Ambar wrote:What curbs US policies from evolving with changing geopolitical situation ? US as a nation has been known for its pragmatic approach to problems than for its 'traditionalism', Pakistan's deceit was conspicuous by 1967 but yet there has not been a fundamental change in the US policies towards it.
Nothing stops the US from changing its policies. That is what
realpolitik is all about and the US are masters of that. As I said, the US still sees, in the short term at least, a lot of benefits in its relationship with Pakistan. The US probably realizes that it cannot stop the fragmentation of Pakistan; it can only postpone that inevitability. The Pakistanis themselves are working towards that end stage, as they did with East Pakistan. The 3½ Friends cannot undo what the Pakistanis themselves want to do. The US is trying to get the best out of these circumstances, perhaps. So long as the US troops and US interests are in Afghanistan, the US needs Pakistan.
If you look at the timeline, the US needed TSP in the 50s for 'stopping the spread of Communism' especially as India wanted to remain 'non-aligned' and later had to seek the assistance of the Soviet Union when the US concluded military treaties with Pakistan and began to supply it with modern equipment, training etc. In the early 60s, the US tried to pacify an estranged Pakistan that threatened to turn to China (seceeding Shaksgam in 1963 to PRC) under a belligerent ZA Bhutto. In the early 70s, the US needed TSP's help to broker the relationship with PRC. As ZAB came to power in c. 1972, the trail went cold but was revived by the events of Dec. 1979. Gen. Zia ensured that no other intelligence organization came into Af-Pak region during those years thus denying a big opportunity for the Americans. The US allowed both covertly and overtly, the Pakistanis to acquire the nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. They also helped in their policy of using terror as a state policy. After
c. 1992, the trail again went cold. However, the US still gave approval to the ISI to install the Taliban regime in Kabul with the Saudi money and support, rather than supporting the more moderate elements. After the Kenyan/Tanzanian bombings in
c. 1998, the US again needed the Pakistani support. The Pakistani policy has always been "Yes, we will support you, but . . ." and the US acceded to those if's and but's.
Thus, events were either fortuitous that were cleverly exploited by Pakistan or were created by Pakistan to get the US behind it.