Islamabad Ghabla:
This is my theory:
1) Headley divulged the details linking ISI to Mumbai 26/11.
2) USA did not want that Pakistani Army is put on the spot as a sponsor of terrorism. It disturbs the illusion that the Pakistani Army is an ally in the war on terror and not the terrorist, even though all sides know the truth about the terrorist army.
3) In India there was some information in the public domain - that the perpetrators, the masterminds were Hafiz Saeed, Lakhvi, etc. - the L-e-T.
4) Talking about Pakistan-sponsored Terror with Pakistan, is not MMS strong suit. He would rather simply wish it away with some pappi-japhi. But regardless of how much he tries, reality is reality and he has to talk 'terror'. His has accepted it as his maximum brief to get a few named terrorists to be brought to court in Pakistan and sentenced. Even this is something that the Pakistanis are not willing to yield on.
5) So when Headley started singing and told about ISI links, MMS and USA came to an understanding, that the ISI link would be used to pressure the the Pakistani Establishment to bring Hafiz Saeed to court but not to stamp Pakistan as a State sponsor of Terrorism. If the Pakis go after Hafiz Saeed, India would stay her hand, keep it under wraps, and not confront Pakistan with the evidence against ISI.
6) Most probably some in the government, like Chidambaram were not happy with this course of action. Chidambaram wanted to nail Pakistan publicly. Any court process against Hafiz Saeed and some years of house arrest with all sorts of biryani and kabap, would hardly have been a satisfactory. MMS wanted to remain in the good books of Obama Administration, to keep his dialog with Pakistan on track and at the same to get the laurels for getting Hafiz Saeed 'behind bars', the Indian public acknowledging that MMS could get things done and he had chosen the right approach to dealing with Pakistan, a superior approach to those suggested by jingoes.
7) Chidambaram threw a spanner in the works. He asked Mr. G.K. Pillai to go public with what we had gathered from Headley.
8 ) Minister of External Affairs, Mr. S.M. Krishna went to Pakistan as MMS's man to work on this deal. S.M. Qureishi told him, that they could think of such a deal, but the agreement with MMS on reaching some comprehensive deal had to speeded up. That is why he wanted to talk about the other issues as well, about Kashmir, about water. If the Paki Establishment were to book Hafiz Saeed, they wanted an understanding on the whole gamut of issues. MMS could not afford to rush through with this agenda, especially as there were no results to show for in terms of Mumbai 26/11 investigation from Pakistan as yet. For Pakistan, it was not sufficient that MMS was offering them to spare the Pakistanis the ignominy of being accused of being State sponsors of Terrorism. The Pakistanis misjudged that it was not a big thing if they were being accused of this. India has done that many times before. They were probably not taking the Headley evidence that seriously. They saw that MMS was willing to relent and to strike a deal, so they thought, it would be the right time to push him on the comprehensive deal.
9) Chidambaram was aware of the going ons. He had to stop MMS from reaching a deal, be it a partial deal between India and Pakistan on Hafiz Saeed for Indian silence of ISI complicity, or some grand understanding, with India giving even more concessions, just so MMS can show India some progress on Hafiz Saeed case. So both things were crucial - the ISI complicity exposé as well as the timing of this exposé. Had S.M. Krishna struck some deal with Qureishi (Pakistan Establishment) and had he come home with that agreement, it would have been a done deal. The Cabinet would have had to go along, as it would have been sold in the Cabinet as forwards movement by the Pakistanis.
10) Mr. G.K. Pillai's exposé undid all the grand plans MMS had as well the hopes Qureishi had of getting something from India. Everything was now in the open.
11) Americans were unhappy. It went against their understanding with India on the tactics of handing Pakistan and perhaps also against FBI's terms of interrogation of Headley by NIA. Their speaker has already spoken about each side sticking to their 'responsibility', etc.
12) Chidambaram knew he was risking American cooperation on Headley, but he reckoned that it was better to be bold right now.
13) S.M. Krishna and Qureishi were both mad at the revelations. The deal had fallen apart. India had nothing more to give the Pakistanis. It was out in the open - that ISI was complicit in the Mumbai Terror Attacks - actually an Act of War. As the anger was mutual against Mr. G.K. Pillai, Krishna also felt no need to come to the defense of his colleague at the press conference.
14) Later on MMS and Krishna tried to save their skins, claiming that the only unfortunate thing was the timing of the revelation by Mr. G.K. Pillai, and not the contents of the revelation, as the timing became a hindrance in coming to some agreement with the Pakistanis. That is just a half-truth of course.
15) S.M. Krishna met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Kabul, all very
Sharm, Sharm! Hillary Clinton probably thought, what a pile of shit.
16) Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao has been saying, that the dialog with Pakistan has not come to an end, and it will continue. This lady may or may not understand, that everything has changed. Now Pakistan stands accused of Terrorism. One cannot turn back the clock! But she still wants to give her boss some hope!
17) Basically Mr. Chidambaram and Mr. G.K. Pillai did a great service to India. It will be interesting to see how it all plays out in the GoI.
amit wrote:Rajesh,
Very good analysis.
But one thing doesn't add up. And that is the NSA's comment in between the Islamabad fiasco and Krishna's stupid comments about Pillai ji.
If we assume that the NSA is in the MMS Pappi Jhappi camp then why would he make those remarks which, if you look at it, went even further than Pillai ji's comments?
Was Krishna's remarks aimed assuaging the US more than the Pacquis after the meeting with Hillary bahen in Kabul?
PS: My personal opinion is that Krishna's interview to IBN blows a hole in the hypothesis that the whole thing was well-orchestrated. It still could be so as some are saying but we've got to wait and see.
The NSA knows that the cat is out of the bag. Any criticism of Mr. Pillai would be suicidal for MMS, were it to come out, what the whole deal was. So it is better to come out in full support of Mr. Pillai and some anti-Pakistan rhetoric right now, as the talks were already dead anyway.
Krishna is harping on spilled milk and trying to justify his initial reaction in Islamabad, that it is all about the timing and nothing more. Probably also trying to downplay the whole thing.
amit wrote:RajeshA wrote:The NSA knows that the cat is out of the bag. Any criticism of Mr. Pillai would be suicidal for MMS, were it to come out, what the whole deal was. So it is better to come out in full support of Mr. Pillai and some anti-Pakistan rhetoric right now, as the talks were already dead anyway.
Krishna is harping on spilled milk and trying to justify his initial reaction in Islamabad, that it is all about the timing and nothing more. Probably also trying to downplay the whole thing.
Boss,
Again you could be right. But that would suggest that Krishna was acting on his own during this stupid interview. Does he have that kind of spunk or is he incredibly stupid?
Somehow the dots don't add up.
Well actually Krishna was made to feel very stupid in Islamabad. MMS sent Krishna there to hammer out a deal on the lines of
Hafiz Saeed for
Silence on ISI complicity. Instead his negotiating position is undercut by the revelations from Mr. G.K. Pillai. Now Krishna was not acting on his own. He was given his brief by MMS.
However after G.K. Pillai made his revelation, NSA tried to save his boss, MMS, by coming in favor of a hard line with Pakistan, but in Islamabad, it was Krishna who was publicly putting out his head out of the window. Now Krishna can't really admit that it was all MMS's idea. Otherwise Krishna loses his standing as an independent minded External Affairs Minister. Qureishi already hinted at that with Krishna getting his orders from Delhi.
So Krishna has to fend for himself now, so he is harping on the timing of the revelations, as being the reason, which undercut his negotiating position. MMS can't really come to the defense of his own man, the man he sent to Islamabad to do his dirty work!
The crux of the matter is that MMS wanted to bury the evidence of Pakistan's complicity in Mumbai 26/11 in exchange for selling some address change for Hafiz Saeed within Pakistan as a victory for India and a peace agreement with Pakistan. He thought he could carry the Home Ministry with him, but Chidambaram refused to play ball.
Somehow it reminds me of the last season of 24.
MMS needs to be questioned on this by the Indian Parliament and a no-confidence motion should be brought against him, if it proves to be true. This is
gaddari!
Satyamev Jayate!