A look back at the partition

[svinayak]

@ldev understanding partition is also key to understanding clear and present danger of TSP.

And, no doubt , we are well wisher of TSP.

Stable Pakistan is in the interest of India.

[ramana]

From Bji's above link. Lt Gen SK Sinha writes:

It was at this stage and soon after the Great Kolkata killings that I had joined the Military Operations Directorate in Delhi. There were three things that I found both interesting and revealing. First, a plan for the evacuation of all British civilians in India to the UK called Plan Gondola. Second, the operational map that I was required to maintain in the Operations Room. Third, a paper on the reliability of the Indian Army prepared by the Director of Military Intelligence.

The British feared an uprising on the lines of what had happened in 1857. Many British civilians were scattered in different parts of the country. Plan Gondola catered for their initial evacuation to temporary camps in the provinces, at provincial capitals and some selected convenient locations. These were called Keeps. Armed protection with necessary logistic support was to be provided at the Keeps.

In the subsequent phase, they were to be evacuated to Safes near the port towns of Kolkata, Vaishakapatnam, Chennai, Cochin, Mumbai and Karachi, awaiting repatriation to the UK. The troops guarding the Safes and Keeps were to be a mix of British and Indian soldiers. In the event, as communal violence escalated there was no need to implement Plan Gondola. There was now much bitterness and violence between Hindus and Muslims and none against the British. It was a great irony that at the height of the communal carnage in Punjab, British officers could move around unarmed in Delhi and Punjab while Indian officers, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, had to carry arms and in remote areas move with an escort.

I had to maintain a large map of India with pins of different colours showing locations of all combat units in the country. Red was for British units, Green for Gorkha units and Brown for Indian units. A distinction was made between Indian and Gorkha units. At that time the Gorkhas were officered exclusively by the British with no Indian officers in those units. The Indian units had a mix of British and Indian officers with Commanding Officers and senior officers mostly British. The “mutiny syndrome” prevailed among the British. It was ensured that no location had only brown pins without some red and green pins in situ. Field Marshal Auchinleck, the then Commander-in- Chief frequently visited the Operations Room and would study the map maintained by me.

The H-M riots helped avoid the 1857 effect on Brits.

[ramana]

And

No doubt the Partition holocaust was the greatest tragedy in the history of the Subcontinent in which millions got killed and millions got uprooted. Soon after Hindus and Muslims had fought unison in the First War of Independence in 1857, the seeds of separatism were sown by Sir Syed Ahmed. He conceived a separate nationhood for the Muslims of India. Lord Morley by accepting separate electorate in 1906 provided the oxygen for it. It fully matured by 1947 and was exploited to the hilt by Jinnah.
Looking back in hindsight, one can say that Partition could have been averted had the Congress been more accommodative and the Muslim League less obdurate. However, after the planned genocide started by Jinnah on i6 August 1946 as part of his Direct Action programme, there could be no going back from the path of disaster. The Qaid-e- Azam had become Qatl-e- Azam.

The puerile attempt by some people to underscore Jinnah’s secular image on the basis of a lone speech by him while inaugurating the Pakistan Constituent Assembly does not carry conviction. One swallow does not make a summer. It now transpires that Jinnah made that conciliatory address not out of any goodwill but under compulsion. The inside story has been revealed in a book Select Documents on Partition of India by a distinguished historian, Dr Kripal Singh. Lord Ismay the Chief of Staff of Lord Mountbatten told him in an interview on August 17, 1964, the background to that much hailed address.

Mountbatten had asked Ismay to convey to Jinnah the need for his taking that line, now that he had achieved his Pakistan. The sole aim was to check the spiraling violence in Pakistan and the counter violence in East Punjab.

That Jinnah ‘s animosity towards India had not changed is made amply clear by Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir launched on 22 October 1947. His earlier slogan was India Divided or India Destroyed. That had now changed to India Divided and India Destroyed. It is a different matter that on 7 November 1947 the Indian Army turned back that invasion from the outskirts of Srinagar. This was perhaps in line with what Charles Martel had achieved at Tours in 732 against the Saracens thereby saving France or Jan Sobleski had done in 1683, throwing back the Turks from the gates of Vienna and saved Europe.

Lately attempts have been made by some people to exonerate Jinnah for his role in Partition.( COMMENT: Jaswant Singh !! ) They have even gone further, by trying to blame Patel and Nehru for accepting Partition. It is even insinuated that they were tired and old, and were in a hurry to grab power. Having opposed the two nation theory and partition all their lives, they caved in and opted for Partition. Ralph Emerson rightly wrote, “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.” In the Army the saying is that consistency is the hallmark of a mule.

Sardar Patel had the uncanny gift of foresight and the ability to take hard decisions. He rightly assessed the situation prevailing in mid 1947. Based on his experience in the Interim Government when the Muslim League had brought government functioning to a grinding halt, the crescendo of communal violence and the Army getting contaminated, combating communal violence for nearly a year, he realized that there was now no alternative to Partition. His decision to salvage the wreck in 1947 was an act of great statesmanship. If that had not been done, things would have become much worse.

We would have had a civil war on our hands with the Army broken up and participating from both sides. One does not know what the outcome of such a conflict may have been. India may have broken up into several independent States like erstwhile Yugoslavia or could have become a much larger version of present Lebanon. In his own words, the Sardar chose to save 80% of the country. Had a patchwork solution of unity with a weak centre been accepted in 1947, the results could have been disastrous. With a weak Centre the integration of the 500 odd Princely States may not have been possible.

The minority population of India was about 12% in 1947. Today, the combined minority population in an undivided India would have been over 40%. Petrol funded Islamist forces that have now emerged in the world would have swamped India. India as we know it today would not have existed. Patel’s acceptance of a moth eaten Pakistan and getting the Congress to accept it, was a great achievement. This was almost at par with his universally hailed achievement of integrating the Princely States with the Indian Union.

The first vivisection of India had taken place in the beginning of the second millennium. Although the Arabs had conquered Sindh in 712 A D, they had remained confined to the deserts of Sindh for three centuries and subsequently Sindh had not broken away from India. The Hindu Shahi dynasty ruled over Afghanistan with their capital at Kabul. They guarded the country’s North West Frontier. Starting from 999 A D, they succumbed to the invasions of the great conqueror and plunderer, Mahmud Gazni. India was exposed for the first time to the ferocity of religious fundamentalism. Soon, Afghanistan ceased to be a part of India. That was our country’s first vivisection.

The second took place in 1947 again on account of religious fundamentalism. Sardar Patel ensured that the 80% residual India was fully integrated and became a strong nation. Despite that part of the country which broke away becoming a theocracy and carrying out instant ethnic cleansing in the West and gradual in the East, Nehru and Patel ensured that India retained her secular values.

In August 1947 the residual Muslim League in India adopted a resolution reviving itself. Surprisingly, undeterred with all that had happened leading to Partition, its representatives in the Constituent Assembly, demanded reservation for Muslims and also separate electorate. Muslim members of the Assembly other than the few of the Muslim League, did not support this demand. It got rejected by an overwhelming majority. Speaking on this issue the Sardar stated, “I know they have a mandate from the Muslim League to move this amendment. I feel sorry for them. This is not a place for acting on madness. This is a place today to act on your conscience and to act for the good of the country. For a community to think that its interests are different from that of the country in which it lives, is a great mistake”.

Unfortunately the successors of Sardar Patel in his party have shown lack of vision. For the sake of garnering Muslim votes, they have been following the policy of appeasement and are prepared in that process to sacrifice national interest.

B K Nehru, an eminent member of the dynasty, in his autobiography, Nice Guys Finish Second, wrote that the old guard in the Congress considered national interests supreme but the new generation feels otherwise, giving priority to party interests....

I think the general puts it very clearly what was saved and how.

[harbans]

The minority population of India was about 12% in 1947. Today, the combined minority population in an undivided India would have been over 40%.

I assume the 12% figure means for undivided India in 47. Is that correct? I thought it was more than 20% at that juncture.

[svinayak]

It was 25% in 1947

[brihaspati]

ramana ji,
I took the military assessment from the professional. The other bit about political assessment needs to be explored. In the political assessment what is being repeated is based on a structured myth which interweaves reality with the un-real in a very clever weave. The reality as evidenced by various facts being brought up through the thread shows things to have been much more complicated than the general makes it look like, and he is not providing any new viewpoint or insight different from the official regime supported one.

His military claims are worthy of note - because he is eminently qualified to say what he is saying in that arena. The other part he is repeating from the standard story as it has been built up around the regime. As we have seen, and even my own questions on the processes - say between CMP arriving and 10th July - have not yet been answered and simply been ignored. Those questions are actually crucial in trying to understand how much is the myth and how much is reality.

Hindsight is decried when it challenges past decisions. But then hindsight should also be decried if it is used to justify past decisions. What happens now cannot then be used to justify what was decided for in the past without a critical re-examination. To show that decisions were "correct" based on what happened long after - one needs to show a solid chain of predeterminations connecting those decisions and the aftermath.

As I pointed out, what is "bad" now could as equally be a product of decisions taken then. A very casual and simplistic argument would be - if unified rashtryia control managed to coopt "minorities" into a supposedly "secular" framwork of prosperity and democracy, then this extended over the entire subcontinental population would have got rid of the supposed problem of Islamism now flanking on both sides of India. Whether alternatives to giving up populations into the whims of Islamo-Brit frameworks were "impossible" alternatives, whether they were not available, or whether they were not adopted because of personal and group ideological commitments - remains an open question.

One of the things remain clear - and in this I agree with MKG, that the deep hatred of an entire population/society prevented us from doing what should have been done then, and prevents us from doing what should be done even now. MKG would not officially agree with my method before 1942, and outside of occasions in 1943, and 1944. But our assessments of the reasons as to why we could not and the final objective would be the same.

The congrez should have declared an independent gov on its own for whole of India, and taken over official command of the armed forces. For precaution, Brit officers should have been quarantined and kept safely. It should have called all Indians to stand unitedly behind itself and ask British officials present to surrender to the gov with immediate effect. There would be revolt by the ML and the Muslim parts of BIA would immediately take up a civil war. But the Brits would not be in a position to intervene militarily. The first riots incited by the ML would have been the greatest excuse to do this on the pretext that a popular majority representative elected body could not sit back idly while its people were slaughtered in meaningless violence. It deems the existing British authority incapable of adequately ensuring the safety of Indian people, and hence a popular government was taking over.

If there was any doubts about the upper echelons of the army, a call to the civilians to arm themselves for "defence" [with a bit of skillful organization to see to it that the citizens militia remained disciplined and under congrez control - which would have been possible, as shown by 1942 organizations in Midnapore and Ballia] - would have kept the upper levels in check.

Yes, people can laugh and ridicule. But this was what should have been done. This task remains unfinished. We have a duty to all Indians on the subcontinent - even if they have turned Islamists, to bring them to civilizational freedom and journey which was their birthright as being born on the subcontinent. They need to be cured of their ideas, but they as a people cannot be hated and rejected and expelled. The solution is not obtained by cutting people off and not cussing them if needed to bring them into light.

[ramana]

Bji, Understood. Recall MKG had to deal with a new crisis every day those days.

Also for my info can you recall the questions again?

As we have seen, and even my own questions on the processes - say between CMP arriving and 10th July - have not yet been answered and simply been ignored. Those questions are actually crucial in trying to understand how much is the myth and how much is reality.

There is still one from those days around and will have them forwarded for his inputs.

[Airavat]

I find it hard to imagine that Baldev Singh ever accepted the way in which non-Muslims were left to fend for themselves, or even the final form of the partition itself.

It's that freakin hard to search for data on the web that you have to "imagine" stuff??

Don't address any more childish queries to me since I have you and a couple of other gasbags on my "ignore list" and will be spared the enlightening experience of reading your posts. And, by the way, your earlier post making assumptions on something I did not write, and then proceeding to launch personal attacks has been reported:

why are you so allergic to revolutionaries which makes you gasp in fright

Hiding behind anonymous handles and displaying bravado on the Internet.....if we ever meet face to face we'll see who really "gasps in fright."

[brihaspati]

ramana ji, I will mail.

I do feel the common theme of justifying the "Partition" on the basis of subsequent "see how prosperous and civilized we have become compared to our neighbour", and how bad we would be if they remained "inside" - needs to be seen for what it hides.

The argument is actually virulently anti-Muslim as a community/social group. Those who quote percentage population of Muslims at Partition and current proportions and imply that because of a lower percentage in India at start as a result of partition and migrations India has prospered and progressed, are actually saying that maintaining low low levels of Muslims in a society is crucial to the economic and social development of that society.

Pakistan's Islam majority formation need not have precluded its growth towards prosperity or modernization. Even without oil-driven economies, Malaysia and Indonesia has prospered with Muslim majorities. Each has pre-Islamic cultural bases common with pre-Islamic India, just like the current territories occupied by Pakistan.

If a higher proportion of Muslims in society is detrimental to growth and progress - does it not then imply a need to ensure that Muslim populations in India are kept "low"?

Is this the right way to think about this?

[Yayavar]

US was not painting itself in flying colours during those days and was soon to follow with even more egregious transgressions in Vietnam/Korea/south america, Iran etc. That could have given pause to Indian leaders just coming out from under another imperial power. There was not much of independent infrastructure either, which still led to dependence on the Angrez. There was also a strong socialist bend among the leaders.
We need to do a more holistic assessment rather than pick a few peeves or wrong paths taken and extrapolate it. Some of the characteristics for individual leaders may come true some not.

once again this "coming out" of Britain's hold needs to be examined. when you have Nehru proudly stomping around the world proclaiming his legacy as the head of a commonwealth country, what "coming out" are we talking about? the fundamental likes and dislikes of Nehru and the Indian system that formed under him, retained almost without any changes, the basic character of the Indian state that existed under the British. the entire administrative/bureaucratic/govt-machinery-complex of the Indian state was a carbon copy of the British Indian state. so what "coming out" is this?

US at that point was nascent yet "open" about India. I would suggest that we look at US-Israel relations at that time too. during that same time, Israel was buying weapons from Soviet Union and yet the diplomatic relations between US and Israel were neutral at worst. after 1967, the two became overtly friendly. until then it was a cautious relationship where the US was sometimes irritated by Israeli actions. did that stop Israel from having an active diplomatic and behind the scenes effort to continue to talk to US? the answer is NO.

the misfortune is that Nehru, by being so malleable to British interests, set the precedent for all of his descendants and non-descendant successors. this is the real problem. the external interests started applying the Nehru yardstick to every head and the result is the deaths of LBS, IG, RG, forceful retirement of PVNR, etc....

Nehru, though his prejudices, cast the dye for his own descendants and made sure that they would have a fundamental weakness in their armor: the dependence on external-interest-support due to the mishaps of foundational ancestor...

The point I was making is, whatever be USA's inclinations to dethrone UK off its colonies, it still wanted its own pound of flesh for its 'commercial empire' -- naval bases or other control. Indian leaders and people after such a long struggle were not going to agree to that especially when USA's 'commercial empire' and its use of force was so apparent. Israel was formed through the UN security council - India was among the 3 or so countries that opposed its formation. It was a different era and a different set of experiences. I dont see how what worked for Israel formed with full connivance of western powers have to do with India's relationship with these other countries.
It is not as if India did not have posiitve relationship with USA.

I'm not sure what linear relationship you are drawing from Nehru to the unfortunate early demise of the other leaders and PVNR.

[Yayavar]

JLN thought INC was the new British as India was the jewel in the crown. He and his cohort were really afraid of coups and emasculated the Indian military. Especially the Indian Army through UPSC selection board and then promotions policy.
When PRC called his bluff India paid the price and is still paying the price. His and his decendents inverse Hamletian policy (to not test or to test) on nuke weapons led to further erosion.

Agree on other points but the extrapolation that INC was the new British in Nehru's mind. Even without that thought the rest of it is the same. The British never emasculated their military.

[brihaspati]

The point I was making is, whatever be USA's inclinations to dethrone UK off its colonies, it still wanted its own pound of flesh for its 'commercial empire' -- naval bases or other control. Indian leaders and people after such a long struggle were not going to agree to that especially when USA's 'commercial empire' and its use of force was so apparent. Israel was formed through the UN security council - India was among the 3 or so countries that opposed its formation. It was a different era and a different set of experiences. I dont see how what worked for Israel formed with full connivance of western powers have to do with India's relationship with these other countries.
It is not as if India did not have posiitve relationship with USA.

I'm not sure what linear relationship you are drawing from Nehru to the unfortunate early demise of the other leaders and PVNR.

There are two possible Israel connections :
(1) Look at JLN's personal move to provide large-scale asylum to the Jews during the war, and why and how it failed
(2) there is one school of thought which links the urgency in Mountbatten [and behind him the Atl gov, and behind it Wavell's legacy and plans and maps and efficient people] to the Amery started process of eventual partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel within a tight deadline. They would like to roll-back in a geographically phased manner. It does make sense if they wanted to get rid of India first and then take up ME.

There was intense discussion in the cabinet about the Egypt-Syria axis, Gulf, and "solving" the Palestine-Israel commitments [given to both Mulsims and the Jews - just as in India to "hindu" and muslim].

Since more and more docs come out about their uncertainty over India [for example Wavell's personal notes about his bitter disappointment at AICC formal acceptance of the CMP as conveyed to him - he wanted congrez not to accept], it is not entirely impossible that they wanted to wind up the Indian headache before they looked into what they perhaps considered a more lucrative case with some future.

By the way the "recognition" of Israel bit was kind of swinging with the seasonal wind for the congrez. JLN's own ideas appear to have been different from the rest of his colleagues, and Israel's recognition was not delayed that much really.

[Yayavar]

From:

Towards Freedom:An Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru (New York: John Day Co., 1941), pp. 228-231

I had long been drawn to socialism and communism, and Russia had appealed to me. Much in Soviet Russia I dislike-the ruthless suppression of all contrary opinion, the wholesale regimentation, the unnecessary violence (as I thought) in carrying out various policies. But there was no lack of violence and suppression in the capitalist world, and I realized more and more how the very basis and foundation of our acquisitive society and property was violence. Without violence it could not continue for many days. A measure of political liberty meant little indeed when the fear of starvation was always compelling the vast majority of people everywhere to submit to the will of the few, to the greater glory and advantage of the latter.

Violence was common in both places, but the violence of the capitalist order seemed inherent in it; while the violence of Russia, bad though it was aimed at a new order based on peace and co­operation and real freedom for the masses. With all her blunders, Soviet Russia had triumphed over enormous difficulties and taken great strides toward this new order While the rest of the world was in the grip of the depression and going backward in some ways, in the Soviet country a great new world was being built up before our eyes. Russia, following the great Lenin, looked into the future and thought only of what was to be, while other countries lay numbed under the dead hand of the past and spent their energy in preserving the useless relics of a bygone age. In particular, I was impressed by the reports of the great progress made by the backward regions of Central Asia under the Soviet regime. In the balance, therefore, I was all in favor of Russia, and the presence and example of the Soviets was a bright and heartening phenomenon in a dark and dismal world.

I dont think Nehru needed anyone to push him towards the Soviet model of Central Planning. His admiration is plain. This was written in 1941 when the West had gone through 10 years of economic Depression, while the Soviets had industrialized their country in their 1st and 2nd Five Year plan.

Yes, and it was a view widely held by many Indians. Even Bhagat Singh's organization was Hindustan Socialist Republican Party. That Russian was a class revolution of the oppressed whereas the western way - colonialism or commercial exploitation of South/central america or Africa or Asia - was simple exploitation of man by man. We can look back and discuss the various transgressions of the 'socialists' and the resultant limiting of India economy and options but 1920's (HSRA) or 1941 is a very different world.

[Yayavar]

Idev, a pan-India revolution was stopped with the assistance of INC. when Bhagat and others were starting to seriously make inroads into public sentiment, we all know what happened don't we? especially the role played by Gandhi/Nehru/INC in making sure that he doesn't survive...

The way I see it is that HSRA disintegrated even though my heart is with them. I tell those stories and have told them to my children at dinner table. Bhagat Singh and BK Dutt gave themselves up to make 'deaf hear' but to what avail? Yes, it inspired folks but not enough. It led to Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukhadev's arrest for Saunder's killing when they had escaped. Bismil and his associates had been captured earlier and hung in 1927. Eventually only Azad was left trying to hold it together and unfortunately was a martyr in 1931 as well. HSRA could not reconvene and different cells in Punjab, UP,Bihar, Bengal carried out their individual small attacks.

That is why I was positing that one fear of Gandhi could be that different cells gaining power could lead to balkanization and different power centers. Whether one agrees with that or not is a different matter.

I can see your anger that more was not done to save Bhagat Singh/Rajguru/Sukhadev and others. But that is not the same as active connivance to kill them.

.same with Bose....in the 1920's, revolutionary zeal was starting to spread in Coastal portions of AP too. once again, it was crushed with the active help of local INC strongmen. there is a very illustrative history of local land-owning elites, with influence and power in INC, crushing the nascent zeal of revolutionaries in that area. especially egregious is the fact that they had no problems in supplying info and intelligence to Brits to crush the resistance. Alluri Sita Rama Raju was one such famous revolutionary who was killed in the same manner.

could you expand on how INC actively 'killed' the revolutionaries. Certainly did not support them since it was against the chosen strategy.

[Yayavar]

viv-ji, the discussion here is to learn, just in the way you mention, that is the primary purpose. We are in agreement. This is indeed a exploration.

Then we are in it together.

Stating that Gandhi was against Hindus is hard to accept - it makes not sense.

With respect Viv-ji, I have not said MKG was anti-Hindu, JLN was, clearly obviously and openly. He merely hid it when going out in masses while stressing on "Pandit" and in classes spoke about his open derision for the same.

Truly the mirror image of Jinnah.

Sanku-ji, I did not say you said it. Just that it has been stated on this thread. JLN probably was not comfortable with the ritualistic and what he thought as 'backward' aspects. He was like many intellectuals quite happy quoting 'astoma..' or other higher philosophical Hindu thought . Again not you, but I do recall it being stated that he was actively anti-Hindi/Sikh in the sense in wanting or abetting in decimation - that I find hard to believe. Of course I might have mis-read what was said.

However MKG's failing was letting the "ahimsa" bit get a little to heavy on him towards the end, nearly delusional. He often speaks of a "robust response" on many occasions, but around partition he had a epic fail -- judging him from his own statements and standards.

I am trying for the reasons of simple collapse of MKG around partition, many have suggested it happened as a result of previous shortsightedness which resulted in his burning many bridges with Bose, and other nationalists not open to blind acceptance of his ideology.

Yes, that would be a good aspect to understand. My thought is that, on practical sense he wanted to avoid deeper fissures that would continue to cause rift for a long time. In the end he could not stop that from happening on some fronts.

Similarly it is wishful thinking to state that revolutionaries would have got India Independence.

The idea is that revolutionaries could have served as one arm, while congress served the other.

The Irish model -- after all significant sections of both INC and Revolutionaries found common cause with Irish model, what was wrong in accepting this part as well?

Yes that is possible but it went against the view INC under Gandhi's leadership had. That is being discussed in various responses in this thread.

[devesh]

I find it hard to imagine that Baldev Singh ever accepted the way in which non-Muslims were left to fend for themselves, or even the final form of the partition itself.

It's that freakin hard to search for data on the web that you have to "imagine" stuff??

Don't address any more childish queries to me since I have you and a couple of other gasbags on my "ignore list" and will be spared the enlightening experience of reading your posts. And, by the way, your earlier post making assumptions on something I did not write, and then proceeding to launch personal attacks has been reported:

why are you so allergic to revolutionaries which makes you gasp in fright

Hiding behind anonymous handles and displaying bravado on the Internet.....if we ever meet face to face we'll see who really "gasps in fright."

yes, I am quivering in fright now. literally shi**ing my pants. is the point about "face to face" supposed to be a reminder for me about your personal background from a certain community? is that supposed to scare me? is that your way of chest thumping and supposedly elevating the status of your community? fascinating.

and your post is being reported for physical threats....the last resort I suppose.

[archan]

Guys cool it. Airavat, that threat is not appreciated.

[Prem]

Mohammad Rafi had good idea !!
Awaaz Do Hum Ek Hain

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4xjFbus ... re=related

[surinder]

Don't address any more childish queries to me since I have you and a couple of other gasbags on my "ignore list"

If they are in ignore lists, why are you responding?

[surinder]

Guys cool it. Airavat, that threat is not appreciated.

Posters have been banned for lesser violations. Why not in this case?

[chetak]

Here we go again! Forgetting to mention whose freedom struggle onlee

Role of Muslims in freedom struggle not portrayed well, feels Ghulam Nabi Azad

[Abhi_G]

Nehru and the Bengal Partition: point 106 shows the attitude of JLN to the uprooted Hindus of Bengal.

http://books.google.co.in/books?id=zW30 ... on&f=false

Nehru told the Nikhil Banga Bastuhara Karma Parishad that they were aliens and they should contact the AICC bureau dealing with foreigners.

[brihaspati]

Re: HSRA:
(1) HSRA's top leadership was eliminated, true. But HSRA had associates/connections/spawns. Rasbehari Bose was originally a HSRA associate. With the fallout over the elimination of the top, Rasbehari went out of India and began laying the base for what was to become INA in SE Asia. There were impacts and threads that led to absorption of HSRA followers into the nationalist socialists [not communists]. Try tracking the antecedents of the congrez socialists.

In fact it was not that unsurprising for me not to find the statements of people like Masani about the AICC eruptions over CMP - highlighted in discussions on CMP.

It was the HSRA strands within congrez that kept the demand on for "revolution".

(2) one of the problems of the nationalist movement seems to have been extremism in methodology. MKG and the group that formed around him out of various factors, took one extreme of pacifism not only in tactics but also in strategy and made it a religion. Something you do almost ritualistically without considering whether you are merely following an idea blindly.

The other extreme was formed by explicit commitment to non-pacifist insurgent methodology only. HSRA, or the more consistently successful Anushilon of Dhaka, [who managed to prevent the typical Brit penetration of org core as was common with every nationalist org that the brits thought were a threat to their imeprialism], did not consider the "mass-line" as feasible or adoptable.

The "communists" were a late-late try from the insurrectionists, to adapt the "mass-line", but by that time communism was an idea firmly based within the Judaeo-christian roots of European imperialism and blatantly anti-Hindu. The continuous dramatics as well as political failures and compromises of the other extreme line of MKG [as well as hostility towards insurrectionist more common to petty political jealousy of a rival claimant to popular imagination] appeared to these insurrectionists as fitting the impotency and perfidy of the "Hindu", and hence fitting the perception of "communism".

The tragedy is that both the extremes failed to understand the need for flexibility of strategy and tactics. MKG's insistence on total submission to his line onlee, and making it into such a religious devotion - that it made it impossible for him later on to call on the other extreme forces within Indian politics when it was crucial to do so - especially in the period 44-47.by the time MKG realized that his own disciples had abandoned him - his own political religion bound him and prevented him from asking for and using the other extreme.

Almost every doc that comes up - shows that the Brits themselves did not believe in their ability and capacity to militarily intervene and keep any potential nationalist outburst down. This is something completely suppressed by those who try to repeat the then public reasons given by anti-insurrectionists against the demand for taking over of gov. All the while the anti-insurrectionists were creating the "threats" and painting the apocalyptic scenario of "foreign intervention" and protracted civil-war - there is solid evidence that they had pretty good inkling of what the Brits really thought about such intervention capacity themselves.

For example, even MKG laments that he has been given info that the Brits have secretly prepared for evacuating Europeans to safety, lashing out that it would be a great blot on the "Indian" character if Brits thought so. Dropping the ethical moral piece - this indicates that the congrez top-leadership could not have been not aware of the real military capacity of the Brits to impose their authority.

Under that background, the official congrez position against the take-over of the admin on its own by declaring itself a national gov, on the public excuses of otherwise the country descends into civil-war/balkanization/bloodshed - and foreign intervention - indicates the fear of loss of political credit of "bringing independence" to the insurrectionist or revolutionary line. Obviously the remnant geographical centre of congrez had more precious blood than the tail ends of Punjab and Bengal which had already been liberally shed and there were also pious sermons about the need to calmly face such shedding of blood if coming from muslim attacks onlee - by the Sikhs and the hindu Bengalees. Obviously balkanization of these two ends was less important than the balkanization of the "centre".

[brihaspati]

Another fear that could be driven by the prospect of relying on militancy towards transition, would be driven by knowledge of rebellious mood within the lower echelons of the army. The congrez top-brass's fear would be that the army would have much greater prestige in post-Indpendence India making their control of state power vulnerable.

The 46 Naval uprising that brought forward public evidence of cross-community collaboration in such militancy, would appear as a political threat no doubt.

[ramana]

Here we go again! Forgetting to mention whose freedom struggle onlee

Role of Muslims in freedom struggle not portrayed well, feels Ghulam Nabi Azad

Isn't INC the party in power for majority of the time since 1947? And which party does Azad belong to/

IDIOT

[brihaspati]

Eastern Army reports complain of "subversive activities" against troops. This mentioned "underground Congressman", CPI activists and RSP were addressing "leaflet appeals" among Indian troops and calling them to revolt. It was mentioned that these activities were primarily carried out in "security soft spots" like the recruit training establishments and non-combatant units. ["most secret WIS(II) 12 March 1943, L/WS/1/1433, OIOC.] Similarly congrez cadre in Assam were "most anxious to infect service personnel" and that these efforst were "most obvious" in enlisting "townsmen and matriculate classes". ["Most secret" WIS(II) 20 Aug. 1943, L/WS/1/1433, OIOC.]

Congrez activists had started pamphleting from 1942 among troops. there is a collection of such pamphlets in HPF(I) 3/31/42, NAI. Throughout the post 1942 period, for example an iconic case is mentioned : two socialists Motilal Singh and Govindeo Brahmachary, were arrested after having been supposedly "spreading anti-British views" among Indian soldiers at their "lemonade bar" located in the Troops' Amusement Park in Ranchi. [Secret letter from P.TMansfield, chief secy, GOBihar, to the secy, Home dept, GOI, 10 April, 1944. HPF(I) 29/6/44, NAI. "Most Secret report on subversive attempts on the loyalty of the IA" by the Chiefs of Staff committee, IA, 10 May, 1943, L/WS/1/707, OIOC].

The British were highly worried about the counter propaganda launched by the Japanese and INA - that challenged the Brits own propaganda on the political issues, and highlighted supposedly better working conditions on the other side. [WIS(II) 11Aug 1944, L/WS/1/1433, OIOC, HPF(I) 51/5/44, NAI].

So they gradually changed the secret surveillance over soldiers' correspondence to reduce their official censorship footprint. This was done deliberately to allow a false sense of freedom of expression so that soldiers and their contacts at home both reveal much more about the psychological and political whirlwinds that might affect the army. This processing of info was used weekly to summarize and produce regular reports and then use them to attenuate military propaganda. For example, W.J.Cawthorn, the director of MI in India,

"The effect of anti-British propaganda and attempts to suborn the troops depends largely on the amount and quality of our counter-propaganda... Through all this period [the war] the responsibility of the British Officer in Indian battalions would be of the greatest importance as a counter-propaganda organization; it is suggested that special attention be paid to this aspect of this duties" [Most secret note entitled The Future of the internal security situation in India' by Brigadier W.J. Cawthorn, Director of MI in India, 31 Aug, 1942, L/WS/1/1337, OIOC]

G.R. Savage, Central Inteliggence Deoartment, [MSS EUR F 161/210, OIOC] recalls that from this period politically critical letters from family members as well as soldiers were not "expunged" except those that would give out locations or strength. This was done to filter out a psychological profile of the observed soldiers and officers and was kept highly secret because it provided a hugely valuable sourc eof information about the country's moods and how the respective soldiers were likely to behave in tempting situations.

Two parallel information policies were employed - one for British officers under pressure from Churchill who was worried about British socialists in BIA. The GHQ on the othet other hand in India was worried about "educated middle classes" in the officer corp - who had to be increasingly recruited to service an increasingly technological warfare. The worrying part was the estimate that this class was nearly 33% of infantry and cavalry.

Already in 1941, the "army cannot but regard the Sikh element in the Army with a degree of suspicion..." [a survey of the Sikh situation as it affects the army", 1941, HPF(I) 232/1940, NAI].

Proposals of changes in the political constitution of India and consequent uncertainty regarding the position of the Indian Army under any new constitution has raised, even in the minds of pre-war soldiers [as opposed to the new classes inducted into the Indian army], doubts whether the British Raj is worth saving for anything but what it pays in cash and kind. The future of the soldier's own community, and the safety of his home and family in a country which may...be controlled by men of a community he regards as hostile, are matters which...cause him more concern than the defeat of the Axis power. His doubts are not diminished if his [army] includes Indians who look forward...to the day when India will be independent of the British Raj."[secret report, by the chiefs of staff comm., IA, 10 May 1943].

Operation "asylum" for example started out its plan to use the IA to suppress armed nationwide rebellion - that "success" of "all plans" could be ensured only be "premised on the loyalty of the Indian forces during the disturbances". In June 1946, Wavell's gov proposed bringing in five Brritish army divisions as a contingency measure to crush any congrez sponsored political uprising. However, London knew or felt that given the situations overall and resource constraints - it would be impossible to inject such large numbers of British troops into India. [and VPM was apparently aware of this].

[Sanku]

Again not you, but I do recall it being stated that he was actively anti-Hindi/Sikh in the sense in wanting or abetting in decimation - that I find hard to believe. Of course I might have mis-read what was said.

I believe that at a cultural level he was certainly uncomfortable. This is as per his own statements as well as the observations of his confidants.

The problem with Nehru is that we know that he actively "put up a show" -- he used to grandstand on issues for mass consumption without believing about them or actually doing nothing concrete to deliver on them.

In this regard, his more private correspondences and conversations and actions are a better judge.

In this regard my reading (and shared by others on BRF like B-ji) has been that Nehru was first and foremost a personal power seeker and suitably deracinated, so he may not want a decimation of Hindus/Sikhs but OTOH not particularly care about their survival either.

To his they were stepping stones.

Of Muslims he was afraid and also felt some what of a kinship (his words) and of course in thrall of the British.

These are dangerous combination.

[devesh]

http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~sch00609

Frances (Fineman) Gunther, journalist and writer, was born in 1897 in New York, the younger of two children of Sonia (Paul) and Dennis Fineman, both Russian Jews. FFG maintained a friendship with her brother, Bernard, into adulthood. FFG attended Barnard College, with a year (1919 1920) at Radcliffe, and was graduated in 1921. She began psychoanalysis in New York in 1923, continuing in Vienna and other places where she lived over the next four decades. During the 1920s, she went to the Soviet Union, and studied Russian theatre.

FFG met John Gunther in 1925, and they were married in 1927. JG became well known for a series of books, including Inside Europe (1936) and Inside Asia (1939). They had two children, both of whom died in childhood: Judy in 1929, before her first birthday, and John, Jr. (Johnny) at 17, in 1947. Johnny's fifteen month struggle with a brain tumor was the subject of JG's Death Be Not Proud, of which FFG wrote the last chapter.

The Gunthers lived in Europe (London, Paris, Rome, Vienna) from 1925 to 1936. As foreign correspondent for the London News Chronicle, FFG covered the establishment of a fascist regime in Austria in 1934. She worked in association with JG for many years, in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and for the News Chronicle and the Chicago Daily News. Her contribution to JG's writings are suggested by annotated drafts of Death Be Not Proud, and a 1934 letter of recommendation in which he stated that "she does most of my work even when I am here [in Vienna]."

In 1937 1938, the Gunthers travelled in the Middle East and Asia, meeting Chaim Weizmann, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawahar lal Nehru, the Chiang Kai sheks, and T.V. Soong; this trip resulted in a continuing friendship between FFG and Nehru. FFG and JG were divorced in 1944, but maintained some contact.

During World War II, FFG wrote articles and made speeches critical of British imperialism and advocating independence for India. Among other organizations, she spoke before the Washington Press Club, the Quaker Institute of International Relations, and the Post War Council in New York. Her speeches were collected in a book, Revolution in India (1944).

After her wide and varied experiences as a journalist, FFG continued to observe major world events, and, absorbed with the idea of world peace, tried to understand and to propose solutions to global conflicts and tensions. Look ing for explanations of political behavior through introspection, she continued to seek enlightenment through relevant courses and lectures. In 1943 1944 she attended the Graduate School of International Relations at Yale to learn more about foreign policy. As a result, she began a study, never completed, entitled "Empire: Notes for a Study of the Theory and Practice of Empires." In 1948 1949 she attended lectures by Karen Horney and others at the New School in New York City, and herself spoke, on "Psychoanalysis and the News World," before the Asso ciation for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis. In 1960 1961 she returned to New York from Israel to take courses on religion, linguistics, and sociology at Columbia University.

Increasingly conscious of her Jewishness and resent ful of its suppression, in late 1949 she joined other Zionists in settling the newly established state of Israel. She took Hebrew lessons and, inspired by Martin Buber and other provocative thinkers whom she met there, began a long range study of Arab Israeli relations. Her interest in the connections between religion and politics culminated in an unpublished work entitled "A Study of Theo Politics."

Her travels continued; in 1950 she visited India as guest of the Nehru family, and the following year met JG in Egypt on his "Inside Africa" trip. She was living in Jerusalem at the time of her death in 1964.

the highlight about Nehru is not about doing a "chi-chi" on him. I couldn't care less if the man liked to sow wild oats in a bunch of different places.

the important thing is FFG's husband John Gunther wrote a very positive article about Indian Independence movement and particularly the role of Congress as opposed to ML. apparently, this article was taken so seriously by the British that Linlithgow personally asked Jinnah if he could do something about a counter-article which presented a more British sympathetic and pro-ML view point?

and the Israel connection is curious. apparently, even after FFG became seriously involved with the Zionists, Nehru still invited her as a "guest of the family". interesting stuff. on the outside, Nehru liked to maintain his pro-Palestine image but here we see that he didn't really dislike "in principle" the Zionists.

[ramana]

i read many of John Gunther's books while in college.
Another was an Inside India cowritten with Turkish write Halide Edib

Eg. of her work:

http://zenfloyd.blogspot.com/2010/03/ha ... ia-as.html

A female Turkish Al Beruni

[chetak]

Here we go again! Forgetting to mention whose freedom struggle onlee

Role of Muslims in freedom struggle not portrayed well, feels Ghulam Nabi Azad

Isn't INC the party in power for majority of the time since 1947? And which party does Azad belong to/

IDIOT

sly double talking/dealing kashmiri IDIOT saar, vast difference onlee.

[A_Gupta]

http://www.dadinani.com/capture-memorie ... y-r-c-mody
My Memories of Sardar Patel by R C Mody

This are the impressions of a man who was young in 1947. If these impressions are accurate, it is interesting that certain people cite Gandhi-v-Bose and Nehru-v-Bose as weighing against Gandhi & Nehru; but never Patel-v-Bose.

Second, here too is expressed the belief too that Patel foresaw Partition and got the other Congress people to accept it.

Another factor which weighed against Patel in my eyes was his extremely hostile attitude towards Subhas. I had come to believe that it was Patel who was mainly responsible for inciting Gandhi against Subhas. Their enmity was not just ideological - it was personal too. It became public knowledge through newspaper reports that that Subhas and Patel's elder brother Vithalbhai (who served as a Speaker of the Central Assembly, predecessor of the present Lok Sabha) were together as patients in an Austrian hospital in the mid-1930s. Here they became very close to one another. Vithalbhai did not recover from the illness. Before passing away, he entrusted some of his assets to Subhas to be used for some good cause in India. When Subhas returned from Austria after his recovery, Sardar Patel asked him to surrender those assets. When Subhas declined to do so, Sardar Patel filed a civil suit against him in a law court. Subhas lost the case, and had to surrender the assets. When this news appeared in the press, Patel's image was in a shambles for a large section of Indians, including me.

and

But once Patel entered the Interim Government as Home Member (with Information & Broadcasting as an additional charge) on September 2, 1946, there was a sudden change in the feelings of young Indians like me about him. Not that there was a change in his style or that his personality underwent a change; he remained the same. But some of his attributes, which scared us earlier, started looking like assets for the country.
...

One of Patel's early acts around that time was to patch up with Subhas Bose's family. Subhas himself was dead, except to those who did not wish to acknowledge this sad truth. Patel publicly embraced Subhas's older brother Sarat, saying that animosity between their families was "now a matter of the past."

and

But the greatest of his foresights was shown by the way he dealt with the crisis created by Muslim League after it entered the Interim Government on 25th October 1946. He was the first to realize that the League had created a vertical divide in the entire governmental machinery on a communal basis, up from a Member (Minister) down to the lowest peon. There was a virtual inter-Departmental (the term Ministry was used only after Independence) war on the Raisina Hill. The League was making a determined attempt to demonstrate that Hindus and Muslims could not work together, to strengthen the notion that partition of the country was unavoidable. In fact, the League had already, in a way, created several Pakistans on Indian soil, if one looked at the working of the Departments of Finance, Industry, Health, Posts & Air, which were under League Members; Liaqat Ali, the Finance Member, presented the Finance Bill (Central Budget) of 1947 to the Central Assembly without showing it in advance to Nehru, who was the leader of the Interim Government.

"How can the country be governed in such a divided way, now and in future?" Patel is reported to have wondered. Nehru was angry with the League, but it was Patel whose prescience helped him and the country to realize the inevitability of the Partition. It was neither defeatism nor a hurry to capture power, as has been imputed to both of them in subsequent years. It was nothing short of foresight and wisdom which Poet Tulsi Das had advocated in the 16th century in this famous verse: "Budh ardh tajain, lukh sarvasa jata" (the wise give up half when they see the whole is going).

[brihaspati]

Things changed a lot by even end of August, 1946. But it still does not explain Patels suggestion way before August or September - that he would be okay with the CMP and accept the "short term" part of gov, if "Jinnah and JLN" came to an agreement over power sharing. Further all these later changes still do not explain as to why Patel thought that putting Jinnah and JLN together without any third party presence would help the duo come to an agreement over the short term.

All these changes still do not explain the sequence of narratives quoted on a certain site - where Patel differs and dissents from MKG over acceptance of CMP - at a stage where MKG was against accepting any part of CMP.

What does Patel's supposed quarrel with Bose has to do anything with Partition? I guess just as Patel's quarrel with Bose is so much to be highlighted by certain people - they do not want to highlight the fact that one of the closest supporters and associates of Bose - was the elder bro of Patel. The elder bro apparently left a will/endowment/money for Bose's endeavours - before his untimely death. Patel fought this "gift".

Shall we go into these family and monetary and romantic and other quarrels of the congrez upper echelon's to score tu-tu-mein-mein points - which are in turn most difficult to show as having any direct relevance for the particular topic - Partition? MKG-Sardar differences over Partition were specifically highlighted becuase they were differing over an issue around Partition. If we are trying to rehabilitate or whitewash JLN because some people have a negative impression of JLN over his supposed quarrel with Bose much earlier - and therefore relative to JLN we must also show Sardar as having similar quarrels with Bose -then this is hilarious.

Let us stick to Partition. There is plenty of material to show that JLN might have had extra activity showing an extra enmity towards Bose, compared to Sardar, and way before "Partition". Moreover the issues on which such differences arose might go beyond Partition. Moreover, Sardar's expression is relatively open and straightforward which makes it easier to pin him down to a position. JLN will be a fascinating study in mismatch between word and deed and capacity to hide intention or motive. Again, as I promised for other issues - I am game for it, but it will not be good for the icon's image. I also do not think it is necessary, but if really this Sardar == JLN game continues, then that very image will unfortunately need to be explored.

[arnab]

Not foreswearing violence has been discussed here as:
1) Calling in Army at a very early level to curb Islamic rioters
2) Not calling for people to get happily butchered but saying that Indians preserved the right to self defense.
etc..

However as has been corrected, INC had no issues in using violence to protect Nehru's hide, as also to stop Hindu's from protecting themselves. Only against the British brutality and Islamist violence did the "we must not blink an eye" come about.

Eh? so " foreswearing violence" cannot be equated with "suggesting armed rebellion" but "not foreswearing violence" can be equated as - "I'll call my teacher to show him that you are fighting " ? what is this - a partition version of "aircraft having over 70% servicability" to "frontline aircraft with over 70% servicability but I can't tell you my sources"

2. Which indians were being butchered? before partition, all hindus and muslims were technically Indians and unlike the ML for the hindus, the INC hadn't washed its hands off the muslim popn.

[brihaspati]

Bose was officially absent from the scene in any relevant way from mid 45 to mid-47, the period when at least officially this partition business suddenly was thrust upon unwilling throats of the congrez. [In reality the game started from Linlithcow, and Zafarullah Khan's so-called maps of two dominions]. I see bringing Bose into this stage - a rather underhand distraction.

Bose had his enemies within Bengal provincial politics too, and just as in any other place long under colonial rule, especially under entrenched Islamic rule - there were "pigeons of good times", people who opportunistically licked the winner's boots. So when Bose gave out to MKG, the birds swung around to the alternate emperor. Many such Bengalee voices chanted the official line of Bose's death etc. But as is quite clear from subsequent drama of various commissions - at least the first two tried desperately to be defensive about JLN and all the commissions, one way or the other tried to hide and suppress more than they tried to clear and got caught out in the process, which onlee increased suspicions among those who did not believ the Taihoku story.

Bose was one of the most emotional and perhaps stupidly idealist of the congrez politicians. He made many blunders - including trusting in the inherent good nature or idealism of his colleagues. It is surprising, since his political education started in the hands of a most worldy wise politician. I thoroughly accuse him of being impatient, and being idealist in expectations of other humans. Hopefully the next time he comes around he would be carrying these previous life lessons. But there is not much point comparing him and his interactions with the remainder top-brass left around MKG. Bose could onlee have had an indirect impact on Partition from 1945 to 1947, [he is unlikely to have survived beyond 63/65] and if anyone did use "him" towards Partition, it was again the clever possible manipulation of international intrigue by the usual suspects - but Bose himself had very little to do in it.

[arnab]

Interestingly, why would these factors onlee act about economic policy and not about previous political steps in the previous decades? If "behavioural" stuff do really affect people's "responses" - they did definitely do so before game theory was invented. [A theory is a model - and it has to be invented, it cannot be discovered].

Well, I think because 'economic policy' is very Executive led unlike the design of the 'political structure' which is Legislature led. Generally speaking the government has only a broad idea of what it wants to do - primarily with the objective of getting re-elected. The Executive (civil service / ministries) actually design ('how to do it') and deliver ('to whom to provide this policy') the government's 'vision'. So this is an extra layer so to say. This layer is important and also works in its own interest. So even if there was a political will to change policy, institutional inertia would have resisted it.

On the 'political' steps that the INC could / should have taken - well there was no reason presumably as to why the INC would want to change a 'system' that had been returning it to power over the last 12 odd years.

So I'm not sure why you feel that this is a dichotomy.

[Yayavar]

Sardar Patel had the uncanny gift of foresight and the ability to take hard decisions. He rightly assessed the situation prevailing in mid 1947. Based on his experience in the Interim Government when the Muslim League had brought government functioning to a grinding halt, the crescendo of communal violence and the Army getting contaminated, combating communal violence for nearly a year, he realized that there was now no alternative to Partition. His decision to salvage the wreck in 1947 was an act of great statesmanship. If that had not been done, things would have become much worse. [/b]

We would have had a civil war on our hands with the Army broken up and participating from both sides. One does not know what the outcome of such a conflict may have been. India may have broken up into several independent States like erstwhile Yugoslavia or could have become a much larger version of present Lebanon. In his own words, the Sardar chose to save 80% of the country. Had a patchwork solution of unity with a weak centre been accepted in 1947, the results could have been disastrous. With a weak Centre the integration of the 500 odd Princely States may not have been possible.

The minority population of India was about 12% in 1947. Today, the combined minority population in an undivided India would have been over 40%. Petrol funded Islamist forces that have now emerged in the world would have swamped India. India as we know it today would not have existed. Patel’s acceptance of a moth eaten Pakistan and getting the Congress to accept it, was a great achievement. This was almost at par with his universally hailed achievement of integrating the Princely States with the Indian Union.

The first vivisection of India had taken place in the beginning of the second millennium. Although the Arabs had conquered Sindh in 712 A D, they had remained confined to the deserts of Sindh for three centuries and subsequently Sindh had not broken away from India. The Hindu Shahi dynasty ruled over Afghanistan with their capital at Kabul. They guarded the country’s North West Frontier. Starting from 999 A D, they succumbed to the invasions of the great conqueror and plunderer, Mahmud Gazni. India was exposed for the first time to the ferocity of religious fundamentalism. Soon, Afghanistan ceased to be a part of India. That was our country’s first vivisection.

The second took place in 1947 again on account of religious fundamentalism. Sardar Patel ensured that the 80% residual India was fully integrated and became a strong nation. Despite that part of the country which broke away becoming a theocracy and carrying out instant ethnic cleansing in the West and gradual in the East, Nehru and Patel ensured that India retained her secular values.

I think the general puts it very clearly what was saved and how.

Yes, and it lends credence to the general view that the Sardar determined the most prudent action and convinced all, including Gandhi, that partition would have to be accepted.

[devesh]

viv ji,

let's not jump so fast on what Sardar might have been thinking. it's not so simple. it all sounds sweet when we hear things like "gangrenous part needs to be cut off" or "wise man saves half when he sees the whole thing dying" and other stuff like that.

Patel, it seems, was advised by British intelligence working under him that if Patel thought of being more forceful with the Muslims, then India would "loose" North West India. Patel simply responded that if the British thought the Muslims could be persuaded by "generosity", then they didn't understand the "Muslim mind".

what does this tell us? for Patel to make such a candid statement, it surely must mean that he was not only aware of the virus of Islamism but perhaps was even calculating the future projection of the Muslims in the subcontinent. he must have realized by that stage that whatever form Partition takes, it was necessary for the Hindus/Sikhs to give a fitting answer to the Muslims via a show of force and violence, if necessary, to convince them to be happy with whatever concessions/land they got and not have any further future designs.

Patel very clearly understood that once the virus of Islamist expansionism was planted in the Muslim mind, appeasement would not work. This is a very significant pointer. We should remember this.

[Yayavar]

viv ji,

let's not jump so fast on what Sardar might have been thinking. it's not so simple. it all sounds sweet when we hear things like "gangrenous part needs to be cut off" or "wise man saves half when he sees the whole thing dying" and other stuff like that.

I'm commenting on the widely held view. Gen. Sinha was in the thick of things and has included the above inference. Whether it is the right assessment or not can only be determined by tallying various original sources. Whether it was the right approach can be debated.

Patel, it seems, was advised by British intelligence working under him that if Patel thought of being more forceful with the Muslims, then India would "loose" North West India. Patel simply responded that if the British thought the Muslims could be persuaded by "generosity", then they didn't understand the "Muslim mind".

what does this tell us? for Patel to make such a candid statement, it surely must mean that he was not only aware of the virus of Islamism but perhaps was even calculating the future projection of the Muslims in the subcontinent. he must have realized by that stage that whatever form Partition takes, it was necessary for the Hindus/Sikhs to give a fitting answer to the Muslims via a show of force and violence, if necessary, to convince them to be happy with whatever concessions/land they got and not have any further future designs.

Patel very clearly understood that once the virus of Islamist expansionism was planted in the Muslim mind, appeasement would not work. This is a very significant pointer. We should remember this.

I can understand Sardar's statement but do not see how the 'fitting response' is derived from it.

[Sanku]

Not foreswearing violence has been discussed here as:
1) Calling in Army at a very early level to curb Islamic rioters
2) Not calling for people to get happily butchered but saying that Indians preserved the right to self defense.
etc..

However as has been corrected, INC had no issues in using violence to protect Nehru's hide, as also to stop Hindu's from protecting themselves. Only against the British brutality and Islamist violence did the "we must not blink an eye" come about.

Eh? so " foreswearing violence" cannot be equated with "suggesting armed rebellion" but "not foreswearing violence" can be equated as - "I'll call my teacher to show him that you are fighting " ? what is this - a partition version of "aircraft having over 70% servicability" to "frontline aircraft with over 70% servicability but I can't tell you my sources"
[/quopte]

What are you blabbering about. I can understand you are hopelessly confused, just dont pour it out here.

2. Which indians were being butchered? before partition, all hindus and muslims were technically Indians and unlike the ML for the hindus, the INC hadn't washed its hands off the muslim popn.

Which Indians were butchered? Oh man why dont you go and read up on the basics before trying to discuss things which are clearly outside your ken.

After entire Ramayan......

[brihaspati]

Interestingly, why would these factors onlee act about economic policy and not about previous political steps in the previous decades? If "behavioural" stuff do really affect people's "responses" - they did definitely do so before game theory was invented. [A theory is a model - and it has to be invented, it cannot be discovered].

Well, I think because 'economic policy' is very Executive led unlike the design of the 'political structure' which is Legislature led. Generally speaking the government has only a broad idea of what it wants to do - primarily with the objective of getting re-elected. The Executive (civil service / ministries) actually design ('how to do it') and deliver ('to whom to provide this policy') the government's 'vision'. So this is an extra layer so to say. This layer is important and also works in its own interest. So even if there was a political will to change policy, institutional inertia would have resisted it.

On the 'political' steps that the INC could / should have taken - well there was no reason presumably as to why the INC would want to change a 'system' that had been returning it to power over the last 12 odd years.

So I'm not sure why you feel that this is a dichotomy.

It would not have been much of a problem if "game theory" had not been mentioned. Game theory works on rational choice theory - one way or the other. People are expected to be expected utility maximizers - whatever be the modifications or extensions of the utility concept involved. In a sense it is also about an assumption of humans being consistent in their strategic profiles [they may mix robbing with piousness - say in a 1:10 ratio - but that ratio more or less remains constant].

Unless something drastically overwrote the code of the brains in the iconic leaders - their strategic approach to manipulation of systems would remain the same - especially if they are doing it in their mature years, where by observation, people do not innovate that much on their strategic profile. Hence for these leaders, their approach at manipulation is expected to have remained the same from before independence [JLN's later statement about already being "old men" at Partition].

Now there is a lot that is made out of economic decisionmaking and the netwrks/systems/processes that involve economics as being somehow radically different from competitive political systems. In reality it is not so. Economic networks and political networks behave in very similar ways. Economic institutions and political institutions have more in common than is ususally acknowledged. In a virtual one-party state that remained in post Independence India, for the period we are talking about - there would not be much radical change in institutional conditions from before.

From 1942, congrez had not really called for any mass action - in fact it did its best to suppress them. We hear of illustrious civil servants working closely and intimately with the congrez leaders in jointly shaping political policy [who influenced whom is of course to be decided by the needs of saving iconic images for devotional worship] - or these politically independent leaders relying on civil-servant "right hand men" to draft the most crucial political documents [they were not merely economic decisions]. They did not pick out alternative people not belonging to the establishment - to do the same stuff. Neither did they do those documents on their own.

So if you are saying that the layer somehow did not allow the leaders to lead - that cannot be claimed to be restricted onlee to post indepndence economics. It then extended backwards to pre-independence days and into political decisions. If broad "visions" about "economics" had to be left to that "sub-layer" who implemented it - and by implication subverted the grand visions of the leaders [the fault was in the implementation and not in the vision - after all at the end of the day it is the yeevil baboo who is responsible not the master], then the same implementation dependence is obvious also in the lead up to the Partition. We hear the excuses - that the leaders did not "want it" but they were forced to accpet it faced with the reality of implementing a no-Partition policy. We also hear that that implementations were not done by their own hand -but through "right hand men".

So either the leaders did not have any vision and just swam with the establishment - or they did try but failed as leaders [ a leader changes establishments and is no longer fit to be called a leader if the establishment leads the leader].