Bharat Rakshak

Arya Sumantra wrote:It is Blake's interpretation of Jaitley's comments that they are "opportunistic".

Nandu wrote:

Arya Sumantra wrote:It is Blake's interpretation of Jaitley's comments that they are "opportunistic".

Wrong. That is not what the cable said.

There is some "twisting" going on here, but not from The Hindu.

“In order for the GOI's efforts to restore sustainable peace and stability in Kashmir to succeed, its engagement with the separatists and with the Kashmiri people must be free of any perception of outside influence,” the Embassy conveyed to Washington in a cable dated October 22, 2009 ( 230893: confidential).

After making a list of the kind of confidence building measures that the Indian government had to play within its Kashmir initiative, the Embassy said the list was not meant to be prescriptive. “It [the list] is provided to help Washington understand the complicated, multi-faceted problem facing the GOI in Kashmir as it moves forward on what is clearly a high priority for Prime Minister [Manmohan Singh], [Union Home Minister P.] Chidambaram and [Congress president] Sonia Gandhi.”

The list, which was described as “illustrative rather than exhaustive,” included the following Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): ensure that dialogue with separatists achieves results; continue generous development spending; conduct panchayat (village council) elections at the earliest; release selected prisoners who are not hard core militants, do not today pose any serious threat, but have been incarcerated for years; release prisoners who have been incarcerated longer than the court-directed sentences; discontinue the practice of re-arresting accused militants who have been released by courts; stop the misuse of the Public Safety Act, which allows the government to detain anyone for two years without trial; repeal, selectively repeal or be more judicious in use of Armed Forces Special Powers Act and the Disturbed Areas Act, which gives the Army almost unchecked powers over the local population in the valley; prosecute transparently and publicly security force personnel involved in human rights violations; relocate security forces camps out of public facilities; more judicious use of house searches and road blockades by security forces; demilitarisation, gradual pullback, and pullout of the paramilitary and Army from visibility in the day-to-day life of Kashmiris; replacement of the paramilitary and Army by the Jammu & Kashmir police; empower the State Human Rights Commission so that it can make transparent inquiries and achieve some tangible results; stop the continued harassment of released/surrendered militants and their families even when these former militants no longer pose any threat; loosen further travel controls on separatist leaders; make the bus links across the Line of Control (LoC) more traveller friendly; ease travel restrictions on cross border travel, increase the number of transit points; open telephone lines across the LoC between ‘Azad Kashmir' and Jammu and Kashmir; encourage separatists to participate in future elections by providing them incentives — funding, security, press coverage; strengthen civil society by making it easier for NGOs to operate.

Director General of Police Kuldeep Khoda told an Embassy official that the J&K Police have for the last two years increasingly become the public face of the security effort in the State.

“He noted that, as far as possible, interaction of security forces with the local population is done by the J&K police in an effort to improve relations between the population and the security forces …

“Security forces have strict instructions to minimize collateral damage to civilians during operations against terrorists, sometimes to the point of letting terrorists escape if it means avoiding civilian casualties. In his view, the reduction in human rights abuses by the security forces and their better community relations have yielded tangible benefits in improving trust between the GOI and Kashmiris.”

Despite Pakistan's cooperation in the Security Council designation of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), American diplomats were concerned that moves by the Pakistan government against the group and its leader Hafiz Saeed were “messy” and might not amount to anything {as subsequent events have clearly shown. It would have been foolish for the Americans to expect anything else. The fact that they still do not realize this is the sad part} more than a “short-term fix.”

Cables from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and Consulate in Lahore, that were accessed by The Hindu through WikiLeaks, showed U.S. diplomats trying hard not to be dismissive of the measures Pakistan was taking against the JuD in the wake of the Security Council designation, but not entirely convinced by them either.

They also revealed that the Pakistan government and the Punjab provincial government, despite knowing in advance about the designation and cooperating in the move, were far from clear-headed about the implementation.

In a cable sent on December 12, 2008 which detailed the steps taken by the Punjab government ( 182691: confidential), Bryan Hunt, Principal Officer at the U.S. Consulate in Lahore, was impressed and, at the same time, aware that much more needed to be done.

He described the preventive detentions of, and “likely filing of criminal charges” against, senior JuD leaders including Hafiz Saeed{We now know the farce of preventive detention and later the drama of 'house arrest' when Prof. Hafeez Saeed saheb was free to go anywhere as he pleased and meet anybody as he pleased. Soon, even this painful farce would be put an end to and Professor saheb would be invited to an iftaar dinner by the Lahore based Army Corps}, and the closure of offices, seizure of financial and physical assets as “unprecedented and suggest[ing] that the Pakistani government has decided to take credible action against the organisation.”

But, he wrote, “even the highest officials of the [Punjab provincial] government appear to have been somewhat confused by the legal grounds for the detentions and the progress of the captures” even though the police told him that they planned to submit “as yet unspecified criminal charges” against the detainees. {And, now, we know that they neither submitted these 'unspecified criminal charges' nor pursued this matter vigorously.}

The police also told him that the detainees would be put on the country's exit control list, which would prevent them from leaving the country should they obtain bail in the criminal cases upon the expiration of their periods of preventive detention.

Mr. Hunt, an extremely popular diplomat during his time in Lahore, also detailed the steps that the provincial government did not take against the JuD.

The cable said the mosques affiliated to the JuD, including the main one at Lahore's Chauburji, and the madrassahs and hospitals run by it, remained open.

The Punjab Home Secretary told the Consulate's Foreign Service National Investigator, usually a local employee at the mission, that the JuD runs 173 schools across Pakistan and three hospitals in Punjab and operates 66 ambulances.

But Mr. Hunt commented that the official had “grossly underestimated the number of JuD schools, which could exceed one thousand madrassahs in Punjab alone.”

The provincial government had no plans to deal with students and patients who would be displaced from the JuD hospitals and schools — Mr. Hunt believed these institutions would have no choice but to shut down soon as they functioned on JuD charities that had been frozen.{But, nothing of that sort ever happened. On the contrary, the Punjab government sanctioned 80 million rupees to JuD}

Evidently reckoning without the JuD's staying power and — as later events showed — its unrestricted fund-collecting activities, Mr. Hunt said “donor support” may be required to keep these institutions running.

The diplomat sounded more hopeful six days later after a breakfast meeting with Shahbaz Sharif. In a cable sent on December 18, 2008, he concluded that the Punjab Chief Minister was “unwavering” ( 183673: confidential/noforn) in his determination to “completely shut down JuD.”

Mr. Sharif told Mr. Hunt that his government would formulate a plan to take over the hospitals and schools previously run by the JuD. This would be easy, the Chief Minister said, telling Mr. Hunt jokingly that “we will use trained doctors to charm the patients with long beards and caps.”

Assuming that control of the schools would pose the bigger challenge, Mr. Sharif said he had “no substantive response” on how to deal with the JuD's extensive madrassah network.

‘Short-term fix'

According to Mr. Hunt, the Chief Minister asked the U.S. to provide evidence that would be required to prosecute the JuD leaders, {Proof, proof and even more proof. That is the mantra of TSP when in fact they have these terrorists sitting, planning and executing attacks from their (night)soil} noting that “proof that originates with the U.S. would have greater credibility than proof produced by India.”

From Islamabad, the livewire U.S. Ambassador, Anne Patterson, sent a cable on December 16, 2008 ( 183225: confidential) analysing Pakistan's preventive detention law, describing it as “murky and fraught with ambiguities” but able to provide a “short term fix.”

She wrote that the “sweeping language” of the law left loopholes — “big enough to drive a jingle truck through,” a reference to Pakistan's ubiquitous decorated trucks — that could possibly enable the indefinite extension of Hafiz Saeed's detention beyond the 12-month cap on preventive detentions. Plus, Ms. Patterson noted, the burden of proof on the government was minimal in such cases. But she also warned that the courts had struck down such orders in several cases.

The U.S. Ambassador was right. Six months later, the Lahore High Court did exactly that.

Ms. Patterson wrote that the bigger question was how Pakistan would charge and prosecute these people. The Embassy's Resident Legal Advisor had spoken to Law Minister Farooq Naek about this. The Minister said charges would possibly be brought under the Anti-Terrorist Act, but “declined to be more specific.”

The lack of clarity at both the federal and provincial levels of government is surprising, given that they knew of the designation well in advance. {What is surprising when the federal and provincial governments along with the Pakistani judiciary are hand in glove in terrorism against India ?}

As a cable sent on December 8, 2008 ( 181794: confidential) noted, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani and the Foreign Minister told a three-member U.S. Congressional delegation — Senators John McCain, Joe Liberman and Lindsay Graham — that the Pakistan government had already begun the process of seeking the arrest of individuals named by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice during her December 4 meetings in Islamabad. {So, the names were given by the US to Pakistan. Did that include Prof. Hafeez Saeed saheb ?}The government had also agreed to cooperate in the UN 1267 Committee to designate these individuals.

The cable added: “Secretary Rice had told the GOP the USG wanted Pakistan to place no holds in the UN 1267 Committee for individuals suspected of involvement in the Mumbai attacks. The GOP has already agreed, informed Gilani. The Secretary also wanted individuals arrested.

“‘We have already taken steps,' Gilani told the Senators. He added that the 1267 process in the UN will give the GOP's actions further legitimacy. Foreign Minister Qureshi asked the Senators to keep this news — that GOP actions against individuals named by the Secretary were already underway — private, and not to repeat it to the media.”

Pakistan Muslim League (N) leader Nawaz Sharif was also being kept informed. The Prime Minister told the delegation that he was meeting Mr. Sharif as the provincial government needed to take actions. He told the senators that all political leaders were on board in the government's approach to the crisis.

Senator McCain, who had met Mr. Sharif earlier in the day, confirmed that the opposition leader had pledged to support the government's action against extremists in Pakistan, including those responsible for the Mumbai attacks.

krisna wrote: 1) The use of inverted commas " " mean that the particular word was used by the said person. Hindu nationalism is opportunistic, said Jaitley

Pressed on the question of Hindutva, Jaitley argued that Hindu nationalism ""will always be a talking point"" for the BJP. However, he characterized this as an opportunistic issue.

svenkat wrote:The Hindu did not report accurately.

It deliberately slandered Jaitley misinterpreting an ambiguous statement.

JE Menon wrote:I heard (or read) somewhere that CENTCOM happened more recently...

The India-US military relationship is set for a qualitative leap with the first ever visit of an Indian Army Chief to the headquarters of the US Central Command (Centcom), which has charge of Af-Pak, the Middle East and Iraq.

Gen. V K Singh will visit the Tampa, Florida-based Command in his 10-day trip to the US between March 6 and 15 with an aim to set up a Brigadier-level direct liaison with the Indian Army. India liaises only with the US Pacific Command, and having a liaison officer in Tampa will signal a recognition of Indian interests in the arc from the Gulf of Aden to the Straits of Malacca, government sources said.

Nandu wrote: ....

Suppiah wrote:I would have thought Wikileaks is a non-profit organisation dedicated to bringing out the 'truth'. If that is the case, why are they doing secret commercial deals with Stalinist yellows and not putting it on open servers? If they are indeed trying to make money out of this whole thing, then it is entirely conceivable that they will salt the mine and dabble with manipulation to enhance the 'value' of the cables.

Will Wikileaks that want everyone to tell the truth clarify on what they were paid for selective distribution?

agony of 1984 Bhopal gas leak disaster is not over
To: <[email protected]>




The U.S. Consulate in Mumbai reports on the manoeuvres of the Dow
Chemical Company to get its plants cleared, and the contradictory
responses of powerful politicians


The Dow Chemical Company, an American multinational that bought the
infamous Union Carbide, appointed a public relations manager recommended
by a Shiv Sena parliamentarian at a generous monthly salary of $20,000.
This was done in the hope that it would put an end to the protests the
politician was spearheading against its proposed research facility in
Pune.

Over in Gujarat, the company had to put on hold a proposed investment by
its European arm in a state-owned unit because a Union Minister
allegedly “demanded a large sum of money” to clear the project, which
Dow refused to pay.

These allegations are contained in a confidential Mumbai Consulate cable
sent to the U.S. State Department in late-2008 and accessed by The
Hindu through WikiLeaks.

Asked by The Hindu to respond, the two politicians, Shiv Sena MP
Shivajirao Adhalrao Patil and Ram Vilas Paswan, at the time the Union
Chemicals and Fertilisers Minister, denied the allegations as totally
baseless. Attacking Dow and Union Carbide as “criminals in my mind,” Mr.
Paswan asserted that they were trying to tarnish his image because he
and his Ministry “strongly opposed their plans to establish a presence”
in Gujarat even while “the case of remediation costs for the Bhopal
disaster” remained unresolved.

The cable was sent under the name of Consul-General Paul A. Folmsbee (173725: confidential, October 15, 2008)
after Consulate officials reported they had heard detailed separate
versions of Dow's troubles from company representatives and the Shiv
Sena MP, Shivajirao Adhalrao Patil.

The cable drew an outline of politicians seeking to exploit Dow's
handicap in India – arising from its association with Union Carbide and
the legacy of the 1984 Bhopal gas leak disaster – for direct or indirect
personal benefit. But even where politicians and government
functionaries were reassuring or sympathetic, when crunch-time came,
they were of no help.

As for Dow, the Mumbai Consulate concluded it did not have the nous to
grasp the political implications of being associated with Union Carbide
and the legacy of the Bhopal gas disaster, especially with the 2009
parliamentary elections just months away.

Dow's Pune facility was to come up on 100 acres of grazing land in
Chakan, Shinde village. Just a day before the Maharashtra government
ordered a temporary halt to the construction at the site on September
26, 2008, and appointed a commission to inquire into the complaints
against it, the Consul General had met Mr. Patil, the Shiv Sena MP from
Shirur in Pune district, to talk about the protests against Dow.

Dow's behind-the-scenes manoeuvres


The politician had expressed “a desire to resolve the dispute
peacefully.” The villagers should have been informed about the project,
he said.

The Mumbai Consulate noted that the Warkaris, a local community,
worshipped a river shrine and were convinced that Dow's activities at
the facility would pollute the river and groundwater sources.

Mr. Patil told the U.S. officials that the villagers had learnt about
Dow's connections to Union Carbide. He said the approvals Dow had
received for the facility related to the manufacture of chemicals, which
was at variance with Dow's description of the facility as a scientific
research centre.

The Shiv Sena MP also said he had advised Dow to explain the project to
the villagers, “preferably through a public relations company that was
experienced at this.” However, he lamented, the company had ignored his
advice and instead relied on police force and started work at the site.

“Patil noted that it was because of this decision that the Warkaris
started protesting and a Dow vehicle was burned,” the cable informed the
State Department.

Mr. Patil then reiterated advice he said he had given Dow in July 2008
about hiring a public relations outfit for this purpose — “like the one
that the local company Bharat Forge hired when it ran into problems, and
give donations to local villagers to resolve the situation.”


On September 29, Rakesh Chitkara, Dow's Head of Corporate Affairs, met
Consulate officials (the cable does not name them). He told them that
three months earlier, Dow “hired the public relations specialist Patil
recommended for USD 20,000 per month.” In parenthesis, the cable added:
“Chitkara said that the PR specialist is a ‘close associate' of Patil.”


Dow had also hired a number of local villagers for construction
projects

The cable ( 41091: unclassified), sent by the U.S. Consul General (CG) in Mumbai, Michael S. Owen, on September 22, 2005, quoted SEWA general secretary Reemaben Nanawati as telling him that the organisation was facing the “wrath” of the State government for “resisting” pressure.

Gujarat Chief Secretary Sudhir Mankad “lost his patience” when asked how many people had been convicted for their role in the 2002 riots, Mr. Owen wrote.

‘Why the obsession?'

“He asked the CG why the U.S. was ‘so obsessed' with the riots. ‘You always express concern about the riots, but look what else is happening in the world,' Mankad complained…Reps of other diplomatic missions visited Gujarat to discuss the economy, education or cultural issues. The U.S. was always different. ‘When I saw your schedule I asked myself why you need to talk to all these groups', he said, referring to the CG's NGO interlocutors…,” Mr. Owen wrote, adding that he “underlined the importance the USG attached to human rights, and said we would continue to follow this issue closely.”

Even as Australian Ministers, politicians and officials were taking the position in public that there was no racial motivation behind the spate of attacks on Indian students in Australia, chiefly in and around Melbourne in the State of Victoria, Australian diplomats were quietly acknowledging to their U.S. counterparts that it was indeed a likely factor. Also, the Australian government's efforts, in their opinion, had only a limited impact on cooling tempers

observed that Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard (she is now the Prime Minister), while condemning the murder, “stopped short of apologizing or referring to racial motivations.” Opposition leader Tony Abbott, the same cable pointed out, had also rejected any such suggestion. However, Peter Varghese, the Indian-origin Australian High Commissioner to New Delhi, seemed to think otherwise. He acknowledged that race “was likely a motivating factor is some attacks.”

Ms. Nayyar was more candid with her views on the Indian media and the coverage of the issue. She told U.S. diplomats that “a visiting contingent of Indian journalists had already written their headline story, ‘why they hate us,' even before landing in Melbourne for a week-long tour. She went on to say that the Indian press was still enamoured with this story and has paid interviewees well for their stories of woe.”

The cable noted that matters were only made worse by unfortunate public comments including one by Victoria's police chief, Simon Overlander, that “the streets of Melbourne are safer than those in India.”

SSridhar wrote: Why should the SEWA general secretary discuss these matters with an American CG ?

SSridhar wrote:

A wide cross-section of Indians from top central ministers (so far, I have not seen any Indian PM being quoted in these leaks) to secretary of voluntary organizations have revealed a hell of a lot to these gora sahibs. What drives them to be so open with these Americans ? Do they get unnerved or charmed by them ? Or, is it a visa or a trip ? Or, simply stupidity ?

abhishek_sharma wrote:‘U.S. needs to read ‘Persian mind' to deal with Iran'

The Political Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi made an “introductory call” on Mr. {K.C.} Singh immediately after his return from the Tehran assignment and after he took charge as Additional Secretary (UN and International Security) in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).

brihaspati wrote:Could be "white adoration" and low-self-esteem combination. An interest from a gora is flattering, and hence the urge to vomit out to an encouraging and approving audience. Remember that the esteemed founders of our Republic repeatedly hammered this into our minds that the "gora" has "caused us grievous hurt", "sure", but over all they have such wonderful qualities that we must look up to them and appeal to their better sense and judgment.

abhishek_sharma wrote:U.S. feared Indian proposal may curtail its influence in UN

The cable targeted India's Permanent Representative Nirupam Sen, claiming that he had been “widely quoted as saying that the current process creates a ‘Secretary-General who is secretary to the P5 and general to the General Assembly,'

Cable speaks of some members of the party advocating that Sonia Gandhi jettison Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister

After the Congress suffered electoral losses in Punjab and Uttarakhand in February 2007, some party members advocated that party president Sonia Gandhi “jettison” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ahead of the Uttar Pradesh Assembly election in April-May 2007 and “put a more saleable political face at the head of the government,” according to a United States Embassy cable (100159: confidential) sent on March 13, 2007.

“Following a string of recent local-level electoral defeats in Mumbai, Uttarakhand, and Punjab, Sonia Gandhi and her personal advisors are very concerned that the impending Uttar Pradesh (UP) elections will turn out horribly for Congress. As a result, some are advocating that she jettison Prime Minister Singh — whose message of rapprochement with Pakistan has been criticized by the BJP — and put a more saleable political face at the head of the government,” the cable sent under the name of Embassy Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey Pyatt reported to Washington.

The Embassy appeared worried about the “reform cadre” in the government being sidelined by the “old line” Congress with socialist sympathies. “What seems clear in the aftermath of recent polls is that the reform cadre of Manmohan Singh, [Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission] Montek Singh Ahluwalia, and Finance Minister [P.] Chidambaram are politically diminished, Sonia Gandhi's inner coterie is deeply worried, and the old line Congress and their Communist fellow-travelers are empowered. Politics in India are a mess right now for Congress, and while the GOI [Government of India] is publicly optimistic about the nuclear deal, it is clearly caught in a domestic political eddy,” the cable added.

It also took note of the political compulsions of the Congress that might have a bearing on U.S. interests. “Others are urging that the Congress hunker down and play it safe on the budget, inflation, economic reform, and foreign policy — including the nuclear deal — to minimize the negative impact on UP voters, many of whom are Muslim and take a dim view of the United States.”
Energy sector concerns

The cable, accessed by The Hindu through WikiLeaks, was sent ahead of a visit to India by Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman to further the U.S.-India relationship in the energy sector.

Mr. Pyatt, in the “scene-setter” for the visit, expressed the hope that Mr. Bodman could win over the Indian nuclear scientific establishment with the prospect of “future-oriented programs” like the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. “Your scheduled meetings in Mumbai with Department of Atomic Energy Secretary Dr. Anil Kakodkar and in New Delhi with Special Envoy Shyam Saran offer an opportunity to highlight the many benefits of U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation, which could be lost if India does not conclude the 123 Agreement quickly,” he wrote.

Briefing Mr. Bodman on what to expect during his meetings in India, the Charge said: “The Prime Minister will likely tell you that his number one priority is extending the benefits of India's rapid growth to the 700 million Indians — mostly in the rural sector — who continue to live at a near subsistence level. Rising food and fuel prices have particularly hurt the poor, creating a political backlash against the UPA government in recent state elections. Prime Minister Singh and your other interlocutors will be very interested in your ideas on how the United States can help with India's energy needs in the short and long term, particularly with respect to the rural sector.”

Looking ahead to Mr. Bodman's meeting with Union Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Murli Deora, Mr. Pyatt wrote that Mr. Deora had “close ties to Sonia Gandhi's inner circle and a political base in Mumbai, and he is central to India's international quest for growing petroleum and natural gas imports, and cooperation with the United States in domestic industry development and regulatory policy.” The Minister had told American diplomats that India did not expect a final agreement to be reached on the oil pipeline with Iran due to Iranian unreliability and Iran changing the terms of the June 2005 agreement to sell India LNG from its South Pars field for 25 years. “The MPNG increasingly sees LNG from Qatar and Australia as a more viable option than several proposed pipeline projects,” the cable noted.

While giving the Energy Secretary a backgrounder to the U.S.-India civil nuclear negotiations, Mr. Pyatt said Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon had handed Under Secretary Nicholas Burns a “completely inadequate counter-draft to the 123 Agreement — authored by the skeptics in India's nuclear establishment who remain concerned about U.S. efforts to ‘entrap' India and constrain its strategic program.”

Mr. Burns, the cable added, had asked Mr. Menon to “provide a more workable basis on which the U.S. and India can continue talks, and invited an Indian team with negotiating authority to the U.S. for the next round of discussions.” (This was sent before the two countries released the full text of the 123 agreement, which allows for cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in August 2007.)

Analysing the compulsions of the Congress-led government in this context, it said:

“The politics around India's energy policy reflects a struggle between needed economic reform and political impediments to change. Prime Minister Singh and Deputy Chairman Ahluwalia are well aware of what economic reforms are needed to enhance India's long term growth.

“They realize that reasonable regulation and market-based pricing of electricity, petroleum products, natural gas, and coal would be most conducive to encouraging investment, reliable revenue streams, energy efficiency, and rational choice among projects and energy sources. However, the political imperatives of middle-class and poor voters' resistance to price increases, particularly with consumer inflation recently exceeding 6%, have induced the GOI to maintain price controls and government subsidies. Similarly, although the GOI privately doubts Iran's reliability as a potential source of natural gas by pipeline or of liquefied natural gas, it continues negotiations with Iran to appease Muslim and left-wing voters and Members of Parliament.”

(This article is a part of the series "The India Cables" based on the US diplomatic cables accessed by The Hindu via WikiLeaks.)

Indeed, the cables reveal U.S. business and officials to be as embedded in India's politics as they are in Pakistan's. {Absolutely true. It may be difficult to swallow, proud as we are that we are very different from the 'Establishment of Pakistan'. The Americans have different techniques for different nations but the end result is the same}

Mr. Assange is genuinely distressed and not a little outraged by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's disputation in Parliament of the authenticity of the India Cables, his Lok Sabha statement that the government “cannot confirm the veracity, contents or even the existence of such communication.”

The WikiLeaks chief has strong words to say on this:

“We have not come across this reaction and that reaction disturbed me. Because Hillary Clinton had been involved in informing the Indian government, in December, as well as many other governments, that this was coming. There has been no question as to the credibility of any document we have ever published in the last four years, let alone the [U.S. Embassy] cables – which have been authenticated by the very aggressive action of the State Department towards us and by hundreds of journalists from the most reputable institutions across the world.

“That is why I said I find that statement a deliberate, knowing attempt to mislead the Indian population...Because it is directly from Prime Minister Singh's mouth and he knows better than to do that. While I have heard – I have no proof but the consensus seems to be that – he is not personally corrupt, here's a clear attempt to cover up for the possible corruption of other people. Rather than simply playing it straight, which he should have done, and say, ‘Look, there are allegations. They are serious and we will investigate them and come to the truth of the matter and give a full report to Parliament.'

“I think if he had taken that approach, he would have been served a lot better. So he has acted against his own interests and acted against the interests of his party, which is odd. So I would suggest it means that he has a habit that he was following rather than thinking things through – and a habit of reactively covering up allegations of corruption.”

These observations were made in response to one of my {N.Ram's} questions during a one-hour interview given to The Hindu at Ellingham Hall, a stately Georgian country house set amidst acres and acres of farmland in the county of Norfolk.

JE Menon wrote:Guys, a question: are ALL the leaked cables available to the general public anywhere?

Or is the only way we can access them through what the newspapers who have an agreement with Assange or whoever choose to dribble out?