India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008

[Sanatanan]

I came across these two blog articles parsing the NSG Waiver and the 123 Agreement, from the one of the comments in SV's blog. Can't say I understood all of it in the first reading, but think they are interesting enough to merit a more detailed read.

Comparison of the NSG drafts and what is it for India (Sunday, August 24, 2008)

A Critical Analysis Of India - US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (Tuesday, May 20, 2008)

[NRao]

It is imperative to remember that India will be where she was at the start IF this entire scheme fails. Not a very big deal from that PoV. So, there is really no point in trying to get back at anyone from a nuclear PoV. Georgia to most is not a surprise - it was a "When" and not "If". The ensuing escalation too is not a surprise, it should get "worse". But, it should not impact India and her aspirations (from a defence PoV - MRCA, P-8I, etc).

Having said that India, IMHO, should get the deal. They will kick-the-can - they have got very good at that.

[Sanatanan]

It is imperative to remember that India will be where she was at the start IF this entire scheme fails.

My opinion is that India was in fact better off with the earlier porous so-called 'technology denial regime'. Post aborted-deal, NSG countries may make it that much more difficult for India to buy equipment and components from them.

As a result of some people's avarice to import technology at all costs, India has now got into this quagmire and might find itself unable to extricate itself.

Notwithstanding the above, a so-called falied-deal may be a blessing in disguise for Indian technology.

[sraj]

And is this a good enough reason to make the strategic concessions that India has already made, or which are currently on the table?

In my opinion, not at all!

(I take it that your question is meant to be rhetorical.)

Sanatanan: it was rhetorical, and you answered it.

The value of this deal to India has been successively whittled down at each stage since J18.

India does not need to make strategic concessions for the equvalent of 'peanuts'. No shame in acknowledging that we got led down the garden path, and are wiser from the experience.

[pradeepe]

IMVHO, thinking that we are being led down the garden path is not the right approach. A more appropriate analogy is one of a business deal where each party negotiates and haggles at every step and if the other side allows an opening will not mind clobbering him.

The option to walk out is always there, and so was the option to quiver in fear of the big bad world out there and sit quarantined inside the hut as was being proposed not too long ago. Every party walks in with its redlines, the real ones btw are never announced. Try closing a business deal in India and announce your "real" redlines up front. For outside watchers with no inside information but significant stake, this is surely an agonising process.

[sraj]

b) sraj said "That is why I have argued on several occasions that India's membership of the UNSC on par with the P-5 is the only way to mitigate the risk of self-interested interpretation/resolution of a dispute by a UNSC whose members will naturally be driven by their geo-political interests."



Dream on!

Read my lips:

India would never be able to join the UNSC on par with the P-5. This anachronistic thinking of the desis that there is a possibility that they can join the p5 at that level is appalling IMO. Sheesh!

The only way India can contribute to that end is to make sure the UNSC is destroyed not support it and beg to join in.

Manny: good points. Let me clarify what I was trying to get to:

In most such things, one needs to follow a two-step process.

1. Establish a clear objective, with the underlying reasoning.

2. Chart out a course to achieve objective taking into account current realities in a dispassionate manner.

"On par with P-5" (actually, P-2 or 3) is meant to be understood in terms of the real world and what getting there will take. UNSC (or whatever the name is at any point in time) will inevitably reflect that reality in its own good time.

"Current realities" - which you rightly allude to above - should provide a litmus test to evaluate whether India should sign ambiguous agreements which will be interpreted by others in their self-interest when the chips are down (in other words, should we do a repeat of Nehru's Kashmir UN folly, believing in the strength of your case and the goodness of others!). They provide a framework for key national security decisions, ensuring that the "full costs" of any action are recognized and taken into account, thus putting into proper perspective the "benefits" on offer. And without the bravado of how we will be so strong in the future that no one will mess with us -- why don't we focus on systematically getting there first instead of signing away crucial degrees of freedom for "peanuts"?.

And, oh, btw........begging is not meant to be one of the options under 2 above. also, I agree with some of the suggestions you make in your post about the way to get to 1.

Let me repost part of my original post which started this particular discussion:

We need to closely study Chinese actions and behavior over the past two decades and why the West practically begged them to join all these groups as a way of trying to encourage China into becoming 'a responsible stakeholder in the international system'.

[pradeepe]

Be practical and realistic and not live in an idealistic dreamy self delusional world that India has lived for the better part of the last 60 years.

Manny, infact I would argue just the opposite. Most of my experience has been that folks in India have over the years been nothing but just that. And if I were to pick a fault, just for the heck of it and probably not grounded in reality itself, it would be that they havent dreamt enough.

I find myself nodding in agreement with your approach. Our path forward should be in rebuilding a new order from the ashes of the old. Can't beg our way into the dilapidated and crumbling structures. They will likely collapse under their own hubris, we could send a collective 1.2 billion farts their way to help expedite the process. Of course I fully expect the arundhatis and the bidwais trying to hold back the gale with their own breeze

[RajeshA]

...and the voices grow louder.

Doubts in Delhi over US clout in NSG by Arati R Jerath: Daily News and Analysis India

Government circles are quite rattled by the extent of opposition that the India waiver encountered at the August 22 meeting of the NSG in Vienna. The Indians had expected only token resistance. Instead they came up against a joint front of six opposing nations.
These nations were strongly supported by two others and a dozen or so more countries expressed quiet reservations. That’s almost half of the 45-member grouping.

The debacle has led to a deep sense of frustration and disappointment that Washington has not delivered on its promise to get India an “unconditional” waiver from the NSG to engage in international nuclear commerce. It’s also sparked off fears that the Bush administration’s clout may be waning, internationally and domestically, and that ultimately, the present US government may not even be able to get the 123 agreement approved by its Congress before it adjourns for the November presidential polls.

Even if India accepts the second draft, or in other words, India and US agree to a second draft, the second draft, one can assume, would surely prescribe more conditions on India than the first draft. The NSG Meeting on Sept. 4,5 can fail regardless of further conditions.

1. It can fail because all of a sudden US realizes that considering that the chances of a passage in the US Congress are dim, the Administration is not too keen anymore in pressing for a Waiver.
2. It can fail because George Bush's clout at the NSG may be receding by the day.
3. It can fail because the Administration's attention is diverted by Russia.
4. It can fail because the Pipsqueaks think, themselves think that with US enmeshed in a tussle with Russia, US would wish to consolidate ranks with the Pipsqueaks and as such there will be no whips.
5. It can fail because the Non-Proliferation Enthusiasts in the State Dept. incl. John Rood make a misjudgment on how far they can push India.
6. It can fail because this whole exercise is to get India to agree to a new baseline for conditions for civilian nuclear cooperation and nothing more, from which the next Administration will continue to ask for further sacrifices of India.
7. It can fail because the Pipsqueak say they did not get the second draft in time to study it, either because the draft is sent by the US too late, or because India and US cannot agree on it till it is too late.
8. It can fail because now that the Olympics are out of the way, China may not mind interceding if it is not satisfied with the Second-Class Status for India.

If the US has the will, the muscle, the clout, it can get any draft through the NSG. It just needs to communicate better, to lobby better. So there is no need to accept any thing more than cosmetic changes for the second draft.

If the US doesn't show the above, then any acceptance of India of any further conditions would prove very contra-productive the next time India sits down to negotiate anything, possibly with a subsequent Administration. India should not let the baseline of conditions to go up. Giving in to more conditions, could also show that India is desperate and the other side will get only more daring and greedy and ask for more.

IMHO, the right course of action will be
a. Allow only cosmetic surgery on the draft
b. If the NSG accepts it, fine. If not, then
c. MMS should go to the people and say he has been betrayed by US. India did everything, US did not keep its part of the bargain.
d. Conduct Nuclear Testing until the Indian scientific community is satisfied, it has enough data. Blame everything on the Pipsqueak and the NPAs
e. Use own new reserves of Uranium for existing reactors
f. Try getting more from non-NSG countries like Namibia, Niger, Uzbekistan
g. If Russia is willing to deal with India without NSG requirement of Full Scope Safeguards, then go ahead.
h. Invest the money, which had been used for importing foreign reactors, in own R&D.
i. Stay on friendly terms without begging with the West.
j. Work on the economy.
k. Accept the next offer, when they accept India as an Equal to the P-5.

[RajeshA]

Biden as Obama's VP: Why India can breathe easy by Aziz Haniffa in Denver Colorado: rediff.com

Other analysts felt that with Biden on the team, even if the deal spills over to an Obama administration, India can rest easy that the agreement would be reintroduced and treated as a foreign policy priority.

[RajeshA]

... and the voices grow louder.

India-US nuclear deal - time for a pause by Rajiv Sikri: Thaindian

Even the most ardent drumbeaters of the government have been forced to admit that the US hasn’t kept its end of the July 18, 2005 bargain. India is seen as having been led down the garden path or as having been double-crossed.

This is a case of brinksmanship by the US administration, which seems to have concluded that, having gone out on a limb on the India-US nuclear deal, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh cannot now step back and will have no option but to swallow all the new conditions being added on to the NSG exemption. Alternatively, the US administration is convinced that it just cannot get the deal through the present US Congress and therefore it is best to break it at the NSG stage, where the opprobrium would be borne by India, rather than in the US Congress, which would put the Bush administration in an embarrassing position.

Take your pick!
...Clean & Unconditional,
...Failure & Acrimony,
...Sellout,
...Walkout,
...Breakout (out of moratorium)

Save Indo-US Relations --- Clean&Unconditional, maybe Walkout

Save Sonia Gandhi && MMS --- Clean&Unconditional, Breakout

Ditch Indo-US Relations --- Failure&Acrimony, Sellout, Breakout

Ditch Sonia Gandhi && MMS --- Failure&Acrimony, Sellout, Walkout

Good for Indo-US Relations, SG && MMS --- Clean&Unconditional

[Suppiah]

http://www.demconvention.com/bill-clinton/

See this comment by BC

Our position in the world has been weakened by too much unilateralism and too little cooperation; a perilous dependence on imported oil; a refusal to lead on global warming; a growing indebtedness and a dependence on foreign lenders; a severely burdened military; a backsliding on global non-proliferation and arms control agreements; and a failure to consistently use the power of diplomacy, from the Middle East to Africa to Latin America to Central and Eastern Europe.

What does he mean? Is that an indirect comment on the Indo-US deal?

[merlin]

I wonder what India is doing to guard against a fait acompli at the NSG. What if we get an NSG waiver that is so full of conditionalities and other obligations on us albeit couched in gentle, soothing language that can be spun as "unconditional for all practical purposes"? Will MMS and company still go ahead and sign it to preserve their domestic H&D?

[RajeshA]

I wonder what India is doing to guard against a fait acompli at the NSG. What if we get an NSG waiver that is so full of conditionalities and other obligations on us albeit couched in gentle, soothing language that can be spun as "unconditional for all practical purposes"? Will MMS and company still go ahead and sign it to preserve their domestic H&D?

In order to fight the next elections, MMS needs a Waiver which is clean and does not get entangled in controversy and cries of sellout, though that is not very probable. He needs a decisive punch to win this match. If Anil Kakodkar mentions foul once, then it is all for nothing. MMS would be forced to walk out - No Separation, No Safeguards, No 123.

[Philip]

There are some points which are getting mixed up with the deal.The main one is that good relations with the US NEED NOT depend upon the deal alone.We can certainly be close friends from a standpoint where each side acknowledges the right of the other to "agree to disagree",issue by issue.This will thereby be a healthy relationship of "equals".If tied to the N-deal,where conditions are being laid down that affect both our military/strategic deterrence and our foreign policy,it will inevitably fail as the majority of the nation will not countenance such a one-sided servile attitude from India that smacks of a colonial mentality.

Now there appears to be hard evidence that there are some in the US/NSG who see this deal as being a backdoor method of inveigling/seducing India into a de-facto acceptance of the CTBT/NPT norms at a time when we have the most pro-western and weakest PM ever.Even with such a western background and outlook ,Nehru rejected on principle the development of nuclear weapons,when confidentially urged to do so to counter China by the then Eisenhower administration.The current dispensation is extremely weak when a massive range of western/US wares are being offered in the form of nuclear fuel and reactors,advanced aircraft,naval technology and other military hardware.These will cost billions upon billions and we all know the attraction in the minds of our politicos of such deals."Every jampot has its fly" (from the Gospel of Philip).In return however,for the privilege of obtaining these wares some sold only to close allies,we must make a leap of faith and embrace the Neo-Con "Christianity",the US in all its undertakings.The "War against Terror",anti-Iranian diplomacy,not "rush in to buy Russian", and convert from NOAT (Non-Alignment) to NATO.The rewards in heaven/paradise for the converted are countless as promised by the Rev.Dubya of the Church of the Latter Day Morons,"every fly will get its jampot" (GOP), even unto the 70 virgins !

"To be, or not to be"...

http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/28/stories ... 911100.htm

The American dilemma at the NSG
Siddharth Varadarajan

The nuclear deal is at its most decisive breaking point today. India has shown its willingness to abide by its commitments. Is the U.S. in a position to do the same?

In the face of evidence suggesting the underselling of India’s case at the Nuclear Suppliers Group last week, it is worth asking why the United States invested three years of political capital in a deal only to see it brought to the edge of a precipice where the smallest of nonproliferation ‘conditions’ is likely to knock it over. The answer lies in the contradictory pursuit of strategic and tactical gains that lies at the heart of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.

The July 2005 nuclear agreement was the product of a strong strategic urge in Washington to do something dramatic to overcome the reticence the Indian political, bureaucratic and military elites have traditionally shown towards entering into a more profound strategic embrace with the U.S. This embrace was not about turning New Delhi into a military ally, something even the most optimistic advocates of the India relationship in Washington knew was unlikely ever to happen. But it was about allowing the U.S. to shape the strategic choices India was making and help the country become a “responsible stakeholder” of a regional and global system underpinned by American hegemony. The alternative was that India could emerge a spoiler who might bandwagon with other powers and make the exercise of that hegemony more difficult.

The brilliance of Philip Zelikow, who was Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s adviser in 2004 and 2005, lay in understanding the seductive potential civil nuclear cooperation held for the Indian elites. The U.S. had wasted five years following the 1998 nuclear tests trying to contain the Indian atomic genie. But as the strategists of the Bush administration surveyed the post-Iraq war world, they asked themselves whether this failure could somehow be turned into the pillar of a new approach. One where India’s obvious military strengths were recognised, including the reality of its nuclear weapons, and an attempt made to harness its abilities so that they could further U.S. interests in the region. If the Iraq fiasco had demonstrated, inter alia, the limits of unilateralist hegemony, could the outsourcing of hegemony to countries like India help transcend those limits?

Not surprisingly, the first branch of U.S. government to realise the promise this new relationship held was the Pentagon. Even during the first four years of the Bush administration, Donald Rumsfeld and Douglas Feith had sought to deepen military-to-military ties with the Indians, with the stress first on exercises and interoperability leading eventually to the sale of equipment. But the weakness of this approach became apparent in the summer of 2003 when a determined American push to get India to send ‘peacekeeping’ troops to Iraq ran aground despite winning the backing of most ‘pundits’ in Delhi. A U.S. envoy made a final push with a top Indian official in early July that year. “Future generations of Americans will be grateful for India’s help,” he said. “But what can you do for us now? Are you prepared to lift the restrictions on our civil nuclear programme?” the official asked. The envoy had no answer. He returned empty handed, but the record of that conversation left its mark in the Beltway. And the effect was felt almost immediately. First up, the High Technology Cooperation Group, which had been set up in 2002, got a boost. Later that year, the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership took shape. The Pentagon was already a believer but it was now the Commerce Department’s turn to test the waters. By September 2004, India had agreed to sign the End Use Verification Agreement that Commerce considered a key benchmark of India’s willingness to accommodate American concerns. Somewhere within the State Department, a little light began to flash. And policymakers like Mr. Zelikow began to ask themselves: Could the sop of a nuclear deal become the cornerstone of a grand strategic bargain with India and pave the way for a vastly expanded relationship?

In January 2005, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, who was the French President’s diplomatic adviser at the time, was asked to test the waters in New Delhi by presenting the Indians with a U.S.-France-U.K non-paper outlining a menu of possibilities, including separation of the civil and military programme. Brajesh Mishra as National Security Adviser in the erstwhile Vajpayee government had earlier broached the idea with the French of offering one or two reactors from among the 21 operating (or under construction) for international safeguards provided sanctions were lifted, with a commitment to safeguard all future reactors as well. That proposal was now dusted off and embellished. The Manmohan Singh government vetoed some suggestions but reacted positively to the idea. By March, the U.S. had made up its mind. Ironically, the immediate catalyst was the American decision to provide F-16s to Pakistan. Washington feared India would be offended. So Dr. Rice travelled to Delhi to tell the Prime Minister about the F-16s. And that the U.S. wanted to work towards the lifting of international restrictions on civil nuclear commerce with India. Dr. Singh assented.

Compelling logic

So compelling was the logic of a nuclear deal with India that it appealed to the American establishment cutting across institutional, ideological, political and sectoral barriers. Thus, Defence, Commerce and State were fully on board. Neocons, realists and liberal internationalists thought it made sense. The Republicans and Democrats did so as well. And as for American capital, especially on the defence, agribusiness, retail and financial services side, no convincing was needed. One more intermediate but crucial step was still to be taken to focus the American mind, and that was the Defence Framework Agreement of June 2005 which foregrounded defence sales. From there to the historic joint statement of July 18, 2005 (J18) was just a matter of detail.

But details do matter and they did prove devilishly difficult. The game in Washington was still a very tightly held one because Dr. Rice knew so dramatic a policy change might not survive the pushes and pulls that came with the full inter-agency process. Though nonproliferation specialists were kept on the periphery of the drafting process, a generalist like Nicholas Burns knew enough of U.S. policies to try and strive for some tactical icing on the strategic cake. The nuclear deal was premised on Indian nuclear weapons not being seen as a threat (and perhaps even as an asset) by Washington as far as the global balance of power was concerned. But this was so only as long as the Indian weapons programme did not become too ambitious. Thus, Mr. Burns and his colleagues sought to make the nonproliferation agenda an essential part of the nuclear deal, even as the wider strategic partnership was designed to be the principal goal. They also knew that some down payment on the foreign policy front might be necessary to guard against India’s tendency to act independently. But getting the balance right was never easy.

When the first draft of J18 was faxed to the Prime Minister’s plane at Frankfurt en route to Washington, it was so full of nonproliferationism that Anil Kakodkar, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, saw red. A message was immediately sent to the Indian negotiators to stand down and not agree to anything until the PM arrived. What ensued was a bitter fight, first within the Indian camp, and then between the Indians and the Americans. In the end, Dr. Rice and President Bush had to intervene. The strategic goal was not to be sacrificed for tactical gains on the nonproliferation front. Those could always be pressed at a later date. Thus the Indians emerged with a reasonably balanced agreement in which some existing and some new nonproliferation commitments were reiterated or made. And in exchange, the U.S. agreed to lift its domestic restrictions and work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.

However, this tension between the pursuit of long-term strategic goals and tactical nonproliferation gains was to recur frequently during the next three years. Each time, the deal was taken to breaking point. Each time, it required President Bush’s intervention to be salvaged. And each time, it required Prime Minister Manmohan to inform Mr. Bush of the gravity of the situation. Throughout these episodes, there were always sections of the Indian establishment that urged the path of least resistance. On foreign policy issues like Iran — where former Under Secretary Stephen J. Rademaker, has admitted India’s vote at the IAEA was ‘coerced’ by the U.S. — the government tended to lose its nerve. But as far as nonproliferation commitments were concerned, the PMO and the Department of Atomic Energy wanted no dilution of the reciprocal balance contained in J18. They had veto power and they never flinched from exercising it.

Thus it was that the separation talks went to the brink in March 2006 before fast breeder reactors and the damaging notion of ‘grid connectivity’ as a criterion for safeguarding reactors were kept out, and the linkage between safeguards, fuel supply and corrective measures brought in. The nonproliferation camp in Washington struck back with the Hyde Act, helped along by some poor Indian diplomacy which saw merit in hailing the passage of a Bill so riddled with extraneous agendas that it has haunted the nuclear deal ever since. In 2007, India recovered some ground in the 123 negotiations, but not without fighting another battle with the nonproliferationists over the question of reprocessing.

As the deal approached its penultimate but actually most decisive stage — the NSG — the nonproliferationists hoped to try their luck one last time. There is, in American football, a move known as a Hail Mary pass, a play so desperate and foolhardy that it is attempted only at the end of the game in order to score a few extra points. What we saw at the NSG and in the run-up to last week’s meeting in Vienna was the diplomatic equivalent of a Hail Mary pass. But it is one in which the Americans seem to have lost control over the ball. Whatever Washington’s internal view or assessment, it was impolitic for Ambassador David C. Mulford publicly and repeatedly to say the waiver would not be “unconditional.” Did you say conditions, sir? Well, we’ve got plenty! New Zealand’s disarmament minister said on Tuesday that NSG states have proposed around 50 amendments. What unfolded in Vienna was not some Machiavellian plot. The script for this farce was in the DNA of the deal.

The pursuit of immediate foreign policy and military payoffs by America over the past three years has made the nuclear deal so suspect in India that future governments will find it politically difficult if not impossible to meet U.S. expectations on a number of fronts. Even so, the Americans are likely to try and exploit divisions within India in furtherance of their strategic agenda. But when it comes to its nonproliferation agenda, Washington will find there is little or no dissonance within the establishment. Dr. Kakodkar said on Monday that India would not be pushed around. It wanted nuclear cooperation, “but not at any cost.” He was speaking with full authority. The final whistle is about to be blown. If President Bush and his top advisers are not able to recover the ball quickly and honour the commitments made in J18, the deal is as good as over.

[Suppiah]

If indeed Us is not throwing its (reduced) weight behind the deal or has lost interest, there is one credible reason - global energy markets have shifted too much in last year or so. Nuke was taboo in much of Europe. Now with rising oil/gas prices, ME terrorism, GLobal warming etc, nuke is the new blue eyed baby. Italy, Ireland, UK, are all talking of dozens, (even hundred) of new plants, even states like Philipines etc., joining the bandwagon. The game has changed.

So if I am the CEO of a US nuke vendor firm, I have enough moolah to chase in less controversial countries and India is not the only game in town anymore. After all everyone knows every single nuke plant is going to go through all the obstructionist tactics that Arundhati Roys, Medha Patkars, Vandhana Siva's, Maoist mass murderers, Stalinist rapist goons, Chinese puppets and others can throw at them, wasting years and years before it can see light of day, if at all.

If business is pushing less, politicians are going to push even less, if not in reverse.

[samuel]

I was running along the Charles yesterday and something about the nonconvergence of the two sides here hit me. It was prompted by what Rangudu wrote, but repeated again. I am not sure I have it, but here is a post nonetheless.

Let me first point to some exemplars:

Just the realities of doing business without p***ing off the town mafia...
(and here some people are having orgasms about UNSC VETO )

and

I once knew of a guy at work who made a lot of "demands" such as "I'll not work for people younger than me" or "I'll only work for top-tier clients" while a couple of us quietly worked the system. A few years later the man was laid off and had to "request" that he be rehired and ended up working for us for the same types of tasks he once demanded he not be put on.

The points, they are making, seem like:
a) Forget about the UNSC veto. India will be never granted that.
b) We have to be subservient to the Mafia.
c) We Indians (and thus India) must not make a lot of demands, otherwise they will ostracize us and we'll end up being where we are now, which is nowhere.

Where do these traits come from?

To me, these statements appear to say something we often hear in India: "Beggars can't be choosers, naturally" or "Tu kya, teri aukaat kya"

However well motivated or not, it is a different fight than the one others are talking about. The second fight rests on the premise that whatever we are getting now is a result of what we've managed to achieve for ourselves. That is unlikely to change in geopolitics. Under this latter view, a confident and resurgent India is happy to negotiate deals to fire its economy, but will not compromise to what is perceived to be its strategic and national interests. Making a nuke deal with the US only made sense when there was a strategic relationship in place. To this second camp at least, to which I happily belong, no such strategic relationship is in place.

So may be rather than twirling emoticons, you could work with your fellow Indians to show that we are safe, and those in the other camp might equally be willing to learn to "work from the inside," hey?

[enqyoob]

I would respectfully submit that there is no convergence here, because there are too many prescriptive conditionalities and terminological inexactitudes in ur understanding and/or exposition.

The points, they are making, seem like:
a) Forget about the UNSC veto. India will be never granted that.
b) We have to be subservient to the Mafia.
c) We Indians (and thus India) must not make a lot of demands, otherwise they will ostracize us and we'll end up being where we are now, which is nowhere.

Where do these traits come from?

To me, these statements appear to say something we often hear in India: "Beggars can't be choosers, naturally" or "Tu kya, teri aukaat kya"

To put it briefly, what we are saying is not that India should not drive in a Lexus down the road, but that India should first make sure there IS a road and how it turns, and follow that. There is no heroism in running into a wall at the first turn, which is what (IMHO) the "Test Now! Say to the Whole World!" crowd is yelling.

The other reason why I argue (mostly) for patience with what the GOI is doing, is because I see too much of the "patriotic opposition" to be coming from deeply-held political prejudices and willingness to sell the nation's interests down the river as long as it gets THEIR leaders elected.

I KNEW it, when I posted that about the realities of dealing with the mafia - that some would IMMEDIATELY rush to interpret that as agreement that we SHOULD always kowtow to the mafia. What took so many hours, I wonder....

I was also pointing out in that post why Russia, with dus hajaar ishtratejic warheads of 1Megaton or more, is still unable to say to the NSG goon gang, and trade whatever it wants with whoever it wants to trade with. But this should not bother Indian patriots. After all, we invented the Brahma-Astra over 1,700,000,000,000 years ago onlee, and have won a few oracle-operator contracts in the West, so surely the whole world is ENTIRELY dependent on Indian benevolence.

[NRao]

My opinion is that India was in fact better off with the earlier porous so-called 'technology denial regime'. Post aborted-deal, NSG countries may make it that much more difficult for India to buy equipment and components from them.

That does not bode well for the 123/IAEA/NSG deals. They all were SUPPOSED to make India a player on the world scene - not just India buying bolts and nuts (along with reactors), but India selling her techs to others too.

Save Indo-US Relations --- Clean&Unconditional, maybe Walkout

Save Sonia Gandhi && MMS --- Clean&Unconditional, Breakout

Ditch Indo-US Relations --- Failure&Acrimony, Sellout, Breakout

Ditch Sonia Gandhi && MMS --- Failure&Acrimony, Sellout, Walkout

Good for Indo-US Relations, SG && MMS --- Clean&Unconditional

Any "Good for India" branch in this logic?

_____________________________________________________

I think Foggy B will come out with a "2nd Draft" a few hours before the NSG meet and expect India to sign on.

India will be better served if she waits for the next prez to take office. Obama should be able to provide a good/frank answer up front and not have to go through all this bollywood drama. Bush has been a slide since J18. NSG is the lowest he can stoop.

[samuel]

To put it briefly, what we are saying is not that India should not drive in a Lexus down the road, but that India should first make sure there IS a road and how it turns, and follow that.

Ok, that was a start and that's as much as I am with you. Though, as I said in my post, you are looking at a very different road than I am, but please don't take you and I to be us individuals alone.

Arguing for patience here with our history of abuse by Abdul, Harry, and Mao is a little insensitive wouldn't you say? In a span of 10 years or less, you are arguing to erase a historical memory build over a 1000. It was just 60 years ago that we hobbled out of it, and the finger poking und mitten grabben has not stopped yet. So, may be patience is required, but of a different kind? I admire your confidence and hope that is how the rest of us turn out, but I'd be just as happy if the rate constants here were 30 instead of 100.

But, knowing that your post might be interpreted the way it was, and yet posting it doesn't make much sense, given the widely prevalent (as rangudu puts it 80% against and 20% for) inability to articulate or understand, would you agree? Why continue on that path if you expect to take us along with you? So, in the other two paras, I am not with you (and no affiliation here personally to BJP/Congress/CPIM and what not, though I did not realize that you did either).

OK, so lets talk about the road, if I may say so. What do you see the path as?

[NRao]

Condi just woke up - again:

Aug 27, 2008 :: India nuke deal is prime focus of US nuclear policy: Rice

US has said the Indo-US nuclear deal, whose fate now rests with the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, is currently the country's "principal focus" on the civil nuclear front.

Asked whether developments in Georgia will affect the US-Russia civilian nuclear deal, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the present focus of America's nuclear commerce policy was the India deal and not the one with Russia.

"Our principle focus right now has been on the India civil nuclear deal, having worked through the IAEA, now working through the NSG, and still trying to get into a position to make the appropriate presidential determinations in early September. So that's our focus right now on the civil nuclear side," Rice said on her way to Tel Aviv.

Commenting on the recent developments in the Caucasus region and Russia's support to the breakaway region of US ally Georgia, Rice said US is keen to ensure that no independent states emerge in Europe.

She, however, did not state clearly as to whether the US-Russia civil nuclear deal, which has already been presented to the Congress, would be affected by Russian military action in Georgia.

"... We're going to continue to review what we will do about the various elements of the relationship with Russia. As you know, we've been very focused on what to do for Georgia. We've been making certain that there's a clear message that there aren't going to be any new lines in Europe," Rice said.

"And we've been very focused on getting the Russians to live up to the obligations that they undertook to (French) President Sarkozy, not all of which have been yet fulfilled," she said.

[Rangudu]

samuel,

Don't try to read the minds of others. You will always fail in that effort.

Anyway, to continue with that story, one of the people who didn't try to get everything at once eventually became the boss of the guy who quit and another person started a highly successful firm down the line.

The point here is that being on the outside throwing stones worked only for a while. Even China got into the system economically before getting politcal freebies.

[RajeshA]

Save Indo-US Relations --- Clean&Unconditional, maybe Walkout

Save Sonia Gandhi && MMS --- Clean&Unconditional, Breakout

Ditch Indo-US Relations --- Failure&Acrimony, Sellout, Breakout

Ditch Sonia Gandhi && MMS --- Failure&Acrimony, Sellout, Walkout

Good for Indo-US Relations, SG && MMS --- Clean&Unconditional

Any "Good for India" branch in this logic?

NRao Ji,
I wouldn't be so presumptuous to claim here what is good for India. There are too many views here. Everybody has his own car and wants his own road. Even Clean&Unconditional is disputed, so....

[Rangudu]

RajeshA,

You've hit the nail on the head. I can easily note several definitions for a satisfactory NSG outcome. Specifically:

1. Some want this deal at any cost - the "economy over nukes" people

2. Some want this deal so long as it does not mean kowtowing to the US

3. Some are okay with conditions as long as they are not written down

4. Some are okay with conditions with interpretable language but without crossing verbal redlines.

5. Some want this deal only if US "solves" TSP for us

6. Some want UNSC before this deal

7. Some want this deal only if it exactly conforms to J18

8. Some want this deal only if Hyde Act is repealed

9. Some do not want this deal under any cirucmstances

10. Some not only want to cancel the deal but all but want us to declare war on the US

etc.

I think MMS and his brainstrust are closer to View #4 while a majority of the deal opponents here on BR tend to be closer to View #7.

[samuel]

samuel,

The point here is that being on the outside throwing stones worked only for a while. Even China got into the system economically before getting politcal freebies.

Thanks for your advice, though I might add, if I had a suck-up of a student or postdoc, he'd never make it anywhere. Had I been one myself, I won't be where I am now (a good place ). I will accept that personal stories are great as long as we try not to make them into examples of paths for the whole country to follow.

Where India is concerned, we aren't talking of throwing stones now, though we certainly did that in our own version of the deer in headlight nonaligned moments, nor are we looking for freebies, are we now?

We'd love to do business, lots of it, and robustly. I claim that we can play a better game down the road, which is a much better entry "into the system" than what we are getting now. I claim that the current so-called entry is neither strategically sound nor economically as significant as it could be, as a consequence. I claim that we can also be in a position in creating a new system, and fare better than we will be from taking this deal now. And I think such a goal is far more useful for India to reassert itself in all her glory.

S

[Philip]

Reading the above views on Indian self-interest or lack of it,the words a few years ago of a late and much lamented friend of mine who was a great admirer of India-Anura B of SL,still ring in the ear;"why doesn't India fight for its legitimate interests better on global issues,when China has discovered its size and power and is exercising it?"

Unfortunately,we've given the world the impression that we are a weak nation,of self-centered leaders,fit only to be colonial serfs.One fact in the article from the Hindu article rankles in the mind-about Condi Rice telling us the bad news about the US resupplying Pak with F-16s and offering us as a sop the nuclear deal instead! In any case Russia was supplying us with the two reactors in TNadu going on stream later this year. Had it been Mrs,Gandhi,she would've told Rice to take her nuclear fuel and eat it !This attitude has made it a cakewalk for the US to give Pak billions in aid,military weaponry,intelligence networking and the cover-up of US complicity in the AQK nuclear smuggling racket,not bothering at all about India's attitude.As a journo pal of mine says,this "men" of this govt. have no balls at all,are undeserving to be called women and should be reclassified as eunuchs!

[svinayak]

Where India is concerned, we aren't talking of throwing stones now, though we certainly did that in our own version of the deer in headlight nonaligned moments, nor are we looking for freebies, are we now?

Also this deal is not verbal language which India is looking for.

[ShauryaT]

Let me repost part of my original post which started this particular discussion:

We need to closely study Chinese actions and behavior over the past two decades and why the West practically begged them to join all these groups as a way of trying to encourage China into becoming 'a responsible stakeholder in the international system'.

Because China was willing to up the stakes in pursuit of their national interests and defy the west through force on the ground, even at great costs. The Indian leadership and its peoples have not shown this capability, in the geo-political sense of things.

The day, when we assert our views in the region through the force of arms and blood, if need be, is the day, the west will recognize India's claims.

[sraj]

Bush has been a slide since J18. NSG is the lowest he can stoop.

It can get lower than where we are at this point.

How about NSG passes a waiver with language that India does not accept, and goes home? For a trailer of this movie, just refresh your memory with the sequence of events before Hyde was passed with all its warts. Despite MMS breaking protocol and telephoning Republican Senator Bill Frist, Majority Leader, to beg him not to do so (ah! here is some past experience in begging we do have, and the results that we can get from begging ).

So now we have a fait accompli, but India vows there is no deal, no business will ever come out of this arrangement, and there is a lot of acrimony all around.

Nonetheless, is India worse off than before J18?

Does GoI have a plan to forestall this fait accompli?

[sraj]

.................
4. Some are okay with conditions with interpretable language but without crossing verbal redlines.
.............

6. Some want UNSC before this deal

7. Some want this deal only if it exactly conforms to J18

I think MMS and his brainstrust are closer to View #4 while a majority of the deal opponents here on BR tend to be closer to View #7.

#6 is important only in the context of #4, as a risk mitigation measure (not as some kind of trophy one can beg to get by showing what a good boy one has been).

The need for #6 as the only scenario under which #4 can fly, helps to clarify the serious risks attached to #4, which GoI is minimizing through wishful thinking and a mistaken belief in the essential goodness of others (a la Nehru, Kashmir, UN).

The whole campaign of GoI for a moth-eaten, illusory UNSC seat is a joke and needs to be aborted. That energy can be better spent on making things happen in the real world -- such as doubling our uranium production, tying up with non-NSG suppliers and letting the world show why and under what provision of international law they have a problem with this, investing in accelerating all aspects of the indigenous nuclear programme, robustly defending our interests in the region..........

[vsudhir]

Union I&B minister lets go some gems on the N-deal.

China's agent Left don't want India to move ahead: Cong

Here're the relevant parts in what is otherwise an entertaining harangue.

Kolkata, August 28:: Union Information and Broadcasting Minister Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi alleged that the CPM was against the Indo-US nuclear deal because it did not want India to have an edge over China.

"The CPM does not want India to go for the nuclear deal. But they do not have any objection to China going for the deal. Can they not be called agents?" Dasmunsi said at the 55th anniversary celebration of Chhatra Parishad, the student wing of Congress.

Asserting that the nuke deal was absolutely necessary to meet India's energy requirement by 2012, he said the deal had been struck with the US after some scouting as it was found to have the required technology.

"Does the deal mean that we cannot make nuclear bombs? The answer is, we can. No one can influence our military strategy. The only condition is that we cannot send our reactors to any other country," he said.

Stating that the nuclear deal had been endorsed by former president A P J Abdul Kalam and the country's scientific community, Dasmunsi accused the CPI(M) of trying to confuse the people about the deal.

Taking a dig at the CPI(M) for describing the deal as "imperialist", Dasmunsi said during the Pakistani incursions in Kashmir in 1948, the communists were busy describing India's newly-won Independence as "false".

So, has GoI agreed in principle to civilian N-trade with the rest of the world wherein we don't export our strengths - reactors and tech - at all? Just wondering onlee.

Disclaimer:
Am cautiously pro-deal as of now. Been swinging between pro- and anti- camps for a while. Awaiting the new NSG draft language and conditions, like the rest of this thread, I guess.

[enqyoob]

OK, so lets talk about the road, if I may say so. What do you see the path as?

Aha! NOW there is converjenj! Here is the narayanan philosophical position on the nuke deal at this point:

There are 2 possibilities at the NSG:

1. NSG says unconditional OK. Then, OK.

2. NSG puts all sorts of conditions.

There is no Indian "walkout" at the NSG - because its not an agreement between NSG and India, it's just NSG talking to themselves.

Then comes the COTUS Hyde gang. In Case 1, if they vote it in, fine, all happy.

Case 2, if they vote it in , phooey! India DOES NOT SIGN the final agreement with the US.

In Case 1, if the COTUS does not agree, then the question of India signing does not arise, because the US can't sign.

OK, so we are left with just 3 scenarios:

1. There is a US-India agreement that we are happy with (well.. some of us..)

2. There is no US-India agreement.

3. Horrible - but there is an agreement, but either the present GOI or future GOI or future GOTUS is not happy with it.

WHAT REMAINS UNCHANGED IS THAT THE IAEA HAS APPROVED THE GENERAL PARAMETERS THAT INDIA WANTED.

At that point, it is entirely up to the Indian Patriots to go and do what is in the national interest - trade with any IAEA member who is willing to trade with India. I suspect that there will be some. Covertly or overtly, I don't care, because India TRIED dealing with the US and NSG in good faith. There is also no ban at that point on India selling reactors or technology to anyone (read Vietnam and maybe Venezuela).

The J-18 is still the benchmark of "good faith".

So I see no reason to jump up and down now.

[Rangudu]

samuel,

You still don't get it. Working for a series of marginal gains in the pursuit of a long term goal does not equal to sucking up. It is ambition at its most refined level. It takes focus and a steady determination to move forward. From Sabeer Bhatia to Vinod Khosla, success did not come with the first step being a big one. It came through years of hard work and incremental victories followed by defeats until one day things exploded.

Also, when is "down the road" and what will India do until then? We still have to engage the US on numerous issues and will those be frozen until we are "down the road"?

Your kind of thinking is binary - either I get all I want or there's no deal. Those kinds of things are only achieved by war victors over the vanquished. That is what happened after WW-II when the current P-5 system was formed. Given that WW-III is not in the picture, we can forget about a similar deal for us anytime soon.

Bottomline, those who say "India is too good for this" or "We will get a super-duper deal down the line" need to back up their views with supporting arguments and data. If you have a plan, lay it out with the likely scenarios and what India can gain at what time.

If not, it's just talk and there's plenty of it to go around. We are after all an argumentative lot.

[RajeshA]

IMO, MMS will get this deal "clean and unconditional" only if MMS is willing to let go and willing to walk away.

There is no Indian "walkout" at the NSG - because its not an agreement between NSG and India, it's just NSG talking to themselves.

"Walkout" means, that India says no to going ahead with the Separation Plan, or doing any bilateral deals with NSG members, if they include NSG Waiver conditions in the bilateral agreements with India. It also means not proceeding with 123 Agreement.

[svinayak]

There are some points which are getting mixed up with the deal.The main one is that good relations with the US NEED NOT depend upon the deal alone.We can certainly be close friends from a standpoint where each side acknowledges the right of the other to "agree to disagree",issue by issue.This will thereby be a healthy relationship of "equals".If tied to the N-deal,where conditions are being laid down that affect both our military/strategic deterrence and our foreign policy,it will inevitably fail as the majority of the nation will not countenance such a one-sided servile attitude from India that smacks of a colonial mentality.

Now there appears to be hard evidence that there are some in the US/NSG who see this deal as being a backdoor method of inveigling/seducing India into a de-facto acceptance of the CTBT/NPT norms at a time when we have the most pro-western and weakest PM ever.Even with such a western background and outlook ,Nehru rejected on principle the development of nuclear weapons,when confidentially urged to do so to counter China by the then Eisenhower administration.The current dispensation is extremely weak when a massive range of western/US wares are being offered in the form of nuclear fuel and reactors,advanced aircraft,naval technology and other military hardware.These will cost billions upon billions and we all know the attraction in the minds of our politicos of such deals."Every jampot has its fly" (from the Gospel of Philip).In return however,for the privilege of obtaining these wares some sold only to close allies,we must make a leap of faith and embrace the Neo-Con "Christianity",the US in all its undertakings.The "War against Terror",anti-Iranian diplomacy,not "rush in to buy Russian", and convert from NOAT (Non-Alignment) to NATO.The rewards in heaven/paradise for the converted are countless as promised by the Rev.Dubya of the Church of the Latter Day Morons,"every fly will get its jampot" (GOP), even unto the 70 virgins !

One friend of mine in New Delhi with family connections to the political parties told me that J Nehru would not have signed this deal. He was correct. IG or JN would have never signed this deal in this way with this kind of vote of confidence.

[Rangudu]

FYI, I'm told that GoI has NOT signed the IAEA safeguards agreement and as such it has no legal standing until the ink is on the paper.

That is India's "walkout" card from the NSG. If the draft v2.0 sucks, GoI need just note that it will not sign the safeguards agreement and terminate the process then and there.

Acharya,

Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi never had to deal with a coalition based political structure in India. And any person who guesses how either would have reacted today is doing just that - guessing.

[svinayak]

... and the voices grow louder.

India-US nuclear deal - time for a pause by Rajiv Sikri: Thaindian

Even the most ardent drumbeaters of the government have been forced to admit that the US hasn’t kept its end of the July 18, 2005 bargain. India is seen as having been led down the garden path or as having been double-crossed.

This is a case of brinksmanship by the US administration, which seems to have concluded that, having gone out on a limb on the India-US nuclear deal, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh cannot now step back and will have no option but to swallow all the new conditions being added on to the NSG exemption. Alternatively, the US administration is convinced that it just cannot get the deal through the present US Congress and therefore it is best to break it at the NSG stage, where the opprobrium would be borne by India, rather than in the US Congress, which would put the Bush administration in an embarrassing position.

Has anybody analysed what the US is getting in term of normalising its relationship with China. There is lot of talk of better relationship with China after Bush visited Beijing.
Is India aware of this during the deal process

[RajeshA]

Has anybody analysed what the US is getting in term of normalising its relationship with China. There is lot of talk of better relationship with China after Bush visited Beijing.
Is India aware of this during the deal process

Not much analysis from me, but what I would presume is that if West enters into a Chilled War with Russia again, some of the old dynamics of the Cold War would reassert itselves.

If Russia is Evil, then China becomes the Balance of Power, if China is Evil, then India becomes the Balance of Power.

But a few ice cubes don't really make a Cold War, so I wouldn't read too much into it. Tomorrow the winds can again change.

Secondly the Beijing Olympics would surely have left an impression on George W. Bush. Was it greed, respect, envy or fear

[sraj]

If the US doesn't show the above, then any acceptance of India of any further conditions would prove very contra-productive the next time India sits down to negotiate anything, possibly with a subsequent Administration. India should not let the baseline of conditions to go up. Giving in to more conditions, could also show that India is desperate and the other side will get only more daring and greedy and ask for more.

India can also push the baseline back by repudiating J18 in the immediate aftermath of a failure at NSG. No point in always being passive and reactive.

GoI can also state a basic principle of international negotiations: "India will not commit to uphold/support any regime if that regime continues to target india".

An intermediate step before "Breakout" can be an announcement withdrawing the unilateral moratorium.

[RajeshA]

If the US doesn't show the above, then any acceptance of India of any further conditions would prove very contra-productive the next time India sits down to negotiate anything, possibly with a subsequent Administration. India should not let the baseline of conditions to go up. Giving in to more conditions, could also show that India is desperate and the other side will get only more daring and greedy and ask for more.

India can also push the baseline back by repudiating J18 in the immediate aftermath of a failure at NSG. No point in always being passive and reactive.

If the outcome is Failure & Acrimony then J18 loses meaning anyway. I think it is too late for a pause as Rajiv Sikri suggests. MMS has too much running on this deal.
India-US nuclear deal - time for a pause by Rajiv Sikri: Thaindian

GoI can also state a basic principle of international negotiations: "India will not commit to uphold/support any regime if that regime continues to target india".

Should have been a policy from the beginning.

An intermediate step before "Breakout" can be an announcement withdrawing the unilateral moratorium.

This intermediate phase would again be just talking and no action. The world would just pile up pressure all at once, and our politicians would crumble. Any retreat then on testing would again be seen as weakness. I'd prefer if the film is a sequel to P-II.
As Tuco says, "When ya wanna shoot, shoot. Don' tawlk"

[samuel]

Rangudu,

I sure don't get it. But before I articulate what happens down the road and what that means, let me say that for every Bhatia or someone in a similar position, there are thousands whose so called little gains aren't that at all. There are examples of lives filled with perceived little gains that did not add up to much. We don't get to hear of them obviously. So, where personal philosophies go, I am quite content and happy with mine and respect you for yours in as much as it works for you.

At any rate, these are not prescriptions for India.

Before we go on, let me post in this message that J18, good job there. IAEA, no issues there.
I congratulate all involved for that.

We've got those two even if we walk out now. If we do, the US WILL have to come back to us, not in the least because its got a Hyde it knows to do nothing with and others will be clamoring to do a deal with us. So, hold on, don't rush it.

What we do as we wait comes in a post next.

N - thanks for post. Gotta go earn my paycheck too, will be back.
S