Bharat Rakshak

Cordesman: Afghan Security Forces may not be ready by July 2011

http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts ... _july_2011

http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/daw ... s-fo-ss-05

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan will only re-open a supply route for coalition troops in Afghanistan once public anger over Nato incursions eases and security improves, the foreign ministry spokesman said on Sunday.

Militants on Saturday threatened more attacks on tankers carrying fuel to Afghanistan through routes in Pakistan to avenge the incursions.

"Unless the reaction cools down and we make sure that the supply line is secured, we cannot reopen it," Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit told Reuters.

Nightwatch 10/1/10

Pakistan: Update. NATO supplies from Pakistan to Afghanistan were blocked for a second day at the Torkham border crossing near Peshawar, according to a Pakistani official. A Peshawar security official confirmed the suspended convoys and said orders to restore NATO supplies were not yet received.

Comment: Readers will recall the suspension of NATO convoys was a reaction to a NATO/US armed helicopter attack on a Frontier Corps outpost that killed three Pakistani paramilitary soldiers.

A point that has gotten lost in the voluminous media commentary is that this is the first time Pakistan has reacted so strongly to the daily violations of its sovereignty. Attacks of this kind have occurred inadvertently and occasionally during the past six or so years.

Sometimes the Pakistani border outposts invited retaliation because they fired mortars in support of the Taliban. Other times, NATO/US forces misidentified the target and hit Pakistani security personnel by mistake, often as they were providing covering fire for infiltrating or exfiltrating Afghan militant groups. Still other times, intermingling made it impossible to separate the Pakistani security personnel from the militants they supplied with food, ammunition and weapons.

Such incidents normally have been handled through meetings along the border, intelligence exchanges, jointly manned centers and flag-officer talks. Something has changed.

Working backwards, the start of the public revelations in Woodward's book coincides with a change in attitude and style in Pakistan, the Taliban and NATO forces, at least based on open source materials.

NATO has been acting with greater haste and more disregard of the border in crossing into Pakistani national territory more frequently. The Pakistanis have been less cooperative, culminating in the border closure at Torkham. They also have been more supportive of militant operations in Kashmir, against India.

Finally, some Afghan Taliban have indulged the ruse of reconciliation, while actually waiting for the US to execute its "exit strategy." Waiting out the Christians or other foreign invaders has always been the Taliban strategy since 2001; just as IEDs have been the favored Taliban tactic to make Afghanistan inhospitable to foreign invaders and encourage them to leave.

The tempo of action seems to have quickened in the direction of an American exit.

Special NightWatch Comment: Mirror imaging is a serious analytical flaw. If things are not done their way, analysts are prone to consider them inferior or wrong. It manifests a dangerous, potentially lethal cultural bias.

This week US officers were quoted in international press, yet again, as accusing the Taliban of cowardice because they use improvised explosive devices and don't come out and fight like men. An odd taunt.

In the past nine years of fighting, the Taliban -- who go to war wearing robes, sandals and turbans and fight mainly with assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades and IEDS -- never accuse US soldiers of cowardice for wearing ceramic armor; riding in tanks and armored fighting vehicles; fighting from forts; using the most advanced artillery invented, helicopter gunships and fighter aircraft; relying on advanced communications, satellites, armed drones; and rotating out after a tour in the field.

The officers might drop the name calling and try to understand what motivates pre-modern men so ill equipped to continue to fight the most advanced military forces in the history of the world for nearly a decade.

A new poll of the Pakistani tribal areas confirms almost every past poll taken in the last nine years. The locals hate the drones and hate the US worse than they hate the Pakistani fundamentalists. They blame their own sense of insecurity on the US, not the Pakistani Taliban.

Only 16 percent of respondents to the poll sponsored by the drone-watchers at the New America Foundation said the drone attacks "accurately target militants." Three times that number said the drones "largely kill civilians."

A plurality of respondents in the tribal areas said that the U.S. is primarily responsible for violence in the region. Nearly 90 percent want the U.S. to stop pursuing militants and nearly 60 percent are fine with suicide bombings directed at the Americans.

As for views on al Qaida, over 75% of respondents strongly disapproved of al Qaeda; more than 66% disapproved of the Pakistani Taliban, and 60% disapproved of the Afghan Taliban. Almost 70 % said they want the army to confront al Qaida and the Taliban in the region; 79% said they wouldn't mind if the tribal area were run by the Pakistan Army, instead of by the "agent" system held over from colonial times.

Comment: In the past ten years, no Islamic teacher or renown in Pakistan has judged attacks against US forces and personnel as un-Islamic. Samples of Friday sermons show that Pakistani imams encourage such attacks.

Conventions of Islamic scholars regularly have met and judged suicide attacks as un-Islamic, but the steady increase in such attacks attests to the emptiness of their guidance. They have limited influence and maintain it by inciting anti-US sentiment and blame for Pakistan's culture of violence.

The international media has reported extensively the findings of the new poll. What they have not reported is that the results are important because they show no change in Pakistani tribal attitudes after nearly ten years of engagement. *

All the US visits, aid and talks have made no difference in reducing the hostile environment in which Pakistani security forces must operate. That hostility is blamed on and directed at the US. This is a significant policy failure because it means the tribal population has become hostile.

The US apparently has no tools or techniques for reducing the hostility. In the border marches of Pakistan, half a generation of tribal youths has grown to adulthood wary of US drone attacks and commando raids. The Pakistan government's primary technique for deflecting blame is to blame the US.

* I think the fatal flaw of the drone strike strategy is the TSPA provides the cooridnates of those tribals who are rebeling against the TSP and the US is happy to oblige thiniking one dead Pashtun is one less to deal with in Afghan. In other words the TSP is using the US to suppress the Paki Pashtuns in FATA areas and hence the resentment.

Only a matter of time before pakis provide the Droneacharyas with coordinates of the NATO supply convoys. That way the ISI dont have to sweat it out. Anyways the lorries used seems to be owned by Gul and co for retired jihadis who are no longer fit for non-state service. So in a sense, a win-win for all.

hnair wrote:Only a matter of time before pakis provide the Droneacharyas with coordinates of the NATO supply convoys. That way the ISI dont have to sweat it out.

about to post a similar thought... after all talipan were stealing all those Humvees for years...

X-post...

Acharya in Geo-political thread..

South Asia’s Geography of Conflict
By Robert D. Kaplan
http://www.cnas.org/node/4952

India will emerge as the key Eurasian pivot state because of its effect on relations between the United States and China. To effectively deal with India, American policymakers must understand Indian geography and geopolitics throughout its long history. In particular, Indian geography is the story of invasions from a northwesterly direction, and India’s strategic challenges still inhere in this fact. Afghanistan, in Indian eyes, is not part of Central Asia but part of the Indian subcontinent. Afghanistan is linked organically to India on account of the record of empires past. This organic connection to India is also true of Central Asia and Iran. As for Pakistan, it is seen by Indians as the modern-day residue of medieval Muslim domination over India. As the India-Pakistan dispute attests, nationalism is young and vibrant in the subcontinent, as it was in early modern Europe. The India-China rivalry, unlike the India-Pakistan one, is far less emotional because it is not borne of historical grievances. India is quietly testing the United States in Afghanistan, to see to what extent America will remain as a great power in Eurasia.


As the United States and China become great power rivals, the direction in which India tilts could determine the course of geopolitics in Eurasia in the 21st century. India, in other words, looms as the ultimate pivot state. But even as the Indian political class understands at a very intimate level America’s own historical and geographical situation, the American political class has no such understanding of India’s. Yet, if Americans do not come to grasp India’s age-old, highly unstable geopolitics, especially as it concerns Pakistan, Afghanistan and China, they will badly mishandle the relationship.

Indeed, America has come to grief in the past by not understanding local histories. India is much too important for us to commit a similar mistake. In fact, India and South Asia in general have a dangerously misunderstood geography. Understanding that geography delivers one to the core of South Asia’s political dilemma, which is about borders that can never be perfect or even acceptable to all sides, so that the map of South Asia resembles that of war-torn, early-modern Europe, made worse by nuclear weapons. Indian history and geography since early antiquity constitutes the genetic code for how the world looks from the vantage point of New Delhi.

The broad arc of territory from Afghanistan southeastward into northern India was for long periods under the embrace of a single polity, so that Afghanistan is linked organically to India, even as Afghanistan matters more crucially to Pakistan. Thus, giving up on Afghanistan would carry momentous geopolitical implications for the United States, as it would affect how elites in New Delhi and other Asian capitals henceforth perceive Washington. Afghanistan is a tipping point for the American projection of power in Eurasia. It will affect at a visceral level how not just Indian, but also Pakistani and Chinese elites, see the United States. And the direction that Afghanistan takes will affect how successful India is in overcoming the problems on its borders in order to emerge as a world-class power. To give readers a rich sense of this, I first delve into South Asian geography and history at some length.

India, thus, is both a subcontinent and a vital extremity of the greater Middle East, with a highly organic relationship to it.
The key to understanding India is the realization that while as a subcontinent India makes eminent geographic sense, its natural boundaries are, nevertheless, quite weak in places. The result has been various states throughout history that do not conform to our spatial idea of India, and in fact lie astride it. In fact, the present Indian state still does not conform to the borders of the subcontinent, and that is the heart of its dilemma: Pakistan, Bangladesh and (to a lesser extent) Nepal also lie within the subcontinent and pose significant security threats to India, robbing India of political energy that it would otherwise harness for power projection throughout much of Eurasia.

Nightwatch on the recent warnings of potential terrorist attacks in Europe;

Special comment on warning: In the past few days the US media has bombarded viewers and listeners with the latest State Department warning about an al Qaida threat in public places in European cities. The warning instructs travelers to not change their travel plans, but to be alert in public places, transportation hubs and gathering places.

It goes without saying that governments must disseminate such warnings, though reporting from Germany and France disputes the threat as stated in the US warning. However, there are some well established precepts of warning that the recent US warning ignores, at least as reported by radio and television.

The main purpose of any warning message, obviously, is to help keep people, companies, countries safe. Warnings do this by raising vigilance in order to generate appropriate reflexive responses. An appropriate reflexive response is a human behavior that is reasonable under the circumstances, that is, appropriate to the information about the threat. (See the writings of Irving Janis, Alexander George and many others for detailed explanations.)

Vigilance is fragile because it is a fear response that is difficult to sustain if the threat fails to materialize as damage.

The appropriateness of a vigilance response is related to the amount of fear-generating information in the warning plus the amount of reassurance it contains. For example, long experience has shown that blanket reassurance always negates vigilance. In practice, reassurance and vigilance cannot co-exist. Reassurance always trumps vigilance.

In attempting to raise vigilance, the latest warning messages advised travelers of potentially mortal danger, but then instructed them to make no changes in plans, which is a blanket reassurance message. The advice to be alert, but make no travel changes is almost certain to erode vigilance, except in the most skittish. It also makes little sense.

Another lesson form the history of warning concerns the content: how much information must a warning contain. Researchers in the 1960s compiled lessons for use by civil defense authorities in responding to natural disaster, such as hurricanes, as well as civil threats, including air raids.

They found that too much history and explanation negates vigilance. Familiarity breeds reassurance and thus, disregard of the warning. On the other hand, too little information breeds disregard because the audience does not know what to do or to avoid.

A problem with the weekend warnings as publicized is they contain no guidance about what to do or avoid. Everyone does something to protect themselves in the face of potentially mortal danger. The warning message advised travelers to not do those things, just be alert.

The US warning also includes a presumption that precautions are universal. Consider, during a recent trip to Europe, travelers could find that Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris had no visible security, but at Schipol airport in Amsterdam, commandos patrolled with slung sub-machineguns.

What constitutes reasonable precautions differs by country and by culture. Plus, what are the reasonable precautions travelers can take against Mumbai-style machine gun and grenade attacks at hotels and synagogues?

Good warnings - meaning, useful in keeping people safe -- require careful crafting and drafting. The weekend warnings seem to be aimed at exonerating the government and placing on travelers the responsibility for being safe from terrorist attacks. Thus, if some US citizens were to die, the government could and would claim it had warned them to be careful, for whatever good that does.

So the rot is very deep now. Looks like its fak-ap in DC.

Anujan's very relevant book review:

X-posting Book review & impressions of Woodward's "Obama's wars" (1 of 2)

Halfway through "Obama's wars" by Bob Woodward. So far it is exclusively about Afghanistan (why the wars in plural?)

Every BRF-ite should read it. Bob Woodward has given a grand sweep of how US fights its wars, the impact of Civil-Military relations on the conduct of the war by the US, the various fissures between intelligence agencies which enhances (or frequently limits) their capabilities, the methods and techniques (which involve robust debate and scholarly reviews) adopted to review their approach and the ruthless single minded pursuit of American interests. This is a very important book for every BRF-ite to read carefully to analyze Unkil's intentions and methods. This is review part 1 of 2, since I am only halfway through the book:

If I may speculate, the publication of this book in October carries a special significance. The publication of the McChrystal review of the afghan war progress forms a central incident in the book. McChrystal's review of the Afghan situation, initiated after the commencement of Obama's presidency was done in the context of Obama reorienting Afghan war as the central war of his presidency, a reversal of the Bush approach of the centrality of Iraq. This review was leaked to Woodward who wanted to publish it (~1 year ago). Then Woodward himself was invited to the Pentagon (along with the Washingtonpost editor and lawyer) to try and get him to not do it, or atleast redact a major portion of it. To understand the report's significance, the report was commissioned in the climate of 3 diverging pulls in the administration. (1) Essentially unlimited commitment to the war -- hundreds of thousands of troops. This option seems to have been given a final burial (2) McChrystal's plan of 30,000 soldiers to replicate Iraq's "surge" (more on this later) and the (3) Biden plan of counterterrorism+: 2 bases in Afghanistan, small elite force with significant mobility to strike anywhere at short notice, and round the clock aerial surveillance. In short, making life "Just about difficult" for Al Qaeda to not use Afghanistan and go elsewhere.

Now back to McChrystal review and the timing of the book: Woodward rightfully points out that only under extraordinary circumstances do US generals ever use the word "defeat" in writing -- and McChrystal had used the word more than a dozen times in his review! The most clear & chilling sentence:

"Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentun in the near-term (by September 2010)...risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible"..."We run the risk of strategic defeat"

And this is October 2010.

Now on to the general review & summary: So far, the book is about the Administration operatives (who are "Win the next elections at any cost" mode) and an army of hyper competitive never-say-die generals (who are in "Win the war at any cost" mode). Their theatrics played out in the media, with one group trying to box in the other through public pronouncements. The administration itself consists of three cliques of people. The "Get Obama re-elected" group (of Rahm Emmanuel and Axelrod), The "Old Obama buddies" group and "Hired professionals for the job" group and the tensions between them. However, my review is not about those parts. I will organize this from an "India centric" viewpoint. First of all, everyone in the US seems to have come around to the view that Military victory (in the classic sense of taliban defeat and capitulation) is impossible. There are two reasons for this impossibility. 1. The current force levels of the US are inadequate for counterinsurgency and 2. Even if they militarily succeed, the other two "legs of the stool" -- Governance & Economic development in Afghanistan and Stability & co-operation of Pakistan is absent. Now, no BRF-ite should even for a moment think that Unkil is not aware of the double game being played by Pakistan: Right off the bat, in page 3 of the book, which details the President-elect Obama (he would take the oath of office many months later, this is during the transition period) being briefed on national security,

McConnell had laid out the problem dealing with Pakistan. It was a dishonest partner of the US in the Afghan war. "They are living a lie", McConnell said.

In fact, I will go a step further and claim that so far the book has covered 3 aspects. (1) The Army-Administration relationship and its impact on the conduct of the war (2) Suicidal behavior of Pakistan and their perfidy (3) To a lesser extent, Karzai's inability to work towards some semblance of a decent administrative structure. A good chunk of the book is about Pakistan's double dealing and Unkil's planning to take into account the double dealing. For example

On the stick side, Riedel said, they had looked at the extreme option of invading Pakistan....immediately dismissed it. (On the carrot side debating whether Pakistan should be rewarded with hundreds of helicopters)....There werent enough helicopters in the world to change Pakistani behavior

Sometimes, the absurdity is even highlighted

Zardari talking with Khalizad: Zardari dropped his diplomatic guard. He suggested that one of the two countries was arranging the attacks by Pakistani taliban inside his country: India or the US. Zardari didnt think India could be that clever. Zardari talking with Bob Woodward: On relations with India, he took pride in what he deemed a significant liberalizing moment. "I've allowed Indian movies for the first time"

In this context, and in the context of Unkil's realization that a counter insurgency is unlikely to succeed, Unkil wants to "Change the facts on the ground". Which essentially means a change in Pakistani behavior. Like blind sheep, every discussion mentioned in the book about "Changing Pakistani behavior" goes back to gaining Pakistani trust by doing something or the other. The administration and the army seems to have bought hook line and sinker, Pakistani claim that resolution of disputes with India would cause it to abandon terrorism. However, it seems to me that three assumptions have not been challenged

1. How will rewarding bad behavior (on the part of Pakistan) ensure Pakistan's compliance to its end of the bargain? What if they demand more? Riedel himself dismisses Pakistani demand of a civil nuclear deal as (paraphrased) "They will simply pocket it and keep doing what they are doing, claiming that it is their right to get a deal like India"

2. What does appeasing Pakistan mean in the larger content of Unkil's strategy in Asia? vis-a-vis China and India?

3. Why not use tools and leverages that exist to punish them?

Unkil's acceptance (in some form or the other) Pakistani position that support of terrorism is in some sense a natural thing to do in its competition with India, is just one aspect of why India should not pin its hopes on the US. The other significant aspect is that US itself is in a "drawdown" mode. Listing a few national interests. Paring down that list to bare essentials. Achieving that bare essentials using minimum casualities and money. In this sense, every objective in Afghanistan is questioned and its scope reduced. For example: The quality of training of the Afghan armed forces, whether to "defeat" or simply "disrupt" the taliban (there are several rounds of discussion between the National Security advisor, Defence secretary, Petraeus, Director of National Intelligence etc. about the single word "Defeat" vs "Disrupt" in the strategy document)

This has convinced me that India relying on the US to accomodate Indian national interest in Afghanistan in some form or extent is a losing strategy on India's part

A few random thoughts and excerpts:

1. On predator drones, Woodward asserts again and again that the drones themselves are just one aspect. Without accurate HUMINT the drones are useless

The US had scored an extraordinary intelligence coup in the ungoverned regions of Pakistan as a result of blending...human sources and technical intelligence...He (McConnell) said, The real breakthrough had been with human sources. That is what President Bush wanted to protect at all costs....without spies, the video feed from the Predator might as well be a blank television screen.

2. The degree to which everyone is prepared to question their assumptions and even winning strategies, hire outside consultants and produce sharp strategy documents is astounding. If GWB's administration had done this 9 years ago, Afghan war would have had a different color now.

3. Everyone wants to fix India-Pak "issues". For example in one of the main strategy meetings on Afghan war

...everyone in the room said it had to be done without fanfare or public attention (India-Pak issues). Otherwise India would go beserk. India thought that the US was filled with closet Pakistani lovers.

and

When it came to India--a country outside of Holbrooke's portfolio but central to Pakistan's concerns--Holbrooke said in his theatric baritone, "I will deal with India by pretending not to deal with India".

and Obama laying out his objectives

I see three key goals. One protecting the US homeland...two, concern about Pakistan's nuclear weapons...third goal about Pakistan-India relationships

4.... but that doesnt mean that a majority of the book is devoted to India-Pak. India is hardly mentioned at all. Maybe 1 or 2 pages. In the context of Mumbai,

CIA intelligence showed no direct ISI link, Hayden told him (Bush). These are former people who are no longer employees of the Pakistani government* (Footnote: The CIA later recieved reliable intelligence that ISI was directly involved in training for Mumbai)

5. For comic relief, one of the SEAL missions into Pakistan produced heavy civilian casualities because

But in that part of the world, people often ran towards automatic weapons fire and explosions..to see what was happening

6. While propounding "Nook Nanga" theory, this has to be taken into account:

And most tellingly, nothing on the shelf specifically addressed towards securing Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Obama's team would have to develop a graduated plan dealing with a range of circumstances, from Pakistan losing a single nuclear weapon all the way up to the Pakistani government falling to Islamic extremists.

I am only halfway through the book, my impressions might change. Rest of the review after I finish the book. And I havent lost sight of the fact that this is October 2010 and the national bird of Pakistan seems to be frisky these days....

Anujan's second part:

Obama's wars Book review 2/2
First general impressions and then India centric view:

Okay, I am done with the rest of the book. Overall the book is about an intellectual, cold, calculating President who knows how to wield power, not get awed or taken in by his Army or intelligence agencies, ask sharp probing questions and rein in his own military. If one incident summarizes the book, it is this: After months of deliberations and nine rounds of grueling strategy reviews, the NSC agrees on a troop level of 30,000. Obama is ready to draft his order when Pentagon and Gates come back with "pending requests" of 4500 support troops and 10% leeway on the 30,000.

Obama erupts. Dictates a 5 page terms sheet clearly laying down the objectives and the numbers so that nobody -- not the vast Armed forces bureaucracy at the Pentagon or the overeager generals get any leeway in "interpreting" his orders in whatever ways they please. (by the way the 5 page terms sheet is worth reproducing here, it clearly lays down US objectives, time lines and force levels in A'stan. I will see if I can scan it from the book).

While such hands on, intellectual and probing President is quite remarkable, what I feel is that this exercise is only as good as its participants. On the one hand, there is Hillary whose loyalty is suspect. Then there is Gates, who is committed to leaving his job in 2011, well before Obama's re-election. Then there is Petraeus, who is media savvy and comes across as a military man who views civilians as unavoidable nuisance. There is Adm Mullen who is stuck in a peculiar place. As chairman of JCSC he is the senior most military officer tasked to advise the President. But since Chief of JCSC is not in the operational chain of command (it flows from the Defense secretary directly to theater commanders and from there to combat commanders), he is more of a figurehead than a soldier. Add to that his tendency to overrule other Chiefs of Staff. In short, after several rounds of gruelling discussions among people who lack imagination, pursue their own agenda and regurgitate operational plans on autopilot, Obama is presented with only one real option. the other two "alternatives" are unrealistic -- 85,000 troops (not available) and 10,000 advisors (surely leading to a Taliban takeover) -- which brings it back to square one -- the original McChrystal recommendation.

Now from an India centric viewpoint. First, what can we expect will happen in Afghanistan?

The rest of the book is a painstaking detail of how the scope and involvement of the US in Afghanistan has been drastically reduced after several rounds of meetings. US seems to have come around to the view that a "Taliban defeat" is a virtual impossibility. For example, Petraeus says:

We are not going to defeat the taliban, but we do need to deny them access to key population areas and lines of communication to contain them.

If at all the operation ends on a high note, it will be after Kandahar is secured.

According to some intelligence analysis, Kandahar was susceptible to a mass uprising that might resemble the 1968 tet offensive in Vietnam...Watch Kandahar, the intelligence warned. It could be more important than Kabul.

After which US troops begin to make their exit.

Next, what is in store for India?

Indians should read this book and WAKE UP!! I feel that the book says only one part of the story. It starts off grandly with Obama declaring:

We need to make clear to people that the cancer is in Pakistan. Obama said. The reason we are doing the target, train and transfer in Afghanistan is so the cancer doesnt spread there.

But then devolves into

The consensus inside the intelligence community was that Afghanistan would not get straightened out until there was a stable relationship between Pakistan and India. A more mature and less combustible relationship between the two longtime adversaries was more important than building Afghanistan, Lavoy said

This reminds me of a story of a man who loses his ring at home, and searches for it in the street, because there is better streetlight there. But this is more sinister than that:

There was another side to the tough talk. As a result of nearly endless policy discussions in the White House, Jones (National Security Advisor), Donilon (Deputy NSA), Lute (Senior advisor for AfPak) and others had repeatedly asked: How are we going to get these guys in Pakistan to Change? For the moment, they knew that this was the wrong question. Pakistan was not going to change. The Pakistanis were hardwired against India. Lets quit banging our heads against the wall and accept it...Pakistan would be at such a disadvantage in a conventional war....that it had relied on two asymmetric tools -- proxy terrorism through LeT and threat of nuclear weapons....Jones tried to convey to them (Pakistanis): We've come to the conclusion that after years of trying, we're not going to change your strategic calculus. It's yours. We accept it and want to understand it better. You get to be Pakistanis in this relationship, while we get to be the Americans. We're not going to try to be both.

Time for SDREs to be less of Gandhi and more of Indira Gandhi.

Anujan wrote:

The consensus inside the intelligence community was that Afghanistan would not get straightened out until there was a stable relationship between Pakistan and India. A more mature and less combustible relationship between the two longtime adversaries was more important than building Afghanistan, Lavoy said

There was another side to the tough talk. As a result of nearly endless policy discussions in the White House, Jones (National Security Advisor), Donilon (Deputy NSA), Lute (Senior advisor for AfPak) and others had repeatedly asked: How are we going to get these guys in Pakistan to Change? For the moment, they knew that this was the wrong question. Pakistan was not going to change. The Pakistanis were hardwired against India. Lets quit banging our heads against the wall and accept it...Pakistan would be at such a disadvantage in a conventional war....that it had relied on two asymmetric tools -- proxy terrorism through LeT and threat of nuclear weapons....Jones tried to convey to them (Pakistanis): We've come to the conclusion that after years of trying, we're not going to change your strategic calculus. It's yours. We accept it and want to understand it better. You get to be Pakistanis in this relationship, while we get to be the Americans. We're not going to try to be both.

How easy for them to say this when for the last 40 years Pakistan is what it is because of American money, support and western media to propogate jihad.

Has this analysis by Ajai Shukla posted here before?

Plan E for Afghanistan

...
This illusion of Indian helplessness, paradoxically, enjoys greater currency in India than it does abroad. While Pakistan realises how much India’s influence is expanding, New Delhi focuses on the negatives: there is no Ahmed Shah Masood, around whom anti-Taliban forces can coalesce, 1990s-style, nor for that matter a coherent Northern Alliance. With the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) controlling swathes of northern and central Afghanistan, India has little opportunity for resuscitating Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara militias. And while Moscow and Teheran still share India’s revulsion to a resurgent Taliban, they are less willing now to work jointly in undermining the Taliban. 2010, New Delhi concludes, is very different from 1996.
...
...
Indian confidence in this intangible, but nevertheless real, asset must guide our strategy in Afghanistan. Our alternative to Blackwill’s Plan B is Plan E — Exit Now. Counter-intuitively, India has more to gain than lose from an immediate US withdrawal.

America’s pullout from Afghanistan will immediately deprive the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Al Qaeda, and a smorgasbord of other radical groups of the glue of a common enemy. Inevitably, driven by the contradictions within their unholy alliance, they will turn their hostility upon one another. A key loser in this fratricidal game will be the traditional referee, the Pakistan Army.
...
...
A popular argument from India’s strategic elite is that Afghanistan would provide a training ground for India-bound terrorists. This is outdated; today, Pakistan is the terror training academy not just for India-focused jehadis, but for a wide assortment of Islamist radicals with grievances against the US, Europe, Russia, Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan, even China. A resurrected Taliban regime could hardly offer better-located training grounds than those around Sialkot and Peshawar.
...
...

We should study his Plan E: US exit from Afghanistan.

Lets list the prespectives from the different entities:

- Taliban Pasthuns
- Non Taliban Pasthuns
- Non Pashtun Afghans
- TSP
- Russia and Central Asia
- Iran
- TSP
- India

Later list the negatives from Indian strategic thinkers
and risk mitigation for each of the negatives.

On page 13 of this thread I had listed the prespectives of different players before the Obama plan. Lets update them to this scenario.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 01#p768001

ramana wrote:We have studied Af-Pak for over a decade and still cling to psy-ops fro interested parties. If Af-Pak is not resolved suitably it will take down the Western domination of the world system. Its bigger than Korea, Vietnam and Cold War. Its an assymetric war between two different world views. The earlier examples were similar zero-sum situations.

Af-Pak region


Indian Prespective:

- Afghanistant shouldnt become safe haven for terrorists
- Afghanistan shouldnt become 'strategic depth' for TSP
- Afghanistan should be multi-ethnic, multi-cultural modern state
- Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam

TSP prespective:

- Afghanistan should have a TSP friendly regime for following reasons:
- Settling Durand Line to prevent loss of NWFP
- Provide strategic depth for
- Terrorist camps
- Hide special weapons
- Hinterland for heroin growing

Pashtun Prespective:

- Any ruler in Afghanistan has to be a Pashtun as they created modern Afghanistan
- Eventually erase Durand line and regain lost lands to British India

Non Pashtun Prespective:
- Pashtuns should not dominate and impact their sub-nationalism:Tajik, Hazara, Uzbeg etc..

US prespective:

- Non Islamist govt in Afghanistan to prevent:
- Regrouping of Islamist forces like AlQ & 'bad' Taliban
- Provide bases for US forces for hedge against Central Asia and fracturing TSP
- Provide base for 'guiding' new ISlamist thinking in Central Asia

PRC prespective:

- Ensure TSP retains influence in Afghanistan to hedge rising India
- Ensure US is weakened due to Afghanistan to preclude Uigher revolt
- Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam

Iran prespective:

- Ensure TSP does not dominate Afghanistan
- Ensure balance in Shia (Hazara interests) versus Sunni(Pashtuns) power
- Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam

Russian prespective:

- Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam
- Ensure Afghanistan keeps the US occupied

Central Asian countries:

- Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam

EU countries:

- Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam
- Ensure Afghanistan is not a heroin producing region

Geographic prespective:

- Afghanistan is the pivot of Central Asia.
- Pathway to conquer Indian sub-continent or Central Asia
- High mountains and challenging terrain
- Not much arable land
- Only three rivers: Helmand,Kabul and Herat

History Prespective:

- Afghanistan has been at cross roads of invasions of Indian sub-continent
- Afghanistan was declared a neutral country between the British and Tsarist Russia
- Afghanistan has suffered continuous turmoil and civil war since 1973 if not since Abdur Rehman in late 19th century

Consequences of US failure in Afghanistan:

- Extremist Islam wins and will roll over most of the current Islamic states
- Have high negative impact on Indian sub-continent
- Certain radicalization of TSP with its nuclear weapons
- Uigher uprising in East Turkistan
- Central Asian countries will be radicalized
- PRC will gain Asian domination but lose East Turkistan
- Russia might be rolled back to the Duchy of Muscovy
- Demoralized by the defeat in far away lands the 'malaise' in American politics could return leading to political wilderness a la Vietnam
- Drug trade will zoom on the supply side
- World globalization will suffer
- It could lead to loss of leadership as other challengers will emerge



What else?

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 75#p769675

ramana wrote:We now have to figure out the maximum and minimum acceptable solutions to each of the parties.

Indian Perspective:
- Maximum acceptable solution is a strong and vibrant Afghanistan free from Islamist fundamentalism.
- Minimum acceptable solution is a Afghanistan free from TSP influence

TSP perspective:

- Maximum acceptable solution is Afghanistan incorporated into TSP

- Minimum acceptable solution: TSP friendly regime in Afghanistan

Pashtun Perspective:

- Maximum acceptable solution: Any ruler in Afghanistan has to be a Pashtun
- Minimum acceptable solution A:ny ruler of afghanistan has to be a Pashtun.

Non Pashtun Perspective:
- Maximum acceptable solution Pashtuns should not dominate and impact their sub-nationalism:Tajik, Hazara, Uzbeg etc.
Minimum acceptable solution: Pashtuns should include the other ethnic minorities in government

US perspective:

- Maximum acceptable solution: Non Islamist govt in Afghanistan
- Minimum acceptable solution: Friendly regime in place irrespective of their Islamist credentials.

PRC perspective:

- Maximum acceptable solution: Ensure TSP retains influence in Afghanistan
- Minimum acceptable solution: Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam

Iran perspective:

- Maximum acceptable solution: Ensure TSP does not dominate Afghanistan
- Minimum acceptable solution: Ensure balance in Shia (Hazara interests) versus Sunni(Pashtuns) power

Russian perspective:

- Maximum acceptable solution: Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam
- Minimum acceptable solution: Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist /"guided" Islam

Central Asian countries:

- Maximum acceptable solution: Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam

Minimum acceptable solution : Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam

EU countries:
Maximum acceptable solution: Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam and drugs production
Minimum acceptable solution : Ensure Afghanistan does not become base for extremist/"guided" Islam and drugs production


Next we work on options that meet the perspectives and acceptable solutions.

In Nov '09 in response to my plan Malayappan wrote

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 29#p771429

Ramana Sir, the PLAN in your post can be actually termed as the best possible solution from the perspective of overall global interests. One clear, positive aspect in that is it preserves territorial integrity of Afghanistan. If the plan is not accepted, dividing up Afghanistan will be the only solution. And the problem will be that this solution will be reached after many, many deaths.

If this so simple, what can possibly prevent this? I must clarify that I 'bolded' overall global interests pointedly, not as a motherhood statement. US and the West today dont seem to think in terms of overall global interest, but choose to place paki interests above everything else. They have pointedly disregarded deaths of their own forces due to attacks from across the border, and copious intelligence from their own agencies on paki role in it. Rather than downsize paki ambitions, they have mounted a massive PR campaign to downsize scope of their own mission!

For your plan to work, US and the West will need to make the conclusion that the overall global interests should be seen as a superior cause than pakistan's narrow anti-Indian agenda. Sadly for them, today they are not there.

The US needs to get out of this paki fix that makes them value the interests of paki army above everything else in this world, including lives of their own citizens!

Very, very prescient! Hats off.

Where is the "bow" icon?

x-post...

brihaspati wrote:That plan "E" seems to be a version of "B" - that needs to find one more excuse to justify what some of the Americans desperately want to do.

Yes this would have been really a way out safely for India, if it was taking place earlier - before Mushy was forced out. Then the Taleban attack, if any, would have to be against the PA. Which would have been nice. So that the public face of ISI+PA would have had to be engaged in taking a beating from the private face of ISI+PA. Not now. Not anymore.

This is an extremely naive assumption that the Talebs will choose the PA as their primary target instead of choosing softer targets. For them, attacking India actually solves lots of tactical and strategic dilemmas. India is "kaffir-land" hence attacking India gains the support of entire Islamic belt. India is also apparently repressing its Muslims by asking them to share in a land with the kaffir which Muslims in their glory days had taken over from the "kaffir" by force. India also provides a an opportunity that is missing in other non-Muslim countries - the willingness of large parts of the rashtryia machinery to protect Islamic claims, and a loud voice from within a section of the "kaffir" that will help to tone down the possible intensity of retaliation or retribution from the Indian side.

Contrary to expectation from naive analysts who have little understanding of Islamism, Islamist factions do not easily undertake violent action against other Islamist groups unless the rewards are immense. It is not in the interest of the Taleb to really fight the PA - which is seen also as a champion of Islamism in certain Islamic quarters. They fight each other only when either party has a tremendous amount of compensation [or booty at stake] to cover the loss of morale and unity.

Published on Wednesday, October 6, 2010
By Karen DeYoung, Peter Finn and Craig Whitlock
Quetta Shura Taliban in talks with Karzai government: Washington Post

The leadership knows "that they are going to be sidelined," the source said. "They know that more radical elements are being promoted within their rank and file outside their control. . . . All these things are making them absolutely sure that, regardless of [their success in] the war, they are not in a winning position."

So the Quetta Shura is negotiating with Karzai. And the impetus is the graduall killing of their numbers and repalcement with more hardline elements by ISI. As usual US is underming Karzai making silly statements which reduce his negotiating power. What is the fundamental flaw in US that makes them do this?

ramana wrote:As usual US is underming Karzai making silly statements which reduce his negotiating power. What is the fundamental flaw in US that makes them do this?

I don't think they really think this out long term. If the mood in Pentagon is bad, if some advisors come with some prejudices, if someone in the Oval office has a bone to pick against Karzai and makes a good pitch, then Karzai would get the kick. When the war is going this wrong, then of course there would be plenty of blame to throw around, then Karzai would get the kick.

I am not really that sure that the Americans really have good advisors or think-tankeratti. It is all surfing the wave. Nobody wants to really dive into the matters.

In fact we should have an exclusive thread for ridiculing Americans. We should be digging up the pieces these people have written in the last 5 years and throwing some light on to the gap between their projections and analyses and the reality today.

Guerrilla warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan has cost America 3 trillion USD and above. One cannot allow oneself to get bogged down. When USA goes to war, it starts throwing so much money around, that keeping Americans bogged down itself becomes a business model and a basis for an economy. They have neither the ability to grasp the ethnic and cultural landscape of other lands nor the ability to game social and security impact and dynamics of their intervention on local populations.

Pakistan deploys air defense missiles in Afghan border?
Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-ma ... z11deyNTmn

Pakistan installs anti-missile system at Orakzai Pak-Afghan border
http://www.samaa.tv/News26152-Antimissi ... akzai.aspx

This was revealed by MNA Munir Orakzai while speaking on SAMAA's program, 'Mohaaz' (to be aired on Saturday morning at 11:30 am).

Orakzai said that additional troops would be deployed to monitor the newly installed defense system.

“Now no helicopter will be able to escape after entering Pakistani territory,” he claimed. SAMAA

X-Post from India Forum on a historical analogy:

The current events in A'stan have an uncanny resemblance to some very less known events in Central Asia that affected India's history in a significant way. I just felt that I must post this as there may be lessons to be learnt from this in today's context.

After having smashed many Indian rulers, Shihab-ad-Din Muhammad Ghori, the Afghan Sultan, decided to settle scores with his Northern neighbor Muhammad Shah of Khwarizm. In 1204 AD Ghori marched on Muhmamad Shah with a large force to seize territory north of the Amu Darya. His forces were strengthened by the mercenaries and cannon-fodder (there were no cannons then) he had acquired from the Ghaznavid territory of Punjab fter he had taken over that.

Compare this with the struggle between TaliPaks and the NA of today (Literally the descendents of these respective parties). Ghori routed Shah on the banks of the Amu Darya
and marched into Khwarizm. The great Mongol ruler, the Ghur-Khan of the Qara-Kitai, had excuses to open hostilities with the Moslem Ghori as his troops had executed buddhist merchants (In return the Ghur-Khan had some Mullahs nailed to their mosque doors). The Khwarizm Shah Muhammad who was his vassal saw a great opportunity in this, and humbly approached his suzerain, the Ghur-Khan, to make common cause against the Afghan Sultan Ghori who was now marching straight into
Central Asia (A superpower, and the NA make an alliance!). The
Qara-Kitaian Mongol cavalry was sent forth under their able commander Tayanku-Taraz who defeated Mhd. Ghori near Hezarasp and Shah got to occupy the territory. Then, the Mongol cavalry trashed Ghori in a big way in Andkhoi, west of Balkh and sent him fleeing into India with all his entourage. Here, he was of course killed by the the Khokars in 1206. Soon aided by the Mongol suzerain of his, Muhammad Shah seized most of A'tan starting from Herat, then Ghor and finally Ghazni.

This ironically drove the whole Ghorid clique into India to take shelter in Delhi with their agent Qutub-ad-Din, who invited them with open hands and used them extensively in India in war against the infidels. The most prominent of the hordes that migrated in this event was the Khalji horde- one of the biggest nightmares we have ever seen in our history.

The fleeing TaliPaks of today being redirected to India is a real danger as the Ghorid agents in Delhi. Also note the western press until a few days ago was waxing eloquently about the Afghani invincibility.

The true superpowers of the past ages- the Mongols on two occassions and Timur-i-lang, have thrashed them badly. So after all history is repeating itself- is it not ironical that even the USA has to follow the footsteps of the Kha'Khans of yore (from Baghdad to Balkh)!

What Americans miss in their policy formulation!

American policy in Afghanistan is a mess and doomed. Why did it so happen, even after pumping in a trillion dollars into the Afghan War?! The Answer is simple - because of Taliban. What is the Taliban? Afghan Taliban are the foot-soldiers of ISI.

So the Americans failed in Afghanistan because they failed to control Pakistan. Why could they not control Pakistan? One controls the behavior of others with carrots and sticks on the one hand, but one also needs a clarity of communication and attention to verification. America has failed on all accounts. They could not control the environment so they lost control over the game.

Before America started doling out carrots to Pakistan, America should first have ensured that Pakistan was a famished rabbit, with no other source of calories. A well-fed Pakistan would not be looking for carrots but rather demanding gaajjar ka halwa from USA.

When we speak of Pakistan, we mean the Pakistani Army. America should not have been delivering them all sorts of weapon platforms. That just whets their appetite even more and they get what they want not by delivering any service to USA but by blackmailing USA. What America should have done after 9/11 is, they should have allied themselves with India and beat the shitt out of Pakistan. They they should have gone ahead and taken the services of the Pakistani Army by paying them enough so that they can pay the minimal wages of the Pakistani soldiers. The carrots should have been the little bandage after a heavy bout of beating with sticks.

By pulling America and other NATO countries into Afghanistan, Pakistan has in fact made itself immune to the use of sticks. America should have thought of that beforehand. What America needs is an easy supply route into Afghanistan. Since Iran does not come into question, and the route over Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan makes the route too long and windy, and the route through Russia is entwined with too much higher geopolitics, USA should have given India the go-ahead to punch its way through PoK into Afghanistan in fact supporting India in this venture. That would have solved NATO's supply problems in Afghanistan.

The reason why America cannot control Afghanistan and Central Asia is because of Pakistan, and the reason why USA cannot control Pakistan is because of China, and the reason why Pakistan is at all available for China is because of PoK being in the hands of Pakistan and China.

With PoK in the hands of Pakistan/China, it doesn't matter what America does, it would never really be able to influence Pakistan nor Islamic Jihad directed against it.

Actually it is a simple matter of fact. But the Americans are too stupid to understand it.

RajeshA wrote: Actually it is a simple matter of fact. But the Americans are too stupid to understand it.

Actually elites who have colonized America very well understand that TSP needs to be sustained as a counterweight to India.

Pranav wrote:

RajeshA wrote: Actually it is a simple matter of fact. But the Americans are too stupid to understand it.

Actually elites who have colonized America very well understand that TSP needs to be sustained as a counterweight to India.

So what do they have China for? To counterweight themselves?

RajeshA wrote:

Pranav wrote: Actually elites who have colonized America very well understand that TSP needs to be sustained as a counterweight to India.

So what do they have China for? To counterweight themselves?

At this point China seems to be quite independent.

India is in a semi-colonized condition, without proven thermo-nukes. Therefore it is a tempting low-hanging fruit, apparently ripe for break-up.

Pranav wrote:

Pranav wrote: Actually elites who have colonized America very well understand that TSP needs to be sustained as a counterweight to India.

RajeshA wrote:So what do they have China for? To counterweight themselves?

At this point China seems to be quite independent.

India is in a semi-colonized condition, without proven thermo-nukes. Therefore it is a tempting low-hanging fruit, apparently ripe for break-up.

Which again makes no sense, because such an India would not be able to balance China in Asia.

RajeshA wrote:
Which again makes no sense, because such an India would not be able to balance China in Asia.

On one hand, break up of major powers is on the agenda, and a large, poorly governed nation like India, is the low-hanging fruit. On the other hand, India could be used to balance China. This is a debate that has gone on for some time amongst the elites that control the west. The general consensus seems to be that India would not be of much use vis-a-vis China.

However, a TSP-China alliance which would control Afghanistan's mineral resources and co-opt Iran and Saudi Arabia is what will make western elites uncomfortable. That is a major factor in Af-Pak strategy. Let's see how this plays out.

Afghan governor 'killed in blast'

The governor of the Afghan province of Kunduz has been killed in an explosion at a mosque which left at least 14 others dead, officials say.

Kunduz Governor killed

[Mr Omar was originally from Takhar province. He was known to have been close to President Hamid Karzai, and had survived a number of previous attempts on his life for which he blamed the Taliban.

His brother was assassinated by the Taliban last year.

US and Pakistan are crossing all limits of civilised behaviour.How long will this refuge to taliban in Pakistan continue?

from twitter, TIFWIW

AP source: Gen. James Jones resigning as President Barack Obama's national security adviser

^^^ Nothing unexpected and is on mainstream news .. WH is going to announce it at 1PM ..r Tom Donilon will be replacement (confirmed by many news sources)

(The departure is not unexpected....resignation will be effective in two weeks, had planned from the start of his tenure to leave the position at about the two-year mark)

Pranav wrote: On one hand, break up of major powers is on the agenda, and a large, poorly governed nation like India, is the low-hanging fruit. On the other hand, India could be used to balance China. This is a debate that has gone on for some time amongst the elites that control the west. The general consensus seems to be that India would not be of much use vis-a-vis China.

Absolutely. India will not survive in one piece if TSP manages to grab Kashmir by hook or crook. And as AfPak unfolds they are pushing the button just enough to antagonize even their benefactor US, who they hope at some point will deliver. Thats why they are so obsessed with Kashmir these days. My biggest fear of course remains: Indian's ruling elite for whom a united India or a disintegerated federation of states in "South Asia" does not matter, they will still be the darlings of the west and propped up to as constables to lord over the warring factions.

The following WSJ article summarizes the pdf file:
Pdf file: http://armed-services.senate.gov/Public ... -07-10.pdf

WSJ: Article: U.S. Contractors Employed Taliban
Excerpts:

... A yearlong investigation by a Senate panel has found evidence that the mostly Afghan force of private security guards the U.S. military depends on to protect supply convoys and bases in Afghanistan is rife with criminals, drug users and insurgents.

The Senate Armed Services Committee inquiry, based on interviews with dozens of military commanders and contractors and a review of over 125 Pentagon security contracts, found evidence of "untrained guards, insufficient and unserviceable weapons, unmanned posts" and other failings that put U.S. troops at risk.

More alarming, the report alleges that some local warlords who have emerged as key labor brokers for private security firms are also Taliban agents.

Sen. Carl Levin (D., Mich.), the chairman of the committee, said failures to adequately vet private security contractors in Afghanistan poses "grave risks" to U.S. and allied troops. The overall lack of proper contractor supervision, he added, poses a fundamental threat to the U.S. mission.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has ordered that all security firms in Afghanistan be dissolved by the end of the year, though that process has only just begun. Coalition officials have supported the effort because of concerns about the private forces, but say the alternative—the Afghan police—isn't yet competent enough to take over the job.

The majority of the private security contractors are Afghan; companies employing them are both international and locally based. The Senate inquiry focuses on the role of Department of Defense contractors, but the State Department also employs private guards.

According to U.S. Central Command figures cited in the report, Afghanistan has more than 26,000 private security personnel, 90% of whom are working under U.S. government contracts or subcontracts.

Doug Brooks, the president of International Peace Operations Associations, a group that represents security firms, said the report highlights the difficulty in complying with contract requirements to provide local hires.

"There's not a huge amount of choice in the local hires they can use," he said. "Where are they going to get guys who have never smoked hashish, who have never worked for the Taliban or who have never considered joining the Taliban?" ...

Wrt to Gen Jones's resignation...:"News blip :"Outgoing Security Advisor Jones Voices Concern on Pakistan")

I am going to take the optimistic view that rational people do rational things and that -- with the help of friends and allies and common goals -- Pakistan will avoid, or hopefully avoid, that unfortunate eventuality. But hope is not a strategy, so we have to be cognizant of the fact that there are things which could happen that could alter the relationship if we are not careful.

Hope Is Not a Strategy

So it is related to US policy wrt TSP.

Pranav wrote:However, a TSP-China alliance which would control Afghanistan's mineral resources and co-opt Iran and Saudi Arabia is what will make western elites uncomfortable. That is a major factor in Af-Pak strategy. Let's see how this plays out.

Not sure about Saudis yet but Iran and Pakistan are already in this together. They are trying hard to improve their relationship despite of conflict of interest such as Shia/Sunni, both have dreams of heading the Ummah, etc. It may only be a marriage of convenience but they both have good reasons to bury their differences for time being. They both are effectively bleeding US and helping China weaken the USA. They both must have Chinese blessings and covert support in this endeavor. At this point it is very doubtful if they would try to undermine each other. Part of Pakistan's brashness comes from the understanding that Iran does not let US open alternate route for supplies in Afghanistan or benefit them with access to CAR resources via their land.

Seems like China is successfully bleeding the NATO using Pakistan and Iran as proxies.

http://www.hlswatch.com/2010/10/09/afpa ... ccessible/

Last Thursday, September 30, the President reported to Congress on the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Courtesy of the American Federation of Scientists Secrecy News Project, you may now read the report for yourself. It is a 1.25 megabyte download from: http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/wh-afpak.pdf

Debka take on what is going on:

Under serious discussion now is a proposal for the north to remain in US/allied hands permanently, the center and south to fall under Taliban control and for Kabul to be a neutral city with a mixed presence of all the parties...

------
President Obama launched in late 2009 a plan for the Taliban to come to negotiations from a position of military weakness. The president allowed the US command until August 2011, when he promised the American people to start pulling the US military out of Afghanistan, to clobber the insurgent forces into a position of inferiority.

Now, with only 10 months left up to that target date, the US president acceded to the request of Gen. Petraeus to shorten the war by ramping up cross-border air attacks on Taliban's logistic bases and sanctuaries in North Waziristan.

--------
Petraeus' most compelling argument for haste was that if the war was not won in the next two months, it would take years. He also convinced Obama that as long as the Taliban can rely on the Haqqani network and other supportive militias, it will prefer to fight on rather than sit down for talks. Up until now, US forces have left the Haqqani fighters alone because of their ties with the Pakistani military, but here, too, the White House agreed that the time of reckoning was here and it was now or never for knocking the legs from under the insurgent movement.

Petraeus told Obama - smashing the Taliban and allies in TSP is the key to success in Afghanistan. Right now the local tribes are backing the taliban. So the Petraeus said that we want to batter them until the tribals say they can't take any more US military pressure. Aerial strikes is fine to achieve this.

But to make an excuse to the media about these attacks into TSP, one had to make a legitimate excuse. So John Brennan, CIA chief Leon Pannetta got together and banged heads. They came up with the story of planned mumbai style attacks in Europe.
Problem was that US only coordinated with London and not with Paris or Geermany. So they are pissed off with the US.

Pannetta and Brennan saw a benefit of improving the image of the afghan war and telling the europeans how their safety is linked to AfPak.

But another problem came, even Pannetta and Brennan who organised this weren't coordinating. They weren't even saying the same story. There was no coordination during the leaks, so each gang had a different story to leak. So, intel chiefs in europe were pissed off with the vague US threat as well as the warning against travel in europe. Embassies obviously gave H Clinton a big telling off which she was furious about.

However the US operation in North Waziristan is still taking place but with a blackout from the US and TSP.

Started reading Woodward's book. First chapter is mostly BRF stuff but is maslafied to impress new President.

Lets see where the beginning begins.

Reason why I say is to call it Obama's War is wrong. Its GW Bush, Clinton, Bush Sr, Reagan and even Carter's war. For it all started with peacenik Jimmy Carter egging Bhutto to destabilize the Afghan dictatorship.

Jimmy Carter: Starting the fire in Afghanistan

Zbig Interview in French news outlet where he states that US aided Afghan Mujahedeen six months before the Soviets invaded

Reagan: Mujahdeen = Freedom fighters
GWB Sr: TSP failing bailed out thru Somalia
Clinton: Blind eye to Islamism in state functionaries And Robinng Raphael shenangians.
GWB Jr= Distracted with Iraq when 9/11 was planned in Af-Pak

Now Obama wanting India to do a Munich to Nazi TSP!