The Ram Janmbhoomi Verdict: News and Discussion

[Patni]

Muslim body rejects any reconciliation bid over Ayodhya

PTI
Thu, Oct 7 06:25 PM

New Delhi, Oct 7 (PTI) A body of Muslim scholars and clerics from Delhi and Uttar Pradesh today rejected the verdict of the Allahabad High Court on the Ayodhya title suit or any reconciliation bid and demanded that the Centre clear its stand on the issue. Led by Shahi Imam of the Delhi Jama Masjid Maulana Syed Ahmed Bukhari, nearly 40 scholars met here and passed a resolution in this regard.

"We reject the judgement of the Allahabad High Court and demand that the central government express its stand clearly with regards to this verdict. We also demand that the Congress party make its stand clear," Bukhari told reporters.

He said they have written to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh regarding the issue and sought time to meet him. "We hold the Congress directly responsible for all the anti-Masjid acts perpetrated right from the raking up of the Babri masjid issue till this verdict.

Congress party, on one hand, kept the Muslims under deception while, on the other hand, it helped communal forces," Bukhari alleged. To a question if representatives of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board were present at the convention, Bukhari replied in the negative.

"Some AIMPLB members are involved in some back-door talking about some sort of negotiations. We did not invite them because we do not want to be part of any such talks.

What kind of compromise formula will they work out when Muslims will not settle for anything less than a Masjid at that site," he said. Asked if he was seeking the support of other political parties as Samajwadi Party chief Mulayam Singh Yadav had met him, Bukhari said, "Support of anybody who is with the Muslim community is welcome".

He said the convention would be a party to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

[chaanakya]

J Sudhir Aggarwal
Vol 15
Pages 3604-3634( 135/251 OF THE vol) Para 3618
http://www.rjbm.nic.in/sa/Judgment%20RJ ... Vol-15.pdf


Next Star in the list is Prof Suvira jaiswal JNU

3618. PW-18 Suvira Jaiswal, an ex Professor of Jawahar Lal Nehru University, New Delhi has deposed that according to her studies and research, there is no evidence that Babri Masjid was constructed after demolition of a temple of Lord Rama or that there existed any temple whatsoever where the Babari Masjid was situated. She also stated of not finding any evidence which may prove that the place in dispute was birth place of lord Rama. In her cross-examination, she said:

“This is correct that I am expert in Ancient History. It is also correct that I have come to this Court to tender evidence as specialist in Ancient History. . . . My specialization is based on investigation into written sources.”

“On the topic that Muslim rulers constructed mosques after destroying temples, neither I conducted any study nor made any compilation of books in this respect. . nor I have read any report in this respect.” (E.T.C.)

“My aforesaid statement that at the place where Babari Mosque was situated, earlier no temple existed there, is my own opinion. It is correct to say that I am giving statement on oath regarding Babari Mosque without any probe and not on the basis of my knowledge, rather I am giving the statement on the basis of my opinion.”

“As per my research, there are such several places in Ayodhya, which claim to be the birthplace of Sri Rama. I cannot point out specifically as to the places which are claimed to be the birthplace of Rama. I did not consider it necessary to research on this point. . . . I did not study the history of Babari Mosque.” (E.T.C.)

“I have not studied history of the period after 12th century but as a historian I can tell that in 16th century Babar got constructed Babari Mosque in Ayodhya.”(

“Whatever knowledge I gained with respect to disputed site, was on the basis of newspaper or what the others told, i.e., from the report of historians. By historians' report I mean “Historian Report to Nation”. This is the same report which was prepared by Surajbhan and Dr. R.S. Sharma. In this report, historians D.N. Jha and Athar Ali were also included. I alongwith my companions also published a pamphlet entitled “Rajnaitik Durupayog Babari Masjid Ram Janmabhumi Vivad” (Political Misuse, Babari Mosque-Rama Birthplace Dispute”). . I had prepared this Pamphlet from the news published in newspapers and after having a discussion with Medieval Expert of my Department.” (E.T.C.)

“I have read nothing about Babari Mosque, I did not study thoroughly, therefore, I cannot say as to when Babari Mosque came into existence. I cannot say as to what was there at the site before coming into existence of Babari Mosque.”(Page 105)

“I do not agree with the opinion recorded in the book by the historian Dr. Aziz. . . . . . I have not read the book of Dr. Aziz Ahmad. But discussion about it was held in the Department. . . . this discussion was held amongst experts in medieval age in my department. This is correct that I regarded the said discussion as true, but on that subject, I have neither read nor wrote any book.”

“The basis of my disagreement with the opinion expressed by Prof. Lal about the pillars, is the opinion and reports of other archaeologists. On this subject, I have read the book of D.Mandal, who is an archaeologist. In this connection I had discussed with my colleague Prof. Ratnakar and also read the articles of Surajbhan.”

(HC observes)
3619. The above extracts of her statement are self speaking. It is really surprising that a witness, claiming to be an Expert Historian, can make such serious statements on historical facts and that too without any study or adequate enquiry into the matter. Newspaper reports or what was told by some others or otherwise cannot be equated with the research work expected from an expert on the subject. She could admit her disagreement with a historian author of a book not after reading it but merely
on the basis of some discussion made in her department.

3621. In fact, what appears from her statement from pages 116-117 that she has deposed to support the statement of PW-16,
20 and 24. The reason is also apparent. She admits to have obtained her Ph.D. under the guidance of Dr. (Prof.) R.S.Sharma, who was at Patna University and later on came to Delhi University. He is a co-author of the article “Historian Report to Nation” along with Suraj Bhan- PW-16 and two others.

The opinion of an alleged expert, which is not based on her own study and research work but reflection of other's opinion, in our view, shall not qualify to be considered relevant under Section 45 of the Evidence Act as well as the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Jai Lal (supra).

So this expert relies on newpaper reports , others discussion about a subject which she has not read and forms an opnion of disagreement about a book without reading it. She also does not agree with the statements of an expert archeologis who did original work.( B B Lal)

[SwamyG]

Ok the more we search the Internet, the more the historian/academics fraternity circle comes evident. These guys all have been cut from the same fabric. Let us take the case of Suvira Jaiswal. For people who want to put a face to the name, here you go.



Source: http://www.hindu.com/2007/03/13/stories ... 891300.htm

Historian Suvira Jaiswal has been elected general president of the Indian History Congress (IHC). She will assume office at the next session of the IHC. Irfan Habib and D.N. Jha have been elected vice-presidents; Satyanarayana and K.K. Shama joint secretaries; and B.P. Sahu and R. P. Rana secretary and treasurer.

The new sectional presidents are Sumasundar Rao (Ancient India), Ruby Maloni (Medieval India), Aditya Mukherjee (Modern India), Shamir Hasan (Countries other than India) and V. Rajan (Archaeology). The 20-member executive committee: U.P. Arora, S.N. Arya, Arun Bandopadhyay, Suraj Bhan, Shashikant Bhat, Susnata Das, Dharmendra Kumar, V. Kunhali, Shireen Musvi, Subhash Ch. Padhy, Mahendra Pratap, V. Ramakrishna, B. Surendra Rao, Sandip Basu Sabadhikary, Mahua Sarkar, B.K. Sharma, Joginder Singh, C.P.N. Sinha, G.J. Sudhakar and R.C. Thakran.

Now why did I highlight some persons in red color? Well these names appear in the list of Sahmat too.

And Suraj Bhan appeared on one side of the case in the dispute. Some of these people appear to scratch each others' back. For example New Perspectives on Caste is a review by K.M.Shrimali on a book written by Suvira Jaiswal. No prizes for guessing, K.M.Shrimali is one on the Sahmat list.

Influential bodies in India seem to be controlled by Marxist and Left leaning personalities. Obviously if they have the mike and the speakers, their voice is what is going to be heard. And they talk about saffronisation of text books. It reminds me of the Hindi proverb, ulta chor kotwal ko dante

[Prasad]

^^^

As far as the allegations about ASI being influenced by Hindutva or BJP. There were about 29 Muslim laborers in the team that did the excavation, out of about 130 or so laborers. That seems to be proportionate with Indian demographics.

SwamyG,
This portion unfortunately appears to be an error from the ASI. The H'ble court had explicitly directed the ASI that to give a semblance of fairness, there should be equal representation of both faiths in the labour pool. And if the ASI was unable to find such labourers, they can take the help of Sri Jilani for the same. This is in the judgement. Vol 4(I think, not sure though) of the judgement by H'ble Sudhir Agarwal J.

[SwamyG]

^^^
I do not understand you. What is the error you are talking about?

[Prasad]

That the ASI employed lesser number of Muslim labourers than directed.

[Amber G.]

chaanakyaji - Thanks. I would have not read this unless you posted the excerpts here. Wow! an expert "who did not study the history of Babari Mosque" .. "never probed the issue", but formed her "opinion" on the basis of newspaper" (and explicitly admitting that it was based NOT on knowledge but on "opinion")!

Reminds me the likes of S. Farmer (of the notoriety of California text book scandal) who claimed to be expert on ancient Hindu culture by studying them "in translation" and not knowing a word of Sanskrit or even devnagri script. ..I remember some one equating it to one claiming to be an "'expert in physics' who studied calculus and differential equations by looking at pictures onlee"

Unfortunately quite a worthies like this exist everywhere.... they need to be exposed..and posts like yours are very helpful. Thanks.

[hnair]

good going, folks

A suggestion: these manipulative historians who get maximum face time due to connections need to be taken to task. For that one needs readily available and to the point reference material excerpts like those provided in this thread.

Can some of the contents of this thread be put into two PDFs?

1st PDF: significant parts of Judgement talking about ASI's detailed study on the history since 3300 years, Sant Thulisidas' points etc

2nd PDF: A full list of Hostile historians, their past polemical statements couched in academic lingo, actual lack of expertise on subject and their methodical debunking by the judges etc. Maybe grade them into five star jokers like Thapar to single star wannabes to rub it in.

Note:
1) I believe these PDFs must be separate or even neutrals will scream this is an agenda driven effort
2) more and more neutrals should know the facts unearthed at the site. Fascinating to say the least

It should be like that eBook on Pakistan from Doc-saar. It is time these people who cynically exploited such issues be made irrelevant

[SwamyG]

This is not related to RJB directly; but material on the "eminent historians". Arun Shourie's book on these historians is reviewed by C.J.S.Wallia here: http://www.indiastar.com/wallia19.html. These folks looks to have connections and reach into NCERT & ICHR as well. It is very similar to the case of a prominent experts who were against the revisions in the California book case.

[ramana]

Lying in court is more egregious than distorting hisotry in text books. I think the eminents didn't care.

[Shankk]

If Islam is religion of peace, Holy Quran is word of God and Muslims are are peace loving people simply obeying the word of God then shouldn't they denounce anything that is obtained in non peace loving manner? It should not just be cosmetic words but real detachment from any gains that may have been made that way. Revelations are being made whether Babri masjid was indeed made in peaceful manner and truth as usual will come out but what about other Islamic gains?

If Muslims are so deeply hurt by one structure that was anyway in shambles until the dispute started, does it also justify Hindus being hurt much much more by demolition of their mother land and dividing it into pieces in the name of Islam? Does Islam really sanctions and justifies breaking lands? If not then it is not Islamic and should IMs not question creation of Pakistan on the very basis of its creation which is Islam?

After all Indian Muslims has many more mosques to go to and live their way of life in Islamic way. Hindus on the hand have lost a big chunk of land permanently and cannot go there and live their way of life. Of course Muslims are as much Indians as anybody else is and their places of worship should be kept safe and they are entitled to all the privileges as any other citizen of India but this selective takleef is causing me takleef.

Will the real Muslims please stand up and tell Pakistan that its creation was based on wrong interpretation of Islam? That Islam does not support breaking breaking lands like that.

Does the demolition of India not hurt them as much as demolition of Babri Masjid?

[Mauli]

Self Deleted

[ramana]

There are deeper reflections in the GDF version of the thread, which is for registered members only.

[Amber G.]

This is not related to RJB directly; but material on the "eminent historians". Arun Shourie's book on these historians is reviewed by C.J.S.Wallia here: http://www.indiastar.com/wallia19.html. These folks looks to have connections and reach into NCERT & ICHR as well. It is very similar to the case of a prominent experts who were against the revisions in the California book case.

SwamyG - IMO, I think this IS related to RJB.. The judgement underscores that honesty and competence is important for teachers and experts. Mischief they make have serious consequences. So thanks for the reference you posted..

Meanwhile, if one does not know much about Harvard's prominent expert mentioned by you, here is one good source:
Thus Spake Professor Michael Witzel A Harvard University Case

BTW, this expert (who inserted himself previously in such cases) is relatively quiet. As in past he is not defending those Historians ... guess too busy fighting subpoena.. (He twice successfully objected in Massachusetts courts against CAPEEM's "overly broad" subpoena.. and avoiding answers in the California courts..)

[Bharath.Subramanyam]

Given below are the links to S Gurumurthy's 3-part article on the Ayodhya verdict.

1. Verdict — a prologue
http://expressbuzz.com/biography/Verdic ... 11591.html
A clinical dissection will reveal whether the verdict solves the dispute, or escalates it. Await the next part.


2. ASI report was crucial
http://expressbuzz.com/biography/ASI-re ... 11869.html
The Ayodhya verdict discusses frankly but with sensitivity, the Hindu-Muslim interface based on historic facts.


3. Division will escalate dispute
http://expressbuzz.com/authorbiography/ ... y/879.html
The decision to divide the disputed land and award 1/3 each to Muslims and Akhara is contrary to the spirit of judgment.

[Prasad]

x-posted from GD thread -

Ok. Moving on,

Vol 7
Page 1679 Page (180/251)

Sri Mishra placed before the Court Babur- Nama by Beveridge to show that it mentions Baqi Beg Chaghaniani; Qib Chaq Turk; Baqi Gagiani Afghan; Baqi Hiz; Kwaja Baqi son of Yahiya son of Ehrari who was murdered in1500 AD; Baqi Beg Taskindi; Baqi Beg Shaghawal; Baqi Beg Mingbashi; Baqi Takhan. Sri Mishra submitted that there is no mention of any Mir Baqi in Babur-Nama.

I suppose that much is clear from the various translations of the BabarNama. There is no mention of any Mir Baqi. There are Mir's and there are Baqi's (Which appears to be an honorific). But no Mir Baqi.

Page 1696 (197/251)

1594. As already said, in 1807 AD under the orders of Governor General and Council, East India Company Dr. Francis Buchanan was directed to conduct survey of all the provinces subject to the Presidency of Bengal. 1595. Due to bad health of Dr. Buchanan the matter could not proceed and it appears that the East India Company thereafter took the help of Mr. Robert Montgomery Martin. 1596. This leads us to look into the biography of “RobertMontgomery Martin”. The report was submitted by Mr. Martin in February' 1838 which was first published in 1838.

Among other things he mentions -

in digging for bricks many images have been discover, but the few which I was able to trace were too much broken to ascertain what they were meant to represent, except one at the convent (Akhara) of Guptar, where Lakshman supposed to have disappeared...The only thing except these two figures and the bricks, that could with probability be traced to the ancient city, are some pillars in the mosques built by Babur. These are of black stone, and of an order which I have seen nowhere else, and which will be understood from the accompanying drawing. That they have been taken from a Hindu building, is evident, from the traces of images being observable on some of their bases; although the images have been cut off to satisfy the conscience of the begot. It is possible that these pillars have belonged to a temple built by Vikrama; but I think the existence of such temples doubtful; and, if they did not exist, it is probable that the pillars were taken from the ruins of the palace. They are only 6 feet high. There is a Shiva Lingga called ageshwar, which is called on by all the pilgrims to witness their faith, when they have performed the usual ceremonies; and this supposed to be the oldest image of the place.

1601. What is apparent from the above report of Martin is that he was the first person to tell us about inscriptions on the wall of the disputed building to say that it was built by Babar. We have also noticed that Buchanan must have visited the area between 1807 to 1814, i.e. after about 280 years (if the disputed building was constructed by Babar in 1528 AD). Martin however, has observed that the building appears to be most modern. He also found that locally the people said that after destructing a temple, the Mosque was constructed by Aurangzeb. It is difficult to believe that till 1807 there was no Hindu person capable of reading and writing Persian or Arabic, as the case may be, to find out what was written in the said inscriptions in the Mosque and to tell others that the disputed building was actually constructed by Babar. Buchanan also does not appear to have actually visited the disputed building in order to collect the details as is evident from the next para that he did not do so (collect measurement) for the reason that it might have offended the Government of Nawab Vazir.

The VHP produced documents allegedly from the British Museum which were extract of reports and documents prepared by Dr. Buchanan himself. The H'ble Judge notes -

As we have already said, the above documents were not proved by the concerned party and a properly obtained document from British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections has also not been produced. It is therefore difficult for us to place any reliance on the said documents.

Essentially disregarding the documents produced by the VHP.

And then -

1609. The long passage we have quoted from several pages of Martin's Eastern India, Vol. II above has some reason. We have no bias or prejudice against the agents of East India Company or the then British Government, but the manner in which they have dealt with the Indian ancient scriptures and have written down about its culture, religion, society etc. needs some deeper consideration. Before making further comments, one thing which is a matter of appreciation, we cannot forget is that whatever was written by western so called intelligentsia mainly in the two centuries as said above, at least has given a foundation or a point of commencement to others, whether in India or outside, to go for further research in the matter and endeavour to place the correct history of this sub-continent before the world at large..

They tried to find out in their own way the most authenticated and original manuscripts on the subject concerned. A language, a culture which was several thousands and more years old, it is surprising that these western intelligentsia class claim to have learnt and understood and that too achieved mastery. They dealt with the above collected material in their own way. Without making any serious comment on this aspect, suffice to mention that the spirit, the context of real intention of a culture which has developed in several thousand years is improbable, if not impossible, to be understood in such a short time. Even today those who are constantly studying and dealing with those matters, are still undergoing rigorous discussion, research and investigation to understand the correct and real intention behind the particular words, sentences, phrases and verses, as the case may be.

1613. The only thing which we really find commendable is that the zeal of the western intelligentsia to know more about the Indian ancient culture brought out the ancient literature from the confines of the Brahmans.... 1614. The casual manner in which the long genealogy covering a very long period was found inconceivable by these writers and has been shortened at their whims and conjectures only because they could not have a complete chain is really startling. Non-availability does not mean non existent. No one can accept that merely because somebody could not give the detail of past generations, that would mean that he has no such ancestry. The casual and contemptuous manner in which Dr. Buchanan or Martin in the above work, i.e., Eastern India (supra) have dealt with the things we have quoted give a few example.

And then goes on to quote from his works of analysing the origin of the Vedas and who authored it. Essentially saying -

The theologians here insist, that every word, sentence and verse in the Vedas, as they now exist, was formed by Brahma before the earth, and that Vyasa did not alter a syllable; but only arranged the original parts into four books...When it was discovered, that these works mentioned many personages, who lived very long after the commencement of the Hindu government, as the power of prophecy could not be received by any one but a Hindu, it was justly concluded, that they were not the works of the lawgiver Brahma, who in fact is a mere creature of imagination; and Mr. Pinkerton is fully justified in calling the Vedas modern forgeries...

But that the Vedas, which now exist, were written by Vyasa the son of Parasara, or so early, seems to me completely incompatible with the mention made in them of the success, that had attended the ceremony used at the coronation of Janmejaya the son of Parikshita, by which he had conquered the world; for Janmejaya was grandson of Abhimanya, who was the great grandson of Vyasa the son of Parasara, and it is altogether impossible, that so remote an ancestor should live to celebrate the conquest of theworld by his descendant....

Page 1735(236/251)

1615. The long observations, we have just made are in the context of the fact that the Buchanan's survey relates to the earliest part of 19th century, i.e., 1807 to 1814. Aurangzeb died in 1707 after having ruled for about 50 years. Therefore, the memory of the people in respect to the incidents which took place during Aurangzeb were just 100 to 150 years old in comparison to that of Babar who was there about more than 275 years back. The people's memory is better reliable in respect to the recent incidents in comparison to ancient one. The belief of the local people about the destruction or construction at the disputed site, in the same way noticed by Tieffenthaler about 50 years back from the period of Buchanan and same thing noticed by Buchanan, in our view, ought to have been given more reliability than simply discarding the same on the basis of an inscription, the possibility whereof was always to be installed at any later point of time. In the absence of any material or anything to show that it was fixed almost 272 years back and the belief of the local people was perverse, we find it difficult to rely only on the observations of Buchanan based on inscriptions, the language whereof was not known to him and there is nothing to show that he could read or understood it.

1616. Sri P.N. Mishra, learned counsel further submitted that had the building in dispute constructed in 1528 and that too at the command of Emperor Babar, it would be inconceivable that Abul Fazal Allami in his work “Ain-e-Akbari” would have failed to notice the same though, if correct, it would have been the work of Akbar's grandfather.

He refers to the “Ain-e- Akbari” written by Abul Fazal Allami, translated in English by H. Blochmann. H'ble judge mentions that Sri Mishra presents various sections of Ain-i-Akbari and Extensive quotes from Abul Fazl about Akbar have been mentioned -

Akbar shaved his beard, was influenced by the Hindu Princess' in his harem. Dogs and pigs were no longer considered bad. He avoided meat in deference to his upbringing among Hindus during certain periods. He considered Islam to be coming to an end. Stopped Jiziya.The killing of animals on certain days was forbidden as on Sundays, because this day is sacred to the Sun..etc.

1622. Chapter IX Vol. 2 of “Ain-e-Akbari” -
Ayodhya, commonly called Awadh. The distance of forty kos to the east, and twenty to the north is regarded as sacred ground. On the ninth of the light half of the month of Chaitra a great religious festival is held.

PS: All emphasis herein are mine. Due to the voluminous nature of documents considered by the H'ble judges I'm not directly skipping to the judgement and their views about these evidences except what they've noted in between the quotes. Please wait till I finish reading them.

PPS: Now I know why the judgement is 8000 pages or so long. In order to consider certain aspects of the reports by Abul Fazl or European travellers or British agents employed to survey eastern India etc, the judgement contains chapter upon chapter of quotations from their works. Extremely interesting to read all the history and how they perceived and noted what they saw but its bloody huge to read ! Hence the huge posts.

[Prasad]

Finally. Conclusion of judgement re-

Page 1449 (200/251) Vol 6. - Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J

1297. Issue No.6 (Suit-1) reads as under:
“Is the property in suit a mosque constructed by Shahanshah Babar commonly known as Babri Mosque, in 1528 A.D.?”

----

Vol 8 Page 1772

1650. In brief, we summarize the things and the position boils down as under:
i. Dr. Fransis C. Buchanan said to be first person who read and collect the transcription but this text duly proved in accordance with law is not available to us.

ii. Next is A. Fuhrer. He was the first archaeologist who read and translated in 1889/1891 and got published three inscriptions alleged to be fixed on Babari Masjid... “Babar’s- Masjid at Ayodhya was built in A.H. 930, or A. D. 1523, by Mir Khan, on the very spot where the old temple Janamasthanam of Ramchandra was standing.. The old temple of Ramachandra at Janamasthan must have been a very fine one, for many of its columns have been used by the Musalmans in the construction of Babar’s masjid..strong, close-grained, dark- coloured or black stone, called by the natives Kasauti, “touch-stone slate,” and carved with different devices.

ii. Third is Annette Susannah Beveridge was the second british scholar who in 1921 published texts of two Inscriptions purported to be of alleged baburi Mosque.

1652. Then next comes the Civil Judge, Faizabad who has mentioned the text of the two inscriptions in his judgment dated 30.03.1946 in R.S. No.29 of 1945.
"Lastly there are the two Inscription in the mosque which have been reproduced in my inspection notes..according to the date in the inscription on the pulpit it was built in 923 Hijri, while according to other it was in 935 H. corresponding with 1528 A.D.

1653. By this time, damage of inscription in 1934 and its restoration is admitted to the parties.
1654. Then next come Dr. Z.A. Desai's edited work in "Epigraphia Indica Arabic & Persian Supplement 1964-65" which gives another story with much difference...From the scrutiny of Dr Desai’s translation it appears that Dr. Desai in 4th line has added “and” between ‘Mir’ and ‘Khan’ and “Baqi” after ‘Khan’. So he has converted ‘Mir Khan’ into ‘Mir Khan Baqi’. And in the 3rd line he has added “of God” after ‘this lasting house’ to make it a mosque... he writes that there are three inscriptions in the Babari Mosque out of which the two were completely destroyed by the Hindu rioters in 1934 A.D. However, he managed to secure an inkstampage of one of them from Sayyid Badru’l - Hasan of Fyzabad.

19. Dr. Desai informs that he has based his translation on the inscription of Fuhrer, although he says that Fuhrer must have been misinformed..But here we do find that Dr. Desai has extensively changed the meaning of the translated passage. It is quite different from what Fuhrer had translated. Without assigning any reason. In Dr. Desai’s translation the name of Mir Baqi the second Asfaq appears where as in the original Persian text Mir Baqi’s name does not appear at all.

1655....almost in all the inscriptions, which have been recovered by ASI said to be of the period of Babar mentions his name with much honour and deference...various inscriptions referred to in "Epigraphia Indica Arabic & Persian Supplement 1964-65" (Supra). "In the above mentioned Inscriptions the Emperor’s name Zahiru’d-Din Muhammad Babur Badshah Ghazi..recorded almost in all other available Inscription of his period, is missing..appears that the forgers of later days were not familiar with the correct name of the said Emperor. In the Inscription, dated A.H. 933 i.e. 1526-27 A.D. found on the wall of a well from Fatehpur Sikri being Plate No. XV(a) in its 1st line his name has been recorded as follows:
“Zahiru’d-Din Muhammad Babur Badshah Ghazi”
(Epigraphia Indica Arabic & Persian Supplement 1964 and 1965 at page-51)

1657. We may place on record that on this aspect of the matter the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the Muslim parties in their rejoinder arguments could not give any substantial reply. They said that the matter involves historical facts. The inscriptions, their text, have been noticed in various history books. They have no other material to support the plea that the building in dispute was constructed by Babar in 1528 AD or at his command by his commander or his agent Mir Baki. They also submit that since this historical event has not been doubted for the last more than one and a half century, this Court may not be justified in recording a finding disturbing the historically admitted and believed fact as the Court is not expert in the matter of history and therefore, there should not be any venture on the part of the Court on this aspect.

1658..also{historians} proved that all have proceeded mechanically and without properly scrutinizing the texts of the inscriptions,..things have been taken as granted...destruction of the temple and construction of a mosque at the disputed place was first noticed by Tieffenthaler..local belief in respect to recent event normally is more reliable then much older one. This belief was so strong that it continued thereafter for the last 50 years and around 1810 AD, when Dr. Buchanan visited Ayodhya..

1659...The Indian Historians basically have followed what was written as per the observations of Buchanan. Nobody made any detailed investigation whatsoever. At least none tried to find out the actual events which took place and the correct historical facts.

1660. Normally, this Court would be justified in following the opinion of Expert Historians particularly when it covers a sufficiently long time, but when directly a historical issue is raised before it and this Court, as a matter of necessity, has no option but to find out the correct historical events to the extent of accuracy as much as possible, we cannot proceed blindly to follow what has been written by earlier Historians ignoring all other aspects..would not have hesitated in following the view which has prevailed for such a long time but where we find, considering all the relevant material, that the view, which has prevailed for such a long time apparently unbelievable and unsubstantiable, followed by the concerned authors and Historians without a minute scientific investigation, we cannot shut our eyes to such glaring errors and record a finding for which we ourselves are not satisfied at all.
1661. In fact the doubts created otherwise are so strong and duly fortified with relevant material that we have no hesitation in observing that they surpass the required test to become cogent evidence to prove a fact otherwise.

In conclusion -

Page 1795 (46/251)

1679. In the above facts and circumstance, it is difficult to record a finding that the building in dispute was constructed in 1528 AD by or at the command of Babar since no reliable material is available for coming to the said conclusion...preponderance of probability shows that the building in dispute was constructed some later point of time and the inscriptions thereon was fixed further later but exact period of the two is difficult to ascertain.
1680. The onus to prove lies upon the party who has pleaded these facts. We have no hesitation in saying that these parties have miserably failed to discharge this burden.

1681. In the absence of any concrete material to show the exact period and the reign of the concerned Mughal emperor or anyone else during which the above construction took place, we are refraining from recording any positive finding on this aspect except that the building in dispute, to our mind, may have been constructed much later than the reign of Emperor Babar and the inscriptions were fixed further thereafter and that is why there have occurred certain discrepancies about the name of the person concerned as also the period. The possibility of change, alteration or manipulation in the inscriptions cannot be ruled out.

1682. It is a matter of further probe by Historians and others to find out other details after making an honest and independent inquiry into the matter

[Prasad]

X-posted from GD thread -

Prasad:

Quote:
Sri Mishra placed before the Court Babur- Nama by Beveridge to show that it mentions Baqi Beg Chaghaniani; Qib Chaq Turk; Baqi Gagiani Afghan; Baqi Hiz; Kwaja Baqi son of Yahiya son of Ehrari who was murdered in1500 AD; Baqi Beg Taskindi; Baqi Beg Shaghawal; Baqi Beg Mingbashi; Baqi Takhan. Sri Mishra submitted that there is no mention of any Mir Baqi in Babur-Nama.

However Mir Baqi the masjid guy, is also called Mir Baqi Tashkandi which could be same as Baqi Beg Tashkindi.

Really? I don't remember seeing that in the judgement. Could you please point me to where it says so?

^^^ Prasad note this Wiki on Mir Baqi and see the Gazateer in the notes section also

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mir_Baqi

^ Department of District Gazetteers (1959), Uttar Pradesh District Gazetteers, Government of Uttar Pradesh, http://books.google.com/?id=fHQbAAAAIAAJ, "... The latter reached Avadh as a result of which Bayazid and his family escaped to Ghazipur ... He appointed Baqi Tashqandi the governor of Avadh, who subdued the ..."

Mir is short for Persain title Mirzada. So the guy could be Baqi Beg Tashkandi and got titled as Mir due to his Shia origins.

Even Beg is a title. In Ottomon Turkey it became Bey.

Ah. I see. I'll quote sections from the judgement and what the H'ble judges have inferred. I suppose then its upto what we believe in.

The judgement quotes Mrs Beveridge (translation of Baburnama) which says that there were two Baqi's who went to Ayodhya to pursue the rebellious Bayazid.

H'ble Judge quotes in Vol 7 Page 1524 -

On page 29 she{a witness} claims that Mir Baqi was appointed commander of Awadh by Babar and on page 130 she says that Baqi Tashkandi was another name of Mir Baqi and this name has been used by Babar in Baburnama but we do not find mention of Mir Baqi or the fact that Baqi Tashkandi was also called as Mir Baqi in the Baburnama though some of the writers on their own have tried to identify “Baqi Tashkandi” with Mir Baqi but without giving any material to justify such inference

Page 1619 -

1477. The language of the inscriptions is same as that is quoted in Baburnama by Beveridge (supra) who claimed to
have text of the two inscriptions from the Deputy Commissioner of Faizabad and has referred to Nevill's Gazetteer of 1905 on page 556 of the book. Reading of the words “Mir Baqi” as “Shaghawal”, “Tashkandi” appears to be the understanding of the author himself inasmuch it is not in dispute that both the names i.e. Baqi Shaghawal and Baqi Tashkandi have been mentioned separately in “Baburnama” and there is nothing to co-relate the two being name of the same person or that to corelate with 'Mir Baqi'. Sri Jilani also could not place anything to co-relate Mir Baqi with Baqi Shaghawal or Baqi Tashkandi to show that they were the names of one and the same person.

Page 1679 -

Our attention was also drew to page 684 of Beveridge's Babur-Nama to show that it is Baqi Tashkindi who came from Awadh (Ayodhya) on 13.06.1529 AD to meet Babar. Page 685 of Babur-Nama shows that Babar sent Baqi Shaghawal on 16.06.1529 while camping near Kalpi to collect information about his enemy, i.e., Biban and Bayazid. On 17.06.1529 AD it is mentioned that one of Baqi Beg's retainers came informing that Baqi had beaten scouts of Biban and Bayazid, killed one of their good men, Mubarak Khan Jalwani and some others, sent in several heads, and one man alive. He says that Baqi Shaghawal has been addressed as Baqi Beg and Baqi Tashkindi who came from Ayodhya has been addressed as Baqi but there is no mention of any of the person addressed as Mir Baqi. It is contended by Sri Mishra, Advocate that the later historians/translators, of their own, identified Baqi Tashkindi as Baqi Shaghawal as well as Mir Baqi though in the entire Babur-Nama, Babar has not addressed anybody or any one as Mir Baqi. He drew our attention to certain persons whose name started with the word Mir, namely, Mir Bujurg Tirmizi; Mir Khurd Bakawal; Mir Mughul son of Abdul Wahab Saghawal; Mir Sang-Tarash; Mir Zadas of Khwast and none of these persons, he submit, can be said to be possibly addressed as Mir Baqi.

Added later.
Regarding taking statements that appear in the Gazette as facts or not -

Vol 8, Page 1795 (46/251)

1677. Sri Ayer has relied on Section 87 of the Evidence Act to contend that the facts stated in a gazetteer may be presumed to be correct unless proved otherwise since the gazetteers are relevant for the purpose of Section 13 of the Evidence Act having noticed the faith of the people and the historical facts therein. To the extent that the gazetteer may be treated to be relevant and one of the piece of evidence, we may not have any objection but to suggest that the facts stated in a gazetteer may presume to be correct unless proved otherwise by applying Section 87 of the Evidence Act, we find it difficult to accept.
1678. In the light of the above we do not find that either the Government of India's White Paper published in 1993 or various gazetteers, merely for mentioning one or the other facts, can be taken to be correct on its face value unless corroborated with cogent evidence.

Baqi appears to be an arabic word -

BAQI
Gender: Masculine
Usage: Arabic
Other Scripts: باقي (Arabic)
Means "eternal" in Arabic. This was the pen name of a 16th-century Turkish poet.

And judging from google search results, it is widely used across the muslim world from algerians to turks to afghans. I'm not sure if it is the same as mentioned in the baburnama though.

Added later - On the other hand, Babur claimed Chagatai lineage and the original Baburnama was written in Chagatai Turkish. So we'll need someone well versed in it to tell us what it actually means.

[SaiK]

I think it is time they start to challenge history books in the courts.

[AKalam]

AFAIK Chagatai Turki is closest to present day Uzbek and Uighur languages. Uighurs in Xinjiang, China, retain the original arabic alphabet (Uzbeks use Russian Cyrillic), so Uighur history or linguistics professors in Kashgar or Urumqi or expats living overseas, or perhaps someone connected to Rebiya Kadeer or her organization (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Uyghur_Congress) might be able to help. Babur's maternal grandfather was one Yunus Khan, a Chagatai Khan, descended from Chinggis, and ruler of Eastern Moghulistan (roughly todays Xinjiang) with its capital in Gulza (Yining), a city in Ili Kazakh autonomous prefecture in Xinjiang:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ili_Kazakh ... Prefecture
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yunus_Khan

[Prasad]

Long Post.

Issues considered in this section -

(G) Issues relating to Deities, their status, rights etc.:
1683. In this category comes issues no. 12 and 21 (Suit-4); and, 1, 2, 3(a), 6 and 21 (Suit-5).

1684. Issues no. 12 (Suit-4) and 3(a) (Suit-5) involves common facts and consideration. Similarly issues no. 1 and 1

(Suit-5) and issues no. 2 and 6 (Suit-5) are common:
“Issue No. 1 (Suit-5):-
Whether the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are juridical persons?

Issue No. 21 (Suit-5):-
Whether the idols in question cannot be treated as Deities as alleged in paragraphs 1,11,12,21,22, 27 and 41 of the written statement of defendant no.4 and in paragraph 1 of the written statement of defendant no.5?

Issue No. 2 Suit-5):-
Whether the suit in the name of Deities described in the plaint as plaintiffs 1 and 2 is not maintainable through plaintiff no.3 as next friend?

Issue No. 6 (Suit-5):-
Is the plaintiff no.3 not entitled to represent the plaintiffs 1 and 2 as their next friend and is the suit not competent on this account?

Issue No. 21 (Suit-4):-
Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of alleged Deities?

Let me state here that for this particular issue, the H'ble Judges have done some heavy duty philosphical quotations as well as legal precedent citing. Therefore any excerpts that I post here may not do justice to the effort they've put in. Also, I trust putting it here that the H'ble judges cited so many sources can lay to rest any claims of the judges having acting based on 'faith' rather than legal precedent or fact.

I'd suggest people to read it all for themselves (Just this section) Quotes include sections from Rig Veda, Brahmanasa, Upanishads, Agamas, Swami Vivekananda's works to name a few. I learnt a lot of new things and I'm sure a lot of members here might too. You can start reading from Page 1864 (115/251) of Vol 8.

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.
http://www.rjbm.nic.in/sa/Judgment%20RJ ... Vol-08.pdf

Page 1842 (93/251)

1710. The pleadings, argument etc. over these issues require us to consider the matter from two different angles: (i) Whether plaintiff no.1 is a Deity in terms of Hindu Law. Its effect, (ii) Plaintiff no.2 is a place and therefore, first of all it has to be seen whether a place by itself can be a Deity and be conferred status of legal person in the light of principles of Hindu Law.
1711. If both these aspects about the Deities are decided in affirmance only then we will have to consider whether there was any Shebait of the said two plaintiffs and whether the plaintiff no.3 has rightly filed the suit in question as their next friend.

1712. First we..consider..how the idol worship came to exist, the concept form and the foundation etc...
“There is a difference of opinion amongst scholars as to whether the religion that is embodied in the Vedas was at all polytheistic. A number of gods indeed are named, but there are various passages in the Rigveda which expressly declare that the various gods are only different names of that “which is one”. Max Muller calls the religion, “henotheism”. The gods to whom the hymns of the Rigveda are addressed are idealised beings, who represent the beneficient and radiant powers of nature, e.g., sun, air, earth, sky, dawn, etc. But the Vedic seers had, from the beginning, a glimpse of the infinity behind these finite forces, as is shown by the conception of 'Aditi' the mother of the gods which, as Max Muller says, was the earliest name invented to express the infinite.”

“There is also no mention of monastic institution in the Vedic literature. According to the Vedic Grihya Sutras, which regulated the life of man, there were the institutions of four Asramas prescribed for all persons belonging to the twice born caste..

1716. In 'Development of Hindu Iconography' by Jitendra Nath Banerjea (First Edition in 1941) - It may be observed, however, that in India, prior to the advent of the Aryans, image-worship might have been practised by her original settlers. But it is still a matter of doubt and controversy when this was first introduced among the Aryans who migrated into India.

1724. A temple is the house of the deity and many of the rules of construction of a temple are practically the same as are prescribed for construction of a dwelling house, the additional rules being laid down to ensure greater sanctity of the structure that is meant for the abode of a deity

Page 1861 - A temple answering the requisites of Hindu religious endowment may be a juridical person and if that being so not only it can sue or being sued but it also entitled to hold property.

1740. In T.R.K. Ramaswami Servai Vs. H.R.E. Madras (supra), it was observed: “The presence of an idol though an invariable feature of Hindu temples is not a legal requisite. If the public or a section of the public consider that there is Divine presence in a particular place, they are likely to be recipients of the bounty or blessings of God, then they are essential features of a temple.”


1741. In Venkataramana Moorthy Vs. Sri Rama Mandhiram (1964) 2 An.WR 457, it was held that to constitute a temple, it is enough if it is a place of public religious worship and the people believe in its religious efficacy, irrespective of the fact there is no idol or structure or other paraphernalia....A place which creates a sense of reverence in the belief that God resides there or an edifice devoted to divine worship is a temple.

1742....a Supreme Court decision, it has however been held in Adangi Nageswara Rao Vs. Sri Ankamma Devatha Temple (supra) it was further observed in para 8 (last passage) that the fact that the temple has ceased to exist or ceased to be used as a place of religious worship either before or after the commencement of the Act under consideration, is absolutely of no consequence.

1746. There is another aspect. When there is a defilement, Punah-pratishthan (re-consecration of images in temples) has to be observed. The Brahmapurana says that “when a image is broken into two or is reduced to particles, is burnt, is removed from its pedestal, is insulted, had ceased to be worshipped, is touched by beasts like donkeys or falls on impure ground or is worshipped with mantras of other deities or is rendered impure by the touch of outcasts and the like-in these then contingencies, God ceases to dwell therein.

Page 1864
1748… the concept of 'Deity' and 'juristic personality' in Hindu Law has to be considered to find out whether plaintiffs no.1 and 2 are "juridical persons".

1750. In legal theory a person is any Being whom law regards as capable of rights or duties. The persons, so defined, may be placed in two categories; (a) natural person, and (b) legal person. Obviously a natural person is a human being. Legal person means Beings, real or imaginary, who for the purpose of legal reasoning are treated in greater or lessor degree in the same way as Human Beings. Legal persons commonalty and loosely are also sometimes termed as fictitious person, juristic person, artificial person or moral person. In this category, we may place a joint stock company, a statutory or local body and in Hindu law, an 'Idol'.

1751...A legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personality beyond the class of human being is one of the most noteworthy feat of the legal imagination. The law, in creating legal persons, always does so by personifying some real thing. The thing personified may be termed the corpus of the legal person so created, it is the body into which the law infuses the animus of a fictitious personality

1752. Serious objection has been raised with the concept of juristic personality though not in the context of idol but in the context of place, inasmuch as, it is contended that everything, as believed by any person, may not be given a legal status in order to confer certain rights and privileges upon him. It is said that like a human being it is conceived in Hindu Shastras that a Deity shall be taken care of in the same manner as that a natural person, for example arrangement of food, cloth, sleep etc. As a matter of fact, however it does not actually and cannot actually happen for the reason that an idol, made of some kind of substance or material, cannot infuse life for all the said purpose. It is only the perception and religious belief. Like a natural person, a Deity cannot claim citizenship under the Constitution of India, cannot participate in election either by contesting or by exercising the right of vote and so on.

1753. The above concept obviously is well embedded in the concept of Hindu Dharma. The form of observance of Dharma vide Hindu scriptures which also provides the procedure of worship in the form of Yagya. The Hindu scriptures also contain the procedure of worship in the form of "Yagya", sacrifices by chanting Mantras etc. and for the said purpose the existence of idol or temple may or may not be necessary.

1754. The Apex Court recognised the Hindu belief that worship consists of four forms of which idol worship is one...In A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu Vs. State of Andhra - In fact, the word "Dharma", which is normally read and misunderstood identifying the word "religion", has a different concept in Hindu vedic literature. According to "Chhandogyopanishad": (Font - KrutiDev010)
^^=;ks /keZ LdU/kk;Kt/;;ua nkufefr izFkeLri ,osfr f}rh;ksa
czg~ekpk;kZpk;Z dqyoklh r`rh;ksa R;UrekRekekpk;Zdqyolkn;u~A
loZ ,rs iq.;yksdk HkofUr czg~elaLFkks erRoesfrA**
There are three branches of Dharma 1. Yagna, study
and donation ¼x`gLFk/keZ½ 2. Tapsaya ¼rkil/keZ½ 3. Brihcharitya
(living in the company of Acharya)."
However, according to "Vaisheshik":
^^vFkkrks /keZ O;k[;kLe;ke:A
;rks;qn;fu: Js;: lflf): l/keZ:AA**
(Dharma is that from which enjoyment ¼vkuUn½ and
Nishreyas is achieved.)
The "Manusmriti", defines "Dharma" as under:
^^osn: Le`fr: lnkpkj: LoLFk p fiz;ekReu:A
,rPprqfoZ?ka izkgzq: lk{k)eZL; u{k.ke~AA**
(Shruti, Smriti, Sadachar and satisfaction of one's soul are
the four features of Dharma.)

1755. In A. S. Narayana Deekshitulu (supra), the Apex Court observed that the basis of Hindu Dharma is two fold, first is the Vedas and the second are Agamas. Vedas, in turn, consist of four texts, namely, Samhitas, Brahmanas, Aranyakas and Upanishads. Samhitas are the collections of mantras..
100. Each text of the Agams has the first portion, called 'Samhita' which contains the four parts namely the Vidya Pada, Kriya Pada, Charya Pada and Yoga Pada. Vidya Pada offers an elaborate enunciation of thephilosophy, whereas Kriya Pada deals elaborately with act of worship. Worship is viewed as Samurta Archana. In other words, the God are endowed with from and this form of worship culminates into Amurta or Nishkala Archana by which one worships and realises the formless. These are the steps to be treated upon one after another.”

1756...Swami Vivekananda in "Complete Works, Vol. 2, page 396 said: "Religion is realization; not talk, nor doctrine, nor theories... It is being and becoming, not hearing and acknowledging; it is the whole soul becoming changed into what it believes. That is religion."

1758....According to Hindu belief, it is for the benefit of the worshippers that there is manifestation in the images of the Supreme Being. It is the human vision of the Lord of the Lords. One can say that it is the human concept of the Lord of Lords. That is how a image and idol comes into picture.

1763. The question of asking of evidence relating to Prana Pratishta ceremony is relevant only in the context of judging whether a temple is a public temple or a private temple. An idol gets conferred the spiritual and divine spirit if the believers or the worshippers visit for its Darshan, Pooja as a matter of right believing the existence of such divine presence and nothing more is required.

1764. "Bhagavadgita" says "whatever may be the form in which each devotee seeks to worship with faith, I make their faith steadfast in that form alone."

1769. In Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami Vs. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami and others (supra) Honble Justice Subrahmania Ayyar of Madras High Court said: "It is to give due effect to such a sentiment, widespread and deep-rooted as it has always been, with reference to something not capable of holding property as a natural person, that the laws of most countries have sanctioned the creation of a fictitious person in the matter as is implied in the felicitous observation made in the work already cited "Perhaps the oldest of all juristic persons is the God, hero or the saint" (Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law, Volume 1, 481).”

1770. Bombay High Court-Manohar Ganesh Tambekar & Ors. Vs. Lakhmiram Govindram (supra)- defendants frequently acted in contravention of the rules, set up a proprietary title to the offerings made, appropriated part of the offerings...
“The Hindu law, like the roman law and those derived from it, recognizes, not only corporate bodies with rights of property vested in the corporation apart from its individual members, but also the juridical persons or subjects called foundations (West and Buhler, H.L.., 201, 185, 553, 555)..Property dedicated to a pious purpose is, by the Hindu as by the Roman law, placed extra commercium, (W & B., H.L., 185, 197)..

Precedents for considering as an underage -

1772. In Prosanna Kumari Debya (supra) the judicial committee observed: “It is only in an ideal sense that property can be said to belong to an idol and the possession and management must in the nature of things be entrusted with some person as shebait or manager. It would seem to follow that the person so entrusted must of necessity be empowered to do whatever may be required for the service of the idol and for the benefit and preservation of its property at least to as great a degree as the manager of an infant heir”-words which seem to be almost on echo of what was said in relation to a church in a judgment of the days of Edward I: “A church is always under age and is to be treated as an infant and it is not according to law that infants should be disinherited by the negligence of their guardians or be barred of an action in case they would complain of things wrongfully done by their guardians while they are under age' (Pollock and Maitland's 'History of English Law', Volume 1, 483".

Precedent for considering the Idol as a juristic person -

1775. In Avadh Kishore Dass v. Ram Gopal (supra),- “Properly constructed, this Wajibularz shows that the entire revenue estate of village Bhawalpura vests in the Temple or the Math as a juristic person.”; and “that the entire property in suit is the absolute property of the God, Thakurji as a juristic person”; and the result “No extract from the revenue records to show that Bhumidhari rights were granted not to the idol or the Temple as a juristic person, but to the appellant personally.”

1778. Justice Chatterjee also in the concurring judgment (above) observed -... A Hindu does not worship the “idol” or the material body made of clay or gold or other substance, as a mere glance at the mantras and prayers will show. They will have the eternal spirit of the deity or certain attributes of the same in a suggestive form which is used for the convenience of contemplation as a mere symbol or emblem. It is the incantation of the mantras peculiar to a particular deity that causes the manifestation or presence of the deity or, according to some, the gratification of the deity.” (emphasis added)

Contrarian View -

1779. However, we find from the judgment of Hon'ble Jenkins, C.J. in Bhupati Nath (supra) that he noticed a slightly different view based on Saraswati's Hindu Law of Endowment on page 647 of the report but His Lordship declined to make any final comment thereon. - ..and the train of reasoning that is suggested by the teaching of the Aditya Purana that the gods cease to reside in images which are multilated, broken, burnt and so forth (Sarswati's Hindu Law of Endowment, page 129). But whatever may be the true view on this obscure and complex question, this at least seems clear that the rule which requires relinquishment should be to a sentient person does not forbid the gift of property to trustees for a religious purpose though that purpose cannot in strictness be called a sentient person.”

1781. In Rambrahma Chatterjee Vs. Kedar Nath Banerjee AIR 1923 Cal 60 it was observed that a Hindu deity is treated in many respects certainly individual.

1785. In Tarit Bhusan Vs. Sri Iswar Sridhar Salagram Shila Thakur AIR 1942 Cal 99 a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court... -"Though an idol is thus recognised as a juristic person capable of suing and being sued, strictly speaking it has no material interest of its own. The efficient subject of the rights ascribed to an Idol must ultimately be some human beings. It must be they who enjoy such rights and, if law protects such rights, it is because of the existence of such ultimate human concern. The Idol, as the juridical person only affords the technical means of developing the juristic relations between those ultimately interested in the endowed property and the strangers. The so-called interest of the Idol is merely an ideal interest very different from the interest which an infant has in his property. The introduction of the Idol and its recognition as a juristic person are more a matter for the procedure and the procedure in India recognises the Idol as having a locus standi in judicio."

1789. Holding Hindu idol as juristic entity the Apex Court in Jogendra Nath Naskar (supra) in para 5 the Court said: “5. It is well established by high authorities that a Hindu idol is a juristic person in whom the dedicated property vests.”

1792. It should however be remembered that the juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated and vivified by the Pran Pratishta ceremony. Thus, in his Bhashya on the Purva Mimamasa, Adhyaya 9, para 1, Sabara Swami states:
nSoxz kek s] nSo{kS=fefr] mipkjfe=e~ ] ;k s inefHkiz Sre~
fou;k sDregfr] r=L; Loe~A
u p xz kee~ {k=e~ ok ;FkkfHkiz k;e~ fofu;qDr nSork] rLekUu
lEiz;PNrk sfrA
nsoifjpkjdk.kke~ rq rrk s HkfrHkZofr] nsorkeq f /k'p ;r~
R;Dre~A
"Words such as 'village of the Gods,' 'land of the Gods' are used in a figurative sense. That is property which can be said to belong to a person, which he can make use of as he desires. God however does not make use of the village of lands, according to its desires".

1802. Quote - It is not a particular image which is a juridical person but it is a particular bent of mind which consecrate the image.
1804. “In our view, no endowment or a juristic person depends on the appointment of a manager..

1810. A Full Bench in Jodhi Rai Vs. Basdeo Prasad, 8 ALJ 817=(1911) ILR 33 Allahabad 735 held that a suit on behalf of an idol must be carried on by some person who represents the idol usually a manager of the temple, in which the idol is installed.

1811. In Darshan Lal and others Vs. Shibji Maharaj Birajman, AIR 1923 All. 120, the question arose as to whether Swami Lachhmi Nand, priest of the temple was entitled to file a suit as a next friend of the idol. He said that he looks after the management of the temple which the Court understood as if he conducts the worshipped and dispensed such charities, if any, as are customary at the said shrine and held that Sri Lachhmi Nand was entitled to bring suit as a next friend of the idol.

1822. Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Jyoti Prosad v. Jahor Lal, AIR 1945 Cal 268. In the course of the judgment Biswas J. observed as follows (p. 277) … Sir Arthur Wilson in the Privy Council case in Jagadindra Nath Soy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi, 81 Ind. App. 203, that the right of suit is vested in the shebait, and not in the idol, but as has been explained in various decisions this does not and cannot mean that a Hindu idol is incapable of suing. The power of suing (as also being sued) undoubtedly resides in the idol, though ex necessitate rei the power must be exercised by and through a sentient being representing the idol.

Idol considered as a Minor -

1824. ……. Apex Court upheld the right of a deity to file a suit for declaration of its title and possession thereof. It also held that an idol of Hindu temple is a juridical person and when Shebait acts adversely to its interest, the idol being in the position of a minor, any person interested in the worship of idol can represent as its next friend to file a suit.

1832. In Bala Shankar Maha Shankar Bhattjee and others Vs. Charity Commissioner 1995 Suppl. (1) SCC 485 - If the general public have always made use of the temple for the public worship and devotion in the same way as they do in other temples, it is a strong circumstance in favour of the conclusiveness of public temple.

PS: All emphasis herein is mine. Will post conclusion tomorrow.

[Patni]

ASI evidence proved demolition beyond doubt

A Surya Prakash
First Published : 07 Oct 2010 12:03:00 AM IST
Last Updated : 08 Oct 2010 01:14:53 AM IST

An important aspect of the Allahabad High Court judgment in the Ayodhya title suits case is its conclusion on the issue whether a Hindu temple existed below the Babri Masjid. All three judges have answered in the affirmative and the reason is the meticulous investigation by the Archaeological Survey of India on the court’s orders in 2003. The judgment refers to that report. Given the significance of this report, it would be worthwhile to examine the evidence they gathered and their conclusions.

Below the surface

Excavation was carried out by ASI from March 12 to August 7, 2003. The court took the view that archaeological evidence would be of importance to decide the question ‘whether there was any temple/structure which was demolished and mosque was constructed on the disputed site’. It first ordered a Ground Penetrating Radar and geo-radiology survey. The Ground Penetrating Radar detected what archaeologists term as ‘anomaly alignments’. Following this survey, the court passed an order on March 5, 2003 directing the ASI to excavate the disputed site and permitted the parties to the dispute to appoint nominees to watch the excavation.

The ASI excavated 90 trenches in five months and submitted its report. It states under the heading ‘The Massive Structure Below the Disputed Structure’: As stated earlier the disputed structure or structure 3 was found directly resting over an earlier construction, structure 4 (pp 33-34) which has survived through its nearly 50-metre long wall (wall 16) in the west and 50 exposed pillar bases to its east attached with floor 2 or the floor of the last phase of the structure’.

The Circular Shrine

Further, it said, ‘From the excavation it could be inferred that there were seventeen rows of pillar bases from north to south, each row having five pillar bases’. Under the heading ‘The Circular Shrine’ it says, ‘A partly damaged east facing brick shrine, structure …… was noticed. It is a circular structure with a rectangular projection in the east….. The structure was squarish from the inner side and a 0.04 m wide and 0.53 m long chute or outlet was noticed on plan made through the northern wall up to the end where in the lower course a 5.0 cm thick brick cut in ‘V’ shape was fixed which was found broken and which projects 3.5 cm outside the circular outer face as a pranala to drain out the water, obviously after the abhisheka of the deity....

‘The brick shrine is similar (Fig 18) on plan to the Chirenath brick temple at Sravasti exposed recently by the Archaeological Survey of India ………..It has also affinity with circular Siva temples of Rewa in Madhya Pradesh at Chandrehe and Masaon belonging to C 950 AD and a Vishnu temple and another without deity at Kurari in Fatehpur district of Uttar Pradesh and Surya Temple at Tindali in Fatehpur district... Thus on stylistic grounds, the present circular shrine can be dated to tenth century AD... They possibly brought the tradition of stone circular temples transformed into brick in Ganga-Yamuna valley’.

Unearthing facts

The Archaeological Survey of India ’s ‘Summary of Results’ is as follows:

The Northern Black Polished Ware (NBPW) using people were the first to occupy the disputed site at Ayodhya during the first millennium BC. This period may be assigned to circa 1000 BC to 300 BC. The Sunga horizon (Second–First century BC) comes next in order of cultural occupation at the site. “Typical terracotta mother goddess, human and animal figurines….represent the cultural matrix of this level”. The Kushan period (first to third century AD) followed the Sunga occupation. The advent of Guptas (fourth to sixth century AD) is represented by the typical terracotta figurines and a copper coin. During the post-Gupta-Rajput period (seventh to tenth century AD) too the site witnessed structural activity including a circular brick shrine. Though the structure is damaged, the northern wall still retains a provision for pranala (waterchute).

“Subsequently, (11th–12th century AD) a huge structure was constructed, which seems to have been short-lived. On the remains of the above structure was constructed a massive structure with at least three structural phases and three successive floors attached to it. It is over the top of this construction during the early 16th century, the disputed structure was constructed directly resting over it.”

Finally, the ASI summed up its answer to the question put to it by the court, namely ‘whether there was any temple/structure which was demolished and a mosque was constructed on the disputed site’, as follows: ‘Now, viewing in totality and taking into account the archaeological evidence of a massive structure just below the disputed structure and evidence of continuity in structural phases from the tenth century onwards up to the construction of the disputed structure along with the yield of stone and decorated bricks... amalaka, kapotapali doorjamb with semi-circular pilaster, broken octagonal shaft of black schist pillar, lotus motif, circular shrine, having pranala (waterchute) in the north, are indicative of remains which are distinctive features associated with the temples of north India”.

Presidential reference

This report played a crucial role in determining a crucial issue before the court. At this point, it would be pertinent to revert to proceedings before the Supreme Court in regard to the presidential reference of January, 1993 and to the declarations and assertions by the Union government before the apex court on how it proposed to resolve the dispute.

A five-judge Bench of the Supreme Court on October 24 1994 delivered its judgment in the Faruqui case (M Ismail Faruqui and Others Versus Union of India and Others) while simultaneously disposing of the presidential reference made the previous year. In that reference the president asked the court: “Whether a Hindu temple or any Hindu religious structure existed prior to the construction of the Ram Janma Bhoomi–Babri Masjid (including the premises of the inner and outer courtyards of such structure) in the area on which the structure stood?” The court declined to answer this question.

In the Faruqui case, the constitutional validity of Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993 was challenged. The court upheld the Act but declared Section 4(3) of Act, which provided for abatement of all pending suits and legal proceedings pertaining to the disputed structure, to be invalid. This meant the revival of all pending suits and legal proceedings before the Allahabad High Court. On the Presidential Reference, the court said it was “superfluous and unnecessary and does not require to be answered”.

The judgement pertained to the constitutional validity of the ‘Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya’ Ordinance on January 7, 1993 for acquisition of 67.703 acres of land in the Ram Janma Bhoomi–Babri Masjid complex and the reference made by the president that very day to the Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution.

The government’s word

Those who opposed the presidential reference said the question was ‘academic’ and ‘vague’ and did not serve any constitutional purpose. The Supreme Court asked the solicitor-general to clarify. The solicitor-general responded with a written statement on behalf of the central government on September 14 1994. He said the government would treat the finding of the court on the question of fact raised in the presidential reference “as a verdict which is final and binding”. The government would make efforts to resolve the controversy by a process of negotiations “in the light of the Supreme Court’s opinion and consistent with it”.

The solicitor-general further went on to say that if efforts at a negotiated settlement did not succeed, “government is committed to enforce a solution in the light of the Supreme Court’s opinion and consistent with it. Government’s action in this regard will be even-handed in respect of both the communities. If the question referred is answered in the affirmative, namely, that a Hindu temple/structure did exist prior to the construction of the demolished structure, government action will be in support of the wishes of the Hindu community. If, on the other hand, the question is answered in the negative, namely, that no such Hindu temple/structure existed at the relevant time, then government action will be in support of the wishes of the Muslim community”. The solicitor-general’s statement formed a part of the record and was taken into account by the court.

The Supreme Court however held that the presidential reference was “superfluous and unnecessary” in view of its decision to uphold the validity of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993, except Section 4(3).

Central issue

The white paper published by the Centre after the demolition of the Babri Masjid offers a clue to why the government posed that question to the Supreme Court: The white paper said: During the negotiations aimed at finding an amicable settlement, one issue that came to the fore was whether a Hindu temple had existed on the site occupied by the disputed structure and whether it was demolished on Babur’s orders for the construction of the masjid. It was stated on behalf of the Muslim organisations, as well as by certain eminent historians, that there was no evidence in favour of either of these two assertions. It was also stated by certain Muslim leaders that if these assertions were proved, the Muslims would voluntarily hand over the disputed shrine to the Hindus. Naturally, this became the central issue in the negotiations between the VHP and AIBMAC. This explains the purpose of the presidential reference...”

Now that the Allahabad High Court has concluded that there indeed was a temple below the disputed structure, the Union government is bound by the commitment made before the Supreme Court on September 14 1994. It now has the answer to the question it posed via the presidential reference and will be morally and legally bound to live up to its commitment.

Understanding Hindu law

Several commentators who are not clued into the intricacies of Hindu law have expressed surprise over the high court’s verdict, especially on the juristic rights of deities exercisable through a ‘next friend’ and on the court’s eventual conclusion that Ram Janma Bhoomi is the birthplace of Ram.

Of the four title suits decided in the Ayodhya case, only one filed on behalf of Bhagwan Shri Ram Virajman was accepted by the court. All the other suits (filed by Sunni Waqf Board and others; Sri Gopal Singh Visharad and Nirmohi Akhara) were dismissed. In the suit filed on behalf of Ram, Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman was the first plaintiff, the second was Asthan Sri Ram Janma Bhoomi, Ayodhya (the place known as Ram Janma Bhoomi) and the third plaintiff was Deoki Nandan Agarwal, a retired judge, who became the ‘next friend’ of the deities in 1989. Following his demise, T P Verma and then Trilokinath Pandey were appointed the ‘next friend’ by the apex court.

K N Bhat, former additional solicitor-general who represented Lord Ram and the Janmasthan acting through the ‘next friend’ Pandey argued that a Hindu deity is a juristic person who can sue and be sued and can possess properties and that this is well-established through judgments of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court; that the Janmasthan is itself a deity; and that the suit is not barred by limitation because the deity (Lord Ram) is in the position of a perpetual minor. The final outcome depended substantially on whether the court accepted these points.

Provides well researched and reasoned path forward that should be followed by GoI.
It does seem that lot rides on the ASI report establishing existence of older temple at the site.

[Ashley Kravitz]

Accept Ayodhya verdict, top cleric Madni tells Muslims
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Accept-Ay ... 10078.aspx

[vera_k]

Cong muzzling the Muslims says Imam

a section of the Muslim leaders alleged on Thursday that Congress general secretary Digvijay Singh was putting pressure on some board members and clerics to keep mum on the judgment.

At a meeting of maulvis and representatives of ulemas, Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid Syed Ahmed Bukhari claimed that the Congress was backing communal forces on the issue.

Unsurprisingly, Bukhari was all praise for Mulayam. "More secular parties should adopt the position taken by Mulayam Singh Yadav. He understands the Muslim sentiment. As many as 95% of Muslims are against the verdict," Bukhari said.

[arjunm]

Hai this my first post. I am following this excellent analysis of the Court verdict by various members and I thought Dr.Koenraadelst 1999 article may shed some light on this contentious issue.After analyzing both parties argument, he consluded "Future historians will include the no-temple argument of the 1990s as a remarkable case study in their surveys of academic fraud and politicized scholarship."

Here is the article-

The Ayodhya Debate: Focus on the 'No Temple' Evidence

Koenraad Elst

Two sides to the story

In references to the question whether there really was a Hindu temple at the Ayodhya site later covered by the Babri Masjid, the focus is invariably on the case made by the Hindu side, viz. that there was a temple, and that different types of evidence confirm this. The standard question is: is this evidence for the temple demolition scenario valid? Have they succeeded in proving the existence of the temple? By contrast, the opponents of the temple hypothesis are but very rarely asked to put their evidence on the table.

Let us now look at the anti-temple argumentation (with due attention to the several non-archaeological types of evidence)[1] and in particular to its offer of positive evidence that the allegedly demolished Hindu temple never existed. Of course, some might argue that it is impossible to prove the non-existence of something, and that it is therefore unreasonable to demand such proof.[2] But this argument is not valid: if there was no temple and no temple destruction, then there must have been something else at the site, some other history preceding the building of the mosque, which is exactly as capable of leaving some written or archaeological testimony as a demolished temple would. There is no need to prove the temple's non-existence, it will do to prove the existence of something else at the site.

The disputed site is an elevated site near the centre of a city, quite well-known to a whole city population, so it is perfectly reasonable to expect the existence of testimonies of any alternative history of the site. Thus, the site may have been covered with a forest and the city records mention its felling to make way for a mosque; or the owner of some secular building standing at the site sold his real estate to the builder of the projected mosque at a fair price, vide the written sales contract. As much as the temple party is expected to provide evidence for the temple, the non-temple party must provide evidence for the alternative to the temple.

Now, a close scrutiny of the argumentation by the non-temple party, whether by the Babri Masjid Action Committee, by the scholars representing it during the government-sponsored scholars' debate of December-January 1990-91 (at least its last two meetings)[3] , or by independent scholars such as those of Jawaharlal Nehru University)[4] shows that none of them even formulates an alternative hypothesis. Not one of the numerous scholars who took up arms against the temple party has thought it necessary to explicitate even in the vaguest terms what exactly happened before a mosque was built at the site. Much less does any of them provide any kind of evidence for such an alternative scenario, eventhough positive proof for a non-temple scenario would be the best possible refutation of the temple scenario.

Vanquishing a straw man

The non-temple argumentation is confined to two types of evidence: arguments from silence, and attempts to find fault with pieces of evidence offered by the temple party.

Criticism of the pro-temple argument is usually directed against a straw man, not against the actual argumentation as presented by pro-temple scholars. A number of much-acclaimed anti-temple publications bravely announce in the introduction or on the cover that they will demolish every argument given (or "concocted" and "maliciously propagated") by the temple party, but then fail to address or even mention the main statements of the pro-temple party. Thus, Asghar Ali Engineer has published two anthologies of articles on this controversy[5] , but carefully leaves out the official as well as the competent non-official formulations of the pro-temple position; instead he includes only a few clumsy ones to create a semblance of even-handedness.

The most powerful non-official books by pro-temple scholars are simply never mentioned, let alone discussed.[6] Even the official argumentation offered by the scholars mandated by the Vishva Hindu Parishad during the government-sponsored debate is generally ignored.[7] Gyanendra Pandey manages to leave all this argumentation by professional historians totally unmentioned in three successive publications purporting to deal with the Hindu way of doing history during the Ayodhya controversy, focusing instead on some Hindi pamphlets by local religious personnel totally unacquainted with scholarly historiography.[8]

The same ignoring of the very argumentation which is purportedly refuted is found in the successive editions of S. Gopal's Anatomy of a Confrontation, for most foreign scholars the only accessible source about the Ayodhya conflict. Even the fact that a government- sponsored debate between historians mandated by both sides took place is obscured in most publications, and when it is at all mentioned, it is mostly to denounce the fact that the government had "collaborated with the communal forces" by giving them a hearing at all.

Case study of a straw man

The single most important book in the whole Ayodhya controversy is Sita Ram Goel's two-volume book Hindu Temples, What Happened to Them. Its first volume contains a number of presentations of specific cases of temple demolitions, a brief presentation of the Islamic theology of iconoclasm, and most of all a list of nearly 2,000 mosques standing on sites of temples demolished by Islamic iconoclasm.[9] Everybody whispered that within the Ayodhya movement, a list of "3,000" demolished temples was circulating. The normal thing to do for serious historians would have been, to analyze this list inside out, and to try to refute it. After all, far from basing itself on "myth", Goel's argument consists of two thousand precise and falsifiable claims, as a scientific theory should. It turns out that none of the anti-temple historians has taken up the challenge of refuting even one of those claims, viz. by proving objectively that one of the mosques in the list had definitely not been built in forcible replacement of a temple. The list has never been discussed and figures in practically no bibliography.[10]

Even more important is the second volume, The Islamic Evidence. It is the key to the whole Ayodhya controversy, no less. Its main parts are a 174-page compilation (emphatically not claiming completeness, merely the discovery of a "tip of the iceberg") of Muslim literary and epigraphic evidence for the demolition of Hindu temples, and a 138-page presentation of the Islamic theology of iconoclasm. Goel's comment on the compilation open thus: "Starting with Al-Biladhuri who wrote in Arabic in the second half of the ninth century, and coming down to Bashiruddin Ahmad who wrote in Urdu in the second decade of the twentieth, we have cited from seventy histories spanning a period of more than a thousand years. Our citations mention fifty kings, six military commanders and three sufis who destroyed Hindu temples in one hundred and seven localities..." [11]

The importance of the book is that it provides the historical and ideological context of the temple demolitions: it demonstrates that the Ayodhya dispute is not a freak case but on the contrary an entirely representative case of a widespread and centuries-long phenomenon, viz. Islamic iconoclasm. It shows that the iconoclastic demolition of Hindu temples was practised in practically all Indian regions which were under Muslim rule at one time. Historians, particularly modern historians with their emphasis on "context", ought to welcome it and study it closely. Instead, it has been completely obscured and kept out of the picture in the whole controversy.

It may have achieved mention in a footnote here or there. The longest discussion of it which I am aware of, is by political scientist Chetan Bhatt (who does not try to hide his ignorance about medieval history), who devotes fifteen lines to it: two separate lines in his text, and a 13-line footnote. He accuses Goel of "a highly selective obsession with archaeology and to some extent anthropology" [12] , of marshalling "the most selective archaeological and historical facts" [13], and of this: "Goel's text uses Islamic sources to 'prove' that Mughals were only interested in religious domination of Hindus and nothing more. The historical method used is based almost entirely on highly selective non- contextual quotations from these sources." [14]

It is of course very convenient to allege that embarrassing quotations are "selective" and "pulled out of context", especially when you don't say what that context is, nor how it changes the meaning of the quotation. But here we are dealing with hundreds of quotations, requiring no less than an equal number of contexts to redeem them, to turn a testimony of fanatical vandalism into a testimony of tolerance. Moreover, it is normal for quotations to be selective (those in Bhatt's own book, culled from writings by Hindu nationalist ideologues to put them in a bad light, certainly are); at any rate, quoting from primary sources is a decent form of scholarship. Incidentally, that the "Mughals" (meaning the Islamic invaders in general) were "only" interested in religious domination is a caricature misrepresenting Mr. Goel's stated views; his point merely is that the religious motive provides an exhaustive and well- attested explanation for the observed fact of Islamic temple- demolishing campaigns.

Bhatt also claims that Goel "provides 'evidence' that the Black Stone in the Ka'ba at Mecca (the most sacred site for Muslims) was originally a shrine to the Hindu God Shiva".[15] In reality, Goel explicitly denies just that claim. He discusses a long-standing Hindu tradition to this effect, as well as testimonies of the mutual visits to each other's temples by Pagan-Arab and Hindu traders and of the (well-founded) Muslim belief in a connection between Arab and Hindu polytheism, to the extent that the first Muslim invaders took great risks to reach and demolish the Somnath temple (Gujarat), in which they believed the Arab deities had taken refuge after the islamization of Arabia. At any rate, the presiding deity of the Ka'ba, Hubal, was a male moon-god just like Shiva, and polytheists have always identified their own gods with roughly corresponding deities in other pantheons.[16] Goel explains how he always "dismissed" this belief as an invention of crank historians, until he ran into some new evidence, and even then he reserves his judgment: "But in the course of the present study this author has run into some facts which force him to revise his judgment. He is not prepared to say that the Ka'ba was a Shiva temple. He, however, cannot resist the conclusion that it was a hallowed place of Hindu pilgrimage." [17]

Bhatt describes Goel's book as "a fairly typical RSS-Hindu-nationalist text". [18] I challenge him to produce a similar text by a declared RSS man. Anyone familiar with the Hindu nationalist movement knows that (and knows why) the RSS scrupulously avoids this type of critical study of Islam as a doctrine. Since at least the Emergency (1975-77, when RSS activists were jailed and developed friendly relations with jailed activists of the Jamaat-i-Islami), the RSS is wooing the Muslim community; its political ally, the BJP, is courting the Muslim voters and showing off its fast-increasing number of Muslim election candidates. Even when criticizing specified Muslim politicians or Islamic militants, the RSS and its allies firmly refuse to turn this into a criticism of Islam as such; rather, they will denounce their Muslim target as "straying from the true message of Islam, which is a religion of peace and tolerance".

In the very book which Bhatt claims to be criticizing, Goel has taken the RSS-BJP leaders to task for precisely this pro-Islamic attitude: "Hindu leaders have endorsed the Muslim propagandists in proclaiming that Islam does not permit the construction of mosques at sites occupied earlier by other people's places of worship. One wonders whether this kowtowing to Islam is prompted by ignorance, or cowardice, or calculation, or a combination of them all. The Islam of which Hindu leaders are talking exists neither in the Quran nor in the Sunnah of the prophet." [19] On other occasions as well, Goel has sternly criticized the RSS and BJP for their policy of eschewing all serious discussion of Islamic doctrine.[20] His book Time for Stock-Taking is the single most incisive critique of the RSS available; unlike the stereotyped and sloganeering tirades by Marxists like Chetan Bhatt, it is based on first-hand knowledge, including the testimonies by a number of disappointed RSS volunteers. In spite of this, political "scientists" like Bhatt can disregard all the evidence and label Goel as an RSS man.

"Disregarding the evidence" is indeed the name of the game. Critics of the Hindu historians' case on Ayodhya have so far never looked their opponents in the eye, smugly settling for a labelling number, excelling in demonizing terminology ad hominem rather than in a factual analysis ad rem. It is historiographical nonsense to discuss the phenomenon of Islamic iconoclasm, in Ayodhya or elsewhere, without addressing the question of its motivation -- always an important aspect in any history of human behaviour. Yet, that is precisely what a whole establishment of Indian historians have done in suppressing the very mention (or in the case of Bhatt, at least the true contents) of Sita Ram Goel's book.

The BMAC historians

The only (partial) exception to the solid front of scholarly disregard for the pro-temple argument is the official statement by the scholars mandated by the Babri Masjid Action Committee half-way through the government-sponsored scholars' debate.[21] The story behind this is that the BMAC officials, no historians themselves, had shown up at the first meeting in December 1990, at which bundles of evidence would be exchanged, with nothing but a pile of photocopies of newpaper articles and book excerpts stating opinions on the Ayodhya dispute, but no historical evidence (the only solid material included pertained to the fairly uncontroversial judicial history of the site since 1857). My reading is that they had been misled into an unwarranted self-confidence by the assurance propagated by certain media-savvy academics that the pro-temple case was completely baseless and fraudulent. To their surprise, they were confronted with a genuine presentation of evidence by the pro-temple party, represented by Prof. Harsh Narain, Prof. B.P. Sinha, Dr. S.P. Gupta, Dr. B.R. Grover, and Mr. A.K. Chatterji (none of them formally associated with the Vishva Hindu Parishad except for Gupta).

In desperation, the BMAC representatives approached Prof. Irfan Habib of the Indian Council of Historical Research asking him to save them. Habib collected a team of genuine historians for them, led by Prof. R.S. Sharma. We will refer to these employees of the BMAC as "the BMAC team", for it is in that capacity that they have participated in the debate, notwithstanding their initial attempt to be recognized as "independent historians" (as the BMAC negotiators have continued to call their own employees). Now that, in spite of minimum coverage in the English-language Indian press, the impression was out that the VHP-mandated team of historians was winning the debate, the BMAC team had little choice but to address the pro-temple argumentation.

On 24 January 1991, when they were expected to present their case, Sharma and his team failed to show up and unilaterally broke off the talks. One could see the unilateral walk-out from the negotiations by the BMAC team as an admission of defeat. But the day before, the four BMAC historians, in their first meeting (chaired by a government representative) with the VHP team, had said that they needed six weeks to study the evidence,-- a remarkable position for people who had led 40 colleagues into signing a public statement on the absolute non-existence of any evidence, just a few days before. However, it must be admitted that they did make their homework as promised. A few months later they presented an argumentation under the title Historians' Report to the Nation, which remained their central argument when the talks briefly resumed in October 1992. Then too, they broke off the talks, viz. in (arguably justified) protest against the VHP's announcement that, disregarding the ongoing negotiations, it would stage a demonstration in Ayodhya on December 6, the occasion when the Babri Masjid was demolished.

In the BMAC team's Report, the salient point is that the BMAC scholars exclusively attempted to refute (a part of) the pro-temple argumentation but made no attempt whatsoever to present any original evidence of their own. In effect, they pretended to sit in judgment on evidence presented to them by supplicants, when in reality they themselves were one of the contending parties in the arena, expected to present their own evidence. Unfortunately, to keep both parties to the rules of a debate and to evaluate the evidence objectively, a genuinely neutral judge would have been needed, and of course, it seemed that there was no neutral judge available in India.

Arguments from silence

The central line of argument in the BMAC team's Report is that until the late 18th century, no literary source mentions a temple or a temple demolition at the site. Arguments from silence are always the weakest type of argument. The absence of testimony in a particular source may simply mean that that the author was unaware of an event eventhough the event did take place; or it can mean that the author had no intention of providing the kind of information which we are looking for, either deliberately or simply because he had a different project in mind when writing that particular text. Thus, poet Tulsidas, author of the main devotional work on Rama in Hindi, the Râmcharitmânas, is often cited as remaining silent regarding the alleged temple demolition. But this proves little, when you keep in mind that in his day (ca.1600 AD) the construction of the Babri Masjid at the site (1528 AD according to the inscription on the mosque itself) was a long-accomplished fact, and that the same Tulsidas doesn't mention any of the numerous temple demolitions even in his own Varanasi. As a rewriter of ancient traditions, Tulsidas was just not a reporter on recent events at all; he does not even mention his own most famous contemporary, the enlightened Emperor Akbar.

But in this case, there is an even more decisive argument against reliance on arguments from silence: each argument from silence against the temple is equally valid as an argument from silence against every possible alternative scenario, for none of the texts cited mentions any non-temple entity at the site.

One frequently mentioned argument from silence is simply disingenuous: the absence of any reference to Ayodhya in Babar's memoirs. As Babar himself relates, the pages for the period when he may have stayed in Ayodhya were blown away during a storm. If those missing pages listed Babar's activities day by day and failed to mention his stay in Ayodhya, then that would constitute a serious argument from silence; but since those pages are missing, there is not even an argument from silence in Babar's memoirs.

A British concoction ?

But if there had never been a temple demolition, why did a tradition come into being asserting just that? Usually, this anomaly is explained by means of an ad hoc hypothesis, viz. that the temple demolition scenario was invented by the British as part of their policy of "divide and rule". Even pro-temple authors like K.R. Malkani, editor-in-chief of the party paper BJP Today, have conceded an important role to this British "divide and rule" policy, which in my view is a figment of the imagination.

Admittedly, at the institutional level the British did follow a policy of "divide and rule": communal recruitment quota and separate electorates for Muslims were obviously meant to isolate the Muslims from the national movement. In their conquest of India, the British had also used one community against another, e.g. they took help from the Sikhs, hereditary enemies of the Moghul Empire, to suppress the so-called Mutiny of 1857, which was a predominantly Muslim revolt aimed at restoring the Moghul Empire. However, in this process, they used existing antagonisms between communities and had no need of inventing new ones.

Moreover, it is simply not true at all that the British encouraged inter-religious rioting, nor that they exploited (let alone created) the kind of emotive issues (such as temple demolitions) which led to street fighting rather than to purely political disunity. Once the British-Indian Empire was securely established, the British rulers sought to establish communal peace, and did so with remarkable success. The period between 1858 and 1920, at the height of British power, saw the lowest incidence of Hindu-Muslim violence since the Ghorid invasion of 1192. When Hindu-Muslim riots started on a large scale in 1922, it was due to the failure of the ill-conceived Khilafat agitation started by the (Muslim and Congress Hindu) Indians themselves.

At any rate, not one of the proponents of the British concoction scenario has discovered even the faintest evidence for it in the copious colonial records. Remark, moreover, that this scenario implies a number of highly unlikely presuppositions. Thus, it imputes a great deal of stupidity to the wily Britons: it has them concoct a temple demolition scenario when so many factual, well- attested temple demolitions had marked India's landscape, often in the form of temple remains being visibly incorporated in mosques built over them. In Ayodhya itself, several Rama temples were destroyed by Aurangzeb (Treta-ka-Thakur and Swargadwar), a fact which even the official polemicists against the Ram Janmabhoomi have not dared to deny; if the British had wanted to poke up anti-Muslim feelings among the Hindus of Ayodhya by means of temple demolition narratives, they had no need at all to go through the trouble of concocting one.

Further, this scenario credits the guardians of Hindu tradition with an uncharacteristic open-mindedness. All through the past centuries, Hindu Pandits have refused to listen to European scholars who claimed that the Sanskrit language had been brought from South Russia during the so-called Aryan Invasion, eventhough this Aryan Invasion Theory is taught in every schoolbook of history in India. These Pandits have consistently turned a deaf ear to European theories about Indian chronology, Sanskrit etymology or Aryan- Dravidian relations. They won't even allow non-Hindus into Hindu temples. Yet, we are asked to believe that a few British agents could infiltrate the local traditions and make these same Pandits swallow and then propagate a newly invented story about the birthpla- ce of one of their greatest gods.

The British concoction hypothesis is conclusively refuted by several pre-British testimonies of (at least the belief in) the temple demolition scenario. The best-known and clearest testimony is certainly the one by the Austrian Jesuit Tieffenthaler, who wrote in 1768: "Emperor Aurangzebe got demolished the fortress called Ramcot, and erected on the same place a Mahometan temple with three cupolas. Other believe that it was constructed by Babor." [22] One could speculate, along with R.S. Sharma and his BMAC team of historians, that the tradition which Tieffenthaler recorded, was a concoction from the early 18th century (still "in its initial phase of creation") [23] , but it cannot, at any rate, have been a British concoction.

To their credit, R.S. Sharma and his team are the only ones in the no-temple camp to have abandoned the British concoction hypothesis, at least implicitly. But they fail to give the elements which could lend substance to a pre-British concoction hypothesis: no who, no how, no why.

A closer look at the argument from silence

While Sharma c.s. leave undiscussed several pre-British testimonies which the VHP-mandated team had brought as evidence, they do mention a few other sources of this type nonetheless. In each case, they claim it as an argument from silence: the source fails to mention the pre-existence or the demolition of a temple at the site. But each of these Ayodhya-related passages cited is very brief and fails to mention other buildings in Ayodhya, and none of the texts cited purports to be a history of temple demolitions, so that the non-mention of a birthplace temple is quite in keeping with the project of the texts concerned, and not a telling omission.

Thus, Abul Fazl's Ain-i-Akbari, completed in AD 1598. Sharma c.s. note that it includes Ayodhya among the foremost places of pilgrimage, calling it "one of the holiest places of antiquity" and "the residence of Ramchandra", and mentioning the celebration of Ram Navami (Rama's birth festival) there. The BMAC historians comment: "Clearly, the tradition till then did not confine Rama's place of birth to the existing town of Ayodhya, let alone the site occupied by the Baburi Masjid." [24]

But this is hardly incompatible with a tradition concerning a specific birthplace. Till today, people can say: "I'm from Scotland", or: "I was born in Edinburgh", rather than to tell you in exactly which house they were born. When filling out forms, people still write the name of the town behind the entry "place of birth", and not the full adress of the building; yet in doing so, they are not denying that they were born in that specific building. You really have to be a university professor to come up with the brilliant idea that when people mention a town as their place of birth, they are implying that they have no notion of having been born in one specific house.

Anyone familiar with the lore of Hindu devotional tradition would find it strange that Hindus would come on pilgrimage to Ayodhya as Rama's city and not let that Rama association come alive in an enactment of Rama's career with the designation of specific sites as the theatres of specific scenes in Rama's life. That, for example, is why another temple in Ayodhya was associated with Rama's death: the Swargadwar, "gate to heaven". Even if Rama were a purely fictional character, the religious imagination would have created that kind of landscape, and in the Bhakti period, i.e. from well before the start of the second Christian millennium, it was the done thing to adorn such religiously meaningful sites with temples.

Sharma c.s. assume that the identification of the demolished building as a "fortress" (Ramkot, "Rama's fortress") refutes the assumption that it was a temple; but Hindu "idol-worshippers" consider a temple as the house of the deity, in the case of a warrior-deity as his fortress. The whole idea of idol-worship is to make a deity come alive, realistically: the idol is washed and clothed and fed, and of course it lives in a house appropriate to its character and epic career.

On balance

So, in spite of sometimes painstaking attempts to neutralize the evidence presented by the temple party, the proponents of the non- temple hypothesis have failed to produce any positive evidence for a non-temple scenario. This observation raises a few questions. First of all: why is there an Ayodhya debate in the first place? Normally, scholars only take time from their busy schedules to reopen a settled affair when new evidence has surfaced which throws a new light on the matter. In this case, no such new evidence has ever been presented. It is most conspicuous by its absence in the opening shot of the debate, the JNU historians' pamphlet The Political Abuse of History (Delhi 1989). Had there not been the purely political motives which drove some to declare the Ayodhya debate opened, we would still have been with the consensus of 1989"

Secondly: what is the score if each one of the attempted refutations of the items of pro-temple evidence proves correct? In that case, the pro-temple evidence is reduced to zero, but that would still make it exactly as voluminous as the evidence for every possible non-temple scenario, which to date is non-existent. Even if all the trouble taken by the pro-temple scholars had been in vain, their evidence would still be equal in magnitude to the evidence offered by their oponents, whose endeavour has been purely negative. Anyone weighing the actual evidence presented by both sides would have to infer that the balance of evidence, while not yet definitive, is strongly on the pro-temple side.

Tampering with the evidence

Before concluding, we want to register a remark on a minor but quite significant chapter in the exchange of evidence: the VHP- mandated scholars have, in their argumentation, pointed out no less than four attempts where scholars belonging to the anti-temple party have tried to conceal or destroy documentary evidence. Those are of course cases where the attempt failed because it was noticed in time, but the question must be asked how many similar attempts have succeeded. At any rate, there has not been any attempt from the anti-temple side to counter or even deny these four specific allegations, nor have they been able to point out any similar attempt by the pro-temple party to tamper with the record.

With one possible exception: immediately after the announcement of the discovery, in the post-demolition debris on 6-7 December 1992, of Hindu sculptures and an inscription explicitly supporting the temple thesis, seventy academics issued a statement alleging that this evidence had been stolen from museums and planted there. Well, who knows. But in the six years since then, this archaeological material has been in the custody of politicians openly hostile to the Hindu Revivalist movement (such as Human Resources Minister Arjun Singh, 1991-96), who would gladly have made the material available for inspection by scholars capable of proving the allegation. So far, however, the attack against the professional integrity of the scholars who presented these findings (grouped in the Historians' Forum chaired by Prof. K.S. Lal) remains unsubstantiated; unless proven, the allegation is a case of defamation.

The politics behind the debate

The political equation behind all this intrigue is rarely understood by non-Indians. Thus, it requires quite a historical excursus to explain why declared Marxists like Irfan Habib, R.S. Sharma and Romila Thapar are making common cause with Islamic fundamentalism in its struggle against Hindu heathenism.[25] Leaving aside the larger framework of the alliances and power equations in India's political arena, we may for now draw attention to a significant asymmetry in the political backgrounds of the pro- and anti-temple parties.

Reducing the "belief" in the pre-existence of a Hindu temple at the site to a political agenda is, apart from being a case of the "genetic fallacy", also counterfactual. Among those who uphold the temple thesis, you find scholars who did not support the movement for replacing the mosque structure with temple architecture, and who explicitly distanced themselves from the Vishva Hindu Parishad's campaign, e.g. Prof. A.R. Khan and archaeologist Dr. Ram Nath. By contrast, I am not aware of anyone in the anti-temple party who supported the right of Hindus to build a temple at the site: every one of them explicitly subscribes to the position that Hindu attempts to reclaim this Hindu sacred site should be thwarted.

Of course, the opponents of the replacement of the Babar mosque (already back in use as a Hindu temple since 1949) with new temple architecture could have taken that political stand without dragging in the historical question, e.g.: "The fact that a Hindu temple stood at the site still does not give Hindus the right to claim it back"; and some of them have indeed fallen back on that position when they saw they were losing the debate on the historical evidence. But in 1989-91, the field seemed ripe for the more aggressive position, which was to deny the Hindu history of the site altogether; nobody had expected that the VHP would be capable (and in effect, it was not capable, but it found some independent scholars who were capable) of collecting and presenting the available as well as some newly-found evidence for the temple.

The VHP-mandated scholars, for their part, have not been aggressive enough to take the struggle into the enemy half of the field by focusing public attention on the quality of the evidence presented by the BMAC-mandated scholars and their allies in academe and the media. That is why the latter have gotten away with creating the false impression, at least among those unacquainted with the actual contents of the debate, that the pro-temple case is weak and fraudulent while, purely by implication, their own case must be unassailable.

The role of foreign scholars

It is not reassuring to watch the ease with which foreign scholars have absorbed or adopted the non-temple thesis from their Indian colleagues (whom they assume to be neutral observers) even without being shown any positive evidence. In academic circles in the West, my own restating the status quaestionis in terms of actual evidence has only earned me hateful labels and laughter, and this from big professors at big universities whose prestige is based on the widespread belief that scholarship goes by hard evidence, not politically fashionable opinions. Never has any of them offered hard evidence for the newly dominant view, or even just shown a little familiarity with the contents of the debate.

Until 1989, there was a consensus about the existence of a medieval Hindu temple and its destruction by Islamic iconoclasm, as laid down in the Encyclopaedia Brittannica (1989 edition, entry Ayodhya): "Rama's birthplace is marked by a mosque erected by the Moghul emperor Babur in 1528 on the site of an earlier temple." Western scholars who did primary research, notably the Dutch scholars Hans Bakker and Peter van der Veer, found nothing which gave reason to question that consensus. Had they cared to follow the debate in India, they would have looked in vain for the presentation by the no- temple party of any historical or archaeological fact which is radically incompatible with (and thereby constitutes a refutation of) that consensus view.

A painful example of a scholar intimidated into conformity by the demonization of the temple thesis can be witnessed is this climbdown by Peter van der Veer, who had at first accepted the pre-existence of the Ayodhya temple on the basis of the local tradition: "While Bakker and I could naively accept local tradition, this cannot be done any longer."[26] In fact, the local oral history was confirmed by other types of evidence as presented by B.B. Lal, S.P. Gupta, Harsh Narain et al., but none of these are known to Van der Veer (as per his own text and bibliography) because his only source turns out to be S. Gopal's Anatomy of a Confrontation, which conceals the pro-temple evidence. More importantly, Van der Veer and Bakker are attacked nominatim in S. Gopal's book [27], which falsely associates them with the Hindu fundamentalist bad guys all while diverting attention from the historical evidence, which it spurns as "pointless".[28] Being associated with Hindu fundamentalism is about the worst defamation one can inflict on an Indologist, and this is the sole reason for Van der Veer's change of heart. At any rate, he offers no historical evidence at all which could justify his retreat from the well-established consensus.

Conclusion

Future historians will include the no-temple argument of the 1990s as a remarkable case study in their surveys of academic fraud and politicized scholarship. With academic, institutional and media power, a new consensus has been manufactured denying the well- established history of temple demolition by Islamic iconoclasm to the Babri Masjid Ram Janmabhoomi site; at least among people with prestige and influence but no first-hand knowledge of the issue. But the facts will remain the facts, and their ongoing suppression is bound to give way.

© Dr. Koenraad Elst, December 4, 1999.

http://koenraadelst.bharatvani.org/arti ... emple.html

References:

[1] On the archaeological aspect, see Ayodhya Archaeology after Demolition by Prof. D. Mandal, Delhi 1993, and Archaeology of Babri Masjid, Genuine Publ., Delhi 1994, by Mrs. Surinder Kaur and Mr. Sher Singh, amateurs with whom other anti-temple authors like Sushil Srivastava have refused to be associated; and on the pro-temple side, The Baburi Masjid of Ayodhya by R. Nath, Jaipur 1991.

[2] E.g. S. Guhan in Jitendra Bajaj, ed.: Ayodhya and the Future India, Madras 1993, p.89.

[3] R.S. Sharma et al.: Historians' Report to the Nation, People's Publ., Delhi 1991. To my knowledge, the argumentation offered by the BMAC office-bearers themselves during the first round of the talks, in December 1990, was never published.

[4] S. Gopal, Romila Thapar, K.N. Panikkar, Bipan Chandra et al.: , JNU 1989; and S. Gopal, ed.: Anatomy of a Confrontation, 2nd ed., Penguin 1992.

[5] A.A. Engineer: Babri Masjid Ramjanmabhoomi Controvercy, Ajanta, Delhi 1990, and Politics of Confrontation, idem 1992.

[6] E.g. Harsh Narain: The Ayodhya Temple-Mosque Dispute, Penman, Delhi 1993, and S.R. Goel: Hindu Temples, What Happened to Them, vol.2, The Islamic Evidence, Voice of India, Delhi 1991.

[7] Available in two editions: The Great Ram Janmabhoomi Evidence, VHP, Delhi 1991, and History vs. Casuistry, Voice of India, Delhi 1991.

[8] Gyanendra Pandey: Hindus and Others (Viking/Penguin 1993), p.9-10; "New Hindu History of Ayodha", Economic and Political Weekly, 18-6-1994; "The New Hindu History", in J. McGuire, P. Reeves & H. Brasted: Politics of Violence (Sage Publ., Thousands Oaks, Colorado 1996), p.143-158.

[9] This first volume includes articles by Harsh Narain, Ram Swarup, Jai Dubashi and Arun Shourie, apart from the main body by Goel himself. In appendix, it also reproduces a list of Hindu temples demolished in Bangladesh in autumn 1989, prepared by the Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Unity Council of Bangladesh, as if to prove that Islamic iconoclasm is not ancient history.

[10] In a review in the Calcutta Telegraph (ca. 30-1-1991), Manini Chatterjee of the Communist Party (Marxist) calls Hindu Temples, vol.1, (along with my own book Ram Janmabhoomi vs. Babri Masjid) a "very bad book", but fails to even attempt a refutation.

[11] S.R. Goel: , vol.2, p.266-267 of the first edition, the one which Chetan Bhatt uses; there is a much-expanded second edition (1994).

[12] C. Bhatt: Liberation and Purity, p.169.

[13] C. Bhatt: Liberation and Purity, p.175.

[14] C. Bhatt: Liberation and Purity, p.278.

[15] C. Bhatt: Liberation and Purity, p.278.

[16] E.g. in his De Bello Gallico, Julius Caesar identified the Celtic gods with the Roman gods familar to his readers. Likewise, a Muslim commentator of the Quran (Md. Faruq Khan: Qur'ân Majîd in Hindi, Rampur 1976, p.242, quoted by Goel: Hindu Temples, vol.2, p.364) identifies the Arab goddesses Al-Lât, Al-Manât and Al-Uzza typologically with Hindu goddesses like Saraswati and Lakshmi.

[17] S.R. Goel: Hindu Temples, vol.2 (1st ed.), p.429.

[18] C. Bhatt: Liberation and Purity, p.278.

[19] S.R. Goel: Hindu Temples, vol.2 (1st ed.), p.ii.

[20] See S.R. Goel, ed.: Time for Stocktaking: Whither Sangh Parivar?, Voice of India, Delhi 1997.

[21] R.S. Sharma et al.: Historians Report to the Nation, cf. supra, largely copied in Pradeep Nayak: The Politics of the Ayodhya Dispute, Commonwealth, Del

[22] Quoted by R.S. Sharma et al.: Historians' Report, p.19, italicizing the words "the fortress".

[23] R.S. Sharma et al.: Historians' Report, p.20.

[24] R.S. Sharma et al.: Historians' Report, p.16.

[25] Thapar and Sharma are quoted as representatives of Indian Marxism in Tom Bottomore's History of Marxist Thought, Oxford 1988, entry "Hinduism"; Habib has subtitled his latest book Towards a Marxist Perspective.

[26] P. van der Veer: Religious Nationalism, p.161. Reference is to his book Gods on Earth, and to Hans Bakker's book Ayodhya

[27] S. Gopal: Anatomy of a Confrontation, p.30.

[28] S. Gopal, ed.: Anatomy of a Confrontation, p.20.














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[ramana]

Its Mulayam playing votebank politics with the Imam. Its related to UP politics. Burkha Dutt would be pleased that she is in Mulayam's company. Anyway what does Amar Sigh say? he has been awfully quiet.
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Its nice to read Dr Elst's article but there are many credible Indian scholars who have already deposed before the Court. We need our own icons and thinkers. After all is aid and done Thapar aunty is till Indian.

[krithivas]

ASI released a report mid-2000 ('05?) of proof that a large structure was mapped (usign ground penetrating radar?) under the RJB-Babri Masjid compound.

The very next day there were serial blasts in Mumbai (think it was the India gate blasts ~50+ deaths).

There was no further press/public discussion thereafter.

ASI evidence proved demolition beyond doubt
......
Provides well researched and reasoned path forward that should be followed by GoI.
It does seem that lot rides on the ASI report establishing existence of older temple at the site.

[ramana]

Fundamental issue in Ayodhya case

by Dr.Subramanian Swamy

T.R. Andhyarujina is a highly respected and accomplished lawyer who is very skilled in court craft. His major point in his Op-Ed [“A Verdict that legitimises the Masjid demolition,” The Hindu, Oct.5, 2010] is that the 8,700-plus pages judgment of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court on the Ayodhya dispute implicitly condones the 1992 demolition of the Babri Mosque structure because the Court did not take judicial notice and draw adverse inference [in fact no reference] against the directly or de facto affiliated parties (in the litigation before the Bench) in that destruction.

I do not dismiss this point because the structure was indeed unauthorisedly demolished and therefore the culprits and the planners of this demolition, whoever they are, have to be brought to book to uphold the rule of law. For this purpose, there is an ongoing criminal case in a special CBI-designated Sessions Court.

In this context, the question is whether every court will have to take judicial notice of this alleged illegal violent event even after the Supreme Court of India has taken such notice? Mr. Andhyarujina himself quotes the Supreme Court judgment [reported in (1994) 6SCC376] in which the court, while absolving the Hindus as a community of the blame, nevertheless held that “Hindus must bear the Cross for it.” This was an extraordinary judicial observation and has profound implications for all communities whenever religious premises are destroyed.

The fact nevertheless remains that throughout the last several centuries, Hindus have deeply held as sacred as Ram's birthplace that exact spot where the Babri Masjid once stood. This is recorded in many official and judicial proceedings.

In 1885, for example, Mahant Raghubar Das, in a Suit No. 61/280 of 1885 filed in the Court of the Faizabad Sub Judge against the Secretary of State for India (who was based in London), prayed for permission to build a temple inside the perimeter of the mosque. His suit was dismissed on March 18, 1886, but in his Order the Sub-Judge, an Englishman, stated: “It is most unfortunate that a Masjid should have been built on land specially held sacred by the Hindus. But as the event occurred 358 years ago, it is too late now to remedy the grievance.” Since the British as policy never sought to disturb the communal and social status quo in India as evidenced, for example, on the ‘Sati question,' the judge took the easy way out and dismissed the suit.

Temple did exist

It is now well established by GPRS-directed excavations, done under the Allahabad High Court monitoring and verification in 2002-03, that a large temple did exist below where that Babri Masjid structure once stood. Inscriptions found during excavations describe it as a temple of Vishnu Hari who had killed the demon king Dasanan [Ravana]. The Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) confirmed these findings on investigations that were directed by the High Court.

A fundamental question arises: Can a temple and a masjid be considered on a par as far as sacredness is concerned? Relying on two important apex judgments that hold the field today, the answer is: No. A masjid is not an essential part of Islam religion, according to a majority judgment of a Constitution Bench of India's Supreme Court (op.cit. 1994), whereas according to the House of Lords, U.K. (1991), the temple is always a temple even if in disuse or ruins.

In the famous Ismail Farooqui vs Union of India case [reported in (1994) 6 SCC 376], the Supreme Court of India observed: “It has been contended that a mosque enjoys a particular position in Muslim law and once a mosque is established and prayers are offered in such a mosque, the same remains for all time to come a property of Allah … and any person professing Islamic faith can offer prayer in such a mosque, and even if the structure is demolished, the place remains the same where namaz can be offered “ [para 80].

The Constitution Bench then rejected this contention, stating: “The correct position may be summarised thus. Under Mohammedan law applicable in India, title to a mosque can be lost by adverse possession. A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) can be offered anywhere, even in the open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions in the Constitution of India”(para 82).

Thus what was wrong with the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 was that it was unauthorised by law and hence a criminal offence. Otherwise any government can deprive Muslims of the Babri Masjid, which would be lawful if the government decides to do so in the interest of public order, public health and morality (Article 25 of the Constitution). This is the position in Islamic law as well since in Saudi Arabia the authorities demolish mosques to lay roads. Even the mosque where Prophet Mohammed used to pray was demolished.

Nataraja statue case

A temple however is not in the same category as a mosque in law. When I was Union Law and Justice Minister, this question of the status of a temple – even if in ruins or without worship – came up before me in November 1990 in a case of a smuggled-out bronze Nataraja statue that was up for sale in London. The Government of India under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had decided to file a case in the London trial court in 1986 for recovery. The Nataraja statue had by then been traced to a temple in ruins in Pathur, Thanjavur district. A farmer named Ramamoorthi had unearthed it in 1976 while digging mud with a spade near his hut.

When the news spread, touts of an antique dealer reached Ramamoorthi, paid a small sum, and smuggled it out to London, where in 1982 it was sold to a private company. In turn, the buyer sent it to the British Museum for appraisal and possible purchase. By then the Government of India was on to it and asked the British government to take action. The Nataraja idol was seized by the London Metropolitan Police, the company sued the police in court for recovery, but lost the case. An appeal was filed in the Queens Bench, which was dismissed on April 17, 1989. The buyer company went to the House of Lords.

On February 13, 1991, when I was Union Law Minister, the landmark judgment dismissing the buyer's final appeal [see (1991) 4 All ER 638] was delivered. The Bench consisting of Justices Purchas, Nourse, and Leggatt concluded: “We therefore hold that the temple is acceptable as party to these proceedings and that it is as such entitled to sue for the recovery of the Nataraja” [page 648 para g]. Thus a disused temple in ruins became a party, and we as Siva bhaktas as de facto trustees thus recovered the Nataraja idol.

No such ruling anywhere in any court exists for a mosque for the simple reason that a mosque in Islam is just a facilitation centre for reading namaz, and has no essentiality for Islam as a religion.

It can therefore be demolished and/or shifted in India under the Constitution as any building can — but of course authorisedly for a public purpose such as public health, public order or morality. The Union Government is committed by virtue of its affidavit filed in the Supreme Court in 1994 to do so if it is found that a temple structure exists below the mosque site. It must hence perform now and deliver on its commitment on oath sworn in the Supreme Court.

This is the fundamental truth in the Ayodhya dispute that is being constantly evaded by those criticising the Allahabad High Court Judgment.[/b]

( The writer is a former Union Law Minister and the Convenor of the Legal and Parliamentary Cells of the Hindu Dharma Acharya Sabha.)
http://janamejayan.w...n-ayodhya-case/

Is this affadavit filed in 1994 available for perusal?

[Prasad]

To quickly add, the cases that Swamy lists in his article above have been cited by the H'ble Judge in his judgement in Vol 8. So Swamy isn't citing cases from thin air nor are they some wishy washy out of the blue cases that may or may not be pertinent to this case. They are very relevant to this case and have been used in the judgement.

[ramana]

SwamyG, How could one who gave such a speech (Dr. Shirin Moosvi) at the History Congress give such deposition in the court?

[Manny]

Another interesting article

Why the Ayodhya judgment is a landmark

http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/oct/ ... ndmark.htm

[JwalaMukhi]

^^ From the above link.

It is in the vested interests of many to keep the Ayodhya issue unresolved, a festering wound that annoys Hindus and rallies Muslims.

On the merits of the case, based on traditional belief and archaeological evidence, it is likely that a Ram temple once stood at the spot. But that's not the point.

The point is that the self-proclaimed 'intelligentsia' want to use Ayodhya, which they portray as the 'original sin' of Hindus, as their excuse for supporting Muslim intransigence in all issues.

Never mind that the judgment is an absolute slap on the faces of the 'intelligentsia': Their desperation shows; the mask is slipping and the claws are coming out.

[Prasad]

H'ble Judges are meticulous like anything!! I'm not tired of saying this again and again. They just quote reams and reams and reams from past cases, sacred texts, accounts ityadi ityadi. Even reading all this takes so much time. Imagine collating all this from various sources and putting them all together into a cogent judgement! Deep deep respect for these gents!

Continuing on on the same issue -
Issues considered in this section -

(G) Issues relating to Deities, their status, rights etc.:
1683. In this category comes issues no. 12 and 21 (Suit-4); and, 1, 2, 3(a), 6 and 21 (Suit-5).

1684. Issues no. 12 (Suit-4) and 3(a) (Suit-5) involves common facts and consideration. Similarly issues no. 1 and 1

(Suit-5) and issues no. 2 and 6 (Suit-5) are common:
“Issue No. 1 (Suit-5):-
Whether the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are juridical persons?

Issue No. 21 (Suit-5):-
Whether the idols in question cannot be treated as Deities as alleged in paragraphs 1,11,12,21,22, 27 and 41 of the written statement of defendant no.4 and in paragraph 1 of the written statement of defendant no.5?

Issue No. 2 Suit-5):-
Whether the suit in the name of Deities described in the plaint as plaintiffs 1 and 2 is not maintainable through plaintiff no.3 as next friend?

Issue No. 6 (Suit-5):-
Is the plaintiff no.3 not entitled to represent the plaintiffs 1 and 2 as their next friend and is the suit not competent on this account?

Issue No. 21 (Suit-4):-
Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of alleged Deities?

Note - As is obvious upon reading the issues listed here, the very nature of the question requires extensive reading of Hindu texts about what constitues a deity and what can be named a deity. Therefore the H'ble Judges have spared no effort in getting to the bottom of it. Therefore quotes and texts are long.

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.

Vol 8 - http://www.rjbm.nic.in/sa/Judgment%20RJ ... Vol-08.pdf
Page 1840 (91/251)

1844. …Ram Jankijee Deities(supra….while usually an idol is consecrated in a temple, it does not appear to be an essential condition. The Apex Court affirmed the Division Bench decision of Madras High Court in Board of Commissioners for H.R.E. Vs. Pidugu Narasimham (supra) and T.R.K. Ramaswami Servai (supra…."The test is not whether it conforms to any particular school of Agama Shastras. The question must be decided with reference to the view of the class of people who takepart in the worship. If they believe in its religious efficacy, in the sense that by such worship they are making themselves the object of the bounty of some super-human power, it must be regarded as "religious worship"..... If the public or that section of the public who go for worship consider that there is a divine presence in a particular place and that by offering worship there they are likely to be the recipients of the blessings of God, then we have the essentialfeatures of a temple as defined in the Act." (Para 15)

1847. …with reference to Section 9 (12) ofMadras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927, the Court in para 47 observed…“Consecration, according to the ceremonial rites prescribed by the Agama Sastras, is not a legal requisite, though it is a sacredotal necessity according to the views of the orthodox. The test is not whether the installation of an idol and the mode of its worship conform to any particular school of Agama Sastras. If the public or that section of the public who go for worship consider that there is a divine presence in a particular place and by offering worship at that place, they are likely to be the recipients of the bounty or blessings of God, then, you have got the essential features of a temple as defined in S. 9, cl. (12) of the Act. The presence of an idol, though an invariable feature of Hindu temples, is not a legal requisite under the definition of a temple in S. 9, cl. (12) of the Act.

1851. In Ganpat Vs. Returning Officer (1975) 1 SCC 589, the Court noticed varied religious practices of Hindus and observed that Hindu is inclined to believe the divine in every manifestation, whatever it may be, and is doctrinally tolerant. The Hindu is deposed to think synthetically. To regard other forms of worship of strange Gods and divergent doctrines as inadequate rather than wrong or objectionable; he (Hindu) tends to believe that the highest divine powers co-complement each other for the well-being of the world and mankind.

1852. In Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi (supra), in para 30 of the judgment, it was held: “30. Hinduism cannot be defined in terms of Polytheism or Henotheism or Monotheism. The nature of Hindureligion ultimately is Monism/Advaita. This is in contradistinction to Monotheism which means only one God to the exclusion of all others, Polytheism is a belief of multiplicity of Gods: On the contrary, Monism is a spiritual belief of one Ultimate Supreme and manifests Himself as many. This multiplicity is not contrary to on-dualism. This is the reason why Hindus stall adoring any Deity either handed down by tradition or brought by a Guru or Swambhuru and seek to attain the Ultimate Supreme.” (emphasisadded)

1853. In Shastri Yagnapurushdasji & others Vs. Muldas Bhundardas Vaishya and another AIR 1966 SC 1119, the Court considered the question as to whether Swaminarayan sect is a religion distinct and separate from Hindu religion or not: {A huge quote about just what is hinduism and what constitutes hinduism. Nice read for those who might be interested}

1855. Construing the right protected under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, the Apex Court in para 31 Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple (supra) said: 31. The protection of Articles 25 and 26 of theConstitution is not limited to matters of doctrine. They extend also to acts done in furtherance of religion and,therefore, they contain a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of the religion. . . .

1860. In Durgah Committee, Ajmer Vs. Syed Hussain Ali AIR 1961 SC 1402, the Constitution Bench said : “While we are dealing with this point it may not be out of place incidentally to strike a note of caution and observe that in order that the practices in question should be treated as a part ofreligion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Art. 26. Similarly, even practices though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself. Unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a religion their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and an integral part of it and no other.”

Place as a Deity -

1879. Learned counsels for the Muslim parties, however, submit that in view of plethora of legal authorities it is now beyond doubt that a Hindu idol, duly consecrated is a legal person, but they further submit that same thing would not apply to a place which has no such definite concept. Thequestion raised obviously is not only interesting but important and has far reaching consequences. It has to be considered very cautiously and carefully.

1880. So the question now is, whether a place can be a Deity or not. Some of the authorities already referred, in our view, In Ram Jankijee Deities &Ors. (supra) the Apex Court in para 14 of the judgment referred to Padam Puran and observed that a Swayambhu or self-revealed image is a product of nature and it is Anadi or without any beginning and the worshippers simply discover its existence and it do not require consecration or Pratistha.

1881. Sri R.L.Verma, learned counsel for the defendant no.3 however submitted that a Swayambhu Deity is only one i.e. the Salgram Shila which depicts Lord Narayana i.e. Vishnu Bhagwan and nonelse. He could not dispute that Hindu worship several places like Kedarnath (State of Uttarakhand); Vishnupad temple at Gaya; rivers like "Sangam" at Allahabad (U.P.); natural formation of snow as "Linga" at Amarnath (State of Jammu and Kashmir); Fire Hills (Jawala Ji) in Himachal Pradesh;m Goverdhan (Mathura (U.P.); etc. as Swayambhu Deity.

1882. How and what manner the people should believe a place or an image having supreme power to cherish the wishes of worshipper has to be considered from the belief of the worshippers and cannot be placed in a straight jacket formula. In para 15 of the judgment in Ram Jankijee Deities & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court said that the question must be decided with reference to the view of the class of people who take part in the worship. If they believe in its religious efficacy, in the sense that by such worship they are making themselves the object of the bounty of some super-human power, it must be regarded as "religious worship". It further says that if the public or that section of the public who go for worship consider that there is a divine presence in a particular place and that by offering worship there, they are likely to be recipients of the blessings of God, it has the essential features of a temple. In para 16 of the judgment the Apex Court further observed that if the people believe in the temples' religious efficacy no other requirement exists as regards other aspects. The Court observed that it is not a particular image which is a juridical person but it is a particular bent of mind which consecrate the image. There is no apparent reason to deny the status of Deity to a place which is worshipped by a large section of people as sacred and pious being the birthplace or the place of manifestation which normally is the term used when ….

1886. We do not find any parallel to the dispute before us where a particular 'Place' is claimed to be a deity, a juridical personality in the shape of an undefined idol, by itself a temple, for the reason of belief of Hindu public that Lord Rama, incarnation of Lord Vishnu, was born thereat and this divine manifestation of the Supreme Lord at a particular place make it sacred and due to belief of Hindu people that God resides there and the 'Place' possesses all such divine and supreme power so as to cherish the wishes of the people and salvation to those who come to worship and Darshan of such place. It is stressed that this itself is sufficient to make the 'Place' a deity and satisfy the requirement of the legal personality. The proposition appears to be quite simple but if we put on tests with the precedents, religious and legal, it become difficult to be answered simplicitor.

1887. What would be the meaning of word “Place” and what shall be its extent? Whether it would be a small place which normally is required for birth of a human being or whether it will cover an area of the entire room, house, locality, city or sometimes one can say even more than that. We know that Hindus worship rivers and lakes like, Ganga, Yamuna, Narmada, Mansarovar etc. They are very sacred and pious...The very origin of such sacred rivers is also a place of worship for Hindus like, Gangotri, Yamunotri (State of Uttaranchal) and Amarkantak (for river Narmada) Similarly certain hills or mountain or hilly terrains as such are treated to be the places of worship like, Kailash, Gobardhan, Kamathgiri etc.

1888. When asked theses questions, learned counsels for Hindu parties also felt difficult to reply. Sri M.M.Pandey submitted that in the present dispute, it is the belief of the Hindu people that the fort of King Dashrath situated at Ayodhya included the part of the building wherein Lord Rama was born according to Hindu belief and the disputed area covered that house...

1891. The concept of deity is deeply embedded amongst Hindus. The Hindu Dharma has elevated the concept of sacredness into an object of divinity fit for worship. However, this is only symbolic. A Hindu does not worship the idol or the material body but it is the eternal spirit of the deity and the image is a mere symbol.

1892. The deity, i.e., the consecrated image or the Swayambhu deity has a juridical status. Law recognises its power of suing and being sued. This power can be exercised by the person who is entrusted with its care and management normally called "Shebait". In the context of Shebait the deity is treated to be an "infant heir" or "with the status of a minor" since it cannot act on its own.

1894. A temple is the house of the deity. Even if the image is broken or otherwise get damaged, the Supreme Being continued to exist and by replacement of the image that continuity is maintained symbolically. A temple and deity is res extra commercium. Presence of idol is not decisive to ascertain the status of a temple.

1896. If the public goes for worship considering that there is a divine presence and offer worship thereat believing that they are likely to be the recipient of the bounty of God then it satisfy the test of a temple. Installation of an idol or the mode of worship are not the relevant and conclusive test.

1897. It leaves no doubt in our mind that according to the well recognised and accepted concepts of Hindu Law in regard to deity and idol, it cannot be disputed now that an idol is a juridical person, can sue and be sued, can acquire property and deal with it in a manner it likes though obviously this user is through a Shebait or the person who takes care of the idol since it cannot act on its own not being a natural person.

1901. The evidence to show that the Hindu people used to visit the fort of Lord Rama and its nearby area believing it to be the birthplace of Lord Rama find mention with number of books of authorities, some of which we have already discussed..

1902. Goswami Tulsi Das in his "Ramcharitmanas" has referred the observance of a grand festival on the day of birth of Lord Rama at Ayodhya. The worship by Hindus in the place called fort of Lord Rama has been referred in the Travellers Account of William Finch.

1903. Tieffinthaler has specifically observed the manner in which the Hindu people used to worship at the place in dispute...Then he mentioned, "however, there still exists some superstitious cult in some place or other. For example, in the place where the native house of Ram existed, they go around 3 times and prostrate on the floor."

1907. The dispute pertaining to this place amongst the two communities is centuries old. Record, prior to 1860 AD, atleast fortify, continuance of such dispute...Several witnesses of the plaintiffs (Suit-4) had admitted that the Hindus used to come to the disputed place for worship believing it the birthplace of Lord Rama.

1908. Record of Suit-1885 shows that the defendant no. 2 therein, i.e., Mohd. Asghar, who contested the said suit in his capacity as Mutawalli of the disputed building (alleged waqf), in his own written statement admitted that the Chabutara constructed in the outer courtyard on south east side of the disputed building used to be attended by Hindus for worshipping, believing it to be the birthplace of Lord Rama. No doubt, he also pleaded simultaneously that the said construction was unauthorised and impermissible but the fact remains that existence of Chabutara, according to the pleadings, had continued at least since about 1855 and this position remain undisturbed till 6th December, 1992....

1909. A place if identified by a name given to the deity by its worshippers/believers and if it can be shown that it relates to a divine or otherwise important phenomena related with religious matters making it a pious and important religious place, it can be held 'deity' and thereby satisfy the requirement of being a 'juridical person'....The Hindu believers and worshippers who go and worship the said place identify it by the name of Lord Rama's birthplace and this identity ascertain and admits no doubt in the mind of those who belief, follow and worship. That being so, we find no reason in denying the status of deity to the said place and the consequential juridical personality upon it. It cannot be disputed that property can be dedicated in the name of the plaintiff no. 2 which can be utilized for the benefit of the said deity. This of course is subject to the issues decided in favour of Hindu parties which pertain to the site in dispute whether is or believed to be the birthplace of Lord Ram for time immemorial and is being worshipped accordingly.

1910...If an idol is faithfully recognised by all those who believe the idol of a particular deity, it is a deity. In the present case idol of Lord Rama, and its worship as such satisfy the requirement of a validly consecrated deity. No further inquiry need be gone into.

1912.Apex Court in above case further observed that a juristic person like any other natural person is in law also conferred with rights and obligations and is dealt with in accordance with law. The entity acts like a natural person but only through a designated person, whose acts are processed within the ambit of law. When an idol was recognised as a juristic person it was known that by itself it cannot act. Like the case of a minor where a guardian has been appointed, so in the case of an idol, a Shebait or manager is appointed to act on its behalf. In that sense, relation between an idol and Shebait is akin to that of a minor and a guardian. As a minor cannot express himself, so the idol, but like a guardian, the Shebait and manager have limitations under which they have to act...

1913. Let us apply these tests in respect to the plaintiffs 1 and 2 in the case in hand. <snip>. It is with this faith and belief it is said that the Hindus are visiting the birthplace of Lord Rama at Ayodhya since time immemorial and despite of several adverse situation the belief and worship has continued unrelented.

1914. It is well settled that faith and belief cannot be judged through any juridical scrutiny, its a fact accomplished and accepted by its followers. In fact this faith necessitated the creation of a unique to be recognised as a juristic person....In the context of Guru Granth Sahib whether it is a juristic person or not an argument was raised though an idol can be recognised to be a juristic person but not a temple and on the same party neither a Gurudwara can betreated to be a juristic person nor Guru Granth Sahib which is only a sacred book. Repelling this argument the Apex Court in Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Som Nath Dass (supra) said that Gurudwara or Guru Granth Sahib cannot be equated with an idol. Sikhism does not believe in worshipping any idol but that does not mean that Guru Granth Sahib in order to treat to be a juristic person should be equated with an idol. When belief and faith of two different religions are different there is no question of equating one with the other. If Guru Granth Sahib by itself could stand the test of its being declared as such, it can be declared to be so.

1915. Applying all these observations to the two plaintiffs we find no hesitation to observe that every condition or ingredient is fully satisfied so as to confer legal personality upon the two.

1918. In view of the above, we find force in the submissions of the learned counsels that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are juridical person and considering… This faith and belief cannot be negatived on the challenge made by those who have no such belief or faith. How it was created, who created, what procedure of Shastrik law was followed are not the questions which need be gone at their instance. We find that such faith and belief is writ large by a long standing practice of Hindus of visiting the place for Darshan and worship.

I need glasses and sleep. And the conclusion on this issue is nowhere in sight

[abhishek_sharma]

The Ayodhya Verdict: From the Urdu Press

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/The-A ... ict/694283

In a signed piece on the Allahabad high court’s judgment regarding the Ayodhya dispute, entitled, ‘Kya zaroori hai Supreme Court jaana — zara ghaor karein...’ (‘Is it necessary to go to the Supreme Court, give it some thought!’), on October 2, the editor of Rashtriya Sahara, Aziz Burney, writes: “Our various religious leaders have also expressed their opinion in favour of going to the Supreme Court. Some political leaders involved in Muslim politics too have expressed dissatisfaction with this verdict, and said that it has been given on the basis of faith and not on facts. With great respect and humility I want to request that, for God’s sake, now there should be an end to politics on this issue, and we should reconsider any intention to go to the Supreme Court, and give some more thought to it — and also consider seriously if the judgment was different, and according to what we wanted, what would have been the situation in the country, what could have been the reaction of the majority of the people?”

But Jamaat-e-Islami’s biweekly Daawat is very critical: “The judgment is extraordinary, in fact, historic, as it has given ‘aastha’ a legal status. The verdict given by the learned judges, giving precedence to traditions over facts, has added a new basis to the world of law, and now judgments would be given on the basis of aastha, even if contrary to facts.”

The paper adds: “This verdict has given legality to the Janmabhoomi movement, as the court has accepted not only that Ayodhya is the Ram Janmabhoomi, but the site where the Babri Masjid was constructed 475 years ago is the actual janmasthan of Ramchandraji... This verdict has, in fact, opened the way for questions being raised about the surrender of other such mosques on the basis of aastha.”

Delhi-based daily Hamara Samaj, in its lead story on October 3, says that Justice S.U. Khan, one of the three judges, has in his judgment said that the opening of the locks of the Babri Masjid in 1986 by the district and sessions judge of Faizabad, “without following the due procedure” was responsible for the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992.

In an editorial entitled, ‘Na koi jeeta, na koi haara’ (‘Nobody won, nobody lost’), the daily Sahafat writes on October 2: “So far, both contestants in the Ayodhya dispute had been of the view that the Babri Masjid was built by Babar’s commander Mir Baqi. Muslims have been paying tax on the mosque’s land for 60 years. In spite of this, the failure of the Sunni Waqf Board to prove this in court is astonishing.”

On the adverse reaction of some eminent jurists and journalists to the judgment, the leading Mumbai daily Inquilab, writes in its October 5 editorial: “the reason for such an intense adverse reaction to the Allahabad high court’s judgment is that it does not resolve a problem going on now for 60 years. It may quite possibly give birth to many new problems... If this judgment is not challenged in the Supreme Court, tomorrow any claim on the basis of faith will have to be accepted, howsoever unbaked, meaningless and baseless it might be... The meaning of accepting the disputed site as Ram Janmabhoomi is that whatever was done to ‘achieve’ it was legitimate, and whatever will be done in the future too will be legitimate. Under this ruling the demolition will also not be illegal.”

Hyderabad’s leading daily, Siasat, castigates the legal team of the Sunni Waqf Board in an editorial on October 1. It adds: “It has to be kept in mind that whereas it is a question of faith for the Hindus, for Muslims too it is of religious importance.”

[Prasad]

It is precisely this whole canard of 'decision was made using tradition and faith instead of facts' that the above excerpt lays into. The H'ble judges have cited legal precedents and logic to say exactly how they decided upon tradition and faith. Blanket statements that Hindu faith has been held above facts appear to be not just false but a sheer debasement of the effort the H'ble judges have put in, in their judgement. Unbelievable!

[Ashley Kravitz]

Wow! It seems journalists from ToIlet are BRF lurkers
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 716643.cms

How HC exposed 'experts' espousing Masjid cause

NEW DELHI: The role played by "independent experts" — historians and archaeologists who appeared on behalf of the Waqf Board to support its claim — has come in for criticism by one of the Allahabad High Court judges in the Ayodhya verdict.

While the special bench of three judges unanimously dismissed objections raised by the experts to the presence of a temple, it was Justice Sudhir Agarwal who put their claims to extended judicial scrutiny.

Most of these experts deposed twice. Before the ASI excavations, they said there was no temple beneath the mosque and, after the site had been dug up, they claimed what was unearthed was a mosque or a stupa. During lengthy cross-examination spread over several pages and recorded by Justice Agarwal, the historians and experts were subjected to pointed queries about their expertise, background and basis for their opinions.

To the court's astonishment, some who had written signed articles and issued pamphlets, found themselves withering under scrutiny and the judge said they were displaying an "ostrich-like attitude" to facts.

He also pointed out how the independent witnesses were all connected — one had done a PhD under the other, another had contributed an article to a book penned by a witness.

Some instances underlined by the judge are: Suvira Jaiswal deposed "whatever knowledge I gained with respect to disputed site is based on newspaper reports or what others told" (other experts). She said she prepared a report on the Babri dispute "after reading newspaper reports and on basis of discussions with medieval history expert in my department." Supriya Verma, another expert who challenged the ASI excavations, had not read the ground penetration radar survey report that led the court to order an excavation. She did her PhD under another expert Shireen F Ratnagar.

Verma and Jaya Menon alleged that pillar bases at the excavated site had been planted but HC found they were not present at the time the actual excavation took place.

Archaeologist Shereen F Ratnagar has written the "introduction" to the book of another expert who deposed, Professor Mandal. She admitted she had no field experience.

"Normally, courts do not make adverse comments on the deposition of a witness and suffice it to consider whether it is credible or not, but we find it difficult to resist ourselves in this particular case considering the sensitivity and nature of dispute and also the reckless and irresponsible kind of statements..." the judge has noted.

He said opinions had been offered without making a proper investigation, research or study in the subject. The judge said he was "startled and puzzled" by contradictory statements. When expert witness Suraj Bhan deposed on the Babri mosque, the weight of his evidence was contradicted by anotherexpert for Muslim parties, Shirin Musavi, who told the court that Bhan "is an archaeologist and not an expert on medieval history".

Justice Agarwal referred to signed statements issued by experts and noted that "instead of helping in making a cordial atmosphere it tends to create more complications, conflict and controversy." He pointed out that experts carry weight with public opinion. "One cannot say that though I had made a statement but I am not responsible for its authenticity since it is not based on my study or research but what I have learnt from what others have uttered," Justice Aggarwal has said, emphasising the need for thorough original research before concurring with what someone else has claimed.

Kudos to Prasadji and Chanakyaji !

[Hari Seldon]

^^^ Wow. Talk about IMPACT or what. Glad to see jingoes penetrate the ToI fortress as well - in the process getting a meaty story out of it for themselves as well.

Hopefully, more and more young-lean-n-mean journos will discover the joys and merits of the rigorous crowd-sourced gyan BR collates on topics of national and public interest only.

[milindc]

Kudos to Prasadji and Chanakyaji !

++1
Appreciate your efforts... it is enlightening to everyone. Thanks

[chaanakya]

x-posting from GD

AT this stage, after a brief digression , I am unable to resist the temptation to tell what was the Judges' views after the examination of alleged experts, much admired by many even on this forum,

J Sudhir Aggrawal
Vol 15
Page 3640- 3641( page 141-142 of the vol) Para

3623. Normally, the Court do not make adverse comments on the deposition of witness and suffice it to consider whether it is credible or not but we find it difficult to resist ourselves in this particular case considering the sensitivity and the nature of dispute and also the reckless and irresponsible kind of statements, and the material got published by the persons claiming to be Expert Historian, Archaeologist etc. without making any proper investigation, research or study in the subject.

3624. This is really startling. It not only surprises us but we are puzzled. Such kind of statements to public at large causes more confusion than clear the things. Instead of helping in making a cordial atmosphere it tend to create more
complications, conflict and controversy. Such people should refrain from making such statements or written work. They must be extremely careful and cautious before making any statement in public on such issues.

3625. The people believe that something, which has been said by a learned, well studied person, would not be without any basis. Normally they accept it as a correct statement of fact and affairs. Normally, these persons do not find a stage where their statement can be scrutinized by other experts like a cross-examination in a Court of law. In legal terminology, we can say that these statements are normally ex parte and unilateral. But that does not give a license to such persons to make statements whatsoever without shouldering responsible and accountable for its authenticity. One cannot say that though I had made a statement but I am not responsible for its authenticity since it is not based on my study or research but what I have learnt from others that I have uttered. No one, particularly when he claims to be an expert on the subject, a proclaimed or self styled expert in a History etc. or the facts or events can express some opinion unless he/she is fully satisfied after his/her own research and study that he/she is also of the same view and intend to make the same statement with reasons.

3626. We do not know how much damage such kind of statements have already caused, but, if any, that has already
been done. At this stage we can only hope and trust that the intelligentsia of this country particularly those who are experts in any discipline, shall live more responsible life, and before expressing any opinion or statement of fact particularly when that involves an extra ordinary sensitive matter, due care and caution shall be practised.

There are examples of Really REAL Expert Witnesses whose depositions are enough to put all these so called experts to great shame. But that we reserve for later.

Meanwhile we continue with Experts' depostions

[chaanakya]

x-posting from GD

J Sudhir Aggrawal\
Vol 15
page 3641-3646 ( page 142-147/251) Para 3627-

(A) Existence of Temple & Demolition :
The questions are whether there existed a temple before the alleged construction of disputed building which was demolished and thereafter the building in dispute was constructed. Here issues no. 1(b) (Suit 4) and 14 (Suit 5) need be answered.
“Whether the building had been constructed on the site of an alleged Hindu temple after demolishing the same as alleged by defendant no.13 ? If so, its effect ?” “Whether the disputed structure claimed to be Babri Masjid was erected after demolishing Janma-Sthan temple at its site ?”

3627. PW-20 Prof. Shirin Musavi Professor in the History Department, Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh also deposed that she did not find any evidence or material to show that Babri Masjid was constructed after demolishing any temple or that any temple ever existed at the disputed site. She also said that the place in dispute was never known as Ram Janam Bhumi or Ram Janam Asthan. Some of the extracts from her cross-examination are reproduced hereunder to throw light as to how much opinion of the above witness is creditworthy and honest, and is relevant under Section 45 of the Evidence Act:

“As per my knowledge, reference of the fact that during his period after demolishing any temple Babar got
constructed a mosque, is not historically found. It may be that material of any temple could have been used for
construction of any mosque, as it was a common practice prevalent those days.” (E.T.C.)


“As per my knowledge, disputed structed was divided in two parts in 19th century. There was some dispute that
there is Sita Rasoi, so, perhaps one portion of disputed structure was separated for worship.”(E.T.C.)


“This is true that there is museum in Jaipur built on the name of Sawai Man Singh which exists today also. It is also true that in that museum, there are more than one map of Ayodhya drawn on cloth. The historians say the entire collection as Kapad Dwar Collection. It is true that in that Kapad Dwar Collection there is a painting annexed with the map wherein temple of three Kapolas is indicated. (of her own said) It is mentioned in Kapad dwar, which is an official catalogue, so far as I remember, at no.176 it is written that it had been purchased from a saint in Rs.5/-. This Kapad Dwar collection is not of 1717 AD but of late 18th century. Late 18th century means after 1750.”
(E.T.C.)


“In my view, to ascertain whether it is temple or mosque, it was not necessary to see the disputed site. I had historical literary evidence, on going through which, I reached the conclusion that this disputed structure was mosque or mosque was not constructed after demolishing temple. Whatever evidence I read, that were either contemporary evidence or nearing the contemporary and also studided late evidence in this connection.” (E.T.C.)


“ However, as a matter of fact, I did not read in any source that this mosque was built here after demolishing any
temple. It is not specifically written anywhere that any vacant land was lying on which a mosque was built.”
(E.T.C.)


“The disputed structure was not a part of the course of my study, but I had myself studied about it. I started
study on this topic from 1986.” (Page 120)


“The Gazetteer is not treated as a source of history; so, I never read it seriously." (E.T.C.)


“I do not consider 1854 Gazetteer to be relevant to the study of history of 16th Century.” (E.T.C.)


"After 1986 I tried to know the nature of the land over which Babri Mosque was built but since there was no mention in any of the sources that this land was acquired by force or was constructed after demolishing any temple." (E.T.C.)


“The legend of Ayodhya being the birth place of Rama is found from 17th century prior to which there is no legend about Rama's birth place in the medieval History. ” (E.T.C.)


“Through gynaecological (sic) survey and exploration and excavation survey, it can be discovered whether a temple existed or not at that place.” (E.T.C.)


“Evidence of the fact whether any building prior to the disputed structure existed or not on the disputed site, can be had only through archaeological exploration.” (E.T.C.)


“ It is true that I do not possess any historical evidence whether any building existed on the disputed structure on disputed site. On her own, said that negative evidence in this regard is available. Negative evidence is as follows:
1. Had any building been demolished , naturally, it would have been written in inscription that this mosque was built
after demolition of any building or temple.
2. Recent contemporary historians would have made reference of this fact in their articles.” (E.T.C.)


“It is correct that in Sikh literature this is a tradition that Guru Nanak had visited Ayodhya, had Darshan of Sri Ram Janam Sthan and had bathed in the river Saryu.”
(E.T.C.)

“I have not studied any book on the History of Ayodhya separately. I have only studied S.P.Gupta's book 'Ayodhya' which is adduced in evidence.”(E.T.C.)