Islamic Sectarianism

[brihaspati]

By the way, Gulen's celibacy [is he now entirely PennState based?] is a matter of immense controversy, and even the Mevlevi Sufi interpretations have a huge problem in explaining his personal stance. Ibn Arabi and Rumi both decry celibacy, as well as "Sunnah" is clearly against it.

But what he represents as a danger is the essential Islamist authoritarianism he reflects in the political sphere in connection with the current regime. I think his leftist-"secular" critic, the journalist Ahmet Sic, was implicated in the very conspiracy (Ergenekon) that he is supposed to have exposed just prior to the publication of his critique of Gulen - and is now in judicial custody awaiting trial.

[brihaspati]

Gulen is an interesting character to study - thanks for bringing him up! Bayram Balci, the French-Turkish scholar sums him up as

Fethullah's aim is the Islamization of Turkish nationality and the Turcification of Islam in foreign countries. Dozens of Fethullah's ‘Turkish schools' abroad—most of which are for boys—are used to covertly ‘convert,' not so much ‘in school,' but through direct proselytism ‘outside school.'" Balcı explained, "He wants to revive the link between state, religion, and society."

[Institut d'Etudes Politiques, PhD thesis : Gülen schools in Central Asia, 2001] Balci also characterizes his movement as serving "to accomplish three intellectual goals: the Islamization of the Turkish nationalist ideology; the Turkification of Islam; and the Islamization of modernity...And therefore, (Gülen) wishes to revive the link between the state, religion, and society".

He is supposed to have escaped on the excuse of getting medical treatment, to the USA in 1998 from where he operates now, after allegedly his secret sermons were broadcast and revealed by the then regime. Allegedly his TV excerpts ran along the lines of

You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers...You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it..."
"You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey … Now, I have expressed my feelings and thoughts to you all in confidence. Know that when you leave here -- as you discard your empty juice boxes, you must discard the thoughts and the feelings that I expressed here."

If true, given his "Nuri" roots, his liberal use of Rumi and Arabi - gives a most interesting use of the Sufi lexicon of political Islam!

[Agnimitra]

Bayram Balci, the French-Turkish scholar sums him up as

...Dozens of Fethullah's ‘Turkish schools' abroad—most of which are for boys—are used to covertly ‘convert,' not so much ‘in school,' but through direct proselytism ‘outside school.'"

They have what they call "Lighthouses" - condos or houses bought by Hizmet (one of the Gulen orgs that sets up schools, etc.) in which students live - a sort of fraternity house. That's where the halaqas (Islamic study circles) are held, casual get-togethers are organized and friends made, and conversions happen.

If true, given his "Nuri" roots, his liberal use of Rumi and Arabi - gives a most interesting use of the Sufi lexicon of political Islam!

Said Nursi is supposed to have had a divine visitation by none other than Imam Rabbani (Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi) when he was once meditating on a hilltop overlooking the Bosphorus! So that is the real idealogical underpinning of the current Gulen movement. For the time being, Rumi is used as a poster boy, whereas Ibn Arabi is dismissed as having been overcome with "shatahaat" - nonsense ramblings produced by divine intoxication...meaning that he witnessed the Truth but didn't know how to express it. However, Gulen has authored a two volume series on Sufism. But he advises his students that the current wave is meant for hizmet (Turkish pronunciation of "khidmat"), i.e., practical service. They go by a process of unfoldment outlined by Nursi - zarreh (nucleus of an individual transformation), qatreh (drop-like formation of a social group with such a common bond and purpose), and finally zohreh (self-witnessing accomplishment of the inner and outer aspects). Nursi is considered to have been the nucleus that prophetically set things moving, and Gulen's is supposed to be in the second stage of Turkey's tryst with Caliphate destiny!

Gulen is probably the most interesting Islamist leader today. His followers promote a neo-Ottoman Islamism which adds an additional layer of Westernization to its historical cosmopolitan flavor (earlier based on Persianization). The story goes that Nursi was once captured by the Russians, who had taken possession of an Ottoman territory in the Caucasus. The Russian general supposedly gloated and showed Nursi what the Otomans had lost; to which Nursi retorted - "So what?! We Moslems will now learn Western science and then come back to take leadership over you again!" This is the basic spirit of the Gulen movement. Even in terms of breeding, lots of Gulenist volunteers take wives from Ukraine and even the US if they can manage it. They are able to attract many Moslem groups and assume leadership, offering solid shari'ah Islam with a modern Western colour, a bit like the "Islam e Ajam" that had developed in Persia centuries ago. At least in the West, Gulenists are a consolidating force amongst Moslem groups, and project a modern face of Islam. In Moslem lands, they are welcomed because Moslems are happy to see Turks return to the fold after decades of Ataturkism. They see it as a sign of re-emergence of the Caliphate (Khilafat).

I think it is also worth observing carefully the connections between Gulenists and Iran, considering the sectarian divide. Nursi had made some overtures by incorporating some essentially Shi'ite liturgies and practices such as recitation of the Jawshan e Kabir into Turkish Islam. Gulen's followers continue that practice. There seems to be an attempt to appropriate certain aspects of Shi'a Islam as well as Persian culture (love for Rumi, etc.), thereby creating an opening for inviting a union, while still being firmly anti-Shi'a, and especially anti-Alevi. They are very firmly rooted in the shari'ah of Sunni mazhabs. In CA stans, they are directly competing against Persian influence, and being quite successful at it I think. They are also active in Afghanistan, esp. North Afghanistan where the Uzbeks have a presence. Also very active in Northern Areas of Pakistan.

Some ministers of Erdogan's cabinet are supposed to have studied in Iran for a while (I can't find the reference; anyone?). When Erdogan started changing Turkey, some Iranian clerics started claiming that Iran had successfully exported the Islamic revolution to the bastion of Ataturkism. OTOH, BRFite shyamd says that Gulen's is a CIA-backed movement. Not sure what to make of this...

[brihaspati]

The point to note is that - again - "Sufi" memes, and Rumi and Arabi is being used as cover for what is essentially political Islam in its classic form. That classic form which aims for complete Islamization of the as yet non-Muslim world. Moreover, Gulenism can successfully use "sufism" to hide its connections to AKP ideological framework, and the Islamist neo-Ottomanization programme.

[ramana]

So all these are new ways to deal with Wahabandism.

[Agnimitra]

The point to note is that - again - "Sufi" memes, and Rumi and Arabi is being used as cover for what is essentially political Islam in its classic form. That classic form which aims for complete Islamization of the as yet non-Muslim world. Moreover, Gulenism can successfully use "sufism" to hide its connections to AKP ideological framework, and the Islamist neo-Ottomanization programme.

I believe there is more than a motivational neo-Ottomanism to Gulen's movement, which is important to recognize if we are to meet it and work with or against it. Most Islamist movements are driven mainly by recedivism or harking back to past glory. Very few of them actually have a somewhat deeper root, and this is important to recognize. IMHO, a cynical dismissal of this deeper aspect would cause us to undermine its staying and spreading ability in different circumstances such as material or political setbacks. This will confound our own calculus.

I don't think Gulen's links with AKP are really hidden, though Gulen does make an attempt to be seen as somewhat aloof, a hermit, the "jabarooti" power behind the transformation. His role as a behind-the-scenes orchestrator seems to be more about giving his "blessing" to this or that figure rather than closer management. Even his close followers say don't see him in the classical mould of a Sufi Sheikh, but more like an "Imam".

Also, Gulen does encourage Sufi practices in some disciples, but maintains that most followers are "20 years away" from being able to understand and practice tasawwuf. He emphasizes "service" for the mass of followers. However, many do begin to get deeper into Sufi practices with time, some of them becoming vegetarian, more detached in their service, etc.

Another nitpick re: your comment about celibacy: In general, Islam frowns on celibacy, but properly speaking, the Qur'an disapproves of institutionalizing celibacy, or considering it as a necessary condition for personal self-realization. OTOH, the same book recommends great reverence for celibates (raahib). Gulen's choice of life pattern is not unique to Moslem auliya. Dozens of respected teachers in the past were either celibate, or retreated from their family life for several years.

To return to the point I was making in the 1st para: If you characterize Islamism as motivated purely by "zar zan zameen", its spread or resilience will confound you. IMHO, this chapter of history and its wars could be fought on newer psycho-physical and psycho-spiritual levels than before. One can argue there is a progressive drill-down towards this in recent history. Very sketchy depiction would be like -- (a) WW1 - Imperial and colonial feudal competition and internecine warfare, emergence of importance of class struggles. (b) WW2 - Occult nationalist fascism, emergence of importance of industrial might in winning wars and anti-racist idealogy. (c) Cold War - Idealogical warfare between socio-political-economic idealogies, emergence of the importance of free market laws, as well as freedom of expression and soft power gimmicks, etc as safety valves. (d) Today add the idea of attitude towards God, death and spiritual practice to the mix. This psychological level potentially transcends identification with social class, economic system, national identification and even social relationships. One has to factor this into a strategy of love and war.

Therefore, IMHO Sufism being used by "classic Islamism" doesn't change anything I said earlier about our need to engage according to our own resources in the subject area. For that, an equally or more profound disciplic force is needed, which is expansive irrespective of these boundaries. Mere "cultural nationalism" won't cut it, though it certainly could be used to encourage such a broader renascence movement.

[brihaspati]

The point to note is that - again - "Sufi" memes, and Rumi and Arabi is being used as cover for what is essentially political Islam in its classic form. That classic form which aims for complete Islamization of the as yet non-Muslim world. Moreover, Gulenism can successfully use "sufism" to hide its connections to AKP ideological framework, and the Islamist neo-Ottomanization programme.

I believe there is more than a motivational neo-Ottomanism to Gulen's movement, which is important to recognize if we are to meet it and work with or against it. Most Islamist movements are driven mainly by recedivism or harking back to past glory. Very few of them actually have a somewhat deeper root, and this is important to recognize. IMHO, a cynical dismissal of this deeper aspect would cause us to undermine its staying and spreading ability in different circumstances such as material or political setbacks. This will confound our own calculus.

I think, we are returning to a fundamental difference in how the two of us view the philosophical basis of what goes as Islam. Moreover, I have learned not to model the "other" by my own self-concept. Gulen-ist propaganda, just like many such other sufi-non-sufi spins - really does not move beyond the very recedivism or "harking back to past glory". He clearly and consciously, justifies what seems like "reform" to outsiders, from within the tradition and practice of early Islam. Moreover there exists plenty of material that shows his claimed target of a revivalism based on his reconstruction of early Islam and "Turkic" "Islam" - one of the primary reasons that he is seen with great suspicion in the CAR countries under the shadow of "Turkmen-ism".

You think that "few" or some within Islamism have a "somewhat deeper root". "Deeper" than "zar/zan/zameen"? I can show very clearly, that these three are never really out of sight, and whenever they do go outside - it creates an unstable movement that implodes out of its own impossible tension as a paradigm to be sustained within the framework of Islam. The main reason, as I have repeatedly pointed out - that all sufi pretensions ultimately submit to a hardcore mollahcracy that simply uses the mobilization/public-emotion aspect [derived from specific pre-Islamic religio-political roots] to consolidate the Islamic state.

I don't think Gulen's links with AKP are really hidden, though Gulen does make an attempt to be seen as somewhat aloof, a hermit, the "jabarooti" power behind the transformation. His role as a behind-the-scenes orchestrator seems to be more about giving his "blessing" to this or that figure rather than closer management. Even his close followers say don't see him in the classical mould of a Sufi Sheikh, but more like an "Imam".

Gulen's critics are getting picked up by the state security forces, and I have already mentioned one instance of Ahmet Sic - one of the two main journalists who apparently broke the news of a coup conspiracy against this very same regime. Moreover you know what calling someone an "Imam" means - and how it is more potentially dangerous in concept than a "Shaykh".

Also, Gulen does encourage Sufi practices in some disciples, but maintains that most followers are "20 years away" from being able to understand and practice tasawwuf. He emphasizes "service" for the mass of followers. However, many do begin to get deeper into Sufi practices with time, some of them becoming vegetarian, more detached in their service, etc.

Gulen's ideological packaging serves the basic purpose that the AKP neo-Ottomanists need to be achieved. It projects a veneer of "liberalism" that apparently is suitable for presentation to the western "public" - and may serve both Turkish as well as "western" government/agency strategic considerations. We have a long history of one or more of the Anglo-Saxon coterie propping up or painting/reconstructing this or that of competing power centres within the Islamic world. In the ME, the three current groups are Iran, Turkey and KSA. When the Ottomans were ripe - the Brits took up promoting Arabs and the Germans took up the Ottomans. At the time, Iran was within Anglo-Saxon ambit. Now, USA needs a handle to isolate Iran - and will need Turkey and Arab both at the same time on one side. So we will see a lot of dramatics of the Gulen type.

Another nitpick re: your comment about celibacy: In general, Islam frowns on celibacy, but properly speaking, the Qur'an disapproves of institutionalizing celibacy, or considering it as a necessary condition for personal self-realization. OTOH, the same book recommends great reverence for celibates (raahib). Gulen's choice of life pattern is not unique to Moslem auliya. Dozens of respected teachers in the past were either celibate, or retreated from their family life for several years.

Yes. But the proportion is the key. Very few are lifelong celibates. Gulen's own justification about this is interesting from a psycho-analytical viewpoint, and some of the key points he repeatedly uses [inlcuding quotes from Rumi and Arabi] can have pretty explosive interpretations. Not that the issue I am hinting at is not a thorny one even within Islam. I am not prepared to discuss them here on a family friendly forum. Quran's discussion of "celibacy"? some other thread perhaps!

To return to the point I was making in the 1st para: If you characterize Islamism as motivated purely by "zar zan zameen", its spread or resilience will confound you.

On the contrary, those are very basic motivators of certain societies. Moreover, there is little that you will be able to show from within the Islamic tradition that goes beyond. Those others - "intense spiritual union" - come from pre-Islamic traditions and have never sat well within Islam, and is in constant tension and almost always defeated in the end to mullahcracy.

IMHO, this chapter of history and its wars could be fought on newer psycho-physical and psycho-spiritual levels than before. One can argue there is a progressive drill-down towards this in recent history.

I was enamoured of Hegelian romanticism about the hidden hand of history - but only as a teenager. Greater details and search for me has led to rejection of that romanticism.

Very sketchy depiction would be like -- (a) WW1 - Imperial and colonial feudal competition and internecine warfare, emergence of importance of class struggles.

Class is undefined, never definable in practice - at best a vague ideological and theoretical construct, useful for propaganda for mobilization for political purposes. WWI was primarily about transition from predominantly western-mixed-industrial-feudalism to industrial expansion needs to turn the world into a bigger single market.

(b) WW2 - Occult nationalist fascism, emergence of importance of industrial might in winning wars and anti-racist idealogy.

It was about primitive accumulation - but this time on a global scale. Fascism or communism or oligarchical authoritarianism - all different attempts at a mad rush to accumulate capital, thinking of the world as single source and sink. It really had nothing to do with anti-racist ideologies - those were just tactical pretensions - again to mobilize support. Nothing has changed a single bit in terms of underlying forces of racism.

(c) Cold War - Idealogical warfare between socio-political-economic idealogies, emergence of the importance of free market laws, as well as freedom of expression and soft power gimmicks, etc as safety valves.

Again however romantic a spin we may give it - that warfare had nothing to do with ideology. It was about competing on a global scale to ensure market share on a wider sense to carry on the "primitive accumulation" started in early 20th century. No market has ever been free, they are just rhetoric again to win constituencies. Markets have always been intervened in - in favour of the loudest and most influential group. "Free" is onlee when such dominant interests can "freely" intervene and manipulate. Apparent Freedom of expression/free market laws - are consequence of the completion of "primitive accumulation" stage, not any conscious desire or policy change. Further accumulation needs willingness of those without control over capital to submit to further exploitation of their productivity.

(d) Today add the idea of attitude towards God, death and spiritual practice to the mix. This psychological level potentially transcends identification with social class, economic system, national identification and even social relationships. One has to factor this into a strategy of love and war.

Yes those who need this to be implemented are the greatest dangers to human progress and freedom. Because they are using this to essentially keep a tight lid and control on consumption and productivity. Think of why Calvinism or Puritanism was so deeply connected to early capital accumulation - as well the Church. When Gulen type Islamists use this language, it means a backdoor way to reinstate the 7th century deserts of Arabia.

Therefore, IMHO Sufism being used by "classic Islamism" doesn't change anything I said earlier about our need to engage according to our own resources in the subject area. For that, an equally or more profound disciplic force is needed, which is expansive irrespective of these boundaries. Mere "cultural nationalism" won't cut it, though it certainly could be used to encourage such a broader renascence movement.

Yes it does not change anything from the fact that "sufism" ultimately is a pretension, a tactical hiding of the imperialism and genocidic tendency - and make it easier for those non-Muslims somehow getting attracted to Islamism on the sly. Regarding tackling by more "dsiciplic" force - we can discuss it elsewhere. Cultural nationalism is the key. Many have gone down the road of "dsiciplic" force - thinking falsely that the Islamist tactic can be turned around and used on Islamists. But that was because they never understood Islam, and were gullible to the pretension - thinking that this "other" aspect was genuine one, something compatible to what they modeled their own philosophies as - and hence an interface. But this goes OT. This thread is about sectarianism within Islam and not about methods to tackle Islam.

[Agnimitra]

Brihaspati ji, again you're doing that verbal Tai Chi in order to deliberately miss the point. I'm not disagreeing with a lot of what you say. To reply briefly to your digressions:

1. Dharma, artha, kama, moksha - they're all natural human dynamics, each with a motive power of its own.

2. All of these are present as forces that shape any and all phases of history. But certainly there are certain phases of time when one of these dominates or "rides" the others in the conscious public awareness. Nothing Hegelian here.

3. Any or all of these can be used to mobilize, sustain or destroy something. They can be mobilized for the greatest good, or evil. There will also always be hierarchies of privilege and service, overt or veiled. Nothing necessarily good or bad about this either.

So, "zar zan zameen" is always going to be a motivation for Islamism. My point is that there is a thread within Islamism that also employs forces other than this, which can prove very useful at levels of open war, hiding and hibernation, and most importantly in apparently co- operative expansion using the "Sufi romanticism" that you are clearly so worried about! My point is to properly acknowledge this powerful ability of Islamism, and formulate a more co-ordinated response. E.g., Hindu or Buddhist religious missions can be supported at some level by government policy. Or that classical arts, philosophy and other cultural trappings of India (all of which are rooted in the Vedic tradition) be promoted as world heritage. Etc. The effect of this on the West is already evident to some extent. It needs to be expanded and deepened there, and it needs to enter the Ummah sphere.

Whether Sufi pretensions within Islam are truly "genuine" or not is beside the point. The fact is that it is a weapon in the monster's hand.

That certain tendencies dampen the production-consumption cycle doesn't make them all bad, especially if they're held in balance. yogam samatvam uchyate. That's OT anyway.

This thread is about sectarianism within Islam and not about methods to tackle Islam.

I believe this thread explores Islamic sectarianism in order to identify typical characteristics, and spot threats and opportunities for us. As Ramana garu said, its about finding ways to deal with Wahabandism and all its weapons.

I spoke from personal experience when I proposed this as an area of engagement. I know several people from Moslem backgrounds who have actually accepted the Indic way of life and worship - even against ostracism and worse from their own community. I have also seen several other Moslems who have developed a deeper appreciation and therefore respect for Indic traditions, thereby losing any sense of false superiority they may have had vis a vis Dharmic religions. This breaks the sort of conviction required in order to execute conversions the other way. It even eases them into our paradigm.

You have doubts about whether the typical Mullahcratic paradigm can truly be comfortable with "Sufi"-like ideas. This doubt is valid, and is to our advantage. You speak of these tendencies within Islam as deriving from specific pre-Islamic traditions. This perception is again valid, and again to our advantage. If we engage aggressively on that platform, the giant sucking sound will favour Indic traditions, which are the more ancient, vaster, more multi-faceted and composite, more profound civilization with a wealth of experience and expression in all conditions of prosperity and adversity.

As for my personal view of the potential of Qur'an to accommodate it, you may say it is based on naive projections of my own religion's nature onto the Other. But given the epistemic fact of ordinality of meaning, intensional and extensional modes of cognition, etc., it is a fact that this is true of everyone, including your own. It is a question of the scale and perspective of one's worldview, and one's self-comfort with the completeness of one's own position and path. Atmavan manyate jagat.

[brihaspati]

If you think you can bend the Quran to accommodate and be "interpretable" in ways that undermine or dissolve the essential power-structure of imperialist genocide that lies within the concept of an Islamic state - fine, go ahead. That is your own view. Unfortunately, I too have "mixed" a lot with Muslims on the subcontinent, as well as abroad - at scales perhaps difficult for you to imagine, or for me to elaborate. I have in fact mixed more with the people in the community that appear to be more successful in manipulating the faith and the community. My conclusions came from almost 25 years of observation -starting right from my childhood. Family interactions, historical legacy of interactions, political interaction, and active presence as a political organizer among self-organized "ghettos". I turned from a romantic about broad hopeful tendencies within that community - into a skeptic, and a realist. I have repeatedly said that I have nothing against the common follower, but I have everything against anything sourced from the theology, and people who take leadership roles using that theology - spin or no-spin. I have repeatedly come across obstruction from these very sources - and when really pressed to the wall, they always show their Sunna-Sharia fangs, sufis especially.

For strategy, I would do exactly that - force them to situations where they have to choose between only two options of Sunna-Sharia on one hand and their liberal spin on the other. If I bet on the outcome, I would be a billionaire.

Atmavan manyate jagat - is a lofty sentiment. Politically and militarily suicidal. You have to understand the "other" as the "other" is, without putting on spectacles that may blind us to obvious problems. "Verbal Tai chi"!!! Do not want another super-comprehension man style personal jibing. You can see that I avoid such stuff even though you attributed words to me which I never said. See if it is possible to restrain that side - don't the Sufis have a bit to say about verbal restraint?

[RajeshA]

This thread is about sectarianism within Islam and not about methods to tackle Islam.

I believe this thread explores Islamic sectarianism in order to identify typical characteristics, and spot threats and opportunities for us. As Ramana garu said, its about finding ways to deal with Wahabandism and all its weapons.

Actually this thread was to study the theological, political and historical differences between various Islamic sects, and see how Indics can exploit those differences eventually.

Cooperation with some Islamic sect to subdue another one, would definitely have been the fruits of such a study. However alliances and understandings with Islamic sects was supposed to be political, diplomatic and military, and not theological. Theological understandings imply compromises with one's own worldview.

The intention cannot be to feed Indic followers to some Islamic sect, with which we arrive at some understanding, where they offer sweet words, some philosophical overlap between the Dharmic and the Sufi, without putting their own compromises with Islam down in writing, thus allowing such them to retract these compromises whenever the more pious cry foul. While the Indics feed them with followers.

Islamic sects are to be encouraged to make theological reforms under influence from Dharmics if it leads to a better understanding between Islamic sects and Indic society, or if leads to them becoming productive members of the society, but these reforms should take place with Indics offering them no followers.

[RajeshA]

This thread is about sectarianism within Islam and not about methods to tackle Islam.

I believe this thread explores Islamic sectarianism in order to identify typical characteristics, and spot threats and opportunities for us. As Ramana garu said, its about finding ways to deal with Wahabandism and all its weapons.

Actually this thread was to study the theological, political and historical differences between various Islamic sects, and see how Indics can exploit those differences eventually.

Cooperation with some Islamic sect to subdue another one, would definitely have been the fruits of such a study. However alliances and understandings with Islamic sects was supposed to be political, diplomatic and military, and not theological. Theological understandings imply compromises with one's own worldview.

The intention cannot be to feed Indic followers to some Islamic sect, with which we arrive at some understanding, where they offer sweet words, some philosophical overlap between the Dharmic and the Sufi, without putting their own compromises with Islam down in writing, thus allowing such them to retract these compromises whenever the more pious cry foul. While the Indics feed them with followers.

Islamic sects are to be encouraged to make theological reforms under influence from Dharmics if it leads to a better understanding between Islamic sects and Indic society, or if leads to them becoming productive members of the society, but these reforms should take place with Indics offering them no followers.

[Agnimitra]

I have repeatedly said that I have nothing against the common follower, but I have everything against anything sourced from the theology, and people who take leadership roles using that theology - spin or no-spin. I have repeatedly come across obstruction from these very sources - and when really pressed to the wall, they always show their Sunna-Sharia fangs, sufis especially.

That is precisely the intention: to have the "leaders" of this community -- both, the good cop Sufi Sheikhs and bad cop Ulema -- show their fangs to the common abdul. The common abdul can easily see the absurdity of their positions after some time. No one likes to be suppressed and manipulated, especially if a wiser, more encompassing view is offered. I believe its called Hineinfuhlen in philosophy. I have seen this practically happen repeatedly with abduls, and am advocating that this be taken up systematically. In no way was I ever suggesting that we engage with the Ulema or Sufi LEADERS, but rather that we invade that social space where abduls who are ripe for that sort of thought are found.

RajeshA, in no way was I suggesting that we hobnob with Ulema and agree on some hybrid theology!! And certainly not feeding Indians to them! Where did you get that? Quite the opposite actually.

Brihaspati ji, I probably don't have anywhere near the age and experience you do, but I do have a decent understanding of the Islamic community, especially the pulse of the average abdul who has a curiosity about his own Islamic identity in a multicultural society or a shrinking global village. Both, in India and also abroad. Learned their theologies, and also some of their languages, like Urdu and Persian, some basic Arabic. Engaged with them and even helped a couple of them make the transition to the Indic worldview and ethic. Similarly, I would like to learn more about Chinese culture and language too, in order to identify such a space or time where India's heritage can make itself available. I don't think Atmavan manyate jagat is politically suicidal when understood and utilized properly -- because consciousness is recursive, has the ability to contemplate itself, and can view similarities and differences rationally. I'm sorry that you consider me to be a naive dreamer who doesn't understand the Islamist animal, which I'm not. I too had a grand uncle who was put into a dungeon by the last Nizam of Hyd's goons, threatened with death and asked to convert. He didn't, but Police Action happened just in time and the Islamist thugs scampered.

When a system with greater capacity for truth is offered, it has a seduction of its own! The mind of the abdul, once stretched beyond its previous dimensions, can never go back to its old blinkered views.

[brihaspati]

Carl ji,
I tried this method. More sincere and qualified people failed. I am not saying that you will not succeed. The success rate is so low, the numerical strength of becomes insignificant - when it really comes to the point of resisting the Islamist call. I would rather more rely on a solid power and will to bring down retribution and unflinching coercive measures against the Islamist infrastructure, while projecting your method in front.

In this method the danger that lurks most strongly is the greater inevitable weakness/confusion in the non-Muslim from false ideas about tolerance/acceptance of the other with all their faults/etc and hence conceding more ideologically first before the other side at all moves. This has happened again and again in Indian history's interactions with Islam. It has always caused more damage than given any gains.

The flute in one hand, and war-trumpet in the other, and ready with the Sudarshan. Then give the smile. All the while sharpening the blade on the grindstone, and knowing which beards and skull-caps and minarets and learning-by-heart centres to be erased. This is actually kindness and help for those minuscule sections you think are ready to cross-over. They rarely, if never, provide any effective resistance when the Islamist consolidation call is given. So even for your method to be effective you need to physically protect them, and their inclination to cross-over.

[Agnimitra]

^^^ All this is perfectly true.

In this method the danger that lurks most strongly is the greater inevitable weakness/confusion in the non-Muslim from false ideas about tolerance/acceptance of the other with all their faults/etc and hence conceding more ideologically first before the other side at all moves.

IMHO this is the legacy of some of our own versions of Vedanta and neo-Vedanta ideologies that left a lasting effect on India, invalidating all structure and taaratamya, all hierarchy of epistemic scopes in an effort to politically unite quareling heterodox traditions in the land. I believe Madhvacharya's Realism (Tattvavada) was not understood well enough by India in his time, and his legacy was not emulated enough. Understanding him could be key to a genuine and robust renascence, firmly rooted in scientific observation and philognosis, with a definite sectarian, expansionist political power of its own. Even the little effect that his legacy generated provided a bulwark against Islamism and rejuvenated Indic society somewhat. Would love to hear your and others' thoughts on this in an appropriate thread sometime.

At some point in the future, though, effecting a defection of big and respected individuals among Islamic or Sufi cognoscenti or prominent laymen is not an improbable scenario, provided the context is created through a gradual and increasing engagement on an aggressive footing. This includes recognizing valid interpretations of the Qur'an itself (especially if it makes the Islamist priesthood uncomfortable), because these interpretations help untie the knot by its own logic. This was the point of my first post on this thread, the purport of which was misunderstood.

"Notable former Muslims"

Preaching and exporting to the Other is actually the essence for Indic culture at this stage, even for a local awakening. Its like the "Pizza Effect". Its the tactic people like Vivekananda, Yogananda, Aurobindo and Bhaktivedanta Swami chose. Its why Sugunendra Swami decided to visit Russia against the "advice" of the "majority" of the Ashta Mathas. So far the focus has been mainly the West. East Asia and the Ummah could be next in the future, as India rises and projects soft power along with muscle. The sooner the better, especially with well-funded monkeys like Zakir Naik, etc running around. JMT.

[svinayak]

In this method the danger that lurks most strongly is the greater inevitable weakness/confusion in the non-Muslim from false ideas about tolerance/acceptance of the other with all their faults/etc and hence conceding more ideologically first before the other side at all moves.
IMHO this is the legacy of some of our own versions of Vedanta and neo-Vedanta ideologies that left a lasting effect on India, invalidating all structure and taaratamya, all hierarchy of epistemic scopes in an effort to politically unite quareling heterodox traditions in the land. I believe Madhvacharya's Realism (Tattvavada) was not understood well enough by India in his time, and his legacy was not emulated enough. Understanding him could be key to a genuine and robust renascence, firmly rooted in scientific observation and philognosis, with a definite sectarian, expansionist political power of its own. Even the little effect that his legacy generated provided a bulwark against Islamism and rejuvenated Indic society somewhat. Would love to hear your and others' thoughts on this in an appropriate thread sometime.

Tell me about it.
Madhvacharya's Realism (Tattvavada) is the key to uniting all the forces in India to understand the reality.
Dharma prachara has been taken up by the Madhava mutt which our family is the follower for centuries . Puttige Mutt is the major force for the 21st century dharma prachara.

[ashkrishna]

Cross posting from the Books thread:

Has anyone read this book by Maulana Wahiduddin Khan:

Indian Muslims: The Need for a Positive Outlook

I shall quote a few excerpts taken from Arun Shourie's The World of Fatwas. It is certainly a fresh and positive outlook compared to the current (often fractious and hypocritical) discourse on the subject.

To me, the muslim press has been suffering from what I can only call unjustifiable self-righteousness on the part of Muslim Intellectuals. It is this innate weakness which has prevented them from seeing their own shortcomings. All they can see are the plots of others behind every problem their community faces. Consequently, instead of engaging themselves in constructive activities, they spend their time inciting members of their community to protest against others.

[Agnimitra]

Madhvacharya's Realism (Tattvavada) is the key to uniting all the forces in India to understand the reality.

All other spiritual traditions have truth. But IMHO Madhvacharya's Vedanta is the ideal point of departure for complete conceptual understanding of dharma and its defence.

Returning to Islamic Sectarianism...
Tajikistan and Iran: Is Dushanbe Distancing Itself from Cultural Cousin?

The root source of Tajik officials’ suspicion actually has just as much to do with religion as it does with politics, explained Parviz Mullojanov, an independent analyst in Dushanbe. Tajiks are predominantly Sunni while Iranians are mostly Sh’ia, Mullojanov pointed out. “There were incidents when students who graduated from Iranian religious schools adopted Shiism, came home and organized some Sh’ia study groups,” Mullojanov said. “There is suspicion.”

Officials in Dushanbe appeared determined to stymie the rising influence of Islam in Tajikistan after they struggled last summer to contain Islamic militants operating in the Rasht Valley, east of the capital. In recent months, authorities have closed unregistered mosques, dictated acceptable topics for imams to preach, and harassed men with beards.

Last fall, after President Imomali Rahmon voiced concern that young people studying Islam “fall under the influence of extremists and turn into enemies,” his government ordered home some 1,400 students studying in the Middle East, including approximately 200 who had been in Iran. Officials later cited “technical problems” behind a decision to prevent a group of teachers from traveling to Tehran to learn the Persian alphabet. And in December, officials yanked 90 Tajik children out of a school run by the Iranian embassy in Dushanbe. {Note: In the recent past Iran has been trying to encourage cultural lobbies in Tajikistan calling for a reversion to the Perso-Arabic script from the Cyrillic script that they adopted since 1940.}

[...]

Dushanbe has also balked at Tehran’s plans for a pan-Persian television station to broadcast in the three Persian-speaking countries: Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan (both Tajik and Dari, which is spoken in Afghanistan, are closely related dialects of modern Persian). In February, the Iranian ambassador said the broadcast equipment was ready to be installed, but Dushanbe has demonstrated little enthusiasm for the project.

[Agnimitra]

X-posting from West Asia thread:

MKB on Israel, Arab Spring and sectarian politics:
Israel inherits the Arab Spring

In the case of Syria, Israel was even suspected to be secretly rooting for the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, seeing him as standing between Israel and the deluge of a Muslim Brotherhood takeover.

On Tuesday, Peres dispelled the strategic ambiguity at one stroke. "Assad must go. The sooner he will leave, the better it will be for his people," Peres said.

[...]

Israel's military intelligence chief Major General Aviv Kochavi made a stunning statement recently that Iran was secretly funding Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. In short, Israel cannot afford to be sanguine about the outcome of regime change in Syria.

Peres apparently had other calculations. What emerges is that Israel has made a cold-blooded assessment that regime change in Damascus is not in the cards.

[...]

The BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - along with Lebanon have smothered Western moves to even hold a discussion in the United Nations Security Council over Syria. The recent visit to Damascus by Arab League secretary general Nabil Elaraby showed that the regional wind is changing in favor of Assad.

[...]

Turkey snubs Israel, again
For a while in the most recent period, Israel pinned hopes on the revival of its moribund security ties with Turkey and on mounting a pincer move in the downstream against Syria from the north and the south. Things were indeed looking good in recent weeks for a normalization of Israel-Turkey relations as the diplomats of the two countries worked hard to get over the bitter legacy of the Israeli attack on the Gaza-bound aid convoy from Istanbul last year that killed nine Turkish citizens.

However, it now transpires that Ankara doggedly sticks to the insistence of a formal Israeli apology, which is not forthcoming as it is tantamount to indicting the Israeli army. The Turks are now threatening that they will punish Israel.

[...]

Ankara would know these are humiliating demands, which even if Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might want to ponder over in a spirit of realpolitik or pragmatism, Israeli public opinion won't allow it. It is possible to discern that the Turks may just be deliberately making things very difficult for Israel to patch up the broken ties. The Turks seem to have suddenly lost the ardor for a "normalization" with Israel at the present juncture, which the Americans have been encouraging.

United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Turkey 10 days ago and made flattering remarks about the country's larger destiny as the leader of the Middle East. The new head of the US Central Intelligence Agency, David Petraeus, made Istanbul his first port of call after leaving his command in Afghanistan. It all but seemed Turkey would bite the tantalizing proposition to act as the beachhead for a concerted intervention in Syria.

But, Ankara carefully weighed the advantages of becoming the instigator of regime change in Damascus and seems to have arrived at the conclusion that the dangers to its own territorial integrity far outweigh whatever geopolitical advantages Washington promises. Simply put, it doesn't suit Turkey to be seen holding the Israeli hand right now. Thus, Israeli hopes of breaking out of regional isolation by reinventing an axis with Turkey over Syria are dissipating.

The clincher for Ankara is that the Syrian developments are taking a dangerous turn toward a full-fledged, no-holds-barred, Lebanon-like religious war in the 1980s, which will be a dreadful thing to happen in its backyard.

The sequence of events triggered by the gruesome killing of three families from the Alawi tribe by Salafi extremists in the city of Homs close to the Turkish border testifies to the grave consequences of the danger of derailment of the democracy movement in Syria, which Ankara has been sponsoring in recent months.

A wave of anti-Salafi resentment is sweeping over the region among Shi'ites and Alawis. The backlash is rekindling dormant religious and sectarian passions. Ankara can sense that Salafi extremists, many of them al-Qaeda affiliates and battle-hardened veterans from the Iraq war, have infiltrated the demonstrations.

If a Lebanon-like civil war erupts in Syria, it will be a matter of time before Turkey too catches fire. The Shi'ites and Alawis in Turkey (who form close to 20% of the population) will instinctively get involved in the Syrian maelstrom. Alawi-Salafi tensions are lurking just below the surface in Turkish society.

The Alawi groups in Turkey have formed an umbrella organization known as the Alawi-Bektashi Foundation, which regularly brings out reports to sensitize the world community on the alleged "rights violations targeting Alawis on the basis of inequality and discrimination" and "hate crimes" by Salafi elements associated with the Fetullah Gulen community.

The latest Alawi report titled "The Alawis as Target of the Community" details that the Gulen community of Salafis in Turkey is waging "black propaganda against the Alawis" to the effect that Alawis have "taken over the judiciary and the military; in Turkey there is a sectarian secularism; an Alawi elite is allowed to rule the Sunni masses", et al.

Kurdish backlash
But what Turkey must really guard against is the near-certain Kurdish backlash of which the signs are already appearing. Turkey's support for the Syrian opposition has already brought about some proximity between the Kurds and Damascus.

Pressed against the wall, Damascus can retaliate against Turkish interference by granting Syrian citizenship to the Kurdish settlers in northeastern Syria, especially Qamishli, which will inevitably pose serious headaches for Ankara in the long term.

Clearly, the Kurdish parties are dissociating from the Salafis in northern Syria and are signaling their willingness to work with the Syrian regime. There is some talk that if the situation deteriorates, Damascus may be left with no option but to arm the Kurdish groups to counter the Salafis.

In sum, Ankara needs to be wary that it is skating on thin ice by pushing the Syrian regime to a point of no return. The plain truth is that the Kurds will invariably take an opposing stand to the approach that Ankara adopts. Abudllah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey, lived for many years in exile in Syria.

Turkish interference in Syria has prompted prominent Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani (Iraq's president) and Massoud Barzani (Kurdistan Region president) to voice support for Damascus. (Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has also expressed solidarity with the Syrian regime by signing an agreement for the supply of 150,000 barrels of oil to Syria.)

Again, it was a historic victory of Turkey's "coercive diplomacy" that in 1998, Ankara amassed troops on the Syrian border threatening to invade and succeeded in literally brow-beating Damascus into agreeing to "demilitarize" the border regions with Turkey - and to expel Ocalan.

Now, against the backdrop of Turkish interference in the current situation, Damascus has dispatched its special forces to the Turkish border region after a gap of 13 years.

On top of this, Damascus chose to dispatch to the border the Fifteenth Division of its army, which is predominantly manned by Sunnis and is under the command of Sunni Syrian officers - rubbishing Ankara's facile assumption that the Syrian army's Sunni officers are about to desert the regime.

On the whole, Israel has rightly assessed that the Turks are beginning to get the Syrian message and are preparing to pipe down.

Ankara is winding down anti-Syria rhetoric and is gradually reviving its old platform of "zero problems" with its tough neighbors.

The irony is that Ankara is also compelled to revive the bonhomie with Iran and launch a concerted military offensive against Kurdish guerrillas in northern Iraq following the killing of 13 Turkish troops on July 14 in Diyarbakir province in eastern Turkey.

In a masterly move with impeccable timing, the Iranian army began operations on July 16 against Kurdish rebels in the Kandil mountains in northern Iraq. In a parallel move, the Turkish military also since began an operation in the Iraqi territory bordering Hakkari province in eastern Turkey.

Ankara is putting on a brave face and claiming that the Iranian and Turkish operations are not coordinated. That may be so in a formal sense. Tehran is not disputing the Turkish claim, either. But the Israelis are a smart lot and can sense perfectly well what is going on - that someone is jogging Turkey's memory that it still has an unfinished Kurdish problem of its own to prioritize, where it has a commonality of interests with Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Evidently, Israel has concluded that the Syrian-Iranian axis is very much intact despite the immense pressure from Saudi Arabia on Assad to break up with Tehran; the Syrian regime is nowhere near collapse despite the concerted pressure by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, France and the US; and, Qatar, which among all Persian Gulf Arab states is always quickest on the uptake, anticipates that an Arab Spring in Syria is going to be a tough call, far tougher than Libya, and Doha shouldn't aspire to punch so absurdly far above its light weight.

Incidentally, Qatar has shut down its embassy in Damascus and pulled out following the attacks on the American and French embassies and the al-Jazeera office in the Syrian capital. Most important, Israel estimates that Turkey has begun gradually backtracking from the path of interference in Syria.

All in all, the specter that haunts Israel is that if the turmoil in Syria abates, the attention of the international community will inevitably revert to the Palestine issue. Abbas is reiterating his intention to seek UN recognition for Palestine at the forthcoming general assembly session in New York in September.

[sanjeevpunj]

Activists: At least 100 killed as Syria tanks storm Hama
Syrian security forces shell city at heart of anti-Assad protests, surround major hospital to prevent the wounded from reaching the building.At least 100 people were said to have been killed Sunday when the Syrian regime launched a fresh crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Hama. The flashpoint central city was the target of an earlier brutal crackdown in the 1980s, at the hands of the father of the current Syrian leader, Bashar Assad."Hama is used to massacres by the Assad family, but we tell this tyrant the more you kill us the more we are determined to oust you," the activist, who requested anonymity, told DPA by phone.
In 1982, a government crackdown caused the deaths of up to 20,000 people in the city, when the town's Sunni population attempted to revolt against then president Hafez Assad's minority Alawite sect.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east ... a-1.376210
This is blowing up into a major sectarean conflict in the region.History repeating itself twenty years later.

[arun]

Less sectarianism than casteism, which Mohammaddens claim does not exist in their religion.

Article in SAAG reports that Ghulam Mohammad Vastnavi got the boot as the head of the Deoband seminary as he was not a upper caste ashraf sayeed who can claim ancestry directly from Arabia and the Mohammadden religions Prophet Mohammad

GHULAM MOHAMMAD VASTANVI – A victim of Super-caste and family hegemony in Deoband?

[ManjaM]

http://news.yahoo.com/victim-indonesian ... 35769.html

Footage of the attack, which circulated widely on the Internet, showed 1,500 hard-liners descending on a house where 20 members of the sect had gathered. The attackers, carrying wooden clubs, machetes and rocks, killed three people and continued to pummel their lifeless bodies, chanting "God is Great!" as police looked on.

But a small, extremist fringe has grown more vocal and violent in recent years. They've been emboldened by the inaction of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who relies on the support of Islamic parties in Parliament, and does not want to offend conservative Muslims by taking sides.
Perpetrators of such violence often go unpunished.
Human rights groups say police, under pressure by hard-liners, did not carry out a proper investigation into the Feb. 6 attacks and that prosecutors, claiming the Ahmadis were instigators, didn't call key eyewitnesses.

Video shows the attack. NSFW and not for the squeamish.

[arun]

Sunni Muslims banned from holding own Eid prayers in Tehran

[Agnimitra]

^^^ In addition, cross referencing with this post, which has some strong words from Iran's Sunni leader.

In spite of the fact that big cities in Iran have churches and synagogues, the minority Sunni community are not given permission to have separate mosques for Friday prayer.

The Maulavi of Zahedan had made the same appeal last year to the agents of Ayatollah Khamenei as well as government servants to allow separate Eid and Friday prayers for Sunnis in Tehran, Esfahan, Kerman and Yazd, requesting him to "abolish this prohibition."

[...]

This leading Sunni cleric added in a speech he made in the Mecca Masjed of Zahedan, "Shi'a and Sunni are two sects of Islam which have kindred and brotherly relations amongst themselves, ... but their mosques and community halls are separate and their questions of fiqh (religious doctrine and law) are separate and differ from one another. There is no possibility for their mosques to be merged and they both be made to line up behind a common Imam (prayer leader)."

He continued, "The basic law gives permission to members of all religions to freely conduct their prayers according to their own customs and ideological viewpoints. Prohibition of this is against the law and uncivil, and is a cause for heartbreak and hopelessness."

[arun]

X Posted from the TSP thread.

In the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, self- claimed haven for the Mohammaddens of the Indian Sub-Continent, 8 die in Green on Green Sub-Sectarian violence pitting Sunnis of the Deoband school of Mohamaddenism against Sunni’s of the Barelvi School of Mohammaddenism:

Godhra Camp violence: Eight killed as two religious groups clash

[arun]

Mohammadden on Mohammadden violence motivated by sectarian differences in India.

Upset at a female member of the family marrying a Sunni Mohammadden, members of a Shia Mohammadden family murder the grooms brother:

Honour killing: Court awards death to five members of family

[arun]

Mohammadden pilgrims of the Shia / Shiite sect killed most likely by their own co-religionists of the Sunni Mohammadden sect in Iraq:

Iraqi police: Gunmen ambush Shiite pilgrims, killing 22

[arun]

X Posted from the TSP thread.

Green on Green violence in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Mohammaddens of the Shia / Shiite and their co-religionists of the Sunni Mohammadden sect take each other on in the Muzaffargarh district of Punjab province:

Two killed as Malik Ishaq continues preaching tour

[arun]

In the Islamic Republic of Pakistan a 12 year old boy is arrested while trying to plant explosives in a place of worship used by Mohammaddens of the minority Shia sect.

For a country claimed to have been created as a safe haven for the Mohammaddens of the Indian Sub-Continent, the seeds of hatred for Mohammaddenism’s minority sects is certainly planted at a very young age:

Sectarian violence: 12-year-old arrested while planting explosives

[vishvak]

In the Islamic Republic of Pakistan a 12 year old boy is arrested while trying to plant explosives in a place of worship used by Mohammaddens of the minority Shia sect.

For a country claimed to have been created as a safe haven for the Mohammaddens of the Indian Sub-Continent, the seeds of hatred for Mohammaddenism’s minority sects is certainly planted at a very young age:

Sectarian violence: 12-year-old arrested while planting explosives

It is a blatant violation of Human Rights of Shias. In India have you heard such regular anti-Shia violence?

[Agnimitra]

Bahrain feels heavy weight of sectarian tension

(Reuters) - In the rubbish-strewn streets of Sanabis, the police are on the prowl for the culprits.

A group of Shi'ite teenagers and women, some of them mothers, some of them single, scuttle into a nearby house, putting out the lights as men get out of cars and drag some boys down from a rooftop across the street.

The incriminating item is hurriedly stuffed down the back of a sofa, letting out a small noise which threatens for a few seconds to give the game away. But the danger passes. The police move on and the small plastic bugle is whipped out once more.

The vuvuzela -- used here to pipe out the phrase "Down with Hamad," Bahrain's king -- has become one of the mundane props in a game of brinkmanship between the Sunni Muslim ruling elite and majority Shi'ites who see confirmation in the daily clashes with police that they are oppressed.

[...]

But a fight that started as an attempt to foster the Gulf region's first real democracy now often looks more like a sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi'ite, as well as a power struggle between the two powers who seek to champion them -- Saudi Arabia and Iran.

[...]

The women in Sanabis, a lower-middle-class suburb of the capital that has developed into one of the strongholds of anti-government feeling, say there can be no compromise with a government that looks down on them as rural Shi'ites of second-class status.

"The government has to go, the crimes are too big now. Through continuous revolution, we cannot stop and cannot surrender," says Fatima, a mother of one.

Most Shi'ites look to Bahrain's most senior Shi'ite cleric Issa Qassem for guidance in religious affairs, though others may follow clerics in Iraq, Lebanon or Iran.

In this home, where the women take refuge from the police, a small frayed sticker of Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sits above a door. Iran once sought to inspire Shi'ites with its 1979 revolution, but its ability to impress has faded.

"Most Sunnis are afraid because the government tries to show them we belong to Iran, so they don't support us," says Umm Haidar, denying claims that clerics abroad give them orders. "We follow them on religion, not politics."

'ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'

Sunnis, who tend to reside in the more affluent areas around Manama, view things through an entirely different lens.

Saud, a young IT lecturer at a private university who did not want to be identified by his full name, says Wefaq and most Shi'ites want an Islamic republic and they are escalating violence against security forces to get it. He denies that Sunnis are the minority.

[...]

He recalled how he found his students separating out into Sunni on one side and Shi'ites on the other at one stage in March, though things have returned now to normal.

ESCALATION FEARED

With entrenched views like these now dominating Sunni and Shi'ite thinking, Bahrain seems headed for more communal strife.

Shi'ites who voted in the by-election and rejected Wefaq say they are witnessing radicalisation in Shi'ite villages.

[...]

One of the main gripes was dismissals of Shi'ites from many companies for taking part in the protests, Mohammed said. King Hamad promised many would get their jobs back but his orders had not been fully implemented, he said, hinting at disputes inside the ruling Al Khalifa family over how to proceed.

[rajanb]

Islamic Fundamentalism in the UK

[arun]

X Posted from the TSP thread.

Gun attack at bus kills 12 in Akhtarabad, Quetta

AKHTARABAD: At least 12 people have been reportedly butchered while four others sustained injuries amid a brazen attack on a passenger bus by unidentified gunmen in Akhtrabad locality of Quetta, SAMAA reported Tuesday morning.

A link to go with the story.

Further this appears to be an act of intra-Mohammadden violence with members of the minority Shia / Shiite sect being the target.

For a self-claimed Islamic Republic, IEDological Muslim State and Safe Haven for the Mohammaddens of the Indian Sub-Continent, Pakistan has a grotesquely high level of intra-Mohammadden violence fuelled by differing interpretations of Mohammaddenism:

Gunmen kill 12 Shiite Muslims in Pakistan

[arun]

In Saudi Arabia, the arrest of two septuagenarians in order to force the surrender of their sons who are leaders of an agitation to prevent discrimination being meted out to the minority Shia / Shiite Mohammadden sect by their co-religionists of the Majority Sunni Mohammadden sect, triggers a riot.

AFP citing the Saudi Press Agency via Google:

14 hurt in rioting in Saudi Shiite-majority village: SPA

[arun]

X Posted from the Islamism thread.

The deep hold that Religion inspired Mohammadden on Mohammadden sectarian violence has on peoples psyche on display.

In Iraq a Sunni Mohammadden mother is arrested for sending her 9 year old son on a suicide mission to bomb a mosque used by Shia Mohammadden co-relgionists that killed 9 people back in 2006:

Mother of 9-year-old Iraqi suicide bomber arrested

[brihaspati]

Actually there could much more mundane factors behind such stuff. There are reports of Palestinian or Lebanese suicide bombers being "created" out of women after trapping them in arranged rape etc. Given other societal and theological forces stacked against women in such conditions, many take the option of being martyrs offered by the pious.

[Agnimitra]

^^^ Ramana ji, my 2 cents: Last century there was a secular pan-Arabism. At that time large parts of Arab peoples were freshly coming out from under Western and, importantly, Turkish Ottoman colonial rule. So this pan-Arabism reflexively set itself up against pan-Islamism, which had an equal psychological pull amongst a section of its masses. Now I think what will happen is that, in this second phase, pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism will align. That is, Islamism will regain its Arab steed while carrying certain non-Arab mawali nations with it. This can now be a force more powerful than pan-Arabism or erstwhile pan-Islamism taken separately.

But will Iran be one of those non-Arab nations that will agree to be carried by Arab-Islamism? We know that TSP will be more than happy to be an Arab or Turk sidekick. So a key consideration in the success of this new Arab nationalism-boosted pan-Islamism will be the role of Iran. Right now the Mullacracy of Iran is encouraging Arab Islamists to take over the Arab Spring in the hope that Iran will have a leadership role in the Ummah. But its way too complex for that. They are worried about neo-Ottoman Turkey, but IMHO that will not be their key challenger. It is Egypt. If Egypt becomes stable and Islamist, then that will do Iran in. Because Egypt can lead the Arab World, particulary the Sunnis and even when it comes to Shi'as, they can use Arab Nationalist sentiment against religious Shi'a sentiment which Iran's Ayatollahs usually promote.

Remember that Iran grew as a power after Sadat practicaly resigned as leader of the Muslim world in 1979 and now the only competition comes from an unpopular US and its minions. The corrupt and weak Saudis and the Westernised Turks appear to be strategicaly incompetant, but if Egypt steps back into the game, things can soon change.

Syria is a matter of tactical importance to power equations, but not strategic. If Syria goes down the path of Egypt and Tunisia, were the figurehead (in this case Assad) is deposed but the regime stays in power and keeps to the same strategic policies and alliances, than Turks still lose out and Iranians win. But if the regime is actualy torn down and replaced by one pro-Western, than Turks will gain influence as main Western ally on Syria's border and Iran will lose influence. In this case, Lebanon will also fall and there will be a wall surrounding Israel, which probably means there will never be a Palestinian state.

A less likely option could be that radical Islamists seize control of this pro-Western revolution and Syria turns into an enemy of the West and Iran. The West has screwed up in such ways before.

If Egypt seizes centerstage as the leader of pan-Islamism, if pan-Islamism acquires an increasingly Arabic motif, and if the center of Shi'ism moves out of the nation-state of Iran, then there is every possibility that Iran will throw in the Islamist towel as far as its internal identity politics is concerned. Fourteen centuries ago the conquest of Persia had given Arabo-Islamism its first and most important strategic-civilizational fillip and catapulted it to a world power. If the above conditions emerge, Persia could be the first to exit Islamism and give it its first and most important strategic death-blow.

IMHO if Western elites are thinking big, then this is what they are thinking - to isolate Iran by depriving it of all geopolitical advantage and leadership prestige over Islamism itself. By doing so, they present Iran with a critical choice involving their delicate identity-issues. And if they respond by exiting Islamism, then Islamism itself will experience a vaccuum (though it is not inconceivable that it will survive in a new avatar).

[ramana]

So where would a revived Fatimid Egypt fit in this scenario? Could it be pan-Arabic Islamist with Shia core? It has to be Shia as Sunnis bow to Mecca only and that is already taken.

[Agnimitra]

So where would a revived Fatimid Egypt fit in this scenario? Could it be pan-Arabic Islamist with Shia core? It has to be Shia as Sunnis bow to Mecca only and that is already taken.

Ramana ji, I don't think Saudi control of Mecca really matters. The cultural heart of Sunni Islamism also can still be in Egypt. Besides, large parts of the ummah generally see the Saudi monarchy as corrupt.

Moreover, under US advice if the Saudis get behind the Egyptians, then Egypt would gain economic viability and be the cultural, ideological and geoatrategic pole of pan-Islamism. The tricky thing is for Saudi patronage to not collide with Egypt's real potential to also influence the Shi'a Arabs. If the Saudi monarchy is smart, they will see the benefits even to themselves. Up to now they have been extremely anti-Shi'a because the center of Shi'a control was in the hands of the Persians.

[Agnimitra]

^^ Added: The force generated by the alignment of pan-Islamism with pan-Arab nationalism and people's empowerment (or the illusion of it) could be enough to eclipse some of the differences between Shi'a and Sunni too. A working relationship and condominium is possible. Already Al-Azhar University in Cairo is famous because some of its leading lights have given fatwas saying that Shi'ism can be a legitimate madhab (sect) of mainstream Islam, just like the other 4 madhabs. Secondly, even those Arab countries that Iran bends over backwards to help are uncomfortable with Persian patronage. Even Hamas leader Hasan Nasrollah gave a speech last year to grudging followers saying that Iran is no longer a "Persian" nation, it is an Arab nation since it is lead by "Arabs". He has to justify it by saying how people like Khamenei, etc were "Seyed", meaning they had Arab bloodlines reaching back to the Prophet. It was a ridiculous speech which angered a lot of Iranians. But it gives an indication of the potential for Arab Shi'a to take back the ruling seats of Shi'ism from the Persians. Ali Sistani sitting in Najaf is possibly one step in this direction.

[ramana]

The fundamental issue in the schism is succession:by birth (Shia) or by capability (Sunni). I dont think it will be papered over. Lets discuss this in the Islamism thread.