Re: Managing Pakistan's failure
Posted: 04 Feb 2011 03:08
Could be. However some of us old timers were following this Pressler charade from mid 80s! And there was no BR then.
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Prem bahalle bahalle!!!US dilemma for Pakistan K.P. NAYAR
Washington, Feb. 3:
The crisis of the Arab Street is slowly spilling into South Asia.
In Lahore, it has surfaced in demonstrations since Sunday against any attempt to release a US consular employee, now in custody for the murder of two Pakistanis, and has spread to the US chancery and the foreign office in Islamabad.
In both cities, the establishment is walking a tightrope, hoping to direct the pervasive anti-Americanism cutting across Pakistani society away from its own rulers. That may be easier than dealing with what is emerging as the worst diplomatic stand-off between Washington and Islamabad.
In an effort to secure the release of Raymond Davis, the consular employee, President Barack Obama quietly sent Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the US and Nato forces in Afghanistan, for a meeting with Pakistan’s army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, but to no avail.
So far, at least. Worse, the Pakistanis made public the general’s trip from Afghanistan without, of course, saying that Davis was his reason to see Kayani.
Obama sent Petraeus following consternation on Capitol Hill here that Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari had turned down a plea by a six-member delegation of US Congressmen to free Davis.
The delegation was made up of members of the US House of Representatives, Stephen Lynch, Brian Higgins, Todd Platts, Jason Chaffetz and Raul Labradorand led by the powerful chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform committee, Darrell Issa.
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{All Paki supporters!}
Many Congressmen think they own Pakistan because of the control the US Congress exercises on the purse-strings of the huge aid to Islamabad and Zardari’s refusal was a rare slap in their faces.
But, for the establishment in Pakistan, the Davis case has come in handy: during crises of the street, it is not uncommon for foreign nationals to become pawns in the games for power. It has happened in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in Idi Amin’s Uganda and in China during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Today, a magistrate in Lahore extended the police remand for Davis by another eight days. This week, the central and Punjab governments clashed on the issue and there was uproar in Pakistan’s National Assembly over the Zardari government’s prospective inability to stand up to pressure from Washington to free Davis.
Islam being the raison d’être for Pakistan, Rawalpindi has always shivered when it rained in Cairo, Tehran or Rabat.
It happened during the siege of the Grand Mosque at Mecca in 1979, again in 1989 after Salman Rushdie published The Satanic Verses and has occurred periodically whenever peace at the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem was disrupted.
Although it is in South Asia, Pakistan’s rulers have always had pretensions of being sentimentally closer to the Arab world than to its neighbours because of religion.![]()
But perhaps for the first time, this proximity, partly self-deluding, has put not only Zardari, but also Kayani and the Opposition’s Nawaz Sharif in a crisis of identity.![]()
Notionally a democracy, Pakistan’s democratic institutions are only slightly stronger than those in many Arab states.As in Egypt, the military is the strongest institution in Pakistan.
Therefore, the potential for a popular revolt in Pakistan against its ruling classes of the Hosni Mubarak variety can only be diverted through the outlet of anti-Americanism.
But the government’s and the military’s dependence on Washington makes any excessive fanning of anti-Americanism self-defeating.
{Really HAMletian choice! And poetic justice/choice too!}
Pakistan’s closeness to Arab despots and the benefits it has received from such closeness from states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also makes it difficult for Islamabad to decide where it stands in the present crisis.
By late this evening, there were signs that a resolution of the crisis over Davis may be in the offing.
Interior minister Rehman Malik today confirmed that the American is in Pakistan on a diplomatic passport.That will make it difficult for the courts in Lahore to hold him in remand much longer.
Need to archive this article. In the last one week I have seen at least one comment on this forum that said that Pakistan was "abandoned" by the US after 1979.
Between 1979 and 1989 Pakistan received $5.6 billion (in constant 2009 dollars) in total aid, of which $3.5 billion was military assistance.) During this period, Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons program without penalty until 1990 while receiving enormous financial and military support from the U.S., which allowed Pakistan to improve its capabilities to fight India.
I hope you don't mean me Shiv.shiv wrote:Need to archive this article. In the last one week I have seen at least one comment on this forum that said that Pakistan was "abandoned" by the US after 1979.
Between 1979 and 1989 Pakistan received $5.6 billion (in constant 2009 dollars) in total aid, of which $3.5 billion was military assistance.) During this period, Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons program without penalty until 1990 while receiving enormous financial and military support from the U.S., which allowed Pakistan to improve its capabilities to fight India.
Johann wrote: I hope you don't mean me Shiv.
I think, if Aasia Bibi is hanged for blasphemy or killed otherwise by anybody in Pakistan, EU Parliament should stop ALL imports from Pakistan. Perhaps BRFites should write to EU Parliamentarians, Pakistani Christians in Europe like Mr. Joseph Philip, and to North League Party and any other group, which has influence in the EU Parliament.ROME: Italian lawmakers and religious associations protested in Rome Wednesday against Pakistan’s blasphemy law, calling for the release of a Christian woman sentenced to death under the legislation.
Catholic and Jewish associations joined human rights group Amnesty International and representatives of the Pakistani community in Italy in a 100-strong demonstration in front of the Italian parliament.
“We want this law to be abolished,” Pakistani-born Joseph Philip told AFP, explaining that his uncle, a Catholic Bishop, had been killed for his religious beliefs. He said he had come to the protest along with 15 compatriots.
Asia Bibi, a 45-year-old, Christian mother-of-five, was sentenced to death in November after Muslim women labourers who worked with her in the fields complained she made derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed.
Umberto Bossi, head of Italy’s anti-immigrant and populist Northern League Party and prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s partner in the centre-right coalition, attended Wednesday’s protest here.
“We want to express our solidarity,” he told journalists. A delegation from the protest also met Foreign Minister Franco Frattini.
Last Thursday the European parliament urged Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari to pardon and release Bibi following calls from several countries, international organisations and an appeal by Pope Benedict XVI.
European parliamentarians also called on the Pakistani government to revise their blasphemy laws and their application.
Ramana, this is why I said in the 'Pakistan proliferation' thread that the US and Pakistan came to an understanding on this issue before Pakistani collaboration was cemented in the US obsession to defeat the USSR and dismantle communism.ramana wrote:Christine Fair spills out a lot of perfidy!
The F-16 Fiasco
Select quotes:Despite full knowledge of Pakistan's nuclear program, Congress added Section 620E to the FAA, which granted the president a qualified authority to waive sanctions for six years, . . . .In 1985, the Pressler Amendment was passed, making U.S. assistance to Pakistan conditional on an annual presidential assessment and certification that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons.
RajeshA wrote: This is an emotive enough issue in many circles in Europe, especially in the various Roman Catholic countries, and it would be easier to win over EU legislators on this issue, than on terrorism.
The screws need to be tightened on Pakistan.
VikasRaina wrote:RajeshA Ji, Somehow love for Pakistan in western world runs deeper than we think it is. Atleast until the point, Pakistan is useful for Geo-strategic reason. Once that phase is over, Pakistan has been and will been thrown away like hair stuck in the comb.
These days only religious issue that is emotive is, if it involves followers of RoP.
I think, we should not see the West as one big bloc working under a singular assumption and control. It is a heterogenous bloc, and may be the pro-Pakistan lobby or the anti-India lobby is there to talk the various groups into supporting Pakistan's longevity, but any such lobby would have its work made more difficult if the various groups get increasingly agitated against Pakistan and want to lash out.Muppalla wrote:As long as India is not divided, this love will be there. The love will never go away and I will bet even if a JDAM goes to US mainland, the love will still be there. Thing might change even if a small district is made independent from India.
We just go in loops and circles on the forum with a lot of analysis and some false hopes.
According to the info it was around 1987 the bomb was transfered.ramana wrote:SSridhar, To add to your remarks, I think 1985-86 period is when the US allowed the PRC to transfer the actual bomb.
Shiv,shiv wrote: You specifically stated that Pakistan was abandoned by the US from 1965 to 1980 and that China then became more important. This completely ignores US support and protection of Pakistan before, during and after the 1971 war since Pakistan was a bulwark in China-US detente. I am sure you have read the released (formerly confidential) cables about the attitude that Nixon and Kissinger had towards issues like India's suspected designs on West Pakistan in 1971 and the encouragement given to China to put pressure on India during the war (which China did not do).
Shiv,Clearly an "abandonment" from 1990 to 2001 is a mealy mouthed version of events. In the 1990s the US unequivocally considered terrorists in Kashmir as "freedom fighters". The same freedom fighters who helped release the 3000 odd people in the twin towers from the bondage of life on earth.
By most reports the Chinese transferred CHIC-4 design to the Pakistanis (PAEC) in late 1982 to early 1983. That is why they conduct their first cold test in March 1983. AQ Khan claims in an interview with Nawa-i-Waqt in February 10 that Pakistan had achieved nuclear weapons capabilityramana wrote:SSridhar, To add to your remarks, I think 1985-86 period is when the US allowed the PRC to transfer the actual bomb. It was this period when they escalted the Mujhedooen operations by providing Stingers and want to ensure that TSP had some deterrent against Soveit retalaliation. The losses in Afghanistan and the economic mess iN FSU forced the end of Cold War soon after that.
Ramana,However the US-PRC perfidy is that the bombs were not taken back after the end of Cold War and allowed to be retained by TSP as Wages of Terrorsim. In fact PRC allowed the TSP to test its bomb in 1990 per the US officials who wrote a book on PRC nuke program. All this after the Cold War was over.
Johann wrote:
What were the conditions of Pakistan's US-supplied weaponry during the Kargil war in 1999? How many operational F-16s and P-3s did they have?
What was Pakistan's economic condition during the Kargil War and on September 10th 2001?
Shiv,ohann I am not sure why you wish to belabor the point and make what seems to me a feeble excuse for American actions.
I have a slightly different opinion on this. Pakistan's survival as a nation state was underwritten by the US apart from arms and funds. Neither China nor the Saudis can do this. I have a list of reasons why I believe this to be true - not least the fact that the Pakistani elite who made all the deals with the US were culturally closer to the US that either KSA or Pakistan.Johann wrote: As long as China and Saudi Arabia remain on the same page as far as Pakistan , the Pakistani Army, and the jihadis they rely on will get all the support they need to survive.
Two kinds of transfers took place. One was actual devices themselves, as you said. The other was the design. In the case of the latter, all possible assistance was provided to Pakistan to build the bomb from scratch. The two principal players supplied many things such as enriched Uranium, Uranium Hexafluoride, ring magnets, inverters, oscilloscopes, Krytron switches etc. The very first cold test was conducted sometime in c. 1983. Hot testing took place in c. 1984. There are several confirmations of this. Even in c. 2002, when AQ Khan was publicly pardoned by Musharraf, the overriding concern in Islamabad was that he would spill the secrets of Chinese assistance. PRC came in very handy for the US because it had not signed NPT.ramana wrote:SSridhar, To add to your remarks, I think 1985-86 period is when the US allowed the PRC to transfer the actual bomb.
tsk tsk Johann. You are confusing "nationalism" with "self indulgence". The loss of East Pakistan did not touch the elite. They just went on and emerged stronger, as did the support they got from the US. It was their own survival that was important to them and the US played an admirable role. Neither they nor the US cared for useless East Pakistan.Johann wrote: What makes you think that the PA elite depend on the Americans for their will to hang together and survive? Nixon's support didn't make any difference to the East Bengali struggle. The absence of US support didn't make any difference during Z.A. Bhutto's struggle to crush the Baluchis. The deciding factor is always much more local.
Johann wrote: Can one honestly say that the devout Zia had more in common with an actor from California like Reagan than King Fahd in Saudi Arabia? Or that Kiyani does not have more in common with the tough generals of the CMC as far as political culture goes than people like Admiral Mullen? The PA and PLA know what it means to run military businesses, dictate policy to civilian leaders, brutally crack down on restless minorities and actively proliferate nuclear materials.
Of course it will not happen if the Americans disengage. The Americans have never fed Pakis and never will feed them. What the Americans did was not even to make the elite richer as you have quite erroneously stated. Th Pakistani elite were rich without America and will continue to be rich minus America. What America did was to help consolidate the military power of the elite against the most dangerous challenges to their existence - mainly India. And that is why I want to see the US back out.Johann wrote:The challenges of feeding a Pakistani population in the course of doubling by 2050 are absolutely mindboggling, but I don't doubt what would happen if and when the Americans disengage again - they will get just enough help from the PRC and the Saudis to blackmail India in to providing the rest of what it needs to survive. India will be wealthy enough to make it a much more attractive target for extortion than mutual assured destruction.
The Demographics are coming after the Elite in Pakistan, for several reasons:shiv wrote:If the US model of supporting the elite over demographic forces is failing, I would like to know what kind of magic the Chinese are going to perform in perpetuating the US model, funding and arming the Pakistani army while the population becomes more numerous, more illiterate and more removed from the rest of the world. the fact that this population of Pakistan will be a problem for India too is beside the point. How is china going to step in where the US failed, using the same tactic (or arming and funding the elite) that the US used? That elite is losing control of its own population. Demography is beginning to kick in in Pakistan.
shiv saar,shiv wrote:In fact China fears Islamism more than the US because China is right here in Asia. US mediated stability in Afghanistan, and lack of significant Islamist encroachment from there is an asset for China. China has a border with Afghanistan as well.
I find China making ass-licking statements about Pakistan - and the ass licking is directed at the Paki establishment. I see no way that China alone can succeed when a combination of China and the US having similar goals in Pakistan have failed. And there is no oil in Pakistan to convert Pakistan into Saudia.
China will have to face up to Islam and I'm lovin' it.
Shiv,shiv wrote: tsk tsk Johann. You are confusing "nationalism" with "self indulgence". The loss of East Pakistan did not touch the elite. They just went on and emerged stronger, as did the support they got from the US. It was their own survival that was important to them and the US played an admirable role. Neither they nor the US cared for useless East Pakistan.
Shiv, your claim was that Zia and the other generals were prone at doing business with the West than it was with China and the Saudis because of a common but fading colonial heritage.Johann wrote:Tell me you're joking. Zia knew well how to run a military business and his suited booted westernized businessmen oiled deals with the US and the west. All deals with Pakistan invariably involve middlemen and kickbacks and the companies that sold to Pakistan were enriched as much as Pakistani officers and middlemen. I believe that you might be attributing a degree of "conscience" and "uprightness" in the US's dealings with Pakistan. The culture I am talking about is hardly the culture of fine dining and ballroom dancing. It is a culture of innate ba$tardry and chootiyapanti in which the US recognized that the Paki elite were incorrigible self serving mofos and Pakistan understood that the US too consists of incorrigible self serving mofos. A conclave of criminals basically with criminal minds on both sides making full use of each others strengths.
Johann wrote:Of course it will not happen if the Americans disengage. The Americans have never fed Pakis and never will feed them. What the Americans did was not even to make the elite richer as you have quite erroneously stated. Th Pakistani elite were rich without America and will continue to be rich minus America.
And you don't think the Chinese and Saudis can do the same thing? Have you been watching the growth of the Chinese economy and armed forces?What America did was to help consolidate the military power of the elite against the most dangerous challenges to their existence - mainly India. And that is why I want to see the US back out.
Yes, Shiv, maintenance and availability is important, which is why I asked you to look back at the readiness of the American platforms PAF and PN during the Kargil War in 1999 and Parakram in 2001-02 after a decade of sanctions. The list of post 9-11 deliveries and sales to Pakistan (which I posted in the mil forum a while back) had spares at the top of their list.I believe you are only bluffing yourself if you point me to "tables" that say that the US paid the Pakis nothing for X years because what the US actually did does not go into tables. Not published ones anyway. If the US supplies 200 F-86s Sabres one day and stops supplying them the next day - I can be shown "tables" that the US is no longer helping. But those Sabres remain operational for years and their life gets extended by indirect means with Chinese, German, Iranian and Turkish mediation while the US can wear a halo around its head and say "Look at the tables. We're not paying Pakistan nothin'" The same thing holds true for F-16s. How stupid it would have been for any Indian to have said in 1990 - "Hey lookee at what we've got. The US is out. So the F-16s are no threat now" So the aid that the US gave to Pakistan in earlier years nicely covered the gap until Pakistan pinched the US's bottom with 9-11. The US took the hint and started helping their gang members again.
Perhaps, but still worth exploring.Disagreement is what we have got.
It has been reported by US intelligence that Pakistan has become the world's fifth largest nuclear weapons power, overtaking Britain. The deployed weapons now number more than 110, according to recent estimates of US intelligence. Pakistan says that it is a credible, minimum nuclear deterrent, and people should not get unduly concerned about the stockpile of nuclear weapons. Observers say that Pakistan has been infuriated by the nuclear deal between Washington and New Delhi, arguing that it has freed India's homemade fuel to produce new weapons. As a result, Pakistan argues that it has no choice but to bolster its own production.It is reported that the US has spent $100 million helping Pakistan to build fences, install sensor systems and train personnel to handle the weapons. But the US is deeply concerned that weapons-usable fuel, which is kept in laboratories and storage centres, is more vulnerable and could be diverted by insiders in Pakistan's vast nuclear complex.Another concern is not the weapons but the increase in production of material, especially plutonium. Pakisan is completing work on a large plutonium production reactor, which will greatly increase its ability to produce a new generation of weapons.The biggest concern for the US is theft from the plants that produce plutonium ( Hu has given them PU Bomb Design,H"i"an ji). It is reported that Al Queda has been attempting to procure nuclear material and recruit scientists in order to build a "dirty bomb." Western security chiefs told a Nato meeting in 2009 that Al-Queda was planning a programme of "dirty radioactive improved explosive devices" which could be used against soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Al Queda papers found in 2007 convinced security officials that greater advances had been made in bio-terrorism than previously feared.There have been attempts by rogue organisations to smuggle weapons grade material. A freight train on the Kazakhstan-Russia border had carried weapons-grade material, and a small dealer in Lisbon had tried to sell radioactive plates stolen from Chernobyl.How is Pakistan financing the new weapons production at a time of financial stress in the country?
OK. So he thinks it won't happen in TSP for the above mentioned reasons. He ignores that the only constant in TSP is the military shadow over the govrnment. Willy nilly since Ayub Khan's coup in the late fifties the Army has cast a long shadow. Right now the people's anger is turned into useless thunderbolts and is diverted. Then will come the TSPA 's turnWILL PAKISTAN BE NEXT?
- It is to be hoped that the Arab future tilts towards democracy
KANTI BAJPAI
The crises in Tunisia and Egypt have surprised the world even as they have shocked the incumbent leaderships. The knock-on effects on South Yemen and Jordan suggest that there is widespread popular disaffection in the Arab world. Is this a pointer to rebellion brewing in the Muslim world beyond the Arab countries? What about Pakistan in particular? Could it be next?
What we are seeing in Tunisia and now in Egypt is large-scale popular rebellion against long-standing authoritarian leaderships. Both are fairly advanced Arab countries in terms of per capita income ($7900 and $5400 respectively in purchasing power parity terms), literacy (78 per cent and 66 per cent), exposure to the media and electronic communications, and political awareness. Both have respectable population growth rates, with Tunisia slightly below the world average and Egypt somewhat above. Both are growing economically at a decent rate — at between 3.5 and 4.5 per cent respectively. Unemployment is probably the most disturbing element, with Tunisia at 14 per cent and Egypt at 10 per cent.
There is trouble also in Yemen and Jordan. How do they stack up against Tunisia and Egypt? Yemen has a per capita income of $2400 and Jordan of $5000. Literacy is at 59 per cent and 91 per cent respectively. Population growth rates are 2.97 per cent and three per cent, well above the global average of 1.17 per cent. Economically, they are both growing at five per cent. And unemployment is 35 per cent and 13 per cent. This suggests that Jordan is somewhat closer to Tunisia and Egypt.
Why then, given quite different profiles, at least between Yemen on the one hand and Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan on the other, are both sets of countries in political difficulty? Do the economic and social characteristics of countries not matter?
There is a view that economic and social deprivation leads to rebellion. An alternative view is that economic and social progress, up to a threshold, gives rise to rebellion. The four profiles sketched in here suggest that the latter view is more credible, as three of the four States represent middle-level developing countries that have attained a certain threshold of economic and social progress. Economic and social progress creates political awareness and a level of political mobilization that is necessary for an agitational movement. Economic and social progress is also influential in determining the nature of the movement. If one had to make a vulgar prediction, it is that Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, as relatively rich and modern societies, will handle the present crises somewhat better and move in the direction of a fairly moderate, liberal alternative. Not so Yemen.
Is there anything that the four countries have in common besides being Arab and Muslim and sharing some economic and social features? One striking common feature is their political leadership which has been in the same hands for three decades. Discontent is as much political, therefore, as it is economic and social.
Where is Pakistan in comparison? Its per capita income is $2600 dollars, close to Yemen’s. Literacy is 54 per cent, again Yemen-like. Population is growing at a more moderate pace, at 1.84 per cent. Economic growth is running at 2.7 per cent, lower than Yemen and barely keeping up with population growth. Unemployment stands at 15 per cent, well below Yemen’s rate. In sum, Pakistan’s economic and social profile is more like that of Yemen than of Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan.
Yet, compared to the four Arab States, Pakistan has certain political characteristics which make massive street protests against the incumbent government unlikely. It has had a history of rather effective street protests — in 1969 to oust Ayub Khan, in 1977 to oust Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and in 2009 to oust Pervez Musharraf. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely to happen in the wake of Tunisia and Egypt.
For one thing, and perhaps most importantly, Pakistan has not had the same leadership for 30 years. Nobody in Pakistan, not even a dictator, has ruled for more than 11 years. Pervez Musharraf, the last authoritarian leader of that country, did not quite make the 11-year ‘limit’, being at the helm from 1999 to 2009.
Secondly, the present government in Pakistan is a popularly elected one. There is discontent in the country, but the Zardari government was elected in a free and fair election and his political capital has not run out — he has not hit the 11-year limit. Nor has it been possible to focus public anger against any one leader. President Asif Ali Zardari is not personally liked, but he is not the only focus of dissatisfaction. The prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, runs the day-to-day affairs of the State with a fairly capable group of ministers. Responsibility is more diffuse in Pakistan.
This brings me to a third feature of the Pakistani system, namely, its relative openness. Pakistan today is not authoritarian in the way that Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen are. There are political spaces and freedoms available to dissenting groups, most obviously parliament. The effect of this is to let pressure dissipate.
Fourth, Pakistan has a lively and relatively free media. Popular expressions of dissent and dissatisfaction are allowed fairly free rein, particularly in periods of civilian rule. Even during military rule, Pakistan’s press has had a fair degree of commentative and reporting freedom. Political unhappiness is therefore not bottled up as in the Arab world.
Another key difference is that Islamic forces in Pakistan have not been suppressed in the way that they have been contained in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. It is not clear to what extent Islamic groups have instigated or taken over the protests in those three countries. In Egypt, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood is becoming more evident. What is worrisome in the Egyptian movement is that the only organized force within it is the Brotherhood. There is a danger, therefore, that the Islamists will manipulate the post-Mubarak phase to their advantage and marginalize the liberals. In Pakistan, by contrast, the Islamists are pretty much out in the open and have the patronage or acquiescence of political parties and the army. Pakistani Islamists may not need a popular movement against the government of the day. They already set a good deal of the agenda and frequently act as a veto group.
Finally, young people have been a crucial force in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, but Pakistan’s youth, particularly educated youth, have really not played much of a role in agitational politics since the late 1960s. Some segments of young people have been drawn into Islamic radicalism, others have joined the mainstream political parties. Yet others have emigrated to the West or are politically apathetic. Those who have joined Islamic radicalism and those in the mainstream parties are not terribly interested in agitational street politics: the radicals are attracted to terrorism and sectarian conflict — Shia versus Sunni — or cultural reformation; and those in the political parties give vent to their views within the political process.
If this is correct, Pakistan is unlikely to be a candidate for the kind of protests we are seeing in the Arab world. Pakistan already has a richer democratic history than these countries. It also has much more instability and political violence. We must hope that the Arab future tilts towards democracy rather than instability and violence.
The author teaches international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
Opinion writers are despairing. Not good.Tamasha at Thimpu Managing Pakistan's failure and denuking it should preoccupy India most, says N.V.Subramanian.
7 February 2011: Can there be successful engagement between a thriving and rumbustious democracy like India and a failing jihadi state like Pakistan?
Not really.
Which is why this writer dismisses as hyperbole (or uncharacteristic cunning?) the Indian foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao's description of her Thimpu talks with her Pakistani counterpart as "successful".
Pakistan and India come to talks with mirror-opposite positions on Kashmir, the subject of Pakistan's eternal obsession. Pakistan claims it as the elusive prize of Partition.
Pakistan believes that with the possession of Kashmir, its problems of nationhood and national identity will cease. That's completely misguided.
If Pakistan had to become a nation, it would have done so in more than sixty years of independence. Kashmir is an excuse it trots out for its own failures in nation-building.
It sees Kashmir's breakaway as a catalyst to Balkanize India. It visualizes India as an artificial construct of secularism to be destroyed for its own survival.
That is one more reason why India will -- and can -- never give up Kashmir. No Central government could survive bartering away the state or changing its boundaries.
The problem for India is that it cannot not keep up the pretense of talking to Pakistan. The United States which has a handle in both countries wants talks to continue even though it is reconciled to its failure.
The US and India share fears about Pakistani nukes. The fear that those nukes will leak to the terrorists, in whole or in part, is what worries them and other responsible nuclear powers.
The crisis centres on the Pakistan army and the intelligence services. They control the deployment and security of the weapons.
Earlier, the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment nuclear-blackmailed India. Alongside, it expanded anti-India terrorism under a nuclear overhang, going all the way up to waging a "limited war" in Kargil.
It's when all this didn't deter India that it has attempted to blackmail the world about its nukes. The blackmail has taken two distinct forms.
One is that the Pakistan military must continue to be richly Western-aided so that it does not weaken against the terrorists and lose control of the nukes. Most of the aid is used to build the war-machine against India.
When Pakistan is questioned about the need for nukes, seeing it is the aggressor against India, and voices are raised to denuke it, it adopts the second distinctive form of blackmail. It lets out that the nukes will be leaked to the terrorists if it is not supported.
This vicious cycle could go on except for one thing. Pakistan is failing at a rapid pace. A terrorist takeover of Pakistan is as much a mid-term possibility as the state breaking up into its rival provinces. Don't imagine a Tunisia not to happen in Baluchistan.
For its internal failings, Pakistan must manufacture an external enemy. It is the United States and India. But for the Pakistan military and ISI, it is more often India.
Given this state of affairs, what can India do? At the most, it can keep up a fiction of talking, which is what this writer suspects the engagement with Pakistan is all about.
Nobody will admit it on the Indian side. But India is playing for time till Pakistan self-destructs.
Except for the huge problem related to the final disposal of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, nobody really cares (including the West) whether or not it survives as one state.
If Pakistani nukes can be evacuated, there will be active Western connivance to dismember it. Remember that together with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has become the incubator of Sunni terrorism.
So do not be surprised if Indo-Pak talks are really about managing Pakistan's failure and to minimize the fallouts. To expect anything more would be unrealistic and optimistic.
A failing nuclear state is a mega threat. If it is jihadi to boot, it becomes a nightmare.
India should benchmark its success dealing with the failed state of Pakistan and seeking ways to denuke it. Nothing else matters.
US attitudes and help to Pakistan and pressures on India were crucial to India's action and served to restrict India while failing to restrict Pakistan. These do not reflect in tables and given the dubious but mutually beneficial nature of US Pakistan relations no records exist the ways in which the US helped. But Pakistan's survival and international status as a coherent nation state as opposed to the dysfunctional nation that it is was sponsored and underwritten by the USA.Johann wrote: I think the larger point I was making was that the US was not critical to the outcome in either "East Pakistan" or Balochistan.
But it sounds like you're claiming US support was at the same level or even higher in the 1972-79 period as it was 1954-1965 and 1969-71. It was not, it was significantly lower. I'd love to see the evidence for that.
In fact what I am saying is not as different as it may seem to you. The westernized Pakistani elite placed themselves inside Western nations as valuable and wealthy members of society who oiled deals for US and other Western businesses in massive and lucrative arms and infrastructure projects that had little impact on developing the population of Pakistan, which remained a feudal society. Islamic aid came with no strings - but it was money nevertheless and as long as the money flowed into western coffers via Pakistani orders and deals, private western businessmen, unhindered by governmental restrictions, were quite happy to toast and fete their Paki pals.Johann wrote:Shiv, your claim was that Zia and the other generals were prone at doing business with the West than it was with China and the Saudis because of a common but fading colonial heritage.
What you are saying now is quite different.
Ayub Khan, with Bhutto as his Foreign Minister were looking well beyond the West after 1963.
Chinese and Islamic aid came with far fewer strings, and reduced their vulnerability to American pressure.
North Korea? Myanmar? Sudan?Johann wrote:And you don't think the Chinese and Saudis can do the same thing? Have you been watching the growth of the Chinese economy and armed forces?
What have the Chinese have been doing in North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan, etc?
When you choose to divide history up into convenient time slices to suit a particular argument - it does not translate into an honest account of events.Johann wrote:Yes, Shiv, maintenance and availability is important, which is why I asked you to look back at the readiness of the American platforms PAF and PN during the Kargil War in 1999 and Parakram in 2001-02 after a decade of sanctions. The list of post 9-11 deliveries and sales to Pakistan (which I posted in the mil forum a while back) had spares at the top of their list.
Did you get the impression that I disagree with what you have written? If so I am not sure how you gained that impression. I have been saying what you have written above for years.RajeshA wrote: A unified Pakistan under whatever dispensation would always be an Indian enemy. A fragmented Pakistan with the word "Pakistan" relegated to history and oblivion can on the other hand work as India's strategic depth to undermine China. We can always build better, deeper connections to the Taliban gangs there, who can spread their ideology Northwards.
The sad truth is that Pakistan’s elites –many of whom sit and have sat and will sit in parliament—have chosen to subjugate their country for their own personal accumulation and preservation of wealth. This should be the focus of public outrage: not Washington’s expectation that its massive investment in Pakistan yield some return for the interests of its taxpayers.
Some readers of this missive may counter that China and Saudi Arabia help Pakistan without such expectations. These cherished myths are rubbish.
What has China done for Pakistan? It did not help Pakistan in any of its wars with India in 1965, 1971 or the Kargil crisis of 1999, when it took the same line as the US and even India. It did little to help Pakistan in the 2001-2002 crisis with India and it even voted in the UN Security Council to declare Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) a terrorist organisation in 2009 in the wake of the Mumbai terror outrage.
The roads and ports and other infrastructure that the Chinese are building in Pakistan principally benefit China. Pakistanis are an afterthought. The Chinese obtain contracts on favourable and profitable investment terms, use their own employees, and contribute little to the local economy ultimately to build projects that facilitate the movement and sales of cheap (but also dangerous and poorly crafted) Chinese goods and products into and through Pakistan.
To free Pakistan of international meddling, Pakistan’s political leaders need only to subject themselves and their patronage networks to an agricultural and industrial tax, a move which Pakistan’s leadership has steadfastly avoided throughout the state’s entire history. Of course, it must improve income tax compliance too.
Given this refusal to expand its tax net, the state relies upon an admixture of international assistance and punitive and regressive domestic sales and income taxes to pay its bills. Sales taxes are especially regressive because they affect the poor far more than the wealthy. Government servants — whose income tax is deducted from their wages — and other honest income tax payers pay their way while the wealthy agriculturalists and business elite abscond. Bangladesh has a better tax compliance record than Pakistan.
Shiv, of course you are right about the various forms of American support that kept Pakistan bobbing in waters for most period and at other time from drowning. But, in terms of war fighting machinery & equipment, the distinction *must* be made between pre-1979 and post-1979 support. At least the pre-1979 US justification was to simply maintain equity (not equality) of Pakistan with India though under that guise they introduced force multiplying conventional weapons in the region. But, the post-1979 support was to establish strategic parity for Pakistan with India. In one stroke, they elevated Pakistan to an entirely different class. There is no parallel to this kind of US support to a country which has been a well known rogue from its very inception. The serviceability or otherwise of the US supplied equipment in 1999 or 2002 time frames simply did not matter thereafter. Still, F-16s remained serviceable to toss a nuke over India.shiv wrote:. . . for at least the first 5 or 6 years of that decade - the old equipment supplied to Pakistan was perfectly serviceable and deadly and served to thwart India. . . . The diplomatic support, and the fact that arms keep working well for decades after they are supplied do not show up on tables.
Arun - stupid or not I don't believe they can follow the advice even if they wanted to do that. The fact that articles such as this one by Ms Fair are appearing in the lay media only now - in 2011 when the basic faults in Pakistan have been apparent for decades is an indicator of how Pakistan and its leaders have been "protected from criticism" as long as they were doing America's job with great enthusiasm. While Ms Fair is probably right about China's selfishness - not a squeak emerges from her about decades of US selfishness in which the US too did not care who was taxed in Pakistan or how Pakistan managed its economy.A_Gupta wrote:Shiv, she points to them the way out. We can only hope they are stupid enough to ignore it.