by China's so-called "string of pearls"—a series of Chinese-built, ostensibly commercial port facilities in the Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Beijing's military ties to Pakistan, interference in the Kashmir dispute and references to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state, as "Southern Tibet" have done little to reassure New Delhi of Chinese intentions. The rapid growth of China's conventional military might in recent years—between 2000 and 2009, China's military spending more than tripled—and the lack of clarity as to its intentions, has spurred India to pursue its own military modernization.

These shifts in India's and China's nuclear force postures thus represent only the latest and most serious efforts to constrain and convey dissatisfaction with the other's perceived regional ambitions. But they are more troubling than conventional redeployments.

First, these developments suggest that neither country has confidence in the other's "no first use" policy. India has good reason for concern: The number of missions attributed to China's deterrent—responding to nuclear attacks, deterring conventional attacks against nuclear assets, providing Beijing freedom from nuclear coercion and otherwise "reinforcing China's great power status"—were enough to make the authors of the Pentagon's annual report on China's military power last year question the country's commitment to its "no first use" policy. India, for its part, relies on its nuclear forces to offset gaps and imbalances between its conventional military capabilities and those of China.

Second, there is a point at which efforts to enhance deterrence can foster an arms race. Any attempt on the part of China to increase its own defenses necessarily weakens, or is perceived to weaken, the security of India, thus spurring further defense build-ups; the opposite is true as well. Shifts in nuclear force posture can be particularly disruptive, and have been known to precipitate crises. Upon the discovery of Soviet efforts to deploy missiles to Cuba in 1962, for example, the U.S. responded militarily with a naval "quarantine" of the island, bringing Washington and Moscow as close as they have ever come to a nuclear war.

Finally, the redeployments of India's and China's nuclear forces suggest that there is deep-seated and growing discord between the two Asian giants. This is troubling news for a region whose future peace and prosperity depends heavily on continued comity between Delhi and Beijing. It is only a matter of time before the China-India military competition begins to affect neighboring states. China's nuclear force modernization, for instance, stands to threaten not only India, but also Korea, Japan and other U.S. partners in Asia. A dramatic defense buildup in India, meanwhile, will no doubt leave Pakistan feeling less secure.

Tensions are unlikely to ease any time soon. The two countries appear much closer to the brink of an all-out arms race than they do to any resolution of their differences. While each profits from the other's economic growth, it is that very growth—which finances military modernization and which is so dependent on potentially vulnerable overseas trade—that creates the conditions for heightened insecurity.

Mr. Sullivan is research fellow and program manager at the American Enterprise Institute's Center for Defense Studies. Mr. Mazza is a senior research associate at AEI.

[dinesha]

That US and Chinese government has discounted Pakistan as any match against war fighting capabilities of India. Having it’s protégée unable to match the might of India and The “two front war doctrine” adopted by forces in India, China had to adopt more offensive posture both diplomatically and militarily in order to tie down and bog down India. This so called assertiveness of China has rang alarm bells in India resulting in India’s deployment of MKI, Agni-II, better roads, raising new Mountain Divs, and operationaisation of forward air bases. All these events had opposite effect of what China wanted and Instead the simmering tension between China and India has come to forefront in the eyes of Media and Think Tank (Pentagon and State Deptt. controlled).
At least all brings in forefront India’s real concern and threats and has led to end of zero sum game between India and TSP.

This could also be Saviour Uncle’s justifications for whole hog participation in Defence and High tech business and R&D(?)

[ramana]

The number of missions attributed to China's deterrent—responding to nuclear attacks, deterring conventional attacks against nuclear assets, providing Beijing freedom from nuclear coercion and otherwise "reinforcing China's great power status"—were enough to make the authors of the Pentagon's annual report on China's military power last year question the country's commitment to its "no first use" policy. India, for its part, relies on its nuclear forces to offset gaps and imbalances between its conventional military capabilities and those of China.

So many caveats! Sounds like Hiranya Kashyap's boons!

[Vril]

i think its been a little offtrack with nuclear exchange ityadi.if things go nuclear there is no deterrence left,no?

With all neighbours nuclear, it will again be the conventional capabilities which will be the Deterrence along with messages through media of the disproportionate retaliation. The example of US's plan B to bomb pakistan back to profit al 20 percenti's age is a case in point.through these leaks, US has sent a clear message (may be they have intelligence on impending attack??)to napaks what awaits them if they do another 9/11.That is deterrence.

I assume China and India, if engaged in war, would like to keep it conventional till it can be. Pakistan is like Bhasmasur, who had the boon of burning to ash anyone on whom he kept his hands ( nook bums). Pakmasur keeps on brandishing this Hand to threaten and inflict pain through its terror networks.only thing we have to dance him into putting his hand on his head. and that's through baluchistan, pakhtoonistan, baltistan and any other stan.

In Indian context too deterrence will work by raising issues through media which hurt both pandas and napaks which have been discussed previously.

[shiv]

Gradually it appears to me that India is moving towards a doctrine that build up ABM and Anti-Missile defences while not going public on massive increases of nuclear arsenal. The reason appears to be that the "established nuclear states" (P5) are getting more and more takleef with the increased number of nuke weapon states because ultimately their own security is threatened by proliferation. The "new NPT" will be fewer nukes in fewer countries with ABM defences to neutralise and reduce the threat of bit players in the nuclear game.

Just my guess:

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4788979

Indian Defence Ministry sources said the weapons under discussion will include anti-ballistic missile systems and the sale of C-17 transport aircraft.

India plans to procure the David's Sling and Iron Dome missile defense systems. David's Sling is a joint effort between Rafael of Israel and Raytheon of the United States. New Delhi, which has already discussed the program with Israel, also needs to gets clearance from Washington because it is a joint Israel-U.S. program.

The Indian military wants David's Sling and Iron Dome to protect against cruise missiles. The Indian Air Force favors David's Sling because it is an effective hit-to-kill interceptor against short-range ballistic missiles, rockets and cruise missiles.

[Vril]

iPhone4 shows Arunachal Pradesh in China

China has got Apple to rig the mapping application in its iPhone4 to show Arunachal Pradesh as part of its territory, according to local media reports. Apple has apparently accepted Beijing's diktat in view of its vast market potential

Deterrence doesnt seem to be working against pandas too.what next?


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 652918.cms

[shiv]

iPhone4 shows Arunachal Pradesh in China

China has got Apple to rig the mapping application in its iPhone4 to show Arunachal Pradesh as part of its territory, according to local media reports. Apple has apparently accepted Beijing's diktat in view of its vast market potential

Deterrence doesnt seem to be working against pandas too.what next?


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 652918.cms

What do you mean by deterrence? What, in your view is deterrence?

[Vril]

^^ such frequent news of integrity of our country being challenged (Kashmir & Arunachal)is definitely a sign of failure of deterrence,whatever that is.

[Pratyush]

^^^ Nothing to with diterrance. Can be taken care off by "educating" the service provider.

[Vril]

^^ its not about edjaculation of provider, which in case is Apple Unkill.its about not caring about a billion plus people and their sovereignty under panda pressure. deterrence has collapsed,if it ever existed.

[shiv]

^^ such frequent news of integrity of our country being challenged (Kashmir & Arunachal)is definitely a sign of failure of deterrence,whatever that is.

You don't know what deterrence is, but you know it has failed? I believe that your posts are off topic for this thread because you do not seem to know anything about the subject but are using this thread as nukkad. Please find an appropriate thread and please stop inviting people to open this thread with meaningless posts that have nothing to do with deterrence.

No offence intended. This is a request.

The thread is about nuclear deterrence.

[Austin]

Coming back to the topic of Deterrence and the whole concept of 2nd strike.

We know that the whole idea of 2nd strike or the jest of it is you do not strike first assuring your potential adversary that your strike will only be if he strikes first , absorb the strike and then retaliate in a devastating manner , which is to say you have enough strike platform , delivery vehical and C&C , Human factor operational post strike.

Now the only problem i see with 2nd strike is we are assuming after the first strike we did not loose all the launch platform warhead and most critically Command and Control system and Human Impact.

How do we really know that Command and Control will actually work after a Nuclear Strike , chances are the Blast Impact and EMP effect will give all the Electronics and RF communication a body blow and make it unoperative.

No body has experienced such strike before to prove their C&C will remain operational , I am sure there may be some studies done but these are just at best some theory and lab proven stuff.

So will 2nd strike work for real even partially or LOW is a better approach ?

[RajeshA]

Wouldn't the Arihant platform be suitable for a 2nd strike capability?

[Austin]

Wouldn't the Arihant platform be suitable for a 2nd strike capability?

Wouldnt Arihant remain vulnerable to SSN , ASW platform ?

[Kanson]

Coming back to the topic of Deterrence and the whole concept of 2nd strike.

We know that the whole idea of 2nd strike or the jest of it is you do not strike first assuring your potential adversary that your strike will only be if he strikes first , absorb the strike and then retaliate in a devastating manner , which is to say you have enough strike platform , delivery vehical and C&C , Human factor operational post strike.

Now the only problem i see with 2nd strike is we are assuming after the first strike we did not loose all the launch platform warhead and most critically Command and Control system and Human Impact.

How do we really know that Command and Control will actually work after a Nuclear Strike , chances are the Blast Impact and EMP effect will give all the Electronics and RF communication a body blow and make it unoperative.

No body has experienced such strike before to prove their C&C will remain operational , I am sure there may be some studies done but these are just at best some theory and lab proven stuff.

So will 2nd strike work for real even partially or LOW is a better approach ?

I guess you must be knowing Russian's Dead Hand C&C for the 2nd strike.

[Pratyush]

Ragesh,

I am not too confident of Arihant as a second strike platform. Due to the relatively short range of its primary weapon, currently published as 700 kms. For it to be effective I feel that the range needs to be 5000 Kms + as that should give it sufficient freedom to manuver in the open ocean.

Would like to see the shape of the ATV 2/3 repoted under construction at the SBC. The early reports were suggesting that they will be larger boats.

Also, is their a plan to create a looking glass type system for C&C for the sub fleet. Unless we are able to implement and demonstrate that we have the necessary C&C to diliver a second strike, our deterrance will always be questioned by our adversaries.


JMT.

[Austin]

I guess you must be knowing Russian's Dead Hand C&C for the 2nd strike.

Kanson indeed and I have David Hoffman book Dead Hand which throws more light on the topic.

The problem is Dead Hand may or may not work after a catastrophic nuclear strike they have not tested those system in a environment that can realistically judge its capability.

DH was designed to calm their nerves so they do not take a wrong decision due to lack of time or bad judgment.

That is the reason both US and Russia maintains a First Strike policy any positive identification of massive strike will be detected by EW systems and their system will go on LOW mode.

No body is certain if their existing C&C will work post such massive strike and its fall out and hence its a case of Use it or Loose it.

Second strike policy can cool nerves but cannot guarantee it will work.

[NRao]

Breaking News: Pakistan, China irritants for India: Army chief

"We should have a great amount of conventional capability to function in a conventional conflagration and yet be prepared to function in a nuclear backdrop," he said.

[ramana]

^^^ Yeah thats raising the threshold for nuclear intervention. I wrote about in my BRM article ten years ago in "Quo Vadis?"

[Amber G.]

OT but I think some here will find this x-post interesting. It is a play about the famous meeting between Heisenberg and Bohr in 1941. (Some say, Heisenberg wanted to tell Bohr that he (Heisenberg) would make sure that Hitler will not have an atom bomb and was asking Bohr to do same with US)..

Shivji, Ramana and others, if you have not read it, you may enjoy it. (Quite a bit of philosophical discussion about the theme of this thread)

X-post ..

This could probably also go in nukkad thread, but I recently read "Copenhagen" (Play by Michael Fray) and liked it very much. It is based around the famous meeting in Copenhagen in 1941, between the physicists Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. Though play is old, it was the first time I read it. Highly recommend it (its less than 100 pages).

[shiv]

^^ Amber G - no link in your post...

[shiv]

Imagine as a thought experiment that war erupts between NoKo and SoKo, and NoKo drops a 3 kiloton nuke on Seoul. 3 kt would probably kill 10,000 in one go and put Seoul out of action for a couple of months.

What would that do for deterrence?

First off "deterrence" would be dead. NoKo is obviously not deterred by the threat of US nukes being used on behalf of SoKo. The question is what would that act do to the US?

Would the US use nukes in retaliation or not?

I would appreciate thoughts from others who might be interested. I will post some of my own thoughts later.

[Pratyush]

Shiv,

Thought provoking question.

The simplest answere will be that the Khans will nuke the north into obvilion. But international relations are never that simple.

The US will be most likely be stoped by the South from nuking the North. As the south will say that they are our own country men and they should not be punished for the actions of the Regime.

This presents the US / South with a cunundrum. They can conventionly try to bring the north down. That in turn raises the risk of PRC entering the conflict on the North's side to stave off its collapse. If that happnes. It will result in a returen to status quo. With a nuked Seol and approx 50000 dead / wounded Southerners.

Or the PRC in return for unspecified concessions from the Khans stays nutural and allows the North's regime to be brought down and assimilated into the south. It will secure the Korean penensula for the neaxt 30 years atleast. As far as the PRC is concerned.

We are in for Interesting times if any of the above happnes. But deterrance will be dead.

JMT

[SSridhar]

First off "deterrence" would be dead. NoKo is obviously not deterred by the threat of US nukes being used on behalf of SoKo. The question is what would that act do to the US?

Would the US use nukes in retaliation or not?

South Korea does not have a ANZUS like treaty with the US for nuclear umbrella and so the US cannot justify using nukes on behalf of S. Korea. S. Korea does not possess nukes. The North Korean deterrence, if at all, is therefore not because of these two factors. The only deterrence that is acting is China, notwithstanding PRC's denial that DPRK does not always listen to them. That could be true in minor matters but in the case of dropping a nuke on S. Korea, DPRK cannot act without China's consent. The latest WikiLeaks confirms how DPRK & PRC collude in proliferation. In a paradoxical way, it is the consistent Chinese support for DPRK that deters.

[negi]

Austin that is why the P5s maintain a sizable SSBN fleet, of all the delivery platforms out there modern nuclear submarines continue to remain an evasive species and have a high chance of survival even during a nuclear war.

[shiv]

South Korea does not have a ANZUS like treaty with the US for nuclear umbrella and so the US cannot justify using nukes on behalf of S. Korea.

Interesting point. So the conclusion here is that even if NoKo uses a nuke the US will not be obliged to use nukes. In other words the US will remain deterred from using nukes even after deterrence has failed as far as NoKo is concerned.

To me, that begs the question - "What will allies of the US who do not have a nuclear umbrella feel about their alliance with the US?" It strikes me that the first thing that would occur to many in such countries is that it is all very well to be allied with the US but the US will not help you against a nuclear attack.

Several answers would occur to me if I were a citizen of a nation allied with te US but lacking a nuclear umbrella
1) When it comes to nuclear war, you need to have your own nukes and have your own deterrence paradigms because the US ain't gonna help ya.
2) The United Nations security council, that was supposed to set up to increase global security and decrease this sort of destabilizing event has members who are complicit in actually provoking such a conflict rather than reducing chances of such conflict.

OK - if SoKo gets nuked you can be sure there will be several rounds of blahblahblah in N York in the UN building. Could it ever be conceivably possible that the "Security Council" would agree and send a "joint force" to nuke the NoKo leadership into submission? With China supporting NoKo - one can expect a Chinese veto making the UNSC powerless.

Now what sort of signal would that send to nations who see this happening? They will see that the Chinese will support and protect their allies. The Chinese have supported NoKo's nuclear program and the Chinese are preventing a nuke attack on Korea.

Allowing NoKo to attack SoKo with a nuke without adequate retaliation to take NoKo down would be a landmark event signalling the end of the US as a major player in East Asia. It would also signal the breakdown of deterrence and the erosion of western sponsored deals like NPT.

[SSridhar]

Shiv, you have raised many interesting points for discussion.

>>In other words the US will remain deterred from using nukes even after deterrence has failed as far as NoKo is concerned.

Deterrence between two nations has different thresholds at each nation's end. If it were purely deterrence between ROK & DPRK, the threshold levels at which it breaks may be lower and yet different between them. However, that is not the case here. ROK is transferring the deterrence to the US because it simply does not possess nuclear weapons. It essentially begs the question how deterrence will work between DPRK and the US. Now, DPRK has a reckless and irrational leadership that simply does not care for its people, just like TSP, and its threshold for provocation is low. The US may not be able to take the same stance due to multiple reasons, two of which are that the Chinese may get involved if DPRK is nuked leading to a wider conflagration and an economically emancipated US cannot afford to open yet another front thereby not only jeopardizing its own economy but also the entire world. DPRK has no such worries and will happily nuke ROK. The US may be deterred from using nukes against DPRK but it will support a massive conventional retaliation by ROK without committing its troops but extending all other forms of support to ROK. That is the likeliest scenario. There are windows, therefore, where a country can use nukes and not be retaliated in the same fashion and yet get destroyed conventionally.

>>. . . it is all very well to be allied with the US but the US will not help you against a nuclear attack.

Isn't that the reason that there is a special 'nuclear umbrella treaty' in the first place ? There could also be limits to how far the US will risk itself by carrying out a nuclear exchange on behalf of its client even when such a treaty exists. The client may use American assets to bluff deterrence (by allowing American nuke-carrying warships to be berthed in their ports etc.), the client may get early warning, intel sharing etc.; whether the US will actually fire a nuke in retaliation may depend upon other exigencies.

>>When it comes to nuclear war, you need to have your own nukes and have your own deterrence paradigms

That is absolutely the truth.

>>The United Nations security council, that was supposed to set up to increase global security and decrease this sort of destabilizing event has members who are complicit in actually provoking such a conflict rather than reducing chances of such conflict.

Very true. Two prominent members are PRC & USA, FSU having died a natural death.

>>Could it ever be conceivably possible that the "Security Council" would agree and send a "joint force" to nuke the NoKo leadership into submission? With China supporting NoKo - one can expect a Chinese veto making the UNSC powerless.

I doubt if UNSC will ever authorize 'nuking' another country.

>>It would also signal the breakdown of deterrence and the erosion of western sponsored deals like NPT.

The Chinese are assiduously working on this new world order.

[ShauryaT]

Allowing NoKo to attack SoKo with a nuke without adequate retaliation to take NoKo down would be a landmark event signalling the end of the US as a major player in East Asia. It would also signal the breakdown of deterrence and the erosion of western sponsored deals like NPT.

It is the PRC that will "allow" DPRK to attack RoK.

A nuclear attack on ROK, assuming PRC allows DPRK to execute such a thing, will result in a three pronged attack on DPRK, using conventional means, by ROK, Japan and the US/Allies. It will mean not the end of the US as a major player, but an arrest on Chinese influence and power in North East Asia as DPRK will cease to exist. The new Korea will be in indebted to the US for a long time to come, will erase the bitterness the Koreans had for the Japanese. Japan's faith in the US would be reaffirmed. PRC will loose its dog in the region and loose strategic space to the US.

PRC will be in no mood to sacrifice its well earned monies or waste 300,000+ people this time around, unlike the 50's to save DPRK from certain route. PRC does not stand to gain much. PRC's best bet is not in having a war between DPRK and ROK, but a merger of the two, in a manner that reduces, US influence in the Korean peninsula.

Added: The only chance that DPRK will have is to mount a guerrilla campaign against the invading forces, but that assumes the support and/or subjugation of the local population, which is unlikely. So, certain route of DPRK will be the outcome, leading to the diminution of strategic space for PRC.

[shiv]

There is a little complication in the idea that China controls NoKos nuclear arsenal. Imagine that SoKo is actually nuked by NoKo. Are the people of South Korea to assume that they have been nuked by a member of the UNSC?

Is the US to assume that it is China, and not NoKo that has actually ruptured global deterrence that has held since August 9th 1945?

As long as no nuclear attack actually takes place it is easy to assume without proof that China retains control of NoKo nukes. But the minute a nuke is used the question assumes a shape that has completely different implications for the world.

Let me leave out SoKo thinking on the issue. SoKo is a non nuclear pipsqueak. Let me look at how the US is to see the issue: The US can choose to see the nuke attack on SoKo in one of two ways (if we read their diplomatic cables )

1) The attack was planned and executed by NoKo alone and China is not involved
2) The Chinese have a direct hand in the attack

What the US and other countries of the world make of this situation will actually dictate the future of deterrence.

If the Chinese originated the attack - they are unlikely to admit that. They will deny that they had anything to do with the attack. Now if the Chinese planned the attack but deny it - and I were the US I could react in several ways.
1) I would expect China to toe the line in the UNSC to take a hard line on NoKo and assist in bringing the NoKo regime to a quick end.
2) China, being innocent of the attack should really have little objection to the use of low yield pinpoint delivered nukes to completely destroy all of NoKo's nuclear infrastructure and the HQ of its regime and military.
3) Any serious Chinese objections can be seen as Chinese complicity indicating a rethink of how states like Japan and even far away germany should view China and their own nuclear capability.

All this assumes that the US leadership is strong.

If the US leadership is weak they will be more likely to hide behind the hijab that says that they should not get involved and that endless jaw-jaw at the UN may solve the issue.

The lessons for Germany and Japan should be very clear either way. India is out of this. Our situation made us "sensible" ages ago. OK we may haggle over numbers and yield and rigidity of spine - but nobody is calculating on the absence of nukes in Indian hands. Unlike SoKo.

But rigidity of US spine is going to be tested.

[negi]

^ Boss you are evaluating from an Indian pov , in case NoKo pulls the trigger it will be game over as far as NoKo is concerned for the entire international community which has until now been watching the tamsaha from the sidelines will no longer be chanting peace depending on the kind of damage which NoKo will inflict it will be bombed back to stone age just like IRAQ and Afghanistan imho we also tend to read too much into PRC's role here i.e. it will veto the US intentions of a military intervention only until NoKo plays shoot and scoot the moment NoKo pushes the N button PRC will have no excuse to take NoKo's side if it was as assertive as it is being made out here it would have taken Paki side during 65,71 or even Kargil. In fact if need be Unkil might summon PRC leadership behind a closed door and cut a deal on how to fix the NoKo and both will become harbingers of world peace it's a win win for both. Having said that if PRC is indeed in complete control of NoKo regime then I guess we can rule out a nuclear strike from NoKo the lizard ain't as foolish as our neighbor on the NW .

As I see it PRC is using NoKo to keep the SoKo and in some ways even Japan in control very much on the lines of Unkil using rent boy TSP against India.

[shiv]

Having said that if PRC is indeed in complete control of NoKo regime then I guess we can rule out a nuclear strike from NoKo the lizard ain't as foolish as our neighbor on the NW .

This is exactly the point.

IF NoKo is under Chinese control they are unlikely to sponsor a nuke attack.

But the North Koreans may not be totally stupid (only half stupid). Having got nuke tech via China it suits them to have China covering their asses. It suits them to pretend to play the dog to China's leash and pretend that they are under Chinese control. As long as they are seen "listening to reason" from China it suits the North Koreans to threaten nuclear war and ultimately be seen taking public orders from China - passing the responsibility of N.Korean actions to China. They threaten war, escalate and when the US or someone begs China to act, China acts and the North Koreans comply - only because China asked. So the appearance of being under Chinese control suits the North Koreans even if they are independent. In a way - they have China by the balls and that can be played by N.Korea.

Once China dances to the NoKo escalation-de-escalation game it can be used with Japan and other nations. So China in a sense can be played by NoKo just like Pakistan plays the US. We are only assuming Chinese control of NoKo. In fact NoKo may be modifying Chinese actions and getting China involved by a calculated escalation game. What can China do about tail wagging dog? Nothing as far as I can tell. It could be an assumption that US controls Pakistan or China controls NoKo.

[ShauryaT]

The term "control" is relative not absolute.

We need to revisit your original question. Your scenario is very quick and does not give enough context. Most presume that in the course of a conflict, DPRK just decides to lob a nuclear device and hence deterrence breaks down.

Mad men with authority are mad, till their survival is at stake, at which point they become completely logical and reasonable. Meaning, until the cost of being mad is borne by someone else, they have no qualms being mad.

In the context of DPRK and RoK, a nuclear device would be the quickest way to end the DPRK regime and Kim Jong-il would know this. His interest is in preservation of the regime and his fiefdom. DPRK would confront RoK, for it is the basis of his state, in that it is not RoK. Kim Jong-il would have to do so, without losing the escalation control matrix, for at a certain point, either conventional and certainly nuclear, it would draw the US into the mix. As long as the US is not in the mix, PRC core interests are not affected by skirmishes and blood baths between the Koreans. PRC would ensure that both conventional and certainly nuclear thresholds are maintained by DPRK, for it is in no mood to engage the US in the 50's style. This may be an opportunity for the US to call PRC and DPRK's bluff for PRC is probably unwilling to put a lot of stake on the ground, but that is another matter.

So, deterrence between DPRK and RoK is maintained, until someone decides to call someone's bluff. It is either the US bluffing that it will protect RoK or PRC's protection of DPRK is bluff. If both are not bluffing then we get the third world war. The US has close to 30,000 troops on the Korean border.

[KLNMurthy]

We have to take into account the psychology of nations who are players here. Basically that is the east asian countries (incl. Russia), US, plus India if she has the courage and vision to enter the fray.

NoKo and Pakistan are China's "non-state actors". And we know that
1. once you unleash non-state actors, it is hard to control them, and prevent them from defining and pursuing their own agenda.
2. The unleasher of the non-state actors always believes, despite evidence to the contrary, that it can, at a pinch, control said NSAs.

Both NoKo and TSP are after:
1. free money for the military / oligarchy
2a. constant pandering to their H&D
2b. constant assuaging of their natural insecurity which comes from being a nonproducing country pitted against a producing sibling or cousin country; because they have no motivation or culture to transform themselves into a producing country, they can only cry for diminution of the producing sibling or cousin.

So, it is quite possible that if SoKo stops being submissive and giving money to NoKo, latter will get stressed to the point that it will launch nukes, since it would view an assertive SoKo as an existential threat. At the point of launching they may or may not feel that they are signing their own death warrant by doing so, because
1. cultures like NoKo or TSP are less horrified than normal cultures by the prospect of mass destruction
2. more importantly, their mindset, bent on posturing and aggressiveness, is such that they would see a launch as a reasonable gamble.

China shares (or at least shared in Mao's time) some of the mentality that a a nuclear war is an acceptable option. Even if they don't believe that any more (there is no evidence that this belief has changed), all their policy is based on the delusion that they can always control NoKo which is not the case. So, that means, to a large extent, they would have no set plan for how they will respond to the scenario where NoKo will nuke SoKo. So, rather than a set-piece quantifiable (in terms of probabilities) series of moves taking place post-nuke attack by NoKo, we will see a chaotic, open-ended crisis period where a number of possibilities can randomly occur, all bets being off. Most likely not much will happen initially from Russia, since it is not directly affected.

In a situation like that, if a party (say the US or India) manages to work out its own plans in advance, and develops the will to carry them out, and is able to communicate very clearly to the other parties, principally China, those plans and that will, then that party is likely to have the best chance to minimize destruction and possibly come out ahead of the game.

[ramana]

X-post from Arihant thread....

Ramana wrote:

Thanks guys. Its a big change. Also means a lot of cobwebs have been cleared up. And means the Nofoo is more aggressive than PRC.
Wonder what happened and why NPA mullahs didn't have a stroke?

NSA advocates use of force to deter adversaries

Gautam DattExpress News Service

First Published : 22 Oct 2010

NEW DELHI: Turning defensive posturing of India's security policy upside down, National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon advocated that use of force must be embedded in the statecraft to deter adversaries in a scenario where a limited war under nuclear cloud was a possibility.


Menon shared his views at 50th anniversary celebrations of National Defence College, country's premier strategic institute, where he was asked to speak on 'The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs'. "The balance is shifting between force and the other instruments of statecraft. We, therefore, need to develop a new and different statecraft," he said elaborating how emerging challenges need new security architecture.

"What India seeks is a new architecture - an open, balanced and inclusive architecture to correspond to the new situation that is emerging," he said.

The National Security Adviser felt that traditional concepts of deterrence were irrelevant in today's technology driven world where lines between conventional and nonconventional warfare had blurred.

He said India's strategic positioning had always been defensive and cited a number of indicators of this policy. The defence budget has remained within three percent in last 60 years, use of force has been limited in internal situations barring Nagaland and Jammu and Kashmir and the army was used only for defensive purposes even during the conflicts, he said. The troops were sent to foreign soils only under UN flag, except in Bangladesh and the Maldives, where it was done in response to a request and India has never retained territory taken by force in the wars and even areas held during 1965 and 1971 conflicts were returned to Pakistan.

Country's nuclear policy - with emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against nonnuclear weapon states and direct linkages to nuclear disarmament - was only an extension of defence security strategy, he said. "It also seems from recent experience that the utility of force, as traditionally configured and conceived, is of limited value in protecting a society or achieving some policy goals. But one can hardly jump to conclusions about the futility of force when limited war under nuclear conditions remains possible, and when adversaries need to be deterred. This debate will continue," he said.

Full text of his speech from MEA website....

Speech by NSA Shri Shivshankar Menon at NDC on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs”
October 21, 2010

Rashtrapathiji,
Your Majesty, the King of Bhutan,
Raksha Mantri,
Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force,
Lt-Gen. Prakash Menon, Commandant NDC,
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen.

I am deeply honoured to have been asked to deliver the keynote address before the seminar on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs” to celebrate the golden jubilee of this prestigious institution. The NDC has made outstanding contributions to the spread of strategic thought and the integration of civil and military thinking in India. You have today assembled a galaxy of experts and authorities to discuss this important question. We await your deliberations with great expectations.

Rather than trying to anticipate what your seminar will throw up, I thought I would look at two issues that you will probably consider in much more detail. Is there in an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? And, how have recent changes in the world and strategic affairs affected the role of force in today’s world?

Is there an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? This is not a question that one normally expects to ask about a power that is a declared nuclear weapon state with the world’s second largest standing army. But India achieved independence in a unique manner; through a freedom movement dedicated to truth and non-violence, and has displayed both ambiguity and opposition to classical power politics. In the circumstances posing the question is understandable and legitimate.

To answer the question let us look at traditional Indian attitudes to force and the lessons India draws from its own history, and at Indian practice since independence in 1947.

Attitudes to Force and Lessons from History

While India may have achieved independence after a non-violent struggle, it was a struggle that Gandhiji described as non-violence of the strong.

As far back as 1928 Gandhiji wrote, “If there was a national government, whilst I should not take any direct part in any war, I can conceive of occasions when it would be my duty to vote for the military training of those who wish to take it.... It is not possible to make a person or society non-violent by compulsion.”

During the Partition riots at his prayer meeting on 26 September 1947 Gandhiji said that he had always been an opponent of all warfare, but that if there was no other way of securing justice war would be the only alternative left to the government.

Faced with the tribal raiders sent by Pakistan into Kashmir in October 1947, Gandhiji said that it was right for the Union Government to save the fair city by rushing troops to Srinagar. He added that he would rather that the defenders be wiped out to the last man in clearing Kashmir’s soil of the raiders rather than submit.


In saying so, Gandhiji was entirely in keeping with a long Indian tradition which has regarded the use of force as legitimate in certain circumstances, namely, if there is no alternative way of securing justice. This is in essence a doctrine for the defensive use of force, when all other avenues are exhausted.

Our two greatest epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana are about wars, and treat rivalries as natural and normal. And the two classical expositions on the use of force, the Geeta and Bhishma’s death bed lecture on statecraft in the Mahabharata’s Shantiparva are extended explanations of a unique point of view.

The clearest description of the uses of force in statecraft is in the Arthashastra by Chanakya, which deals with both internal and external uses of force.

The lesson that comes through very clearly in both the major Indian epics, which deal with wars of necessity, is also apparent in Kautilya, the original realist, and in Ashoka, the convert to idealism. Ashoka and Kautilya were both products of a highly evolved and intricate tradition of statecraft which must have preceded them for centuries. A simple reading of the Arthashastra suffices to prove how evolved Indian strategic culture was as early as the third century before Christ, and how the use of force was limited both by practical and moral considerations. This was not a doctrine of “God on our side”, (though that helped, as Krishna proved in the Mahabharata). Nor is it about just wars. In the Indian tradition the use of force is legitimate not just if it is in a good cause and its results will be good. Instead, this was a doctrine that saw force as necessary in certain circumstances, to obtain justice, when all other means are exhausted, and which also recognised that force was not always the most effective or efficient means to this end.


The other lesson that Indian thinkers have consistently drawn from history is of the perils of weakness. The colonial narrative of India’s history, stressing “outside” invasions and rulers had as its corollary the conviction that India must avoid weakness at all costs lest that history be repeated. The Indian quest after 1947 for strategic autonomy and for autonomy in the decision to use or threaten force has a long tradition behind it.

What I am trying to say is that Indian strategic culture has an indigenous construct on the role of force in statecraft, modified by our experience in the last two centuries. War and peace are continuing themes in Indian strategic culture. While not celebrating war the culture treats defensive war as acceptable when good fights evil to secure justice. Indian strategic culture has been comfortable with this contradiction. While Gandhiji shunned the use of force and opposed violence in politics he was politically steely and unyielding, and accepted violence as unavoidable and justified in certain circumstances.

As a result of this acceptance of contradictions, Indian strategic culture supports ethical views that dovetail easily with international norms of conduct, whether legal or on human rights. It is a culture that tends instinctively to pluralism, tolerance of different views and positions, and a reliance on argumentation, diplomacy and law before recourse to the use of force. It is therefore no surprise that it seeks a rule based international order to limit the anarchy among states that is sometimes evident.


This aspect of Indian strategic culture is common to what Kanti Bajpai described as the three streams of Indian strategic culture, namely, “Nehruvians”, neo-liberals and hyper-realists. They might differ on the best means but not on India’s strategic goals . To summarise Bajpai, all three streams agree on the centrality of the sovereign state in international relations and recognise no higher authority; see interests, power and violence as the staples of international relations that states cannot ignore; and think that power comprises both military and economic capabilities at a minimum. Beyond this they differ.

Interestingly all three streams, “Nehruvians”, neoliberals and hyperrealists, believe that nuclear weapons are essential for India’s security in a world that has shown no signs of moving to their abolition and elimination.

In other words, there is substantial agreement on values, on goals and even on means in our policies, despite marked and rapid changes in the external environment in which we have operated. That is why the core traits of our foreign and defence policies have persisted since independence, irrespective of the parties in power.

The Indian Practice since 1947

Let us look at this aspect of Indian strategic culture in action, in other words at Indian practice and policy since independence.


• The defence budget has only exceeded 3% of GDP in one year of the last sixty-three.

• There have been clear limits on the use of force internally. The use of military force for internal security functions has been severely circumscribed, limited to those cases where there is a strong correlation to inimical forces abroad such as Nagaland and J&K.

• The armed forces of the Union have only been used defensively against external aggression in the sixty-three years of the Republic.

• India has never sent troops abroad except for UNPKO or at the express request of the legitimate government of the country concerned. This was true in the Maldives in 1987, in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Bangladesh in 1971.

• India has also never retained territory taken by force in the wars that she has fought. This is so even for some Indian territory taken back from Pakistan in the Indian state of J&K which was returned to Pakistani control after the 1965 and 1971 wars.

India as a NWS


The Indian nuclear doctrine also reflects this strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against non-nuclear weapon states and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament. We have made it clear that while we need nuclear weapons for our own security, it is our goal to work for a world free of nuclear weapons, and that we are ready to undertake the necessary obligations to achieve that goal in a time-bound programme agreed to and implemented by all nuclear weapon and other states.

In sum, there is an Indian way, an Indian view and an Indian practice in the use and role of force. We do not claim that it is better or worse than any other way that other nations adopt. It is a result of our own history and experience, and we feel it best suited to our goals and situation. And it too is evolving, both consciously and unconsciously, as is the world around us. It is time now to consciously build our own concepts and strategic thinking, adapted to today’s realities and India’s environment, including on the role of force.

Force in Today’s World

The other issue that you will be considering is how changes in the world and in strategic affairs have affected the role of force.

It seems to me that the changes we see in world politics and the effects of technology are the two factors that have most affected the strategic calculus of those in the international system who might seek to use force for political purposes.

Consider the global political situation first.

With global and regional balances of power characterised by unequal distributions of power; the interdependence between major powers created by globalisation; the state losing its monopoly of violence in contested hegemonies both internally and externally; and the diversity of values espoused by states, world politics today is in an unprecedented state of flux. It does, however seem that the cost to the major powers of using force in their dealings with each other could prevent the emergence of direct conflict between them.

The effects of technology are harder to describe and predict. In the early fifties, there were those who hoped that the unprecedented power of the atom bomb had made war unthinkable and therefore abolished it! Unfortunately, we now know better. In fact we have seen technology place increasingly lethal power in the hands of non-state actors. Terrorism is technologically enabled and knows no boundaries today, even drawing on support from within state systems. After several centuries, once again the state is not the sole or always the predominant factor in the international system. In some cases, it is businesses and individuals who now determine our technological future and it is these units that a successful policy must now increasingly deal with.

We have also seen technology create new domains for contestation, such as cyber space, where the speed of manoeuvre, premium on offense, and the nature of the battle-space make us rethink traditional concepts of deterrence. As technology has expanded the spectrum, the line between conventional and non-conventional warfare has blurred. The definition of force, the classic marker of power, has now expanded, thus changing the utility of force as traditionally configured.

As we enter a world of multiple powers, with rapidly shifting balances, change alone is certain. Unfortunately, force is the hedge chosen by several powers against heightened uncertainty in the international system. The balance is shifting between force and the other instruments of statecraft. We therefore need to develop a new and different statecraft.

If change alone is certain, and if the utility of force in statecraft is itself changing in fundamental ways, it is all the more necessary that we return to the values in which the use of force must be embedded. Ultimately it is not just the logic of politics or technology but the values and purposes of the state and society that determine the choices that we make of the uses and nature of force.

What India seeks is a new security architecture, an open, balanced and inclusive architecture, to correspond to the new situation that is emerging. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are radically different from those of the twentieth. Nuclear confrontation or war between major powers is not as likely as the threat from derivatives of nuclear deterrence, namely, terrorism and nuclear proliferation, which are being used to subvert the emergence of a plural, secular and democratic international order in the twenty-first century. The challenges of a globalised world cannot be handled by twentieth century military alliances or containment strategies.

Conclusion

So in effect my argument is that in India’s experience the use of force must be governed and circumscribed by the values of state and society. I have also tried to suggest that there may be value in studying the Indian way, the Indian view and Indian practice in the use and role of force in state-craft.

It also seems from recent experience that the utility of force, as traditionally configured and conceived, is of limited value in protecting a society or achieving some policy goals. But one can hardly jump to conclusions about the futility of force when limited war under nuclear conditions remains possible, and when adversaries need to be deterred. This debate will continue.

I wish you success in continuing the debate and in your deliberations.

New Delhi
October 21, 2010

WOW!!! And with the King Of Bhutan as the Chief guest is very significant for he has borders with a challenger. And note the date: Oct 21 is day after anniversary of 1962 aggression.

There is no update to his speech.

PS: I wonder if its the non-use of nukes on Non-Nuke Weapon states(NNWS) ie the negative security guarantee that he is talking about or is it as it reads!

Anyway means the cobwebs have been cleared.

[V_Raman]

And no discussion on this!!!!! I almost fell off my chair when I read it!!!! Is BR still digesting the news???

[Raja Ram]

The most interesting thing about this speech is the reference to the no first use. Has anyone noticed that he has qualified that the no-first use is only against non-nuclear states?

Does that change a lot of things or what? The NSA has otherwise chosen to carefully articulate this speech,no single word is out of place, so this cannot be a slip of tongue. There is a lot that is being conveyed by what has been left unsaid. Therefore it is very significant.

[rohiths]

I think the NFU is only for public consumption. When push comes to shove it will be abandoned. If asked to clarify, GOI will tell "we believe in NFU", "we are peacefool onlee" but if situation warrants nukes may be used against pureland

[csharma]

IIRC, one of ex IAF chief (maybe Tipnis) had said that if we know Pakistan is going to drop nukes on us, we are not going to sit quiet or something to that effect.

The change could be prompted by the prospect of two front war that India is factoring in as a real possibility.