Bharat Rakshak

Paul wrote:But when it comes to national interests...thay are the one and the same.

How does one reconcile the contradictions of a booming economy and democracy with world class elite institutions and yet chaotic conditions in service provision of the most rudimentary types? I argue that for India we need a new category. I argue that India is today a flailing state---a nation-state in which the head, that is the elite institutions at the national (and in some states) level remain sound and functional but that this head is no longer reliably connected via nerves and sinews to its own limbs. In many parts of India in many sectors, the everyday actions of the field level agents of the state—policemen, engineers, teachers, health workers—are increasingly beyond the control of the administration at the national or state level.

While one doesn’t want to place too much weight on any given cross-national comparison, it is clear that there is no question that India is not a failing state. It is not failing economically. It is not [failing] to maintain the basics of law and order and security—with some exceptions with Naxal areas, and movements on the edges of India the state actively maintains order. It is certainly not failing to maintain democracy, while there are certainly pockets of trouble, by and large India has maintains all of the features of a modern democratic polity: electoral democracy, an active parliament with constraints on the executive, respect for human rights, a free press, an independent judiciary. But at the same time, it is clear India is not an entirely successful state either—its performance in basic services lags even compared to its region. I characterize this inability to maintain control of the administrative apparatus in order to effectively deliver services through the government I label as a “flailing” state and turn to greater description in the next section with speculation on diagnosis and prospects in the final section.

What this produces is a combination of different uncertainties at different
horizons. In India, one is uncertain about the near future (and even, for that matter, about what is really happening in the present). But, as India’s formal political and administrative institutions are roughly those of many advanced nations, one can imagine India 50 years in the future without having had any major institutional shifts but having made a long hard steady slog to prosperity and governmental efficacy so long-run uncertainty is less. In contrast, in China one is very confident about the present-what the government says will happen will, with some slips twixt cup and lip, happen. But transitions in authoritarian regimes have, in many instances, been very problematic, and accompanied both in Chinese history and in recent practice, led to long interruptions in both economic and social progress so the long-run future of China is especially uncertain.

Just recently, another Harvard prof was interviewed on rediff said India is a "flailing state" if not a "failing state".

prad wrote:

ramana wrote:Paul, Russia is an Asian located in Europe. They may look Caucasian but they still are Asians.

imvho, i have to disagree with that one. the question of Russian identity has long been debated. but their core identity: the Eastern Orthodoxy gained from the Byzantine Empire, which itself was an offshoot of the Roman Empire, is very much Western. at best, it can be described as a combination of Western/Byzantine and the tribal peoples that lived in the Muscovy region before their Christianization. to go beyond and say Russians are Asians might be stretching it a bit too much.

one could argue that the Orthodoxy was only acquired in the last 1050 years. true, but it is those 1000 years that were crucial in forming the present Russian nation and its identity.

Paul wrote:Right...It's control over Siberia is a vestiege of European colonization of the globe.

Also, why is Russia persisting in aligning itself with Europe (which is in decline anyways)...just like it is in Atlanticist agenda to expand the frontiers of Europe to include the Caucasus and project Pakistan as a mediterranean/ME culture, it should be in Asian interests to push Asian frontiers west of the Urals.

prad wrote:Acharya, what do you mean by civilizational core? are you talking about geography or in a more cultural view point. as for geography, PRC's current boundaries are artificial. Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia were never a part of Chinese core. these were all additions in the past 70 years.

brihaspati wrote:The Gilgit Baltistan adventure of the Chinese may actually be standing on literally shaking grounds.

brihaspati wrote:I was referring to the unstable geology of the entire belt. Early this year, a landsilde blocked off a river and created a huge temporaty lake which potentailly theratens the settlements of the entire region. It has also blocked off the KKH. The Chinese arrived amidst fanfare and high hopes - but could not do much more than provide some overflow channels.

A_Gupta wrote:
2. Regarding "flailing India", perhaps it was this by Lant Pritchett of Harvard
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/lpritch/P ... ate_v1.pdf

Table 4: India scores far the best in its region on rule of law
and human rights, but middle of the pack in services
Suspension of
Rule of Law,
Violation of
Human Rights
(1-10, 1 worst)
Progressive Deterioration
of Public Services
(1-10, 1 worst)
India 5.4 6.7
Sri Lanka 7.5 6.5
Bangladesh 7.8 6.6
Pakistan 8.7 7.1
Nepal 8.8 7.4
Source: Failed State Index, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/

One of the most pre-eminent among the foreign policy elite, the guy who first hob-knobbed with AfPak terrorists who now haunt India: Zbignief Brizinsky. In a book, actually interview with him and Brent Scrowcroft by David Ignatius of WP, Zbig clearly says India is an arftifical state (with so many languages and ethnicities glued together) and it is unclear whether in its current form, many northern states will be with India. He further goes on to add that as Indian people are more economically empowered the fisssures will only be exaggarated as people become more politically conscious. He argues that India is not a good partner for US, and both argue that by giving India a nuke deal which TSP is so upset about, it has undercut India's ineterests.

Scowcroft: Pakistan, in a sense, got a tough hand in the division of India, in 1947. They inherited the tribal areas, the most fractious areas. They did not inherit the Congress Party, which gave a sense of unity of India that Pakistan didn't enjoy. And they have been unable to deal with democracy....

....I think it's going to take great skill to prevent an explosion. If the army splits, the nuclear weapons are not necessarily secure. And a Pakistan in chaos could be a fatal attraction for India to solve the Kashmir problem. It certainly would have repercussions in Afghanistan.

Ignatius: That's a grim forecast. Zbig, do you share that?

Brzezinski: I do....

Scowcroft: .....He has another problem, and that is, in a sense, reorienting the army. The Pakistan army has always faced India, because that's where the problem's been. He has to get them to face their northwest territories, not because the United States wants it but because that is the new threat.

Brzezinski: ...India is preoccupied with its conflict with Pakistan and is certainly not capable of playing a stabilizing role, even if it is not actively destabilizing....

Scowcroft: ...India is another interesting case. India is becoming an economic powerhouse, but they're doing it almost in spite of themselves. In its early years, many of the Indian governing elite were educated in England in Marxist economics. They had a socialist orientation. As a result, the government still continues some residual suspicion of entrepreneurship. And yet they're doing reasonably well...

If the army splits, the nuclear weapons are not necessarily secure. And a Pakistan in chaos could be a fatal attraction for India to solve the Kashmir problem. It certainly would have repercussions in Afghanistan.

Ignatius: We haven't talked much about India, and that's typical of foreign policy discussions. This enormous, increasingly prosperous democracy in the heart of South Asia just doesn't hit the American radar screen. We worry about the Middle East. We worry about China and Japan. We often forget about India.

The Bush administration has worked very hard to cement a new strategic relationship with India, to make real accommodations to India as a nuclear power, in effect to grandfather their breakout nuclear weapons program into the nonproliferation treaty. Do you both think that was wise? And do you think it was successful?

The Indians, to my surprise, at this writing seem unwilling to close the deal. It's a very favorable deal for them. But something in their nationalist character keeps them from signing on the dotted line. Zbig, why is that? What's going on with India?

Brzezinski: Well, the Indians are very difficult customers. They have been that way for fifty years. They certainly were not helpful during the cold war. They weren't helpful during the Afghan War. I'm not sure how helpful they are right now, because they're obviously interested in limiting Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. And that's driving the Pakistanis into some of their more rash actions. So that is worrisome.

Secondly, I feel very uncomfortable about the nuclear deal we signed with India. I think we are legalizing what might be called preferential and selective proliferation. The exclusion of their fourteen reactors from international control damages our credibility on the nonproliferation issue.

These fourteen reactors are producing weapons. Excluding them from international control has potentially significant implications, even in terms of the military balance in the Far East. If the Indians were to significantly increase their nuclear arsenal, would the Chinese stick to their minimum nuclear deterrence posture? I don't think we have thought through the strategic implications of this.

Ignatius: Brent, the administration saw this as a real breakthrough agreement.

Brzezinski; But for what?

Scowcroft: They did.

Ignatius: For the opportunity it presented to make a strategic alliance with a rising economic superpower in Asia that was also a democracy.

Brzezinski: Against whom?

Ignatius: It wasn't against anybody. It was, again, a positive-sum game. It was premised on these two great democracies, the United States and India, making common cause and putting aside their differences. How well do you think that's worked out? Zbig's skeptical of it.

Scowcroft: I don't think it has worked out. It was, at best, premature. I don't know what deliberations went into this emotional surge toward India. Maybe because Russia was no longer a pillar for India, they were available. There may have been some calculation about needing a counter to growing Chinese strength. I don't know. But obviously, we embraced India very strongly. As it turned out, that had negative implications for Pakistan. We're paying for that right now.

Brzezinski: There may have been anti-Muslim feeling, too, among some of the people who were for it.

Scowcroft: I don't know. It's possible. I'm puzzled by it. But from the Indian perspective, they obviously felt they needed partners other than Russia. But part of the reason they have not fully embraced a close relationship may be that the Indians don't want to be a small boat floating in the wake of the great United States, because one of their other alternatives is to lead the developing world. And as we've seen in the Doha [Development] Round discussions, they have played that role quite seriously.

So we've got a whole situation in flux right now. My own sense is that it's good that the nuclear deal is now on the shelf. I think it was premature at least. But what's going on with India is a much deeper issue.

Paul, Russia is an Asian located in Europe. They may look Caucasian but they still are Asians.

Ignatius: Do you both regard India as essentially a benign force? We focus on the Chinese economic miracle, but some people argue that we're looking in the wrong place. The country that will really be increasingly dominant in technology and will really compete with us is India, not China. Do you think there's a malign underside to this story of India's growth?

Brzezinski: Maybe there's a vulnerability rather than a malign reality. India is a remarkable success as a democracy, but it's also a deceptive success. India's social disparities are far more acute than China's. {Until Bihar announced a 11% growth rate for last year, I'd have agreed with him. With the new fact, I'm now much more optimistic.} The poverty, for the lower portion of the population, is far graver. That is something that still has to be overcome. The Indians are way behind the Chinese in developing a respectable modern urban sector and even in their transportation system.

The second problem is illiteracy, in which India is again way worse than China amongst women -- somewhere near fifty percent. Among men it's somewhat lower, but still staggeringly high for a country that aspires to be a technological pioneeer.

And, then there is a third aspect, which is again very different from China, and again to India's disadvantage. China is ninety percent Han. India is really diverse ethnically- 180 million Muslims. I think there are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan.

Think what will happen when the masses get literate and politically activated. That hasn't happened yet. The system works on the basis of dynastic political parties inherited form British colonial rule, with a democratic tradition but with the masses relatively easily molded in one direction or another. Once the masses begin to be motivated by their personal or group preferences, ethnic dislikes, religious phobias, and social resentments, India could be a very troubled place.

Brzezinski: .....If we can do that, then the West will remain the preeminent region in the world for some decades. Even if we are more attentive to the Far East, Japan needs us at least as much as we need them, and probably much more. China, for all its potential for global leadership, will still be, for the next several decades, a country with massive infrastructural problems and poverty. India has yet to prove that it can sustain its national unity. They're a population of a billion people who are still mostly politically inactive and not yet mobilized. We don't know what will happen when that population, so differentiated in ethnicity, language and religion, becomes genuinely politically awakened.

So the West has role to play....

csharma wrote:Stephen Cohen talks about "Irrelevance of India's military power".

http://acdis.illinois.edu/students/cour ... ndia.html/

csharma wrote:Stephen Cohen talks about "Irrelevance of India's military power".

http://acdis.illinois.edu/students/cour ... ndia.html/

Machinations of two old foes grow in intensity as they seek to fill power vacuum after Nato pullout
Simon Tisdall, The Guardian, Friday 7 May 2010

Intent on filling a vacuum after the US withdraws from Afghanistan, India and Pakistan are engaged in what analysts warn is a dangerously escalating "proxy war". That's bad news for Britain and Nato – because, paradoxically, the two old foes' intensifying machinations could delay or fatally undermine the western pull-out on which all current calculations are based.
[...]
India's worries that Pakistan, by inserting itself in the centre of the peace process, will either fix it or wreck it, depending on its self-interest at the time, may be shared in Washington. But the US is now determined to keep both Pakistan's military and Karzai sweet, after the recriminations of the last 12 months over battlefield setbacks.

With an offensive looming in Kandahar, the immediate US focus is on beating back the Taliban in the south, keeping Pakistan's tribal belt under pressure, strengthening the Afghan government's future negotiating position, and ensuring that "Afghanisation" will work sufficiently well to allow the troops to leave.

The Indians will lobby Obama when he visits later this year. But right now, Delhi's insecurities and resentments are not a top priority. There is also some sympathy for Pakistan's long-standing complaints that by involving itself in Afghanistan, India is surreptitiously trying to encircle Pakistan and is training and funding Baluch separatists.

Amid rising region-wide tensions, in which China, Russia and Iran also hold cards, the risk is increasing that the jockeying for position over Afghanistan could fatally complicate US and British hopes of finally extricating themselves from the quagmire into which they strayed in 2001. Yet the closer their withdrawal gets, the less leverage they can apply.

"Neighbouring states are already considering the Americans as good as gone and are preparing for an endgame scenario with old rivalries renewed," Rashid said. "If no solution is found to reconcile Pakistani and Indian interests [in Afghanistan], the coming months might see stepped-up terrorist attacks against Indians in Kabul and the return of militants infiltrating Indian Kashmir." Rather than the end of the Afghan war, this sounds uncomfortably like the resumption of a regional one.

The details of the Pakistan-China deal are far from clear, but the stringent conditions India has accepted in its deal with the US seem to be absent in the instant case. Pakistan has neither agreed to throw open its nuclear reactors to IAEA inspections, nor has reached any agreement with the IAEA on safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, permitting intrusive inspections, which India has accepted. Perhaps, these conditions may come up when the matter is brought up at the NSG.But given the US position, the NSG may, at best, impose the same conditions as in the Indian case. But in the case of China, the transparent process in the US Congress and elsewhere will be absent and Pakistan is likely to sail through the NSG, with conditions similar to those implicit in the India waiver.Interestingly, China does not seem to have claimed exemption under the 'grandfather clause' for the supply by arguing that the present deal was part of the 1985 agreement, which led to the construction of two reactors in Pakistan. The argument clearly is that the deal is necessary to restore the nuclear balance in South Asia, a right China arrogates to itself with the acceptance of the US. China has accepted the Pakistani contention that India will be able to strengthen its weapons capability by devoting its entire production of fissile material for arms, while securing enough supplies of uranium from abroad for peaceful uses.Apart from the current mood in Washington to appease Pakistan in the context of its Afpak policy, there are two reasons why the US will not object to the Pakistan-China deal at the NSG or elsewhere. It needs China's support immediately to impose sanctions against Iran and China may well have extracted its price for an abstention on the Iran sanctions resolution in the Security Council. Contrary to the provisions of the UN Charter, an abstention by a permanent member has come to be considered as assent.Secondly, Pakistan has been blocking the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), much to the chagrin of a majority of member States. China may well have insisted that Pakistan should let the FMCT negotiations go forward, now that Pakistan had the facility of importing reactors without signing the NPT.

Although China has long denied helping any nation attain nuclear capability, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, AQ Khan, himself has acknowledged the crucial role China played in his nation’s nuclear weaponization by gifting 50 kilograms of weapons-grade enriched uranium, nuclear weapons blueprints and tons of uranium hexafluoride for Pakistan’s centrifuges. This is perhaps the only case in which a nuclear weapon state has actually passed on weapons grade fissile material as well as a bomb design to a non-nuclear weapon state. Sino-Pakistan nuclear collusion has continued despite the fact that China is an NPT signatory.

RoyG wrote:

csharma wrote:Stephen Cohen talks about "Irrelevance of India's military power".

http://acdis.illinois.edu/students/cour ... ndia.html/

A bit too simplistic.

Incorrect dates.

Stupid title.

Agree with him on bureaucratic interference.

Feel like inviting him to BRF.

One hour closer to death.

AnimeshP wrote:
Amen to that ... If this is the kind of drivel is considered expertise then I am Einstien ...
The guy doesn't know what he is talking about ...

brihaspati wrote:But for that, they dont need to raise a public debate! The leaders speak what is on theirminds anyway, unless ofcourse the wesr expects this leaders to be replaced soon.

Johann wrote:In many ways this very old rivalry is a moot point as Russia and Latin(ised) Europe will need to lean on each other heavily in coming decades to maintain their place in the world. Russia's shift to wholesale arms procurement from France and Germany is only the start of a deeper strategic and economic integration between the EU and Russia, even though autarky is Russia's fundamental impulse.