Bharat Rakshak

Lin Fengjun, a professor of International Relations at Peking University, told the Global Times, "In the competition between China and India, Japan is likely to become India's natural ally. Japan is also aware of India's growth. An Indo-Japanese strong trade partnership also creates the possibility of security cooperation between the two countries."

Data shows that from 2008 to 2009, Japanese investment in India reached 809 billion yen ($8.84 billion), while its investment in China was 679 billion yen ($7.42 billion).

According to a poll by the Indian foreign ministry, more than 94 percent of Indian people support Japan's investment in their country.

sum wrote:

And with good reason — this is the first time that Japanese investments in India have exceeded investments in China.

Wow....Japanese seem to be hedging their bets despite all the Japs-Chini bhai bhai theme lately.

Long used to practising passive, cheque-book diplomacy, Tokyo now seems intent on influencing Asia’s power balance. A series of subtle moves has signalled Japan’s aim to break out of its post-war pacifist cocoon. One sign is the emphasis on defence modernisation. Japan’s navy, except in the nuclear sphere, is already the most sophisticated and powerful in Asia. China’s rise has prompted Japan to strengthen its military alliance with the U.S. But in the long run, Japan is likely to move to a more independent security posture.

The Indo-Japanese security agreement, signed when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Tokyo in October 2008, was modelled on the March 2007 Australia-Japan defence accord. Now the Indo-Japanese security agreement has spawned a similar Indo-Australian accord, signed when Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd came to New Delhi last month. As a result, the structure and even large parts of the content of the three security agreements — between Japan and Australia, India and Japan, and India and Australia — are alike.

Actually, all three are in the form of a joint declaration on security cooperation. And all of them, while recognising a common commitment to democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, obligate their signatories to work together to build not just bilateral defence cooperation, but also security in Asia. They are designed as agreements to enhance mutual security between equals. By contrast, the U.S.-India defence agreement, with its emphasis on arms sales, force interoperability and intelligence sharing — elements not found is Australia-Japan, India-Japan and India-Australia accords — is aimed more at undergirding U.S. interests.

India and Japan, for example, must co-develop defence systems. India and Japan have missile-defence cooperation with Israel and the U.S., respectively. There is no reason why they should not work together on missile defence and on other technologies for mutual defence. There is no ban on weapon exports in Japan’s U.S.-imposed Constitution, only a long-standing Cabinet decision. That ban has been loosened, with Tokyo in recent years inserting elasticity to export weapons for peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism and anti-piracy. The original Cabinet decision, in any event, relates to weapons, not technologies.

As two legitimate aspirants to new permanent seats at the U.N. Security Council, India and Japan should work together to persuade existing veto holders to allow the Council’s long-pending reform. They must try to convince China in particular that Asian peace and stability would be better served if all three major powers in Asia are in the Council as permanent members. Never before have China, Japan and India all been strong at the same time. Today, they need to find ways to reconcile their interests in Asia so that they can coexist peacefully and prosper.

The joint statement, which came at the end of the annual bilateral summit, expressed satisfaction at the deepening of the annual strategic dialogue between the Foreign Ministers as well as other policy dialogues and the desire to enhance exchanges in the defence field.

Strengthening of collaboration on issues of common strategic interest; setting up of a strategic cooperation mechanism; increase in defence and coast guard cooperation, exchange of information to fight terrorism and other transnational crimes; cooperation at the U.N.; and cooperation on disarmament and non-proliferation were some of the areas earmarked for enhanced collaboration.

On the defence front, the action plan visualises regular meetings between the Defence Ministers, annual official- level defence policy dialogue, annual military-to-military talks, regular reciprocal visits of the Service chiefs and ground-to-ground staff talks, Navy-to-Navy staff talks, and developing an annual calendar of defence cooperation and exchanges.

In his statement, Mr. Hatoyama mentioned that the two sides discussed cooperation in defence of sea lanes of communication.

The action plan also includes joint exercise and meeting between the Coast Guards of both nations.

Both nations will hold annual bilateral exercise alternately off India and Japan, and if possible hold multi-lateral cooperation too. The Malabar 2007 exercise involves five navies — India, Japan, the United States, Australia and Singapore. The plan also envisages participation as observers in major army and air force exercises and passing exercises during ship visits.

Official sources said the proposal was under discussion and the Railway Ministry was exploring the possibilities of introducing superfast trains on certain routes like Mumbai-Ahmedabad and Delhi-Chandigarh sectors.

India and Japan also decided to work out all logistical and funding issues related to the western Dedicated Rail Freight Corridor with an aim of implementing its first phase next year.

The main loan amount for the 900-km-long first phase of the project from Rewari in Haryana and Vadodara in Gujarat is Rs 17,700 crore, mainly from Japan. “Both sides will strive for early finalisation of a funding and implementation schedule for the whole western corridor (that covers a distance of 1,483 km from Jawaharlal Nehru Terminal in Mumbai to Tughlakabad in Delhi via Maharashtra, Haryana, Rajasthan and Gujarat.)

Tokyo and Washington are contemplating Japanese participation in a multinational project to develop the F-35 stealth fighter, sources in both governments said Tuesday.

The move is intended to clear the way for Japan to adopt the F-35 as its mainstay fighter jet, because countries not participating in the project won't be allowed to acquire it at an early date.

Japan has also studied other planes, such as the F/A-18 and F-15FX produced by the U.S., and the Eurofighter, produced by a consortium of European manufacturers.

. . . high-level officials from India and Japan are likely to meet in the second week of January to take forward negotiations on inking a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA).

Officials in the Commerce Ministry said here on Wednesday that negotiators would work on narrowing gaps in services and pharmaceuticals — areas of interest to India. However, Japan has several apprehensions about opening these sectors. The Indian pharmaceutical industry, which gets 45 per cent of its $20-billion revenue from exports, is seeking market access in Japan that has a tough control regime for drug imports. Japan is also apprehensive about giving access to Indian professionals in services, which contribute about 55 per cent to the Indian economy.

The talks for opening up of markets were launched in 2007 and officials on both sides have completed 12 rounds of talks.

Dr. Singh and Mr. Hatoyama had instructed their officials on Tuesday to sort out the issues in the way of the CEPA. According to Indian official figures, the two-way trade for 2008-09 stood at $10.6 billion, with imports accounting for $7.6 billion.

MONDAY, JANUARY 04, 2010
The unrealistic DPJ?
http://www.observingjapan.com/

In the Wall Street Journal, Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini recently warned of the dangers of the Hatoyama government's "unrealistic" policies and advising Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio to follow Barack Obama's lead.

Hatoyama, they tell us, needs to face up to reality. He "needs to become 'Hatobama,' a pragmatist ready to disappoint ideological allies and assuage centrist fears of a policy agenda his country simply can't afford."

They knock Hatoyama and the DPJ for "ambitious" and "contradictory" promises, repeat unquestioningly the Washington line that the DPJ risks undermining the US-Japan alliance (more on this in a moment), and finally worry that the DPJ is too strong, too unhindered and therefore could run up Japan's debt without triggering growth, producing an "an unnecessarily turbulent 2010." Hatoyama needs to become less ideological and more willing to compromise, like Obama.

The central premise of this op-ed is that if Japan struggles, it is because of the unthinking ideology of the DPJ and not because of the intractable problems that years of misrule by the LDP left for the DPJ to solve. There are several critical gaps, however, in this op-ed.

First, aside from suggesting that Hatoyama become more willing to "assuage centrist fears" — whatever those are — they offer few indications as to what the Hatoyama government should be doing. What, if anything, should the government scale back? What should it be doing instead? Japan's national debt is obviously a problem, but, on the other hand, given that the government has managed to run up the national debt to such considerable heights without facing disaster, it seems that Japan is in uncharted waters when it comes to the its debt-GDP ratio.

Second, and related to this last point, Bremmer and Roubini are vague about the consequences of the Hatoyama government's policies. "Unnecessarily turbulent?" What does that mean in real-world terms? More importantly, how much more turbulent could it get compared to 2008-2009? Alternatively, might not turbulence simply be the natural by-product of an electoral victory that even these authors recognize as "historic."

Masaru wrote:Japan mulls selling India nuclear power technology

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on Tuesday offered to consider selling nuclear power technology to India, but called on New Delhi to sign the nuclear test-ban treaty.

Energy-starved India is interested in wooing Japan's thriving nuclear power industry, but Tokyo has so far not allowed Japanese companies to do business in nuclear reactors and fuels until New Delhi agrees to stop conducting nuclear tests.

Sanjay M wrote:
What about India wooing Korean nuclear power companies as an alternative?

http://www.economist.com/businessfinanc ... extfeature

Under action plans agreed to by both leaders, Japan and India will hold regular vice ministerial-level dialogues on foreign policy and defense matters, as well as maritime security dialogues to safeguard the passage of commercial ships in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. Hatoyama and Mr. Singh agreed to speed up talks on concluding an economic partnership agreement and to realize at an early date a project to build a freight railway between New Delhi and Mumbai. Improvement in India's infrastructure will benefit not only India but also Japanese companies engaged in economic activities in the country.

Buddhism teaches us from the starting point of how human beings should be, their state of mind and way of life

Mr. Okada told reporters that he reiterated his government's pledge to reach a decision on relocation of Futenma by May. He said Tokyo would determine the future of the air station in a way that would have "minimal impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance."

“We look to our Japanese allies and friends to follow through on their commitments”

SwamyG wrote: The Chinese and Japan continue to meet. The Chinese Vice President, Hi, says Hatoyama should visit China in 2010. Source Hi had visited several Asian countries in December, and had met the Japanese Emperor too. So you ask what is the big deal? Well Ichiro Ozawa actually forced Emperor Akihito to give an exceptional audience to Xi by passing some protocols.

Scratching each others backs is wonderful.

The French newspaper Le Figaro reported from Tokyo last Wednesday that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had delivered to the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) the script of a spectacular reconciliation this year between the two countries. The report said the CCP had proposed that Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama begin the process by going to Nanjing, where a mass killing of Chinese civilians by the Japanese Imperial Army took place in December 1937 and subsequent months.

This first visit to Nanjing by a Japanese prime minister since the war would present to the Chinese people Tokyo's official apologies without ambiguity, easing lingering anti-Japan sentiment among the Chinese public. In return, some months later, on August 15, the anniversary of the Japanese surrender in 1945, Chinese President Hu Jintao would go to Hiroshima, the first city to experience atomic bombing, and declare the three non-nuclear principles: China will not make a nuclear first strike, will not attack any non-nuclear country and will not export nuclear arms.

China seems to have refrained from using the Japan historic card to control its own people since 1996, when then-prime minister Shinzo Abe chose Beijing for his first overseas visit out of a desire to strengthen ties with the leaders of Japan's important neighbor. Historically, the CCP's one-party regime has been legitimized, in part, by its struggle against the Japanese invader.Though KMT did all the fighting when Mao was hiding in the mountains

There are conflicting views among Japanese experts. Some say that in preparation for a succession of power in 2012 and beyond, Beijing's secret battles are intensifying. A faction of ex-president Jiang Zemin, who annoyed Japanese leaders by bringing up the history issue during a banquet with the emperor, has been gaining ground recently. Others believe Beijing wants to settle historic issues once and for all, to enable the two nations to build a future-oriented relationship of mutual trust.

Prime Minister Hatoyama will likely continue his promised efforts to "rebalance" Japanese relations with the US and China, but now that he's actually responsible for governing, Mr Hatoyama needs to ask himself: Which country would ultimately keep the Japanese people's best interests at heart - democratic America or authoritarian China? If the prime minister answers the latter, then the Japanese public - and the Obama administration - really will need to start worrying.

Katsuya Okada said during a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi on Sunday in Tokyo that if China violates an agreement signed in 2008 governing the development of oil and gas field in East China Sea, "Japan will have to take certain action", the AFP reported.

In response, Yang emphasized that "the sovereign rights of Chunxiao oil and gas field belong to China", according to Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu.

Apart from gaining the trust of its neighbours, the push is also aimed at gaining some political mileage at home. The ruling DPJ is eyeing next summer's Upper House election as well as nationwide local-level elections in 2011 as an opportunity to drive a wedge between the LDP and its ally New Komeito, which is clearly supportive of granting voting rights to foreign residents. If the bill passes through the Diet and becomes law, Japan will join the ranks of 38 countries - including many EU nations, the United States and South Korea, which currently allow local-level voting rights to foreign residents. It will also help Japan do away with some of the historical problems which have been lingering since the colonial period.

Japan is in many respects beginning to travel down the road taken by Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. With the end of the Cold War, the European Union both quickened its pace of regional integration and yearned for more autonomy from Washington. Germany and France even led the charge against the Iraq war in 2003, and the trans-Atlantic alliance emerged the stronger for it. Europe no longer grumbles about the excesses of U.S. power. And the United States enjoys the benefits of a more independent and capable Europe that is shouldering a heavy burden in Afghanistan, leading the effort to curb climate change, and helping to stabilize the global economy.

Japan needs to similarly update its alliance with the United States, getting a measure of distance from Washington, but ultimately making the partnership stronger and more mature. Japan has the potential to be a regional leader on peacekeeping, foreign aid and clean energy technology.

As Japan deepens its bilateral relationship with China, the two countries may finally have the opportunity to replicate the kind of rapprochement achieved by France and Germany after World War II. In the same way that Europeans built a self-sustaining regional peace, Japan should capitalize on the stability afforded by its alliance with the U.S. to make a push for Sino-Japanese reconciliation and regional integration.

A more assertive and independent Japan promises to do much more for East Asia and the United States than a Japan that defers to Washington. It is past time for Washington and Tokyo to bring the alliance into the 21st century.

S&P yesterday lowered the outlook on Japan’s AA sovereign credit rating to “negative” because of diminishing “flexibility” to cope with the world’s largest public debt and concern about the lack of a plan to rein in budget deficits.

The rise apparently reflected the economic slump as the number of monthly suicides topped 3,000 from March to May in line with the tendency of people with economic problems to commit suicide around the time a business year ends. Most Japanese companies close books on March 31.

Major foreign media outlets are leaving Japan in droves, a sign of financial difficulties at home as the news industry struggles with falling advertising revenue. But observers note that Japan is also losing its appeal as the most newsworthy country in Asia, with China now the hot spot.

In many ways, Toyota is symptomatic of a nation that has lost its way. According to a 2008 Pew survey, Japanese were more dissatisfied with the direction of their country than almost any other nation, including Pakistan and Russia.

Toyota's fall from grace caps a 20-year economic malaise that is infecting the popular culture, manifesting itself in a preference for staying home, avoiding risk, and removing oneself from the hierarchical system.

Low birth rates and out-migration patterns mean the country's population is predicted to fall from 127 million to 95 million by 2050, creating unparalleled demographic pressures. A shrinking, bargain-hunting, risk-averse population translates into a deflationary spiral, low wage growth, and decreased tax revenues. Japan's debt is now more than twice GDP, by far the highest rate of any industrialized nation.

DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa, the power behind the throne of the Hatoyama administration, recently led a delegation of 143 parliamentarians and hundreds of businessmen to Beijing, reviving in form if not substance the tributary delegations from China's neighbors that, in pre-modern times, ritually visited the Chinese court to acknowledge its suzerainty as Asia's "Middle Kingdom." Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, posed smilingly for photos with every one of them. When Xi Jinping, tipped to be Mr Hu’s successor, visited Tokyo shortly afterwards, he was rushed in to see the emperor – the usual requirement that 30 days notice be given for such a visit was waived.

Some western observers in Tokyo muse that perhaps Japan is once again following its historic policy of adapting to shifts in global politics by aligning itself with great powers. Before the first world war the country had a special relationship with Britain. In the inter-war period Japan allied itself with Germany. Since 1945, it has stuck closely to America. Perhaps the ground is being prepared for a new "special relationship" with China?

If Japan really is edging away from the United States to align itself with China today, that is a compelling indicator that the future belongs to Beijing, and that America's best days as the world's indispensable nation are behind it.

Yet this judgment is, if anything, premature -- and may simply be wrong. Imperial Britain, Nazi Germany, and America during the Cold War were actual or aspiring hegemons from outside Asia; Japan's alliance with each of them cemented its own role as Asia's dominant power. Japan was not aligning with each of these powers to bandwagon with them, subordinating its power and interests to theirs. It allied with these Western states to facilitate its own pursuit of national power and leadership in Asia. This is true even of Japan's Cold War alliance with the United States, when post-war leaders in Tokyo pursued a conscious strategy of developing Japan's economic and technological dynamism within the cocoon of American military protection.

Historically, Japan has shown a striking ability to rapidly transform itself in response to international conditions, as seen in the Meiji break from isolation, the rise to great power in the twentieth century, the descent into militarism, and renewal as a dynamic trading state. Since 2001, successive Japanese prime ministers have articulated unprecedented ambitions for Japanese grand strategy. These have included casting Japan as the "thought leader of Asia," forging new bilateral alliances with India and Australia, cooperating with these and other democratic powers in an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," formalizing security cooperation with NATO, constructing a Pacific community around an "inland sea" centered on Japan as the hub of the international economic and political order, and building a new East Asian community with Japan at its center. These developments reflect the churning domestic debate in Japan about its future as a world power and model for its region, trends catalyzed by China's explosive rise.

"China's positions on issues like arms sales to Taiwan, and Tibet, have been consistent and clear," Wang Baodong said, "as these issues bear on sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are close to Chinese core national interests." What Beijing means by this and similar phases asserting national integrity is that such interests are vital, cannot be compromised, and will be protected at all costs — by force if necessary.

...

A big question for some of China's neighbors, including Japan, India and Southeast Asia, is if and when Beijing will extend its list of core sovereignty interests to include claims to land territory that India says belongs to it, and to sea and island territory that Japan and some Southeast Asian countries say belongs to them. This is a major issue and the scale of the claims can be exacerbated by emotive nationalism. China's claims are linked to the maintenance or recovery of territory it says was taken by colonial powers when it was weak.

So far Beijing has described the territorial disputes with India, Japan and Southeast Asian countries as ones involving its "indisputable" or "inalienable" sovereignty. While not ready to compromise on the principle that the territory concerned rightfully belongs to China, it has remained open to talks and has not described the claims as "core" national interests.

However, Beijing has been reinforcing its presence, influence and strength in various ways in or close to these disputed zones. This has prompted some analysts to describe the strategy as "creeping assertiveness," in which China gradually assembles the sinews of power that could eventually be used to enforce its claims. The key point here is the definition of China's national unity. So far, this has not included territory disputed with India, Japan and Southeast Asia.

One part of the answer lies in keeping the U.S. engaged in Asia, its five Asia-Pacific alliances in good order, and broadening U.S.-India relations, including defense and security links. Another approach is to enmesh China not just in extensive trade, investment and other civilian ties with its Asian neighbors, but also in cooperative security arrangements.

India wants Japan to shun its apprehensions and join hands in the atomic energy sector. This would stimulate the Japanese economy as well as provide muscle to the bilateral strategic partnership, said former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, who was the Prime Minister's Special Envoy on Indo-U.S. nuclear issues.

“We see Japan as a strategic partner contributing to India's economic and social development. It is against this background that we must explore the prospects for civil nuclear energy cooperation,” Mr. Saran observed at a seminar on Indo-Japan cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear energy organised by the influential International Friendship Exchange Council (FEC) in Tokyo.

He then spelt out areas where both countries could cooperate — reprocessing, R&D and setting up nuclear plants. Japan has a closed fuel cycle in which it reprocesses spent fuel and has set up Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs). India too would reprocess spent fuel for second generation FBRs. “It would be worthwhile if we could engage in a collaborative effort [in FBRs],” Mr. Saran observed.

The other area for cooperation was reprocessing. Japan has been in reprocessing for 18 years while India recently signed a pact with the U.S. in the same sector. Mr. Saran wanted Japan to share its experience in this area which could also give its nuclear industry a major boost when the country is facing depression.

SwamyG wrote:. It can just get 'badder' as goods are not produced, investment falls, demand falls..... by now you should have a spiral bubble in your head. If not, you can read about Deflationary spiral and its effects. So now you see why Japan should be worried.

ramana wrote:Masaru, In history, only the Turks have shown the adaptability to change of the Japanese.

Some folks say the Japanese language has Turkic elements.

For much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, many linguists who studied Turkic, Mongolic, and Tungusic regarded them as members of a common Ural-Altaic family, together with Finno-Ugric and Samoyedic, based on such shared features as vowel harmony and agglutination. While the Ural-Altaic hypothesis can still be found in encyclopedias, atlases, and similar general reference works, it has not had any adherents in the linguistics community for decades. It has been characterized by Sergei Starostin as "an idea now completely discarded" (Starostin et al. 2003:8).

In 1857, the Austrian scholar Anton Boller suggested adding Japanese to Altaic or more precisely to Ural-Altaic (Miller 1986:34). For Korean, G.J. Ramstedt and E.D. Polivanov put forward additional etymologies in favor of its inclusion in the 1920s.

Poppe considered the issue of the relationship of Korean to Turkic-Mongolic-Tungusic was not settled. In his view, there were three real possibilities: (1) Korean did not belong with the other three genealogically, but had been influenced by an Altaic substratum; (2) Korean was related to the other three at the same level they were related to each other; (3) Korean had split off from the other three before they underwent a series of characteristic changes. Poppe leaned toward the third possibility (ib.), but did not commit himself to it in this work.

Roy Andrew Miller's 1971 book Japanese and the Other Altaic Languages convinced most Altaicists that Japanese also belonged to Altaic (Poppe 1976:470). Since then, the standard set of languages included in Altaic has comprised Turkic, Mongolic, Tungusic, Korean, and Japanese.

An alternative classification, though one with much less currency among Altaicists, was proposed by John C. Street (1962), according to which Turkic-Mongolic-Tungusic forms one grouping and Korean-Japanese-Ainu another, the two being linked in a common family that Street designated as "North Asiatic".

Officials from the two countries, who held talks here for three days last week, were able to resolve differences over opening up sectors like pharmaceuticals and services - areas of great interest to India.

Once the free trade agreement, officially dubbed as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), is signed and operationalised, as many 9,000 products -- ranging from steel and apparel to drugs and machinery -- are expected to be traded either without duty or at substantially reduced tariffs.

The FTA would keep a number of items, sensitive to the agriculture and employment-oriented sectors, out of the purview of both countries. Each side will have its own negative list of items. However, India's list would be bigger, with eight per cent of the tradeable items included. It will be three per cent for Japan, sources said.

Bilateral trade between India and Japan has more than doubled over the past four years to about USD 11 billion in 2008-09.

Later in the week, Japanese Defence Minister Toshimi Kitazawa is scheduled to arrive here on a bilateral visit. Mr. Antony had paid a visit to Tokyo in November last year and discussed issues relating to anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and maritime security.

India-Japan bilateral security and defence co-operation is guided by the Joint Statement issued by the Defence Ministers in May 2006 and the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation issued during the visit of Manmohan Singh to Japan in October 2008.

Despite their continuing lead in technological innovations, Japanese companies are losing out to South Korean rivals in a growing number of sectors as they fail to grasp the diversifying consumer needs worldwide, they said.

Even as many individual companies made efforts to keep up their competitiveness, the total factor productivity of Japan as a whole has changed little since the 1980s and the nation's service sectors remain weak, he said. Japanese firms have continued to spend heavily in research and development even in tough times, but such efforts have not led to increased productivity, he added.

Instead, they need to rethink their strategy toward the "volume zone" consumers in the emerging markets and have a more accurate grasp of the consumer needs there. The Japanese firms' R&D efforts to adapt their products to local markets have been insufficient.

A key problem with Japan's manufacturing sector today is that the pursuit of technological innovations has not necessary led to competitive advantages for the companies, said Ryozo Yoshikawa, a special researcher of the University of Tokyo's Manufacturing Management Research Center.

Japan spent ¥19 trillion in R&D, had 710,000 researchers in natural science, humanities and social science fields and newly registered 140,000 patents in 2007 — all ranking No. 2 in the world. Still, Japan fell from the world's No. 3 in 2000 to 13th in 2007 in per capita gross domestic product, while slipping from the top position in the Swiss-based International Institute for Management Development's competitiveness ranking in 1993 to 24th in 2007, he observed.

Meanwhile, the market value of Samsung Electronics alone rivals those of Japanese giants Sony, Panasonic and Toshiba combined, and South Korean makers today dominate electronics and electric equipment markets in emerging economies, Yoshikawa said. Contrary to what the companies believe, Japanese manufacturers' R&D investments have not resulted in higher profits.In a number of consumer electronics products, personal computers and semiconductors, South Korean firms have outperformed Japanese companies in their share of the global market.

Digitization of manufacturing has had a huge impact because it made it easy for companies without the necessary technology to be able to build high-tech products thanks to the digitized product design information and product development process. Today, micro-controlled units can perform what used to be made possible only with the knowhow built through years of efforts by Japanese engineers, he pointed out.

South Korean firms including Samsung may trail others in innovations but develop their products flexibly to fit the needs of people in each market. Globalization means diversification of consumer needs around the world and the competitiveness of a company would depend on whether its products would be selected by the diverse consumers.

Japanese firms lag behind firms in South Korea, Singapore and India in tapping into human resources globally — even though they expanded into overseas markets decades earlier than many Asian rivals.

China's rapid growth over the past 30 years has pushed some of its leading firms to the forefront of global competitiveness.The number of Chinese firms among the Fortune 500 rankings has increased from a mere six in 1999 to 43 in 2008.

But He also recognized that a whole range of social problems confronting China today — a result of the introduction of a market economy system — are all the more serious because China has gone through what most Western economies have experienced over the past one or two centuries in just 30 years.He stressed that many of the problems emerging in China — widening rich-poor gap; increasing fraud and bribery; product safety and food scandals; environment destruction and energy waste; and labor-management disputes and mass protests — are not unique to China but something that most advanced economies have experienced in their own phase of economic development.

After experiencing a challenging year, India has taken a new step to attract more foreign tourists to the country by launching a visa-on-arrival scheme.

Under the scheme, citizens of Japan and four other countries--Finland, Luxembourg, New Zealand and Singapore--can obtain a tourist visa for up to 30 days at four international airports: Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata.

Introduced on Jan. 1, the new visa scheme helped boost the year-on-year number of foreign arrivals by 17 percent and 10 percent in January and February, respectively, according to Banerjee, who visited Tokyo for a promotional event late last month.

Last year, about 160,000 Japanese are estimated to have visited India. With the new scheme, the South Asian country expects the number of Japanese arrivals to reach 200,000 this year, he said.

The visa-on-arrival scheme is a significant step for India, whose visa regulations are considered to be rigid. But some travel agencies say the 60 dollars visa fee feels expensive to many Japanese travelers as they can obtain a tourist visa for 1,200 yen if they apply in Japan.