Deterrence

[shiv]

Well Chander is technically correct about lower yields for more accurate missiles. However he is wrong about the "Do not want to cause wanton damage". A 150 kiloton weapon, or, for the skeptics, even a 20 kiloton weapon will cause "wanton damage". Forty or Fifty thousand deaths or more is not to be sniffed at. Secondly, the whole purpose of an NFU doctrine with guaranteed retaliation in case of attack is to cause wanton damage.

[ShauryaT]

Makes sense. After all we are not mass murderers. Accuracy will always win over brute large scale destruction.

A nuclear weapon by definition is a mass murder weapon. Brute large scale, almost indiscriminate killing is the point of it. As Shiv ji says, even a 20 KT weapon is not to be scoffed at from the mass murder angle. So, the question here is what is the most efficient mass murder weapon? What yields make for efficient killing? If one studies the replacement warheads of these MT weapons, you will see the answer from a western perspective - it is still MT levels of destruction, just made more efficient that is all.

The point is the reduction of yields from MT to high KT is not due to any humane consideration but as a matter of efficacy. I know, I sound brutal, but this business is such. Sorry.

[Vashishtha]

A nuclear weapon by definition is a mass murder weapon. Brute large scale, almost indiscriminate killing is the point of it.

Couldn't have put it any better..

Btw, Taking out deep buried bunkers and command posts.. etc will require megaton warheads right? Even though your delivery mechanism is accurate, a smaller warhead wouldn't do much damage...

[ShauryaT]

Yes, but a sufficiently hardened bunker will sustain even a MT burst unless hit upon directly.

The overpressure needed to generate the necessary pounds of pressure per square inch to destroy hardened bunkers is quite high.

[shiv]

Btw, Taking out deep buried bunkers and command posts.. etc will require megaton warheads right? Even though your delivery mechanism is accurate, a smaller warhead wouldn't do much damage...

I think the idea that any country can take out an adversary's underground bunkers is misplaced because even megaton weapons do not do that much damage to bunkers that are not directly underneath. When you consider that those bunkers will likely be spread out in wide open countryside or in mountains, it would be an utter waste of nukes trying to hit a bunker and maybe 2-3000 people inside. A minor miss would be totally wasted. Even a 1 megaton nuke that misses by just 2 km may leave a bunker intact, so you have to know exactly where to hit and the underground complex of bunkers may extend for many kilometers in unknown directions.

Better to simply lob the bombs into as many city centers as possible and kill several hundred thousand or million in nuclear retaliation and leave the bunker occupants free to come out and find everything outside unlivable. Nuclear retalliation is about inflicting suffering. Trying to hit hidden bunkers in pinpoint targets does not cut it. A blunt weapon aimed at maximum suffering is what nuclear retaliation means.

[Christopher Sidor]

Nukes are considered bad because of the radiation fall out that they leave behind. A Uranium or Plotonium bomb will leave radio active debris, which will pollute and harm generations to come. Now Thermo-nuclear weapons, i.e. H-bombs, do not theoretically leave behind such debris but unfortunately the trigger for a H-Bomb is generally a mini plutonium/uranium nuke. Hence there is still a radioactive fallout.

But there is another class of weapons which does not leave behind radio-active debris. These class of weapons are called as pure-fusion-weapons. As of today, work is still continuing on these class of weapons. It is rumored that one of the reasons that India did not sign CTBT was due to these class of weapons. Now since these weapons do not leave radio-active fallout, they are hard of detect, when exploded. Source is a IEER paper dated Oct-1998.. Also these pure-fusion-weapon systems can scale upto massive sizes and scale down to kilo-ton ranges. So India can explode a 10 kt pure-fusion-weapon system and claim that it was just a 10 kt RDX test. A new type of non-nuclear bomb that we were testing. And since there will not be any radio-active fall out, the Geiger counter counters will not register anything. To confuse everybody India can precede and follow this tests with 2-3 actual 10 kt RDX blast.

The beauty of these, i.e. pure-fusion-weapon systems, is that they can be thought of RDX on steroids. Till now we have been squeamish about targeting paki and chinki civilians. But with these pure-fusion-weapons that can be eliminated. After all there will not be any contamination or fall-out to worry about. Our troops can easily travel through the areas which have been nuked with these pure-fusion-weapon systems, without any nuclear-protective gear. No need to carry guilt that future generations of Pakis or Chinkis will be deformed because of our actions.

If we have these pure-fusion-weapon system, then with a small warhead and with the precision which is expected out of Agni-5 and possibly the K-4 missile, we can have a very powerful deterrent force. We can blow up divisions of PLA, china's factories and infrastructure.

[RajeshA]

But there is another class of weapons which does not leave behind radio-active debris. These class of weapons are called as pure-fusion-weapons. As of today, work is still continuing on these class of weapons. It is rumored that one of the reasons that India did not sign CTBT was due to these class of weapons.

Well that is actually a dream weapon, but AFAIK still only fiction, unless some super-genius Indian scientists come along!

[ramana]

MMS address to Commanders Conf

Nuclear Security and proliferation are a serious threat

...
"Nuclear proliferation and nuclear security remain a serious threat in our neighbourhood," he toldthe commanders, and also highlighted that cyber threats as "emerging as a major source of worry"....

The news service adds its own massa spin and calls the neighborhood South Asia. He did not use that word.

The key message is that prolif and security are linked. We know that but why now and to that audience.

I think the underlying message is thaat TSP is slipping on the jihadi slope and soon the noks will be with the jihadis.

[ramana]

Another news report confirming the gistof MMS message: loose nooks from TSP.

LINK

[Christopher Sidor]

The existing or shall we say current Chinese ruling dispensation, PRC its ruling party CPC and the armed wing of CPC, i.e. PLA/PLAAF/PLAN have a very low value of human life. They after all lost 20 million in some crazed frenzy over some crack-pot theory, whose main purpose was to eliminate all those did not think like Mao. Ditto for Pakistan, Pakistan murdered a million and drove some 10 million from their homes in what was then East-Pakistan. Pakistan did an encore of this in Baluchistan and in the northern-areas of J&K, which is continues to illegally occupy.

So if we are expecting that by threatening, PRC/CPC/PLA/PLAAN/PLAAF or the Paki State/Army with civilian casualties, we are going to deter them, then we are living in a dream world. What will deter these b*****s, (please pardon my use of profanity) is strikes which take away their ability to wage war or aggression. i.e. Strikes on their amassed amour, their command-control facilities, air bases, transport junctions & points, etc. If we can threaten the families of serving PLA/PLAAF/PLAN/Pakistani Army officers with destruction, then we will able to deter them. If we hold Chinese civilians hostage to nuclear missiles it will not work. This is where comments by "Avinash Chander, chief controller for missiles and strategic systems at DRDO" in the Business Standard article posted by sivab on 8-Oct-2011 come into play.

Sorry for such a late comment, but I was unable to put into words what was in the back of my mind.

[devesh]

Pak might be different from PRC on the "suffering of people" front. it depends on which area of Pak you are going to hit. if a demonstration of some nukes on Pakjab core is done, they will capitulate quickly. otherwise they won't. start taking out the fertile fields of Pakjab and turn them into nuclear wastelands, and TSP will tremble and surrender. that's what they do best.

[shiv]

Pak might be different from PRC on the "suffering of people" front. it depends on which area of Pak you are going to hit. if a demonstration of some nukes on Pakjab core is done, they will capitulate quickly. otherwise they won't. start taking out the fertile fields of Pakjab and turn them into nuclear wastelands, and TSP will tremble and surrender. that's what they do best.

Hitting fields is a waste of time. Nuclear bombs are not big enough. Life must become difficult for the ruling elite. That means their water supply, their fuel, their electricity lines and their servants should all be "deaded". When they peep out of their foxholes they should find fertile fields onlee where they can crap and pee and bury the dead. Their houses/palaces/mansions should be gone.

[devesh]

Shiv ji,
I didn't literally mean bombing fields. just a pointer that Pakjab needs to feel devastation of unimagined proportions and Pak will surrender. destroying all the irrigation/transportation infra of Pakjab has the same affect of barren wastelands >> it destroys their fertile agricultural base. then mass starvation will result within weeks.

[Christopher Sidor]

We will need hundreds of nuke to destroy all or a significant part of west-punjab fields. Then also it is not assured that the Pakistan Army will surrender.

Rather what we need is the extermination of the Pakistani Army, annihilation of its armor, all of its cantonments areas. Complete and total. Its civilian population is no concern to us. Along with this extermination what is needed is the total destruction of Pakistan industrial base. i.e. not a single industrial plant should be left standing, no factory should survive in sindh, all of its mines its entire railway system should be blasted away to kingdom come. And finally we need to eliminate the modern financial basis of Pakistani state. That means burning down all of Pakistani land records, all of its bank ledgers from all of its banks, all of the tax collection records, any paper which has anything to do with money, has to be shredded.
And oh if we want to destroy Pakistan ability to feed itself, then we need something drastic. like exploding a few kilotons of nukes at the bottom of Indus river of west-punjab. The contamination will be carried far and wide and into the underground water system too, polluting pakistan's water for generations to come. In fact we can take all of our nuclear waste, wrap it around a few nukes and explode these nukes in the bottom of Indus river.

Is this doable. Yes. Will we do it. Well the question is do we want to do it ??

[RamaY]

Shivji,

This might be in support of your recommendation - a nuke aresenal based on smaller nukes.
One could take comfort if India developes MIRV vehicles in all it's strategic missiles.

The military purpose of a MIRV is threefold:

Provides greater target damage for a given missile payload. Radiation (including radiated heat) from a nuclear warhead diminishes as the square of the distance (called the inverse-square law), and blast pressure diminishes as the cube of the distance. For example at a distance of 4 km from ground zero, the blast pressure is only 1/64th that of 1 km. Due to these effects several small warheads cause much more target damage area than a single large one. This in turn reduces the number of missiles and launch facilities required for a given destruction level - much the same as the purpose of a conventional submunition.

With single warhead missiles, one missile must be launched for each target. By contrast with a MIRV warhead, the post-boost (or bus) stage can dispense the warheads against multiple targets across a broad area.

Reduces the effectiveness of an anti-ballistic missile system that relies on intercepting individual warheads. While a MIRV attacking missile can have multiple (3–12 on United States missiles and 3-10 on Russians) warheads, interceptors may have only one warhead per missile. Thus, in both a military and an economic sense, MIRVs render ABM systems less effective, as the costs of maintaining a workable defense against MIRVs would greatly increase, requiring multiple defensive missiles for each offensive one. Decoy reentry vehicles can be used alongside actual warheads to minimize the chances of the actual warheads being intercepted before they reach their targets. A system that destroys the missile earlier in its trajectory (before MIRV separation) is not affected by this but is more difficult, and thus more expensive to implement.

[RamaY]

shiv wrote:
I think the thing that is needed is to encourage and get a Pakistani nuclear bomb to go off somewhere in the world - preferably in Pakistan itself - proving that irrational people now have the bomb. That would give every power in the world the best excuse to take the crap out of Paki nukes. The problem here may be that Pakis also understand this.

There is one good place I know that can undo Pakistan and it's source of hatred.

[shiv]

We will need hundreds of nuke to destroy all or a significant part of west-punjab fields. Then also it is not assured that the Pakistan Army will surrender.

Rather what we need is the extermination of the Pakistani Army, annihilation of its armor, all of its cantonments areas. Complete and total. Its civilian population is no concern to us. Along with this extermination what is needed is the total destruction of Pakistan industrial base. i.e. not a single industrial plant should be left standing, no factory should survive in sindh, all of its mines its entire railway system should be blasted away to kingdom come. And finally we need to eliminate the modern financial basis of Pakistani state. That means burning down all of Pakistani land records, all of its bank ledgers from all of its banks, all of the tax collection records, any paper which has anything to do with money, has to be shredded.
And oh if we want to destroy Pakistan ability to feed itself, then we need something drastic. like exploding a few kilotons of nukes at the bottom of Indus river of west-punjab. The contamination will be carried far and wide and into the underground water system too, polluting pakistan's water for generations to come. In fact we can take all of our nuclear waste, wrap it around a few nukes and explode these nukes in the bottom of Indus river.

Is this doable. Yes. Will we do it. Well the question is do we want to do it ??

Sidorji - I think you are overestimating the power of nuclear bombs and our ability to produce them. You are also IMHO overestimating the damage that needs to be done. Why destroy all tanks if you can just stop those tanks from being used getting the ports, depots and fuel supply.

And Pakistan has few land records or even a paper trail of importance so it is a waste of time going for all that. As for factories, we can leave out the football manufacturing units I guess. Textiles and footballs is what Pakistan produces. As well as hot air. But get the houses and mansions of the top 40 families and jernails, either with nukes or PGMs.

[Prem]

PDYs Still Kicking

“India should be relieved Pakistan has gone ahead and tested its nuclear devices and declared itself a nuclear weapons state. Such a move has ensured greater transparency about Pakistan’s capacities and intentions. It also removes complexes, suspicions and uncertainties…” — J.N. Dixit
“The possibility of nuclear war between India and Pakistan is infinitesimally small due to close cultural linkages, India’s fear of the consequences of prosecuting a war of annihilation against Pakistan, conventional near parity and the controlled nature of conflicts… Time and again there were crises, but the meta-stable system righted itself.” — Bharat Karnad
“There is no more ironclad law in international relations theory than this: nuclear weapon states do not fight wars with one another.” — Devin Hagerty

[Prem]

Leeches

As congressional budget battles loom, 22 leading nuclear arms control advocates have joined in an effort to urge President Barack Obama to protect funds for nuclear non-proliferation and securing of loose nuclear material. "We strongly urge you to make every effort to ensure that threat reduction and nonproliferation programs are funded at the Senate Appropriations Committee-approved level in the fiscal year 2012 energy and water appropriations bill," the arms control leaders wrote to Obama on Oct 27. "Based on reports from Hill staff, we are concerned that while the final funding level remains unresolved, the administration is not forcefully making the case for the Senate version of the bill, which in key respects is identical to your request.
The deficit-conscious House is looking to cut U.S. funding for nuclear nonproliferation programs well below the White House's requested levels
The signers included Ambassador Kenneth Brill, former U.S. ambassador to the IAEA; David Culp, legislative representative for the Friends Committee on National Legislation; Charles Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists; John Isaacs, executive director of the Council for a Livable World; Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association; and Stephen Young, senior analyst for the Union of Concerned Scientists.

[RajeshA]

X-Posting from "India-China News and Discussion" Thread

For example, you were talking about a nuclear exchange. How do you know that such an exchange wont be covertly initiated by a third party via SLBM.

That would always remain a possibility until the Chinese do not vacate Tibet, thereby ending the fundamental reason for India-China enmity. Chinese too are aware of this. If it doesn't bother them, so why should it bother me?!

In fact by giving the nukes to Pakistan, they have made their position clear - nuclear exchange with India is acceptable! So that is where we are headed.

But then, in that scenario, third parties who set off the conflagration would benefit. You have no plans to get back at them?

If we suspect the third party is Pakistan, then it doesn't matter because a Paki Nuke is in truth a Chinese Nuke. We nuke both.

If we suspect the third party is USA, then again it doesn't matter because we nuke China first, and when both of us have nuked the sh*t out of each other, India and China can both agree to throw the rest over on USA. Why? Because we can't really hope to take down USA with our nukes! And the devastation we would get in return would be comprehensive, which means USA may get a little hurt and we would be glassed up fully. Pakistan and China would remain! That would be a juvenile strategy. Sound strategy would be to take down our two rivals in the neighborhood, and if the Chinese have some nukes left, we coordinate with them to attack USA, holding the Americans responsible for the mistake but only in the aftermath of the nuclear exchange. An attack on USA afterwards would be far better, because we wouldn't really have much left to be taken down, and neither would the Chinese have much left. That would open up new options for cooperation!

So regardless of who attacks us, we attack China!

[RajeshA]

Continuing from "India-China News and Discussions" Thread

but I doubt that all the hundreds or more that this thread is being translated to are very familiar with nuclear deterrence doctrines. So, to somebody who is not exposed to these matters - Rajesh's statements on nuclear missiles flying about may come across as extremely cavalier and an example of 'Indian hatred'.

Don't have a problem with the content of the arguments - but only with the way it is put across.

Arjun ji,

As I see it

Deterrence == Military Capacity to Retaliate + Political Will

Being cavalier about nuclear missiles flying about feeds into the second part "Political Will"! If an impression is made on the adversary that there the citizenry would "easily" go along with MAD, then it means the "Political Will" can also be arranged. India is weak on Political Will, and it is here that the cavalier stance of the citizenry or at least of the jingos goes a long way in bolstering the impression that the adversary better not count on lack of political will in India to retaliate using nukes, should the occasion arise.

Here are some of my Sun Tzu wisdoms:
1) If one hyena attacks me, then I'll shoot both that hyena and its bigger brother who trained it.

I can't allow myself to get mauled by the first hyena to such an extent that when the first hyena and I are done with each other, I become easy prey for the second hyena. So I needed to shoot the big brother hyena before I am completely incapacitated by the attack of the first hyena.

If Pakistan attacks, we attack China.

2) If I am mauled by some animal in the night, we assume it is one of the hyenas.

If I don't attack the hyenas, they will feel emboldened to attack me either again or next.

If there is a nuclear terror attack, we have to assume it was Pakistan or China, and we attack both.

3) If a herd of elephants is headed towards me and there is no escape and I have only two bullets, then I'll first shoot the two hyenas sitting in the shadow underneath a tree.

If I escape the stampede of the elephants alive, I don't want the hyenas coming down on me, finishing me off and getting fat om my meat.

If say a third power attacks India, say it is USA, we still attack Pakistan and China. We wouldn't want to leave them standing when we are down. Why? Because we can't really hope to take down USA with our nukes! And the devastation we would get in return would be comprehensive, which means USA may get a little hurt and we would be glassed up fully. Pakistan and China would remain! That would be a juvenile strategy. Sound strategy would be to take down our two rivals in the neighborhood, and if the Chinese have some nukes left, we coordinate with them to attack USA, holding the Americans responsible for the mistake but only in the aftermath of the nuclear exchange. An attack on USA afterwards would be far better, because we wouldn't really have much left to be taken down, and neither would the Chinese have much left. That would open up new options for cooperation!

So regardless of who attacks us, we attack China!

[ramana]

Pioneer prints PTI report from Washington DC

Nixon's tilt toward Pak and China drove India to test

Picture is of POKII but please ignore that.

Nixon's tilt towards Pak, China led India to 1st nuclear test

Tuesday, 06 December 2011 15:30 PTI | Washington

US tilt towards Pakistan and its overtures to China in the early 70s apparently led India to go ahead with the decision to conduct its first nuclear test in Pokharan in 1974, which caught the entire western intelligence by surprise.
A secret State Department intelligence note, dated January 14, 1972, acknowledged that US policy had an impact on India's decision making on nuclear weapons, saying there was "little doubt" that the then president Richard Nixon's announcement of his trip to China changed New Delhi's calculations.

The late US president, who was forced to step down in the wake of Watergate scandal, had troubled relations with India because of his tilt towards Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pak war and his moves to reconcile with China.

Declassified American documents of the era reveal that as of early 1971, all evidence indicated that the Government of India had decided to defer indefinitely the development and explosion of a test device.

"In early August, however, the cabinet undertook a review of Indian nuclear policy in the wake of President Nixon's July 16 announcement of his proposed trip to China. There can be little doubt that the July 16 announcement has had major implications for India's security calculations and its nuclear policy," the six-page intelligence note said, which was released by the National Security Archive.

"In New Delhi's view, the announcement appeared to rule out all hope that India (not a signatory to the NPT) could anticipate a joint US-Soviet umbrella against the threat of Chinese nuclear attack," it said, adding that the decision to detonate a nuclear device may have been triggered by the deepening crisis in Indo-Pakistani relations.

"India may have concluded that an early test would demonstrate its increasing military strength to Pakistan and remind the latter's Chinese and American friends of its potential power," the intelligence note said.

"Although the immediate issue with Pakistan has been settled, a test still would probably be regarded as very useful by the Indians," it added.

The documents claim that US assessment was that a nuclear test would constitute dramatic support for India's contention that it is the only important power on the subcontinent.

"India also may hope that a demonstrated nuclear capability would quash any thoughts of revenge the Pakistanis might still entertain," the State department said.

Six months later in June 1972, the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, wrote to president Nixon about intelligence reports which also came from other sources that India has decided to go nuclear.

"Such a test would likely affect the attitudes of the USSR and the People Republic of China toward South Asia, and would probably generate Pakistani pressures for enhanced security guarantees. Again, we should be carefully consider our position," Kissinger wrote in his note.

Analysing the latest round of declassified documents of the era, the National Security Archives writes that relations between New Delhi and Washington were already cool during the Nixon administration which treated India as a relatively low priority.

"Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China underlined India's low priority by suggesting that if New Delhi ever faced a crisis with Beijing it could not count on Washington for help, it said.

One thing is the report is hedging both ways. Its written after the Bangaldesh War and could be a forecast, thinking out of the box type of memo.

Second thing is the test was undertaken in 1974, a full three years after the so called July 1971 cabinet meeting and two and half years after victory in Bangla Desh. To me if it was just glory, India would have perfected the design but not tested.

I think an unwritten bargain between US and India was broken by Nixon. and India had to demonstrate its resolve that despite deferring in perpetuity, the will was there to survive.

[ramana]

More from Hindu

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a ... 692819.ece

New Delhi

Washington was caught on the wrong foot when India conducted the peaceful nuclear explosion of May 1974, and again when its intelligence agencies were unaware of India testing the nuclear bomb for a second time in 1998, according to declassified U.S. documents posted on the Net by the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project and the National Security Archive.

The State Department's Intelligence and Research (INR) wing had felt that India was preparing for a nuclear test from 1972 onwards but Washington's focus on Vietnam and its preoccupation with China and the Soviet Union perhaps led it to give India low priority. As a result, the U.S. was taken completely by surprise when India tested the nuclear bomb in 1974.

{Author doesn't understand the meaning of that date. Its two weeks after the Dec 16 th surrender of TSP forces in East Pakistan and the USS Enterprise leading Task Force 74 into Bay of Bengal. So someone wondered what is India upto?}

The U.S. was partly to blame because despite the wealth of assessments, barely five months before the test, its Embassy felt India might not test because it was facing grave economic problems and there were no rumours of a test as in 1972.

The documents also give the impression that top-level policymakers at that time were not overly concerned about the dangers of proliferation. The intelligence community gave scattered assessments and the government was prone to scaling down their warnings when reports to the contrary came from other sources.

{Causes for failure. Discounting reports with superior knowledge. So a failure of assessment. The big problem is they didn't think they were threatening India when the sent the Enterprise task force and tried to inveigle PRC into attacking India. Next they doubted if India could do it when faced with difficulties.}


INR first voiced its suspicions in early January 1972 and barely a fortnight later the U.S. Embassy here saw “straws” suggesting an underground test “some time in future.” But after the Canadians said they had warned New Delhi of the implications of using raw material supplied by them for making nuclear bombs, the doubts subsided. The doubts resurfaced after the Canadians felt that as Indian nuclear scientists were capable of combining “guile” with “technical proficiency,” they could easily have “easily misled” them.

{The Canadians have this Anglo disorder of looking at India thru the 'distrustful native' eyes of the British colonials.}


The Americans were still not sure and became further baffled when the Canadians and the British did not detect any Indian intention to test though they seemed to have the capability.

{Here is thh Million dollar questioin. Why didnt India test when it could?}

By mid-1972, the suspicions were back again after a Japanese Embassy official said the “Indians have decided to go ahead with a nuclear test” which could occur at “any time” in the Thar Desert. But subsequent cables cast doubt on the diplomat's assessment.

The conflicting reports prompted National Security Assistant Henry Kissinger to go in for a high-level study memorandum on the implications of an Indian nuclear test for U.S. interests. The study and the response, however, remained unattended for some time in Mr. Kissinger's office, indicating that the U.S. government's attention was on other issues and it did not give much importance at that time to nuclear proliferation issues. Assessments continued to swing one way or the other but after the test was made, the U.S. felt it had missed the signs.

[SSridhar]

{Here is the Million dollar question. Why didn't India test when it could?}

1972 was a particularly difficult year for Indian economy. We had borne the 10million refugees from Bangladesh, fought a war and were having a severe drought too in 1972. Indian leaders would have correctly assessed imposition of economic blockade had a test been conducted then.

[ramana]

The idea of testing in 1972 is a figment of imagination and based on extrapolation. India had just defeated TSP, stared down PRC and looked Task Force 74 in the eye. So the letter writer assumed that India will test as he knew what sending the task Force ment. So he wrote what he thought India will do.


My question is about earlier times before NPT cut off date.

[ramana]

More on above theme

Mrs Gandhi's triumph

http://www.dailypio neer.com/ columnists/ item/50640- mrs-gandhi's-triumph.html

Recently declassified American documents explain how India caught the US by surprise on May 18, 1974 when it conducted its first nuclear test.
It is perhaps a coincidence, but as India celebrates the 40th anniversary of the most resounding victory of its Armed Forces, America’s National Security Archive has declassified a series of secret documents entitled “The Nixon Administration and the Indian Nuclear Programme, 1972-1974�, analysing why the US Intelligence agencies failed to predict the first Indian nuclear test in May 1974.
In India, triumph was soon followed by the worst diplomatic debacle. Mrs Indira Gandhi, who had led Indian troops to victory, lost everything on the negotiating table at Simla. The Simla Agreement, signed on July 2, 1972 by Mrs Gandhi and her Pakistani counterpart, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, should have provided opportunities for both countries to start over in a new direction.

That was not to be the case, though Mrs Gandhi had all the cards in her hand, in particular 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war. Although the Simla Agreement was to put in place some basic concepts such as the normalisation of relations between the two countries, the opening of posts, telegraph, road, air or sea communications, or border crossings, it did not do so.

Mrs Gandhi probably believed that the Jammu & Kashmir issue could soon be resolved (it is said that Bhutto had agreed to a solution in a secret deal), but many in Pakistan felt that Bhutto had made too many concessions to “that woman� as Gen Yahya Khan used to call India’s Prime Minister. Soon after the Simla summit, Mrs Gandhi realised that she had been taken for a ride. This is probably the reason why on September 7, 1972, she authorised scientists of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre to work on a nuclear device. As Bhutto’s political position gradually weakened, he could not afford anymore ‘compromises’ on Jammu & Kashmir and the possibility of fresh conflict reappeared. It was then that Mrs Gandhi decided to go ahead with the ‘peaceful’ nuclear test at Pokhran in Rajasthan.

The newly declassified papers cover the period starting just after the Bangladesh liberation war till the ‘post-mortem’ assessment in 1976. On January 14, 1972, the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence prepared a top secret note: “India to Go Nuclear?� The memo pointed out: “There are continuing reports that the Indians are preparing to detonate a nuclear device during the next several weeks. While the exact timing described in these reports varies, the date chosen may prove to be January 26, the day on which India celebrates the promulgation of its post-colonial Constitution and the end of dominion status.� It added, “The purpose of the planned detonation is unclear in the reports.�

The documents demonstrate that the CIA knew India had the capability to produce 20 to 30 weapons and “could easily test a device in an underground site, such as an abandoned mine�. However, Washington, DC did not show great interest in “the concerted effort by India to conceal such preparations … which may well succeed�. The first lot of documents deal with the period before the Simla summit.

For American analysts, India’s motivation to test a nuclear device would be “domestic political pressures and concerns about China and Pakistan�. The intelligence analysts believed that an eventual test would be more “a demonstration of scientific and technological prowess�; the strategic significance was negligible for the US. Hence, the scrutiny of India’s nuclear preparations did not go further due to “a relatively modest priority has been attached to relevant intelligence collection activities�.

In other words, the US did not consider it worth its effort to keep a watch on India. Greater resources and more personnel were deployed to keep a watch on China which had exploded a nuclear device at Lop Nor in Xinjiang eight years ago. US President Richard Nixon was more interested to change the dynamics of the Cold War by visiting the Forbidden City to Chairman meet Mao Tse-tung.

Britain had passed intelligence inputs to the US in April 1972 which concluded that India was not going to conduct a nuclear test. “HMG (Her Majesty’s Government) had taken new preliminary look at Indian nuclear intentions. The UK had concluded that India had the capacity of proceeding to nuclear explosion, but that it had detected no indication that GoI (Government of India) had in fact decided to do so,� the documents say.

But some thought differently. Japanese diplomat Ryohei Murata believed that India had decided to go ahead with conducting a nuclear test and detonation could take place any time. Murata also accurately predicted that the Thar desert in Rajasthan would be the test site. The Japanese believed that the 'forces' wanting to go nuclear within the Government of India were prevalent. The Americans described the Japanese information as 'scanty'�.

Around that time, Mr Henry Kissinger ordered a National Security Study Memorandum on the implications of an Indian nuclear test for the US. In August 1972, a Special National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the chances of India deciding to conduct a nuclear test were 'roughly even'. The SNIE's assessments on this issue were later criticised in a post-Pokhran report as “marred by waffled judgdments�. The conclusions should have been 60-40 in favour of a decision to test.

The SNIE had suggested that the factor 'impelling India to set off a test was the belief that it would build up its international prestige and demonstrate India's importance as an Asian power and overawe Pakistan'. In early-1973, John Pinajian, the IAEA's representative in India, became suspicious that New Delhi was preparing for a nuclear test after Mr Raja Rammana, the BARC director, did not allow him to access the facility to conduct an experiment which had been approved by India's Atomic Energy Commission.

The US Embassy in Delhi sent a cable to the State Department in early 1974 about “India’s Nuclear Intentions�. The conclusions were: 'Deeper economic problems, among other considerations, militated against a nuclear test in the near future, even though the Indian Government had the capabilities to produce and test a device. The Embassy, however, admitted that 'we know little about relevant internal Government debate'.

India's 'peaceful' nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974 caught the US by surprise. The post-explosion analysis shows that the American intelligence agencies had not been searching for signs that a test was on the cards. The day after the explosion, the US Embassy in Delhi tried to justify its failure. As Ambassador Moynihan was in London, Deputy Chief of Mission David Schneider sent a report to the State Department, 'India's Nuclear Explosion: Why Now?' The Embassy, which had no clue of the “Indian decision-making�, put the blame on domestic politics and psychological reasons. It rationalised the test by 'the need to offset domestic gloom and the need for India to be taken seriously. The decision will appeal to nationalist feeling and will be widely welcomed by the Indian populace'.
We now anxiously wait for New Delhi to declassify documents for an Indian view in the matter. Whether we will see that happen in our lifetime is another matter.

CLAUDE ARPI
LATEST FROM CLAUDE ARPI

Now we know why Perkovich kept insisting that prestige and scientists drove the decision to test in 1998. In other words his knowledge was driven by same logic as in 1974.

In all these revelations is there any input from Jerome Weisner?

[shiv]

Now we know why Perkovich kept insisting that prestige and scientists drove the decision to test in 1998. In other words his knowledge was driven by same logic as in 1974.

In all these revelations is there any input from Jerome Weisner?

There is a mildly pisko-racist assumption here. Goras do things for science and competence. Kaalus do it for echandee and status. The idea that Indians might do it for something else would mean attributing the same labels of greatness to kaalus that are self applied to goras. The truth is that Yamrika is totally hung up on echandee and status. NASA was set up because of Sputnik.

[Austin]

A bit older but interesting when looked in the context of US NMD and Europe Missile Defense System.

US is moving towards a Nuclear Primacy

The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy - Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press

[ramana]

Crucial missing piece by Inder Malhotraji.

Fourteen Days to Freedom

...
Yet, towards the end of the 1971 war, the arrogant incumbent of the White House dispatched a nuclear task force of the US Seventh Fleet, with one Marine battalion on board, to the Bay of Bengal. Again, Indira Gandhi was unperturbed. All she did was send for Raja Rammana, then director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, and told him to start working on an underground nuclear detonation.

This test took place on May 18, 1974 when the JP movement — so named because the Gandhian Jayaprakash Narayan was its leader — was in full blast, and there was much discontent against the prime minister. Her opponents screamed that she had “staged” the test to divert attention from her failings. The ignoramuses didn’t know that a nuclear test has a gestation period of at least three years.

So very clearly Nixon broke and unstated bargain and forced India's hand. India took a beating in 1962 and still didnt go for a test. However when US sent a nuke armed task force India had to go for it.

[ramana]

When we look back at the history of Dec 16th date, we should link it to May11th 1974, also.

Naval Ops In Eastern theatre

When you deal with a power-law as opposed to normal law situation, the response has to be assymetric.

You can see from above the Soviet fleet entered the area of interest after the US fleet and was in no position to oppose it despite brave words.

And only the PM is cognizant of what is to be done and she did it.

And she didnt let the services feel the heat in order to let them finish the task at hand.

[Christopher Sidor]

^^^^
It was clear that US was hell bent on not permitting the armed forces of Pakistan from being wiped out. Also noteworthy is the claim by Kissinger that it would take about 72 hours for India to move its forces from then East-Pakistan to West-Pakistan. Also note that the Soviet's did promise us a diversion in case China sought to create mischief, but no such assurance was forth coming as far as the US was concerned.

Another noteworthy point that the Americans thought that the Soviets might seek a base in Vizag, as quid-pro-quid. Vizag along with the base which they would eventually acquire in Vietnam, would have led to American naval deployment in South-East Asia and possibly Western Indian ocean to be severely challenged.

What I am not convinced is about so called "central-Asian-instability", which was used as an excuse by certain Indians not to dismember Pakistan once and for all. This was 1971. instability in Central Asia and Afghanistan/Iran would come at least a decade more. And that too because of the fool-hardy decisions made by both the super powers. So in 1971 there was no instability as far as the Central Asia was concerned. Also keeping the so called instability away on Western Punjab border did nothing to ease the havoc that Pakistan has wrecked on two Indian states of Punjab and Kashmir.

In light of these it makes one wonder, would have 9/11 happened if US had not prevented Western Pakistan to suffer the fate for which it was entitled to? Also why should one help out US in Pakistan, with track record of US laid bare in this article. With respect to China, yes if America is taking steps which enhance India's interest and goals then we should help them out. But with respect to Pakistan and in fact the whole of Central Asia and Western Asia we should not be helping out the yanks.

[ramana]

I think those reports are hedging both ways because they(West) dont want top reveal what they really know.

What did the Russian, Chinese, and French think about all this?

From Inder Malhotra's "Fourteen Days to Freedom" Mrs G did decide in Dec 1971. Then there is a flurry of reports in early 1972 claiming to be from someone's anuntie and uncle that India has decided to go nuclear. Then we see more reports that its all not real. Then 1974 smiling buddha and they get shocked.

Most likely they got off track at the long delay of three years from decision to test. They(including Indian political opposition) all expected it would be like a bomb in the basement and made overnight latent to patent.

[ramana]

Hindu reports Dr. P.K. Iyengar has passed away:

He played a key role in 1974 PNE

He did more than that!

He played a key role in 1974 PNE

T.S. Subramanian

The former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), P.K. Iyengar, 80, who passed away in Mumbai on Wednesday, was a great scientist and a role model to many people, according to AEC Chairman Srikumar Banerjee. He excited the minds of youngsters in several fields.

Dr. Iyengar was Chairman, AEC, and Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) from 1990-93. He was Director, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), from 1984 to 1990. Prior to this, he headed the Physics group in BARC.

Dr. Banerjee said Dr. Iyengar played a leading role in India's first Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in May 1974 at Pokhran in Rajasthan. “He was the Director of the Physics group at the BARC at that time. High pressure physics was an important component of the PNE and it was part of the Physics group. The PNE was a good achievement.”

Dr. Iyengar was “extremely sharp and his grasp of several subjects was very good,” the AEC chairman said.

Dr. Iyengar, who belonged to Tirunelveli district in Tamil Nadu, did his postgraduation in physics in 1952 from the University of Travancore and obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Bombay in 1963. He joined the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) of the DAE in 1952. He was deputed to Chalk River Laboratories of the Canadian Atomic Energy Establishment. He was trained in Canada under Dr. B.N. Brockhouse, a Nobel Laureate in Physics.

After he returned to India, Dr. Iyengar pioneered research in neutron physics and built an internationally recognised team in that field in the BARC. He led a team that indigenously designed and developed the PURNIMA reactor, which was commissioned in 1972. He made a significant contribution to the indigenous building of the Dhruva reactor, which attained criticality when he was Director, BARC. Dhruva continues to be a world-class facility even today, and Dr. Iyengar's contribution during the final stages of its commissioning was significant.

Starting his research in nuclear physics in the TIFR in 1952, Dr. Iyengar foresaw the advent of nuclear reactors and the opportunities they offered in both basic research and nuclear technology. He started building neutron spectrometers in 1958 around Apsara, Asia's first nuclear reactor, even before the high flux reactor CIRUS was operational, and gave India an early start in neutron beam research. He encouraged research and development in material science, radiation physics, molecular biology, lasers and accelerators. He was primarily responsible for the establishment of the Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology in Indore. As AEC Chairman, Dr. Iyengar vigorously pursued the nuclear power programme with the commissioning of reactors at Narora in Uttar Pradesh and Kakrapara in Gujarat. He emphasised the importance of the development of the Fast Breeder Test Reactor at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research at Kalpakkam, near Chennai.

“Dr. Iyengar left an important mark on various aspects of the DAE programme. He was also interested in the DAE's training programmes. I am personally indebted to him because I had many opportunities to interact with him,” Dr. Banerjee said.

DAE spokesman S.K. Malhotra said Dr. Iyengar was “frank in expressing his views and quick in taking decisions.”

After his retirement from the DAE, Dr. Iyengar held several positions. He received several awards, including Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar award and Padma Bhushan. He is survived by his wife, a son and a daughter.

2011 has been a bad year for Indian stalwarts have joined the immortals: KS and now PKI.

RIP.

[ShauryaT]

RIP, PKI Sir. I knew he was not well and was prodding BK to video record him. Time will vindicate his stand on the IUNCA and Shakti-I.

[Christopher Sidor]

^^^^
It is truly a sad day as far as India is concerned. Truly a gem of India has passed away. I hope his soul finds peace.

[abhishek_sharma]

Nuke weapons are meant for strategic purpose only: Army Chief

[ramana]

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 3#p1227483

X-post....
Nuclear weapons only for strategic deterrence: Army chief

:
:
"Let's be quite clear on it... Nuclear weapons are not for war-fighting. They have got a strategic significance and that is where it should end," said Army chief General V K Singh, speaking on the sidelines of the 64th Army Day on Sunday.
:
:
"A lot has changed since the days of Op Parakram. If we did something in 15 days then, we can do it in seven days now. After two years, we may be able to do it in three days," Gen Singh said.

In other words, the Army's three "strike" corps -- 1 Corps (Mathura), 2 Corps (Ambala) and 21 Corps (Bhopal), each with their three to four self-contained, highly-mobile "battle groups" centered around T-90S and T-72 M1 tanks - can now be ready at their border launch points within a week of the government directive.

The Army is now working towards further cutting down this mobilization timeframe to 72 to 96 hours, even as its 10 "pivot corps" undergo "structural changes", operational logistics are reorganized and "theatrisation of combat support" tested.

Gen Singh did admit the Army was fine-tuning its "Pro-Active Strategy", sometimes dubbed the "Cold Start" doctrine, to achieve desired politico-military results. The unstated aim is to punish Pakistan in a limited manner, not invade or occupy its territory, in the event of a terror strike.

The strategy to launch multiple blitzkrieg thrusts across the border, tested in two major exercises Vijayee Bhava and Sudarshan Shakti last year, has certainly got Pakistan worried.

Having already boosted its nuclear arsenal to around 90-110 warheads, compared to India's 80-100, Pakistan has also taken to projecting its 60-km Nasr (Hatf-IX) nuclear missile as a fitting riposte to thwart any such Indian move.

But while India has a declared commitment of "no first-use", its nuclear doctrine does hold that "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage". India even retains the option to retaliate with nuclear weapons if its forces "anywhere" are attacked with biological or chemical weapons.

[pgbhat]

India even retains the option to retaliate with nuclear weapons if its forces "anywhere" are attacked with biological or chemical weapons.

hain? is TOIlet saying that or Army Chief?

[NRao]

The significance of a MIRV was brought out in another thread. The following article states the number of MIRVs to vary between 3 and 10. Since they all are nuclear capable, one can get a good estimate of the size of the smallest nuke India can produce (with confidence?).

Agni-V launch soon: DRDO

Agni-V will feature Multiple Independently-Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) with each missile being capable of carrying 3-10 separate warheads.

[ramana]

NRao, What that means is in a regiment there will be vehicles carry a mix from 3 to 10 to give flexibility to the SFC in targeting. It doesn't mean that same vehicle will carry different weight RVs. I would like the latter. Have a vehicle deliver a low yield payload and follow a few seconds later with a high yield. The first wipes out any defenses and the second delivers coup de grace.