Bharat Rakshak

SSridhar wrote:
It is obvious that there is now a co-ordinated move by the Chinese to pressurize India from Uttara Khand to Arunachal Pradesh. Is it purely irredentism ? No, it is much more than that. China wants to keep India in a vice-like grip across all fronts, military, economic, political and diplomatic. But, why is this sudden sharp turn of events from the Chinese ?

The recent article on the divisions of India that appeared in a Chinese website and was dismissed by some as 'not Chinese thinking' not only shows our glib attitude but also our inability to confront reality or both. That article showed a remarkable coincidence in the thinking of the Chinese and the Pakistanis. It was not a chance happening. China does see an opportunity now to cause more harm to India than before. In spite of growing Indo-US proximity, the increasing dependence of the US on China in this hour of economic doom and gloom, far outstrips the Indo-US warmth and so China feels that apart from making some noise the US cannot do much if PRC decides to toy with India. With the kind of very deep pocket it has now, it is able to shut India out of energy deals all over the world thereby causing one of the greatest insecurities for India. We are being systematically starved of access to energy. China is also worried that sooner than later, China may lose its biggest advantage of locking up India through Pakistan. India has already unshackled itself from TSP and TSP is in itself in great danger of disintegration. Even if Pakistan doesn't disintegrate due to its 3½ friends, it would significantly lose its capacity to trouble India. The Indian influence and power will then amplify automatically and China will be disadvantaged. Within the next 5 to 10 years, many positive things will happen to India which will blunt some of the advantage that PRC enjoys today vis-a-vis India. The expansion of the strategic assets in the Indian Navy, strategic missiles, robust economic growth, UNSC seat, growing soft-power are some of the worrying factors for China. From thei PoV, now is the best time to harm India.

As for SLOCs, which B.Raman suggests, the Chinese would least likely take the help of India. They do not want to even give the impression that they depend on us for anything. The Chinese have a very poor opinion of India and definitely consider India as an enemy even if we make friendly overtures. In fact, the Chinese misinterpret that as cowardice. We can certainly lead them along this garden path and lull them but we should be prepared to give them back in the same coin for when, not if, the assault eventually comes, the Chinese would use their massive resources.

chanakyaa wrote:Agreed. This is an "International Aerospace Forum" so I'll make this last post and stop.

Do you think China doesn't know that? I think, Chinese are trying to make smaller Asian countries, the way South American countries are to U.S. "DEPEPNDENT". Territorial disputes these days are like "wildcards" used to keep nations on toes. All smaller Asian countries are export driven. Today they export to US and EU, tomorrow they will do overwhelmingly to China to keep their economies running. This gives China tremendous leverage. Time will tell, but, Chinese may not jeopardize this relationship by taking their land. They might sit at negotiation take, arguing for next 50 years but will not hurt.

You seem to be taking some pride in India being "less domineering". If we were living in time of Ram and Laxman, I would take pride as well, but the problem is we don't. If we look in the past, we see that every major largest and successful economies in the world have at some point in its modern history has taken assertive and dominant role. Japan, U.S., U.K., to some extent Russia, France, Germany, Spain. In this day and age, I think a country either uses others or gets used in some shape or form. I get tears in my eyes my seeing my "less domineering" country is still being used.

I hope you are not taking this as good for Turkey. If given choice, Turkey would rather be part of EU and not NATO. Being part of NATO means, war, destruction, death, whereas being part of EU means prosperity, healthy trade, backing of a powerful currency. EU will never allow a Muslim nation to be part of their union. I don't buy their otherwise reasoning that Turkey is not ready. **IN THE CONTEXT, YOU DO NOT WANT TO BE LIKE TURKEY**

I'm okay with this strategy, but this also means "being used" for India, unless India can derive some premium for its "being used against Beijing" stance which I absolutely don't see evident of. We are not demanding enough. I hope bureaucrats in New Delhi are not getting wet dreams about one day Asian nations knocking at India's door for help against China. I hope I'm wrong but hard to see it happening.

Oh man!! Why are you hoping for Asian countries, not even half the size of India, to create some kind of alliance. Shouldn't India be the one taking a lead. Where does this tendency of subordination come in people of India? May be we are so used to rushing to temple, mosque, durga everytime we run into problem that we have forgotten the meaning of the simple word "LEADERSHIP". Very scary thought.

I agree, with the "look east" policy but IMHO China may not alienate any major countries in Asia. They will continue to build the "love and hate" relationship. And, one day when Chinese Yuan/Renminbi takes over as Asian currency, that will mark the end of India's influence. We have to work very hard to constantly engage in Asian policy and be an assertive alternative you are describing.

With Respect,
JAI HIND

The US will draw India into its strategic orbit and use it for ‘restricting’ third countries. Noting that India had a robust economic growth in recent years and has emerged as a new and important rising power in Asia, the analysis has alleged that the US is increasingly focusing on big power status and geo-political role of India and considering the latter as a ‘strategic partner for changing the Asian power balance’.

Qiu Shi’s reference to, if not endorsement of, the opinion of a Russian scholar foreseeing the US encroachment upon India’s border disputes looks intriguing. By implication, the Sino-Indian boundary question may come under this category. Already the atmosphere remains vitiated by the adverse Chinese criticisms through their media against India’s dispatch of additional troops to Arunachal Pradesh. At such a time, why Chinese opinions are further complicating the situation by linking the US with the Sino-Indian border issue in a very subtle manner? The apparent thinking on the US factor may be seen as adding an international dimension to the Sino-Indian border issue.

prad wrote:

Sanku wrote:Thats great Prad, and I agree with your analysis to an extent as well. Yet you have not addressed the question as to what you see as the alternative groupings and time frames.

what is this, pick on the newbie and see whether he passes the traditional BRF jingo assessment? i think i'll pass. if you believe the above topic warrants a debate, then you should start first.

Rejecting China's claim on Arunachal Pradesh, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee on Wednesday asserted that there was no question of India surrendering its sovereign rights over the state.

"We have made it clear that there is no question of surrendering our soveriegn rights over Arunachal. The question does not arise. There were 11 rounds of discussions (on the boundary question) in the last six to seven years. We consistently said that we cannot accept China's claim on Arunachal," Mukherjee told a press conference here.

"India has recognised Tibet as an autonomous region of Peoples Republic of China with which trade through traditional routes stopped after the 1962 war.

"Please write the name of the region carefully as Tibet Autonomous Region of Peoples Republic of China, as it has wide international connotations," Mukherjee said."

Elections are taking place regularly in Arunachal which is sending two representatives to Lok Sabha," he noted. India has consistently maintained that Arunachal is an integral part of the country.

ramana wrote:In 2007 way before the meltdown, Seminar India had a special issue on "Envisioning Asia" Issue 573.

It talks about linking India, China and Japan. The problem in my mind is all three are beholden to US in one way or the other.

Japan is an industrial power which could not turn its clout to develop into a financial power. China is an industrial and a regional militray power with some clout.

India is still a developing power.

prad wrote:i personally hold a very pessimistic view of China's prospects. as i said before, any economy that needs a $600 Billion stimulus when it's growing at 7% and the stimulus only adds 1% growth to a $4 Trillion economy is an economy that has some deep problems. no economy can indefinitely keep growing at 10%. it hasn't happened before, it won't happen now or in the future. the official PRC reported data on bad loans to GDP ratio is 25%, while in reality, this ratio might be closer to 35 - 40%. the bubble that is the chinese economy is waiting to be unravelled. the financial crisis of 2008 is a step in that direction.

it is unlikely that the chinese consumer is going to start spending now when they didn't do so under good economic conditions and the US consumer won't recover to pre recession levels for at least 3 years and even after that spending might never be so high again. China is a country where internal stability is threatened in 7% GDP growth conditions (for those who have researched this, they know it's true). the divide between coastal and interior interests has always been sharp and the recession has exacerbated those tensions.

the stimulus has worked in China, but how long is the communist party going to keep giving hundreds of billions of stimulus year after year? oddly, the Politburo decided giving more free credit is the solution to the problem (banks lent 6 trillion yuan in loans in the first 6 months of 2008; i can only hazard a guess as to how much of that are performing and how many will go bad). in the short term, this might result in increased economic activity, but in the long run the bad loan problem is being exacerbated by the State itself.

China is going the same way as the US housing industry. they are bloating an already inflated bubble even more. i believe a correction is on its way and very likely to occur by 2015 if not sooner.

On Apr. 22, Goldman Sachs (GS) said it expects Chinese GDP growth to hit 8.3% this year, compared with an earlier forecast of 6%. Other banks have become more optimistic, too. Citing what she called "very strong stimulus-related bank-lending growth," Tao Wang, head of China economic research at UBS (UBS), last week upgraded the bank's 2009 GDP growth forecast to 7.5%, from its earlier forecast of 6.5%. "While the external outlook remains bleak, there have been signs of domestic activity picking up in China, as a result of the government's policy stimulus," she wrote.

Much of the juice is coming from state-owned banks. While the Obama Administration struggles to get U.S. banks to start lending again, Chinese banks are following government orders and flooding the country with loans. In the first three months of the year, new lending by Chinese banks grew 30%, to $676 billion. That means the banks are already more than 90% toward Beijing's target for the whole year. "It looks like the banks have fulfilled their brief with vigor and commitment," says Standard Chartered Bank's head of China research, Stephen Green.However, many believe such a lending bonanza could lead to higher levels of nonperforming loans further down the line.

With more than $1.95 trillion in foreign reserves, the central government can afford to open its coffers, too. Earlier this month, Beijing announced it will spend $125 billion to build hospitals across China, as well as to expand medical insurance to cover 90% of China's 1.3 billion people by 2011. The government has also announced a significant expansion of its pension program. Since the global recession is hammering China's exports (they fell 20% in the first quarter of 2009), economists say the country must rely more on consumption to drive economic growth. And to boost consumer confidence, the government needs to provide better medical care, more secure pensions, and higher-quality schools, though many say it could take a generation before the Chinese abandon their penurious ways. Consumption in China now only makes up some 37% of GDP, compared with 70% in the U.S. "The government needs to carry out reform to unleash potential demand and turn it into purchasing power," says Xu Xiaonian, a professor of economics and finance at the China Europe International Business School in Shanghai. That will "get people to spend money instead of saving it."

Under withering criticism for its handling of the country's economic slowdown and Mumbai's terrorist attacks (BusinessWeek, 12/4/08), the Indian government fought back over the weekend, announcing a coordinated, two-flanked stimulus plan that could top $8 billion. India's moribund stock market momentarily cheered, rising almost 4% by midday. But it then deflated, closing up just 1.5%, on a day when other Asian markets soared on optimism about economic recovery plans in the U.S. and China.

As the business community's less-than-enthusiastic reaction to the package sank in, New Delhi sought to reassure investors that the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is not finished. More measures are on the way, Kamal Nath, the Minister for Commerce & Industry, told a group of reporters outside his New Delhi office. "There is Step One, then there is Step Two, and then there is Step Three," he said.

But with India already facing sizable budget deficits, significant inflation, and a continuing liquidity crisis, it is unclear what more the government can do, especially if it wants to hold on to its credit ratings. "Frankly, this is the most that India can afford," says Aninda Mitra, a sovereign credits analyst at Moody's (MCO) in Singapore. He estimates the cost of this package to be 0.8% of India's gross domestic product, which brings the country's budget deficit close to 10% of GDP, if one includes all government borrowings and not just those of the central government. "This is a country with very large government debt," says Mitra. "You can't start to expect China-style packages."

As a fi rst step in this endeavor, this article examines a key ingredient in the
expected emergence of a “strategic triangle”—the prospects of Indian sea power.
While no one has rigorously defi ned this international-relations metaphor, scholars
typically use it to convey a strategic interplay of interests among three nationstates.
In this initial foray, we employ the term fairly loosely, using it to describe
a pattern of cooperation and competition among the United States, China, and
India. It is our contention that Indian Ocean stability will hinge largely on how
India manages its maritime rise. On the one hand, if a robust Indian maritime
presence were to fail to materialize, New Delhi would essentially be forced to surrender
its interests in regional waters, leaving a strategic vacuum to the United
States and China. On the other hand, if powerful Indian naval forces were one day
to be used for exclusionary purposes, the region would almost certainly become
an arena for naval competition. Either undesirable outcome would be shaped in
part by how India views its own maritime prerogatives and by how Washington
and Beijing weigh the probabilities of India’s nautical success or failure in the
Indian Ocean.
If all three parties foresee a muscular Indian naval policy, then, a more martial
environment in the Indian Ocean will likely take shape. But if the three powers
view India and each other with equanimity, the prospects for cooperation will
brighten considerably. Capturing the perspectives of the three powers on India’s
maritime ambitions is thus a critical analytical starting point.

It is learnt that officials of the Obama administration have stepped up pressure on the advisers of His Holiness -- to persuade the Dalai Lama not to raise any controversy over Arunachal Pradesh for the time being -- till the American President succeeds in persuading the Chinese to resume their dialogue with the representatives of His Holiness.

The Obama administration is showing signs of greater sensitivity to the concerns and interests of China than those of India. Reliable reports indicate that it is veering towards a policy of neutrality on the issue of Arunachal Pradesh, which has been a major bone of contention between India and China.

There is also a possibility of the US abstaining when the specific proposal for assistance from the Asian Development Bank for a flood control project in Arunachal Pradesh comes up for approval before the ADB.

The reality is that on every matter, which is of concern to India, greater attention is being paid to China's sensitivities and concerns.

During his first visit to China next month, President Obama hopes to strengthen ties with Beijing on efforts to combat climate change, address the global financial crisis and contain nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran. Perhaps most important, he also aims to improve the U.S. relationship with China's military.

In early March, the U.S. Navy reconnaissance ship Impeccable was in the South China Sea hunting for Chinese submarines when it was swarmed by Chinese vessels that tried to block it and destroy its sonar equipment. A similar incident occurred in May in the Yellow Sea.

Both confrontations ended peacefully when the U.S. ships made it clear that they would leave;

Guanbu (state security dept) has defected to the US.

by Amit Singh
There is a reason why the US fears China. Unlike Japan which was milked by the United States, because they were not strong militarily, China doesn't want to be subjugated in the same way and dictated by US terms and conditions.

sum wrote:

Guanbu (state security dept) has defected to the US.

What does this mean?
An agent from Guanba has defected to US?

15 Oct 2009, 1734 hrs IST
Highly placed sources in the government have told TIMES NOW that India is still undecided on responding to the olive branch extended by the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao after Beijing's verbal offensive.

In the midst of a war of words between the two countries, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao expressed his desire to meet his Indian counterpart Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Thailand next week.

Premier Wen conveyed his wish during a meeting with Petroleum Minister Murli Deora, who was on a visit to Beijing to attend a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meet, sources said.

The Chinese leader's remarks come a day after Beijing raked up its claim over Arunachal Pradesh questioning Prime Minister Singh's visit there on October 3 and India hitting back today on Chinese plans to involve in projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

New Delhi has maintained that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India and the Prime Minister has a right and responsibility to visit the state. In a strongly-worded statement, it also asked China to cease from activities in PoK taking a "long-term view" of Sino-India relations.

During the meeting with Wen, Deora put up India's case for participating in the SCO's Tashkent-based Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure along with the six-nation security grouping's full members.

India along with Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia has an observer status in the SCO, which comprises China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The Chinese can now buy any sort of stuff they want from the US. Anything. They no longer even need those legions of "Students" to spy for them. Just cold hard cash - which they have bucket loads of.

SwamyG wrote:Please also read/see: Niall Ferguson: U.S. Empire in Decline, on Collision Course with China

Putting a finer point on it, Ferguson says America today is comparable to Britain circa 1900: a dominant empire underestimating the rise of a new power. In Britain's case back then it was Germany; in America's case today, it's China.

Wow, he is finally saying what many at BRF have been saying. Kudos to BRF gurus.

SwamyG wrote:Please also read/see: Niall Ferguson: U.S. Empire in Decline, on Collision Course with China

Putting a finer point on it, Ferguson says America today is comparable to Britain circa 1900: a dominant empire underestimating the rise of a new power. In Britain's case back then it was Germany; in America's case today, it's China.

Wow, he is finally saying what many at BRF have been saying. Kudos to BRF gurus.

. . . The case, involving a group of Chinese Muslims known as Uighurs, again thrusts the court into the jangle of policy decisions and constitutional principles involving the approximately 220 men still held at the base in Cuba. . . lawyers for the Uighurs said restricting what judges may do to release those who have won their freedom would make the court's 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush meaningless. . . . The men, captured in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2001 but now thought to pose no threat to the United States, are considered terrorists by the Chinese government and risk persecution if returned to China. A federal judge ruled that, if there were no place else to go, the 17 prisoners could be released into this country. . . . "There is a fundamental difference between ordering the release of a detained alien to permit him to return home or to another country and ordering that the alien be brought to and released in the United States without regard to immigration laws," Kagan wrote in the government's response. . . . Four Uighurs have been sent to Bermuda, while six have accepted an invitation to move to the Pacific island nation of Palau. The country has offered to take six of the seven other Uighurs at Guantanamo, and Kagan said some departures for Palau are imminent.

"The United States is working diligently to find an appropriate place to resettle the remaining Uighur detainees," she wrote. She said the men were being held in the least restrictive part of the facility, with special privileges.

viv wrote:Is there further implication that neither was the dominant power after the collision..

Jayadeva Ranade
First Published : 23 Oct 2009 11:08:00 PM ISTLast Updated : 22 Oct 2009 11:56:58 PM IST

China’s latest protest, provoked by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tawang 10 days earlier on October 3, was tougher than similar protests lodged routinely in the past. The admonition to India ‘to take China’s solemn concerns seriously and…. not stir up trouble at the disputed area ..’ contains the unmistakable suggestion of a warning.


The protest coincided with the free exercise of their democratic franchise by the people of Arunachal Pradesh. More importantly, this precedes the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang in early November. The warning leaves little room for doubt that, in the immediate term, China will ratchet up the pressure on India in a determined effort to scuttle the Dalai Lama’s visit.

China also has long-term objectives and perceives the current global geopolitical environment as conducive to formalising its sphere of influence. The latest protest comes in the wake of steadily increasing Chinese pressure on India over the past couple of years. These are also intended to test India’s national resolve.

Progress in the border talks, protracted over almost three decades, has been glacial with China exhibiting no inclination for forward movement. The incidence of incursions by Chinese troops across the entire length of the border has increased. This coincides with a comprehensive build-up of defences across the border, construction of new airfields and a railway in Tibet and, modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army, whose doctrine is to ‘win short-duration local wars under hi-tech informatised conditions’.

The largest-ever air-land integrated joint military exercise ‘Kuaye-2009’ (Stride-2009), the conclusion of which was timed to coincide with China’s 60th anniversary celebrations on October 1, demonstrated this capability. Some 50,000 troops and 60,000 vehicles from four of China’s seven Military Regions participated in the exercise, underscoring the country’s rapid power projection capability and showing that it envisages a possible war on its periphery. China’s official media has also published a number of articles critical of India in the past few months.

It has simultaneously reopened territorial issues hitherto considered settled. India’s external affairs minister was surprised, for example, by his Chinese counterpart’s statement in May 2008 that Sikkim is a disputed area. This after the matter had been resolved during the visit of former Prime Minister Vajpayee to Beijing in 2005 and official Chinese maps, reversing a half century-old policy, began depicting Sikkim as part of India since 2006. Chinese diplomatic missions began issuing visas on pieces of paper to residents of Jammu and Kashmir indicating that China considers the state as disputed. Tourist maps distributed in China now reportedly depict Kashmir as ‘independent’.

China adopted other policies that India cannot view as friendly. These include sustained opposition, in close collusion with Pakistan, to the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. After the advent of the Obama administration, China has revived efforts to portray the agreement as violating the principles of nuclear non-proliferation. Beijing’s opposition to expansion of the UN Security Council, which would allow India a permanent seat on the Council, is unyielding. Apart from declining visas to residents of Arunachal Pradesh, China objected to the Asian Development Bank granting aid to an energy project in Arunachal Pradesh and has warned it will object in future too.

There was a suggestion in the media that Chinese contacts with insurgent groups in the northeast have resumed. China continues to enhance military and nuclear collaboration with Pakistan and has agreed to assist Pakistan with a new nuclear plant and, during Pakistan Prime Minister Gilani’s visit to Beijing earlier this month, it also concluded additional military cooperation agreements.

Beijing has been emboldened by its successes during the past two years, especially on the Tibet and Taiwan issues. Tibet, which is politically, militarily and strategically important for China, has been a long-standing irritant because of the support to the Dalai Lama from US and other Western powers.

The award of the Nobel Peace Prize enhanced the Dalai Lama’s international stature and facilitated his building an effective platform compelling China to open negotiations with him. The global economic crisis, however, has provided China with an opportunity to flex its strength and adopt a tougher stance. The weakened economies of the Dalai Lama’s major supporters gave heft to Beijing’s diplomatic push. Last October, coinciding with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s pitch for infusion of Chinese funds into the IMF, British foreign secretary David Miliband reversed Britain’s 90-year-old stand and officially jettisoned the concept of suzerainty as outdated, thereby calling into question the 1914 Agreement with Tibet. He declared Tibet part of the People’s Republic of China.

France, a staunch supporter of the Dalai Lama’s cause whose stance has irked Beijing, was the next to fall in line. Chinese President Hu Jintao declined to meet Nicholas Sarkozy on the sidelines of the G20 early this year till France clarified its position on the Tibet issue. France capitulated, declaring that its official position remained unchanged and that it does not support Tibetan independence.

The US, whose economy has been hit hard by the global economic crisis, is acutely conscious that China holds over $1 trillion in US Treasury and other Bonds, has foreign exchange reserves exceeding $2 trillion and, together with the US, accounts for 30 per cent of the world’s GDP. The Obama administration views its options with China as limited and has soft-pedalled issues like human rights and Tibet. American sensitivity to China on the Tibet issue was again recently highlighted when Obama declined to receive the Dalai Lama in the White House, for the first time since 1991, so as not to upset China prior to his visit in November.

These developments will encourage Beijing to exert pressure on India to prevent the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang and impose severe restraints on him. If Beijing succeeds it will be a precedent for considerably greater pressure on India on a range of issues, including Tibet.

About the author:

Jayadeva Ranade is a former additional secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India

SwamyG wrote:

viv wrote:Is there further implication that neither was the dominant power after the collision..

Ha...ha.... the jingo in you wants to know if India would be dominant

China’s bad behavior is posing a growing threat to the rest of the world economy. The only question now is what the world — and, in particular, the United States — will do about it.

Some background: The value of China’s currency, unlike, say, the value of the British pound, isn’t determined by supply and demand. Instead, Chinese authorities enforced that target by buying or selling their currency in the foreign exchange market — a policy made possible by restrictions on the ability of private investors to move their money either into or out of the country.

There’s nothing necessarily wrong with such a policy, especially in a still poor country whose financial system might all too easily be destabilized by volatile flows of hot money. In fact, the system served China well during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. The crucial question, however, is whether the target value of the yuan is reasonable.

Until around 2001, you could argue that it was: China’s overall trade position wasn’t too far out of balance. From then onward, however, the policy of keeping the yuan-dollar rate fixed came to look increasingly bizarre. First of all, the dollar slid in value, especially against the euro, so that by keeping the yuan/dollar rate fixed, Chinese officials were, in effect, devaluing their currency against everyone else’s. Meanwhile, productivity in China’s export industries soared; combined with the de facto devaluation, this made Chinese goods extremely cheap on world markets.

The result was a huge Chinese trade surplus. If supply and demand had been allowed to prevail, the value of China’s currency would have risen sharply. But Chinese authorities didn’t let it rise. They kept it down by selling vast quantities of the currency, acquiring in return an enormous hoard of foreign assets, mostly in dollars, currently worth about $2.1 trillion.

Many economists, myself included, believe that China’s asset-buying spree helped inflate the housing bubble, setting the stage for the global financial crisis. But China’s insistence on keeping the yuan/dollar rate fixed, even when the dollar declines, may be doing even more harm now.

U.S. officials have been extremely cautious about confronting the China problem, to such an extent that last week the Treasury Department, while expressing “concerns,” certified in a required report to Congress that China is not — repeat not — manipulating its currency. They’re kidding, right?

The point is that with the world economy still in a precarious state, beggar-thy-neighbor policies by major players can’t be tolerated. Something must be done about China’s currency.

Acharya wrote:

Is war with China unthinkable? Will such an assumption not weaken the
Indian defense posture? Secondly, borders have been softened but no
borders have been redrawn. India should not drop its deterrence.

While a war with China is unthinkable in the political and strategic sense,
in a purely military view, China should continue to define Indian military
capabilities. One reason that war is unthinkable is that India today
possesses an effective deterrent capability against China. This does not
mean that India will not prepare its defenses. Indian presence is strong on
the border and it has acquired strategic strength with its nuclear
programme. Moreover, the Chinese believe that one should despise the
enemy strategically and respect him tactically. The Chinese are aware of
the risks involved in attacking the Indian border. Therefore, there is no
contradiction in asserting that war is unthinkable and still maintaining
guard.
War between India and China is unthinkable because, in the context of
globalization, the possibility of conflict is made absolutely remote. Neither
India nor China’s national interests would be furthered as a consequence
of war. Maintaining military deterrent capability is a means to maintain
peace.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/opini ... ranscripts of Defeat &st=cse&scp=1


The New York Times

October 29, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor
Transcripts of Defeat
By VICTOR SEBESTYEN

London

THE highly decorated general sat opposite his commander in chief and explained the problems his army faced fighting in the hills around Kabul: “There is no piece of land in Afghanistan that has not been occupied by one of our soldiers at some time or another,” he said. “Nevertheless much of the territory stays in the hands of the terrorists. We control the provincial centers, but we cannot maintain political control over the territory we seize.

“Our soldiers are not to blame. They’ve fought incredibly bravely in adverse conditions. But to occupy towns and villages temporarily has little value in such a vast land where the insurgents can just disappear into the hills.” He went on to request extra troops and equipment. “Without them, without a lot more men, this war will continue for a very, very long time,” he said.

These sound as if they could be the words of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander in Afghanistan, to President Obama in recent days or weeks. In fact, they were spoken by Sergei Akhromeyev, the commander of the Soviet armed forces, to the Soviet Union’s Politburo on Nov. 13, 1986.

Soviet forces were then in the seventh year of their nine-year-long Afghan conflict, and Marshal Akhromeyev, a hero of the Leningrad siege in World War II, was trying to explain why a force of nearly 110,000 well-equipped soldiers from one of the world’s two superpowers was appearing to be humiliated by bands of “terrorists,” as the Soviets often called the mujahideen.

The minutes of Akhromeyev’s meeting with the Politburo were recently unearthed by American and Russian scholars of the cold war — these and other materials substantially expand our knowledge of the Soviet Union’s disastrous campaign. As President Obama contemplates America’s own future in Afghanistan, he would be well advised to read some of these revealing Politburo papers; he might also pick up a few riveting memoirs of Soviet generals who fought there. These sources show as many similarities between the two wars as differences — and may provide the administration with some valuable counsel.

Much of the fighting during the Soviet war in Afghanistan was in places that have grown familiar to us now, like Kandahar and Helmand Provinces. The Soviets’ main base of operations was Bagram, which is now the United States Army headquarters. Over the years, the Soviets changed their tactics frequently, but much of the time they were trying and failing to pacify the country’s problematic south and east, often conducting armed sweeps along the border with Pakistan, through which many of the guerrillas moved, as the Taliban do now.

That war was characterized by disputes between soldiers and politicians. As Russian documents show, the politicians ordered the invasion against the advice of the armed forces. The chief of the Soviet Defense Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, raised doubts shortly before Soviet forces were dispatched on Christmas Day 1979. He told Dmitri Ustinov — the long-serving defense minister who had been a favorite of Stalin — that experience from the British and czarist armies in the 19th century should encourage caution. Ustinov replied: “Are the generals now making policy in the Soviet Union? Your job is to plan specific operations and carry them out ... . Shut up and obey orders.”

Ogarkov went further up the chain of command to the Communist Party boss, Leonid Brezhnev. He warned that an invasion “could mire us in unfamiliar, difficult conditions and would align the entire Islamic East against us.” He was cut off mid-sentence: “Focus on military matters,” Brezhnev ordered. “Leave the policymaking to us.”

The Soviet leaders realized they had blundered soon after the invasion. Originally, the mission was simply to support the Communist government — the result of a coup Moscow had initially tried to prevent, and then had no choice but to back — and then get out within a few months. But the mujahideen’s jihad against the godless Communists had enormous popular support within the country, and from outside. Money and sophisticated weapons poured in from America and Saudi Arabia, through Pakistan.

The Soviets saw withdrawal as potentially fatal to their prestige in the cold war, so they became mired deeper and deeper in their failed occupation. For years, the Soviets heavily bombarded towns and villages, killing thousands of civilians and making themselves even more loathed by Afghans. Whatever tactics the Soviets adopted the result was the same: renewed aggression from their opponents. The mujahideen, for example, laid down thousands of anti-tank mines to attack Russian troop convoys, much as the Taliban are now using homemade bombs to strike at American soldiers on patrol, as well as Afghan civilians.

“About 99 percent of the battles and skirmishes that we fought in Afghanistan were won by our side,” Marshal Akhromeyev told his superiors in November 1986. “The problem is that the next morning there is the same situation as if there had been no battle. The terrorists are again in the village where they were — or we thought they were — destroyed a day or so before.” Listen to a coalition spokesman now explaining the difficulties its forces are facing in tough terrain, and it would be hard to hear a difference.

There are many in Washington now calling on President Obama to cut his losses and find an exit strategy from Afghanistan. Even if he agreed, it may not be an easy business. When Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet leader in March 1985 he called Afghanistan “our bleeding wound.” He declared that ending the war was his top priority. But he could not do it without losing face.

The Soviet leadership fatally prevaricated. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze wanted to pull out of Afghanistan immediately and blame Kremlin predecessors for the unpopular war. So too did Mr. Gorbachev’s most important adviser, the godfather of the perestroika and glasnost reforms, Aleksandr Yakovlev.

But Mr. Gorbachev dithered, searching for something he could call victory, or at least that other elusive prize for armies in trouble: peace with honor. “How to get out racks one’s brains,” Mr. Gorbachev complained in the spring of 1986, according to Politburo minutes. “We have been fighting there for six years. If we don’t start changing our approach we’ll be there another 20 or 30 years. We have not learned how to wage war there.”

Mr. Gorbachev was also haunted by the image of the last Americans leaving Saigon in panic: “We cannot leave in our underpants ... or without any,” he told his chief foreign policy aide, Anatoly Chernyayev, whose diaries have recently become available to scholars. Chernyayev himself called Afghanistan “our Vietnam. But worse.”

Withdrawal was a long, drawn-out agony. By the time the last troops left in February 1989, around 15,000 Soviet soldiers and 800,000 Afghans had died. “We must say that our people have not given their lives in vain,” Mr. Gorbachev told the Politburo. But even his masterful public relations skills could not mask the humiliation of defeat. Indeed, it marked the beginning of the end for the Soviet empire in Europe, as revolution swept through Eastern Europe in 1989, and of the Soviet Union itself two years later.

In 1988, Robert Gates, then the deputy director of the C.I.A., made a wager with Michael Armacost, then undersecretary of state. He bet $25 that the Soviet Army wouldn’t leave Afghanistan. The Soviets retreated in humiliation soon after. Mr. Gates, we can assume, paid up. But is there a gambling man out there who would lay money on the United States Army withdrawing in similarly humbling fashion? And would the defense secretary accept the bet?

Victor Sebestyen is the author of “Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire.”