India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008

[Sanatanan]

. . . my question is what happens if India is "approved" by this gang to import fuel and other stuff, but not to import the ENR. OK, so India has to use some E and R from indigenous technology, and at that point, the E&R plants become opaque to inspecteurs, being outside the deal. Hajaar tons of LEU goes in, hajaar tons of stuff come out, along with a few grams of glowing HEU. Unphortunately, saar, our technology is indigenous onlee, not as efficient as phoren imported onlee, so efficiency eej only 50 percent of imported. Tsk! Tsk! sorry, we cannot account phor other 50 perjent onlee.

I feel that Article 6 (iii) of the 123 Agreement may be relevant for this scenario, if the NSG, in its waiver, manages to include, in some form or the other, a requirement that India must adhere to the Indo-US 123. {Perhaps, at the moment, this is not a requirement for the LEU imported for Koodankulam, unless the Indo-IAEA Safeguards Agreement recently initialled subsumes the earlier Koodankulam Agreement.}

(iii) With a view to implementing full civil nuclear cooperation as envisioned in the Joint Statement of the Parties of July 18, 2005, the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred. To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility. Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either Party and will be concluded within one year. The Parties agree on the application of IAEA safeguards to all facilities concerned with the above activities. These arrangements and procedures shall include provisions with respect to physical protection standards set out in Article 8, storage standards set out in Article 7, and environmental protections set forth in Article 11 of this Agreement, and such other provisions as may be agreed by the Parties. Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.

I feel the "physical protection standards" referred to in Articles 7 and 8 of the 123 text (which in turn refer to INFCIRC 225/REV 4), might in some way include the techniques to be used for plutonium assay at various stages of reprocessing. As such, prior agreement between India and IAEA - and also US, at least for US supplied fuel - for the atom counting equipment (which, in this discussion, are postulated above to be indigenous) may become necessary before India can embark on reprocessing imported fuel.

[ramana]

Manny, How can we send some members to get re-educated by you? You sure are shaping well as a jingo. Good job!

But my endorsement of you doesnt mean I dont like sraj's posts. What he suggest should have happened long before if the previous generation had done an analysis of the adversaries. They thought everyone was good.

[Manny]

Manny, How can we send some members to get re-educated by you? You sure are shaping well as a jingo. Good job!

But my endorsement of you doesnt mean I dont like sraj's posts. What he suggest should have happened long before if the previous generation had done an analysis of the adversaries. They thought everyone was good.

Well... I am not a Paranoid Indian who is so scared of those white people who are out to get us... and neither am I naive/fool who think the Gora's are the best. I am confident that desis are good as any and that we should be brave enough to move forward and make alliances with anyone and everyone as much as possible...at the same time, watch our back. Be practical and realistic and not live in an idealistic dreamy self delusional world that India has lived for the better part of the last 60 years.

[ramana]

Op-Ed in Pioneer, 28 Aug., 2008

Led down the garden path

Ajoy Bose

The US appears to have done little lobbying with NSG members in the lead-up to the Vienna meeting. Now there is growing concern in New Delhi that the NSG roadblock may be the result not just of a miscalculation by the US but a deliberate American ploy

Have the Americans led the Manmohan Singh Government down the garden path on the India-US nuclear deal? A month after the UPA regime turned itself upside down to somehow thrust the nuclear deal through, regardless of the political fallout, there is suddenly a question mark on the feasibility of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement in its present form between India and the United States. It now turns out that the Bush Administration is no longer able to, or does not want to, do what it had promised - bulldoze the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group into accepting a waiver for India from non-proliferation rules that govern other countries.

Much to the surprise of New Delhi, the nuclear deal after sailing through the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency has run into serious problems in the NSG. The Government is reportedly astonished that almost overnight not one or two but an entire group of nations has mushroomed into a vociferous lobby that is insisting on more specific and overt commitments from India to the non-proliferation regime and also more clearly underline in the agreement the more unpalatable prescriptions of the Hyde Act. This kind of language is precisely what the Indian negotiating team had fought so hard to keep out of the nuclear cooperation agreement to save the Government from domestic criticism.

Interestingly, till the NSG actually began its deliberations, New Delhi had been informed by Washington that only two countries - Austria and Ireland - were expected to raise a few tricky questions on the deal and these could easily be defused. But as it turned out, these two countries were joined by New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands, making them a formidable group whose objections could hardly be ignored. A day after the NSG meeting on August 22 in Vienna, even Japan is reported to have raised some questions on the nuclear deal.

It is most unlikely that such concerted opposition to the nuclear deal could happen without the knowledge of the Americans. Moreover, since the countries that have raised objections are all known to be susceptible to US pressure, their opposition to the deal in its present form makes little sense had the Bush Administration really leaned on them. This is why there is growing recognition in New Delhi that the roadblock in the NSG may be the result not just of a miscalculation by the US but a deliberate ploy.

Experts and analysts point to other signals in this direction. For instance, Washington appears to have done little lobbying with others in the lead-up to the NSG meeting and whatever emissaries it sent out were quite junior in status. The US Ambassador in New Delhi, Mr David Mulford, also sent mixed messages by declaring on the eve of the NSG meeting that it would be unwise for India to expect an unconditional waiver. And finally, the US official, Mr John Rood, deployed by the Bush Administration for the meeting in Vienna, is known for his strong non-proliferation agenda.

Two different explanations are being given for this sudden shift in the American approach to the nuclear deal. The first is that the Bush Administration had right from the outset planned to introduce a more non-proliferation dimension to the agreement when the Manmohan Singh Government was far too politically committed to the deal for it to back out. It is possible that Washington, DC believes that New Delhi will accept a more explicit commitment to non-proliferation rather than risk a collapse of the entire deal.

Significantly, ever since the joint statement proposing the deal that was issued after Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh met President George W Bush in July 2005, there have been persistent reports that a strong non-proliferation agenda was driving Washington, DC in cementing the agreement with New Delhi. Since the UPA regime under strong pressure from both the Right and the Left at home was not prepared to accommodate more overt non-proliferation rhetoric in the bilateral agreement, the last minute tweaking by the NSG would eminently suit the US in firing from the shoulder of the 45-nation body. If India could be hustled into diluting its nuclear weapons programme, it would provide the Republicans with a famous diplomatic victory virtually on the eve of the US presidential election.

The other reason being given for the Americans deciding to suddenly soft-pedal the nuclear deal in its present form is linked to their fear that they may not be able to get the bilateral 123 Agreement through the US Congress in time even if the NSG gives a green signal to the deal. In this eventuality, major competitors like Russia and France would be free to start negotiating nuclear civilian trade with India even as the US would have to wait for the next Administration to take charge next year. This would be clearly disadvantageous to American commercial interests, and this is why it would suit the US to stall a NSG decision so that the Russians and French do not get a headstart.

Although the UPA Government continues to bluster that all is well with the deal and it would be duly passed by the US Congress, insiders maintain that there is deepening concern about the major political embarrassment in store for the Prime Minister and the Congress if the Americans pull the plug at this stage.

The second reason is marginal because the conditions are not for commercial benefit but for strategic objectives.

MMS will emerge taller if he walks out for it says to the nation I have protected the national interests. Off course business "leaders' will get outtheir knives but it wont matter. He can contest and win in nay constituency after the walkout. Maybe even in Singur.

Ajoy Bose is a NDC alumus and not the average DDM.

Sucker punch in polite terms.

[RajeshA]

Led down the garden path by Ajoy Bose: The Pioneer

Two different explanations are being given for this sudden shift in the American approach to the nuclear deal. The first is that the Bush Administration had right from the outset planned to introduce a more non-proliferation dimension to the agreement when the Manmohan Singh Government was far too politically committed to the deal for it to back out. It is possible that Washington, DC believes that New Delhi will accept a more explicit commitment to non-proliferation rather than risk a collapse of the entire deal.

The other reason being given for the Americans deciding to suddenly soft-pedal the nuclear deal in its present form is linked to their fear that they may not be able to get the bilateral 123 Agreement through the US Congress in time even if the NSG gives a green signal to the deal. In this eventuality, major competitors like Russia and France would be free to start negotiating nuclear civilian trade with India even as the US would have to wait for the next Administration to take charge next year. This would be clearly disadvantageous to American commercial interests, and this is why it would suit the US to stall a NSG decision so that the Russians and French do not get a headstart.

Considering that US has its hands full with Russia, I wonder how USA would react, if India should go for a few nuclear tests as a reaction to American betrayal and European snobbishness. The 'free world' has no choice other than accepting our jolly happy smiling democracy faces.

This is a serious question. If we do need further testing for a credible deterrent, then the only possibility is either wait till China or Pakistan provide us a reason, or the international situation is favorable, i.e. the international community swallows our waywardness for the sake of balance of power.

[Katare]

Bush knows India will not sign anything that doesn't meet its basic minimum demands. He'll get it the way India-US wants it. There is bunch of little nations with no stakes in the deal that are taking the moral high grounds. Once they had their fix of morality they'll come around seeing that their moral actions will have real consequences and cost.

[JE Menon]

Nalapat's ridiculous whine is beneath contempt...

I suppose the countries pushing the deal through are brown, black or yellow!!!

[NRao]

US refuses to rule out changes in N-deal

The spokesman's comments came a day after Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon's visit to fine tune the language a waiver acceptable to the NSG without adding any new conditions

Washington: The US says there are no plans to change the India-US civil nuclear deal to get a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), but would not rule out the possibility altogether.

"There are no plans that I know of to change the agreement. But you know, in life you never rule things out," State Department deputy spokesman Robert Wood told reporters Tuesday.

"But it's obviously got to be something that both the United States and India can agree to if there were going to be changes," he said when asked if any changes were contemplated to meet the concerns of the 45-member cartel.

"But I've heard no mention of a need to, you know, adjust the agreement in any way," Wood added.

The spokesman's comments came a day after Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon's visit to fine tune the language a waiver acceptable to the NSG without adding any new conditions.

Menon had a long session with his counterpart, US Undersecretary of State William Burns, followed by a meeting with President George W. Bush's acting National Security Adviser James Geoffrey to work out a formulation acceptable to both NSG and India.

The nuclear cartel that controls global export of nuclear fuel and knowhow had last week failed to reach a consensus at its Vienna conclave on giving India a clean waiver in the face objections from some sceptics. It meets again Sep 4-5 to decide on the India-specific waiver.

The spokesman said the Bush administration was well aware that the Congressional clock was ticking and was working very hard to address the concerns of NSG to see the "critically important" deal through at the earliest.

"We're working very hard. We would like to see this agreement come into fruition because it's critically important for both the United States and India," Wood said.

"And we are aware that the congressional clock is ticking and we are going to be consulting with other governments, particularly governments in the NSG, to try to move this process forward as quickly as we can."

The US Congress which must approve the implementing 123 agreement after the green signal from NSG is set to adjourn Sep 26.

Admitting that some countries have a number of concerns about the India deal, he said, "but they're good questions and we think we've got good answers to those."

Asked how the US was addressing the concerns of NSG members, Wood said it did so through discussions during the Vienna meeting of NSG and through ongoing talks with various governments about the issues.

Source: Indo-Asian News Service

[putnanja]

The American dilemma at the NSG

The American dilemma at the NSG

Siddharth Varadarajan

The nuclear deal is at its most decisive breaking point today. India has shown its willingness to abide by its commitments. Is the U.S. in a position to do the same?

In the face of evidence suggesting the underselling of India’s case at the Nuclear Suppliers Group last week, it is worth asking why the United States invested three years of political capital in a deal only to see it brought to the edge of a precipice where the smallest of nonproliferation ‘conditions’ is likely to knock it over. The answer lies in the contradictory pursuit of strategic and tactical gains that lies at the heart of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.

The July 2005 nuclear agreement was the product of a strong strategic urge in Washington to do something dramatic to overcome the reticence the Indian political, bureaucratic and military elites have traditionally shown towards entering into a more profound strategic embrace with the U.S. This embrace was not about turning New Delhi into a military ally, something even the most optimistic advocates of the India relationship in Washington knew was unlikely ever to happen. But it was about allowing the U.S. to shape the strategic choices India was making and help the country become a “responsible stakeholder” of a regional and global system underpinned by American hegemony. The alternative was that India could emerge a spoiler who might bandwagon with other powers and make the exercise of that hegemony more difficult.

The brilliance of Philip Zelikow, who was Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s adviser in 2004 and 2005, lay in understanding the seductive potential civil nuclear cooperation held for the Indian elites. The U.S. had wasted five years following the 1998 nuclear tests trying to contain the Indian atomic genie. But as the strategists of the Bush administration surveyed the post-Iraq war world, they asked themselves whether this failure could somehow be turned into the pillar of a new approach. One where India’s obvious military strengths were recognised, including the reality of its nuclear weapons, and an attempt made to harness its abilities so that they could further U.S. interests in the region. If the Iraq fiasco had demonstrated, inter alia, the limits of unilateralist hegemony, could the outsourcing of hegemony to countries like India help transcend those limits?

Not surprisingly, the first branch of U.S. government to realise the promise this new relationship held was the Pentagon. Even during the first four years of the Bush administration, Donald Rumsfeld and Douglas Feith had sought to deepen military-to-military ties with the Indians, with the stress first on exercises and interoperability leading eventually to the sale of equipment. But the weakness of this approach became apparent in the summer of 2003 when a determined American push to get India to send ‘peacekeeping’ troops to Iraq ran aground despite winning the backing of most ‘pundits’ in Delhi. A U.S. envoy made a final push with a top Indian official in early July that year. “Future generations of Americans will be grateful for India’s help,” he said. “But what can you do for us now? Are you prepared to lift the restrictions on our civil nuclear programme?” the official asked. The envoy had no answer. He returned empty handed, but the record of that conversation left its mark in the Beltway. And the effect was felt almost immediately. First up, the High Technology Cooperation Group, which had been set up in 2002, got a boost. Later that year, the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership took shape. The Pentagon was already a believer but it was now the Commerce Department’s turn to test the waters. By September 2004, India had agreed to sign the End Use Verification Agreement that Commerce considered a key benchmark of India’s willingness to accommodate American concerns. Somewhere within the State Department, a little light began to flash. And policymakers like Mr. Zelikow began to ask themselves: Could the sop of a nuclear deal become the cornerstone of a grand strategic bargain with India and pave the way for a vastly expanded relationship?

In January 2005, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, who was the French President’s diplomatic adviser at the time, was asked to test the waters in New Delhi by presenting the Indians with a U.S.-France-U.K non-paper outlining a menu of possibilities, including separation of the civil and military programme. Brajesh Mishra as National Security Adviser in the erstwhile Vajpayee government had earlier broached the idea with the French of offering one or two reactors from among the 21 operating (or under construction) for international safeguards provided sanctions were lifted, with a commitment to safeguard all future reactors as well. That proposal was now dusted off and embellished. The Manmohan Singh government vetoed some suggestions but reacted positively to the idea. By March, the U.S. had made up its mind. Ironically, the immediate catalyst was the American decision to provide F-16s to Pakistan. Washington feared India would be offended. So Dr. Rice travelled to Delhi to tell the Prime Minister about the F-16s. And that the U.S. wanted to work towards the lifting of international restrictions on civil nuclear commerce with India. Dr. Singh assented.
Compelling logic

So compelling was the logic of a nuclear deal with India that it appealed to the American establishment cutting across institutional, ideological, political and sectoral barriers. Thus, Defence, Commerce and State were fully on board. Neocons, realists and liberal internationalists thought it made sense. The Republicans and Democrats did so as well. And as for American capital, especially on the defence, agribusiness, retail and financial services side, no convincing was needed. One more intermediate but crucial step was still to be taken to focus the American mind, and that was the Defence Framework Agreement of June 2005 which foregrounded defence sales. From there to the historic joint statement of July 18, 2005 (J18) was just a matter of detail.

But details do matter and they did prove devilishly difficult. The game in Washington was still a very tightly held one because Dr. Rice knew so dramatic a policy change might not survive the pushes and pulls that came with the full inter-agency process. Though nonproliferation specialists were kept on the periphery of the drafting process, a generalist like Nicholas Burns knew enough of U.S. policies to try and strive for some tactical icing on the strategic cake. The nuclear deal was premised on Indian nuclear weapons not being seen as a threat (and perhaps even as an asset) by Washington as far as the global balance of power was concerned. But this was so only as long as the Indian weapons programme did not become too ambitious. Thus, Mr. Burns and his colleagues sought to make the nonproliferation agenda an essential part of the nuclear deal, even as the wider strategic partnership was designed to be the principal goal. They also knew that some down payment on the foreign policy front might be necessary to guard against India’s tendency to act independently. But getting the balance right was never easy.

When the first draft of J18 was faxed to the Prime Minister’s plane at Frankfurt en route to Washington, it was so full of nonproliferationism that Anil Kakodkar, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, saw red. A message was immediately sent to the Indian negotiators to stand down and not agree to anything until the PM arrived. What ensued was a bitter fight, first within the Indian camp, and then between the Indians and the Americans. In the end, Dr. Rice and President Bush had to intervene. The strategic goal was not to be sacrificed for tactical gains on the nonproliferation front. Those could always be pressed at a later date. Thus the Indians emerged with a reasonably balanced agreement in which some existing and some new nonproliferation commitments were reiterated or made. And in exchange, the U.S. agreed to lift its domestic restrictions and work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.

However, this tension between the pursuit of long-term strategic goals and tactical nonproliferation gains was to recur frequently during the next three years. Each time, the deal was taken to breaking point. Each time, it required President Bush’s intervention to be salvaged. And each time, it required Prime Minister Manmohan to inform Mr. Bush of the gravity of the situation. Throughout these episodes, there were always sections of the Indian establishment that urged the path of least resistance. On foreign policy issues like Iran — where former Under Secretary Stephen J. Rademaker, has admitted India’s vote at the IAEA was ‘coerced’ by the U.S. — the government tended to lose its nerve. But as far as nonproliferation commitments were concerned, the PMO and the Department of Atomic Energy wanted no dilution of the reciprocal balance contained in J18. They had veto power and they never flinched from exercising it.

Thus it was that the separation talks went to the brink in March 2006 before fast breeder reactors and the damaging notion of ‘grid connectivity’ as a criterion for safeguarding reactors were kept out, and the linkage between safeguards, fuel supply and corrective measures brought in. The nonproliferation camp in Washington struck back with the Hyde Act, helped along by some poor Indian diplomacy which saw merit in hailing the passage of a Bill so riddled with extraneous agendas that it has haunted the nuclear deal ever since. In 2007, India recovered some ground in the 123 negotiations, but not without fighting another battle with the nonproliferationists over the question of reprocessing.

As the deal approached its penultimate but actually most decisive stage — the NSG — the nonproliferationists hoped to try their luck one last time. There is, in American football, a move known as a Hail Mary pass, a play so desperate and foolhardy that it is attempted only at the end of the game in order to score a few extra points. What we saw at the NSG and in the run-up to last week’s meeting in Vienna was the diplomatic equivalent of a Hail Mary pass. But it is one in which the Americans seem to have lost control over the ball. Whatever Washington’s internal view or assessment, it was impolitic for Ambassador David C. Mulford publicly and repeatedly to say the waiver would not be “unconditional.” Did you say conditions, sir? Well, we’ve got plenty! New Zealand’s disarmament minister said on Tuesday that NSG states have proposed around 50 amendments. What unfolded in Vienna was not some Machiavellian plot. The script for this farce was in the DNA of the deal.

The pursuit of immediate foreign policy and military payoffs by America over the past three years has made the nuclear deal so suspect in India that future governments will find it politically difficult if not impossible to meet U.S. expectations on a number of fronts. Even so, the Americans are likely to try and exploit divisions within India in furtherance of their strategic agenda. But when it comes to its nonproliferation agenda, Washington will find there is little or no dissonance within the establishment. Dr. Kakodkar said on Monday that India would not be pushed around. It wanted nuclear cooperation, “but not at any cost.” He was speaking with full authority. The final whistle is about to be blown. If President Bush and his top advisers are not able to recover the ball quickly and honour the commitments made in J18, the deal is as good as over.

[harbans]

I've been pro-deal all along. But if NZ, Austria and a bunch of proliferationist nuke countries that i see include Netherlands tries and screws India's interests, i say MMS..TEST! AK can come back and supervise some MT thermonuke tests, neutron weapons tests and continue testing for a few months. No moratarium. Start bombing Kiyani's thugs along LOC and Nepal for allowing the Kosi breach to happen..occuppy militarily that part of Nepal and fix the breaches. Lets show some spunk. I'll be proud of MMS then for sure. Time may have come to fix the NPT where it belongs as far as India is concerned..in the dumps. You want India outta da tent..lets piss inside. Loudly with masive farts to go along..

[RajeshA]

I've been pro-deal all along. But if NZ, Austria and a bunch of proliferationist nuke countries that i see include Netherlands tries and screws India's interests, i say MMS..TEST! AK can come back and supervise some MT thermonuke tests, neutron weapons tests and continue testing for a few months. No moratarium. Start bombing Kiyani's thugs along LOC and Nepal for allowing the Kosi breach to happen..occuppy militarily that part of Nepal and fix the breaches. Lets show some spunk. I'll be proud of MMS then for sure. Time may have come to fix the NPT where it belongs as far as India is concerned..in the dumps. You want India outta da tent..lets piss inside. Loudly with masive farts to go along..

Well said, Harbans Ji,
Now I don't need to write the same thing.

Perhaps we should make a Monument at Pokhran III Site on which we embellish the words
This accomplishment would not have been possible without the significant contributions of:
a. Daryl Kimball
b. Henry Sokolski
c. Helen Clark
d. Phil Goff
e. Austrian Politicians
f. Swiss
g. Netherlands
h. Norway
i. Sweden
j. Denmark
k. Ireland
l. John Rood
m. Mulford (and his invitations to conditions)
and many more

[enqyoob]

Rajesh: Enjoy this one.

You have to read between the lines, because it's written by someone from Austria or Germany. What they say is that the Oiropeans started refusing export permission, and brought several items onto the watch list, AFTER 1989. But the Paki nuke program was "critical" before 1988. Among the companies mentioned as suppliers are Dutch and Austrian companies, among others. Probably Swiss ones too.

All guilty as sin.

[John Snow]

"The only way to get what you want in multi lateral fora is to hold to ransom everybody but not to reason" Spinster.

(Example who cares about Dolphins dieing when US Navy wants ultra ultra sound radars to detect enemy submarines. Who cares if glaciers of Iceland are melting because of GMC gass guzzling SUVs? You just hold the eco system to ransom and keep doing what you feel is best)

All we have to do is start up lignite and high ash content coal fired thermal plants, dig for local U and do our way and swadeshi way, in the short run once the global cost of doing the way we do is felt all scandenvian countries down under countries will come to grips automatically.

Its time to test some ICBMs so that Scandenivians can understand the power shortage in India.

[RajeshA]

Rajesh: Enjoy this one.

You have to read between the lines, because it's written by someone from Austria or Germany. What they say is that the Oiropeans started refusing export permission, and brought several items onto the watch list, AFTER 1989. But the Paki nuke program was "critical" before 1988. Among the companies mentioned as suppliers are Dutch and Austrian companies, among others. Probably Swiss ones too.

All guilty as sin.

Thanks Narayanan Ji. Will read.

[ramana]

RaviBg, Thanks for posting the SV article. It has lot to digest. Looks like MMS and co had many pressures and managed to pilot thorugh the minefield of US strategic and non-proliferation objectives which are one and same. Reading this article with the Ajoy Bose shows that there is some drastic plans in the offing in delhi. All the media re putting the same line. There is a suspecion about how Geelani did a Lazarus on teh Separatist movement.

There is lot riding on the deal for the US - strategic offshoring as the Commies and nationalist Muslims were saying. Looks like US figured out they backed the wrong horse by propping up TSP to play with. If they have so much riding why are they sabotaging the deal. Its a minor sop for what they will get eventually. A castrated eunuuch wont do you much good. Look at what happened to the Sultanates. All the Malik this and Malik that, they all perished.

I think Mulford has been the most undiplomatic Ambassador in the State Dept. He should be checked for the foot in the mouth disease when he comes back(play on the foot and mouth disease checks in US customs for returning travellers)

[enqyoob]

[url-http://oraclesyndicate.twoday.net/stories/4677486/]More on Austrian role in proliferation: [/url]

Q: Did you monitor the illegal trade in nuclear materials, weapons parts and technology in 1990's and which particular countries were involved in illegal proliferation?

A: Yes, I did. For me it was a voluntary mission and I worked under many covers in Europe and Asia. Since the beginning of 1992, following a meeting in Jerusalem's "King David Hotel" with a prominent Israeli and international nuclear expert, the late Shalheveth Freier, I performed many special tasks. The purpose of my mission was to penetrate organised crime and intelligence groups trading in nuclear materials, weapons parts and technology. Most of these products originated in Russia and in other states of the former USSR, some also from China.

In my work, I had contacts with several intelligence agencies but I was not employed by any of them. My work lasted until December 16, 1994. At this stage, the countries (or rather their intelligence services and various criminal groups) involved in the nuclear proliferation were mainly Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Baltic states (Latvia and Lithuania), and Kazakhstan. Chinese and Mongolian private groups traded in post-Soviet nuclear materials via Hong Kong.

The countries searching for nuclear materials, weapons and technology were (among other) Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea and some terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Palestinians from several political-military organisations (al Fatah, Abu Nidal Organisation) often served as intermediaries for Arab and other states. Chechen rebels, fighting against Russia and cooperating with the Russian and other mafias, were an important source of materials and weapons for al-Qaeda.

Several countries, including Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, as well as Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Israel were "transit" places for shipments of nuclear materials and products from Russia or other post-Soviet states to "end users" in other countries. Specialised laboratories in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, France and other states tested illegally imported nuclear products.

American, Australian, Canadian, and also Mexican businessmen or intelligence "front companies" participated in the illegal nuclear trade and in the proliferation of nuclear technology.

Q: Do you know anything about the nuclear purchases made by Pakistan in the past?

A: Yes, I think I could trace some purchases of nuclear materials and products by Pakistan from Russia on black market. In fact, there was no other way to get them. Saudi Arabia and Brunei financed some of these transactions. I remember a shipment of special nuclear products from Russia to Austria in late 1992, which went to Pakistan then. It was perfectly organised from both sides -- the seller and the buyer.

The products were shipped by Russian military plane, delivered to a Russian diplomatic mission, inspected by experts and sold and shipped to the buyer. The end user was Pakistan but the products went there through a third party. No Pakistani officials or other people took part in the transaction carried out in Austria, near Vienna. Money was paid through banks, not in cash. But there were also cash-goods exchanges in Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg and Liechtenstein.

[Arun_S]

Thanks RaviBg.
I would like to highlight some other parts that are important:
The American dilemma at the NSG

The American dilemma at the NSG

Siddharth Varadarajan
... .... .. .
But details do matter and they did prove devilishly difficult. The game in Washington was still a very tightly held one because Dr. Rice knew so dramatic a policy change might not survive the pushes and pulls that came with the full inter-agency process. Though nonproliferation specialists were kept on the periphery of the drafting process, a generalist like Nicholas Burns knew enough of U.S. policies to try and strive for some tactical icing on the strategic cake. The nuclear deal was premised on Indian nuclear weapons not being seen as a threat (and perhaps even as an asset) by Washington as far as the global balance of power was concerned. But this was so only as long as the Indian weapons programme did not become too ambitious.

Read no light weight credible TN. Least of the kind that enable a reach that is real deterrent to it. Thus it has to centrally focus on:
1. prevent credible test/validity of Indian TN.
2. dismantle to bare sustenance level the people and facilities. Achieved by PM MMS cutting down the DAE budget, and separation of reactors, labs and people. No money to rebuild what is lost to civilian sector the Indian N wpn capability will be a setback and at best stay nascent.

Thus, Mr. Burns and his colleagues sought to make the nonproliferation agenda an essential part of the nuclear deal, even as the wider strategic partnership was designed to be the principal goal.

Mark the word "Essential element".

.... .. They also knew that some down payment on the foreign policy front might be necessary to guard against India’s tendency to act independently. But getting the balance right was never easy.

Cut India's independence, something it has preserved though its 60 years through thick and thin.


Each of the 3 sentences need to read independently. They all run counter to Indian ascend and independence, while at the same time preserving continued US global domination, at the expense of India. IOW "the condom".

All Indians need to together gather around Anil Kakodkar and others to defend Indian interest and Red Lines.

[enqyoob]

More - on the Swiss role in proliferating nuclear weapons:

another is about a spy scandal of some kind brewing over there in Germany and Switzerland which may in some part be tied to Sibel Edmonds' case. What's going on there? I guess, first of all, we'll save Dennis Hastert till later. First of all, tell us about this family in Germany.

Ryland: There's a family called the Tinner family. They are a Swiss family actually, a father and two sons. The father has been an associate of A.Q. Khan going back to the 1970s. He and his sons were one of the key suppliers to the A.Q. Khan network. A.Q. Khan is the "father of the 'Islamic bomb.'" He was the one who was running the nuclear program in Pakistan, and he was getting all of the hardware and technology from the nuclear black market to build the Pakistan bomb, and then he, or at least the network, began exporting the technology to Iran, Libya and various other places including North Korea.

Now, the Tinners were key suppliers of that network, and they were arrested when the A.Q. Khan network was officially exposed in 2004. The Tinners have been awaiting trial since 2004 – particularly one of the sons, Urs Tinner. So they've been awaiting trial since 2004 and the Swiss government has been trying to build a case so that they could prosecute the Tinners in court.

The U.S. government has been very reluctant to assist the Swiss. They had a lot of information about the Tinners' involvement in the Khan network, but they simply refused to even respond to requests for help from the Swiss attorney general. That was through 2006 and 2007, I think, but they eventually gave some limited assistance – but now there's this big scandal in Switzerland that was announced just two or three weeks ago that the Swiss government has destroyed all of the evidence in that case, so it looks as though that prosecution won't go ahead.

The executive branch of the Swiss government destroyed all 30,000 pages of evidence in that case, and they did that in secret – they didn't tell the parliament, or the court system or anything. There's a very strong suspicion that they did that at the request of the United States, and the suggestion is that the CIA has been actively been involved, working with the Tinners going back a number of years, and that the CIA was desperate that that information not become public.

Horton: I'm sorry. The CIA was helping these guys do their dirty work? Or these guys were stabbing the CIA in the back, Luke?

Ryland: Well, it's not entirely obvious. It might be the case that the Tinners were helping the Khan network, and then realized that the CIA was onto them, and then started working for the CIA to help expose some of the network. That's one hypothesis. Another hypothesis is that the CIA was just "running" these guys, and was aware of their involvement. In fact, according to some reasonable reports, the CIA paid the Tinners lots of money to be involved in this network. Now we don't really know why that's the case.

[harbans]

Rajesh Ji the epitaph on Pokhran III site is just appropriate. Let them wallow in their own puke. I think AK is disgusted. So is MMS. Time has come that India shows spunk including with the Pakis and Nepalese. MMS and SG better get out of their slumber. And leftists be damned..this is not their victory. Let that be clear too. This message should be clear and presented with clarity.

[Prem]

I've been pro-deal all along. But if NZ, Austria and a bunch of proliferationist nuke countries that i see include Netherlands tries and screws India's interests, i say MMS..TEST! AK can come back and supervise some MT thermonuke tests, neutron weapons tests and continue testing for a few months. No moratarium. Start bombing Kiyani's thugs along LOC and Nepal for allowing the Kosi breach to happen..occuppy militarily that part of Nepal and fix the breaches. Lets show some spunk. I'll be proud of MMS then for sure. Time may have come to fix the NPT where it belongs as far as India is concerned..in the dumps. You want India outta da tent..lets piss inside. Loudly with masive farts to go along..

Well said, Harbans Ji,
Now I don't need to write the same thing.

more[/b]

Ram Ram bhaui, phir log kya Kahenge?
These decisions are best to be taken after black September.

[ramana]

Prem. All these articles are to ensure there is no black September.

[RajeshA]

More - on the Swiss role in proliferating nuclear weapons:

Narayanan Ji,

Thanks for these pearls. I did read about the Swiss case lately. However somehow I don't buy this. US keeps saying they would want to get their hands on A.Q. Khan and interrogate him. Would they want Swiss to destroy evidence relating to his dealings. Either the 30,000 Documents were transferred to CIA, or they were really destroyed because CIA was complicit in those dealings.

[Prem]

Pem. All these articles are to ensure there is no black September.

WEST still dont understand Indoo soul and they keep under estimating old SDRE politicians who being born and brought up in complexties of all kinds are always at ease with all sorts of problem , never in rush. I am quite positive about NSG shenanigans being all cosmetic. Just like in marriage event in India in which everyone from relative to Naukar gets the shagun/nauga same was emulated in Vien.
Zoolanders etc wil be put to Z~~~~s if they are acting separately from Uncle. Otherwise Indians walk out with smile on face and choicest Punjabi epithets in their heart.

[nkumar]

Does anyone still have any doubt about the real intentions and goal behind this deal after reading the articles of SV and Ajay Bose! There is very little 'bijlee' or 'energy security' (its been a long time since I last heard about this term!). Unkil has game theorized India very well. Good use of saam, daam, dand, bhed, chhal, kapat . It is doing all to restrict the entry of an entrant into an incumbent club. We need to stop thinking like pygmies and be more ambitious. I say test the nukes to make them sophisticated, test ICBMs to reach anywhere, result will be that India will be engaged very closely (and get more respect as a bonus). It is of no use to discuss who proliferated what, that is useful when we know that judges and jury are impartial. We need to become judges rather than trying to impress the jury with reason (and cry like a child).

[enqyoob]

You r probably right. The key is

US keeps saying they would want to get their hands on A.Q. Khan and interrogate him.

But they have absolutely no intention of doing so, and if they "get their hands on him" it would be only to keep him from falling into, say, Russian hands, by silencing him. Anyway I don't see what is this 300,000,000,000 pages of evidence. All it takes is one letter, authenticated, hey?

[ramana]

Yes Uncle wants to do all that and maybe more. But India too wants to do something- get out of the mistake of 1968 when the NPT came into effect. The very same articles show how much India tried and succeeded. Yes there were tactical setbacks like Hyde. But now US is stuck with Hyde and nothing to show if India walks out. So MMS and co have give it a good try. Lets see how it turns out.

[RajeshA]

You r probably right. The key is

US keeps saying they would want to get their hands on A.Q. Khan and interrogate him.

But they have absolutely no intention of doing so, and if they "get their hands on him" it would be only to keep him from falling into, say, Russian hands, by silencing him. Anyway I don't see what is this 300,000,000,000 pages of evidence. All it takes is one letter, authenticated, hey?

Well sometimes there can be paper trails, one document pointing to the other, the content in one document implying the existence of some other document. It could be: if you can't find the concerned document, then burn down the library or format the whole hard drive thing.

I found the Détente section in your Makhan Factory very interesting. Showed AQ could manipulate people in the West quite well.

[RajeshA]

Arrrey, Austrian Chhokarriya ne muskuraa diya naa, yani Ikraar hai

NSG: Austria hints at softening stand by Sachin Parashar: TOI

"Austria fully understands the importance of the Indo-US nuclear deal and India's right to produce energy from whatever sources it desires. We want India to meet its objectives. As for the NSG meet, we want the group to achieve a result that would be a net gain and we are confident that it will happen," said spokesperson Peter Launsky in reply to queries mailed to foreign minister Ursula Plassnik.

What is the need to clutch at straws? Earlier the press was saying Swiss willing to support India. Pakka, Babu.

[ramana]

The Tinner documents one copy is with the US. The one with the Swiss is the destroyed one as it has design details of stuff they shouldnt know. Its all in the TSP prolif thread. Should read more threads.

[RajeshA]

India waiting for new NSG draft: Hindu

New Delhi: Indian officials are still waiting for the United States to send across a new draft of the proposal seeking an exemption for India from the export guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

On Monday, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon held one round of talks with U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs William Burns in Washington. Mr. Menon is in the U.S. on a private visit — his son is getting married in Seattle — and he will be back at work on September 4. But the formulation of the new draft is being handled solely by the American side and Indian officials say they hope the text is shared with them well before the next NSG plenary, scheduled for September 4-5.

Working back from those dates, NSG members would ideally like to receive the final draft for consideration at least a week before the meeting. The less time there is for the process of internal review in NSG capitals, the greater is the possibility that the waiver might not be approved in the second meeting either. But if the draft is to be ready for circulation by Friday, that leaves less than 24 hours for India to react to the American draft, assuming it is shared with New Delhi expeditiously.

Asked about various formulations doing the rounds on the consequences of testing and other issues, Indian officials said they were not going to react to “trial balloons” being floated from Washington and that there was yet no draft proposal to react to.

India, say senior officials, has made its position on the kind of waiver that is needed clear.

[RajeshA]

The Tinner documents one copy is with the US. The one with the Swiss is the destroyed one as it has design details of stuff they shouldnt know. Its all in the TSP prolif thread. Should read more threads.

I feel Saar is speaking to me. Thanks Ramana Ji.

[svinayak]

The second reason is marginal because the conditions are not for commercial benefit but for strategic objectives.

MMS will emerge taller if he walks out for it says to the nation I have protected the national interests. Off course business "leaders' will get outtheir knives but it wont matter. He can contest and win in nay constituency after the walkout. Maybe even in Singur.

Ajoy Bose is a NDC alumus and not the average DDM.

Sucker punch in polite terms.

Has uncle achieved anything with the US China relationship. It has been able to get cooperation after US endorsed the Olympics.

But the Nuke deal time line gave Uncle enough time to leverage cooperation with China in Asia and reduce support of China to Pakistan.

[svinayak]

Clearly, some within the international community are not yet ready to accept a world order in which those of an ethnicity different from themselves be given the same privileges as they themselves enjoy. Unless of course that country be China, which is not only responsible for making North Korea and Pakistan nuclear powers, but which is fawned on by all the countries now opposing India at the NSG.

China is the pivot for asia and the balance of power for India. Indian elite is unable to understand this.

[G Subramaniam]

What the white nations do not realise is that, they can only delay, they can never stop
indian nukes, missiles etc

Unlike the islamic world, there are plenty of intelligent indians who can design any stuff

In the US math olympiad 2008 team, out of 6, there are 2 Indians

[G Subramaniam]

Western nations denuking themselves a-la South Africa by 2050 ?

By 2040, Whites will be a minority in the US
In France, muslims will be 30%

I bet the white elite will denuke than let their nukes fall into the hands of 'undesirables'

[yogi]

I say that India should clearly convey to Switzerland and other European countries, that it will side with Russia on the issue with Georgia. Time to move over asking for bheekh and flex some muscles.

[NRao]

India should not take sides. With the largest middle class in the world there is no need to do so. Nokia needs India.

However, it is imperative that India make all these clubs inconsequential ASAP - and they can do it.

India should give up chai-biscut attitude, and of course corruption, which is actually shooting India in her foot. I think India needs to become self sufficient in most respects - a self sustaining nation.

IF she can do that and the earlier that can happen will help all these arm twisting, etc not worth even thinking about.

The rest will be about to ensure it will not happen.

[Y. Kanan]

I'm a noob when it comes to the subject of our ongoing nuke deal with the US. So please forgive what may be a stupid question.

Why didn't we do a nuke deal with Russia, instead?

When it comes to nuclear energy, what's the advantage of going with the US instead of Russia? Indeed, IS there any technical reason for this?

[enqyoob]

Simple answer AFAIK is that Unkil Amirkhan is running a Protection Racket. US is (has been?) in a position to squeeze the Russians who were starving (literally) with promises of hard cash for space and nuclear cooperation. Thus Russian weapon uranium was being ground down and sold for a song to the US, while the uranium price kept rising on the free market. Likewise, the Russian space program's survival depended on NASA $$ based on the ISS. Similarly, Club membership in G-8 , etc. etc.

All these were subject to squeeze if Russia did nuke cooperation beyond certain limits. So, over time, Russian willingness to supply reactors, then fuel, to India, became weaker and weaker, especially with a drunken turd like Boris Y. running the show.

So, the NSG was ganged up to prevent Russia and France from giving India what the US was not willing to give.

This IMO is the reason why even now India bleats that India won't do anything under the IAEA agreement (which basically says that it's fine to trade with India) unless blessed by both the NSG and the COTUS.

This is of course ludicrous - that Russia and France have to wait for the COTUS to say it's OK to deal with India - but that was the reality - maybe until Aug. 11, 2008 when Georgian Yahya set out on his grand conquest.

With the run-up in energy prices the Russian economy has improved, and meanwhile the speculation on uranium prices has burst and the price, which shot from $10 to $123 per whatever unit, is now down to $60. Russia is anyway facing "expulsion" from the G-8, and has cut off its ties to NATO, so the pretences are largely all shattered. Russia is talking about installing sophisticated radar and air defense systems in Syria and maybe Cuba... (and maybe Venezuela?) and may be in a position to support Iranian threats to block the Straits of Hormuz if they are attacked, cutting off 1/3 of world oil supply.

So I doubt if any of these things hold any more. But basically, it's bad news to make deals with Russia because the US and the Protection Racket will sabotage it.

Just the realities of doing business without p***ing off the town mafia...

(and here some people are having orgasms about UNSC VETO )

[Gerard]

Why didn't we do a nuke deal with Russia, instead?

Because Russia is a member of the NSG and upholds the full scope safeguards rule. The NSG (and thus Russia) will not sell fuel or reactors to India unless it accepts safeguards on all nuclear facilities everywhere in India. This would mean the end of the nuclear weapons programme in India. The proposed NSG waiver would exempt India from this requirement for full scope safeguards.

Bear in mind that the FSS rule was aimed at the 3 non state parties to the NPT (India, Israel and Pakistan). The NNWS parties to the NPT are already under full scope.
Israel has just one reactor and that is military. It has no civilian nuclear power programme.
Pakistan is a beggar nation and cannot afford to buy reactors.
So FSS was really aimed at hobbling India. Russia obviously knew this when it joined the NSG.