Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by RamaY »

negi wrote: RamaY lets not bring in the Unkil angle here , Unkil has done what it had to long back i.e. looked the other-way when Cheena was arming the TSPA with the bum and mijjiles. It need not do anything of this sorts on it's own specially when paranoids in DC are now loosing sleep over Baki nukes (why do you think CIA and Blackwater types are all over the TSP territory) .
Who knows what Unkil was giving doing in Pakistan in 1980s? Probably that is the reason why they are swarming all over Pakistan

I will shut my mouth for now...
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by shiv »

RamaY wrote:Pakistan may not care to be economical with it's Pu because most of it is donated anyways. The MBRL version doesn't mean Pakis will have dozens of <30cm diameter nukes. It could just be that they will use a couple of them on advancing Indian units augmented by Uranium based nukes.
Assuming that your belief is correct - it still means that Pakistan willbe unable to hold back Cold Start with this puny effort.

Secondly what is the guarantee that Unkil did not provide these pencils to Pakis to "maintain parity" with a stronger India? After all Unkil is bankrolling Paki military for past 60 years.
Yes indeed - the US may have supplied these designs to Pakistan along with intsructions on how to arm them and deliver them. But many questions arise from this. To get back to one basic point - Nasr is 30 cm diameter and Nasr was unveiled just a couple of weeks ago. Does that mean that the US supplied these pencils a few weeks ago? If the US had supplied these pencils 5 years ago then Pakistan could have mounted them on Ghauris and fired them from deep inside Pakistan into India. If you have a small nuke you don't need a small missile after all. You can use a bigger missile. The implication is that Unkil supplied pencil nukes to Pakistan and Pakistan kept them in cold storage for years until India invented Cold Start and Pakistani invented 60 km Nasr to put those pencils inside. This story includes both great cleverness and great stupidity in one package.

Finally the US presumably did not have EULA for the nukes they gave to Pakistan. If they did it means US technicians are crawling all over Pakistan's nukes. if they did not then Pakistan will have to maintain those nukes on their own. How long can a warhead be stored before the fissile material needs to be renewed or the conventional explosive changed? What is the guarantee that the nukes will work as advertised? How much will it help Pakistan to launch nuclear duds at an Indian armored column?

Another point is that we cannot expect normal behavior from Pakis. They have defied common sense and human behavior for too long and too often.
Can we expect rational thought from Indians?
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by GuruPrabhu »

negi wrote:Hey what does one mean by keeping core separate from warhead ?
There have been many versions of this myth circulated over the years. Early on, it used to be characterized as a "few turns of a screwdriver away".

Now, it can't be that simple. If the claim is of FBF, then we know that a weapon has to be charged with D-T. Clearly that is more than a "few turns of a screwdriver". IMO, it is all propaganda and/or posturing.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by shiv »

negi wrote:Hey what does one mean by keeping core separate from warhead ? Wasn't Shakti-II a 15kt class pu fission 'warhead' ? In the present context what is a core and a warhead ?
There is no public information on this apart from statements from various sources saying that this is done. Another data point here is Raj Chengappa's story of the Pohkran tests where he speaks (dramatically) of Pu balls being shipped to Pokhran in a special flight after which the bombs were assembled on site. I am guessing that would be an example of a "fissile core" being separate from a bomb.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by somnath »

GuruPrabhu wrote:
negi wrote:Hey what does one mean by keeping core separate from warhead ?
There have been many versions of this myth circulated over the years. Early on, it used to be characterized as a "few turns of a screwdriver away".

Now, it can't be that simple. If the claim is of FBF, then we know that a weapon has to be charged with D-T. Clearly that is more than a "few turns of a screwdriver". IMO, it is all propaganda and/or posturing.
GP-ji, my understanding was that the warhead is the conventional explosive wrap + the "lens" + the electronics, while the "core" is the fissile material...Raj Chengappa had some interesting snippets of our efforts of finetuning the former in his Weapons of Peace...

In the early days, the fissile material was produced in BARC and the warheads assemblies at TBRL, Chandigarh...

Not sure how complicated the mating process is though, but it cant be a very time consuming exercise, even if it techincally chllenging..Whats your thoughts?
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by negi »

In that case I highly doubt this core being separated from the 'warhead' theory because

1. It defeats the whole purpose of testing a 'warhead' which is what we did when Shakti-II was detonated i.e. it was different from others as in all others were n-devices.
2. The assembly of the physics package was done in field by BARC's A team, one cannot expect these gents to be present at launch sites to assemble the whole thing in event of a N-war.

I have read about warheads not being mated with missiles but this is the first time I am reading about core being separated from warhead. Anyways looks like this is one of those topics where we wont know the details. :D
Last edited by negi on 30 May 2011 10:07, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by GuruPrabhu »

somnath wrote:Whats your thoughts?
My thought is this: leave it to the folks who know what they are doing.

Further, it is a complete waste of time to speculate on the design of the weapons. One can go by claims such as FBF, TN, RGPu, meta-phase, etc etc -- but ultimately it is pure time-pass.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Rahul M »

+ 1
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by GuruPrabhu »

negi wrote: I have read about warheads not being mated with missiles but this is the first time I am reading about core being separated from warhead.
You missed the time-pass in the pre-missile era.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by shiv »

negi wrote:In that case I highly doubt this core being separated from the 'warhead' theory because

1. It defeats the whole purpose of testing a 'warhead' which is what we did when Shakti-II was detonated i.e. it was different from others as in all others were n-devices.
2. The assembly of the physics package was done in field by BARC's A team, one cannot expect these gents to be present at launch sites to assemble the whole thing in event of a N-war.

I have read about warheads not being mated with missiles but this is the first time I am reading about core being separated from warhead. Anyways looks like this is one of those topics where we wont know the details. :D
Negi if you look at a nuclear bomb as a whole lot of components that degenerate with time being put together it actually makes sense to keep it all disassembled but ready for assembly when necessary. The downside is only that it cannot be used instantly. But the pros are there too. Security is one thing. There are other things. For example I read that Pu is very reactive and reacts with the stuff around it and this goes on inside a warhead also. Perhaps it is best to have "fresh Pu" stored under ideal conditions (In the refrigerator? :mrgreen: ). The other thing is the Deuterium/Tritium boosting charge (if that is what is used) . Of course that can be injected at the last minute - but if the design does not allow that the Tritium itself is gradually becoming useless. And the conventional explosive - how long is the "guarantee period" of the explosive. 5 years? 10 years? It degenerates over time and perhaps storage under ideal conditions may be better and allows for regular quality control checking.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Dhiman »

Q. It is being said that Pakistan is developing tactical nuclear weapons in a big way for use against India. Can these be special target of theft by terrorist groups, especially when they are said to have insider support in the Pakistan nuclear establishment, the armed forces or the ISI?
A. There are rumours, and also some reports, that they are developing tactical nuclear weapons. I doubt this very much. A tactical nuclear weapon is for use against enemy forces, not the population, and is a sub-kiloton device. Our policy is “no first use”. We won’t be the first to use nuclear weapons of any kind against any country. But the retaliation from our side will be massive if a nuclear device is used against us. I wonder if that is an acceptable risk for Pakistan to take — using a tactical weapon against India and inviting a massive retaliation.
I recently searched through the web to find a free download of a 1964 Hollywood classic "Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb". In this movie, USSR is said to have a "Doomsday Machine" which essentially senses a nuclear attack (via surge in nuclear radiation). The machine is "always on", cannot be turned off, and as soon as it detects a nuclear attack, it will automatically launch "USSR nukes" towards pre-specified target (the automatic response assured by the machine nullifies any human conditionality from coming up during the critical moment).

Practical issues aside, some similar automatic response program would definitely be a major deterrent and put some meat behind the "no first use, but assured massive response" nuclear doctrine. For example IA units could carry the switch for such a device with them when the enter Pakiland, the device will activate when it senses radition, and can only be turned off by Pres/PM/etc DNA signature(s) after returned into Indian territory :rotfl: After that let, Pakis decide whether they want to trigger a nuclear attack on themselves by exploding tactile nukes.
Last edited by Dhiman on 30 May 2011 10:30, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by ramana »

Shiv, When S-2 the fission bomb was tested in 1998, it was said to be from inventory i.e full assembled and stored for use by IAF. And it performed per design. It was stated to be test of the aging effects too as it was first assembled in 1989. C Rajamohan said this at the Center for Advanced Study of India(CASI) in Uty of Pennsylvania.
The main message is no separation of core etc for this genre of weapon.

Dhiman,
The guys who run India know what they are doing. Automatic response systems could end up erring.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by somnath »

GuruPrabhu wrote:
somnath wrote:Whats your thoughts?
My thought is this: leave it to the folks who know what they are doing.

Further, it is a complete waste of time to speculate on the design of the weapons. One can go by claims such as FBF, TN, RGPu, meta-phase, etc etc -- but ultimately it is pure time-pass.
Of course, we are (at least I am) speculating here..But just on the concept of keeping the warhead and core separate (as opposed to classifying the design of the bomb) - I would say that it is a security an maintenance imperative, isnt it? The fissile cores need to be replaced at certain periodicity - given that the weapons are hardly ever used :twisted: , it would mkae sense to keep them separate from the warhead assembly..Else, they will need to carry out an elaborate "demating" exercise...there is also the issue of security - the fissile core just by itself is far less valuable to a random rogue than one already mated and ready to be mounted on an M2K!
ramana wrote:The main message is no separation of core etc for this genre of weapon
Really? Strange, because I heard CRM give a talk not so long back (~3 years) here in SG, and he did mention separation of core and warhead while talking about security of the arsenal...Bharat Karnad says the same thing, in 2008 in his book..Raj Chengappa alluded to the same in his book, in 2001...

In fact this is first time I am hearing anywhere that it is otherwiese!
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Shrinivasan »

Core Mated with Warhead Mated with Missile etc are all academic discussions, it is not an either or scenario but an AND scenario. Some Cores are mated with warheads, some kept separated, some warheads are mated to missiles. :twisted:

A Chaiwala from Maharajpur mentioned that the M2Ks there regularly practice with multiple DUMMY warheads and the ground crew perform drills to bring the Bombs/warheads from storage to the aircraft under different (Weather and otherwise) conditions. :twisted:

The Second runway also helps matters...
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Rahul M »

bulls eye.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by negi »

some warheads are mated to missiles
Is there any reference to support the above ? If it is Chaiwallah then , hey nobody asked in first place. It's not worth it :wink:
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by GuruPrabhu »

somnath wrote: Of course, we are (at least I am) speculating here..But just on the concept of keeping the warhead and core separate (as opposed to classifying the design of the bomb) - I would say that it is a security an maintenance imperative, isnt it? The fissile cores need to be replaced at certain periodicity - given that the weapons are hardly ever used :twisted: , it would mkae sense to keep them separate from the warhead assembly..Else, they will need to carry out an elaborate "demating" exercise...
Yes, it is fair to speculate based on known phenomenon. For instance, it is known that alpha decays of Poo will lead to He build-up in a pit. After some time, this will lead to mechanical faults. However, the shelf-life will depend on the details of the alloy used - this part is difficult to speculate upon. The shelf-life may well be of the order of ten years. There will also be some spontaneous fission of Poo which will gradually add to the gamma/beta emissions. I would speculate that a pit would be recycled at some point due to this factor alone.

Secondly, the half-life of tritium is well-known. Again, whether the weapon is kept charged up or not is a matter of design. Someone has suggested a rotation system in which a weapon may be recharged every year or so (or, something like when 10% of T is depleted). The recharging may not involve serious dismantling if the design has some pressurize and seal feature -- difficult to speculate upon.

Having said that, this is all based on an FBF concept, cartoons of which are available on websites. Whether the cartoon has anything to do with reality is pure speculation.

Finally, there may well be devices that are not FBF (or even a U-T TN). There is absolutely ZERO data on S4 and S5. It helps to remember this last bit.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Guddu »

Deleted.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by GuruPrabhu »

Guddu wrote:Shiv: 1 ton=100 kg, kiloton= 100 x1000=100,000, not 1 million, IMHO.
1 tonne = 1,000 kg

1 ton = 2,000 lbs

tonne is also known as "metric ton".

(if ton = 100 kg, I am perilously close to weighing a ton)
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by shiv »

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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by shiv »

Yenjoy.. For your edification and poste-rio-rity :D
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html

It was decided that since the Indian nuclear tests had given an opportunity to Pakistan to conduct nuclear tests after 14 years of conducting only cold tests, the maximum benefit should be derived from this opportunity. It was, therefore, decided, that multiple tests would be carried out of varying yields as well as the live testing of the triggering mechanisms. Since the tunnel at the Ras Koh Hills had the capability to conduct six tests, therefore, six different nuclear devices of varying designs, sizes and yields were selected, all of which had been previously cold tested.

Immediately afterwards, began the process of fitness and quality checks of the various components of the nuclear devices and the testing equipment. A large but smooth logistics operation also got underway with the help of the Pakistan Army and Air Force. This operation involved moving men and equipment as well as the nuclear devices to the Ras Koh test site from various parts of the country.

There are some plausibility problems with this account. The first issue is that successfully collecting data from an actual nuclear test (an area in which Pakistan had no experience despite years of cold tests) is far from straightforward (see [Teller et al 1968; pp. 150, 167]), and increases in difficulty with multiple tests in a single shaft. Unexpected device behavior or problems anywhere along the tunnel could result in the loss of data on any or all shots. If internal telemetry failed, wholly or in part, it would be very difficult to recover useful results from external seismic measurements with so many devices simultaneously exploded so close together. Six devices constituted a large part of the then available highly enriched uranium, perhaps 90 kg consumed out of 210 kg on hand (although once it had spent a couple of years processing its stockpile of low enriched uranium, this would rise to 800 kg or so). A great deal of Pakistan's immediate nuclear resources would be consumed for quite a gamble on useful results.

Other problems include that according to post-test statements, all of these devices were of basically the same type - fusion boosted fission bombs. Furthermore four of the devices were all in the same low yield range (fractional kiloton to a few kilotons), far less than the tens of kilotons claimed for the other two. It is questionable that so many different systems of this type could be usefully tested. Due to the extensive cold testing, the non-nuclear behavior of these systems should have been well understood and thus variations purely in the implosion assembly design would not merit nuclear testing. By exploding them all once (and the last test only a few days later) there would be no opportunity to analyze the test results and conduct retests, or tests of redesigns.

It is also difficult to credit the implication that such an extraordinarily complex test operation was planned and conducted in 10 days. Admittedly, the preparations for tests dated back years (decades!) so that the test equipment would already be on hand, and the basic procedures would have already have been worked out. Nonetheless, there is a big difference in complexity between a one device test, and a five device test, and it is hard to believe that such an operation could be successfully assembled and executed in such a short time without any prior test experience.

Part of the explanation is no doubt that the numerous tunnel fired cold tests were, or at least could be made to be, pretty fair simulations of actual nuclear test exercises. (At least up to the point of data collection - no amount of cold testing can verify the proper behavior of instruments intended to collect data from an energy density and energy output regime a million times higher.) Also the mobilization of test activity immediately after the first Indian tests, detected by U.S. intelligence, indicates that Azam may be wrong - that the planning for the test exercise was conducted much earlier, even before the Indian test, and these previously laid plans were simply being put into operation. Even if not, test preparations clearly began immediately, and thus had an additional week to be successfully concluded. It is significant that the observed preparation activity began a week before Prime Minister Sharif authorized tests, and suggests that the testing activity may not have been entirely under his control.

The tunnel under Koh Kambaran was 1 kilometer long and is described as L-shaped (just as the Indian vertical shafts were L-shaped). The reason for this is that the shaft leading to the entrance is thus shielded from the device detonation, and energy cannot propagate straight up the shaft from the device to the entrance. The description of the tunnel has having separate assembly rooms indicates that in addition to the L-tunnel at the end, the main tunnel had a number of other side tunnels branching off it every couple of hundred meters.

On 19 May 1998, two teams of 140 PAEC scientists, engineers and technicians left for Chagai, Baluchistan on two separate PIA Boeing 737 flights. Also on board were teams from the Wah Group, the Theoretical Group, the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) and the Diagnostics Group. Some of the men and equipment were transported via road using NLC trucks escorted by the members of the Special Services Group (SSG), the elite commando force of the Pakistan Army.

[Azam 2000]

According to the Azam the nuclear devices - in sub-assembly form - were flown from Rawalpindi to a designated airfield in Baluchistan (Quetta?) on a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) C-130 Hercules transport aircraft (it is curious that so many would all be entrusted to a single aircraft though). Four PAF F-16s armed with air-to-air missiles provided escort, with secret orders to shoot the C-130 down if it tried to fly out of Pakistani airspace. The F-16s were ordered to keep their radio communications equipment turned off so that no orders, in the interim, could be conveyed to them to act otherwise. They were also ordered to ignore any orders to the contrary that got through to them during the duration of the flight even if such orders originated from Air Headquarters. :shock: :shock: :shock: :rotfl:

Dr. Samir Mubarakmand
at a post-test conference.
The nuclear devices were assembled separately at the test site in individual assembly rooms ("zero rooms") located along the one kilometer tunnel under the mountain Koh Kambaran in the Ras Koh range. Azam states that Samar Mubarakmand personally supervised the complete assembly of all five nuclear devices (implying a very lengthy assembly process since it would have to be sequential, probably lasting more than a day). Diagnostic cables were then laid through the tunnel, and out of the tunnel to the telemetry station which communicated with the command/observation post 10 km away. Afterwards, a complete simulated test was carried out by tele-command. This process of preparing the nuclear devices and laying of the cables and the establishment of the fully functional command and observation post took 5 days (i.e. until about 24 May).

On 25 May it was reported by the Associated Press and Reuters that U.S. intelligence officials had said that Pakistani preparations had accelerated in recent days at a site called Raskoh in the Chagai Hills (it later transpired that Ras Koh was indeed the test area, but Ras Koh is a separate mountainous area over 40 km from the Chagai Hills area). Tunneling activities and the setup of explosive monitoring equipment had been observed. "At this point, they could conduct a nuclear test at any time," said one official.

At the same time it had become increasingly likely that any U.S. aid package would fall short of Pakistani expectations. The major inducements suggested at this point - the delivery of 28 F-16s that Pakistan has already paid for and was promised by Pres. Clinton two years ago anyway, and the rescheduling of loans - was not very tempting. Pakistan seemed to be after explicit U.S. security guarantees, something that was unlikely to be offered.

The test tunnel was sealed by the Pakistan Army 5 Corp on 25 May with the assistance and supervision of the Pakistan Army Engineering Corps, the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) and the Special Development Works (SDW) - a military unit created 20 years earlier specifically to carry out field engineering for nuclear tests. Mubarakmand is said to have walked a total of 5 kilometers along the stuffy tunnels checking and rechecking the devices and the cables before the cables were finally plugged into the nuclear devices. Sealing the tunnel consumed 6,000 bags of cement and was completed by the afternoon of 26 May 1998. 24 hours later the cement had set in the desert heat, and the engineers certified that the site was ready. The fact the tests were ready was relayed to the Prime Minister via General Headquarters.

Late in the day on 27 May the U.S. government reported that Pakistan had been observed pouring cement in a test shaft in the Chagai Hills. This indicated that nuclear test devices were being sealed in, which is the final necessary step before conducting nuclear tests. Officials then predicted that tests could occur within hours.

Pres. Bill Clinton made a last-minute plea to Sharif, Wednesday night. According to presidential spokesman Mike McCurry it was a "very intense" 25-minute call in which the president implored the prime minister not to conduct a test. It was the fourth presidential call to Sharif since India's first explosion on May 11. But the test time had been set - 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 28 May 1998.

The Test is Fired

In the pre-dawn hours of 28 May Pakistan cut the communication links for all Pakistani seismic stations to the outside world. All military and strategic installations in Pakistan were put on alert, and the Pakistan Air Force F-16A and F-7MP air defense fighters were placed on strip alert - ready to begin their take-off roll at any moment.

Azam provides a detailed account of the events that day:

At Chagai, it was a clear day. Bright and sunny without a cloud in sight. All personnel, civil and military were evacuated from ‘Ground Zero’ except for members of the Diagnostics Group and the firing team. They had been involved in digging out and removing some equipment lying there since 1978.

Ten members of the team reached the Observation Post (OP) located 10-kilometres away from Ground Zero. The firing equipment was checked at 1:30 p.m. and prayers were offered. An hour later, at 2:30 p.m., a Pakistan Army helicopter carrying the team of observers including PAEC Chairman, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, KRL Director, Dr. A.Q. Khan, and four other scientists from KRL including Dr. Fakhr Hashmi, Dr. Javed Ashraf Mirza, Dr. M. Nasim Khan and S. Mansoor Ahmed arrived at the site. Also accompanying them was a Pakistan Army team headed by General Zulfikar Ali, Chief of the Combat Division.

At 3:00 p.m. a truck carrying the last of the personnel and soldiers involved in the site preparations passed by the OP. Soon afterwards, the all-clear was given to conduct the test as the site had been fully evacuated.

Amongst the 20 men present, one young man, Muhammad Arshad, the Chief Scientific Officer, who had designed the triggering mechanism, was selected to push the button. He was asked to recite "All praise be to Allah" and push the button. At exactly 3:16 p.m. the button was pushed and Muhammad Arshad stepped from obscurity into history.

As soon as the button was pushed, the control system was taken over by computer. The signal was passed through the air link initiating six steps in the firing sequence while at the same time bypassing, one after the other, each of the security systems put in place to prevent accidental detonation. Each step was confirmed by the computer, switching on power supplies for each stage. On the last leg of the sequence, the high voltage power supply responsible for detonating the nuclear devices was activated.

As the firing sequence passed through each level and shut down the safety switches and activating the power supply, each and every step was being recorded by the computer via the telemetry which is an apparatus for recording reading of an instrument and transmitting them via radio. A radiation-hardened television camera with special lenses recorded the outer surface of the mountain.

The voltage reached the triggers on all five devices simultaneously in all the explosive lenses with microsecond synchronization.

As the firing sequence continued through its stages, 20 pairs of eyes were glued on the mountain 10 kilometers away. There was deafening silence within and outside of the OP.

A short while after the button was pushed, the earth in and around the Ras Koh Hills trembled. The OP vibrated as smoke and dust burst out through the five points where the nuclear devices were located. The mountain shook and changed colour as the dust of thousands of years was dislodged from its surface. Its black granite rock turning white as de-oxidisation from the radioactive nuclear forces operating from within. A Huge cloud of beige dust then enveloped the mountain.

The time-frame, from the moment when the button was pushed to the moment the detonations inside the mountain took place, was thirty seconds. For those in the OP, watching in pin-drop silence with their eyes focused on the mountain, those thirty seconds were the longest in their lives. It was the culmination of a journey which started over 20 years ago. It was the moment of truth and triumph against heavy odds, trials and tribulations. At the end of those thirty seconds lay Pakistan’s date with destiny.

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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Amber G. »

GuruPrabhu wrote:
Amber G. wrote:[
Sir ji, there was no " I can make bomb too".. at least not in my message.
Amber-ji,

I am with you on that. I have noticed this phenomenon over decades. Folks read obvious propaganda websites and then figure out that they know "bomb design".

There is a simple psychological play here. ...
Good observation. Another aspect, I think which is more serious, , is harmful ignorance some "experts" peddle. One example - recent media (and some posts in BRF too) echoing such experts after Fukushima. And there were takers for even the most ridiculous statements peddled by these worthies and their sites. (Busby comes in mind, but he is not alone).

Result of all this, when one believes everything on web without critical thinking, is sometimes, harmful.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Gagan »

Shiv saar,
That is a nice long story they have come up with.
I am sure it accurately describes the environment of the day surrounding the tests.

I am curious though, why did they say 5 tests onlee and not 7 or 8?
If you are lying about 5, then why not increase the number and make it a nice round figure hain ji?

Also curious that there are NO specifics about the bum whatsoever, no size, no type no material used in the bum mentioned at all.

It is a good story, and that is about it.

The airport that they mention is probably Dalbandin. This place is just 50-60 kms west of both the test sites. And there was once a rumour of the Pakistanis keeping bums at a small house there. Though looking at the airfield, it is a very small sleepy little town with mostly mud houses!
Quetta is quite far off to the north.

In fact the Shamshi airbase is about 100 odd kms south to this place, and is the next closest airfield.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Amber G. »

somnath wrote: A question to GP, Amberg et al on the whole concept of delivering a nuke from a range of 60 km (ange of NAsr)..How practical is it? I mean how does the unit delivering the weapon scoot in time to prevent any bloback of radiation to hit itself? Or is it that a sub-kiloton weapon cannot blow radiation back to that distance?
One well known aspect, if one assumes that the blast is near the ground, I guess, would be radiation fallout would be much more severe (order of magnitude more) than Hiroshima type blasts (which were higher in air). Basically the dirt mixed with all the fission fragments would be blasted off, and it will fall down, causing much more fall out damage.
Order of magnitude calculation - about 1 km radius (does not matter much if it is 1KT, or 10KT or even 100KT ) initial radiation dose alone would be serious enough for anyone outside with no protection., .One in a tank or in bunker at these distances..would be much safer from the radiation and 60Km is a long range for initial burst to do much damage to unit delivering the weapon. Of course, long term effects of the fall out will spread with wind and rain.

I have seen (Fas site ?) quite a few sites with good simulations so jingos may like to see the numbers..(plug in KT, height of the blast etc)

Just some random thoughts..:)
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by shiv »

Gagan wrote: I am curious though, why did they say 5 tests onlee and not 7 or 8?
:rotfl: Simply because the first announcement that came out was "two tests. Soon after that the number was corrected to "five".

Funny that Pakistan - which was making implosion bombs using 20 kg Uranium in 1998 - now has the fourth largest arse-nal in the world and nano-nukes to go in tube launched rockets 12 years later. That explains how Pakistan is such a sci-tech powerhouse.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by somnath »

GuruPrabhu wrote:here is absolutely ZERO data on S4 and S5. It helps to remember this last bit
It does, indeed...In fact the really curious thing about the Indian sub-kiloton tests is figuring out how it fits in with our doctrine...We have stated NFU (well, some ambiguities there thanks to Shiv Menon, but let that pass - else Ramana will anyway ask it to be passed :wink: ), and we dont have Paki-type plans to forward deploy TNWs or use TNW as a tool for "conventional" responses...As a second strike, what use is a subkiloton weapon? Are we looking to create an escalatory ladder within the nuclear matrix? Funnily, this is one area that there is absolutely no coverage of...(Of course, I could have missed)..

And GP/Amber G - thanks for the clarifications! :)
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by ramana »

Somnath, I see you take my name gratuitously. I did get clarification on that NDU speech by SSM. I am that persistent. And folks do respond to my requests for they now am sincere in seeking the clarifications.

S4 and S5 are way beyond understanding in the normal sense. They are building blocks.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Guddu »

GuruPrabhu wrote:
Guddu wrote:Shiv: 1 ton=100 kg, kiloton= 100 x1000=100,000, not 1 million, IMHO.
1 tonne = 1,000 kg

1 ton = 2,000 lbs

tonne is also known as "metric ton".

(if ton = 100 kg, I am perilously close to weighing a ton)
Yes you are right in the scientific sense, mine was the colloquial definition per wiki..

"In Britain, a ton is colloquially used to refer to 100 of a given unit. Ton can thus refer to a speed of 100 miles per hour, and in this instance is always prefixed by the definite article, e.g. "Lee was doing the ton down the motorway"; to money e.g. "How much did you pay for that?" "A ton" (£100); to 100 points in a game e.g. "Eric just threw a ton in our darts game" (in some games, e.g. cricket, more commonly called a century); or to a hundred of pretty much anything else."
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by somnath »

ramana wrote:Somnath, I see you take my name gratuitously
It was supposed to be a light hearted remark! :roll: And maybe it would be good if you can share the "clarification" you got..
ramana wrote:S4 and S5 are way beyond understanding in the normal sense. They are building blocks
??How so? Building blocks to what?
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Gagan »

Between S4 and S5, one of them was simply buried in a sand dune and was made to go off.

I guess it would be one of the wells in Navtala and with a sand dune covering it.

And they were not afraid of venting. It must have been a very compact thing and would be pure maal.
If this was impure maal (reactor grade) then for that subkiloton yield it would have been bigger and bulkier, and would have needed a proper deep shaft.
But they did that 'in a sand dune' !

Correct me if I am wrong.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by shiv »

Gagan wrote:Between S4 and S5, one of them was simply buried in a sand dune and was made to go off.

I guess it would be one of the wells in Navtala and with a sand dune covering it.

And they were not afraid of venting. It must have been a very compact thing and would be pure maal.
If this was impure maal (reactor grade) then for that subkiloton yield it would have been bigger and bulkier, and would have needed a proper deep shaft.
But they did that 'in a sand dune' !

Correct me if I am wrong.
I believe we are veering off the topic of Paki nukes and heading back to the muchly discussed topic of Indian nukes.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by shiv »

Guddu wrote: "In Britain, a ton is colloquially used to refer to 100 of a given unit. Ton can thus refer to a speed of 100 miles per hour, and in this instance is always prefixed by the definite article, e.g. "Lee was doing the ton down the motorway"; to money e.g. "How much did you pay for that?" "A ton" (£100); to 100 points in a game e.g. "Eric just threw a ton in our darts game" (in some games, e.g. cricket, more commonly called a century); or to a hundred of pretty much anything else."
Guddu no matter what the colloquial definition may be - all references to kilotons in the context of nuclear explosions including Wiki take "kilo" to mean 1000 and mega to mean 1 million with 1 million being 1 followed by 6 zeros.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Virender »

Amongst the 20 men present, one young man, Muhammad Arshad, the Chief Scientific Officer, who had designed the triggering mechanism, was selected to push the button. He was asked to recite "All praise be to Allah" and push the button. At exactly 3:16 p.m. the button was pushed and Muhammad Arshad stepped from obscurity into history.
So Muhammad Arshad was the one who put the fuse wire in burnt chinese power socket :mrgreen: :D in order for it to work.....So now we know about pakistani contribution to its pindigenous new-clear program after decades of grass grazing , otherwise i am wondering which nation will let a measly trigger designer to attract the limelight when there are scores others in queue with way better resumes and credentials.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by UBanerjee »

Amber G. wrote: PS - One non-trivial aspect of dirty bomb is panic. After Fukushima, I am amazed at the ignorance peddled by media (and a few idiots who acted as experts). Panic evacuation after a radiation scare may cause hundreds of times more casualty than actual device... For this, authorities and citizens must be educated to learn about radiation, how to monitor it and learn to evacuate orderly without panic.
Really a key point I would agree- has to be the absolute centerpiece of any civilian training to prevent mass hysteria and the attendant violence.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by GuruPrabhu »

somnath wrote:
ramana wrote:S4 and S5 are way beyond understanding in the normal sense. They are building blocks
??How so? Building blocks to what?
somnath-ji,

As I said, data are not available. There is speculation that these were precursors to gen IV designs. We can speculate more -- my fav: Look up metastable isotopes/allotropes of maal.

But then, this is way OT for a thread dedicated to "pin a tail on a packee in the dark"
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by GuruPrabhu »

Virender wrote:
Amongst the 20 men present, one young man, Muhammad Arshad, the Chief Scientific Officer, who had designed the triggering mechanism, was selected to push the button. He was asked to recite "All praise be to Allah" and push the button. At exactly 3:16 p.m. the button was pushed and Muhammad Arshad stepped from obscurity into history.
So Muhammad Arshad was the one who put the fuse wire in burnt chinese power socket :mrgreen: :D in order for it to work.....So now we know about pakistani contribution to its pindigenous new-clear program after decades of grass grazing , otherwise i am wondering which nation will let a measly trigger designer to attract the limelight when there are scores others in queue with way better resumes and credentials.
Quintessential candidate for Raakit-Mard, is this Mohd. Arshad :rotfl:
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Gagan »

Err,
Haseen Atim Bum more like.

Was there a Haseena Atim Bum in that team during their tests?
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by shiv »

Virender wrote:
Amongst the 20 men present, one young man, Muhammad Arshad, the Chief Scientific Officer, who had designed the triggering mechanism, was selected to push the button. He was asked to recite "All praise be to Allah" and push the button. At exactly 3:16 p.m. the button was pushed and Muhammad Arshad stepped from obscurity into history.
So Muhammad Arshad was the one who put the fuse wire in burnt chinese power socket :mrgreen: :D in order for it to work.....So now we know about pakistani contribution to its pindigenous new-clear program after decades of grass grazing , otherwise i am wondering which nation will let a measly trigger designer to attract the limelight when there are scores others in queue with way better resumes and credentials.
Maybe. Maybe - but if the bums had not gone off - only the lowly guy would have had his head chopped off. "OK birather - you designed the only Paki part here - you press the button and if it doesn't work..."
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Pratyush »

Shiv Ji,

Head cut off........

Dont you think that it is too light a punishment for him. Or you meant the other head.
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Re: Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

Post by Rahul M »

GuruPrabhu wrote:[(if ton = 100 kg, I am perilously close to weighing a ton)
:rotfl: :rotfl:
same here.
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