A look back at the partition
Re: A look back at the partition
Partition and the Decolonisation of India
As the British civil servant Sir John Strachey wrote in 1888, "the truth plainly is that the existence side by side of these hostile creeds is one of the strong points in our political position in India. The better classes of Mohammedans are already a source to us of strength and not of weakness.... They constitute a small but energetic minority of the population, whose political interests are identical with ours." (India, 1888, p.225).
In furtherance of this policy of 'divide and rule,' the All-India Muslim League was formed as a counter to the Indian National Congress in December 1906. The British politician, Ramsay Macdonald, reveals that the Muslim leaders "were inspired by certain Anglo-Indian officials, and that these officials pulled wires at Simla [the 'summer capital' of India] and in London and of malice aforethought sowed discord between the Hindu and the Mohammedan [i.e., Muslim] communities" (MacDonald, The Awakening of India, 1910, p.284).
However, the provincial elections of 1937 "provided Congress with an overwhelming victory.... The Muslim League did, in comparison, very badly, winning a comparatively small proportion of the Muslim vote" (Denis Judd, Jawaharlal Nehru, 1993, p.27).
In the light of these results, the leader of the Muslim League, Mohammed Ali Jinnah decided that "the League should strengthen its attraction to Muslim voters by an appeal to Islamic anxieties" (Judd, p.27).
In March 1942, as the Japanese imperialist armies approached the borders of India, the British government despatched Sir Stafford Cripps to india on a mission "to attempt to achieve a reconciliation between the Raj [i.e., the British establishment] and its Indian opponents" (Judd, p.35).
Cripps proposed that "after the war, a constituent assembly, elected in a system of proportional representation by new provincial assemblies, would determine the constitution" of India.
The scheme contained "an important concession to Muslim separatism in the proposal that any province would have the right to remain outside of the new Dominion" (Judd, p.36).
In August 1942, 'Quit India' became the official policy of Congress. The British government struck back and "the whole of the Working Committee of Congress and a number of other party leaders were arrested." Congress "was declared an illegal organisation and its assets and records were confiscated, curfews were imposed and assemblies of more than five people were banned; there were mass arrests (Judd, p.38).
The Viceroy, Viscount Wavell, gave "unabashed support for Jinnah and the Muslim league" (Judd, p.40) and "when the British authorities were obliged, as they inevitably were, to reopen negotiations about India's future independence, the Muslim League had made so much progress among India's Islamic community that it could claim almost equal standing with Congress." (Judd, p.39). Jinnah could then claim that "the Muslim League was the true, indeed the only, voice of Islam in India" (Judd, pp.44-45).
In February 1947, the new Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, "announced in the House of Commons that the British would withdraw from India not later than June 1948." In March 1947, Lord Mount-batten was sworn in as the last Viceroy of India, charged with bringing about "a transfer of power" (Judd, p.49,50).
In May 1947, Mount-batten showed Nehru a 'secret' British plan, called significantly 'Plan Balkan,' which "devolved power to the provinces, including the princely states." Nehru denounced the plan as producing "fragmentation and conflict and disorder" (Jawaharlal Nehru, Letter to Mountbatten, May 1947, cited in Judd, p.52).
British authorities were pleased to amend their proposals to allow for "the concept of an Indian state as a continuing entity," (Judd, p.52) although this would be a partitioned state, in which the predominantly Muslim areas would be permitted to secede from India to form Pakistan.
Source: Excerpt from "British Neo-Imperialism." Online at: http://www.oneparty.co.uk/html/britneo.html
As the British civil servant Sir John Strachey wrote in 1888, "the truth plainly is that the existence side by side of these hostile creeds is one of the strong points in our political position in India. The better classes of Mohammedans are already a source to us of strength and not of weakness.... They constitute a small but energetic minority of the population, whose political interests are identical with ours." (India, 1888, p.225).
In furtherance of this policy of 'divide and rule,' the All-India Muslim League was formed as a counter to the Indian National Congress in December 1906. The British politician, Ramsay Macdonald, reveals that the Muslim leaders "were inspired by certain Anglo-Indian officials, and that these officials pulled wires at Simla [the 'summer capital' of India] and in London and of malice aforethought sowed discord between the Hindu and the Mohammedan [i.e., Muslim] communities" (MacDonald, The Awakening of India, 1910, p.284).
However, the provincial elections of 1937 "provided Congress with an overwhelming victory.... The Muslim League did, in comparison, very badly, winning a comparatively small proportion of the Muslim vote" (Denis Judd, Jawaharlal Nehru, 1993, p.27).
In the light of these results, the leader of the Muslim League, Mohammed Ali Jinnah decided that "the League should strengthen its attraction to Muslim voters by an appeal to Islamic anxieties" (Judd, p.27).
In March 1942, as the Japanese imperialist armies approached the borders of India, the British government despatched Sir Stafford Cripps to india on a mission "to attempt to achieve a reconciliation between the Raj [i.e., the British establishment] and its Indian opponents" (Judd, p.35).
Cripps proposed that "after the war, a constituent assembly, elected in a system of proportional representation by new provincial assemblies, would determine the constitution" of India.
The scheme contained "an important concession to Muslim separatism in the proposal that any province would have the right to remain outside of the new Dominion" (Judd, p.36).
In August 1942, 'Quit India' became the official policy of Congress. The British government struck back and "the whole of the Working Committee of Congress and a number of other party leaders were arrested." Congress "was declared an illegal organisation and its assets and records were confiscated, curfews were imposed and assemblies of more than five people were banned; there were mass arrests (Judd, p.38).
The Viceroy, Viscount Wavell, gave "unabashed support for Jinnah and the Muslim league" (Judd, p.40) and "when the British authorities were obliged, as they inevitably were, to reopen negotiations about India's future independence, the Muslim League had made so much progress among India's Islamic community that it could claim almost equal standing with Congress." (Judd, p.39). Jinnah could then claim that "the Muslim League was the true, indeed the only, voice of Islam in India" (Judd, pp.44-45).
In February 1947, the new Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, "announced in the House of Commons that the British would withdraw from India not later than June 1948." In March 1947, Lord Mount-batten was sworn in as the last Viceroy of India, charged with bringing about "a transfer of power" (Judd, p.49,50).
In May 1947, Mount-batten showed Nehru a 'secret' British plan, called significantly 'Plan Balkan,' which "devolved power to the provinces, including the princely states." Nehru denounced the plan as producing "fragmentation and conflict and disorder" (Jawaharlal Nehru, Letter to Mountbatten, May 1947, cited in Judd, p.52).
British authorities were pleased to amend their proposals to allow for "the concept of an Indian state as a continuing entity," (Judd, p.52) although this would be a partitioned state, in which the predominantly Muslim areas would be permitted to secede from India to form Pakistan.
Source: Excerpt from "British Neo-Imperialism." Online at: http://www.oneparty.co.uk/html/britneo.html
Re: A look back at the partition
For the INC leaders, BIA was a sacred cow: No attempts were made by them to entice them in their struggle, nor to prevent recruitment to BIA, nor to prevent BIA movements, nor to descredit the BIA in any way or form. Not one. MGK & INC were proud supporters of both great wars. Given that the BIA was an "instrument of British coercive power" (Brihaspati's language, I like it), it is puzzling that INC never tried to blunt this sword over them. Same applies to Police. In fact Gandhi stopped the entire 1942 quit India movement because of the burning of a police station (another instrument of coercive power). As if a red line had been crossed.ramana wrote:surinder, Lt Gen P.S. Bhagat was in-charge of Gandhiji's security during his confinement in Pune and was advised by him to stay on in the Army as India needed people like him once she gained Independence.
Also note, Bhagat Singh & associates had put down a Police chief, and that was not something that could go unpunished by the British, nor was it something that would be supported by MKG & JLN.
Same story regarding INA. Even independent India would not touch any INA memebr by a 10 foot pole (the old aggreement still holding?). I think it was patel who appealed mutinous navymen off Mumbai to quit. He was asking that the executioner be handed back the sword snatched from him.
Such pattern is hard to ignore. (or explain).
Re: A look back at the partition
This was trick on India.shravan wrote:
In May 1947, Mount-batten showed Nehru a 'secret' British plan, called significantly 'Plan Balkan,' which "devolved power to the provinces, including the princely states." Nehru denounced the plan as producing "fragmentation and conflict and disorder" (Jawaharlal Nehru, Letter to Mountbatten, May 1947, cited in Judd, p.52).
British authorities were pleased to amend their proposals to allow for "the concept of an Indian state as a continuing entity," (Judd, p.52) although this would be a partitioned state, in which the predominantly Muslim areas would be permitted to secede from India to form Pakistan.
Re: A look back at the partition
Good point. But note in that case the "leader" of the independence movement should have figured this out and used that as a bargaining point for concessions. Failure to exploit this position, still points to a failed leadership. This is just too damning.Sanku wrote: Or it could mean that the empire was held together by India, and India did the heavy lifting for all the colonies (expect Ireland, they did their own)
Re: A look back at the partition
Mohajirs or UP and Bihari Muslims who went to Pakistan unscratched created the infrasctructure of hatred for Hindus over there. The UP Muslamans in lahore in 40s laid the foundation for blooddshed few years latter. The similar forces are still existent in india. Jinnah was sick and dying ( died without medical aid)s and good possibility that these Mohajirs created such cricumstances and used egoistic Jinnah to serve their own purpose. Ikball and Mohajirs might be more guilty than the lawyer who fought case on their behalf.
Re: A look back at the partition
In the end the British could not call the INA a "mutiny" thanks to Savarkar's book on the First war of Independence.
Re: A look back at the partition
I would like to remind that the discussion commenced that the religions were mutually exclusive and hence there were no meeting ground and that was one of the causes for the Partition.brihaspati wrote:It is not true that marriages between Hindus and mUslims did not take place. But the Islamic regimes, including most "enlightened ones" viciously intervened and forbade marriage of Muslim women to Hindu men. They demanded, abducted, and forced Hindu women to get married to Muslim men.
I stated that there were no common grounds not even what could have been possible if there were inter faith marriages and which was not allowed. I, for one, is not aware of any. In fact, the Muslims were called mlechhas and that is also noted by Al Bureni.
I am astonished that you wish to debate the issue with an example that the Muslims demanded, abducted, and forced Hindu women to get married to Muslim men and make it a common ground!!!!!!! How so? I fail to see the connection.
I would be immensely surprised that a common ground of religious meeting could be when women of a community can be demanded, abducted, and forced Hindu women to get married to Muslim men.
A rather unusual commentary I must say!!
In fact, this would lead to 'Honour Killing' and not a common ground for the twain to meet!! It happens even today in places like Haryana and some other places, where it is even for issues like gotra!
I remain perplexed at your comment, unless that you wish to be some sort of a wikipedia doing service to the community by giving an overview of how Muslim, sufis and otherwise, abducted the Hindus etc etc. Even so, I fails to see how that could help in having a common ground for meeting of minds!!!
The issue of Muslim rulers not allowing Hindus to take Muslim wives is not pertinent as far as Hindus were concerned. Hindus would not take Muslim wives or so I believe. Please read Al Bureni's impressions on Hinduism.
And please note, my post was analysing the Partition and the psyche of the time and it went off with some bringing in Indic issues and the how Hindus still ruled supreme, implying that there was no Mugal Empire. In fact, with to some my limited knowledge of history, they were forgetting that the British had to take a firman from the Mugals to start their 'business'. So, why to the Mugals for the firman? Which Hindu ruler could have substituted?
Why must history as taught in India be taken as junk? What does the Indic history say? That there was no Mughal empire?
Why must we be so defensive? I say who cares what the past is as written by anyone. We were not there. Our future is what will make us what we are! Let us look to our future and make the best of it!!
Read Omar Khayyanm - The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
And Kalidasa - Today is the day of days and within it's brief space lies the verities and realities of existence .
While it is appreciated that one has a 'Hindu' pride, yet that should not obfuscate issues.
Re: A look back at the partition
Brishapati, Please stay on topic. Thanks, ramana
Re: A look back at the partition
A few things that are missed throughout any discussion on these issues:
1. There is NO such thing as an Indian Muslim community politically.
2. There are many sects and many different linguistic groups are Mohammedans, each with its own history and very distinct attitudes.
3. The Muslims of Rajasthan and Assam as an example, of whom I have some experience interacting with, were never Islamist historically, Religion was never their ethnicity, and by and large still is not.
4. Groups even today, particularly Urdu speakers have dominated Muslim discourse and claimed to be their spokesperson. Check how many more Muslim votes BJP gets in states like Gujarat, Karnataka and among Shias.
Speaking of Muslims as a monolithic entity is not correct IMHO and also unfair.
Atish.
1. There is NO such thing as an Indian Muslim community politically.
2. There are many sects and many different linguistic groups are Mohammedans, each with its own history and very distinct attitudes.
3. The Muslims of Rajasthan and Assam as an example, of whom I have some experience interacting with, were never Islamist historically, Religion was never their ethnicity, and by and large still is not.
4. Groups even today, particularly Urdu speakers have dominated Muslim discourse and claimed to be their spokesperson. Check how many more Muslim votes BJP gets in states like Gujarat, Karnataka and among Shias.
Speaking of Muslims as a monolithic entity is not correct IMHO and also unfair.
Atish.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 12410
- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: A look back at the partition
surinder,
I said "possibilities".
First, what I said was that a possible perception of core "then" in some, especially those that led the Congress "then". This is not our concept of core.
Regarding the second query, look for a police officer from Bengal of the early post-independence period named Samar Sen. Especially the name may come up in connection with SP Mukerjee's period in the parliament in the opposition, and his death. (Mukherjee's diary was not handed over to his mother in spite of repeated requests).
Some further refs : K.N. Rao's "The Nehru Dynasty", Taya Zinkin's "The French Memsahib", M.O. Mathai's "My Days With Nehru/The Reminiscences of the Nehru Age", Mohammad Yunus's "Persons, passions and Politics".
I said "possibilities".
First, what I said was that a possible perception of core "then" in some, especially those that led the Congress "then". This is not our concept of core.
Regarding the second query, look for a police officer from Bengal of the early post-independence period named Samar Sen. Especially the name may come up in connection with SP Mukerjee's period in the parliament in the opposition, and his death. (Mukherjee's diary was not handed over to his mother in spite of repeated requests).
Some further refs : K.N. Rao's "The Nehru Dynasty", Taya Zinkin's "The French Memsahib", M.O. Mathai's "My Days With Nehru/The Reminiscences of the Nehru Age", Mohammad Yunus's "Persons, passions and Politics".
Re: A look back at the partition
May we confine ourselves to the Partition and pre Partition period?
If ancient history is to be appended it must be linked and not just thrown in as bait!
It is also requested people read posts and then reply.
If ancient history is to be appended it must be linked and not just thrown in as bait!
It is also requested people read posts and then reply.
Re: A look back at the partition
Will History repeat itself and partition can happen again? The reason i ask is similar players and fundamentals still exist.
Re: A look back at the partition
Though this question is OT, I will venture to answer it here since there is no appropriate thread to answer this.Prem wrote:Will History repeat itself and partition can happen again? The reason i ask is similar players and fundamentals still exist.
This is not my opinion. It is the thought of one of the most forward thinking Chief of the Army, Gen BC Joshi.
He said that India has taken one Partition and still suffering. Will it take another one?
And -
Pakistan is already reeling, will it be able to take another huge exodus of Mohajirs, who they already dislike?
You have the answer? I had!
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 12410
- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: A look back at the partition
RayC, in the light of ramana's reminder, just keeping brief and closing this line of exchange. I pointed out with good examples, from historical narratives, many from Islamic chroniclers just like Al Biruni - that Hindu's did marry Muslims and vice versa. Especially in Kashmir, we have explicit narrative claims. The procurement procedure for the bride and nature of the marriage is something else to be discussed. Thats all. My point was simply that there were no inherent resistance or hatred of the Muslim for marital purposes in the Hindu - this intermixing was stopped in one direction only by the Muslim rulers. Period.
Re: A look back at the partition
Brihaspatiji,
I wanted to ask if you had insights as to the growth of the deobandis and their entry into Punjab and how that radicalization played out in partition. Also, it appears to me that many leaders simply lacked the means or will to play from the outside; they appeared to already rely and require the continued benevolence of UK. That appeared to matter to them. Was this a mere front for something more or was this all just an extension or universal love and dhimmitude with gratitude? Further, we don't normally think of MKG as being out of touch. Were they really out of touch with the people and the transformation happening right under them?
S
I wanted to ask if you had insights as to the growth of the deobandis and their entry into Punjab and how that radicalization played out in partition. Also, it appears to me that many leaders simply lacked the means or will to play from the outside; they appeared to already rely and require the continued benevolence of UK. That appeared to matter to them. Was this a mere front for something more or was this all just an extension or universal love and dhimmitude with gratitude? Further, we don't normally think of MKG as being out of touch. Were they really out of touch with the people and the transformation happening right under them?
S
Re: A look back at the partition
I will also keep it brief after Ramana's injunction, please read what you have written in context of my post of interaction of the two communities.brihaspati wrote:RayC, in the light of ramana's reminder, just keeping brief and closing this line of exchange. I pointed out with good examples, from historical narratives, many from Islamic chroniclers just like Al Biruni - that Hindu's did marry Muslims and vice versa. Especially in Kashmir, we have explicit narrative claims. The procurement procedure for the bride and nature of the marriage is something else to be discussed. Thats all. My point was simply that there were no inherent resistance or hatred of the Muslim for marital purposes in the Hindu - this intermixing was stopped in one direction only by the Muslim rulers. Period.
Your post had nothing to do with the Partition in the context of what I was trying to state. Kashmir came into the issue after the Partition. Your post was however an expression of indication to display knowledge! But that was not what was required since many here are equally knowledgeable and don't display! Knowledge must be in context! Though I will readily confess that your anecdotal discourses on historical past is indeed absorbing. Reminds me of Thakurma's Jhuli!
Kashmir is not the issue. I am well aware of Kashmir. Existed there and interacted there for most of my life! Tried to understand Kashmir too!
If you want to know, even today, the Muslims pray at the ceremonies at Hindu temple. I helped some to the Kheer Bhavani!
That is why I don't buy much what is the popular view!
Read Al Buruni's Kitab fi Tahqiq ma li al-Hind. He is quite categorical.
And you have YOURSELF said they abducted Hindu women! Is that marriage! Odd idea of marriage!!
If there is no inherent 'resistance or hatred of the Muslim for marital purposes in the Hindu - this intermixing was stopped in one direction only by the Muslim rulers.' then how come Akhbar married a Hindu princess/
And how this prejudice exists even today? There are no Muslim rulers today. Heard of the recent Rizwan case?
Please let us not re-invent history to be PC.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 12410
- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: A look back at the partition
samuelji,
both the Barelwis and the Deobandis were involved. I will try to post later. As for the apparent impotence from the Indian side, it is important to note that JLN was increasingly aggressive against the British and in favour of the INA, between the time period ranging from apparent reports of Bose's death and JLN's visit to Malay hosted by Mountbatten where they really first "got together". Something changed dramatically here - as henceforth suddenly JLN's stance becomes much more moderate and dependent on Mountbatten. 45-47 is exactly the period when the Partition plan was being sharpened. The Malay visit happened in 1946. Here, even though JLN had declared initially his intention to lay a wreath at the site of the INA memorial, he was persuaded by Mountbatten to drop the idea. They apparently had a long chat over dinner and thsi appears to be a turning point.
While commenting about dealing with Nehru, Mountbatten said,
"I used to see most of my ministers about once a fortnight, but Nehru I saw pretty much every day. I told him I had no intention of attending Cabinet meetings. They were quite prepared at the time to have me in but I said, 'No, you must learn to do without me. You are the chief executive, you take the chair. I don't want to be present.' But I said, 'I would appreciate it if I could see all the Cabinet papers before the meetings. And I'd like to see you before you go in because I can perhaps help you over some of your problems before you go in." (Larry Collins And Dominique Lapierre, Mountbatten And Independent India 16 August 1947 - 18 June 1948 p.4).
The extent to which Nehru was controlled by Mountbatten follows in details given by Mountbatten:
"The paper was passed around and the Prime Minister said, "Now we come to item no.3." He did it in a rather unusual way, bless his heart. He had agreed with me it shouldn't go through, it should be rejected. Instead of saying at once it should be rejected, he passed it out. Immediately they all Started jabbering. They all said it was a great idea, and Nehru let them go on and when they had finished he said, "I think it is a very bad idea," and he gave the reasons. He said he'd seen His Excellency who disapproved of the paper and he gave my reason.
But he is only a constitutional head of state, they all said. You don't have to listen to him. This is a paper we want. What does it matter what he thinks? Nehru said, "You don't think we asked Mountbatten to stay here simply as a figurehead? We asked him to stay because he's more experienced than we are as an administrator. He loves India as much as we do. And what he says we should do. I'm not interested in what you think, I am interested in what Mountbatten thinks. He won't have it, and I won't have it. It is thrown out."(p.5-6)
At one place, in his interview, Mountbatten refers to Congres leaders as, "I believe that if the British hadn't put them in prison, they would have been even less qualified, I mean, they weren't very highly qualified when they did take over."(p.7)
When the Punjab Partition violence erupted, Mountbatten was vacationing at Simla. Mountbatten narrated the incident in the interview:
"Menon said, "Your Excellency must return to Delhi". I said, "Don't be silly, V.P., you must come up here-it can't be essential for me to come back. I am a Constitutional Governor-General. If my cabinet has something which they wish me to countersign have them send the documents up here.! shall countersign! "I can't remember whether he rang me again or whether he then said, "Well, as a matter of fact the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister want you to come down."
"Why?"
"They want more than your advice, they want your help."
"Well, I'm not coming, tell them."
He said, "If your Excellency isn't down within 24 hours, don't bother to come. It'll be too late, we will have lost India."
"All right, V.P., old swine," I said, "I shall come down." We ordered the train and down we went. "(p. 44)"
Mountbatten himself felt that whatever was done by Nehru and the others was too much and the people on learning these facts may behave differently. That is why he tried to conceal. While narrating the chain of incidents after his return from Simla, he said:
"The thing was deteriorating and they said, 'We don't know how to hold it'.
I said,"Why not'? You have taken over power."
And Nehru said. "While you were exercising the highest command in the war, we were in prison. You are a professional, a high level administrator. We're not amateurs, we just know nothing. You can't just turn over this country to us, having stayed with us all our lives with all your knowledge and experience, then leave us. without any experience or knowledge of how to do it. Will you run the country?".
"You must understand", Nehru said. "You've got to take it. We pledge ourselves. We shall do whatever you say. We 'U be far more obedient than when you were Viceroy. Please, take over the country." (p. 45-46)
About this offer Mountbatten said, "Well, look, it's terrible, for if it were known that you'd turned over the country to me, you'd be finished. You'd be a laughing-stock. The Indians keep back the British Viceroy and then turn the country back to him? This is out of the question! " (p. 46)
"Well, we may find ways of disguising this, but if you don't do it, we can't manage it."
"All right, "I said it, very reluctantly. "I'll do it, and of course I can pull the country together because I do know how to do it, but I think you must all agree that nobody must know about this. Nobody must know you have made this extravagant offer to me, or these requests; we shall find a solution which will be done in such a way that it will appear to be constitutionally normal, correct and proper. "( p.46)
Mountbatten narrated:
"So you two will ask me. to set up an Emergency Committee in the Cabinet, and I will agree. Will you do that?"
"Yes."
"All right. You 've asked me. I will take the chair because you invite me to?"
"Yes, we invite you."
"The Emergency Committee will consist of the people I will nominate."
"Oh, we must have the whole Cabinet!"
"The whole Cabinet?" I said, "It would be disastrous. I don't want all your odds and sods, I just want the key people. And I want the Director of Civil Aviation, the Director of Railways."
"You can have the Minister."
I said, "I don't want the Minister at all, I want the civil servants who are doing it. I want the Chief of Police, I want the head of the Indian medical services. I want my wife, who will immediately set up a council for all the voluntary organizations. and she will represent them. The Secretary will be General Erskine-Crum, my Conference Secretary. The minutes will be kept by British stenographers. The minutes will be typed in the course of the meeting and handed to people as they go away and be acted on at once. In every case, you invite me to do this?"
"Yes, we invite you."
"Nobody will know that you asked me to tell you what to do. All you're doing is you've left me in the chair. The Prime Minister sits on my right, the Deputy on my left, and every time I'll always go through the motions of consulting you, and whatever I say, you're not going to argue with me, we haven't got time. I'll say, 'I'm sure you wish me to do this,' and you'll say, 'Yes, please.' That's all I want. I don't want you to say anything else."
I said, "Not if you're going to delay things. You can go through the motions of arguing with me so long as you finally do what I say. Do you want me to run the country or are you going to try and make a mess of it yourself!"
"Ah, all right ,"he said. "You can run the country."(p. 46-47)
Mountbatten expressed his concern about this offer in the following words:
"It was the most extraordinary conversation I've ever had and that's why I didn't record it. It is a very dangerous thing, really. This is probably the first time it's been recorded. I told very few of my staff. I struck to the fiction that Nehru and Patel had invited me to come down because they'd decided to set up an Emergency Committee in the Cabinet (They didn't even know what an Emergency Committee was.) They'd asked me to take the chair, and I had with some reluctance, agreed, provided they would sit on each side of me and tell me what they wanted me to do. They'd asked if my secretary would do the notes, and I'd said yes, if it was convenient, and so on." (p. 47-48)
When the interviewers asked him, "You have no record in your notes of the conversation?" Mountbatten responded,
"I'll tell you why you haven't got this. It was not done at the time, it was too hot. What's going to come is very hot, and I wouldn't put it down. It's only now, after 25 years, that I can tell it." (p. 45)
The degree of control expressed continued. When Mountbatten learnt about attack on Gandhi, his press secretary Campbell and Johnson was with him and he told him, "If the old boy dies we're in real trouble." (p.64)
On the way Mountbatten claims to have told his press secretary that the killer was a Hindu. When Allen asked him, how do you know, Mountbatten said, "I don't. But if it is a Muslim we are all finished, so it may as well be a Hindu." (p.65)
Mountbatten claims to have summoned S. Baldev Singh. Nehru, Patel and Baldev Singh, all were in tears. Baldev Singh, the Minister of Defence was at a loss what to do. Mountbatten said to them, "Wait a moment and I'll tell you what to do. Just wait here."I then sent for the three chiefs of staff, all Englishmen. I turned to Nehru and said,
"You must go to All India Radio and broadcast to the country."
"I can't I am not prepared, I don't know what to say."
I said, "Look, it will come. You go to All India Radio and you, Alan, you lay on the programme. Tell them to clear the air and stand by for a broadcast from the P.M."
Again, Nehru protested. He said, "I don't know what to say."
I said, "Look, when you get there, God will tell you what to say. It will be a great speech." And, of course, it was. I'm not trying to blow my own trumpet, but this was the difference between a British trained, political leader and an eastern fatalist. If I'd been in Madras then and not come back to Delhi, I tremble to think of the inaction there would have been. Nothing would have happened at all.
I went back into Gandhiji's room, very quickly, voice down, very slowly. I did it all as though I was in church. I felt I was in a church service, really, and one was trying to arrange the choir movement. That was the extraordinary feeling about it. And that, I do know, had a most powerful effect. Nobody around. I was once more back in charge of the country.
There were two occasions when that happened. Once during in the riots in Peshawar in April, and then when I went into that room and nothing was happening. It's the most extraordinary thing, that Indian weakness of not taking action.
Don't forget the three C-in-C's were British, and I would like to point out to you that it was an unusual decision that was made. At the time, it was accepted by them all and I'm sure Gandhi himself would have approved." (p. 67-68)
both the Barelwis and the Deobandis were involved. I will try to post later. As for the apparent impotence from the Indian side, it is important to note that JLN was increasingly aggressive against the British and in favour of the INA, between the time period ranging from apparent reports of Bose's death and JLN's visit to Malay hosted by Mountbatten where they really first "got together". Something changed dramatically here - as henceforth suddenly JLN's stance becomes much more moderate and dependent on Mountbatten. 45-47 is exactly the period when the Partition plan was being sharpened. The Malay visit happened in 1946. Here, even though JLN had declared initially his intention to lay a wreath at the site of the INA memorial, he was persuaded by Mountbatten to drop the idea. They apparently had a long chat over dinner and thsi appears to be a turning point.
While commenting about dealing with Nehru, Mountbatten said,
"I used to see most of my ministers about once a fortnight, but Nehru I saw pretty much every day. I told him I had no intention of attending Cabinet meetings. They were quite prepared at the time to have me in but I said, 'No, you must learn to do without me. You are the chief executive, you take the chair. I don't want to be present.' But I said, 'I would appreciate it if I could see all the Cabinet papers before the meetings. And I'd like to see you before you go in because I can perhaps help you over some of your problems before you go in." (Larry Collins And Dominique Lapierre, Mountbatten And Independent India 16 August 1947 - 18 June 1948 p.4).
The extent to which Nehru was controlled by Mountbatten follows in details given by Mountbatten:
"The paper was passed around and the Prime Minister said, "Now we come to item no.3." He did it in a rather unusual way, bless his heart. He had agreed with me it shouldn't go through, it should be rejected. Instead of saying at once it should be rejected, he passed it out. Immediately they all Started jabbering. They all said it was a great idea, and Nehru let them go on and when they had finished he said, "I think it is a very bad idea," and he gave the reasons. He said he'd seen His Excellency who disapproved of the paper and he gave my reason.
But he is only a constitutional head of state, they all said. You don't have to listen to him. This is a paper we want. What does it matter what he thinks? Nehru said, "You don't think we asked Mountbatten to stay here simply as a figurehead? We asked him to stay because he's more experienced than we are as an administrator. He loves India as much as we do. And what he says we should do. I'm not interested in what you think, I am interested in what Mountbatten thinks. He won't have it, and I won't have it. It is thrown out."(p.5-6)
At one place, in his interview, Mountbatten refers to Congres leaders as, "I believe that if the British hadn't put them in prison, they would have been even less qualified, I mean, they weren't very highly qualified when they did take over."(p.7)
When the Punjab Partition violence erupted, Mountbatten was vacationing at Simla. Mountbatten narrated the incident in the interview:
"Menon said, "Your Excellency must return to Delhi". I said, "Don't be silly, V.P., you must come up here-it can't be essential for me to come back. I am a Constitutional Governor-General. If my cabinet has something which they wish me to countersign have them send the documents up here.! shall countersign! "I can't remember whether he rang me again or whether he then said, "Well, as a matter of fact the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister want you to come down."
"Why?"
"They want more than your advice, they want your help."
"Well, I'm not coming, tell them."
He said, "If your Excellency isn't down within 24 hours, don't bother to come. It'll be too late, we will have lost India."
"All right, V.P., old swine," I said, "I shall come down." We ordered the train and down we went. "(p. 44)"
Mountbatten himself felt that whatever was done by Nehru and the others was too much and the people on learning these facts may behave differently. That is why he tried to conceal. While narrating the chain of incidents after his return from Simla, he said:
"The thing was deteriorating and they said, 'We don't know how to hold it'.
I said,"Why not'? You have taken over power."
And Nehru said. "While you were exercising the highest command in the war, we were in prison. You are a professional, a high level administrator. We're not amateurs, we just know nothing. You can't just turn over this country to us, having stayed with us all our lives with all your knowledge and experience, then leave us. without any experience or knowledge of how to do it. Will you run the country?".
"You must understand", Nehru said. "You've got to take it. We pledge ourselves. We shall do whatever you say. We 'U be far more obedient than when you were Viceroy. Please, take over the country." (p. 45-46)
About this offer Mountbatten said, "Well, look, it's terrible, for if it were known that you'd turned over the country to me, you'd be finished. You'd be a laughing-stock. The Indians keep back the British Viceroy and then turn the country back to him? This is out of the question! " (p. 46)
"Well, we may find ways of disguising this, but if you don't do it, we can't manage it."
"All right, "I said it, very reluctantly. "I'll do it, and of course I can pull the country together because I do know how to do it, but I think you must all agree that nobody must know about this. Nobody must know you have made this extravagant offer to me, or these requests; we shall find a solution which will be done in such a way that it will appear to be constitutionally normal, correct and proper. "( p.46)
Mountbatten narrated:
"So you two will ask me. to set up an Emergency Committee in the Cabinet, and I will agree. Will you do that?"
"Yes."
"All right. You 've asked me. I will take the chair because you invite me to?"
"Yes, we invite you."
"The Emergency Committee will consist of the people I will nominate."
"Oh, we must have the whole Cabinet!"
"The whole Cabinet?" I said, "It would be disastrous. I don't want all your odds and sods, I just want the key people. And I want the Director of Civil Aviation, the Director of Railways."
"You can have the Minister."
I said, "I don't want the Minister at all, I want the civil servants who are doing it. I want the Chief of Police, I want the head of the Indian medical services. I want my wife, who will immediately set up a council for all the voluntary organizations. and she will represent them. The Secretary will be General Erskine-Crum, my Conference Secretary. The minutes will be kept by British stenographers. The minutes will be typed in the course of the meeting and handed to people as they go away and be acted on at once. In every case, you invite me to do this?"
"Yes, we invite you."
"Nobody will know that you asked me to tell you what to do. All you're doing is you've left me in the chair. The Prime Minister sits on my right, the Deputy on my left, and every time I'll always go through the motions of consulting you, and whatever I say, you're not going to argue with me, we haven't got time. I'll say, 'I'm sure you wish me to do this,' and you'll say, 'Yes, please.' That's all I want. I don't want you to say anything else."
I said, "Not if you're going to delay things. You can go through the motions of arguing with me so long as you finally do what I say. Do you want me to run the country or are you going to try and make a mess of it yourself!"
"Ah, all right ,"he said. "You can run the country."(p. 46-47)
Mountbatten expressed his concern about this offer in the following words:
"It was the most extraordinary conversation I've ever had and that's why I didn't record it. It is a very dangerous thing, really. This is probably the first time it's been recorded. I told very few of my staff. I struck to the fiction that Nehru and Patel had invited me to come down because they'd decided to set up an Emergency Committee in the Cabinet (They didn't even know what an Emergency Committee was.) They'd asked me to take the chair, and I had with some reluctance, agreed, provided they would sit on each side of me and tell me what they wanted me to do. They'd asked if my secretary would do the notes, and I'd said yes, if it was convenient, and so on." (p. 47-48)
When the interviewers asked him, "You have no record in your notes of the conversation?" Mountbatten responded,
"I'll tell you why you haven't got this. It was not done at the time, it was too hot. What's going to come is very hot, and I wouldn't put it down. It's only now, after 25 years, that I can tell it." (p. 45)
The degree of control expressed continued. When Mountbatten learnt about attack on Gandhi, his press secretary Campbell and Johnson was with him and he told him, "If the old boy dies we're in real trouble." (p.64)
On the way Mountbatten claims to have told his press secretary that the killer was a Hindu. When Allen asked him, how do you know, Mountbatten said, "I don't. But if it is a Muslim we are all finished, so it may as well be a Hindu." (p.65)
Mountbatten claims to have summoned S. Baldev Singh. Nehru, Patel and Baldev Singh, all were in tears. Baldev Singh, the Minister of Defence was at a loss what to do. Mountbatten said to them, "Wait a moment and I'll tell you what to do. Just wait here."I then sent for the three chiefs of staff, all Englishmen. I turned to Nehru and said,
"You must go to All India Radio and broadcast to the country."
"I can't I am not prepared, I don't know what to say."
I said, "Look, it will come. You go to All India Radio and you, Alan, you lay on the programme. Tell them to clear the air and stand by for a broadcast from the P.M."
Again, Nehru protested. He said, "I don't know what to say."
I said, "Look, when you get there, God will tell you what to say. It will be a great speech." And, of course, it was. I'm not trying to blow my own trumpet, but this was the difference between a British trained, political leader and an eastern fatalist. If I'd been in Madras then and not come back to Delhi, I tremble to think of the inaction there would have been. Nothing would have happened at all.
I went back into Gandhiji's room, very quickly, voice down, very slowly. I did it all as though I was in church. I felt I was in a church service, really, and one was trying to arrange the choir movement. That was the extraordinary feeling about it. And that, I do know, had a most powerful effect. Nobody around. I was once more back in charge of the country.
There were two occasions when that happened. Once during in the riots in Peshawar in April, and then when I went into that room and nothing was happening. It's the most extraordinary thing, that Indian weakness of not taking action.
Don't forget the three C-in-C's were British, and I would like to point out to you that it was an unusual decision that was made. At the time, it was accepted by them all and I'm sure Gandhi himself would have approved." (p. 67-68)
Last edited by brihaspati on 25 Aug 2009 01:56, edited 1 time in total.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 12410
- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: A look back at the partition
RayC,
you remind me of those party bosses who agreed to a conclusion of a debate, and then summed it up as the last speaker in favour of his own position knowing well that the others will not have occasion to come back and reply. My response was to your raising issues of strict social divisions between the Hindu and the Muslim and it was you who had wondered how Akbar could obtain a Hindu princess for marriage - and it was you who had gone back to Akbar's period at least apparently in connection with finding root causes behind the Partition. In my post I had clearly cited that this long experience of blocking and intervention in two-way intermingling could have hardened Hindu attitudes towards intermarriage with the Muslim. There is no reconstruction of history here.
you remind me of those party bosses who agreed to a conclusion of a debate, and then summed it up as the last speaker in favour of his own position knowing well that the others will not have occasion to come back and reply. My response was to your raising issues of strict social divisions between the Hindu and the Muslim and it was you who had wondered how Akbar could obtain a Hindu princess for marriage - and it was you who had gone back to Akbar's period at least apparently in connection with finding root causes behind the Partition. In my post I had clearly cited that this long experience of blocking and intervention in two-way intermingling could have hardened Hindu attitudes towards intermarriage with the Muslim. There is no reconstruction of history here.
Re: A look back at the partition
any footnotes from documents to make the Larry Collins And Dominique Lapierre narrative authentic?
After all there City of Joy remains a bit of imaginative re- creation of the truth!
After all there City of Joy remains a bit of imaginative re- creation of the truth!
Re: A look back at the partition
Sadly in your exuberance to show your deep knowledge you don't do an indepth search and just pick and peck.brihaspati wrote:RayC,
you remind me of those party bosses who agreed to a conclusion of a debate, and then summed it up as the last speaker in favour of his own position knowing well that the others will not have occasion to come back and reply. My response was to your raising issues of strict social divisions between the Hindu and the Muslim and it was you who had wondered how Akbar could obtain a Hindu princess for marriage - and it was you who had gone back to Akbar's period at least apparently in connection with finding root causes behind the Partition. In my post I had clearly cited that this long experience of blocking and intervention in two-way intermingling could have hardened Hindu attitudes towards intermarriage with the Muslim. There is no reconstruction of history here.
Please check when the Akbar issue came into being!
Re: A look back at the partition
Brihaspati mahasay,
While I with deep humility concede that you are a well read person and we have much to learn from you, yet you have to give space for disagreement when you become too expansive with the facts and the context.
While I with deep humility concede that you are a well read person and we have much to learn from you, yet you have to give space for disagreement when you become too expansive with the facts and the context.
Re: A look back at the partition
OK. You both have made your points. Can we get back to the topic? So no more replies to each other for atleast five more pages.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 12410
- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: A look back at the partition
Just the ref asked for :Mountbatten and independent India, 16 August 1947-18 June 1948 / [interviewed by] Larry Collins & Dominique Lapierre - by Mountbatten, Louis Mountbatten, Earl, 1900-1979 - its from Vikas, New Delhi, 1984. It is a book of interviews of Mountbatten, hence its Mountbatten's version - footnotes cannot authenticate what he is narrating. As far as I know it has not been formally challenged or banned.
Re: A look back at the partition
ramana wrote:OK. You both have made your points. Can we get back to the topic? So no more replies to each other for atleast five more pages.






The VCOAS has spoken!
Re: A look back at the partition
Many thanks. This is a book I need to read. If true, what a right royal f*ckup or shall I say N**ru this. Did the pain of partition rest really on such flimsy leadership?
Here is some more information:
A view that emerges is that
a) a plausible misperception of "peaceful coexistence"
b) Rapid influx of deo/barelvi jihadis for who Jinnah was the engine.
c) Jinnah could articulate a case to British, who "gave the cake to them"
d) An incompetent leadership, intransigent and dependent on British.
e) The everpresent local goonda.
What I don't understand is, why wasn't Nehru that obvious chump for the British. If he was off with the begging bowl behind the scenes, why did they not let the country be, burn and still control the game? Would Nehru not have been pliant? Or did this follow from the inherent mistrust of the hindoo, or the need to care for the closer, conquering muslims, who had a "genuine case"?
Here is some more information:
Code: Select all
Table: 02 Evolution Of Madaris in Pakistan
Province/Region 1947 1960 1980 1988 2000
Punjab 121 195 1012 1320 3153
NWFP 59 87 426 678 1281
Sindh 21 87 380 291 905
Balochistan 28 70 135 347 692
Azad Kashmir 04 08 29 76 151
Islamabad - 01 27 47 94
Northern Areas 12 16 47 102 185
FATA - - - - 300
Total 245 464 2056 2861 6761
Source: Ministry of Religious Affairs, Islamabad, 1988, 2000. Quoted in Saleem Mansur
Khalid, Deni madaris main ta’leem: ka’fiyat, mas’il, imkanat (Islamabad: Institute of
Policy Studies, Idara-e-Fiqr-e-Islami, 2004) p. 145. (Figures of 1980 are based on reports of
1979).
a) a plausible misperception of "peaceful coexistence"
b) Rapid influx of deo/barelvi jihadis for who Jinnah was the engine.
c) Jinnah could articulate a case to British, who "gave the cake to them"
d) An incompetent leadership, intransigent and dependent on British.
e) The everpresent local goonda.
What I don't understand is, why wasn't Nehru that obvious chump for the British. If he was off with the begging bowl behind the scenes, why did they not let the country be, burn and still control the game? Would Nehru not have been pliant? Or did this follow from the inherent mistrust of the hindoo, or the need to care for the closer, conquering muslims, who had a "genuine case"?
Last edited by samuel on 25 Aug 2009 02:34, edited 1 time in total.
Re: A look back at the partition
Has anyone here tried to consider what would have happened if there had been NO Partition?
Let us list other nations that became independent around that time:
1. Indonesia
2. Malaysia
3. Myanmar
4. Iraq
5. Eqypt
6. Libya
7. Morocco
8. Rwanda
9. Burundi
10. Congo
11. Uganda
12. Afghanistan
13. Ouabngui-Chari (wherever that is)
14. Chad
15. Saudi Arabia
16. Sudan
17. Somalia
18. Ethiopia.
19. Kenya
20. Syria
21. Jordan
19. Tanzania
Any reason to expect that the development of Undivided Pakistan would have been any different from the glorious trajectories of these other beacons of freedom and enlightenment? What has happened to the less-organized religions and cultures of these nations in the years since?
Let us list other nations that became independent around that time:
1. Indonesia
2. Malaysia
3. Myanmar
4. Iraq
5. Eqypt
6. Libya
7. Morocco
8. Rwanda
9. Burundi
10. Congo
11. Uganda
12. Afghanistan
13. Ouabngui-Chari (wherever that is)
14. Chad
15. Saudi Arabia
16. Sudan
17. Somalia
18. Ethiopia.
19. Kenya
20. Syria
21. Jordan
19. Tanzania
Any reason to expect that the development of Undivided Pakistan would have been any different from the glorious trajectories of these other beacons of freedom and enlightenment? What has happened to the less-organized religions and cultures of these nations in the years since?
Washington, Aug. 24: His Divine Excellency Caliph Pervez Akbar of Shāhān-e Jinnah (see inset), accompanied by his 4th wife, Arundhatunnisa Begum, and their entourage arrived in Washington DC today in his personal fleet of 5 Airbus A-380s to attend the Kentucky Derby where his horse Jaswant is one of the favorites. The Caliph is also expected to meet with Assistant Deputy Secretary of State Muddlin HalfBright to discuss the transfer of the northern state of JammuKashmir to the United States in exchange for reducing the national debt of S-e-J by $20B, and releasing the sale of 10 gold-plated F-16 Block 20 two-seater sports airplanes intended for the Caliph's personal fleet. Meanwhile, 1.2 million peasants and Oracle Operators are reported to have died of starvation in the penal colony of bharatrakshak, formerly known as the Nicobar Islands, two months after Cyclone Shireen devastated the colony.
Re: A look back at the partition
Or:
As the hohseh rfseh big kaboosh jani jani army from iran marched into herat to grab land with full chinese support, led by Major Farhat Brar of Swat and Subedar-Major Mohd Rafi of Dhaka, a section of the re-raised Pandey Brigade of the Indian Army, in a brilliant flanking maneuver, captured an entire battalion without firing a shot. Celebrations are on throughout the nation, especially in Sargodha where the major's ancestors hail from.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 12410
- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: A look back at the partition
Barelvi's actually took up a pro-British position. Raza Khan (Founder of Berelwy Seminar) rejected the spiritual jurisdiction of the Ottoman Khilafat based on the accepted position that the caliph must be from Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet to which the Ottomans did not belong. He held the view that the real Khilafat had ended with the first four caliphs (Khulafa al-Rashidun) and protested the ban imposed by Sultan Abd Al-Hamid II against discussions on this subject. Ahmed Rida rejected the jihad against the British occupation of India since "Jihad is not obligatory for us, the Muslims of India, on the basis of the Qur'an. He who holds that it is obligatory is an opponent to the Muslims and intends to harm them!" However the Barelvis finally turned towards a position of supporting the Partition, whereas the Deobandi top leadership stood against Partition.
Deobandi militancy started with Rashemi Romal Movement in Punjab. Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi, from Sialkot, played a central role in it. Sahranpur in UP, New Delhi and South Punjab were important centres of Deobandi activism. Then there is a significant role of Maulana Mahmoodul Hasan who was among the first batch of students from Dar ul Ulum Deoband and was the one who started Deobandi activism in the region. He also founded Jamiat ul Ulma-i-Hind. Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi was his student and was profoundly influenced by him. Ubaidullah Sindhi was the first Deobandi Alim who cast some influence on South Punjab. The other phase was the setting up of Majlis e-Ahrar and its activism against Ahmadis in the 1930s. The down-hill slide for Ahrar started by 1935, when the issue of Masjid Shaheed Ganj flared up and Ahrar had an ambivalent stance regarding it. Ahrar had a short lived political life, but its influence was quite long lasting. Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of Sipah i- Sahaba had Ataullah Shah Bokhari as a source of inspiration. Bokhari also settled in Multan, a centre of South Punjab. The Deobandi mosques and madrassas which were mostly set up in Jalandhar and Ludhiana, were relocated in the South Punjab after Partition. Many seminaries were opened in Multan, Okara, Cheehawatani and Bahawalpur etc. Because a large group of such elements settled in South Punjab, that is why many seminaries like Khairul Madaris and Qasim ul Ulum were opened there. After 1947 the Deobandis got a substantial push.
Shah Wali Ullah and Maulana Abdul Wahab Nijedi are contempories. Shah Wali Ullah had tried to reconnect Arabia and the subcontinent. In Eastern India, Faraizi Movement and Titu Mir's movements followed a turn towards the Deobandi position. Haji Shariat Ullah was also a hardliner. Barelvi Islam has greater accommodation for local culture and social ethos. Shah Wali Ullah's followers waged Tehrik-e-Jihad in 1831-32 at Balakot which was spearheaded by Syed Ahmed Shaheed and Shah Ismael Shaheed. However, with the ascendancy of the British they went into hibernation. However the upper rungs of Wahabi Deobandis took a "nationalist" position in the sens of favouring non-division. Mayo was assassinated by a Wahabi (Sher Ali) in Andamans.
The spiritual leaders of rural Punjab had been turned into feudal lords by the British and used them as its collaborators. Punjabi middle class therefore started nurturing suspicion against that class of pirs and Sajjada Nishins (keepers of shrines). Hence a Deobandi streak started becoming evident in the urban centres of the Punjab from 1920s and 30s. In the south, however, Deobandi extremism found space only after partition in 1947. The British wanted to use these Shia feudal landholders as their collaborators which they did quite successfully as their political influence grew after they were granted proprietary rights of the lands attached to the shrines through Madad-i-Muash jagirs. This is partially true in Jhang, Layyah or Multan. After the Partition, as far as Jhang is considered, many people moved from Rohtak and Hissar and settled down in Jhang city area, where people were mostly carpet weavers by profession and they in collaboration with the local businessmen wanted economic/political space against Shia landlords.
Deobandi militancy started with Rashemi Romal Movement in Punjab. Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi, from Sialkot, played a central role in it. Sahranpur in UP, New Delhi and South Punjab were important centres of Deobandi activism. Then there is a significant role of Maulana Mahmoodul Hasan who was among the first batch of students from Dar ul Ulum Deoband and was the one who started Deobandi activism in the region. He also founded Jamiat ul Ulma-i-Hind. Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi was his student and was profoundly influenced by him. Ubaidullah Sindhi was the first Deobandi Alim who cast some influence on South Punjab. The other phase was the setting up of Majlis e-Ahrar and its activism against Ahmadis in the 1930s. The down-hill slide for Ahrar started by 1935, when the issue of Masjid Shaheed Ganj flared up and Ahrar had an ambivalent stance regarding it. Ahrar had a short lived political life, but its influence was quite long lasting. Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of Sipah i- Sahaba had Ataullah Shah Bokhari as a source of inspiration. Bokhari also settled in Multan, a centre of South Punjab. The Deobandi mosques and madrassas which were mostly set up in Jalandhar and Ludhiana, were relocated in the South Punjab after Partition. Many seminaries were opened in Multan, Okara, Cheehawatani and Bahawalpur etc. Because a large group of such elements settled in South Punjab, that is why many seminaries like Khairul Madaris and Qasim ul Ulum were opened there. After 1947 the Deobandis got a substantial push.
Shah Wali Ullah and Maulana Abdul Wahab Nijedi are contempories. Shah Wali Ullah had tried to reconnect Arabia and the subcontinent. In Eastern India, Faraizi Movement and Titu Mir's movements followed a turn towards the Deobandi position. Haji Shariat Ullah was also a hardliner. Barelvi Islam has greater accommodation for local culture and social ethos. Shah Wali Ullah's followers waged Tehrik-e-Jihad in 1831-32 at Balakot which was spearheaded by Syed Ahmed Shaheed and Shah Ismael Shaheed. However, with the ascendancy of the British they went into hibernation. However the upper rungs of Wahabi Deobandis took a "nationalist" position in the sens of favouring non-division. Mayo was assassinated by a Wahabi (Sher Ali) in Andamans.
The spiritual leaders of rural Punjab had been turned into feudal lords by the British and used them as its collaborators. Punjabi middle class therefore started nurturing suspicion against that class of pirs and Sajjada Nishins (keepers of shrines). Hence a Deobandi streak started becoming evident in the urban centres of the Punjab from 1920s and 30s. In the south, however, Deobandi extremism found space only after partition in 1947. The British wanted to use these Shia feudal landholders as their collaborators which they did quite successfully as their political influence grew after they were granted proprietary rights of the lands attached to the shrines through Madad-i-Muash jagirs. This is partially true in Jhang, Layyah or Multan. After the Partition, as far as Jhang is considered, many people moved from Rohtak and Hissar and settled down in Jhang city area, where people were mostly carpet weavers by profession and they in collaboration with the local businessmen wanted economic/political space against Shia landlords.
Re: A look back at the partition
Here is a paper that may be useful:
http://www.gcu.edu.pk/FullTextJour/Hist ... P28-50.pdf
and
http://www.sacw.net/partition/june2004IshtiaqAhmed.pdf
http://www.gcu.edu.pk/FullTextJour/Hist ... P28-50.pdf
and
http://www.sacw.net/partition/june2004IshtiaqAhmed.pdf
Re: A look back at the partition
http://persian.packhum.org/persian/main
To study the The mindset in perspective.
To study the The mindset in perspective.
Re: A look back at the partition
shravan wrote:Interesting insight into the partition of India. Sorry if already posted.
History of Independence & partition of India
Is the above article correct ?
This is pretty much how I understood it from what I have read and the references I posted in the following post
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 07#p723407
Re: A look back at the partition
N Guru>> you bring sanity to those who just want to hukka smoking and visualizing things. The problem with hookah effort is that it goes in a puff!
Re: A look back at the partition
Next up; dispelling the notion of peaceful coexistence (we've seen examples of intransigence and domination).
From: Dr. Ambedkar's book
From: Dr. Ambedkar's book
CHAPTER VII: HINDU ALTERNATIVE TO PAKISTAN
[IV]
[The riot-torn history of Hindu-Muslim relations, 1920-1940]
Such is the history of Mr. Gandhi's efforts to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity. What fruits did these efforts bear? To be able to answer this question it is necessary to examine the relationship between the two communities during 1920-40, the years during which Mr. Gandhi laboured so hard to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity. The relationship is well described in the Annual Reports on the affairs of India submitted year by year to Parliament by the Government of India under the old Government of India Act. It is on these reports/1/ that I have drawn for the facts recorded below.
Beginning with the year 1920 there occurred in that year in Malabar what is known as the Mopla Rebellion. It was the result of the agitation carried out by two Muslim organizations, the Khuddam-i-Kaba (servants of the Mecca Shrine) and the Central Khilafat Committee. Agitators actually preached the doctrine that India under the British Government was Dar-ul-Harab and that the Muslims must fight against it and if they could not, they must carry out the alternative principle of Hijrat. The Moplas were suddenly carried off their feet by this agitation. The outbreak was essentially a rebellion against the British Government The aim was to establish the kingdom of Islam by overthrowing the British Government. Knives, swords and spears were secretly manufactured, bands of desperadoes collected for an attack on British authority. On 20th August a severe encounter took place between the Moplas and the British forces at Pinmangdi Roads were blocked, telegraph lines cut, and the railway destroyed in a number of places. As soon as the administration had been paralysed, the Moplas declared that Swaraj had been established. A certain Ali Mudaliar was proclaimed Raja, Khilafat flags were flown, and Ernad and Wallurana were declared Khilafat Kingdoms. As a rebellion against the British Government it was quite understandable. But what baffled most was the treatment accorded by the Moplas to the Hindus of Malabar. The Hindus were visited by a dire fate at the hands of the Moplas. Massacres, forcible conversions, desecration of temples, foul outrages upon women, such as ripping open pregnant women, pillage, arson and destruction—in short, all the accompaniments of brutal and unrestrained barbarism, were perpetrated freely by the Moplas upon the Hindus until such time as troops could be hurried to the task of restoring order through a difficult and extensive tract of the country. This was not a Hindu-Moslem riot. This was just a Bartholomew. The number of Hindus who were killed, wounded or converted, is not known. But the number must have been enormous.
In the year 1921-22 communal jealously did not subside. The Muharram Celebrations had been attended by serious riots both in Bengal and in the Punjab. In the latter province in particular, communal feeling at Multan reached very serious heights, and although the casualty list was comparatively small, a great deal of damage to property was done.
Though the year 1922-23 was a peaceful year the relations between the two communities were strained throughout 1923-24. But in no locality did this tension produce such tragic consequences as in the city of Kohat. The immediate cause of the trouble was the publication and circulation of a pamphlet containing a virulently anti-Islamic poem. Terrible riots broke out on the 9th and 10th of September 1924, the total casualties being about 155 killed and wounded. House property to the estimated value of Rs. 9 lakhs was destroyed, and a large quantity of goods were looted. As a result of this reign of terror the whole Hindu population evacuated the city of Kohat. After protracted negotiations an agreement of reconciliation was concluded between the two communities. Government giving an assurance that, subject to certain reservations, the prosecution pending against persons concerned in rioting should be dropped. With the object of enabling the sufferers to restart their businesses and rebuild their houses, Government sanctioned advances, free of interest in certain instances, amounting to Rs. 5 lakhs. But even after the settlement had been reached and evacuees had returned to Kohat there was no peace, and throughout 1924-25 the tension between the Hindu and Musalman masses in various parts of the country increased to a lamentable extent. In the summer months, there was a distressing number of riots. In July, severe fighting broke out between Hindus and Musalmans in Delhi, which was accompanied by serious casualties. In the same month, there was a bad outbreak at Nagpur. August was even worse. There were riots at Lahore, at Lucknow, at Moradabad, at Bhagalpur and Nagpur in British India; while a severe affray took place at Gulbarga in the Nizam's Dominions. September-October saw severe fighting at Lucknow, Shahajahanpur, Kankinarah and at Allahabad. The most terrible outbreak of the year being the one that took place at. Kohat which was accompanied by murder, arson and loot.
In 1925-26 the antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims became widespread. Very significant features of the Hindu-Muslim rioting, which took place during this year were its wide distribution and its occurrence, in some cases, in small villages. Calcutta, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces and the Bombay Presidency were all scenes of riots, some of which led to regrettable losses of life. Certain minor and local Hindu festivals which occurred at the end of August, gave rise to communal trouble in Calcutta, in Berar, in Gujarat in the Bombay Presidency, and in the United Provinces. In some of these places there were actual clashes between the two communities, but elsewhere, notably at Kankinarah—one of the most thickly populated jute mill centres of Calcutta—serious rioting was prevented by the activity of the police. In Gujarat, Hindu-Muslim feeling was running high in these days and was marked by at least one case of temple desecration. The important Hindu festival of Ramlila, at the end of September, gave rise to acute anxiety in many places, and at Aligarh, an important place in the United Provinces, its celebration was marked by one of the worst riots of the year. The riot assumed such dangerous proportions that the police were compelled to fire in order to restore order, and five persons were killed, either by the police or by riots. At Lucknow, the same festival gave rise at one time to a threatening situation, but the local authorities prevented actual rioting. October saw another serious riot at Sholapur in the Bombay Presidency. There, the local Hindus were taking a car with Hindu idols through the city, and when they came near a mosque, a dispute arose between them and certain Muslims, which developed into a riot.
A deplorable rioting started in Calcutta in the beginning of April as an affray outside a mosque between Muslims and some Arya Samajists and continued to spread until 5th April, though there was only one occasion on which the police or military were faced by a crowd which showed determined resistance, namely, on the evening of the 5th April, when fire had to be opened. There was also a great deal of incendiarism and in the first three days of this incendiarism, the Fire Brigade had to deal with 110 fires. An unprecedented feature of the riots was the attacks on temples by Muslims and on mosques by Hindus which naturally led to intense bitterness. There were 44 deaths and 584 injured. There was a certain amount of looting and business was suspended, with great economic loss to Calcutta. Shops began to reopen soon after the 5th, but the period of tension was prolonged by the approach of a Hindu festival on the 13th of April, and of the Id on the 14th. The Sikhs were to have taken out a procession on the 13th, but Government were unable to give them the necessary license. The apprehensions with regard to the 13th and 14th of April, fortunately, did not materialise and outward peace prevailed until 22nd April when it was abruptly broken as a result of a petty quarrel in a street, which restarted the rioting. Fighting between the mobs of the two communities, generally on a small scale, accompanied by isolated assaults and murders continued for six days. During this period there were no attacks on the temples and mosques and there was little arson or looting. But there were more numerous occasions, on which the hostile mobs did not immediately disperse on the appearance of the police and on 12 occasions it was necessary to open fire. The total number of casualties during this second phase of the rioting was 66 deaths and 391 injured. The dislocation of business was much more serious during the first riots and the closing of Marwari business houses was not without an effect on European business firms. Panic caused many of the markets to be wholly or partially closed and for two days the meat supply was practically stopped. So great was the panic that the removal of refuse in the disturbed area was stopped. Arrangements were, however, made to protect supplies, and the difficulty with the Municipal scavengers was overcome, as soon as the Municipality had applied to the police for protection. There was slight extension of the area of rioting, but no disturbances occurred in the mill area around Calcutta. Systematic raiding of the portions of the disturbed area, the arrest of hooligans, the seizure of weapons and the re-inforcement of the police by the posting of British soldiers to act as special police officers had the desired effect, and the last three days of April, in spite of the continuance of isolated assaults and murders, witnessed a steady improvement in the situation. Isolated murders were largely attributable to hooligans of both communities and their persistence during the first as well as the second outbreak induced a general belief that these hooligans were hired assassins. Another equally persistent feature of the riots, namely, the distribution of inflammatory printed leaflets by both sides, together with the employment of hired roughs, strengthened the belief that money had been spent to keep the riots going.
The year 1926-27 was one continuous period of communal riots. Since April 1926, every month witnessed affrays more or less serious between partizans of the two communities and only two months passed without actual rioting in the legal sense of the word. The examination of the circumstances of these numerous riots and affrays shows that they originated either in utterly petty and trivial disputes between individuals, as, for example, between a Hindu shopkeeper and a Mahomedan customer, or else, the immediate cause of trouble was the celebration of some religious festival or the playing of music by Hindu processionists in the neighbourhood of Mahomedan places of worship. One or two of the riots, indeed, were due to nothing more than strained nerves and general excitement. Of these, the most striking example occurred in Delhi on 24th June, when the bolting of a pony in a crowded street gave the impression that a riot had started, upon which both sides immediately attacked each other with brickbats and staves.
Including the two outbursts of rioting in Calcutta during April and May 1926, 40 riots took place during the twelve months ending with April 1st 1927, resulting in the death of 197 and injuries, more or less severe, to 1,598 persons. These disorders were widespread, but Bengal, the Punjab, and the United Provinces were the parts of India most seriously affected. Bengal suffered most from rioting, but on many occasions during the year, tension between Hindus and Mahomedans was high in the Bombay Presidency and also in Sind. Calcutta remained uneasy throughout the whole of the summer. On 1st June a petty dispute developed into a riot in which forty persons were hurt. After this, there was a lull in overt violence until July 15th, on which day fell an important Hindu religious festival. During its celebration the passage of a procession, with bands playing in the neighbourhood of certain mosques, resulted in a conflict, in which 14 persons were killed and 116 injured. The next day saw the beginning of the important Mahomedan festival of Muharram. Rioting broke out on that day and, after a lull, was renewed on the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd. Isolated assaults and cases of stabbing occurred on the 23rd, 24th and 25th. The total ascertained casualties during this period of rioting were 28 deaths and 226 injured. There were further riots in Calcutta on the 15th September and 16th October and on the latter day there was also rioting in the adjoining city of Howrah, during which one or two persons were killed and over 30 injured. The April and May riots had been greatly aggravated by incendiarism, but, happily, this feature was almost entirely absent from the later disorders and during the July riots, for example, the Fire Brigade was called upon to deal with only four incendiary fires.
Coming to the year 1927-28 the following facts stare us in the face. Between the beginning of April and the end of September 1927, no fewer than 25 riots were reported. Of these 10 occurred in the United Provinces, six in the Bombay Presidency, 2 each in the Punjab, the Central Provinces, Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa, and one in Delhi. The majority of these riots occurred during the celebration of a religious festival by one or other of the two communities, whilst some arose out of the playing of music by Hindus in the neighbourhood of mosques or out of the slaughter of cows by the Muslims. The total casualties resulting from the above disorders were approximately 103 persons killed and 1,084 wounded.
By far the most serious riot reported during the year was that which took place in Lahore between the 4th and 7th of May 1927. Tension between the two communities had been acute for some time before the outbreak, and the trouble when it came was precipitated by a chance collision between a Mahomedan and two Sikhs. The disorder spread with lightning speed and the heavy casualty list—27 killed 272 injured—was largely swollen by unorganised attacks on individuals. Police and troops were rushed to the scene of rioting quickly and it was impossible for clashes on a big scale to take place between hostile groups. Casual assassinations and assaults were however, reported, for two or three days longer before the streets and lanes of Lahore became safe for the solitary passerby.
After the Lahore riot in May, there was a lull for two months in inter-communal rioting, if we except a minor incident, which happened about the middle of June in Bihar and Orissa ; but July witnessed no fewer than eight riots of which the most serious occurred in Multan in the Punjab, on the occasion of the annual Muharram celebrations. Thirteen killed and twenty-four wounded was the toll taken by this riot. But August was to see worse rioting still. In that month, nine riots occurred, two of them resulting in heavy loss of life. In a riot in Bettiah, a town in Bihar and Orissa, arising out of a dispute over a religious procession, eleven persons were killed and over a hundred injured, whilst the passage of a procession in front of a mosque in Bareilly in the United Provinces was the occasion of rioting in which fourteen persons were killed and 165 were injured. Fortunately, this proved to be the turning point in inter-communal trouble during the year, and September witnessed only 4 riots. One of these, however, the riot in Nagpur in the Central Provinces on September 4th was second only to Lahore riot in seriousness and in the damage which it caused. The spark, which started the fire, was the trouble in connection with a Muslim procession, but the materials for the combustion had been collected for some time. Nineteen persons were killed and 123 injured were admitted to hospitals as a result of this riot, during the course of which many members of the Muslim community abandoned their homes in Nagpur.
A feature of Hindu-Muslim relations during the year which was hardly less serious than the riots was the number of murderous outrages committed by members of one community against persons belonging to the other. Some of the most serious of these outrages were perpetrated in connection with the agitation relating to Rangila Rasul and Risala Vartman, two publications containing most scurrilous attack on the Prophet Muhammed, and as a result of them, a number of innocent persons lost their lives, sometimes in circumstances of great barbarity. In Lahore a series of outrages against individuals led to a state of great excitement and insecurity during the summer of 1927.
The excitement over the Rangila Rasul/2/ case had by now travelled far from its original centre and by July had begun to produce unpleasant repercussions on and across the North-West Frontier. The first signs of trouble in this region became apparent early in June, and by the latter part of July the excitement had reached its height. On the British side of the border, firm and tactful handling of the situation by the local authorities averted, what would have been a serious breach of the peace. Economic boycott of Hindus was freely advocated in the British Frontier Districts, especially in Peshawar, but this movement met with little success, and although the Hindus were maltreated in one or two villages, the arrest of the culprits, together with appropriate action under the Criminal Law, quickly restored order. Across the border however, the indignation, aroused by these attacks on the Prophet, gave rise to more serious consequences. The Frontier tribesmen are acutely sensitive to the appeal of religion and when a well-known Mullah started to preach against the Hindus among the Afridis and Shinwaris in the neighbourhood of the Khyber Pass, his words fell on fruitful ground. He called upon the Afridis and Shinwaris to expel all the Hindus living in their midst unless they declared in writing that they dissociated themselves from the doings of their co-religionists down country. The first to expel their Hindu neighbours were two clans of the Khyber Afridis, namely the Kuikhel and Zakkakhel, on the 22nd July. From these, the excitement spread among their Shinwari neighbours, who gave their Hindu neighbours notice to quit a few days later. However, after the departure of some of the Hindus, the Shinwaris agreed to allow the remainder to stay on. Some of the Hindus on leaving the Khyber were roughly handled. In two cases, stones were thrown, though happily without any damage resulting. In a third case, a Hindu was wounded and a large amount of property carried off, but this was recovered by Afridi Khassadars in full, and the culprits were fined for the offence. Thereafter, arrangements were made for the picketing of the road for the passage of any Hindu evacuating tribal territory. Under pressure from the Political Agent an Afridi jirga decided towards the end of July to suspend the Hindu boycott pending a decision in the Risala Vartman case. In the following week, however, several Hindu families, who had been living at Landi Kotal at the head of the Khyber Pass moved to Peshawar refusing to accept assurances of the tribal chiefs but leaving one person from each family behind to watch over their interests. All told, between four hundred and fifty Hindus, men, women and children, had come into Peshawar by the Middle of August, when the trouble was definitely on the wane. Some of the Hindus were definitely expelled, some were induced to leave their homes by threats, some left from fear, some no doubt from sympathy with their neighbours. This expulsion and voluntary exodus from tribal territory were without parallel. Hindus had lived there for more generations than most of them could record as valued and respected, and, indeed, as essential members of the tribal system, for whose protection the tribesmen had been jealous, and whose blood feuds they commonly made their own. In all, about 450 Hindus left the Khyber during the excitement; of these, about 330 had returned to their homes in tribal territory by the close of the year 1927. Most of the remainder had decided to settle, at any rate for the present, amid the more secure conditions of British India.
The year 1928-29 was comparatively more peaceful than the year 1927-28. His Excellency Lord Irwin, by his speeches to the Central Legislature and outside, had given a strong impetus to the attempts to find some basis for agreement between the two communities, on those questions of political importance, which were responsible for the strained relations between them. Fortunately the issues arising out of the inquiry by the Simon Commission which was appointed in 1929, absorbed a large part of the energy and attention of the different communities, with the result that less importance came to be attached to local causes of conflict, and more importance to the broad question of constitutional policy. Moreover, the legislation passed during the autumn session of the Indian Legislature in 1927 penalising the instigation of inter-communal hostility by the press, had some effect in improving the inter-communal disturbances. The number of riots during the twelve months ending with March 31st, 1929, was 22. Though the number of riots was comparatively small, the casualties,—swelled heavily by the Bombay riots,—were very serious, no fewer than 204 persons having been killed and nearly a thousand injured. Of these, the fortnight's rioting in Bombay accounts for 149 killed and 739 injured. Seven of these 22 riots, or roughly one-third of them, occurred on the day of the celebration of the annual Muslim festival of Bakr-i-Id at the end of May. The celebration of this festival is always a dangerous time in Hindu-Muslim relations. The Muslim regard it as a day of animal sacrifice, and as the animal chosen is almost always a cow the slightest tension between the two communities is apt to produce an explosion. Of the Bakr-i-Id riots only two were serious and both of them took place in the Punjab. The first took place in a village in the Ambala District in which ten people were killed and nine injured. The other riot which took place in Softa village in the Gurgaon District in the Southern Punjab, attained considerable notoriety because of its sensational features. The village of Softa is about 27 miles south of Delhi and is inhabited by Muslims. This village is surrounded by villages occupied by Hindu cultivators who, on hearing that the muslims of Softa intended to sacrifice a cow on the 'Id Day,' objected to the sacrifice of the particular cow selected on the ground that it had been accustomed to graze in fields belonging to the Hindu cultivators. The dispute over the matter assumed a threatening aspect and the Superintendent of Police of the district accordingly went with a small force of police, about 25 men in all, to try to keep peace. He took charge of the disputed cow and locked it up, but his presence did not deter the Hindu cultivators of a few neighbouring villages from collecting about a thousand people armed with pitchforks, spears and staves, and going to Softa. The Superintendent of Police and an Indian Revenue official, who were present in the village, assured the crowd that the cow, in connection with which the dispute had arisen would not be sacrificed, but this did not satisfy the mob which threatened to burn the whole village if any cow was sacrificed, and also demanded that the cow should be handed over to them. The Superintendent of Police refused to agree to this demand, whereupon the crowd became violent and began to throw stones at the police and to try to get round the latter into the village. The Superintendent of Police warned the crowd to disperse, but to no effect. He, therefore, fired one shot from his revolver as a further warning. Notwithstanding the crowd still continued to advance and the Superintendent had to order his party of police to fire. Only one volley was fired at first, but as this did not cause the retreat of the mob, two more volleys had to be fired before the crowd slowly dispersed, driving off some cattle belonging to the village.
While the police were engaged in this affair a few Hindu cultivators got into Softa at another place and tried to set fire to the village. They were, however, driven away by the police after they had inflicted injuries on three or four men. In all 14 persons were killed and 33 were injured. The Punjab Government deputed a judicial officer to enquire into this affair. His report, which was published on 6th July, justified the action of the police in firing on the mob and recorded the opinion that there was no reason to suppose that the firing was excessive or was continued after the mob had desisted from its unlawful aggression. Had the police not opened fire, the report proceeds, their own lives would have been in immediate danger, as also the lives of the people of Softa. Lastly, in the opinion of the officer writing the report, had Softa village been sacked, there would certainly have broken up, within 24 hours, a terrible communal conflagration in the whole of the surrounding country-side.
The riots of Kharagpur, an important railway centre not far from Calcutta, also resulted in serious loss of life. Two riots took place at Kharagpur, the first on the occasion of the Muharram celebration at the end of June and the second on the 1st September 1928, when the killing of a cow served as a cause. In the first riot 15 were killed and 21 injured, while in the second riot, the casualties were 9 killed and 35 wounded. But none of these riots is to be compared with those that raged in Bombay from the beginning to the middle of February, when, as we have seen, 149 persons were killed and well over 700 injured.
During the year 1929-30 communal riots, which had been so conspicuous and deplorable a feature of public life during the preceding years, were very much less frequent. Only 12 were of sufficient importance to be reported to Government of India, and of these only the disturbances in the City of Bombay were really serious. Starting on the 23rd of April they continued sporadically until the middle of May, and were responsible for 35 deaths and about 200 other casualties. An event which caused considerable tension in April was the murder at Lahore of Rajpal, whose pamphlet Rangila Rasul, containing a scurrilous attack on the Prophet of Islam, was responsible for much of the communal trouble in previous years, and also for a variety of legal and political complications. Fortunately, both communities showed commendable restraint at the time of the murder, and again on the occasion of the execution and funeral of the convicted man; and although feelings ran high no serious trouble occurred.
The year 1930-31 saw the eruption of the Civil Disobedience Movement. It gave rise to riots and disturbances all over the country. They were mostly of a political character and the parties involved in them were the police and the Congress volunteers. But, as it always happens in India, the political disturbances took a communal twist. This was due to the fact that the Muslims refused to submit to the coercive methods used by Congress volunteers to compel them to join in Civil Disobedience. The result was that although the year began with political riots it ended in numerous and quite serious communal riots. The worst of these communal riots took place in and around Sukkur in Sind between the 4th and 11th of August and affected over a hundred villages. The outbreak in the Kishoreganj subdivision of Mymensingh District (Bengal) on the 12th/15th of July was also on a large scale. In addition, there were communal disturbances on the 3rd of August in Ballia (United Provinces); on the 6th of September in Nagpur, and on the 6th/7th September in Bombay; and a Hindu-Christian riot broke out near Tiruchendur (Madras) on the 31st of October. On the 12th of February, in Amritsar, an attempt was made to murder a Hindu cloth merchant who had defied the picketers, and a similar outrage which was perpetrated the day before in Benares had very serious consequences. On this occasion, the victim was a Muslim trader, and the attack proved fatal; as a result, since Hindu-Muslim relations throughout most of Northern India were by this time very strained, a serious communal riot broke out and continued for five days, causing great destruction of property and numerous casualties. Among the other communal clashes during this period were the riots at Nilphamari (Bengal) on the 25th of January and at Rawalpindi on the 31st. Throughout Northern India communal relations had markedly deteriorated during the first two months of 1931, and already, in February, there had been serious communal rioting in Benares, This state of affairs was due chiefly to the increasing exasperation created among Muslims by the paralysis of trade and the general atmosphere of unrest and confusion that resulted from Congress activities. The increased importance which the Congress seemed to be acquiring as a result of the negotiations with the Government aroused in the Muslims serious apprehensions and had the effect of worsening the tension between the two communities. During March, this tension, in the United Provinces at any rate, became greatly increased. Between the 14th and 16th there was serious rioting in the Mirzapur District, and on the 17th, trouble broke out in Agra and continued till the 20th. There was also a communal riot in Dhanbad (Bengal) on the 28th, and in Amritsar District on the 30th ; and in many other parts of the country, the relations between members of the two communities had become extremely strained.
In Assam, the communal riot which occurred at Digboi in Lakhimpur District, resulted in deaths of one Hindu and three Muslims. In Bengal, a communal riot took place in the Asansol division during the Muharram festival. In Bihar and Orissa there was a certain amount of communal tension during the year, particularly in Saran. Altogether there were 16 cases of communal rioting and unlawful assembly. During the Bakr-i-Id festival a clash occurred in the Bhabua sub-division of Shahabad. Some 300 Hindus collected in the mistaken belief that a cow had been sacrificed. The local officers had succeeded in pacifying them when a mob of about 200 Muhammedans armed with lathis, spears and swords, attacked the Hindus, one of whom subsequently died. The prompt action of the police and the appointment of a conciliation committee prevented the spread of the trouble. The Muharram festival was marked by two small riots in Monghyr, the Hindus being the aggressors on one occasion and the Muslims on the other. In the Madras Presidency there were also several riots of a communal nature during the year and the relations between the communities were in places distinctly strained. The most serious disturbance of the year occurred at Vellore on the 8th of June, as a result of the passage of a Muslim procession with Tazias near a Hindu temple; so violent was the conflict between members of the two communities that the police were compelled to open fire in order to restore order; and sporadic fighting continued in the town during the next two or three days. In Salem town, owing to Hindu-Muslim tension a dispute arose on the 13th of July, as to who had been the victor at a largely attended Hindu-Muslim wrestling match at Shevapet. Another riot occurred in October at Kitchipalaiyam near Salem town ; the trouble arose from a few Muslims disturbing a street game played by some young Hindus. Hindu-Muslim disturbances also arose in Polikal village, Kurnool District, on the 15th of March, owing to a dispute about the route of a Hindu procession, but the rioters were easily dispersed by a small force of police. In the Punjab there were 907 cases of rioting during the year as compared with 813 in 1929. Many of them were of a communal character, and the tension between the two principal communities remained acute in many parts of the Province. In the United Provinces, although communal tension during 1930 was not nearly so acute as during the first 3 months of 1931, and was for a while overshadowed by the excitement engendered by the Civil Disobedience Movement, indications of it were fairly numerous, and the causes of disagreement remained as potent as ever. In Dehra Dun and Bulandshahr there were communal riots of the usual type, and a very serious riot occurred in Ballia city as a result of a dispute concerning the route taken by a Hindu procession, which necessitated firing by the police. Riots also occurred in Muttra, Azamgarh, Mainpuri and several other places.
Passing on to the events of the year 1931-32, the progress of constitutional discussions at the R. T. C. had a definite reaction in that it bred a certain nervousness among the Muslim and other minority communities as to their position under a constitution functioning on the majority principle. The first session of the Round Table Conference afforded the first "close-up" of the constitutional future. Until then the ideal of Dominion Status had progressed little beyond a vague and general conception, but the declaration of the Princes at the opening of the Conference had brought responsibility at the Centre, in the form of a federal government, within definite view. The Muslims, therefore, felt that it was high time for them to take stock of their position. This uneasiness was intensified by the Irwin-Gandhi settlement, which accorded what appeared to be a privileged position to the Congress, and Congress elation and pose of victory over the Government did not tend to ease Muslim misgivings. Within three weeks of the "pact" occurred the savage communal riots at Cawnpore, which significantly enough began with the attempts of Congress adherents to force Mahomedan shopkeepers to observe a hartal in memory of Bhagat Singh who was executed on 23rd March. On 24th March began the plunder of Hindu shops. On the 25th there was a blaze. Shops and temples were set fire to and burnt to cinders. Disorder, arson, loot, murder, spread like wild fire. Five hundred families abandoned their houses and took shelter in villages. Dr. Ramchandra was one of the worst sufferers. All members of his family, including his wife and aged parents, were killed and their bodies thrown into gutters. In the same slaughter Mr. Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi lost his life. The Cawnpore Riots Inquiry Committee in its report states that the riot was of unprecedented violence and peculiar atrocity, which spread with unexpected rapidity through the whole city and even beyond it. Murders, arson and looting were widespread for three days, before the rioting was definitely brought under control. Afterwards it subsided gradually. The loss of life and property was great. The number of verified deaths was 300; but the death roll is known to have been larger and was probably between four and five hundred. A large number of temples and mosques were desecrated or burnt or destroyed and a very large number of houses were burnt and pillaged.
This communal riot, which need never have occurred but for the provocative conduct of the adherents of the Congress, was the worst which India has experienced for many years. The trouble, moreover, spread from the city to the neighbouring villages, where there were sporadic communal disturbances for several days afterwards.
The year 1932-33 was relatively free from communal agitations and disturbances. This welcome improvement was doubtless in some measure due to the suppression of lawlessness generally and the removal of uncertainty in regard to the position of the Muslims under the new constitution.
But in 1933-34 throughout the country communal tension had been increasing and disorders which occurred not only on the occasion of such festivals as Holi, Id and Muharram, but also many resulting from ordinary incidents of every-day life, indicated that there had been a deterioration in communal relations since the year began. Communal riots during Holi occurred at Benares and Cawnpore in the United Provinces, at Lahore in the Punjab, and at Peshawar. Bakr-i-ld was marked by serious rioting at Ayodhya, in the United Provinces over cow sacrifice, also at Bhagalpore in Bihar and Orissa and at Cannanore in Madras. A serious riot in the Ghazipur District of the United Provinces also resulted in several deaths. During April and May there were Hindu-Muslim riots at several places in Bihar and Orissa, in Bengal, in Sind and Delhi, some of them provoked by very trifling incidents, as for instance, the unintentional spitting by a Muslim shopkeeper of Delhi upon a Hindu passer-by. The increase in communal disputes in British India was also reflected in some of the States where similar incidents occurred.
The position with regard to communal unrest during the months from June to October was indicative of the normal, deep-seated antagonism between the two major communities. June and July months, in which no Hindu or Muhammedan festival of importance took place, were comparatively free from riots, though the situation in certain areas of Bihar necessitated the quartering of additional police. A long-drawn-out dispute started in Agra. The Muslims of this city objected to the noise of religious ceremonies in certain Hindu private houses which they said disturbed worshippers at prayers in a neighbouring mosque. Before the dispute was settled, riots occurred on the 20th July and again on the 2nd September, in the course of which 4 persons were killed and over 80 injured. In Madras a riot, on the 3rd September resulting in one death and injuries to 13 persons was occasioned by a book published by Hindus containing alleged reflections on the Prophet. During the same month minor riots occurred in several places in the Punjab and the United Provinces.
In 1934-35 serious trouble arose in Lahore on the 29th June as a result of a dispute between Muslims and Sikhs about a mosque situated within the precincts of a Sikh temple known as the Shahidganj Gurudwara. Trouble had been brewing for some time. Ill-feeling became intensified when the Sikhs started to demolish the Mosque despite Muslim protests. The building had been the subject of prolonged litigation, which has confirmed the Sikh right of possession.
On the night of the 29th June a crowd of 3 or 4 thousand Muslims assembled in front of the Gurudwara. A struggle between this crowd and the Sikhs inside the Gurudwara was only averted by the prompt action of the local authorities. They subsequently obtained an undertaking from the Sikhs to refrain from further demolition. But during the following week, while strenuous efforts were being made to persuade the leaders to reach an amicable settlement, the Sikhs under pressure of extremist influence again set about demolishing the mosque. This placed the authorities in a most difficult position. The Sikhs were acting within their legal rights. Moreover the only effective method of stopping demolition would have been to resort to firing. As the building was full of Sikhs and was within the precincts of a Sikh place of worship, this would not only have caused much bloodshed but, for religious reasons, would have had serious reactions on the Sikh population throughout the Province. On the other hand, inaction by Government was bound to cause great indignation among the Muslims, for religious reasons: and it was expected that this would show itself in sporadic attacks on the Sikhs and perhaps on the forces of Government.
It was hoped that discussions between leaders of the two communities would effect some rapprochement, but mischief-makers inflamed the minds of their co-religionists. Despite the arrest of the chief offenders, the excitement increased. The Government's gesture in offering to restore to the Muslims another mosque which they had purchased years ago proved unavailing. The situation took a further turn for the worse on the 19th July and during the following two days the situation was acutely dangerous. The Central Police station was practically besieged by the huge crowds, which assumed a most menacing attitude. Repeated attempts to disperse them without the use of firearms failed and the troops had to fire twice on the 20th July and eight times on the 21st. In all 23 rounds were fired and 12 persons killed. Casualties, mostly of a minor nature, were numerous amongst the military and police.
As a result of the firing, the crowds dispersed and did not reassemble. Extra police were brought in from other Provinces and the military garrisons were strengthened. Administrative control was re-established rapidly, but the religious leaders continued to fan the embers of the agitation. Civil litigation was renewed and certain Muslim organisations framed some extravagant demands.
The situation in Lahore continued to cause anxiety up to the close of the year. On the 6th November, a Sikh was mortally wounded by a Muslim. Three days later a huge Sikh-Hindu procession was taken out. The organisers appeared anxious to avoid conflict but nonetheless one serious clash occurred. This was followed by further rioting on the next day. But for the good work of the police and the troops, in breaking up the fights quickly, the casualties might have been very large.
On the 19th March 1935 a serious incident occurred in Karachi after the execution of Abdul Quayum, the Muslim who had murdered Nathuramal, a Hindu, already referred to as the writer of a scurrilous pamphlet about the Prophet. Abdul Quayum's body was taken by the District Magistrate, accompanied by a police party, to be handed over to the deceased's family for burial outside the city. A huge crowd, estimated to be about 25,000 strong, collected at the place of burial. Though the relatives of Abdul Quayum wished to complete the burial at the cemetery, the most violent members of the mob determined to take the body in procession through the city. The local authorities decided to prevent the mob entering, since this would have led to communal rioting. All attempts of the police to stop the procession failed, so a platoon of the Royal Sussex Regiment was brought in to keep peace. It was forced to open fire at short range to stop the advance of the frenzied mob and to prevent itself from being overwhelmed. Forty-seven rounds were fired by which 47 people were killed and 134 injured. The arrival of reinforcements prevented further attempts to advance. The wounded were taken to the Civil Hospital and the body of Abdul Quayum was then interred without further trouble.
On the 25th August 1935 there was a communal riot at Secunderabad.
In the year 1936 there were four communal riots. On the 14th April there occurred a most terrible riot at Firozabad in the Agra District. A Muslim procession was proceeding along the main bazar and it is alleged that bricks were thrown from the roofs of Hindu houses. This enraged the Muslims in the procession who set fire to the house of a Hindu, Dr. Jivaram, and the adjacent temple of Radha Krishna. The inmates of Dr. Jivaram's house in addition to 11 Hindus including 3 children were burnt to death. A second Hindu-Muslim riot broke out in Poona in the Bombay Presidency on 24th April 1936. On the 27th April there occurred a Hindu-Muslim riot in Jamalpur in the Monghyr District. The fourth Hindu-Muslim riot of the year took place in Bombay on the 15th October 1936.
The year 1937 was full of communal disturbances. On the 27th March 1937 there was a Hindu-Muslim riot at Panipat over the Holi procession and 14 persons were killed. On the 1st May 1937 there occurred a communal riot in Madras in which 50 persons were injured. The month of May was full of communal riots which took place mostly in the C. P. and the Punjab. One that took place in Shikarpur in Sind caused great panic. On 18th June there was a Sikh-Muslim riot in Amritsar. It assumed such proportions that British troops had to be called out to maintain order.
The year 1938 was marked by two communal riots—one in Allahabad on 26th March and another in Bombay in April.
There were 6 Hindu-Muslim riots in 1939. On the 21st January there was a riot at Asansol in which one was killed and 18 injured. It was followed by a riot in Cawnpore on the 11th February in which 42 were killed, 200 injured and 800 arrested. On the 4th March there was a riot at Benares followed by a riot at Cassipore near Calcutta on the 5th March. On 19th June there was again a riot at Cawnpore over the Rathajatra procession.
A serious riot occurred on 20th November 1939 in Sukkur in Sind. The riot was the culmination of the agitation by the Muslims to take possession, even by force, of a building called Manzilgah which was in the possession of Government as Government property and to the transfer of which the Hindus had raised objections. Mr. E. Weston—now a judge of the Bombay High Court—who was appointed to investigate into the disturbances gives the following figures of the murdered and the wounded:
CASUALTIES OF THE RIOTS IN SUKKUR, SIND, NOVEMBER 1939
Of the many gruesome incidents recorded by him the following may be quoted:
"The most terrible of all the disturbances occurred on the night of the 20th at Gosarji village which is eight miles from Sukkur and sixteen from Shikarpur. According to an early statement sent by the District Magistrate to Government, admittedly incomplete, 27 Hindus were murdered there that night. According to the witnesses examined the number was 37.
"Pamanmal, a contractor of Gosarji states that at the time of satyagraha the leading Hindus of Gosarji came in deputation to the leading zemindar of the locality Khan Sahib Amirbux who was then at Sukkur. He reassured them and said he was responsible for their safely. On the 20th Khan Sahib Amirbux was at Gosarji, and that morning Mukhi Mahrumal was murdered there. The Hindus went to Khan Sahib Amirbux for protection and were again reassured, but that night wholesale murder and looting took place. Of the 37 murdered, seven were women. Pamanmal states that the following morning he went to the Sub-Inspector of Bagerji, which is one mile from Gosarji, but he was abused and driven from the thana. He then went to Shikarpur and complained to the panchayat, but did not complain to any officer there. I may mention that the Sub-Inspector of Bagerji was afterwards prosecuted under section 211, Indian Penal Code, and has been convicted for failure to make arrests in connection with murders at Gosarji.
"As Khan Sahib Amirbux, the zemindar, who was said to have given assurance of protection to the Hindus of Bagerji, was reported to be attending the Court, he was called and examined as a Court witness. He states that he lives half a mile from Gosarji village. The Sub-Inspector of Bagerji came to Gosarji on the 20th after the murder of Mehrumal, and he acted as a mashir. He says that the Hindus did not ask for help and there was no apprehension of trouble. On the night of the 20th he was not well, and he heard nothing of the murders. He admits that he had heard of the Manzilgah evacuation. Later in his evidence he admits that he told the villagers of Gosarji to be on the alert as there was trouble in Sukkur, and he says he had called the panchayat on the evening of the 19th. He went to Gosarji at sunrise on the 21st after the murders. He admits that he is regarded as the protector of Gosarji."
Mr. Weston adds/3/ :—
"I find it impossible to believe the evidence of this witness. I have no doubt that he was fully aware that there was trouble in Gosarji on the night of 20th and preferred to remain in his house."
Who can deny that this record of rioting presents a picture which is grim in its results and sombre in its tone? But being chronological in order, the record might fail to give an idea of the havoc these riots have caused in any given Province and the paralysis it has brought about in its social and economic life. To give an idea of the paralysis caused by the recurrence of riots in a Province I have recast the record of riots for the Province of Bombay. When recast the general picture appears as follows:
Leaving aside the Presidency and confining oneself to the City of Bombay, there can be no doubt that the record of the city is the blackest. The first Hindu-Muslim riot took place in 1893. This was followed by a long period of communal peace which lasted up to 1929. But the years that have followed have an appalling story to tell. From February 1929 to April 1938—a period of nine years—there were no less than 10 communal riots. In 1929 there were two communal riots. In the first, 149 were killed and 739 were injured and it lasted for 36 days. In the second riot 35 were killed, 109 were injured and it continued for 22 days. In 1930 there were two riots. Details as to loss of life and its duration are not available. In 1932 there were again two riots. The first was a small one. In the second 217 were killed, 2,713 were injured and it went on for 49 days. In 1933 there was one riot, details about which are not available. In 1936 there was one riot in which 94 were killed, 632 were injured and it continued to rage for 65 days. In the riot of 1937, 11 were killed, 85 were injured and it occupied 21 days. The riot of 1938 lasted for 2 1/2 hours only but within that time 12 were killed and a little over 100 were injured. Taking the total period of 9 years and 2 months from February 1929 to April 1938 the Hindus and Muslims of the City of Bombay alone were engaged in a sanguinary warfare for 210 days during which period 550 were killed and 4,500 were wounded. This does not of course take into consideration the loss of property which took place through arson and loot.
V
[Such barbaric mutual violence shows an utter lack of unity]
Such is the record of Hindu-Muslim relationship from 1920 to 1940. Placed side by side with the frantic efforts made by Mr. Gandhi to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity, the record makes most painful and heart-rending reading. It would not be much exaggeration to say that it is a record of twenty years of civil war between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace.
[READ FULL TEXT ON LINK]
Re: A look back at the partition
Nairad Chaudhuri too gives many examples of lack of peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence is a situation that needs to be achieved by some active means and not by relying on myths.samuel wrote:Next up; dispelling the notion of peaceful coexistence <snip >
From: Dr. Ambedkar's book
Re: A look back at the partition
And after all that; after saying Gandhi failed to unite, the country is fractured, the situation is precarious Ambedkar goes on to say the wrong thing: piece of cake, this partition business...Why were people who bore witness to such animus came up so short?
VI
[The problems of population transfer are solvable and need not detain us]
So much for the problem of boundaries. I will now turn to the problem of the minorities which must remain within Pakistan even after boundaries are redrawn. There are two methods of protecting their interests.
First is to provide safeguards in the constitution for the protection of the political and cultural rights of the minorities. To Indians this is a familiar matter and it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it.
Second is to provide for their transfer from Pakistan to Hindustan. Many people prefer this solution and would be ready and willing to consent to Pakistan if it can be shown that an exchange of population is possible. But they regard this as a staggering and a baffling problem. This no doubt is the sign of a panic-stricken mind. If the matter is considered in a cool and calm temper, it will be found that the problem is neither staggering nor baffling.
To begin with, consider the dimensions of the problem. On what scale is this transfer going to be? In determining the scale one is bound to take into account three considerations. In the first place, if the boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal are redrawn, there will be no question of transfer of population so far as these two Provinces are concerned. In the second place, the Musalmans residing in Hindustan do not propose to migrate to Pakistan, nor does the League want their transfer. In the third place, the Hindus in the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan do not want to migrate. If these assumptions are correct, the problem of transfer of population is far from being a staggering problem. Indeed it is so small that there is no need to regard it as a problem at all.
Assuming it does become a problem, will it be a baffling problem? Experience shows that it is not a problem which it is impossible to solve. To devise a solution for such a problem it might be well to begin by asking what are the possible difficulties that are likely to arise in the way of a person migrating from one area to another on account of political changes. The following are obvious enough: (1) The machinery for effecting and facilitating the transfer of population. (2) Prohibition by Government against migration. (3) Levy by Government of heavy taxation on the transfer of goods by the migrating family. (4) The impossibility for a migrating family to carry with it to its new home its immovable property. (5) The difficulty of obviating a resort to unfair practices with a view to depress unduly the value of the property of the migrating family. (6) The fear of having to make good the loss by not being able to realize the full value of the property by sale in the market. (7) The difficulty of realizing pensionary and other charges due to the migrating family from the country of departure. (8) The difficulty of fixing the currency in which payment is to be made. If these difficulties are removed, the way to the transfer of population becomes clear.
The first three difficulties can be easily removed by the two States of Pakistan and Hindustan agreeing to a treaty embodying an article in some such terms as follows :—
"The Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan agree to appoint a Commission consisting of equal number of representatives and presided over by a person who is approved by both and who is not a national of either.
"The expense of the Commission and of its Committees both on account of its maintenance and its operation shall be borne by the two Governments in equal proportion.
"The Government of Pakistan and the Government of Hindustan hereby agree to grant to all their nationals within their territories who belong to ethnic minorities the right to express their desire to emigrate.
"The Governments of the States above mentioned undertake to facilitate in every way the exercise of this right and to interpose no obstacles, directly or indirectly, to freedom of emigration. All laws and regulations whatsoever which conflict with freedom of emigration shall be considered as null and void."
The fourth and the fifth difficulties which relate to transfer of property can be effectually met by including in the treaty articles the following terms:
"Those who, in pursuance of these articles, determine to take advantage of the right to migrate shall have the right to carry with them or to have transported their movable property of any kind without any duty being imposed upon them on this account.
"So far as immovable property is concerned it shall be liquidated by the Commission in accordance with the following provisions:
(1) The Commission shall appoint a Committee of Experts to estimate the value of the immovable property of the emigrant. The emigrant interested shall have a representative chosen by him on the Committee.
(2) The Commission shall take necessary measures with a view to the sale of immovable property of the emigrant."
As for the rest of the difficulties relating to reimbursement for loss, for payment of pensionary and charges for specifying the currency in which payments are to be made, the following articles in the treaty should be sufficient to meet them:
"(1) The difference in the estimated value and the sale price of the immovable property of the emigrant shall be paid in to the Commission by the Government of the country of departure as soon as the former has notified it of the resulting deficiency. One-fourth of this payment may be made in the money of the country of departure and three-fourths in gold or short term gold bonds.
"(2) The Commission shall advance to the emigrants the value of their immovable property determined as above.
"(3) All civil or military pensions acquired by an emigrant at the dale of the signature of the present treaty shall be capitalized at the charge of the debtor Government, which must pay the amount to the Commission for the account of its owners.
"(4) The funds necessary to facilitate emigration shall be advanced by the States interested in the Commission."
Are not these provisions sufficient to overcome the difficulties regarding transfer of population? There are of course other difficulties. But even those are not insuperable. They involve questions of policy. The first question is: is the transfer of population to be compulsory, or is it to be voluntary? The second is: is this right to State-aided transfer to be open to all, or is it to be restricted to any particular class of persons? The third is: how long is Government going to remain liable to be bound by these provisions, particularly the provision for making good the loss on the sale of immovable property? Should the provisions be made subject to a time limit or should the liability be continued indefinitely?
With regard to the first point, both are possible, and there are instances of both having been put into effect. The transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria was on a voluntary basis, while that between Greece and Turkey was on a compulsory basis. Compulsory transfer strikes one as being prima facie wrong. It would not be fair to compel a man to change his ancestral habitat if he does not wish to, unless the peace and tranquillity of the State is likely to be put in jeopardy by his continuing to live where he is or such transfer becomes necessary in his own interest. What is required is that those who want to transfer should be able to do so without impediment and without loss. I am therefore of [the] opinion that transfer should not be forced, but should be left open for those who declare their intention to transfer.
As to the second point, it is obvious that only members of a minority can be allowed to take advantage of the scheme of State-aided transfer. But even this restriction may not be sufficient to exclude all those who ought not to get the benefit of this scheme. It must be confined to certain well-defined minorities who on account of ethnic or religious differences are sure to be subjected to discrimination or victimization.
The third point is important and is likely to give rise to serious difference of opinion. On a fair view of the matter it can be said that it is quite unreasonable to compel a Government to keep open for an indefinite period the option to migrate at Government cost .There is nothing unfair in telling a person that if he wants to take advantage of the provisions of the scheme of State-aided migration contained in the forgoing articles, he must exercise his option to migrate within a stated period, and that if he decides to migrate after the period has elapsed he will be free to migrate, but it will have to be at his own cost and without the aid of the State There is no inequity in thus limiting the right to State aid. State aid becomes a necessary part of the scheme because the migration is a resultant consequence of political changes over which individual citizens have no control. But migration may not be the result of political change. It may be for other causes, and when it is for other causes, aid to the emigrant cannot be an obligation on the State. The only way to determine whether migration is for political reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a definite point of time. When it takes place with in a defined period from the happening of a political change, it may be presumed to be political. When it occurs after the period, it may be presumed to be for private reasons. There is nothing unjust in this. The same rule of presumption governs the cases of civil servants who, when a political change takes place, are allowed to retire on proportionate pensions if they retire within a given period, but not if they retire after it has lapsed.
If the policy in these matters is as I suggest it should be, it may be given effect to by the inclusion of the following articles in the treaty:
"The right to voluntary emigration may be exercised under this treaty by any person belonging to an ethnic minority who is over 18 years of age.
"A declaration made before the Commission shall be sufficient evidence of intention to exercise the right.
"The choice of the husband shall carry with it that of the wife, the option of parents or guardians that of their children or wards aged less than 18 years.
"The right to the benefit provided by this treaty shall lapse if the option to migrate is not exercised within a period of 5 years from the date of signing the treaty.
"The duties of the Commission shall be terminated within six months after the expiration of the period of five years from the date when the Commission starts to function."
What about the cost? The question of cost will be important only if the transfer is to be compulsory. A scheme of voluntary transfer cannot place a very heavy financial burden on the State. Men love property more than liberty. Many will prefer to endure tyranny at the hands of their political masters [rather] than change the habitat in which they are rooted. As Adam Smith said, of all the things man is the most difficult cargo to transport. Cost therefore need not frighten anybody.
What about its workability? The scheme is not new. It has been tried and found workable. It was put into effect after the last European War, to bring about a transfer/5/ of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody can deny that it has worked, has been tried and found workable. The scheme I have outlined is a copy of the same scheme. It had the effect of bringing about a transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody can deny that it was [=has] worked with signal success. What succeeded elsewhere may well be expected to succeed in India.
The issue of Pakistan is far from simple. But it is not so difficult as it is made out to be, provided the principle and the ethics of it are agreed upon. If it is difficult it is only because it is heart-rending, and nobody wishes to think of its problems and their solutions, as the very idea of it is so painful. But once sentiment is banished and it is decided that there shall be Pakistan, the problems arising out of it are neither staggering nor baffling.
Re: A look back at the partition
You know shiv, just from a "project managment" point of view I see this as a right royal disaster. Every year since 1920 to independence, hindus and muslims were at each other's throats. We had a Nehru with a bad friggin ego, a Jinnah out to screw everyone else, a Gandhi whose message was not really working. And no one, no one was preparing for independence in a way we expect a nation to. They went on and on about quit india and then the Brits said, sure, we quit. Nehru's beggin Mountbatten to hang on and help out, for the love of India, for fux sake. Sure, comes the reply. These machinations are causing huge upheavals in the country and kegs are blowing everywhere. I can't even begin to say how much this hurts. Goddamn jokers.
S
S
Re: A look back at the partition
Would you have known any of this but for this thread?
-
- BRFite
- Posts: 1392
- Joined: 18 Nov 2007 05:03
- Location: Pee Arr Eff's resident Constitution Compliance Strategist (Phd, with upper hand)
Re: A look back at the partition
Jinnah Was Secular at One Time: KS Sudarshan ex RSS Sarsanghchalak
Something funny is surely on! I am trying to step back from the debate and take a bird's eye view of the larger picture and things are not really that clear. Lots of smoke and mirrors abound.K Sudarshan wrote:"Jinnah had many facets. If you read history then you will come to know that Jinnah was with Lok Manya Tilak and was totally dedicated to the nation. And when Gandhi started the Khilafat movement, with the idea that currently we are opposing the British and if Muslims join in then their support will help gain independence. But at that time Jinnah opposed it saying that if the Caliph in Turkey has been dethroned what has India got to do with it. That time nobody listened to him, which saddened him. So he quit the Congress and left for England and only returned in 1927," said Sudarshan.
Re: A look back at the partition
JS has done big favour and its a step in right direction to find out the truth. The jokers have been treated as icons while country still suffer from their inadequencies reflected in their decisions . The personal/personality interests have been served at the cost of national interest and lets hope right lessons from history may make our politicians change and do something constructive for Desh and shun setting national priorities on ad hoc basis.
Munna , the whole panga is adding more confusion to the already confused life of Paki Abduls. Either this or MMS will go in da history as some one who corrected Chacha's mistakes.
Munna , the whole panga is adding more confusion to the already confused life of Paki Abduls. Either this or MMS will go in da history as some one who corrected Chacha's mistakes.

-
- BRFite
- Posts: 1392
- Joined: 18 Nov 2007 05:03
- Location: Pee Arr Eff's resident Constitution Compliance Strategist (Phd, with upper hand)
Re: A look back at the partition
I share your hunch that MMS might achieve something spectacular, let us see. But then I get uneasy thinking that maybe my jingo mind is being too ambitious.Prem wrote:Munna , the whole panga is adding more confusion to the already confused life of Paki Abduls. Either this or MMS will go in da history as some one who corrected Chacha's mistakes.