Indian Navy News & Discussion - 22 April 2015

[srai]

^^^

This one from that pdf looks like a quite plausible design:


Easier to standardize if using U-VLS. But the IN has multiple VLS types at the moment.

[Karthik S]

We need this capability given the limited number of missiles our ships carry.

[Singha]

it would be a lot easier for the ship to run back to port and reload than this circus at sea...repeated 32 times over...

we need to establish a few more naval armament and refueling FARP type places like in car nicobar, andamans, gujarat to have a good coverage...and in future socotra, maldives, mauritius and madagascar should be on the to-do list. the NATO navies take advantage of US/anglo-french bases like seychelles, comoros, djibouti, bahrain, diego all the time...they never return to europe for fuel or weapons.

[Singha]

we should also look to lease an island or base in indonesia for the same. they have 6000 islands, so a suitable island will not be an issue if Djakarta approves.

[shiv]

How many Barak 8 missiles will be used per engagement?

What sort of situation would a ship have to place itself that would require the firing off of 32 Barak missiles

Who would be sending in the attack aircraft/missiles against which Barak is to be used?

From what range would those attacks be carried out against an Indian ship that has put itself in that position?

[srai]

it would be a lot easier for the ship to run back to port and reload than this circus at sea...repeated 32 times over...

we need to establish a few more naval armament and refueling FARP type places like in car nicobar, andamans, gujarat to have a good coverage...and in future socotra, maldives, mauritius and madagascar should be on the to-do list. the NATO navies take advantage of US/anglo-french bases like seychelles, comoros, djibouti, bahrain, diego all the time...they never return to europe for fuel or weapons.

It makes sense if you only need to reload a few that were expended ... say 3 or 4 missiles maybe upto 8 or so. But if you expend significant amount out of the 32 available, then better head to port and get it topped off.

[titash]

it would be a lot easier for the ship to run back to port and reload than this circus at sea...repeated 32 times over...

we need to establish a few more naval armament and refueling FARP type places like in car nicobar, andamans, gujarat to have a good coverage...and in future socotra, maldives, mauritius and madagascar should be on the to-do list. the NATO navies take advantage of US/anglo-french bases like seychelles, comoros, djibouti, bahrain, diego all the time...they never return to europe for fuel or weapons.

It makes sense if you only need to reload a few that were expended ... say 3 or 4 missiles maybe upto 8 or so. But if you expend significant amount out of the 32 available, then better head to port and get it topped off.

One thing to note...in the next decade or so, we fully expect 14 warships equipped with MF-STAR/Barak-8 (3x P-15A, 4x P-15B, 7x P-17A). That should provide enough escorts for the Vikramaditya & Vikrant. Also, the 3x P-15 and 9x-10x Talwar class frigates will sport the VLS Shtil (I saw a new article for such an upgrade recently). That should be enough area air defence missiles to go around. Specially given the organic air cover that the Mig-29Ks provide.

[Philip]

The latest "F" mag has a detailed report on the PRC's grand mil display.The amt. of BMs is staggering. The lethality of the carrier-killer DF-21 upgrade is mentioned.In the future,we not only will have to defend ourselves (CVs) against BMs,but also sub-launched cruise/supersonic anti-ship missiles which will be far more difficult to detect that air/ship launched ones given extensive air cover and detection from UAVs,AEW helos,etc. China plans almost 50 low-earth orbiting sats for surveillance and targeting in the Indo-China Sea.The speed with which the PRC is expanding its naval capabilities isn't a joke.They will easily outnumber any adversary in numbers (barring N-subs),and match capability quite soon.

The yawning gap in the IN's capabilities are subs.However,one is not sure whether the IN /MOD are on the right track regarding the sub fleet composition and acquisitions.Even if we build one sub/yr from now on,we will be poutnumbered by the PLAN which is building almost 2-3 subs/yr. and is simultaneously building 4 for Pak as Pak builds the other 4 AIP Yuans at Karachi.

[titash]

PF - this level of asymmetry sounds like a ripe case for the use of tactical nukes

If the Pakis can threaten us with the nuclear option every alternate day, we ought to be able to do the same w.r.t. China

[srai]

it would be a lot easier for the ship to run back to port and reload than this circus at sea...repeated 32 times over...

we need to establish a few more naval armament and refueling FARP type places like in car nicobar, andamans, gujarat to have a good coverage...and in future socotra, maldives, mauritius and madagascar should be on the to-do list. the NATO navies take advantage of US/anglo-french bases like seychelles, comoros, djibouti, bahrain, diego all the time...they never return to europe for fuel or weapons.

It makes sense if you only need to reload a few that were expended ... say 3 or 4 missiles maybe upto 8 or so. But if you expend significant amount out of the 32 available, then better head to port and get it topped off.

Another scenario where it would make sense would be in an eventuality where all 32 were expended and now need to head home to get topped off, you may want to reload a few say 4 missiles before heading home. Better than heading home "naked"

[Philip]

The US at DG has done just that at DG.Pre-positioned ships with everything you need to start a war are there,including B-52/B-2 infrastructure.Singha is right.We should establish logistic support infrastructure at those places where we have close security relationships with,esp the island'littoral nations of the IOR and those of the Indo-China Sea.

However,there is no harm in beefing up the number of missiles aboard our warships,or at least to make provision for a swift augmentation of installing swiftly extra missiles or weaponry in a crisis. Some of the surface combatants appear to be underarmed and need better layered air/missile defence.

[kit]

Those catamaran type vessels will find it easier to rearm submarines i suppose ?

also i think some sort of design changes might be needed for a " docking" type of transfer similar to spacecraft .. the docking midget can travel from supply ship to the recipient vessel to rearm from the inside .. complicated but workable for large warships

[Singha]

How many Barak 8 missiles will be used per engagement?

What sort of situation would a ship have to place itself that would require the firing off of 32 Barak missiles

Who would be sending in the attack aircraft/missiles against which Barak is to be used?

From what range would those attacks be carried out against an Indian ship that has put itself in that position?

imagine a task force of 4 indian ships - 1 DDG, 1 FFG, 1 corvette, 1 oiler being targeted by land based air and the barak8 is only on the DDG. the corvette has only ciws, the FFG has shtil which is MR.

once the ships are located by LRMP, the order goes to land based attack a.c. 8 fighters each with 2 ASMs are tasked for the job.
the ASMs are a mix of high subsonic and supersonic. the subsonic one has 250km range, the supersonic ones only 100km.
the fighters split into 4 pairs and approach from two different vectors. around 200km out they release the 8 subsonic ASMs from well outside range barak8 and continue to provide some waypoints periodically using datalink to the LRMP which has powerful sea search radar and standing by 200km away tracking the ships. the continue to close at mid subsonic speed and go supersonic and high around 110km out, releasing the 8 supersonic ASMs around 80km out before turning away.

just before all this, a pair of dummy aircraft have darted in to some 70km to tickle the DDG radar and make it launch a pair of Barak8 as the risk of them releasing ASMs is always there. this provides the final position fix to the LRMP ESM which updates the shooting pack.

so now you have
8 subsonic ASMs which are 50km out.
8 supersonic ASMs which are 80km out but will quickly overhaul the subsonics enroute
2 of the supersonic ASM has ARM and HOJ seekers (unknown to the DDG) and will home in on its big radar emitter

the subsonics are sea skimmers in the terminal phase and are diving for the deck
the supersonics will also sea skim for the last 20k...
all have been programmed with certain waypoints to attack from round the clock and various heights.

how does the task force deal with 16 inflight missiles?

note that this is well within the PAF capability and not a problem at all for the PLANAF which has its own legion of missile armed naval strike a/c.

[Singha]

if we cannot deal with this, we need to take care to always remain outside the land based fighter combat radius and always have some organic air cover (whether from carrier or land which is impossible for india). fighter radius can be extended by refuelers.

imo if we want to keep surface ships for a fighting and not convoy escort role, they need carriers. and perhaps 150km range agile-endgame SAMs of the SM6 mould...which is why khan saheb is heavily investing in it. the proliferation of chinese air launched ASM is the great game changer.

it is also ok to go the soviet union route and move all your heavy weapons underwater - SLCM, ASM, SLBM everything moves underwater for them, with a few coastal patrol corvettes to show the flag on top. the big meat like Yasen can flatten a entire city with 40 Kalibr from its VL tubes and lord knows how many in the TT room...and it can dart in and escape @ 30knots and nobody without a intensive ASW protection would even know what hit them.

if our ships cannot get within 500km of the cheen coast without facing a hailstorm of ASMs(and ASBMs!) what do you propose to use to put pressure on cheen ?

I am sure we can beat up TSP but TSP has ceased to be our main problem for a while now.

[tsarkar]

How many Barak 8 missiles will be used per engagement?

Normally salvoes of two missiles are fired against each incoming targets, but IN experience consistently in Barak-1 firings even against the newest missiles has shown the first missile hitting and the second missile hitting the debris or flying through.

Barak 8 by design will use a single missile against each target. In the unlikely chance of a miss, the long engagement range, quick reaction time, and high speed ensures time for a second missile launch.

tsarkar, Maybe VLS for everything is not good How about standard VLS for just strike missiles for IN.

The slewing/elevation of conventional box/arm launchers increases reaction time. Rotating/Elevating mechanisms corrode in sea environments and are completely eliminated in VLS. Lastly VLS fit flush with the deck improving low observability.

Cold launch is not safer if rocket booster does not fire after launch the missile will land right on the ship.

Cold Launch, like that tested for Agni - V Canister Launch (or is it called Agni 6?) with dead weight, typically ensures that the gas generators have sufficient thrust to take the dead weight reasonably far away from the launchers.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/photo/46248413.cms
http://www.freevisuals4u.com/photos/201 ... issile.jpg
Check the height at which the missile motor fires vis-à-vis height of ship.

US replaced the loading crane with additional 3 VLS cells.

[Singha]

chatter on idrw article comments claims 2Q CY2016 launch of Aridaman and sea trials in 2017.

[srin]

tsarkar, Maybe VLS for everything is not good How about standard VLS for just strike missiles for IN.

The slewing/elevation of conventional box/arm launchers increases reaction time. Rotating/Elevating mechanisms corrode in sea environments and are completely eliminated in VLS. Lastly VLS fit flush with the deck improving low observability.

What about the reverse ? The rate of fire won't be such an issue for Brahmos. So, a Twin-arm shtil like launcher from under deck magazine for Brahmos - and VLS only for Baraks.

[sudhan]

Cold Launch, like that tested for Agni - V Canister Launch (or is it called Agni 6?) with dead weight, typically ensures that the gas generators have sufficient thrust to take the dead weight reasonably far away from the launchers.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/photo/46248413.cms
http://www.freevisuals4u.com/photos/201 ... issile.jpg
Check the height at which the missile motor fires vis-à-vis height of ship.

tsarkar ji, I believe both the links that you have stated (of brahmos launches)show hot launches. I believe Bmos is always hot launched. (Or am I mistaken? )

In case of the pics provided above, I believe the first stage of bmos is dual pulse: A smaller first burn to lift it high enough and a stronger second burn to provide initial acceleration for the ramjet to kick in. I believe the RuN has some true cold launched missiles on their ships, not sure how they took care of the risk of failed ignitions.

Of all the land-based cold launched missiles, I have not come across a system with in built mechanism to take the missile to a safe distance before the first stage ignition. For eg, S-300 family (quite a few videos of accidents can be seen online, where 1st stage fails to ignite and the missile falls right back on the launcher), Agni V (there was a trial of the gas generator system where they launched a full size model of A5 with a purpose-built first stage that took the dummy missile away from the launcher, this however is not in the production variant), the Shourya and even the mighty SS-18 seems to have no inbuilt mechanism to move it away from the silo from where it is cold-launched. The missile is ejected from the canister / silo and the first stage ignites.

[John]

Sudham, Brahmos is cold launched notice the ejection and lack of ventillation to hot exhaust in vls cells compared to barak.

Tsarkar those photos are misleading. They show when side thruster fires to realign the missile. Take a look at this video you can see clearly see booster fires off after missile is ejected.

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=yMkr_3_CZO4

[Prasad]

The US at DG has done just that at DG.Pre-positioned ships with everything you need to start a war are there,including B-52/B-2 infrastructure.Singha is right.We should establish logistic support infrastructure at those places where we have close security relationships with,esp the island'littoral nations of the IOR and those of the Indo-China Sea.

However,there is no harm in beefing up the number of missiles aboard our warships,or at least to make provision for a swift augmentation of installing swiftly extra missiles or weaponry in a crisis. Some of the surface combatants appear to be underarmed and need better layered air/missile defence.

Maldives, seychelles, mauritius are all pretty nice places for IN sailors to R&R

[Philip]

"Blow Hot ,Blow Cold",Remember that great sizzlingly hot flick of the late '60s? Two couples on a gorgeously romantic Greek isle,but only one couple doing the biz,if you catch my drift!

Russians love cold launch while the west prefers hot launch.The French however if I recollect,obtained cold launch tech from the Russians.

Here's a most interesting piece about Japan's amphib capabilities. Posted here because they echo India's island defence as well and we also have our conflicting budgetary interests of the IN,which also appear to give a higher priority to carrier air power and has slept over the crisis in its sub fleet.

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defens ... /73482062/

Japan's Amphib Capabilities Stuggle With Rivalries, Budgets
By Paul Kallender-Umezu

TOKYO — Concerns are mounting among US Marine Corps observers and defense analysts that Japan’s commitment to developing an amphibious capability is being sidelined by senior Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) leadership who favor investments in submarines, ASW capabilities, aerial reconnaissance and ballistic missile defense.

The “de-emphasis” potentially calls into question the effectiveness of the force, scheduled to become operational in the spring of 2017 and deemed essential to deter aggression against Japan’s far-flung southeastern Nansei Shoto island chain, said Grant Newsham, a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies.

“This is a historic point we're at. For the first time since the end of World War II, Japan has a choice of whether it wants a military able to defend Japan and protect its citizens or to just drift along with a stunted, misshapen SDF [Self Defense Force] that's of little use from a national security perspective and for Japan to remain pathologically dependent on the United States,” Newsham said.

The Joint Staff Office headed by Adm. Katsutoshi Kawano and the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) appear to still be committed to amphibious development, and the MSDF Mine Warfare Force that has been assigned responsibility for the effort appears to have operated effectively at last month's Operation Dawn Blitz exercise.

However, in the MSDF, Japan’s amphibious plans seem relegated toward the bottom of the pecking order, he said. (*Just like India?)

In terms of funding, efforts related to the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) amount to 17.9 billion yen (US$27.3 million) for the financial year to April 2016 to acquire land to build bases for 52 AAV-7 amphibious landing vehicles, seven Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and CH-47JA transport helicopters.

The ARDB initially will deploy around 2,000 troops supported by about 90 specialists for training. Currently about 700 troops of the GSDF’s Sasebo-based Western Army Infantry Regiment are charged with defending about 6,000 islands and islets of the Nansei Shoto that extend south and west into the Pacific until they nearly reach Taiwan.

“Too often, people equate 'amphibious' with the Senkakus and since the Senkakus are tiny there's no need for an amphibious force. Instead, one should understand that the entire Ryukyus and Nansei Shoto are in play," Newsham said.

Newsham said that if properly funded, the scheme for ARDB would be about the correct size and organization, and that many more forward-thinking MSDF officers supported the development.

“Even if it lacks enough amphibious ships for a standing three-ship amphibious ready group like the Americans have, they can still do quite well with two ships, or even one, operating in support of GSDF,” Newsham said.

However, compared to resources being diverted into other programs, the ARDB is under-resourced, both in absolute budget and in planning, tactics training and equipment, sources said.

Col. Jonathan Goff, USMC liaison to the SDF, agreed that the ARDB faced a tough challenge if it was going to be an effective partner to the US.

First, the brigade's equipment will be almost immediately inadequate because of short-sightedness and (perhaps deliberate) under-funding, he said. For example, the ARDB needs its MV-22s to have refueling capabilities, attack helicopters need to be networked and, helicopters need folding blades, which can be retrofitted, for example. And all acquisitions need to be suitable for marine operations. None of this has been considered, Goff said.

“They have most of the right gear but lack enablers. There is a budgeting process deficiency coupled with a planning process deficiency. There are many things the SDF did not think about when planning for this,” Goff said.

More worryingly, a series of briefings beginning this spring by the Japanese Maritime Staff Office to the USMC made it increasingly clear that the MSDF now regards the ARDB as a distraction rather than a priority. The ARDB already faces the probability of being poorly trained but also may be the victim of inter-service rivalries.

Newsham said the USMC has received signals from the MSDF that it is not only reluctant to hold a Dawn Blitz 17 drill, citing lack of resources and ships, but also to commit to a joint effort with the GSDF to establish a joint task force to coordinate the amphibious mission.

“Amphibious operations are joint operations, requiring all three services to cooperate and operate in a unified fashion. Setting up a joint command for the Southwest Island Region is essential for focusing the amphibious development effort. This lack of jointness is SDF's most serious deficiency and prevents it from being effective," Newsham said.

"Amphibious development potentially serves as the forcing function for SDF to overcome this fundamental problem, and to actually become a useful force, able to defend Japanese territory and protect Japanese citizens. It currently cannot do either of these very well,” Newsham said.

Such parochialism among the three services that is moving beyond a lack of coordination to the point of noncooperation may prove to be strategically damaging to the ARDB’s chances of being an effective force.

“The best thing they could do is establish a Southwest Regional Joint Command centering on Kyushu and Nansei Shoto and consisting of all three components under one commander. Next, establish a joint operational command counterpart to the three service operational commands and give the Joint Staff real authority over the services," Goff said.

Further evidence that the ARDB effort is being choked comes with the fact that its two biggest advocates in the GSDF, Lt. Gen. Koichiro Bansho, former vice chief of staff of GSDF and commander of the Western Army; and Lt. Gen. Koichiro Bansho, former vice chief of staff of the Joint Staff Council, were both eased into early retirement this August.

The ARBD requires a new doctrine of maneuver warfare along with realistic training to form a ground force suitable for a maritime nation, not a Soviet land invasion, and which must be inherently expeditionary, Goff said.

“The SDF continues to insist on “a Japanese Way” of Amphib ops ... I hear this too often. That way is just an extension of the big land force doctrine, with centralized control, that they already possess,” Goff said.

Therefore, the ARDB “desperately” needs more training with US forces rather than less, Goff continued. The ARDB also needs organizations to test and evaluate units for combat readiness based on an objective set of training standards, taking advantage, for example, of the USMC’s Tactical Training Exercise and Evaluation Groups.

Related to this, ARDB needs to tap into new leadership that is open to the experience of the US, and not controlled by GSDF doctrines that were devised in the 1950s and that have no experience fighting amphibious warfare.

“There needs to be training where failure is allowed and units pushed to their failure point. The GSDF is an army of companies with almost no training at the regiment or above. Their capacity is adequate if the Russians invade Hokkaido, but not for a mobile, agile force in 2015,” Goff said.

Christopher Hughes, a Japan military expert and professor of international politics and Japanese studies at the University of Warwick, said it was perhaps too early to judge the unit, which has only been in planning since 2013.

“I hear the criticism of the Japanese moves thus far, but it takes time to build a marine force-type capability and we also know even the USMC is not free of rivalries in working with other US military services," Hughes said.

As the revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines make clear, it is Japan's responsibility to first respond to any attack on its southern islands. So Hughes believes that over time the ARDB would overcome Japan’s typical interservice rivalries because of the looming threat from China in this area.

“It's unusual that a defense capability — amphibiosity — potentially has such strategic, transformational importance, if taken advantage of," Newsham said.

“Japan's decades-long underfunding of the JSDF is a disgrace. However, even without major increases it is possible to develop a useful amphibious force as envisioned by GSDF and others. It just takes reorganizing existing assets and, as important, changed mindsets and missions,” he said.
.

Just a couple of days ago one was reading a piece about our own lack of "jointness" in theatre warfare and that our only joint command,the A&N command was that only in name. We similarly have little overt ambitions in establishing the foundation for a future marine Corps,essential if we are to defend smaller island and littoral nations in the IOR (at least),and our ambitions in Asia-Pacific waters. What we need is to establish at least 3 amphib divisions,or convert the majority of troops in S.Command to prioritise and train for amphib operations.These troops must also have the necessary eqpt. and ships to support them.Troop transports,ro-ro ships,amphibs like the Juan Carlos or Mistrals at least,plus LSTs,LCTs,LCI/LCUs,fast hovercraft LCs,AGIs,etc.,etc. The amphibs with flat tops could be designed as 'swing" ships,able to switch roles easily with onboard multi-role helos/STOVL aircraft. These would support our few CVs in time of crisis. The amphib forces should not only be meant for defence of the islands but also as an offensive force needed to take out any enemy bases which it might obtain in an IOR littoral nation or in the Indo-China Sea (ICS)."Offence is the best form of defence". The A&N command should be the launch pad for our ICS ops.

[ShauryaT]

we should also look to lease an island or base in indonesia for the same. they have 6000 islands, so a suitable island will not be an issue if Djakarta approves.

We would have to work with our US friends for the same --- would be a good test of "strategic relationship"? Otherwise, the largest muslim nation is fairly well aligned with PRC, due to business and the interests of the elite there. Although we have a better and available option in Nha Trang.

[ShauryaT]

The amphib forces should not only be meant for defence of the islands but also as an offensive force needed to take out any enemy bases which it might obtain in an IOR littoral nation or in the Indo-China Sea (ICS)."Offence is the best form of defence". The A&N command should be the launch pad for our ICS ops.

Also, do not forget naval fire support. The lack of such fire support for example in Op. Pawan cost us over 200 lives. The need is not just on the east but on the west too. I imagine many times, what would have happened if India was faced with a Kandahar type event and the location was accessible over waters.

[Aditya G]

Hi shaurya

200 lives. I would like to know the origin of this figure

Thanks

[ShauryaT]

Hi shaurya

200 lives. I would like to know the origin of this figure

Thanks

Aditya G: Multiple numbers from different sources, do not intend to do a post mortem of Op. Pawan, as it was not pretty.

From Wiki, sourced to BR. Link not active anymore.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORC ... ter03.html

Operation Pawan (Hindi: ऑपरेशन पवन Ŏparēśan Pavan, lit. "Operation Wind") was the codename assigned to the operation by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to take control of Jaffna from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), better known as the Tamil Tigers, in late 1987 to enforce the disarmament of the LTTE as a part of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. In brutal fighting lasting about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE, something that the Sri Lankan army had tried but prevented mainly due to Indian political interventions. Supported by Indian Army tanks, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery, the IPKF routed the LTTE, at the cost of 214 soldiers.[2]

http://revisitingindia.com/2013/10/03/i ... -lana-war/

IPKF was able to overcome LTTE’s fierce resistance only after twenty days of fighting. By the end of October it had 319 soldiers killed and 1039 wounded, against 1100 LTTE militants killed. Jaffna was finally under Indian control but it was a hollow victory. During the battle, the main force of LTTE along with its leadership had escaped to the Vanni Jungles in the north. The dream of destroying them in 72 hours was lost. Now, India was here for the long haul. By the year’s end, General Singh was quietly eased out of his command to be replaced by General AS Kalkat, who proved to be a much more competent soldier.

[Philip]

Yes,Shaurya,I've often mentioned this missing capability. Had the IN at least big guns of INS Mysore of yore,we could've shelled LTTE positions from the sea anywhere into the Jaffna peninsula. Without full details of the IN's operations supporting the IPKF,I feel that this was an aspect not worked out properly enough,as the IA thought that it would be a walkover.I remember one key mil man telling me that they were surprised at the sophistication of the arms with the LTTE which they never knew existed.

In this op,the fundamental failure was that of intel,intel about the LTTE's strength,arms and the mindest of its fuhrer,Prabhakaran,who hated India and Rajiv G. The Indian mission in Colombo also did not provide the IA with full details about Lankan casualties,who took huge losses daily due to landmines and ambushes.The total support of the LTTE from the Jaffna Tamils was another misread.When the IPKF were recd. with flowers,they did not know how shortlived that welcome would be from the locals.

A more forceful cordon sanitaire of the entire N-East would've helped a lot,but without operational details available one can't say more ,except that the LTTE Sea Tigers were not eliminated. Eventually,the SLA's MBRLs gave them the crucial firepower advantage.

[Singha]

akula torpedo room
http://i56.photobucket.com/albums/g191/ ... 152_XU.jpg

ideally our future SSN class will either have big tubes with sub caliber mix and match weapons or something like this for nirbhay...i think virginia is moving to the big tube idea.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... s_open.jpg

torps seems to be stored closely packed behind the TT room with a complex system of hydraulic machinery to fetch and load them under manual . the Seawolf SSN room with 50 weapons must be quite a sight

control.http://img.yonhapnews.co.kr/photo/yna/Y ... 100_P2.jpg

[Singha]

NDTV - indo-japan-usa exercise commences tomorrow in golf van bengalen. kilo sub used in exercise with western navy for first time.

NDTV has learned that as part of the exercises that commence tomorrow, the Indian submarine INS Sindhudhwaj will be tasked to intercept ships and submarines of a combined US-Japanese-Indian fleet operating within a designated zone. It's a war game that will test the skills of a young Indian Captain commanding a small submarine against the combined might of shore-based maritime surveillance aircraft, anti-submarine helicopters and the sonar systems of some of the world's most advanced warships.

All of these ships and aircraft will have clear orders - "there's an 'enemy' sub in these waters, get him before he gets us." For the captain of the sub, this will be an ultimate test. He will be need to creep in to torpedo or missile range undetected before simulating an attack on an 'enemy' ship.

What the Indian commander does have on his side is deep knowledge of the conditions of the Bay of Bengal. The Sindhudhwaj, based in Visakhapatnam, regularly operates in these waters and her commanding officer would look to take advantage of the salinity, variable temperatures and current patterns of these waters which often make submarine detection extremely challenging.

[kit]

wont these exercises give out real time acoustic signatures of the sub .. more akin to a fingerprint ..the US can share with the Pakistanis !

[Singha]

the iranians have the same kilos.

[disha]

How many Barak 8 missiles will be used per engagement?

What sort of situation would a ship have to place itself that would require the firing off of 32 Barak missiles

Who would be sending in the attack aircraft/missiles against which Barak is to be used?

From what range would those attacks be carried out against an Indian ship that has put itself in that position?

Those are tough questions.

It is easier to dream of a crane that will load in rough seas and rain storms *while* the ship is engaged by enemy! This must justify further need for R&D.

[kit]

How many Barak 8 missiles will be used per engagement?

What sort of situation would a ship have to place itself that would require the firing off of 32 Barak missiles

Who would be sending in the attack aircraft/missiles against which Barak is to be used?

From what range would those attacks be carried out against an Indian ship that has put itself in that position?

Those are tough questions.

It is easier to dream of a crane that will load in rough seas and rain storms *while* the ship is engaged by enemy! This must justify further need for R&D.

how about a submarine replenishment ship ..stealthy

[disha]

How many Barak 8 missiles will be used per engagement?

What sort of situation would a ship have to place itself that would require the firing off of 32 Barak missiles

Who would be sending in the attack aircraft/missiles against which Barak is to be used?

From what range would those attacks be carried out against an Indian ship that has put itself in that position?

imagine a task force of 4 indian ships - 1 DDG, 1 FFG, 1 corvette, 1 oiler being targeted by land based air and the barak8 is only on the DDG. the corvette has only ciws, the FFG has shtil which is MR.

once the ships are located by LRMP, the order goes to land based attack a.c. 8 fighters each with 2 ASMs are tasked for the job.
the ASMs are a mix of high subsonic and supersonic. the subsonic one has 250km range, the supersonic ones only 100km.
the fighters split into 4 pairs and approach from two different vectors. around 200km out they release the 8 subsonic ASMs from well outside range barak8 and continue to provide some waypoints periodically using datalink to the LRMP which has powerful sea search radar and standing by 200km away tracking the ships. the continue to close at mid subsonic speed and go supersonic and high around 110km out, releasing the 8 supersonic ASMs around 80km out before turning away.

just before all this, a pair of dummy aircraft have darted in to some 70km to tickle the DDG radar and make it launch a pair of Barak8 as the risk of them releasing ASMs is always there. this provides the final position fix to the LRMP ESM which updates the shooting pack.

so now you have
8 subsonic ASMs which are 50km out.
8 supersonic ASMs which are 80km out but will quickly overhaul the subsonics enroute
2 of the supersonic ASM has ARM and HOJ seekers (unknown to the DDG) and will home in on its big radar emitter

the subsonics are sea skimmers in the terminal phase and are diving for the deck
the supersonics will also sea skim for the last 20k...
all have been programmed with certain waypoints to attack from round the clock and various heights.

how does the task force deal with 16 inflight missiles?

note that this is well within the PAF capability and not a problem at all for the PLANAF which has its own legion of missile armed naval strike a/c.

1. Does not the DDG, FFG and Corvette have any offensive capability?

2. Is it not that the DDG can throw a 250 Km protective bubble around it? Or the scenario involves the DDG battle group sitting out still in waters as sitting ducks?

3. It is interesting that the enemy aircraft is allowed to come within the >120 Km bubble of the EL/M-2248 MF-STAR and launch super-sonic missiles.

4. Does both PAF and PLANAF have integrated supersonic AShM? It is interesting that PAF is mentioned., do they have Supersonic AShM integrated with their F-16s?

Sir., this quote is interesting:

all have been programmed with certain waypoints to attack from round the clock and various heights.

For this to work., the entire DDG group (yes the DDG, Corvette etc) should remain still. They should not disperse out or turn around or even move sideways. There will be no waypoint from 80 km out., the missiles own primary seeker takes over from the aircraft some 20 km out. So who provides the waypoints for different curves?

[shiv]

once the ships are located by LRMP, the order goes to land based attack a.c. 8 fighters each with 2 ASMs are tasked for the job.
the ASMs are a mix of high subsonic and supersonic. the subsonic one has 250km range, the supersonic ones only 100km.
the fighters split into 4 pairs and approach from two different vectors. around 200km out they release the 8 subsonic ASMs from well outside range barak8 and continue to provide some waypoints periodically using datalink to the LRMP which has powerful sea search radar and standing by 200km away tracking the ships. the continue to close at mid subsonic speed and go supersonic and high around 110km out, releasing the 8 supersonic ASMs around 80km out before turning away.

just before all this, a pair of dummy aircraft have darted in to some 70km to tickle the DDG radar and make it launch a pair of Barak8 as the risk of them releasing ASMs is always there. this provides the final position fix to the LRMP ESM which updates the shooting pack.

so now you have
8 subsonic ASMs which are 50km out.
8 supersonic ASMs which are 80km out but will quickly overhaul the subsonics enroute
2 of the supersonic ASM has ARM and HOJ seekers (unknown to the DDG) and will home in on its big radar emitter
.

Which fighters would be carrying such missiles and what is the range of these fighters? Specific models would improve the realism of this discussion. Which air base they operate from would also be relevant and any refuelling ability

The information is relevant because the "safe distance" for the fleet would be the combat radius of these fighters from the air base plus range of missile. If the fighters have a combat radius of 500 km + AShM of 100 km, a fleet that is 600 km out would be at the limit of the range. Technically the fleet would not be able to hit the mainland without missiles with a range of over 600 km and the mainland would be able to do nothing about the fleet. But the fleet could still dominate the shipping lanes.

[Karthik S]

once the ships are located by LRMP, the order goes to land based attack a.c. 8 fighters each with 2 ASMs are tasked for the job.
the ASMs are a mix of high subsonic and supersonic. the subsonic one has 250km range, the supersonic ones only 100km.
the fighters split into 4 pairs and approach from two different vectors. around 200km out they release the 8 subsonic ASMs from well outside range barak8 and continue to provide some waypoints periodically using datalink to the LRMP which has powerful sea search radar and standing by 200km away tracking the ships. the continue to close at mid subsonic speed and go supersonic and high around 110km out, releasing the 8 supersonic ASMs around 80km out before turning away.

just before all this, a pair of dummy aircraft have darted in to some 70km to tickle the DDG radar and make it launch a pair of Barak8 as the risk of them releasing ASMs is always there. this provides the final position fix to the LRMP ESM which updates the shooting pack.

so now you have
8 subsonic ASMs which are 50km out.
8 supersonic ASMs which are 80km out but will quickly overhaul the subsonics enroute
2 of the supersonic ASM has ARM and HOJ seekers (unknown to the DDG) and will home in on its big radar emitter
.

Which fighters would be carrying such missiles and what is the range of these fighters? Specific models would improve the realism of this discussion. Which air base they operate from would also be relevant and any refuelling ability

The information is relevant because the "safe distance" for the fleet would be the combat radius of these fighters from the air base plus range of missile. If the fighters have a combat radius of 500 km + AShM of 100 km, a fleet that is 600 km out would be at the limit of the range. Technically the fleet would not be able to hit the mainland without missiles with a range of over 600 km and the mainland would be able to do nothing about the fleet. But the fleet could still dominate the shipping lanes.

How about carrier based fighters ?

[BharadwajV]

Singha Saar, you have not accounted for the IN's Softkill features.
With modular this and that, it's easier to keep up with the times on EW front.
Not every incoming threat will be met by a Barak-8.

[shiv]

How about carrier based fighters ?

Whose carrier? Which specific aircraft?

[Singha]

Shiv, the older MirageIII of PAF tasked for naval strike can carry 2 drop tanks under wing and 1 Exocet under the centerline.

but let us discount these soon to be retired kit and run with either the F-16-block52 or the JF-17.
they would have 1 centerline large drop tank, 2 SRAAM for self defence and 2 air launched ASM of harpoon size (subsonic). they would be topped up by Midas tanker around 150km offshore in a safe protected refueling area.

for china the combatants would be H-6 (tu16 clone) bomber with multiple subsonic and supersonic ASM and also the JH7 naval strike fighter with 2 ASM. you can add some PLANAF Su30 also with 2 supersonic ASM.

[Cain Marko]

^ if lrmp can see the ships, in all likelihood ship can see lrmp via mfstar, if so, element of surprise is reduced. Next, a kamov picket goes up that ensures that any incoming sortie and possibly release and trajectory of sub and supersonics is tracked.
Jmtp

[SNaik]

Here are some examples of how it could be done:

http://www.wrk.ru/forums/attachment.php?item=474661