Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
^^pragnya, I see where you are coming from but IMHO, this kind of fine tuning simply has not worked for 66 years and there is no reason why it will work now. The PSU model is absurd in today's India and we need to face up to this truth. To be as efficient as we can, we need to either throw all markets completely open or adopt the China totalitarian model. The in-between pinko model is killing us because it breeds sycophancy, corruption and inefficiency. All we need to do is look around us and see which countries still follow our model and which do not. The latter have outstripped us in development in spite of being behind us 20-30 years ago.
BTW, the Hansa is a perfect example of our cockeyed system. Here we have a light plane that is excellent by any standard and could rank among the best in the world but it is now dead. It just exists in some flying clubs and that's it. No exports, nothing.
BTW, the Hansa is a perfect example of our cockeyed system. Here we have a light plane that is excellent by any standard and could rank among the best in the world but it is now dead. It just exists in some flying clubs and that's it. No exports, nothing.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
^^^
Victor,
there is no model which is ideal. many french/israeli companies are govt controlled. Russia pretty much owns everything as is China. only american is pvt sector dominated but still works thro' US govt. besides each country has unique dynamics so to say one model works is stretching it.. in 66 years due to various priorities of the incumbent govts and their vision - of strategic independance, of developing MIC besides precarious financials have shaped the state we are in today. it is only in last 30 years that even basic infra has been created, so to broad brush everything with american model is not tenable.
HAL/NAL/DRDO have atleast many things to showcase as compared to nothing (barring a few odd ones) from the pvt sector. all the infra related to design/testing/manufacture are with the DPSUs/DRDO/NAL.
having said that i would be happy if pvt sector leaps in big. but considering the huge capital and long gestation invoved in defence r&d/manufacture no pvt sector is biting the bullet deeply. you see them doing sub assemblies/systems etc... heck even the tender for the AVROS which IAF earmarked for 'only' pvt sector did not attract any one!!!
however it is good they have started even if by drops but in the medium term i only see a collaboration between DPSUs/DRDO/NAL and the pvt sector as the model which would work.
you may disagee but i respect your pov too.
Victor,
there is no model which is ideal. many french/israeli companies are govt controlled. Russia pretty much owns everything as is China. only american is pvt sector dominated but still works thro' US govt. besides each country has unique dynamics so to say one model works is stretching it.. in 66 years due to various priorities of the incumbent govts and their vision - of strategic independance, of developing MIC besides precarious financials have shaped the state we are in today. it is only in last 30 years that even basic infra has been created, so to broad brush everything with american model is not tenable.
HAL/NAL/DRDO have atleast many things to showcase as compared to nothing (barring a few odd ones) from the pvt sector. all the infra related to design/testing/manufacture are with the DPSUs/DRDO/NAL.
having said that i would be happy if pvt sector leaps in big. but considering the huge capital and long gestation invoved in defence r&d/manufacture no pvt sector is biting the bullet deeply. you see them doing sub assemblies/systems etc... heck even the tender for the AVROS which IAF earmarked for 'only' pvt sector did not attract any one!!!
however it is good they have started even if by drops but in the medium term i only see a collaboration between DPSUs/DRDO/NAL and the pvt sector as the model which would work.
you may disagee but i respect your pov too.

Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
This Avro replacement is a good example of the strawman disconnect that is confusing people. No company, be it private or public, can make 56 sophisticated transport aircraft without making a loss because the economies just don't exist with today's tech unless this is a base order with a much larger guaranteed number to follow. In the public companies, the government eats the loss (ie. subsidizes the aircraft) which private investors wont and should never be expected to do. If the objective with the Avro replacement is ostensibly to encourage the growth of the private sector aviation industry for the greater good of India, shouldn't the govt subsidize it too? What we should be concerned about is the efficiency with which we find and deploy all the assets available in India without any restrictions, take foreign help where required and then focus on delivering the best product in the quickest time.pragnya wrote: i would be happy if pvt sector leaps in big. but considering the huge capital and long gestation invoved in defence r&d/manufacture no pvt sector is biting the bullet deeply. you see them doing sub assemblies/systems etc... heck even the tender for the AVROS which IAF earmarked for 'only' pvt sector did not attract any one!!!
BTW, Dassault is a private company owned by EADS which makes Airbus and the Dassault family. It doesn't make any sense to compare us to Israel which has compulsory military service for everyone, incl Raj Babbar types, but even they are privatizing IAI in the face of union resistance! Brazil's Embraer was privatized a decade ago and look at them now. Please forget Russian companies--they are all partly or wholly private but owned by ex-military and mafia thugs in cahoots with the Kremlin and are almost bankrupt. I myself suggested the China model--produce or be shot--as one option for us. But regarding the "govt control" issue: even in the US, every govt contractor (Boeing, LM etc) is controlled by the govt in the realm of govt products. IOW, there is no way a Reliance or Tata could make fighters for IAF without being under the control of the GoI. The only difference is they can operate without all of the handicaps of public companies and be able to bring the best talent and resources to the table. In fact, since every single tech developed by the PSUs are owned by the Indian taxpayer, any private players should be given access to that tech without cost if they want it. They also pay taxes and own the tech.
I like positive thinking, even when it is flying outside the envelope of reality but how does the pvt sector showcase anything in a market they are not allowed to operate in?HAL/NAL/DRDO have atleast many things to showcase as compared to nothing (barring a few odd ones) from the pvt sector. all the infra related to design/testing/manufacture are with the DPSUs/DRDO/NAL.
This is a recipe for disaster IMO. The bigger the project, the more gigantic the waste of money and time. I simply do not see their cultures meshing as equals at any point. If it were 80% private to 20% PSU, maybe but that too is iffy since the best guys in the PSUs may jump ship midway which is the legitimate worry of the GoI. To truly provide a level playing field, the only option that will work is for the govt to subsidize private companies just like they do the PSUs. This BTW is also the model in the US--few if any US companies develop a weapon system any more without being invited by a govt tender being reimbursed in advance for development and production of prototypes.i only see a collaboration between DPSUs/DRDO/NAL and the pvt sector as the model which would work.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
As I recall, Dassault is owned by the Dassault group with 50 odd %. EADS has the second highest shares in the ownership but less than half at some 45%. EADS itself has significant state ownership though majority is publicly traded and hence private at ~70% iirc with the rest of the 30% having state control.Victor wrote:BTW, Dassault is a private company owned by EADS which makes Airbus and the Dassault family.
And for all practical purposes Dassault is akin to HAL in that they have a monopoly in fighter design and manufacture in France. The big difference is that France has an amazing system of integrating the military into product design and development, similar to Israel.
Yes, but remember that IAI products are still world class. Per se, state control has not affected their quality badly.It doesn't make any sense to compare us to Israel which has compulsory military service for everyone, incl Raj Babbar types, but even they are privatizing IAI in the face of union resistance!
Embraer is not a good compare for us, because they are basically a systems integrator without the mandate to indigenize that HAL has (and should have).Brazil's Embraer was privatized a decade ago and look at them now.
Their efficiency and design capability are good things for us to emulate, but at the same time, we are unhappy because the raw material (ie carbon fiber etc) for the ALH airframe comes from abroad (or used to), this is simply not a concern for Embraer.
That's not accurate. Russian industry is pretty competitive at many levels and a world leader in specific areas - e.g. mobile SAM systems. The rationalization that is currently underway, is shoring up an industry champion in each sector - e.g. UAC is now the umbrella corporation that has MiG and Sukhoi both in its network. MiG is floundering - though critics note that Sukhois political influence has caused a lot of issues, whereas Sukhoi (and its network of associated factories) have made healthy profits off of Su-30 and Su-27 export sales.Please forget Russian companies--they are all partly or wholly private but owned by ex-military and mafia thugs in cahoots with the Kremlin and are almost bankrupt.
That Chinese model remains a bit suspect (IMHO). We see a lot of fancy gear - the reliability and actual performance of that gear remains unknown. Further, Chinese state firms are byzantine in terms of influence peddling/nepotism and all the sorts of stuff one associates with state ownership plus totalitarian govts.I myself suggested the China model--produce or be shot--as one option for us.
Which if taken to extremes as was the case with the JSF is also a danger, as private companies will routinely pitch for the most complex program that can get them the most funding.This BTW is also the model in the US--few if any US companies develop a weapon system any more without being invited by a govt tender being reimbursed in advance for development and production of prototypes.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
The problem is management and accountability.Even the pvt. sector is not insured against inefficiency.In dealing with some of our corporate giants,the committee approach, passing-round-the-table decision making, leads to babu-like delays.When there is a clear head of project,who has overall pharaonic like power,plus is held accountable for failure and can get sacked for the same,results happen more often than not.In the pvt. sector,the key advantage is that there is far better money-management,budget restraints, unlike the flexible,ever-expanding attitude of the DPSUs and a lesser tolerance for failure.We have created large behemoth-like DPSUs,whose appetite for funds is consuming us without acceptable results.As some have suggested,there should be specialist areas of excellence,compartmentalised and separate in entity,which will remain focussed on obtaining results with lesser babu hurdles and red tape to contend with.Each project should also have its clear hierarchy to achieve results.This way one would be able to see which divisions are on track and which are lagging behind,and for what reasons and evolve alternatives and solution within the specified timeframe of the project.
There are also three key aspects,Design,Development and Production.Who designs weapon systems (design parameters upon whose input,end-user priorities critical for success),who develops the same and who ultimately produces the weapon system.In the complex and gargantuan DPSU empire,these aspects need to be clearly spelt out and the list of successes and failures for systems for the three services and strategic command examined to give insight into a review of the issue.From reports,the new DRDO chief has already begun redrawing the map.Where the Pvt. sector comes in ,essential for competition and in keeping costs affordable,is another Q,depending upon the project,but with our DPSUs failing to deliver,the cry from the end-user,the services to take matters into their own hands,or even head the DPSUs is becoming louder by the day.The IAF now want to follow the IN's approach,where the IN designs its own warships and has IN or ex-IN senior officers heading the yards.
However,even with this happening,the services gaining better control over the DPSUs,the MOD's own imperial babu durbar of indecision and protracted acquisition protocols, as 60-70% of our systems and components are imported,can negate much of the required management improvements.The MOD has also in the past and present been accused of also steadfastly refusing to integrate the armed forces into its key policy and decision making structure.Unless the political will is there to make improvements,we will continue to suffer whether we produce at home or import.The manner in which Raj Babar and the MPs left early to catch their flights ,instead of listening to the classified intel on the border clashes and tri-service briefings,indicates where the major problem lies,at the top.Perhaps next time the media should instead be invited for the briefings so that the netas can obtain the same watching Arnab & co. on telly in the evenings in the comfort of their homes and watering holes!
However,there is nothing to be lost in trying out alternatives with the LTA.If it succeeds,great.if not how much worse off would we be if it suffers the same fate as some of our on-going projects experiencing intense birth pangs like the,IJT,LCA whatever?
There are also three key aspects,Design,Development and Production.Who designs weapon systems (design parameters upon whose input,end-user priorities critical for success),who develops the same and who ultimately produces the weapon system.In the complex and gargantuan DPSU empire,these aspects need to be clearly spelt out and the list of successes and failures for systems for the three services and strategic command examined to give insight into a review of the issue.From reports,the new DRDO chief has already begun redrawing the map.Where the Pvt. sector comes in ,essential for competition and in keeping costs affordable,is another Q,depending upon the project,but with our DPSUs failing to deliver,the cry from the end-user,the services to take matters into their own hands,or even head the DPSUs is becoming louder by the day.The IAF now want to follow the IN's approach,where the IN designs its own warships and has IN or ex-IN senior officers heading the yards.
However,even with this happening,the services gaining better control over the DPSUs,the MOD's own imperial babu durbar of indecision and protracted acquisition protocols, as 60-70% of our systems and components are imported,can negate much of the required management improvements.The MOD has also in the past and present been accused of also steadfastly refusing to integrate the armed forces into its key policy and decision making structure.Unless the political will is there to make improvements,we will continue to suffer whether we produce at home or import.The manner in which Raj Babar and the MPs left early to catch their flights ,instead of listening to the classified intel on the border clashes and tri-service briefings,indicates where the major problem lies,at the top.Perhaps next time the media should instead be invited for the briefings so that the netas can obtain the same watching Arnab & co. on telly in the evenings in the comfort of their homes and watering holes!
However,there is nothing to be lost in trying out alternatives with the LTA.If it succeeds,great.if not how much worse off would we be if it suffers the same fate as some of our on-going projects experiencing intense birth pangs like the,IJT,LCA whatever?
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
surprising you say this. 56 - by no stretch is small. we are not talking of mass produced automobiles for gen public but specialised complex machines for the services. by the same token, even fighters (light/300, medium/200, heavy/250) forget the transports (all included 200) look small in number - so the same argument can be brought forward to 'not' involve in r&d, prod etc..Victor wrote:This Avro replacement is a good example of the strawman disconnect that is confusing people. No company, be it private or public, can make 56 sophisticated transport aircraft without making a loss because the economies just don't exist with today's tech unless this is a base order with a much larger guaranteed number to follow. In the public companies, the government eats the loss (ie. subsidizes the aircraft) which private investors wont and should never be expected to do.
great many things are spoken about how the pvt sector is panacea for all of India's ills. what is their contribution even wrt automobiles?? has any pvt firm developed any engine except may be TATA for one of their cars?? all we have seen is wholesale shifting of assembly lines from FORD/RENAULT/HYUNDAI/SUZUKI/OPEL/BENZ etc to India. how is it different from screwdrivergiri that all accuse HAL of?? what r&d contribution is there?? same wih Bikes.
as for the govt 'eating loss' wrt DPSUs, what option is there since they are the guarantors of national security. also note while cross subsidization has happened, dividends too have been paid to the govts by select few.
unless the pvt sector comes forward with a proposal how that can be sorted? if that happens then these 'can' happen -If the objective with the Avro replacement is ostensibly to encourage the growth of the private sector aviation industry for the greater good of India, shouldn't the govt subsidize it too? What we should be concerned about is the efficiency with which we find and deploy all the assets available in India without any restrictions, take foreign help where required and then focus on delivering the best product in the quickest time.
1. pvt sector can use DPSU/DRDO/NAL infra at discounted cost.
2. govt can incentivise/allow tax benefits considering the gestation period with defence equipment manufature.
Victor, on the one hand you say 'numbers' are too small to be economical and then you say this!! numbers are going to remain 'small' and 'uneconomical' because the requirement is for the services.I like positive thinking, even when it is flying outside the envelope of reality but how does the pvt sector showcase anything in a market they are not allowed to operate in?
in the last 20 years things have changed and there are a host of pvt sector firms catering to HAL/NAL/ADA etc..some 'niche' equipment, some basic stuff. i hardly see the pvt sector in small arms like guns/rifles where R&D cost and gestation is much smaller and these are mass products!!!
IMO while the govt can/should make it more easier for them to enter all fields of defence prod, if 'small', 'uneconomical' is bandied about for non-participation - the whole point is redundant.
This is a recipe for disaster IMO. The bigger the project, the more gigantic the waste of money and time. I simply do not see their cultures meshing as equals at any point. If it were 80% private to 20% PSU, maybe but that too is iffy since the best guys in the PSUs may jump ship midway which is the legitimate worry of the GoI. To truly provide a level playing field, the only option that will work is for the govt to subsidize private companies just like they do the PSUs. This BTW is also the model in the US--few if any US companies develop a weapon system any more without being invited by a govt tender being reimbursed in advance for development and production of prototypes.
that is your pov which i disagree with and answered it before.
.................
Karan M, appreciate your points.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Thinking in terms of the avero replacement. I have a question, would it be a good idea to add the an 32 replacement programme to it as well. Cause, the an 32 would need replacement, in the medium term, as well. Basically, what im thinking, is why have 2 separate designes, for aircrafts that will have overlapping roles.
Also by clubbing we, will have econmy of scale as well.
Also by clubbing we, will have econmy of scale as well.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
One mustn't think of any new aircraft as a direct replacement of this or that aircraft in the inventory, but as replacement or upgradation of capabilities. Just because the current force structure is in a certain way doesn't mean it has to remain the same way in the future i.e we don't necessarily need 150+ ~5 tonne payload transports. We have already committed to the HAL MTA, which is a much more comprehensive programme. Best we consolidate on it.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Tks
The C 17 is broader than some of our roads
K
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
HAL MSM
MCSRDC, HAL has upgraded and delivered an Air Combat Simulator (ACS) at AF Station, Hindan for training IAF fighter pilots in close combat using Beyond Visual Range (BVR) weapons. The final testing of the simulator is over and it was accepted by IAF on July 31, 2013.
The major operational components of ACS are Cockpit,Visual System (including Domes, Out-of-The-Window (OTW) projectors and target projectors), Instructor Operating Stations (IOS), Fighter Controller Consoles and Master Game Observation Console. The upgrade of ACS involved refurbishment of cockpit to current standard cockpit, replacement of inflatable domes with newly designed nine-metre diameter rigid domes, provision of IOS with a Virtual Reality helmet for instructor to see OTW visuals as well as HUD, development of new Visual Display System for rendering OTW visuals and target aircraft with increased depth of perception and special effects for missile firing.
The uniqueness of ACS is that it facilitates training in 10 different types of fighter aircraft viz., MiG-21 Bison,MiG-29, MiG-27, Su-30, Mirage-2000, Jaguar, Mirage-III, Mirage-V, F-16 and F-6. Any aircraft can be used as own aircraft or enemy aircraft. The combat scenario can be generated up to two numbers of own aircraft versus two numbers of enemy aircraft in airto- air combat. During the dynamic combat scenario, simulation of handling capabilities, aero dynamics, engine and flight control performance of own and enemy aircraft models are very close to real aircraft. The sensor and man-machine interface are also similar to the real aircraft.
MCSRDC, HAL has upgraded and delivered an Air Combat Simulator (ACS) at AF Station, Hindan for training IAF fighter pilots in close combat using Beyond Visual Range (BVR) weapons. The final testing of the simulator is over and it was accepted by IAF on July 31, 2013.
The major operational components of ACS are Cockpit,Visual System (including Domes, Out-of-The-Window (OTW) projectors and target projectors), Instructor Operating Stations (IOS), Fighter Controller Consoles and Master Game Observation Console. The upgrade of ACS involved refurbishment of cockpit to current standard cockpit, replacement of inflatable domes with newly designed nine-metre diameter rigid domes, provision of IOS with a Virtual Reality helmet for instructor to see OTW visuals as well as HUD, development of new Visual Display System for rendering OTW visuals and target aircraft with increased depth of perception and special effects for missile firing.
The uniqueness of ACS is that it facilitates training in 10 different types of fighter aircraft viz., MiG-21 Bison,MiG-29, MiG-27, Su-30, Mirage-2000, Jaguar, Mirage-III, Mirage-V, F-16 and F-6. Any aircraft can be used as own aircraft or enemy aircraft. The combat scenario can be generated up to two numbers of own aircraft versus two numbers of enemy aircraft in airto- air combat. During the dynamic combat scenario, simulation of handling capabilities, aero dynamics, engine and flight control performance of own and enemy aircraft models are very close to real aircraft. The sensor and man-machine interface are also similar to the real aircraft.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
I will have to dig out the picture, but, I had placed a water bottle on the top of one of its tires/tyres to provide a sense of dimension and taken a 270 deg picture - standing inside the wheel well. Properly stitched they provided a complete top-to-bottom picture of the entire landing gear (front and rear).The C 17 is broader than some of our roads
BTW, I had also taken pictures of the different types of screw heads they use (on the ramp alone). IIRC I had some 6/7 of them.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
<OT>NRao wrote:I will have to dig out the picture, but, I had placed a water bottle on the top of one of its tires/tyres to provide a sense of dimension and taken a 270 deg picture - standing inside the wheel well. Properly stitched they provided a complete top-to-bottom picture of the entire landing gear (front and rear).The C 17 is broader than some of our roads
BTW, I had also taken pictures of the different types of screw heads they use (on the ramp alone). IIRC I had some 6/7 of them.
NRao ji, please consider using AutoStitch, which can be had from University of Bath's webpage. The tool is very simple to use and the settings listed below are the only ones I ever use:
Edit -> Options -> Output Size -> Width
Edit -> Options -> Orientation Settings -> Auto Straighten (check box)
The best part is that you can toss the images into the tool and it will figure out what goes where.
</OT>
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Just to present my belated view I would like to say that I am all for IAF using BRD for R&D and production of aircraft in future. HAL after messing around for 50 years is just a screw driver king, so we should give IAF a chance. If one looks at the tender notices going out for Rustom, HTT etc, then it seems HAL will import all the components including the paint and the plate saying "Manufactured by HAL".
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 14th Oct 13
Indian Air Force (IAF) chief, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne has sugar coated his bid to import 106 basic trainer aircraft from Pilatus Aircraft Co, by proposing that Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) builds the trainers in Bangalore to blueprints supplied by the Swiss company.
HAL, which is designing its own basic trainer for the IAF --- the Hindustan Turbo Trainer – 40 (HTT-40) --- has flatly rejected the proposal. The company has allocated Rs 130 crore of its own money to continue developing the HTT-40, which is projected to fly by 2015.
Browne’s new ploy follows Defence Minister AK Antony’s cold-shouldering of a letter from the IAF chief, demanding an over-the-counter purchase of 106 PC-7 Mark II trainers from Pilatus. Such a purchase would be a windfall for the Swiss company worth at least Swiss Francs 750 million (Rs 5000 crore).
Last year, the IAF purchased 75 PC-7 Mark II trainers for 557 million Swiss Francs (Rs 3,725 crore). Pilatus has delivered at least 15 of those trainers.
When the purchase of 75 trainers from the global market was approved in 2009, it was decided that HAL would simultaneously design and build 106 trainers. But, in July, as reported first by Business Standard (July 29, “Indian Air Force at war with Hindustan Aeronautics; wants to import, not build, a trainer”) the IAF chief wrote to Mr Antony, savaging HAL’s proposal and recommending that this order be handed to Pilatus.
In his unprecedented attack on HAL, which builds a range of aircraft for the IAF, Browne alleged that the HTT-40 trainer would cost Rs 43.59 crore per aircraft, which inflation would raise to Rs 64.77 crore in 2020. Arguing for Pilatus, Browne’s letter falsely claimed that the PC-7 Mark II costs just Rs 30 crore per aircraft when, in fact, India was already paying Pilatus about Rs 40 crore (Swiss Francs 6.09 million) for each trainer supplied.
The IAF confirms that it approached HAL to build 106 PC-7 Mark IIs under license from Pilatus, even while rubbishing HAL’s ability to design and build the HTT-40. An IAF statement to Business Standard says, “IAF had invited HAL to manufacture the balance PC-7 Mk II required by IAF under license in India. However, in their own interest HAL declined to participate in license manufacture of the PC-7 Mk II.”
Turned away by HAL, Browne bizarrely claimed during the Air Force Day functions on Oct 8 that the IAF’s base repair depots (BRDs) --- which were set up to maintain and overhaul aircraft and engines --- could also build aircraft. The IAF chief declared, "The 14 base repair depots (BRDs) have grown in both capability and capacity in a manner that the day is not far when it will be able to develop its own medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA)."
A reality check was quickly provided by the IAF’s maintenance chief, Air Marshal P Kanakaraj, who admitted that assembling aircraft “(would) be a quantum jump in the working of the maintenance command… We are bound to make mistakes initially, so pilot-less aircraft are an ideal platform to start off.”
Asked to comment on whether BRDs would now build Pilatus trainers, the IAF responded: “No decision has been taken on manufacturing the trainer aircraft in Base Repair Depot. As and when any decision is taken at a later stage, you would be informed.”
Meanwhile, the IAF is squeezing HAL to reflect a higher price for the HTT-40. At a recent meeting in HAL Bangalore, Air Marshal Fernandes flew down from Air Headquarters in New Delhi to demand that a slew of inputs, including the cost of development, be factored into the cost.
Ironically, the IAF glosses over the most compelling argument for an indigenous trainer --- the cost of spares, maintenance, overhauls and upgrades during 40 years of operational service. These “life-cycle costs”, which add up to at least thrice the procurement cost of an aircraft, would be significantly higher in the case of Pilatus, also creating a dependency on the continuation of the Pilatus manufacturing line.
Business Standard has also highlighted (July 30, “IAF diluted at least 12 benchmarks for trainer aircraft”) the murkiness around the decision to award Pilatus the contract. A range of crucial performance benchmarks were diluted by the IAF after it was decided to buy 75 trainers from the global market, even as HAL developed 106 trainers. Diluting these benchmarks made the PC-7 Mark II eligible for purchase.
The IAF, which pushed through the proposal to import 75 trainers while HAL designed and built 106 HTT-40s now argues that operating two different types of trainers would complicate administration and logistics.
IAF proposes to HAL - build Swiss trainer aircraft but HAL rejects it!!!
Business Standard, 14th Oct 13
Indian Air Force (IAF) chief, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne has sugar coated his bid to import 106 basic trainer aircraft from Pilatus Aircraft Co, by proposing that Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) builds the trainers in Bangalore to blueprints supplied by the Swiss company.
HAL, which is designing its own basic trainer for the IAF --- the Hindustan Turbo Trainer – 40 (HTT-40) --- has flatly rejected the proposal. The company has allocated Rs 130 crore of its own money to continue developing the HTT-40, which is projected to fly by 2015.
Browne’s new ploy follows Defence Minister AK Antony’s cold-shouldering of a letter from the IAF chief, demanding an over-the-counter purchase of 106 PC-7 Mark II trainers from Pilatus. Such a purchase would be a windfall for the Swiss company worth at least Swiss Francs 750 million (Rs 5000 crore).
Last year, the IAF purchased 75 PC-7 Mark II trainers for 557 million Swiss Francs (Rs 3,725 crore). Pilatus has delivered at least 15 of those trainers.
When the purchase of 75 trainers from the global market was approved in 2009, it was decided that HAL would simultaneously design and build 106 trainers. But, in July, as reported first by Business Standard (July 29, “Indian Air Force at war with Hindustan Aeronautics; wants to import, not build, a trainer”) the IAF chief wrote to Mr Antony, savaging HAL’s proposal and recommending that this order be handed to Pilatus.
In his unprecedented attack on HAL, which builds a range of aircraft for the IAF, Browne alleged that the HTT-40 trainer would cost Rs 43.59 crore per aircraft, which inflation would raise to Rs 64.77 crore in 2020. Arguing for Pilatus, Browne’s letter falsely claimed that the PC-7 Mark II costs just Rs 30 crore per aircraft when, in fact, India was already paying Pilatus about Rs 40 crore (Swiss Francs 6.09 million) for each trainer supplied.
The IAF confirms that it approached HAL to build 106 PC-7 Mark IIs under license from Pilatus, even while rubbishing HAL’s ability to design and build the HTT-40. An IAF statement to Business Standard says, “IAF had invited HAL to manufacture the balance PC-7 Mk II required by IAF under license in India. However, in their own interest HAL declined to participate in license manufacture of the PC-7 Mk II.”
Turned away by HAL, Browne bizarrely claimed during the Air Force Day functions on Oct 8 that the IAF’s base repair depots (BRDs) --- which were set up to maintain and overhaul aircraft and engines --- could also build aircraft. The IAF chief declared, "The 14 base repair depots (BRDs) have grown in both capability and capacity in a manner that the day is not far when it will be able to develop its own medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA)."
A reality check was quickly provided by the IAF’s maintenance chief, Air Marshal P Kanakaraj, who admitted that assembling aircraft “(would) be a quantum jump in the working of the maintenance command… We are bound to make mistakes initially, so pilot-less aircraft are an ideal platform to start off.”
Asked to comment on whether BRDs would now build Pilatus trainers, the IAF responded: “No decision has been taken on manufacturing the trainer aircraft in Base Repair Depot. As and when any decision is taken at a later stage, you would be informed.”
Meanwhile, the IAF is squeezing HAL to reflect a higher price for the HTT-40. At a recent meeting in HAL Bangalore, Air Marshal Fernandes flew down from Air Headquarters in New Delhi to demand that a slew of inputs, including the cost of development, be factored into the cost.
Ironically, the IAF glosses over the most compelling argument for an indigenous trainer --- the cost of spares, maintenance, overhauls and upgrades during 40 years of operational service. These “life-cycle costs”, which add up to at least thrice the procurement cost of an aircraft, would be significantly higher in the case of Pilatus, also creating a dependency on the continuation of the Pilatus manufacturing line.
Business Standard has also highlighted (July 30, “IAF diluted at least 12 benchmarks for trainer aircraft”) the murkiness around the decision to award Pilatus the contract. A range of crucial performance benchmarks were diluted by the IAF after it was decided to buy 75 trainers from the global market, even as HAL developed 106 trainers. Diluting these benchmarks made the PC-7 Mark II eligible for purchase.
The IAF, which pushed through the proposal to import 75 trainers while HAL designed and built 106 HTT-40s now argues that operating two different types of trainers would complicate administration and logistics.
IAF proposes to HAL - build Swiss trainer aircraft but HAL rejects it!!!
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
^^^
Perhaps, the IAF is looking for commonality for the basic trainer. As having two different airframes, for the same job. Will complicate maintenance and training for the instructors.
Perhaps, the IAF is looking for commonality for the basic trainer. As having two different airframes, for the same job. Will complicate maintenance and training for the instructors.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
If the deal is canceled, what happens to the money already paid to Augusta & the few aircraft's in hand with the IAF>
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
[
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Image ... rvice.htmlPratyush wrote:^^^
Perhaps, the IAF is looking for commonality for the basic trainer. As having two different airframes, for the same job. Will complicate maintenance and training for the instructors.
A special ceremonial occasion on December 16, 2004, was held at the Indian Air Force Station, Hakimpet, to mark the phasing out of the PZL/WSL TS-11 Iskra tandem seat trainer from the Indian Air Force (IAF) Service. The ceremony marked 29 years of service for the Iskra, which is one of the longest stints for a Jet Trainer in the IAF. The Iskra along with the Kiran Mk II formed the backbone of applied training (Stage IIA) for the fledgling pilots of the IAF.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Shiv ji,
My comment was keeping with the experience of the IAF, in the past, where the Iskara was operated along side the Kiran. You would need 2 separate set of trainers and logistics for Aircraft's that were doing the same job.
Why have such a system beets me. If an opportunity presents it self to simplify the logistics. Then it ought to be taken. Like with the PC-7. The HTT 40 will be doing the same job as the PC 7.
In order to simplify the logistics the HTT-40 should be scrapped, as a production aircraft.
However, it should be persisted with as a tech demonstrator, and the developmental tests ought to be completed. In order to teach the HAL. The steps necessary for aircraft development. So that, they acquire the necessary project management skills for future projects.
My comment was keeping with the experience of the IAF, in the past, where the Iskara was operated along side the Kiran. You would need 2 separate set of trainers and logistics for Aircraft's that were doing the same job.
Why have such a system beets me. If an opportunity presents it self to simplify the logistics. Then it ought to be taken. Like with the PC-7. The HTT 40 will be doing the same job as the PC 7.
In order to simplify the logistics the HTT-40 should be scrapped, as a production aircraft.
However, it should be persisted with as a tech demonstrator, and the developmental tests ought to be completed. In order to teach the HAL. The steps necessary for aircraft development. So that, they acquire the necessary project management skills for future projects.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Buy some useful a/c. Not for politician's picnicsPratyush wrote:If the deal is canceled, what happens to the money already paid to Augusta & the few aircraft's in hand with the IAF>
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
If we are going to set up an entire plant along with testing and R&D facilities in India (the very reason for the project), 56 is not enough to cover the costs, let alone make a profit to keep the companies going. Why do you think nobody bothered to respond to the RFP? The break even will vary from aircraft to aircraft but I've seen numbers as low as 80 or 100 thrown around. You better believe that there are many companies who want to get into this space and while they will not throw money away, they are more than willing to take a calculated gamble in India, even working at a short-term loss, if they see no sign of behind the scenes govt sabotage. They will do this because they see a huge market for aircraft in India. Unfortunately, so do the babu-neta combine and they will do everything in their power to make sure it doesn't happen, India's interests be damned. At the most benign, it is naivety to not see this clearly.pragnya wrote:56 - by no stretch is small.
I'm surprised you are asking this but in a nutshell--Indian auto companies are exporting Indian-designed cars, running on Indian-designed engines, assembled in Indian factories all over the world, even in some developed countries. Yes, they employ foreign expertise in a few critical areas (eg. mHawk engine) but the end result is totally Indian, not unlike Ford employing German expertise or Fiat employing Japanese expertise in engines, powertrains and so on. More important, Tata and Mahindra LEARN AND ABSORB from this. One example is Mahindra's new engine. Mahindra tractors have a cult following among the redneck farmers in US and let's not forget that Tata owns Land Rover and Jaguar along with all their technologies. This is what we should aspire to in aeronautics as well and my question to you is: can you think of any reason why we cannot or should not do it?great many things are spoken about how the pvt sector is panacea for all of India's ills. what is their contribution even wrt automobiles?? has any pvt firm developed any engine except may be TATA for one of their cars??
This guy has a hide as thick as the Indian One-Horned Rhino. Even after being show up as a liar and a p!mp for HAL on live TV, he still propagates blatant untruths. The plain fact is there is no such thing as "HAL's own money". It is accounting subterferge for Indian taxpayer's money but of course he will neglect to mention this minor fact. The farticle doesn't deserve serious attention and he is merely collecting his lifafa for the quarter. Don't blame him, it's his job and I won't be surprised to see him trumpeting F-35 in the future.From Ajai Shuka farticle: HAL...has allocated Rs 130 crore of its own money to continue developing the HTT-40, which is projected to fly by 2015.
This makes the most sense but it will kill another pet babu-neta project, the MTA, likely another multi-decade-muti-lakh-crore drain on India's resources and defense preparedness which will end in a zero. I had suggested some time ago that we consolidate the An-32/MTA project with the looming Indian civil regional transport requirement which will go into the hundreds and also exports. Look for an already-proven aircraft that fulfills all these roles adequately if not *perfectly* and then go for it hammer and tong. The aircraft I had suggested was the BAE 146 which has ceased production but is still one of the most popular, economical, sturdy and successful aircraft in the world. IMO, GoI should try to buy the entire production line and hand it over to a consortium of private players but I don't expect a sound decision like this to happen as long as leeches and thugs rule in Delhi.Pratyush wrote: I have a question, would it be a good idea to add the an 32 replacement programme to it as well. Cause, the an 32 would need replacement, in the medium term, as well. Basically, what im thinking, is why have 2 separate designes, for aircrafts that will have overlapping roles.
Also by clubbing we, will have economy of scale as well.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Absolutely sad to see what IAF has become."The 14 base repair depots (BRDs) have grown in both capability and capacity in a manner that the day is not far when it will be able to develop its own medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA)."![]()
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Did Browne actually say that? That the BRDs could one day develop a MMRCA or did he say that they could assemble one?
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Karan don't get fooled this is not Mr. Brown speaking this is Mr. Anthony shadow boxing through IAF. Once DM cleared HTT-40 project there should not be any comment regarding that in public from anybody from IAF but since it is not the case it can't be so other than having backing from MoD since IAF is subservient to them only.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
I doubt that. In the past 8 years, we have seen one thing. That the IAF/HAL are doing what they see fit, but in the absence of a proper overarching policy directive. My question is whether Mr Browne actually said that - even if he did, I would chalk it up to hyperbole, as a warning shot across HALs bows. Developing a MMRCA at BRDs?
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Warning shot ??? Pipe dreaming about taking up a design/development project (having no experience in that) to fullfill a requirement in decades which they have right now doesn't exactly qualify as a "warning shot" IMHO. No matter what people here believe IAF can do nothing without getting a nod from MoD.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
VAYU: Time for a hard look.AM Brijesh Dayal (retd)
The article refers to the controversy over the trainer.A fe wpoints.
HTP-32.108 engine failures and 23 fatalities.The last accident in which two instructors were killed was the last straw for the IAF.Thus the MOD cleared the acquisition of 181 basic trainers,immediate import of 75 and the remainder the manufacture of 106 according to the HAL design (HTT-40).Having acquired the Pilatus PC-7,eatblished training parameters,etc.the IAF is keen that the option for more aircraft is exercised.If the MOD accepts this it willl kill off the HAL trainer.HAL no doubt are unhappy.
The AM says that he is not "wading into" the arguments and merits of each side,but is trying to throw light on why a Love-hate" relationship exists between the IAF and HAL.
HAL says that the IAF changes SR's mid-stream,is pro-importand against self-reliance,etc. The IAF counters saying that HAL and the DRDO are given "first lien" on meeting their requirements based upon "inflated claims" and then fail to meet performance parameters,costs and timeframes.The AM is spot on when he says that the fundamental Q is whether the "defence research and development and production are there to serve the needs of the armed forces,or the armed forces meant to play second fiddle to sustain a military-industrial complex that is bureaucratically driven,with an archaic mindset out of tune with the technological and commercial realities of today?"
A comparison how a balance has been achieved in other nations is given.He adds that HAL is one of Asia's largest cos. with a captive IAF as customer.We refuse to review the organisation of the MOD which is "frozen in time".We witness inter-service rivalries that results in wasteful duplications and a military industrial complex that is only accountable to its bureaucratic mastersand not to the ultimate users .The MOD becomes arbiter in disputes and with no professionals within it to guide it,everything comes down to personalities and ad-hocism. Since there is neither an aerospace vision nor strategy ,we are interested in continuing licence manufacture .This can then be blamed on the IAF!"
Now rather than integrating and becoming more cohesive and fostering mutual support,the IAF being its captive and almost only customer,and add the AOC -Maintenance to the HAL Board along with the Dy.Chief,the Dy Chief of Air Staff has been removed and has now been relegated to the lowly position of a "permanent invitee"!
The AM adds that nowhere in the world do aerospace cos. exist like HAL which wants to cover every aerospace activity.The last to do so was in the USSR,which also made domestic goods.No one today tries to be totally self-reliant,since tech is diverse,and cross linkages need to be dynamic,efficient and economical.
He says that we need to take a hard look at how our aerospace industry is organised and managed.A national aerospace policy,involving all stakeholders,an aeronautics commission along with a dedicated dept. of aeronautics and supporting institutional bodies.APJAK mooted this effort under the auspices of the ASI in 2004.
He concludes by saying that HAL and the MOD should focus on the bigger challenges facing the mil-industrial complex,and not grudge the IAF in getting the basic trainer of its choice,in the interest of the safety of its pilots and future combat potent.Is this not the morally upright decision for the Def. Min. to take?
In view of the fact that HAL's HTT-40 has yet to fly even in prototype form,which will take several years to perfect given HAL's shining track record with the LCA and IJT,the urgency of getting our pilots trained using one trainer as commonsense would dictate,establishing the Pilatus PC-7 as the only basic trainer for the IAF in this era is the only sensible decision.
PS:This issue of VAYU has some excellent articles on "the Challenge of indigenisation" ,Air Cmde. jasjit Singh,
"Single or two seat fighters","Air combat philosophy","Enduring story" (Indo-Russian def. cooperation spanning 6 decades),"Dassult's deadly Rafale",Exclusive interview with the Air Chief,etc.I trust that others will post excerpts from these as well.
The article refers to the controversy over the trainer.A fe wpoints.
HTP-32.108 engine failures and 23 fatalities.The last accident in which two instructors were killed was the last straw for the IAF.Thus the MOD cleared the acquisition of 181 basic trainers,immediate import of 75 and the remainder the manufacture of 106 according to the HAL design (HTT-40).Having acquired the Pilatus PC-7,eatblished training parameters,etc.the IAF is keen that the option for more aircraft is exercised.If the MOD accepts this it willl kill off the HAL trainer.HAL no doubt are unhappy.
The AM says that he is not "wading into" the arguments and merits of each side,but is trying to throw light on why a Love-hate" relationship exists between the IAF and HAL.
HAL says that the IAF changes SR's mid-stream,is pro-importand against self-reliance,etc. The IAF counters saying that HAL and the DRDO are given "first lien" on meeting their requirements based upon "inflated claims" and then fail to meet performance parameters,costs and timeframes.The AM is spot on when he says that the fundamental Q is whether the "defence research and development and production are there to serve the needs of the armed forces,or the armed forces meant to play second fiddle to sustain a military-industrial complex that is bureaucratically driven,with an archaic mindset out of tune with the technological and commercial realities of today?"
A comparison how a balance has been achieved in other nations is given.He adds that HAL is one of Asia's largest cos. with a captive IAF as customer.We refuse to review the organisation of the MOD which is "frozen in time".We witness inter-service rivalries that results in wasteful duplications and a military industrial complex that is only accountable to its bureaucratic mastersand not to the ultimate users .The MOD becomes arbiter in disputes and with no professionals within it to guide it,everything comes down to personalities and ad-hocism. Since there is neither an aerospace vision nor strategy ,we are interested in continuing licence manufacture .This can then be blamed on the IAF!"
Now rather than integrating and becoming more cohesive and fostering mutual support,the IAF being its captive and almost only customer,and add the AOC -Maintenance to the HAL Board along with the Dy.Chief,the Dy Chief of Air Staff has been removed and has now been relegated to the lowly position of a "permanent invitee"!
The AM adds that nowhere in the world do aerospace cos. exist like HAL which wants to cover every aerospace activity.The last to do so was in the USSR,which also made domestic goods.No one today tries to be totally self-reliant,since tech is diverse,and cross linkages need to be dynamic,efficient and economical.
He says that we need to take a hard look at how our aerospace industry is organised and managed.A national aerospace policy,involving all stakeholders,an aeronautics commission along with a dedicated dept. of aeronautics and supporting institutional bodies.APJAK mooted this effort under the auspices of the ASI in 2004.
He concludes by saying that HAL and the MOD should focus on the bigger challenges facing the mil-industrial complex,and not grudge the IAF in getting the basic trainer of its choice,in the interest of the safety of its pilots and future combat potent.Is this not the morally upright decision for the Def. Min. to take?
In view of the fact that HAL's HTT-40 has yet to fly even in prototype form,which will take several years to perfect given HAL's shining track record with the LCA and IJT,the urgency of getting our pilots trained using one trainer as commonsense would dictate,establishing the Pilatus PC-7 as the only basic trainer for the IAF in this era is the only sensible decision.
PS:This issue of VAYU has some excellent articles on "the Challenge of indigenisation" ,Air Cmde. jasjit Singh,
"Single or two seat fighters","Air combat philosophy","Enduring story" (Indo-Russian def. cooperation spanning 6 decades),"Dassult's deadly Rafale",Exclusive interview with the Air Chief,etc.I trust that others will post excerpts from these as well.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
^^Thanks Philip. Would be much obliged if you could post a couple more article excerpts you mentioned as and when time allows, starting with "Challenge of indigenisation". Bullet points is fine.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Obviously this will drag...the French have a NEW President and India is headed towards an election............2+2=20Austin wrote:Concerns Rise As Indian Fighter Negotiations Drag On

Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Some snippets from VAYU.With delay in signing the FGFA,numbers too have come down to 116 from 140+.Probably due to rising costs,rupee devaluation,etc.Even 100+ 5th-gen aircraft would be a huge asset,as in another feature on the Rafale,the author has said that just 2 sqds. of Rafales with top cover by SU-30MKIs plus our AEW/AWACS aircraft would be able to cover the entire Indian air space.The problem is that even with 100+ FGFAs,272 Flankers,120 Rafales,approx. 200 sundry legacy upgraded aircraft (60+ MIG-29s,40+ M-2000s,100+ Jaguars) and our Bisons and upgraded MIG-27s soldiering on way beyond their pension plan,we will still be about 200 aircraft short around 2020.Where these birds will fly in from is anybody's guess,as the max LCA's that we can expect built from all the latest reports is 40 MK-1s.At the very least,nursing Bisons,etc. to 2025,we will still need at least 120-160 new aircraft.
Another VAYU article is on the "rising and rising" operational costs of fighters.heavy twin-engined fighters like the Flankers,Rafales,etc. is far higher than smaller single-engined aircraft.The IAF spent a massive 4000+ Cr. on fuel alone during 2012-2013! SU-30MKI costs according to the article are now in the region of $100M,up from initial $35M. Two-seat fighters are more expensive to operate than single-seaters,there's another piece on this issue,on "fuel burn",where we will have more twin-engined MKIs,Rafales and MIG-29s than single-engined fighters,where we once had 400+ MIG-21s in service.Ashley Tellis is quoted as having much earlier advocated that the IAF should've picked "the least expensive, combat proven fighter that would be a bridge to obtaining more advanced stealth aircraft in the future ".Tellis was obviously plumping for the F-16 or F-18,the former taboo as it is operated by the Pakis,and the latter rejected so we are told because of performance shortcomings.However,the Rafale is turning out to be as expensive or more than the MKIs,so what options are left for the IAF? The Gripen,which has 1/4th the flying costs/hr of the Typhoon?
"Spin the wheel,roll the dice,shuffle the pack",appears to be the sentiment of the season. The MOD's indecision looks ominous for yet another knee-jerk solution next year,keeping in character the MOD and its dismal track record.At the moment one might as well try one's luck at a casino!
Another VAYU article is on the "rising and rising" operational costs of fighters.heavy twin-engined fighters like the Flankers,Rafales,etc. is far higher than smaller single-engined aircraft.The IAF spent a massive 4000+ Cr. on fuel alone during 2012-2013! SU-30MKI costs according to the article are now in the region of $100M,up from initial $35M. Two-seat fighters are more expensive to operate than single-seaters,there's another piece on this issue,on "fuel burn",where we will have more twin-engined MKIs,Rafales and MIG-29s than single-engined fighters,where we once had 400+ MIG-21s in service.Ashley Tellis is quoted as having much earlier advocated that the IAF should've picked "the least expensive, combat proven fighter that would be a bridge to obtaining more advanced stealth aircraft in the future ".Tellis was obviously plumping for the F-16 or F-18,the former taboo as it is operated by the Pakis,and the latter rejected so we are told because of performance shortcomings.However,the Rafale is turning out to be as expensive or more than the MKIs,so what options are left for the IAF? The Gripen,which has 1/4th the flying costs/hr of the Typhoon?
"Spin the wheel,roll the dice,shuffle the pack",appears to be the sentiment of the season. The MOD's indecision looks ominous for yet another knee-jerk solution next year,keeping in character the MOD and its dismal track record.At the moment one might as well try one's luck at a casino!
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
The issue is more from India side as FM does not want to sign any deal this year that can burden the CAD and politically too its not appropriate moment ....so the negotiation will continue till next government comes in and takes a decision.sameerjoshi wrote:Obviously this will drag...the French have a NEW President and India is headed towards an election............2+2=20
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
And the French are balking at ToT which was promised. Apparently they claim its extra. Looks like bad faith negotiations.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
The IAF uses all these open attacks on DPSUs in press as messaging. They are warning shots in that they help it lobby for its decisions to be approved. Its always been that way..Sagar G wrote:Warning shot ??? Pipe dreaming about taking up a design/development project (having no experience in that) to fullfill a requirement in decades which they have right now doesn't exactly qualify as a "warning shot" IMHO. No matter what people here believe IAF can do nothing without getting a nod from MoD.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
From reports the French want two contracts,one for the built in France birds and another for the HAL built birds,but the MOD wants just one,where the French have to guarantee the quality of HAL built birds.The cost of the bird is now $100M and the deal is escalating to $30B! Other VAYU snippets say that the FGFA numbers have come down to 116,production in India only by 2022,due to costs,etc.SU-30MKI upgrades of 80 BMos carrying "Super Sukhoi" birds will cost another $2B.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
So if 2-engine fighters are so expensive (duh), the single engine F-35 becomes more attractive than the Rafale, no? Our patentable selection process should meticulously reexamine life cycle costs considering 1 vs 2 engine, F-35's life expectancy (7 years old vs Rafale's 27 years old) and long-term technological edge over China and Pakistan (most imp).Philip wrote:Even 100+ 5th-gen aircraft would be a huge asset
Well, if the objective is starchy white lungis, not India's defense, the safest thing to do is *nothing* which is exactly what RMji has done.keeping in character the MOD and its dismal track record.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Vic,the F-35 comes with its own bag of ballast.Huge IR sig.,poor air combat capability,etc. price also around $100m,but various versions with differing capability (1st,2nd and turd class variants).There are too many issues of advanced tech transfer as we are so shy of signing on CISMOA,etc.The Rafale in maritime exercises along with USN forces,was found to have a very low RCS,which was difficult for US fighters to pick up,it generally had the advantage of getting off the first BVR shot.After going through several articles on various issues,the IAF appears to want the Rafale as a complement to the MKIs,sharing a lot of ordnance,including KH-31s,Meteor,etc.Evaluations have shown that two flights of two Rafales each,controlled by one E-3F AEW&C with Link 16,can achieve total air superiority over a theatre as large as France.Implying that two sqds. of Rafales along with our Phalcon AWACS will be sufficient for our air space.For strike,MKIs providing top cover with the 400km R-172 ultra-LR AAM supposedly being developed in a JV,will be able to deal with enemy AEW aircraft.There are hints that it may replace the M-2000s to carry the air-launched leg of the N-triad.10 years down the line,is has been argued that with 24 sqds. of MKIs,Rafales and upgraded M-2000s,we will possess perhaps the most potent strike force of Asian air forces,with the FGFA also entering service.It is probably why the CoAS has said that the IAF have no "plan B" if the Rafale deal collapses.
It all sounds great if we had the money.24 sqds. of high performance twin-engined aircraft sounds very appetising,but where are the rest of the sqds. of the IAF going to come from? The remainder will be upgraded Jaguars,MIG-29s,and an assortment of a few sqds. of upgraded Soviet era MIG-21s/27s.10-12 sqds. the max.The number required bandied about is 42 sqds.Still at least 6-8 sqds. short,and even these barring the MIG-29UGs will have to be replaced.Had the LCA arrived by now and produced at a healthy rate one would be confident of bridging the gap.If one looks at the strategy of our mortal enemies,they are steadily inducting lesser capable aircraft from local built Flankers to JF-17s,but in larger numbers.They too are inducting their own versions of AEW aircraft,both imported (Sewden) and indigenous (Chinese).One has no idea how much an LCA MK-1 will cost,but surely we could get about 3 for the price of one Rafale .It can't replace the Rafale capability wise,but would keep numbers of aircraft healthy for air defence to deal with the large numbers being fielded by the Sino-Pak JV .Getting the LCA into service is looking more and more truly critical in the long term as an affordable fighter,and should be given the top priority of all our indigenous aviation programmes.A drastic measure to achieve results would be to put the project under the control of the IAF.In fact ,taking a leaf out of the IN's book,the ADA should come under the IAF's wing .But in fact this is not happening.Look at the HAL board issue where the Dy.CoAS has been dumped as a member and is now reportedly only a permanent special invitee.
The situ requires very firm and swift decision making by the Def. Min,but he appears to be truly "deaf" to the crisis,and as Vic has said,"starchy white lungis" appear to be his top priority!
It all sounds great if we had the money.24 sqds. of high performance twin-engined aircraft sounds very appetising,but where are the rest of the sqds. of the IAF going to come from? The remainder will be upgraded Jaguars,MIG-29s,and an assortment of a few sqds. of upgraded Soviet era MIG-21s/27s.10-12 sqds. the max.The number required bandied about is 42 sqds.Still at least 6-8 sqds. short,and even these barring the MIG-29UGs will have to be replaced.Had the LCA arrived by now and produced at a healthy rate one would be confident of bridging the gap.If one looks at the strategy of our mortal enemies,they are steadily inducting lesser capable aircraft from local built Flankers to JF-17s,but in larger numbers.They too are inducting their own versions of AEW aircraft,both imported (Sewden) and indigenous (Chinese).One has no idea how much an LCA MK-1 will cost,but surely we could get about 3 for the price of one Rafale .It can't replace the Rafale capability wise,but would keep numbers of aircraft healthy for air defence to deal with the large numbers being fielded by the Sino-Pak JV .Getting the LCA into service is looking more and more truly critical in the long term as an affordable fighter,and should be given the top priority of all our indigenous aviation programmes.A drastic measure to achieve results would be to put the project under the control of the IAF.In fact ,taking a leaf out of the IN's book,the ADA should come under the IAF's wing .But in fact this is not happening.Look at the HAL board issue where the Dy.CoAS has been dumped as a member and is now reportedly only a permanent special invitee.
The situ requires very firm and swift decision making by the Def. Min,but he appears to be truly "deaf" to the crisis,and as Vic has said,"starchy white lungis" appear to be his top priority!
Last edited by Philip on 17 Oct 2013 04:54, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Victor wrote:They are going to HPC and BPC, both PSUs like IOC. Private players are kept out "for security reasons" which raises the question: how can a private company pose a threat that a PSU cannot? So the PSU monopoly remains and the tender is not truly open to ensure the greatest possible savings.RajitO wrote:IAF seems to be on a Jihad against all PSUs
Why not??
A certain airline has a very high percentage of a particular community.
A lot of them are openly inimical of India and Indians, though they are all born in India.
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
I don't think that the IAF is on any jihad because they don't like the look of the PSUs or their bosses,but want delivery of weapon systems promised a very long time ago,but many of which are nowhere on the horizon.Take the IJT for example.It has nursed the Kirans for so long and they've reached the end of their lives.The IJT bit the dust at the 2011 air show,two years have passed and we are told that it has inherent design defects,"spin" problems,etc. If it does not appear within 2 years (which seems most likely as HAL wants to concentrate efforts on the basic trainer instead !),a firang alternative will have to be bought.The LCA is over a decade late.APJAK promised (on the assurance of those involved) in 2003 that "200 would be built by 2010".Not one has been delivered to the IAF a decade later! The aging MIG-21s will now serve for yet another decade,60 years of the type in service.In contrast,look at the Germans.They have just said goodbye to that great fighter,the F-4 Phantom,which has served them for 40 years.How on earth, or in the air is the IAF going to defend the nation's air space and take the battle into enemy territory if it has no replacement aircraft available indigenously? It will be forced to import.
The simple truth is that it cannot be fed anymore on mere promises which can't be kept.In order to improve desi design and production it has suggested using its BRDs as an asset for some work,starting at the bottom of the pile,with the basic trainer production.If we really want to indigenise,then the IAF must be allowed to go the IN way,with its own in-house design and R&D facilities .Absorbing the ADA would be a good step.However,one must ask and examine why the DPSU's have performed so poorly and are also at a crisis right now in absorbing advanced mil-tech. which the off-set policies demand.
In what was probably his last article written,the late great Air Cmde.Jasjit Singh "warrior-scholar",in VAYU (The challenge of indigenisation-The case of the aircraft industry) has given us a comprehensive review going back to the industrial revolution.Some brief points:
Our erstwhile colonial rulers did not industrialise the colonies,but used their resources to industrialise at home.We were given fading industries like textiles,etc. Post Independence,there was a debate about the direction we had to take.Fortunately we went in for a mixed economy which gave us the base built up over several decades,which has given us much socio-economic development.
In indigenisation of military weapons,we have lagged behind given our emphasis on "cutting edge" tech.We have been too theoretical rather than the practical application of theoretical knowledge.This echoes Prof. Das' oft repeated emphasis on our low knowledge of aircraft engineering.The bit about the LCA's engine taking 2 days to replace due to complicated connections with other components,is a case in point.JS adds that we have had to "condense" centuries of industrial dev. without any great resources barring our human resources which the imperialists used to colonise other nations from Fiji to s.America providing cheap (virtual slave) labour. The greatest "exploitation" was the millions of Indian soldiers who fought these "imperialist wars".Therefore he says,we must keep in view the handicap which we have had in our attempts to indigenise.
Coming to HAL post Independence,it started off on the right vector.(1)Indigenous design and dev. even getting foreign help (Dr. Tank),(2) licensed production right down to nuts and bolts,and (3) direct imports of urgent and high-tech items to meet operational requirements.He says that the last two items have coalesced.Licensed assembly and production of systems designed abroad of which
HAL had no access to.TOT actually meant "production technology".Even minor changes could not be made to MIGs independently without the approval /involvement of Russia. The Chinese thieves simply "stole" the design and reverse-engineeered it ,why they don't get the top versions anymore of Russian wares.
The triple process and second factor,licence production,recd. a huge boost when the IAF was authorised to expand from 24 to 64 sqds. Since Russia also did not expect forex in payment but goods on barter,it helped a lot as Soviet tech improved catching up with western counterparts.Moscow then offered even long-term credits at very low interest rates to ensure a long and steady supply of consumer goods and commodities.We strangely however set up an engine plant in the backwoods of Koraput where not even a rail link or airfield existed and the aircraft plant at Nasik! This involved thousands of trucks hauling engines,etc.,adding to costs and inefficiency.The negative part was that licence production dominated and successive govts. became complacent.Efforts to diversify supply came down to two sources,the Soviets and two European manufacturers.Piecemeal acquisitions (Jaguars) added to cost escalations no economies of scale.None of these ventures was converted into JVs nor was design data transferred as part of the contracts preventing us from even improving the design at home.(Here one must ask who was to blame? Surely the myopia of the MOD/DPSUs,as it ultimately is the MOD that firms up the details of the contract once the type.model is selected by the end user. )The major casualty of this was indigenous design and development.This is the foundation of self-reliance.The other two processes best serve as interim measures until we reached self-reliance in the former.This has thus been a "one-legged" effort.he adds that "it will be a very long time before an Indian pilot flies a modern Indian designed aircraft (he could hear loud noises about the LCA,but it proves his point).
The LCA: Conceived in '79-'80 as an incremental low-cost fighter for battlefield support to land forces to replace the MIG-21 beginning '85-'86,450 to serve as the "workhorse" of the IAF,as Mr.Arun Singh used to say.The MIG-21 had 3 key deficits which needed to be resolved in the new aircraft.(1) repositioning of the engine air intake from the nose to the fuselage sides for bird strike reasons.25% of our crashes were due to this factor.(2)to install a batter modern interception radar in the nose and and HUD ,the nose now being free of constraints.(3) Cockpit AC.The MIG-21s came with only a heating system for use at high alts.,whereas in our context,temps. soared at low level,over 70 deg. within two mins of take-offs.Pilots lost an average of 3.5kg in a 40 min. sortie!
The MIG-21 also had 475kg of ballast spread in the front fuselage for COG in the partially unstable design.Limited range and payload,like most Soviet aircraft,defensive in orientation,but available at low cost and in large numbers.had one been able to use the 475kg for fuel,would've dramatically improved the aircraft's capability.
Unfortunately,the '80s were spent "hyping" the std. of preparation and ASRs to make it the (wet) dream of a fighter pilot.There was a vicious tussle as to who would head the project.The typical desi compromise.The ADA set up under the DRDO (for financial regulation) which milked HAL's designers and engineers.3 decades after the HF-24,the only HAL designed aircraft,the LCA has finally started to move ahead with the design feasibility that the IAF had major difficulties with.During the 3 decades,tech advanced rapidly,"the design team of Dr.Tank had retired,and in the absence of institutional memory,the same mistakes committed in the HF-24 were repeated in the LCA." In short in 2013,the LCA has yet to reach its IOC even though the IAF have placed an order for 40 aircraft demonstrating its committment.With a new engine,the GE-414,significant design changes and extensive development processes have to be undergone.The lessons:
1.Design and Dev. the foundation for indigenisation and self-reliance.
2.HAL's Design Division has been "emasculated" over decades,to the extent that we are importing an ab-initio trainer after a lapse of 4 years.
3.The marginalisation of HAL achieved by establishing the ADA under the DRDO.The stakeholders are increasingly the MOD/Govt. and not the IAF.
4."Combat level of the IAF facing an unprecedented 24% drop."
5.What was true at the time of Independence is true today.The IAF is the primary stakeholder in the aircraft and systems acquired in defending the country.
6.The IAF is expected to increase force levels to 42 sqds. by 2022 and poss. 49 by 2030 or so.
If this is true,why shouldn't the IAF be more involved in design,development and acquisition of systems needed for it to function at shirt notice,against immense odds and yet win the wars of the nation? If the answer is "yes",then how can it be achieved.The answer,the IN model.
That's for later.
The simple truth is that it cannot be fed anymore on mere promises which can't be kept.In order to improve desi design and production it has suggested using its BRDs as an asset for some work,starting at the bottom of the pile,with the basic trainer production.If we really want to indigenise,then the IAF must be allowed to go the IN way,with its own in-house design and R&D facilities .Absorbing the ADA would be a good step.However,one must ask and examine why the DPSU's have performed so poorly and are also at a crisis right now in absorbing advanced mil-tech. which the off-set policies demand.
In what was probably his last article written,the late great Air Cmde.Jasjit Singh "warrior-scholar",in VAYU (The challenge of indigenisation-The case of the aircraft industry) has given us a comprehensive review going back to the industrial revolution.Some brief points:
Our erstwhile colonial rulers did not industrialise the colonies,but used their resources to industrialise at home.We were given fading industries like textiles,etc. Post Independence,there was a debate about the direction we had to take.Fortunately we went in for a mixed economy which gave us the base built up over several decades,which has given us much socio-economic development.
In indigenisation of military weapons,we have lagged behind given our emphasis on "cutting edge" tech.We have been too theoretical rather than the practical application of theoretical knowledge.This echoes Prof. Das' oft repeated emphasis on our low knowledge of aircraft engineering.The bit about the LCA's engine taking 2 days to replace due to complicated connections with other components,is a case in point.JS adds that we have had to "condense" centuries of industrial dev. without any great resources barring our human resources which the imperialists used to colonise other nations from Fiji to s.America providing cheap (virtual slave) labour. The greatest "exploitation" was the millions of Indian soldiers who fought these "imperialist wars".Therefore he says,we must keep in view the handicap which we have had in our attempts to indigenise.
Coming to HAL post Independence,it started off on the right vector.(1)Indigenous design and dev. even getting foreign help (Dr. Tank),(2) licensed production right down to nuts and bolts,and (3) direct imports of urgent and high-tech items to meet operational requirements.He says that the last two items have coalesced.Licensed assembly and production of systems designed abroad of which
HAL had no access to.TOT actually meant "production technology".Even minor changes could not be made to MIGs independently without the approval /involvement of Russia. The Chinese thieves simply "stole" the design and reverse-engineeered it ,why they don't get the top versions anymore of Russian wares.
The triple process and second factor,licence production,recd. a huge boost when the IAF was authorised to expand from 24 to 64 sqds. Since Russia also did not expect forex in payment but goods on barter,it helped a lot as Soviet tech improved catching up with western counterparts.Moscow then offered even long-term credits at very low interest rates to ensure a long and steady supply of consumer goods and commodities.We strangely however set up an engine plant in the backwoods of Koraput where not even a rail link or airfield existed and the aircraft plant at Nasik! This involved thousands of trucks hauling engines,etc.,adding to costs and inefficiency.The negative part was that licence production dominated and successive govts. became complacent.Efforts to diversify supply came down to two sources,the Soviets and two European manufacturers.Piecemeal acquisitions (Jaguars) added to cost escalations no economies of scale.None of these ventures was converted into JVs nor was design data transferred as part of the contracts preventing us from even improving the design at home.(Here one must ask who was to blame? Surely the myopia of the MOD/DPSUs,as it ultimately is the MOD that firms up the details of the contract once the type.model is selected by the end user. )The major casualty of this was indigenous design and development.This is the foundation of self-reliance.The other two processes best serve as interim measures until we reached self-reliance in the former.This has thus been a "one-legged" effort.he adds that "it will be a very long time before an Indian pilot flies a modern Indian designed aircraft (he could hear loud noises about the LCA,but it proves his point).
The LCA: Conceived in '79-'80 as an incremental low-cost fighter for battlefield support to land forces to replace the MIG-21 beginning '85-'86,450 to serve as the "workhorse" of the IAF,as Mr.Arun Singh used to say.The MIG-21 had 3 key deficits which needed to be resolved in the new aircraft.(1) repositioning of the engine air intake from the nose to the fuselage sides for bird strike reasons.25% of our crashes were due to this factor.(2)to install a batter modern interception radar in the nose and and HUD ,the nose now being free of constraints.(3) Cockpit AC.The MIG-21s came with only a heating system for use at high alts.,whereas in our context,temps. soared at low level,over 70 deg. within two mins of take-offs.Pilots lost an average of 3.5kg in a 40 min. sortie!
The MIG-21 also had 475kg of ballast spread in the front fuselage for COG in the partially unstable design.Limited range and payload,like most Soviet aircraft,defensive in orientation,but available at low cost and in large numbers.had one been able to use the 475kg for fuel,would've dramatically improved the aircraft's capability.
Unfortunately,the '80s were spent "hyping" the std. of preparation and ASRs to make it the (wet) dream of a fighter pilot.There was a vicious tussle as to who would head the project.The typical desi compromise.The ADA set up under the DRDO (for financial regulation) which milked HAL's designers and engineers.3 decades after the HF-24,the only HAL designed aircraft,the LCA has finally started to move ahead with the design feasibility that the IAF had major difficulties with.During the 3 decades,tech advanced rapidly,"the design team of Dr.Tank had retired,and in the absence of institutional memory,the same mistakes committed in the HF-24 were repeated in the LCA." In short in 2013,the LCA has yet to reach its IOC even though the IAF have placed an order for 40 aircraft demonstrating its committment.With a new engine,the GE-414,significant design changes and extensive development processes have to be undergone.The lessons:
1.Design and Dev. the foundation for indigenisation and self-reliance.
2.HAL's Design Division has been "emasculated" over decades,to the extent that we are importing an ab-initio trainer after a lapse of 4 years.
3.The marginalisation of HAL achieved by establishing the ADA under the DRDO.The stakeholders are increasingly the MOD/Govt. and not the IAF.
4."Combat level of the IAF facing an unprecedented 24% drop."
5.What was true at the time of Independence is true today.The IAF is the primary stakeholder in the aircraft and systems acquired in defending the country.
6.The IAF is expected to increase force levels to 42 sqds. by 2022 and poss. 49 by 2030 or so.
If this is true,why shouldn't the IAF be more involved in design,development and acquisition of systems needed for it to function at shirt notice,against immense odds and yet win the wars of the nation? If the answer is "yes",then how can it be achieved.The answer,the IN model.
That's for later.
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- BRFite
- Posts: 598
- Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14
Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013
Valid point, in the short term. However breaking the PSU monopoly is only possible once the IAF has provided a fig leaf that it did all it could to give the PSUs a chance. Take even the BRD "threat" -- it's a way to rattle the cages and tell folks that the status quo is not acceptable.Victor wrote:They are going to HPC and BPC, both PSUs like IOC. Private players are kept out "for security reasons" which raises the question: how can a private company pose a threat that a PSU cannot? So the PSU monopoly remains and the tender is not truly open to ensure the greatest possible savings.RajitO wrote:IAF seems to be on a Jihad against all PSUs
....despite DPSUs stooping to all time lows by commissioning hatchet jobs on service chiefs by journalists steeped in similar levels of mediocrity.Philip wrote:I don't think that the IAF is on any jihad because they don't like the look of the PSUs or their bosses,but want delivery of weapon systems promised a very long time ago,but many of which are nowhere on the horizon.
By default or not, I think the IAF is definitely working to a big picture plan now. It is reasonably happy to incorporate desi tech in MKI, Jaguars etc. but has no time or cash anymore to spend on empire building masquerading as nation building.
Ironically, such a position requires the IAF to develop a specialized "Acquisitions" cadre and sub-organizations, where unlike the Navy it has been complacent and apathetic (Army is a joke altogether in this respect.)
Of course, the rubber will really meet the road when some of the more advanced military MRO operations from foreign-led JVs start cutting into the turf of BRD type set-ups.