Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

[Screambowl]

Pakistanis are desparate for high profile successes now. The hard hitback on LOC has rattled them. They want to push current GOI on backfoot in return - we can hurt you too. To do this, they are willing to even train JEM/LET cadre in AFB attack running the risk of some of these cadre defecting to anti Pak mil units

More attacks are a given.

[/quote]

Pakis do firing at LOC to give cover for their infiltrating operatives. It does not matter, whether we silence their guns or they do to ours.
The terrorists have managed to sneak inside our territory and they have succeeded and carrying out attacks. I agreed with you, if some one is thinking that these attacks are to destroy infrastructure. Then I am afraid that we are wrong.

They gave the message that they will hit us again and again and Kashmir has to be discussed. They came to die , so killing them must not be boasted.We don't do the same, well because we cannot do like them. As that will invite more attacks in India.

[Karan M]

>>Pakis do firing at LOC to give cover for their infiltrating operatives. It does not matter, whether we silence their guns or they do to ours.

Shastri, it does matter because it damages their infrastructure and also signals India is giving as good as it gets, and more, which was not the case under MMS & co's PMO

What it also means is that a frustrated Pak Army will then ratchet up the ante elsewhere.

Until and unless we hit across in Pakistan, we are playing their game.

[Karan M]

Daksh close up. Gripper details



26/11 - NSG BD trooper uses stick and rope to check for booby traps (caution image is gruesome)

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CXyHL_SU0AET371.jpg

[Screambowl]

>>Pakis do firing at LOC to give cover for their infiltrating operatives. It does not matter, whether we silence their guns or they do to ours.

Shastri, it does matter because it damages their infrastructure and also signals India is giving as good as it gets, and more, which was not the case under MMS & co's PMO

What it also means is that a frustrated Pak Army will then ratchet up the ante elsewhere.

Until and unless we hit across in Pakistan, we are playing their game.

If we see the data, it costs us more than Pakis. We have lost more soldiers and civilians due to shelling and firing across the border. Though at Paki side more civilian population lives close to the border. Plus the terrorists have managed to sneak into our territory. And This is why we see these Pathankot type attacks.

I agree with the point that their military infra is neutralized but in the long term tt is not helping. And in the present we are unable to do anything with the proxy they have created to divert our resources in DEFENDING the attacks and not neutralizing the planners.

How long it's going to take diplomatically, well I doubt it's too long. Of course Modi ji has collected the support from the world through his visits. But it has merely affected the Pakis. They are still adamant and morally high.

[shaun]

For India to retaliate , we need bigger provocation , life of mango man and man in uniform is cheap and all the same in the eyes of our politicians and bureaucrat. The last time India almost retaliated is when parliament was attacked.

in between these are some of the easy things that can be done with minimal investment but will go a long way securing our interest.

1. Restructuring these old military bases around ,gearing up them for asymmetric warfare.
2. A Joint command for all crisis pertaining to our national interest home or abroad where terrorist are involved .
3. Media management . we need to win the propaganda war as well.

[Karan M]

Shastri ji, what data? Which data? Does Pakistan even give out any data?

What we do know is that each time we have responded, the Pakistani Army or its proxies like the Pakistan rangers have come to us, tail between their legs.

So quite frankly, this is wrong: "We have lost more soldiers and civilians due to shelling and firing across the border. " The Pakistanis lose more soldiers than we do, when we hit back hard.

Which is why events like Pathankot are their attempt to score one and force us to the negotiating table.

[Karan M]

For India to retaliate , we need bigger provocation , life of mango man and man in uniform is cheap and all the same in the eyes of our politicians and bureaucrat. The last time India almost retaliated is when parliament was attacked.

in between these are some of the easy things that can be done with minimal investment but will go a long way securing our interest.

1. Restructuring these old military bases around ,gearing up them for asymmetric warfare.
2. A Joint command for all crisis pertaining to our national interest home or abroad where terrorist are involved .
3. Media management . we need to win the propaganda war as well.

almost, being the key word. under a nuclear overhang and with decades of mismanagement (aka relative conventional balance not being what it was), politicians develop cold feet.

[ShauryaT]

If Garuds were deployed to make first contact, does it mean NSG was not there at the base at that time. If NSG were there then decision to deploy only 12 Garuds needs some explanation. I am still under the impression NSG was not there at circa 3 AM at the base.

[disha]

I am surprised that this is not discussed here:

Modi gives Badmash 72 hours deadline to respond!

http://www.firstpost.com/india/well-don ... 74972.html

[shaun]

The politicians developed cold feet for several reasons
a) Some politicians are compromised to foreign powers .
b) Afraid of sanctions from International communities.
c) Greed for International recognation like our Pandit
d) politicians who can't "
... differentiate a mortar from a motor .."
e) politicians who knows the short comings but still sits on the problems be it financing or bureaucratic loop holes .
f) Weak Generals

[chetak]

If Garuds were deployed to make first contact, does it mean NSG was not there at the base at that time. If NSG were there then decision to deploy only 12 Garuds needs some explanation. I am still under the impression NSG was not there at circa 3 AM at the base.

I have said this before in answer to a similar question. The NSG was not at the point of initial contact but a just little away from there and very much on the base.

The NSG may not have been as optimally placed as the Garuds were at the time, in relation to the target hence first contact by the Garud team.

[chetak]

Shastri ji, what data? Which data? Does Pakistan even give out any data?

What we do know is that each time we have responded, the Pakistani Army or its proxies like the Pakistan rangers have come to us, tail between their legs.

So quite frankly, this is wrong: "We have lost more soldiers and civilians due to shelling and firing across the border. " The Pakistanis lose more soldiers than we do, when we hit back hard.

Which is why events like Pathankot are their attempt to score one and force us to the negotiating table.

we were already at the negotiating table. NSAs and FSs were getting chummy, Modi had already payr cho--oed good sharif's mummy. FMs were already on first name terms.

or are you saying that they mean, put cashmere on the table ASAP and loose the rest of the agenda??

[shaun]

If Garuds were deployed to make first contact, does it mean NSG was not there at the base at that time. If NSG were there then decision to deploy only 12 Garuds needs some explanation. I am still under the impression NSG was not there at circa 3 AM at the base.

NSGs were guarding the technical area and also evacuating people from non technical area. Garud made 1st contact because their mandate say so , SAR for downed pilots and Base security . I am more baffled by the way they got pinned down by those pigs after even knowing their location. Garuds are highly trained and they have the latest gizmos which can even put NSG to shame. But those gizmos with them shown on tv shows may be rationed through out the units . What they uniformly have is BPJs and fire power , equipment like NVG of latest Gen , HHTI and ROV should be in adequate supply ,

[ShauryaT]

Shaun: Thanks for the information. If it is not too much, please link the source of this information that at time of first contact NSG was tasked with guarding technical area. So, to understand correctly, there were 150 NSG at the base, 900-1000 Army men but 12 Garuds were sent to make first contact? Is that correct?

[ramana]

Parvin Swami graphic shows NSG deployed in critical areas. Contact happened elsewhere.




NSG deployed at AF staff homes and Technical Area.

Combat happened at DSC mess area.

So what rubbish about NSG should not have been deployed!

[chetak]

this is the one guy who gets it.

Amit ‏@different_take Jan 4

On analysis of the reactions on Pathankot. I feel there is a reason why we have sawa crore devi-devtas. That is the min needed to save us

8 retweets 9 likes

[Screambowl]

Shastri ji, what data? Which data? Does Pakistan even give out any data?
What we do know is that each time we have responded, the Pakistani Army or its proxies like the Pakistan rangers have come to us, tail between their legs.
So quite frankly, this is wrong: "We have lost more soldiers and civilians due to shelling and firing across the border. " The Pakistanis lose more soldiers than we do, when we hit back hard.
Which is why events like Pathankot are their attempt to score one and force us to the negotiating table.

Wiki is not very authentic, but when we have no credible source then wiki is approx data. It is on wiki.
Any how, Pakistan has once again proved that they are adamant. And will talk only when Kashmir is discussed.

[Philip]

Have we considered the poss. that the pigs had local support/mules who may have provided or carried prt of their explosives meant to blow up the aircraft? The alleged drug smuggling connection could've been used for logistic purposes.

[Shameek]

Have we considered the poss. that the pigs had local support/mules who may have provided or carried prt of their explosives meant to blow up the aircraft? The alleged drug smuggling connection could've been used for logistic purposes.

The article below questions if they had inside knowledge as well. I would suggest staying out of the comments section to avoid raising ones BP.

Link

Sources said that the two groups of terrorists exactly knew the meeting point inside the Airbase raising suspicion that a prior detailed recce of the IAF base was done before.
The sources said that investigators will check if inside help was given for this reccee.

[Shameek]

Inside The Pathankot Air Base

Apologies if posted earlier.

Pathankot: Beside a burnt truck in the motor transport section of the Pathankot Air Station, about a kilometer from the imposing, heavily-guarded main gate, lay a crumpled camouflage jacket. This is where Garud commando Gursewak Singh fell fighting terrorists early on Saturday morning.

Not far from there, a group of about 50 commandos of the elite National Security Guards sat on the ground, their weapons on their laps or beside them. Most had removed their masks and none of them was talking.

Their faces betrayed no emotion, only extreme exhaustion. The three-and-a-half day gun battle to eliminate six terrorists who attacked the base had ended only a few hours before.

About a 100 metres away from the motor transport section is a wall of the sprawling air base. In some places it is as high as 10 feet and has concertina wires, a type of barbed wire. In other places, only wiring marks the boundary of the airfield.

Very close to the transport section is a row of neatly painted houses with manicured gardens. These are residential quarters for airmen and their families. On the road in front, chain tracks from armoured vehicles were still fresh. They led to the technical area, where, in an enclosure of about 15 feet by 20 feet neatly marked out by tape, lay the bodies of five terrorists. They were all in green military fatigues.

"There are some dugouts here, part of old structures and had very thick vegetation. Perhaps that is why the terrorists holed up here," a Garud commando in full battle gear, explained to reporters. "We used bulldozers to remove the vegetation as we moved slowly first to corner and then eliminate them."

It was here that Lieutenant Colonel Niranjan Kumar was killed and his buddy seriously injured. A note circulated in the highest levels of the government says, "Lt Col Niranjan died accidentally when handling the dead body of a terrorist."

Most buildings in this part of the base were evacuated. "Had the terrorists got into residential quarters, we could have been looking at a hostage situation and casualties could have been huge," the Garud commando said.

When this reporter asked his name, he smiled and said, "operations are on, we don't wear name or rank tags."

Three blocks of living quarters separate an open ground and the Defence Security Corps (DSC) mess. Four soldiers were killed here when terrorists opened fire. "Havilder Jagdish of the DSC chased a terrorist and grappled with him bare-handed, killing him before he died," Air Commodore J S Dhamoon, who commands the base, said.

Diagonally opposite the DAC mess is the battered two-storied residential building where the last gun battle was fought. A portion of the building came down in the exchange of fire and multiple explosions. Burnt tree parts indicate the intensity of the operation to eliminate the last two terrorists; four had been killed on Saturday.

Firing had suddenly started from the first floor of this building on Monday. Nearly 24 hours later, hundreds of commandos and sniffer dogs were still checking the area for improvised explosive devices and booby traps.

[srai]

Shaun: Thanks for the information. If it is not too much, please link the source of this information that at time of first contact NSG was tasked with guarding technical area. So, to understand correctly, there were 150 NSG at the base, <a href="tel:900-1000">900-1000</a> Army men but 12 Garuds were sent to make first contact? Is that correct?

The timelines are still a bit hazy at this point given partial tit-bits being reported. Most likely the 12 Gaurds were within the vicinity to make first contact and their priority was to channel the terrorists away from the technical and residential areas. This it seems they were able to accomplish but that seems to have forced the terrorists straight towards the DSC mess where most of the casualties occurred. We will need to wait for a more complete timelines.

[Sid]

Looks like only 6 Garuds (3 pairs) made contact. Other 3 pairs per securing other area. 6 vs 4 does not seem like big numerical advantage.

Btw, do Garud force have any ranking scheme. All news seems to refer them as Garud commandos only.

[deejay]

any options in their minds on how to retaliate ?

Apologies, had to log off yesterdin.

Multiple options - the attack helo folks are more integrated with IA so their options include more ground ops. The fighter guys were ofcourse more for precision strike options .

[Screambowl]

So basically it is

NSG was to prevent terrorists taking hostages.

Garuda for assisting the NSG through the AFB for safeguarding the technical facility and eliminate the terrorists.

DSC, because there is man power shortage in SF, DSC looks over the prohibited areas??

[deejay]

So basically it is

NSG was to prevent terrorists taking hostages.

Garuda for assisting the NSG through the AFB for safeguarding the technical facility and eliminate the terrorists.

DSC, because there is man power shortage in SF, DSC looks over the prohibited areas??

You are writing this because you have not read the previous discussions on the thread.

[ramana]

deejay, You think those five bodies are still booby trapped?
Maybe best to demolish them as a hazard.
Don't want more casualties trying to make them safe.

[Singha]

even though its very hot, bulky, heavy its better to make a standard SOP and wear the huge bomb disposal suit and helmet . the khans certainly did that in iraq as per hurt locker! dead terrorists are not so common and we should be able to take the time.

I would imagine they will start inserting sticks of RDX up their posteriors if they sense this is a opportunity to kill more unprotected kafirs using ropes and sticks. bomb disposal experts are valuable resources.

[Kakkaji]

Have we considered the poss. that the pigs had local support/mules who may have provided or carried prt of their explosives meant to blow up the aircraft? The alleged drug smuggling connection could've been used for logistic purposes.

Story by Sujan Dutta in today's Calcutta Telegraph says the following:

1. The terrorists used the drug smuggling ring to infiltrate. The Punjab Police SP went to pick up consignment, but was surprised to see the terrorists as consignment and chickened out. He fed half-truth to superiors.

2. The second lot of 2 terrorists 'may' have been sheltered by someone inside the airbase.

3. The security agencies pooled their strengths and resources. Everyone had an assigned role. There were gaps, but no incompetence.

Can someone please post the full story? I can't right now. TIA

[ramana]

x-posts from GDF....

Command Confusion

COMMAND CONFUSION

The answers, based on the accounts of multiple sources, paint a picture of confusion and a chain of command weighed down by too many generals.

Authorities in Delhi effected three changes of command during the operation in Pathankot in moves that left the field operatives wondering who was actually in charge.

The confusion at the top resulting from the presence of multiple agencies - the air force, army, NSG, BSF and Punjab police - was evident in the dribs and drabs of mixed-messaging from the battlefield, usually through sources from different agencies, some reporting to the defence ministry and some to the home ministry.

Union home secretary Rajeev Mehrishi said in his media briefing on Sunday that the decision on the operation was taken at a meeting chaired by the national security adviser, Ajit Doval, with the service chiefs and the heads of the intelligence agencies on the afternoon of January 1.

The changes were actually effected on the evening and the night of January 1-2, more than 12 hours after New Delhi had received intelligence on the infiltration from Pakistan with inputs that they could attack a high-value target in the Pathankot area.

The area, often called a "chicken's neck" because it is between the border and the Himalaya, is thick with military installations: apart from the air force station itself there are two divisional headquarters of the army, along with their infantry, armoured and artillery brigades.

It is likely that by the afternoon of January 1, one or more of the militants had actually sneaked into the airbase.

The first officer to be put in command of the operations against the killers was Brig. Anupinder Singh Belvi, commander of the Mamoon (51) Brigade, co-located with the Pathankot airbase, under the army's 29 Division.

The brigadier reached the air force station with troops for a recce on the evening of January 1.

Later in the night, about 90 minutes before the first exchange of fire in which the air force commando, Garud Gursewak Singh, was killed, the inspector-general (operations) of the NSG, Maj. Gen. Dushyant Singh, landed in Pathankot with about 160 of his men. They had been despatched from Manesar near Delhi.

NSG AND ARMY

The NSG officer wanted to take command. The brigadier replied he had received no orders to hand over command. Under the rules of business of government, the army almost never operates under a police force.

The NSG describes itself as a federal contingency force. It reports to the Union home ministry. The army reports to the defence ministry.

The confusion was sorted out after the brigadier was told that the NSG would lead the operations and the army was to support it with two columns and a squad of special forces. Accordingly, the brigadier asked for two columns of the 11 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles under their commanding officer and teams of the 1 Para (special forces) to be deployed at the Pathankot airbase.

Special forces are an offensive tactical wing, not expected to be put in charge of defences such as perimeter security. The army was aghast that that was the brief being given to them.

This was about an hour before "first contact", the first sighting of a team of the militants by an air force unmanned aerial vehicle. The army columns were told to take charge of the technical area. That is the area the militants were seeking to enter and could not.

The NSG went scouring the grounds in the less sensitive domestic area for the militants.

The NSG is made up of two wings: the Special Action Group (SAG) and the Special Rangers Group (SRG). The SAG mostly has army personnel seconded to the Union home ministry who are usually deputed for two years. The SRG has mostly select personnel from the central police forces.

Unlike an army special force unit - where soldiers serve in all counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist environments - the NSG is usually not used as a first responder. Its training is mostly oriented to operations in urban built-up areas.

The army brigadier, the first responder in Pathankot, had to hand over command not only on orders from above but also to an officer who was superior in rank to him, the major general with the NSG. Maj. Gen. Dushyant Singh is himself quite familiar with the zone. He was the commander of the 26 division in Jammu before his current assignment.

Around 10 in the morning of January 2, by when the air force commando, Gursewak, had been killed while trying to defend an entrance into the technical area, the senior-most air force officer in the region reached the air force station: Air Marshal S.B. Deo, the chief of the Western Air Command, headquartered in New Delhi. An air marshal is the equivalent of a lieutenant general, senior to a major general. Also, Pathankot was in his area of responsibility.

The immediate responsibility for the air station vests with Air Commodore Jagmeet Singh Dhamoon, the air officer commanding.

The air marshal is a distinguished fighter pilot who was director-general (air operations) before taking over as the air officer commanding-in-chief of the Western Air Command. The securitisation of the Pathankot air force station, however, was a ground operation. In effect, both the brigadier and the major general were junior to him.

Not to be outdone, also on the afternoon of January 2, the director-general of the NSG - the major general's immediate boss - R.C. Tayal, landed in Pathankot. The officers who were immediately in Pathankot or in the vicinity of the air force station, the brigadier and the air commodore, had more than one senior watching them on the field.

The Border Security Force (BSF), under the Union home ministry, did not want to be left out of the action. It also despatched a deputy inspector-general (border range) to the air force station.

The confusion created by the presence of so many uniformed luminaries in the field of battle - too many generals - was reflected at the political level, unsurprisingly.

On the evening of January 2, Union home minister Rajnath Singh tweeted, after being fed information from the wings under his ministry, that he was extending his congratulations to the forces because they had successfully neutralised five attackers. Later, the home minister had to delete his tweet.

In the event, the encounter continued for 30 more hours.

[Screambowl]

So basically it is

NSG was to prevent terrorists taking hostages.

Garuda for assisting the NSG through the AFB for safeguarding the technical facility and eliminate the terrorists.

DSC, because there is man power shortage in SF, DSC looks over the prohibited areas??

You are writing this because you have not read the previous discussions on the thread.

From the status of their job and arms they carry to prevent the sabotage, it obviously looks like, either there is weapon shortage or they don't care about the lives of these ex servicemen. This is a ''chalta hai'' attitude and honest observation.

[ramana]

Kakkaji Here:

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1160108/j ... o8c6jJIios

'Drug-terror nexus' in Pathankot

SUJAN DUTTA

IF ONLY THIS WAS DONE ON JANUARY 1


Security forces scour Bhullaechak Colony near Tibri Cantonment in Gurdaspur, less than 50km from Pathankot, on Thursday after a farmer said on Wednesday that he saw two men in army fatigues moving in a suspicious manner. The army and police are carrying out joint combing operations. “We are not taking any chance. All vehicles and people, in and around the area, are being physically checked,” Gurdaspur senior superintendent of police Gurpreet Singh Toor said. (PTI)

New Delhi, Jan. 7: The militants who attacked the Pathankot Air Force base tapped into drug-smuggling channels to carry out the raid, according to an assessment in the security establishment in New Delhi.

The security agencies are also probing an explosive element: whether one of the two squads of attackers, carrying heavy weapons, was "sheltered" inside the base, an executive familiar with the security assessment said.



The investigation is taking into account the nature of the terrain around the Shakargarh Bulge through which the Ravi river flows in and out of Pakistan bordering northern Punjab. Long stretches of the international boundary in the zone are not fenced.

The region has a history of being used to traffic contraband drugs. Local officials have been bribed by smugglers.

In the marriage of narcotics smuggling and terrorism, one line of investigation is probing whether a Punjab security official was lured into being an accomplice of the attackers.


He may have been lured by a combination of money and flesh but when he went to receive the consignment, the "package" turned out to be a gang of gun-wielding terrorists. That made him turn chicken and report to a superior with a half-truth, not the full story, the investigators suspect.

These disclosures were made when a security assessment was shared with a handful of journalists, including this correspondent, to challenge a perception that there was doubtful synergy in the chain of command during the Pathankot operation.

The alleged nexus between the drug mafia and politicians in Punjab has been a festering issue in the past few years. The Congress has consistently accused the Parkash Singh Badal government, which is partnering the BJP, of being hand in glove with drug cartels.

Last year Jagdish Singh Bhola, a former DSP, was booked in a Rs 600-crore synthetic drug scam. Bhola had named Bikram Singh Majithia, the state's revenue minister as well as the younger brother of Union minister Harsimrat Kaur Badal, the daughter-in-law of chief minister Badal.

Bhola had alleged that the drug trade was being run with the minister's patronage. Majithia's name figured in the Enforcement Directorate's chargesheet filed in Delhi's Patiala House court in February last year. According to the chargesheet, Majithia received Rs 35 lakh from a key accused as "election fund" between 2007 and 2012.

Majithia had denied his involvement in the scam, saying it was a conspiracy to malign him and the state government.

Central security agencies suspect druglords aided and abetted by a section of Punjab police and politicians have been providing logistics support to militants as soon as they cross the border, less than 30km from Pathankot.

Contacted today by this newspaper, Punjab education minister Daljit Singh Cheema refused to comment.

The border region is notorious for its heroin trails. In 2014, the BSF seized 370kg of heroin from the area. Till August last year, the seizure was 240kg.

Pathankot used to be part of Gurdaspur district but was later carved out as a separate district.

Surrounded by paddy fields, most of the villages in both districts are well connected to cities by roads. Amid multi-storey houses that suggest a certain degree of prosperity, one facility stands out in Pathankot town: a drug de-addiction centre.

Most of the occupants are said to be aged between 18 and 25. "During the militancy in the 1980s, thousands of young people were killed and reported missing. Now, the drug trade is killing the young," Manjit Singh, a primary school teacher in Pathankot, said.

Official perspective

In order to tackle the terrorists, the government deep-selected army commandos below the age of 30 years serving with the National Security Guard (NSG) and flew them to Pathankot.

Maj. Gen. Dushyant Singh, the inspector-general (operations) of the NSG, was deliberately placed in command because he had served in the region and also because he was the senior-most of the operational officers. Nine columns of the army were also deployed.

The review of the operations so far says the army and the NSG shared responsibility. Just as the NSG does not have equipment - like Cassipir mine-protected vehicles and BMPs (troop-carriers armed with cannons) - the army does not have some of the specialised weapons with the NSG, such as stun grenades. They were asked to pool in resources.

Air Marshal S.B. Deo, the western air chief, was asked to coordinate the movement of forces to limit casualties that could have occurred in the event of crossfires. The coordination was required because of multiple agencies that were deployed in the same counter-terrorist mission.

"Everyone was doing what he was best at. You cannot call it a mistake of planning or decision-making," the executive familiar with the assessment said, presenting a perspective from within the security establishment.


"There may have been a fault in training or execution. The first advantage in such a situation is always with the attacker. So after they attacked the DSC (Defence Security Corps) and killed them, we knew where they were and we confined them to a small space. Often, you have to take a decision. And the decision was taken promptly on January 1 itself. Everyone was on board. Right or wrong, we cannot be faulted for being indecisive," said the executive.

The assessment regards the operations on the night of January 2 as crucial. These were conducted after Union home Minister Rajnath Singh had tweeted (and later deleted the tweet) that five militants had been killed and that operations were drawing to a close. In reality, four had been killed by then but their bodies had not been taken into custody.

The force commander was advised to switch on all floodlights, including the headlights of vehicles, inside the base. The forces were also asked to open fire every 15 minutes or so through the night, whether they spotted the attackers or not.

The next firefight was also near the DSC guardroom, which showed that the tactic worked. "The idea was to tell the terrorists that we are here and we want you to know that we are here," said the executive.

Additional reporting by Imran Ahmed Siddiqui in Pathankot

[Singha]

it would be quite plausible per countless mumbai movies to use a police vehicle with a uniformed senior officer riding to bypass all road checkpoints. it would be ideal way to move drugs around.
same goes for any other country - a police checkpoint will not search their own police vehicle if a known officer is driving it.

[ramana]

Is the Punjab Police SP now like The Police Commissioner Hasan Gafoor (?) who waited it out in his jeep during 26/11.

[ramana]

Link:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 1#p1959821

Patting myself on back!!!

kenop, Tell me more about NJS. We are ignoring a major thing here. If NJS is last point on the border what was the SP doing there?

I think the SP carjack story is all hogwash.
The SP went to pick up the perpetrators who he thought were usual drug smugglers. Meanwhile at 3:00 AM the 'drug smugglers' turned out to be terrorists and dumped him. Didn't kill him as he was a compromised asset.

Man Singh and SBajwa please what are your thoughts?

SunilUpa could very well be as its now clear there were two teams. We are looking for single explanation to the events.

So taxi hijack is another team.

RV?

[Screambowl]

Is the Punjab Police SP now like The Police Commissioner Hasan Gafoor (?) who waited it out in his jeep during 26/11.

Hypothetically: He could be the local point of contact for terrorists , which was intentionally planted by IB/RAW to lure the ISI operatives.

[habal]

BPJ have anti-ballistic plates in front and back. Garud commando didn't know paki concept of 2 teams, ome engages forces and the other waits at 9 o'clock or 3 o'clock silently and doesn't engage the opposition but waits for a good, clean shot. So most bullets to abdomen & chest could have been side shots.

btw when alert came at Jan 1 that base was to be attacked and terrorists had penetrated. What were DSC doing cooking non-chalently. Shouldn't they be hunkered down and opt for some MRE till all-clear was sounded.

[deejay]

Habal ji, 60 -70 DSC personnel. This was the DSC mess. Food / Tea and other eats would be getting ready round the clock. It was early winter morning and because most were out there were only 04/05 in the cook house. The Op lasted 80 hrs. You don't think they would not rotate / eat in between?

[shaun]

From all the information that have poured in , till date , It can be rightly assumed , the responders to this attack did their level best to mitigate this crisis in best way possible with what ever resources they could master in this scenario.There should not be any doubt about it. Paras , NSG , Garuds and regular infantry thats the most lethal mix of operators , geared for any eventualities. In a more tactical level , after the pigs were spotted inside the base , Garuds were deployed to neutralize them , they achieved in containment of those varmints with casualties but failed to neutralize them if reports are to be believed. This is the youngest of all the SFs but geared and trained for this type of situations , some where i feel they could have done better but no doubt they are bravest of the braves. Salute.


For mango people , the perception is , if we didn't have intel of an impending attack and we fail then there is still room for leniency but if we have prior intel to an attack and we fail , then full question mark for Govt . And that perception is enhanced by our DDM , propped up by compromised and egoistic retd generals and poor media management.

[shaun]

Shaun: Thanks for the information. If it is not too much, please link the source of this information that at time of first contact NSG was tasked with guarding technical area. So, to understand correctly, there were 150 NSG at the base, 900-1000 Army men but 12 Garuds were sent to make first contact? Is that correct?

Well , do you think , the whole contingent of NSG , ARMY and GARUD , will chant AOA and charge those pigs ???!!!!!!!
Every one have a specific duty to perform. As per information , after those pigs were spotted , GARUDS were sent to neutralize them.

BPJ have anti-ballistic plates in front and back. Garud commando didn't know paki concept of 2 teams, ome engages forces and the other waits at 9 o'clock or 3 o'clock silently and doesn't engage the opposition but waits for a good, clean shot. So most bullets to abdomen & chest could have been side shots.

btw when alert came at Jan 1 that base was to be attacked and terrorists had penetrated. What were DSC doing cooking non-chalently. Shouldn't they be hunkered down and opt for some MRE till all-clear was sounded.

How come you know , GARUDS are illiterate to that concept , they might have made some error , was it due to tactics or non availability of equipment like NVG and HHTI , we don't know , but they were successful in containment of those varmints.

Its a sprawling campus with 24 km of perimeter fence , even if you know , there is some impending attack , you can't make people stop eating and shitting .

[Screambowl]

Its a sprawling campus with 24 km of perimeter fence , even if you know , there is some impending attack , you can't make people stop eating and shitting .

what about the 6 terrorists , where would they be eating and shitting during attack?