Bharat Rakshak

SSridhar wrote: the US technological help that has very substantially led to China being where it is today.

Realist IR theories focus on power, and for decades, they maintained that the bipolar world of the Cold War and the unipolar post-Cold War world dominated by the United States were relatively simple systems not prone to wars of miscalculation. They also held that nuclear weapons raised the cost of conflict and made war among the major powers unthinkable.

Meanwhile, liberal theorists argued that a triumvirate of causal variables (institutions, interdependence, and democracy) facilitated cooperation and mitigated conflict. The dense set of international institutions and agreements (the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, etc.) established after World War II—and expanded and depended on since the end of the Cold War—provided forums for major powers to work out their differences peacefully.

Moreover, economic globalization made armed conflict too costly. Why quarrel when business is good and everyone is getting rich? Finally, according to this theory, democracies are less likely to fight and more likely to cooperate, and the major waves of democratization around the world over the past 70 years have made the globe a more peaceful place.

At the same time, constructivist scholars explained how new ideas, norms, and identities have transformed international politics in a more positive direction. In the past, piracy, slavery, torture, and wars of aggression were common practices. Over the years, however, strengthening human rights norms and taboos against the use of weapons of mass destruction placed guardrails on international conflict.

Unfortunately, nearly all of these pacifying forces appear to be unraveling before our eyes. The major driving forces of international politics, according to IR theory, suggest that the new Cold War among the United States, China, and Russia is unlikely to be peaceful.

Let us begin with power politics. We are entering a more multipolar world. To be sure, the United States is still the world’s leading power, according to nearly all objective measures, but China has risen to occupy a strong second-place position in military and economic might. Europe is an economic and regulatory superpower in its own right. A more aggressive Russia maintains the largest nuclear weapons stockpile on Earth. And major powers in the developing world—such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil—are choosing a nonaligned path.

Realists argue that multipolar systems are unstable and prone to major wars of miscalculation. World War I is a classic example.

Multipolar systems are unstable in part because each country must worry about multiple potential adversaries. Indeed, at present, the U.S. Defense Department frets about possible simultaneous conflicts with Russia in Europe and China in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, U.S. President Joe Biden has stated that the use of military force remains on the table as a last resort to deal with Iran’s nuclear program. A three-front war is not out of the question.

Wars of miscalculation often result when states underestimate their adversary. States doubt their opponent’s power or resolve to fight, so they test them. Sometimes, the enemy is bluffing, and the challenge pays off. If the enemy is determined to defend its interests, however, major war can result. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely miscalculated in launching an invasion of Ukraine, incorrectly assuming that war would be easy. Some realist scholars warned for some time that a Russian invasion of Ukraine was coming, and there is still the possibility that the war in Ukraine could spill across NATO’s borders, turning this conflict into a direct U.S.-Russia conflagration.

In addition, there is the danger that Chinese President Xi Jinping might miscalculate over Taiwan. Washington’s confusing “strategic ambiguity” policy as to whether it would defend the island only adds to the instability. Biden has said he would defend Taiwan, but his own White House contradicted him. Many leaders are confused, including possibly Xi. He might mistakenly believe he could get away with an attack on Taiwan—only to have the United States intervene violently to stop him.

Moreover, after several U.S. presidents have threatened “all options on the table” for the Iranian nuclear program without backing it up, Tehran might assume that it can make a dash for the bomb without a U.S. response. If Iran is mistaken in doubting Biden’s resolve, war could result.

Realists also focus on shifts in the balance of power and worry about the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. Power transition theory says that the fall of a dominant great power and the rise of an ascendant challenger often results in war. Some experts worry that Washington and Beijing may be falling into this “Thucydides Trap.”

Their dysfunctional autocratic systems make it unlikely that Beijing or Moscow will usurp global leadership from the United States anytime soon, but a closer look at the historical record shows that challengers sometimes start wars of aggression when their expansive ambitions are thwarted. Like Germany in World War I and Japan in World War II, Russia may be lashing out to reverse its decline, and China may also be weak and dangerous.

Some people might argue that nuclear deterrence will still work, but military technology is changing. The world is experiencing a “Fourth Industrial Revolution” as new technologies—such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and communications, additive manufacturing, robotics, hypersonic missiles, directed energy, and others—promise to transform the global economy, societies, and the battlefield.

Many defense experts believe we are on the eve of a new revolution in military affairs. It is possible that these new technologies could, like tanks and aircraft on the eve of World War II, give an advantage to militaries that go on the offense, making war more likely. At a minimum, these new weapons systems could confuse assessments of the balance of power, contributing to the above risks of miscalculation.

China, for example, is leading in several of these technologies, including hypersonic missiles, certain applications for artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. These advantages—or even the false perception in Beijing that these advantages might exist—could tempt China to invade Taiwan.

In the new Cold War, international institutions have simply become new arenas for competition. Russia and China are infiltrating these institutions and turning them against their intended purposes. Who can forget Russia chairing a meeting of the United Nations Security Council as its armies invaded Ukraine in February? Similarly, China used its influence in the World Health Organization to stymie an effective investigation into COVID-19’s origins. And dictators vie for seats on the U.N. Human Rights Council to ensure their egregious human rights abuses escape scrutiny. Instead of facilitating cooperation, international institutions are increasingly exacerbating conflict.

The free world is recognizing that it is too economically dependent on its enemies in Moscow and Beijing, and it is decoupling as fast as it can. Western corporations pulled out of Russia overnight. New legislation and regulations in the United States, Europe, and Japan are restricting trade and investment in China. It is simply irrational for Wall Street to invest in Chinese technology companies that are working with China’s People’s Liberation Army to develop weapons intended to kill Americans.

But China is also decoupling from the free world. Xi is prohibiting Chinese tech firms from listing on Wall Street, for example, because he doesn’t want to share proprietary information with Western powers. The economic interdependence between the liberal and illiberal worlds that has served as a ballast against conflict is now eroding.

Democratic peace theory says democracies cooperate with other democracies. But the central fault line in the international system today, as Biden explains, is “the battle between democracy and autocracy.”

To be sure, the United States still maintains cordial relations with some nondemocracies, such as Saudi Arabia. But the world order is increasingly divided with the United States and its status quo-oriented democratic allies in NATO, Japan, South Korea, and Australia on one side and the revisionist autocracies of China, Russia, and Iran on the other. One does not need a stethoscope to detect the echoes of the free world’s conflict against Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperial Japan.

Moreover, constructivists might note that the democracy versus autocracy cleavage in international politics is not simply an issue of governance but of ways of life. The speeches and writings of Xi and Putin are often ideological rants about the superiority of autocratic systems and the failings of democracy. Like it or not—we are back in a 20th-century contest over whether democratic or autocratic governments can better deliver for their people, adding a more dangerous ideological element to this competition.

Fortunately, there is some good news. The best understanding of international politics may be found in a combination of theories. Much of humanity prefers a liberal international order, and this order is only made possible by the realist military power of the United States and its democratic allies. Moreover, 2,500 years of theory and history suggest that democracies tend to win these hard-power competitions and autocracies flame out disastrously in the end.

Unfortunately, the clarifying moments that bend history in an arc toward justice often only emerge after major-power wars.

bala wrote: The motivation behind the "technological" help needs to be understood.

The fangs of the deep state operating in the US has global imprint across various nations including China.

Many of the initial factories were owned and operated by the deep state actors/relatives/friends & family in the US.

All the costs for the transfer were borne by China.

Over time, the Chinese using their clout in foreign trade started the arm-twisting of politicos in the US.

bala wrote:Jay, The Deep state are usually non-state actors with powerful financial clout (not listed in usual wealthy people lists).

The China tango happened during Nixon/Kissinger era. During Reagan era and George Bush Sr era it deepened. Bush Jr furthered his father's policies. economic pillar is symbiotic and heavily mutually dependent.

The Deep state are usually non-state actors with powerful financial clout. They include a network of people with state actors. Currently Blinken and Nuland are part of this deep state. (not listed in usual wealthy people lists).

All of the worldwide color revolutions are financed by them.

Deep State" existed during the British Raj rule of India which is a totally different topic.

The China tango happened during Nixon/Kissinger era. Behind the scenes were the "Deep State" enabling this tango.

Clinton era saw the blatant exchange of critical rocket technology to China.

Bush Jr furthered his father's policies, remember his father was China veteran.

The only president who really opposed China was Trump

The rest of US Presidents paid lip service. Only the military angle is heightened nowadays.

I completely discount any verbiage emitted nowadays from the establishment.

Understanding the deep state takes a nuanced view of things since there is no deep media analysis, facts are hard to nail since they cover themselves up very well, since there are experts involved.

Did you know that until 1968 the IB of India reported to MI of England?[

Jay wrote:

Did you know that until 1968 the IB of India reported to MI of England?[

I absolutely did not know that. Can this be verified with a source?

chetak wrote:

Jay wrote:


I absolutely did not know that. Can this be verified with a source?

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 893291.cms

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/i ... Nehru.html

Shaping a 21st-century world order: The nation-state vs the civilizational state
APR 30, 2023, 6:28 PM

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US President Joe Biden positions the Ukraine war as a battle between autocracy and democracy. That reduces what is at stake in the war. The stakes constitute a fundamental building block of a new 21st-century world order: the nature of the state.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents the sharp end of the rise of a critical mass of world leaders who think in civilizational rather than national terms. They imagine the ideational and/or physical boundaries of their countries as defined by history, ethnicity, culture, and/or religion rather than international law.

Often that assertion involves denial of the existence of the other and authoritarian or autocratic rule.


As a result, Russian President Vladimir Putin is in good company when he justifies his invasion of Ukraine by asserting that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. In other words, Ukrainians as a nation do not exist.

Neither do the Taiwanese or maritime rights of other littoral states in the South China Sea in the mind of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Or Palestinians in the vision of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s coalition partners.

Superiority and exceptionalism are guiding principles for men like Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, India’s Narendra Modi, Hungary’s Victor Orban, and Mr. Netanyahu.

In 2018, the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, adopted a controversial basic law defining Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

“Contrary to Israel’s Declaration of Independence, the nation-state law was seen as enshrining Jewish superiority and Arab inferiority, as bolstering Israel’s Jewish character at the expense of its democratic character, ” said journalist Carolina Landsmann.

Israeli religious Zionist writer Ehud Neor argued that “Israel is not a nation-state in Western terms. It’s a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy that Jewish people were always meant to be in the Holy Land and to follow the Holy Torah, and by doing so, they would be a light unto the world. There is a global mission to Judaism.”

Similarly, Mr. Erdogan describes Turkey as “dünyanın vicdanı,” the world’s conscience, a notion that frames his projection of international cooperation and development assistance.

“Turkey is presented as a generous patriarch following in the steps of (a particularly benevolent reading of) the Ottoman empire, taking care of those in need—including, importantly, those who have allegedly been forgotten by others. In explicit contrast to Western practices described as self-serving, Turkish altruism comes with the civilizational frame of Muslim charity and solidarity reminiscent of Ottoman grandeur,” said scholars Sebastian Haug and Supriya Roychoudhury.

In an academic comparison, Mr. Haug and Ms. Roychoudhury compare Mr. Erdogan’s notion of Turkish exceptionalism with Mr. Modi’s concept of ‘Vishwaguru.’

The concept builds on the philosophy of 19th-century Hindu leader Swami Vivekananda.
“His rendition of Hinduism, like Gandhian Hindu syncretic thought, ostensibly espouses tolerance and pluralism. With this and similar framings, the adoption of an allegedly Gandhi-inspired syncretic Hindu discourse enables Modi to distance himself politically from the secularist civilizational discourse of (Indian nationalist leader Jawaharlal) Nehru,” the two scholars said.

“At the same time, though, Modi’s civilizational discourse, with its indisputable belief in the superiority of Hinduism, has begun to underpin official rhetoric in international forums,” they added.

{Note the secualr point of view on Hinduism from the two authors. Vishwaguru is about knowldge and not hegemony!}

In a rewrite of history, Mr. Putin, in a 5,000-word article published less than a year before the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, portrayed the former Soviet republic as an anti-Russian creation that grounded its legitimacy in erasing “everything that united us” and projecting “the period when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as an occupation.”

In doing so, Mr. Putin created the justification civilisationalist leaders often apply to either expand or replace the notion of a nation-state defined by hard borders anchored in international law with a more fluid concept of a state with external boundaries demarcated by history, ethnicity, culture, and/or religion, and internal boundaries that differentiate its superior or exceptional civilization from the other.

Civilisationalism serves multiple purposes. Asserting alleged civilizational rights and fending off existential threats help justify authoritarian and autocratic rule.

Dubbed Xivilisation by the Global Times, a flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, Mr. Xi has redefined civilization to incorporate autocracy.

In March, Mr. Xi unveiled his Global Civilization Initiative at a Beijing conference of 500 political parties from 150 countries.

Taking a stab at the Western promotion of democracy and human rights, the initiative suggests that civilizations can live in harmony if they refrain from projecting their values globally.

“In other words, quipped The Economist, “the West should learn to live with Chinese communism. It may be based on Marxism, a Western theory, but it is also the fruit of China’s ancient culture.”

Mr. Xi launched his initiative days before Mr. Biden co-hosted a virtual Summit for Democracy.

The assertion by a critical mass of world leaders of notions of a civilizational state contrasts starkly with the promotion by Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s Indonesia-based largest and most moderate Muslim civil society movement, of the nation-state as the replacement in Islamic law of the civilizationalist concept of a caliphate, a unitary state, for the global Muslim community.

Drawing conclusions from their comparison of Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey and Mr. Modi’s India, Mr. Haug and Ms. Roychoudhury concluded that civilisationalist claims serve “two distinct but interrelated political projects: attempts to overcome international marginalization and efforts to reinforce authoritarian rule domestically.”
{Incorrect assertion. Civilizational states transend nations which are a construct of Treaty of Westphalia to bring peace to war torn Europe.}


Like Mr. Biden, Mr. Xi and other civilizationalist leaders are battling for the high ground in a struggle to shape the future world order and its underlying philosophy.

Mr. Biden’s autocracy vs. democracy paradigm is part of that struggle. But so is the question of whether governance systems are purely political or civilizational. Countering that assertion could prove far more decisive.

—



Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and scholar, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and scholar and a Senior Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute. He is the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

sanman wrote:https://twitter.com/MaxBlumenthal/statu ... 1550016527

Since its inaugural Meeting in 1954, the annual Bilderberg Meeting has been a forum for informal discussions to foster dialogue between Europe and North America. Every year, approx. 130 political leaders and experts from industry, finance, labour, academia and the media are invited to take part in the Meeting. About two thirds of the participants come from Europe and the rest from North America; one third from politics and government and the rest from other fields.

Imagine if Pakistan was doing a similar summit in PoK.

His reaction would have been - "Masterstroke- Pak remains undeterred by India.

India needs to rethink its foreign policy."

“The ‘great risk’ Europe faces is getting ‘caught up in crises that are not ours,”

If the Europeans didn’t learn anything from Iraq.

After his 6 hour meeting in China he told reporters that Europe should create distance with the U.S. & should not get involved in supporting America over China when it comes to Taiwan

France will soon celebrate D-Day in remembrance of the fallen souls mainly scores of American, Canadian and British troops who gave their lives in bravery to liberate France from under the German occupation.

I wonder what kind of speech Macron will now have for the occasion.

Stephen Dziedzic @stephendziedzic

Striking language from James Marape as he opens meeting between Indian PM Narendra Modi and Pacific leaders. Marape calls Modi the "leader of the Global South" and India the "third big voice" in global politics which "must emerge." He says the Pacific will "rally behind" India

First, with a GDP of $2.66 trillion, India’s economy is larger than three member countries of the G-7 – France, Italy, and Canada. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world and is expected to grow at 5.9 percent in 2023-2024. India is also the fastest growing economy in Asia. The World Bank has said that India’s growth rate is the highest among the seven largest emerging-market and developing economies.

India’s economic growth is in contrast with that of Western countries, most of which are facing stagnant growth prospects. Anne-Marie Gulde-Wolf, deputy director for the Asia and Pacific department of the IMF, said that India could be a key economic engine capable of driving global growth through consumption, investment, and trade. As an outlier among world’s major economies, India remains an attractive investment destination due to factors such as market potential, low manufacturing costs, business reforms, and a favorable industrial climate.

Recently India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world. With 68 percent of the population of working age (15-64 years) and 65 percent of the population under the age of 35, India offers a young and abundant skilled and semi-skilled work force.

Second, along with the United States and Japan, the European countries are formulating their policies to engage more with the Indo-Pacific region. In the past few years, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany – G-7 members from Europe – have formulated their own Indo-Pacific strategies. Italy too has shown inclination recently to engage with the Indo-Pacific region.

With the global geopolitical and economic epicenter shifting to the Indo-Pacific, European countries are keen to benefit from the economic opportunities that the region offers. However, the Indo-Pacific has its own challenges with a belligerent China expanding its strategic and economic footprint. For the Western countries, India has emerged as a major strategic partner to contain China, particularly in the Indian Ocean component of the Indo-Pacific region. Of the G-7 members, India has strategic partnerships with the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, and Japan. India’s relations with Italy are rapidly expanding in the strategic domain.

Third, India has unexpectedly become a transit country to resolve the European energy crisis caused by the Russia-Ukraine war. Before the war started, Europe secured around 40 percent of its oil and gas supply from Russia. European countries plunged into an energy crisis as they reduced energy purchases from Russia over the course of the past year.

For its part, Russia offered its oil to India at discounted prices to compensate for the loss incurred due to European countries reducing their oil imports from Russia. As a result of securing energy supplies at discounted prices, India has increased its oil purchases from Russia. Russia has become India’s top supplier of oil.

Fourth, India is one of the few countries in the world to have cordial ties with both Russia and the West. The war in Ukraine has dragged on for more than one year with no end in sight. The situation at present could be best described as heading toward a stalemate.

As Western countries continue supplying arms to Ukraine, Moscow has also been intensifying attacks on Kyiv. The war has already disrupted economies and supply chains for many Western countries. India could, through direct or indirect mediation, offer a face-saving option to both the warring sides in near future. India’s approach of balancing ties with Russia and the West could assume importance in case of any possibility of dialogue and diplomacy to end the war.

Whether or not the G-7 expands to a G-8 again, this time to accommodate India, remains to be seen. However India’s engagements with the G-7 are imperative to address the challenges the grouping is facing.

India’s and China’s dispute along the border is illustrative of the growing rivalry between the two countries, which is shaping the security landscape and strategic environment of South Asia. China is gaining power and influence in the Indo-Pacific – where India has long been the dominant power – and using it as yet another arena for its strategic rivalry with the United States. Given Europe’s trade with the region and the complex interplay of relations between China, the US, India, Russia, and the European Union, this dynamic will have severe consequences not just for the region, but for Europe as well.

Beijing has tightened its grip over the entire Indian Ocean region in the past two decades. It has created a network of military and commercial facilities – the so-called string of pearls – and strengthened its economic relations with countries of the region. In 2022, Sri Lankan debt obligations to China rose to $7 billion, while the Maldives owes some 40 per cent of its GDP to China. These economic dependencies have eroded India’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood. New Delhi had built up strong diplomatic ties with other countries in the region through its “island diplomacy” and initiatives such as the Security and Growth for all in the Region maritime cooperation. China’s investment in the region has now pushed New Delhi into an economic competition which it may ultimately have difficulties sustaining.

Beijing is concerned about India’s growing military ties with the US and tends to consider India’s intentions through the lens of its own rivalry with the US. India’s inability to push back China at the border also further diminishes New Delhi’s influence over the smaller regional states, namely Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and even the Maldives, by absorbing the financial, military, and administrative resources that could be spent on expanding India’s footprint in the region. It also poses questions about India’s relative power and its ability to protect smaller neighbouring countries from Chinese coercion. This leaves New Delhi even more isolated in the region that includes its arch-rival Pakistan.

Both India and China insist that they want to rebuild trust but they cannot agree on the process. Because it currently has the upper hand, China would like trust building to remain a strictly bilateral matter and does not want organisations such as the G20 and the SCO, the other three BRICS states – Brazil, Russia, and South Africa – or even the ASEAN-led institutions to play any role in the so far hypothetical normalisation process. In doing so, China challenges India’s multilateral aspirations and de facto reduces New Delhi’s capacity to manage collectively the consequences of China’s rise for itself and the region. The war in Ukraine makes this even easier as Russia, traditionally on India’s side in multilateral regional arrangements, seems distracted and neutralised by its new, albeit uneasy, proximity to China.

The escalating tensions and aggression since 2013 are therefore no coincidence. Beijing’s coercion on the border and naval build-up in the Indian Ocean force India into a costly arms race and warn it against what Beijing considers excessive proximity to the US. In the ongoing great power competition between China and the US, every issue becomes a zero-sum game. This makes it harder for India to solve its border conflict with China and at the same time manage China’s rise and growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region in a peaceful manner.

The Indo-Pacific region accounts for 40 per cent of the bloc’s extra-EU imports and 27 per cent of its total exports, most of which are sea-borne. As such, the Indian Ocean is Europe’s primary gateway to the Indo-Pacific region. China and India may be slowly but effectively moving towards a new phase of antagonistic rivalry. While the prospect of open confrontation remains only a distant possibility, further polarisation of India-China relations in the Indian Ocean is a problem not only for India, but also for Europe.

The Biden administration has been trying to bury the free-trade era for months.

U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai drove a nail into its coffin in January, telling the world’s one percent at Davos that the Biden administration would try to shape a “new economic world order” around protecting workers. And National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan sought to deliver last rites in April, promising the White House would forge a “new Washington consensus” to replace the one that had governed the globe for over a generation.


“I remain convinced that through all of this disruption we’re moving towards a new economic order,” Tai told POLITICO in an interview. “I’d really like to fill that gap with a positive vision that we will be prepared for it.”


The goal is to replace the old paradigms of globalization — free trade and a reliance on markets — with a “worker-centered” trade policy that raises wages not just for Americans, but around the world.

Biden’s team is moving slowly to transform a paralyzed World Trade Organization, once the premier facilitator of globalization, into a new-look economic club that reflects its progressive values. As those efforts crawl along, Biden has sought to forge new economic partnerships in Asia and Latin America, but the nascent efforts pale in comparison to China’s trillion-dollar infrastructure program for developing nations and risk replicating the corporate-friendly trade policies of the old system.

“In the end, the way that we are going to build an international economic architecture is not going to be with kind of Parthenon-style, clear pillars as we did after the Second World War,” Sullivan said, “but something that feels a little bit more like a Frank Gehry — a mix of structures and substances.”

In 1990, on the eve of the first Iraq War, President George H.W. Bush used almost the same words to tell Congress the U.S. would pursue a “new world order” based on commonly held democratic and capitalist values.

Rubio’s monologue was a remarkable admittance for a senior Republican lawmaker: that the last 50 years of U.S. economic policy and foreign policy, inaugurated by Richard Nixon’s visit to China and exemplified by Ronald Reagan and Bush winning the Cold War, has ultimately failed — or at least run its course.

And in that room, Rubio’s comments registered as common knowledge, even with veterans of the U.S. foreign policy establishment on Biden’s team.

“We all hoped for that vision,” said Sherman, with an air of nostalgic regret. “But what changed is that the [Chinese leader] Xi Jinping of today is not the Xi of the 1990s that we all thought we knew.”

The exchange was a striking point of agreement between Biden’s team and Rubio, who had labeled the president’s diplomatic appointees “polite and orderly caretakers of America’s decline” at the start of the administration. But it was just one example of a broad reappraisal of the legacy of an economic model that scholars call neoliberalism — a broad belief in free trade, global democratization, and low levels of regulations, taxes and social services in domestic policy.

Once the mainstream position in Washington, spanning from the presidencies of Nixon to Obama, such “neoliberal” economic policies are now assailed by left and right alike.

“The promise that was made is that globalization is going to make corporations rich, but it’s also going to lift people out of poverty,” Duss said. “And it turns out that leads to massive growth in inequality, and powers corruption and authoritarianism and environmental disruption.”

“The U.S. passed NAFTA, it granted most favored nations treatment to China and then everything went to hell for 20 years,” said Lighthizer. “We lost jobs, we had communities break up, we had opioid addiction, and maybe the worst part of it was — we had the rich here get very rich and the middle class and lower middle class get screwed. So it was a disaster.”

Tai and Biden’s answer to both neoliberalism and right-wing populism is their oft-cited worker-centered trade policy. In a phrase, it seeks to flip globalization on its head.

For decades, as Tai tells it, global trade has been a “race to the bottom”: corporations seeking greater profits by moving to nations with lower wages and fewer regulations. While many workers — particularly in China, with state support — moved out of poverty under this model, Tai argues it contributed more to inequality and environmental degradation. That, in turn, has fed the populist backlashes to the neoliberal era that led to Brexit, Trump’s election, and the rising tide of populism seen around the world.

Tai and Sullivan frame their task as reversing that dynamic. Instead of allowing corporations to decamp to countries with lower wages and regulations, they envision forming a club of nations that adhere to higher standards for workers’ rights and environmental protection. If trade is facilitated between high-standard nations, and discouraged with nations that do not abide by them, the U.S. can encourage a “race to the top,” Tai has said, in which economic activity that pays well and protects the environment is incentivized.

Put another way: If neoliberalism has been labeled globalist — or supporting the interests of a global elite — Tai and Biden’s policy could be described as internationalist — supporting the interests of workers, regardless of nationality, over the elites and business owners. It’s a decidedly left-wing economic perspective that progressive trade voices have pushed since the dawn of the neoliberal era, but it’s the first time that the leaders of the world’s largest economy have embraced it.

Instead, Biden has peddled a new type of economic “partnership” that aims to raise economic standards while avoiding the third rail of tariffs — the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Asia and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity for the Western Hemisphere.

While they don’t include some key elements of usual trade partnerships — tariff reductions and enforceable standards — the administration and its allies have touted them as forums to develop new economic rules and standards that will guide trade among like-minded nations. If done right, Biden’s team envisions them as vehicles to negotiate the values they hope will guide the next chapter of the global economy.

“What we’re looking to form are open societies, open markets where you have confidence in a level playing field and the values that you’re trading under,” Tai told POLITICO, saying that would give other nations “a proposition for growth that is more inclusive, where it’s not just the bigs getting bigger, but that the littles have a chance, too — and that goes for corporations, countries, [and] economies.”


“We can’t wait for WTO reform,” Sullivan said. “We have to be pursuing a range of other strategies to deal with China as it actually is,” like the Indo-Pacific forum and recent U.S. efforts with Europe and Japan to promote trade in less-polluting steel production, which would cut out Chinese producers and have recently hit a pause.

Those efforts, Sullivan said, will aim for a “plurilateral approach” where the U.S. and allies can “collectively align our approaches to deal with certain non-market economic practices that are fundamentally harmful,” like those coming from China.

sanman wrote:India to Push Back Against ‘agenda-Driven’ Global Ranking Firms: Modi Advisor

https://indianexpress.com/article/india ... s-8631578/

ramana wrote:The dumb Sarkari IIMs should create their own global indices and not work for HBS seminars.

The polycrisis has many sources. In my opinion the main source of the polycrisis afflicting the world today is artificial intelligence. Climate change comes second, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine qualifies as the third. The list is much longer but I’ll focus on these three. That should help reduce the confusion.


We, human beings, are both participants and observers in the world in which we live. As participants we want to change the world in our favor; as observers we want to understand reality as it is. These two objectives interfere with each other. I regard this as an important insight which allows me to distinguish between right and wrong.

This made me almost instinctively opposed to AI and I wholeheartedly agree with the experts who argue that it needs to be regulated. But the regulations have to be globally enforceable because the incentive to cheat is too great; those who evade the regulations gain an unfair advantage.

Unfortunately, global regulations are unattainable because the world is dominated by a conflict between two systems of governance which are diametrically opposed to each other. They have radically different views on what needs to be regulated and why.

I refer to the two systems of governance as open and closed societies. I define the difference between the two as follows: in an open society, the role of the state is to defend the freedom of the individual; in a closed society, the role of the individual is to serve the interests of the rulers.