Bharat Rakshak

RoyG wrote:

csharma wrote:Stephen Cohen talks about "Irrelevance of India's military power".

http://acdis.illinois.edu/students/cour ... ndia.html/

A bit too simplistic.

Incorrect dates.

Stupid title.

Agree with him on bureaucratic interference.

Feel like inviting him to BRF.

One hour closer to death.

Acharya wrote:

brihaspati wrote:But for that, they dont need to raise a public debate! The leaders speak what is on theirminds anyway, unless ofcourse the wesr expects this leaders to be replaced soon.

According to Zbig Bezezinski India is a tricky customer. They are unable to figure out what the real mood of the country on which the leaders depend on.

For an island-nation of barely 1.3 million people who live on a speck of verdant but craggy territory in the Indian Ocean, Mauritius is more riven by the politics of communalism than one might expect in a tiny democracy.

. . . nearly half of the population is Hindu, with the rest comprising of Creoles, Christians, Muslims, and whites of French descent who are known here as Francos.

. . . he Francos and the Creoles never fully accepted independence. Freedom from the British meant the inevitability of dominance in government and the bureaucracy by the largest social grouping, the Hindus. And even among the Hindus, there are divisions: the Vaishyas are the ones who generally hold the reins of governmental power; the Tamils and the Telugus are the ones who manage finance. The Francos are the biggest owners of Mauritius' vast sugarcane plantations; whites also control major banking and insurance institutions, and they influence some of the big advertising and marketing companies. The market value of publicly traded companies is just about $6 billion.

. . . Moreover, people of Indian origin don't seem too keen to get into large-scale entrepreneurship, displaying a caution that's perhaps hard-wired in them;

. . . imports constitute more than a fifth of the GDP of nearly $9 billion. And even though the per capita income is $7,000, unemployment is nearly 8 per cent — an unacceptably high figure in view of Mauritius' high literacy and youthful demography.

While Mauritius provides nearly $12 billion annually in foreign direct investment to India — making it India's largest supplier of FDI — that money is not local but belongs sometimes to questionable sources who route their cash through this country on account of its liberal tax policies.

Beyond routing FDI, Mauritius can be a platform for high-tech, and for re-export zones. China has recognised this, and is building industrial parks, and a new airport. Beijing's idea seems to be to use Mauritius as a launch pad for re-exporting consumer and other goods to Africa and Europe. With such economic aspirations, there will inevitably be political ambitions — something that must surely worry India's leaders.

Sanjay M wrote:

RoyG wrote: A bit too simplistic.

Incorrect dates.

Stupid title.

Agree with him on bureaucratic interference.

Feel like inviting him to BRF.

One hour closer to death.

I dunno, I kind of agree with him. India can't even get an NSC without alarmists darkly warning of it becoming a harbinger of dictatorship.
I also agree with DRDO's reputation for non-achievement (Arjun tank, LCA, etc)

When we can't whip an opponent one-fifth our size, then it says a lot about us to the rest of the world.

The date thing for Brasstacks ('89 rather than '69) was just a simple tongue-trip. We all do that once in awhile.

See - this is why I feel going after the Atlanticists is the best strategic approach, rather than hankering for Surya to get "taken seriously", or hoping that tit-for-tat bombing campaign in Karachi/Lahore/whatever will somehow deter ISI.

AnimeshP wrote:Well ... Stephen Cohen is being highly disingeneous when he says that the Indian military lacks the capability to whip an enemy one-fifth our size. Maybe he should have gone and read up the US State Department archives before opening his trap. You see when your opponent (whatever his size be) has the overt backing of the biggest dada (US) in the mohalla, there's not much you can do beyond landing a couple of slaps to his face. What Mr Cohen probably could not digest was the fact that India not only landed a few slaps but also managed to break both the legs of the said enemy while he was being backed and protected by the dada.

The dates were not the only discrepancy in his presentation (though I would expect someone who claims to be an expert to atleast get their facts straight). I don't recall India ever having "invaded and occupied" Sri Lanka. Also, how come he never mentioned "Operation Cactus" which was a classis force projection operation carried out jointly by all 3 branches of the Indian military. Or for that matter the 2004 Tsunami relief operations. Or even the anti-piracy operations currently being undertaken by the Indian Navy.

Sanjay M wrote:

AnimeshP wrote:Well ... Stephen Cohen is being highly disingeneous when he says that the Indian military lacks the capability to whip an enemy one-fifth our size. Maybe he should have gone and read up the US State Department archives before opening his trap. You see when your opponent (whatever his size be) has the overt backing of the biggest dada (US) in the mohalla, there's not much you can do beyond landing a couple of slaps to his face. What Mr Cohen probably could not digest was the fact that India not only landed a few slaps but also managed to break both the legs of the said enemy while he was being backed and protected by the dada.

He didn't say the Indian military lacked the ability to whip Pakistan - he said India (politicians included) lacked the capability. I happen to agree with that - the politicians are a big hindrance to effective military and foreign policy.

The dates were not the only discrepancy in his presentation (though I would expect someone who claims to be an expert to atleast get their facts straight). I don't recall India ever having "invaded and occupied" Sri Lanka. Also, how come he never mentioned "Operation Cactus" which was a classis force projection operation carried out jointly by all 3 branches of the Indian military. Or for that matter the 2004 Tsunami relief operations. Or even the anti-piracy operations currently being undertaken by the Indian Navy.

He did praise India's army for its civil relief operations. Technically, it was again politicians who pushed to invade and occupy Sri Lanka, which led to the suffering of our troops.
Anti-piracy operations are good, but they don't necessarily justifiy acquisition of aircraft carriers. Those things are to enhance our strategic power, and unfortunately they may not be enough to offset the strategic handicap from our politicians and their myopia.

In his live dialogue on IslamOnline.net, Mukhetdinov pointed out that, according to the recent sociological researches, by 2020, Muslims may compose the half of Russia's population, which may be possible due to extensive labor migration from Central Asia to Russia.

But the 21st century belongs to India and China, both belonging to the non-Abrahamic traditions. For a change, the non-conflicting, non-proselytising Asian civilisations are becoming the economic axis of the world and power is shifting. This is an inflexion point in world history.

India has proposed a three-pronged approach that would enable countries on the Indian Ocean rim to work together for better protecting their sea lanes and tackling natural calamities.

Underscoring the critical importance of the Indian Ocean to international commerce and energy security, the visiting Indian naval chief, Nirmal Verma said: “Two thirds of the world's oil shipments, one third of its bulk cargo, and half the world's container traffic passes through the expanse of the Indian Ocean. The world's pre-eminent energy and trade seaway, the Indian Ocean, will matter even more in future.”

Admiral Verma, who spoke on Monday at the second Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in Abu Dhabi, pointed out that Indian ocean littoral countries needed to prepare themselves well to tackle three key issues; humanitarian disasters, protection of the environment and the scourge of piracy.

The naval chief proposed a brainstorming session among member countries that would lead to the conduct of a Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) exercise.

“HADR could become one of the major fields of IONS activities,” he stressed.

Delegations from 32 nations are attending this year's three-day conference, which opened on Monday.

The Indian Navy, which played a pioneering role in 2008, handed over the chairmanship of the IONS to Naval Staff Brigadier Ibrahim Salim Al Musharrakh, Commander of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Navy.

Highlighting the importance of concrete environmentally-friendly measures, the naval chief advocated the formation of a “working group” of a few navies within the IONS community that would propose measures “to reduce our carbon footprints.”

Responding to the grave threat posed by piracy, Admiral Verma suggested that limitations of assets among member countries could, in substantial measure, be overcome through a well coordinated and secure information exchange network.

For starters, information exchanges could begin at a “sub-regional” level.

The naval chief also emphasised honing the skills of naval personnel, especially in the field of navigation.

He also called for the sharing of hydrographic data based on the ‘North Indian Ocean Hydrographic Commission (NIHOC)' model.

In the maiden edition of a new monthly magazine, Geopolitics, Sreeram Chaulia argues that Indian foreign policy planners need to do serious work on grand strategy and broadening the scope of interests to far-flung parts of the world.
http://www.usindiafriendship.net/


GEOPOLITICS, MAY 2010

INDIA IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

The MEA’s policy planners will have to cast India’s foreign policy in a new perspective and come up with an inclusive mapping exercise. SREERAM CHAULIA takes a close look...

THE REVIVAL of the long-dormant Policy Planning Division of India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in September 2009 through the initiative of the then Minister of state for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor is a positive step for a country that wants to climb up the rungs of global status and power.

Policy planning bureaus have played a vital role in foreign ministries of great powers by providing broad direction, outlook and blueprints that percolate through the veins and arteries of the system. The famous Cold War doctrine of containment, for instance, was the brainchild of George Kennan, the first Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department. His ‘X’ article in the journal Foreign Affairs (July 1947) recorded his acute observations on the wellsprings of Soviet conduct and laid out the parameters of a global response to the USSR’s “expansive tendencies.” Encouraged by his mentor — the powerful Secretary of State George Marshall — Kennan and his team of researchers produced the fundamentals that became the bedrock of American foreign policy for decades to come.

India’s policy planners must always bear in mind that power of any kind is relative in international relations, and accordingly come up with power-enhancement plans that factor in the prospects of other states in a dynamic environment. For instance, if India keeps growing at around 8-9 per cent for twenty years and China stays the course with double-digit growth, both states will be absolutely better off but India will be relatively weaker. If India’s nuclear deterrent improves through our scientific community’s efforts (the latest figure is that we have the capacity to assemble a 200-kiloton nuclear device) but falls below the shifting definition of ‘credibility’ due to the even more rapid weapon experimentation by other powers, we will continue to be subjected to blackmail and bullying.

Decisiveness about what kind of a power China is and where it is heading has to be a key formulation for the MEA’s policy planners. Just as Kennan instinctively grasped the reality of Stalin’s USSR and made a value judgement that it was characteristically aggressive, India has to make up its mind about its northern neighbour one way or the other and compose a broad set of measures to manage this relationship. At present, vacillation and ambiguity about China’s motives, behaviour and future trajectories predominate in Indian policy circles, leading to a confusing approach that is neither fish nor fowl.

While some degree of open-mindedness and flexibility, to some extent, are definite assets in the highly unpredictable and volatile social world, Indian foreign policy planners cannot be paralysed with a wait-and-see attitude towards a China that is undertaking a rapid revolution in military affairs and has a predatory commodity exports and foreign investment-promotion strategy.

Even the booming bilateral trade between India and China must be tempered with comparisons to China’s trade equations with other countries. This will help New Delhi foresee longer-term tensions and avoid a scenario where Beijing can convert thick economic exchanges into unacceptable political domination through lobbies or infringement of India’s foreign policy autonomy. How and through what means China might attempt to parlay its ballooning trade surplus with India (which stood at $16 billion, as of 2009) into a superior-inferior power relationship must be closely monitored and countered. Comparative examples of China’s relations with Taiwan, South Korea, Russia, Japan, the EU and the USA must be studied extensively by Indian planners before crafting appropriate defensive and offensive mechanisms.

Unlike the days of the ‘Indira Doctrine’, when domination of South Asia was a transparent and suffused aim of Indian foreign policy, we now live in an interconnected world where we must register our strong presence in far-flung parts of the world to be recognised as a genuine, global power. Indian policy planners have to revisit lessons from the gradual displacement of New Delhi by Beijing as the pre-eminent Asian power in Africa: first by means of Mao Zedong’s radical “Afro-Asianism” and later through proactive loans and natural resource-centric infrastructure building sprees.

Be it the 1960s or the 2000s, India has been passive and lacking in concrete tools for courting and winning over African nations and people. It is largely due to foreign policy neglect and underestimation of Africa’s economic and human potential that New Delhi has been left with a tough mission of playing catch-up with Beijing. Given the high priority of gaining traction in Africa, the MEA’s policy planners must devise quickimpact projects, funds and programmes on a war footing that would reconnect African states and societies with their Indian counterparts.

Contemporary India is not known for ‘thinking big’ on foreign policy thrusts despite the legacy of Nehruvian globalism. The narrow educational and experiential backgrounds of the current Indian political class and the obsessive media focus on just the country’s immediate neighbours have reproduced a frog-in-the-well mentality that discourages knowledge accumulation and production beyond a certain geographical radius or comfort zone. There are, for example, countless Pakistan and Sri Lanka hands in and outside government in India but hardly anyone who has a masterly grasp of the politics and predilections of the Caribbean or Bolivarian America.

The revived Policy Planning Division should have the luxury of not being entrusted with one particular brief and instead should have the whole world as its horizon. It must acquire the acumen to interpret the direct or indirect ramifications for India of a disputed election in Ukraine, a coup in Côte d’Ivoire, or a flared up boundary dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. Inputs do come into the MEA from different embassies and consular missions around the world, but more than collating in-house diplomatic cables and emails is required to arrive at comprehensive estimates and policy adjustments that keep relating back and forth to the refrain of pre-eminent doctrinal foreign policy principles. Intellectual talents that are outside the charmed circle of power holders will have to be mined extensively for situating Indian concerns within larger contexts.

MEA’s policy planners should embark on their historic mission with the basic presumption that the entire world is or soon will be India’s backyard. While the primacy of some regions or issues may demand greater attention at times, Indian foreign policy must be ready with doctrines and deeds to exert influence in the remotest of corners. Since all of planet earth and outer space are India’s theatres, a robust and competent foreign policy planning arm to execute this challenging role becomes a pressing imperative.

(The author is Associate Professor of world politics at the O.P. Jindal Global University)

____________________

A: Well, the Global Times, which is an offshoot of the People's Daily, translated "balance" as zhiheng, which means "to conscribe," and not pingheng, which is "to balance." So naturally, you give that interpretation, which is to conscribe China, it must have aroused Chinese anger. Why should I say that as a Chinese?

But I am saying what I am saying not because I am Chinese or because I am anti-China, but because I represent Singapore, and this is in my national interest that there should be a balance in the Pacific. Without America, you can take Japan, you can put North and South Korea together, you can put the whole of ASEAN together, you can even get India together. You can't balance China. India is too far away and they can't project the forces into the Pacific. But the Americans can.

Q: You said that India was far away. But India now seems to have finally awoken from its long sleep. In what way do you think India should get involved in providing a stabilizing effect for the Asia-Pacific region?

A: India's military role will be confined to South Asia and she cannot project her forces into the Pacific. She might be able to project her forces into the Straits of Malacca because it's near the Andaman Islands and she's got bases there. But to go beyond Singapore upwards will be a difficult problem for her.

So militarily, I would say India is confined to the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca, the Northern Straits of Malacca. Land projections across the Himalayas or across Bangladesh or Burma are very difficult. Similarly for the Chinese. So unless there's a huge deterioration of relations, I do not see a repeat of 1962.
Q: Relations between India and the United States have improved very much, especially in the past decade or so. President Barack Obama even called India a "natural ally." Do you think the relationship is developing into an alliance?

A: Well, I am not sure they are natural allies forever. Because for a long time, the United States favored Pakistan because India was in alliance with and buying her weaponry and trading with Russia. So she was in the other bloc. Now the Russians have lost that ability, but the Indians still maintain their military relations and supplies of military equipment and hardware, aircraft. I am not sure if submarines are also (included).

But it will take some time for the Russian Republic to find the strength it had with the Soviet Union, with the whole empire. But nevertheless, their military technology is considerable and Putin has shown he is going to keep that up. And so you see they are producing updates of Sukhoi and the MiGs and selling them around the world.

Q: The United States also seems to be interested in selling arms to India, but I think this seems to be evolving into something much larger.

A: No, it's much larger because their interests are aligned. The Americans would want another heavyweight at the other end of the tug-of-war role. And the other heavyweight is India. It may not have the GDP, either total--its total GDP is less than one-third of China. But the number of population is not very far off China, and they may even become larger than China by 2050 or 2060.

So it is useful for the United States to have a stabilizer in South Asia. And I think the United States must be realistic enough to see that, at the rate India is growing, she cannot project her military forces beyond the Straits of Malacca. The Chinese can project not their whole weight, but some weight to the Indian Ocean, routes to Myanmar. They have a seaport in Myanmar and routes to the port in Pakistan. But this is a long logistic line.

CLAIRE BERLINSKI
A Hidden History of Evil
http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20_2_s ... hives.html

Why doesn’t anyone care about the unread Soviet archives?

MARC RIBOUD/MAGNUM PHOTOS
Though Mikhail Gorbachev is lionized in the West, the untranslated archives suggest a much darker figure.
In the world’s collective consciousness, the word “Nazi” is synonymous with evil. It is widely understood that the Nazis’ ideology—nationalism, anti-Semitism, the autarkic ethnic state, the Führer principle—led directly to the furnaces of Auschwitz. It is not nearly as well understood that Communism led just as inexorably, everywhere on the globe where it was applied, to starvation, torture, and slave-labor camps. Nor is it widely acknowledged that Communism was responsible for the deaths of some 150 million human beings during the twentieth century. The world remains inexplicably indifferent and uncurious about the deadliest ideology in history.

For evidence of this indifference, consider the unread Soviet archives. Pavel Stroilov, a Russian exile in London, has on his computer 50,000 unpublished, untranslated, top-secret Kremlin documents, mostly dating from the close of the Cold War. He stole them in 2003 and fled Russia. Within living memory, they would have been worth millions to the CIA; they surely tell a story about Communism and its collapse that the world needs to know. Yet he can’t get anyone to house them in a reputable library, publish them, or fund their translation. In fact, he can’t get anyone to take much interest in them at all.

Then there’s Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, who once spent 12 years in the USSR’s prisons, labor camps, and psikhushkas—political psychiatric hospitals—after being convicted of copying anti-Soviet literature. He, too, possesses a massive collection of stolen and smuggled papers from the archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which, as he writes, “contain the beginnings and the ends of all the tragedies of our bloodstained century.” These documents are available online at bukovsky-archives.net, but most are not translated. They are unorganized; there are no summaries; there is no search or index function. “I offer them free of charge to the most influential newspapers and journals in the world, but nobody wants to print them,” Bukovsky writes. “Editors shrug indifferently: So what? Who cares?”

The originals of most of Stroilov’s documents remain in the Kremlin archives, where, like most of the Soviet Union’s top-secret documents from the post-Stalin era, they remain classified. They include, Stroilov says, transcripts of nearly every conversation between Gorbachev and his foreign counterparts—hundreds of them, a near-complete diplomatic record of the era, available nowhere else. There are notes from the Politburo taken by Georgy Shakhnazarov, an aide of Gorbachev’s, and by Politburo member Vadim Medvedev. There is the diary of Anatoly Chernyaev—Gorbachev’s principal aide and deputy chief of the body formerly known as the Comintern—which dates from 1972 to the collapse of the regime. There are reports, dating from the 1960s, by Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief of the Central Committee’s International Department until 1987 and then Gorbachev’s advisor until 1991. Zagladin was both envoy and spy, charged with gathering secrets, spreading disinformation, and advancing Soviet influence.

When Gorbachev and his aides were ousted from the Kremlin, they took unauthorized copies of these documents with them. The documents were scanned and stored in the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation, one of the first independent think tanks in modern Russia, where a handful of friendly and vetted researchers were given limited access to them. Then, in 1999, the foundation opened a small part of the archive to independent researchers, including Stroilov. The key parts of the collection remained restricted; documents could be copied only with the written permission of the author, and Gorbachev refused to authorize any copies whatsoever. But there was a flaw in the foundation’s security, Stroilov explained to me. When things went wrong with the computers, as often they did, he was able to watch the network administrator typing the password that gave access to the foundation’s network. Slowly and secretly, Stroilov copied the archive and sent it to secure locations around the world.
....

Stroilov claims that his documents “tell a completely new story about the end of the Cold War. The ‘commonly accepted’ version of history of that period consists of myths almost entirely. These documents are capable of ruining each of those myths.” Is this so? I couldn’t say. I don’t read Russian. Of Stroilov’s documents, I have seen only the few that have been translated into English. Certainly, they shouldn’t be taken at face value; they were, after all, written by Communists. But the possibility that Stroilov is right should surely compel keen curiosity.

For instance, the documents cast Gorbachev in a far darker light than the one in which he is generally regarded. In one document, he laughs with the Politburo about the USSR’s downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 in 1983—a crime that was not only monstrous but brought the world very near to nuclear Armageddon. These minutes from a Politburo meeting on October 4, 1989, are similarly disturbing:

Lukyanov reports that the real number of casualties on Tiananmen Square was 3,000.

Gorbachev: We must be realists. They, like us, have to defend themselves. Three thousands . . . So what?

And a transcript of Gorbachev’s conversation with Hans-Jochen Vogel, the leader of West Germany’s Social Democratic Party, shows Gorbachev defending Soviet troops’ April 9, 1989, massacre of peaceful protesters in Tbilisi.

Stroilov’s documents also contain transcripts of Gorbachev’s discussions with many Middle Eastern leaders. These suggest interesting connections between Soviet policy and contemporary trends in Russian foreign policy. Here is a fragment from a conversation reported to have taken place with Syrian president Hafez al-Assad on April 28, 1990:

H. ASSAD. To put pressure on Israel, Baghdad would need to get closer to Damascus, because Iraq has no common borders with Israel. . . .

M. S. GORBACHEV. I think so, too. . . .

H. ASSAD. Israel’s approach is different, because the Judaic religion itself states: the land of Israel spreads from Nile to Euphrates and its return is a divine predestination.

M. S. GORBACHEV. But this is racism, combined with Messianism!

H. ASSAD. This is the most dangerous form of racism.

One doesn’t need to be a fantasist to wonder whether these discussions might be relevant to our understanding of contemporary Russian policy in a region of some enduring strategic significance.
.....
Zagladin’s records also note that the former leader of the British Labour Party, Neil Kinnock, approached Gorbachev—unauthorized, while Kinnock was leader of the opposition—through a secret envoy to discuss the possibility of halting the United Kingdom’s Trident nuclear-missile program. The minutes of the meeting between Gorbachev and the envoy, MP Stuart Holland, read as follows:

In [Holland’s] opinion, Soviet Union should be very interested in liquidation of “Tridents” because, apart from other things, the West—meaning the US, Britain and France—would have a serious advantage over the Soviet Union after the completion of START treaty. That advantage will need to be eliminated. . . . At the same time Holland noted that, of course, we can seriously think about realisation of that idea only if the Labour comes to power. He said Thatcher . . . would never agree to any reduction of nuclear armaments.
Kinnock was vice president of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004, and his wife, Glenys, is now Britain’s minister for Europe. Gerard Batten, a member of the UK Independence Party, has noted the significance of the episode. “If the report given to Mr. Gorbachev is true, it means that Lord Kinnock approached one of Britain’s enemies in order to seek approval regarding his party’s defense policy and, had he been elected, Britain’s defense policy,” Batten said to the European Parliament in 2009. “If this report is true, then Lord Kinnock would be guilty of treason.”
.....


Perhaps it doesn’t surprise you to read that prominent European politicians held these views. But why doesn’t it? It is impossible to imagine that figures who had enjoyed such close ties to the Nazi Party—or, for that matter, to the Ku Klux Klan or to South Africa’s apartheid regime—would enjoy top positions in Europe today. The rules are different, apparently, for Communist fellow travelers. “We now have the EU unelected socialist party running Europe,” Stroilov said to me. “Bet the KGB can’t believe it.”

And what of Zagladin’s description of his dealings with our own current vice president in 1979?

Unofficially, [Senator Joseph] Biden and [Senator Richard] Lugar said that, in the end of the day, they were not so much concerned with having a problem of this or that citizen solved as with showing to the American public that they do care for “human rights.” . . . In other words, the collocutors directly admitted that what is happening is a kind of a show, that they absolutely do not care for the fate of most so-called dissidents.
Remarkably, the world has shown little interest in the unread Soviet archives. That paragraph about Biden is a good example. Stroilov and Bukovsky coauthored a piece about it for the online magazine FrontPage on October 10, 2008; it passed without remark. Americans considered the episode so uninteresting that even Biden’s political opponents didn’t try to turn it into political capital. Imagine, if you can, what it must feel like to have spent the prime of your life in a Soviet psychiatric hospital, to know that Joe Biden is now vice president of the United States, and to know that no one gives a damn.

Brazil and Turkey's announcement of a nuclear fuel deal with Iran has done more than complicate U.S. plans for a U.N. sanctions resolution. It also threatens, or promises, to upend the political order that has held sway in the Security Council for decades -- one in which the five permanent members of the U.N.'s most powerful body make all the critical decisions on key security matters.

If one thinks of the United States as the central node in a more networked governance arrangement, then one can see how the reforms made to date do not weaken American influence.

The thing is, this only holds if rising powers such as Brazil and India want to be supporters of a U.S.-led system, or if they want to posit an alternative.

Something else vitally important to notice has happened here. This has become the first Middle Eastern stand-off in which the most important player from outside the region was China -- because China is the one country that had and has the power to determine whether or not a sanctions regime would work. ...

abhishek_sharma wrote:The return of Plan B: emerging power diplomacy in the Middle East

http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts ... iddle_east

D Roy wrote:
So I don't really see why India needs to go Asia-Pacific and China needs to go IOR if a simple agreement on safeguarding Chinese SLOCs in the IOR by the Indian Navy can be made.

In the himalayas, everybody keeps what they already have and just demilitarize the entire Indo-tibetan border with significant number of military observers stationed on either side and joint patrolling by .lightly armed border guards.

Couple this with direct overland trade and tourist exchange and presto - Sino-Indian rapprochement.