10 June 2012 Sunday
Jaibans Singh on why a precipitate decision on Siachen would be counterproductive
Let’s avoid another Himalayan blunder
SIACHEN WILL come up in the secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan on 11-12 June. The last parley was held a year back on 30 May 2011; then, the two countries failed to agree on the modalities for demilitarisation while agreeing ‘in principle’ to the need. The talks in May 2011 were held after a gap of three years.
As the date approaches, it is being suggested that the operation was, at the outset, a misadventure committed by the then military commanders Lt Gen ML Chibber and Lt Gen PN Hoon, as Gen Chibber is said to have admitted later. It is also being said that a come-down on its position by India would positively impact the confidence-building measures; some analysts are looking at the issue as a ticket for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the Nobel Peace Prize.
This media hype is misleading, given that astute military minds have applied themselves to the situation. Articles on the subject are being written by those who have neither seen the area nor possess adequate knowledge of war. India has strong reasons to be satisfied with the operational situation in Siachen, having dominated the Pakistani positions and having mastered the art of countering the vagaries of high-altitude weather.
Post the devastating avalanche at Gayari in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Pakistan has built a sustained campaign for taking forward the process of demilitarisation. Initial conciliatory statements by Pakistan Army chief Gen Kayani were followed by a media blitz aimed at pressurising the Indian side to toe the Pakistani line. Recently, Choudhary Ahmed Mukhtar, the erstwhile defence minister of Pakistan claimed that the armies of both countries are the biggest hurdles in resolving the issue. In the next breath he declared Gen Kayani as the best bet for reaching a solution. By so saying, he has left the Indian army as the only identifiable hurdle in the talks. This is propaganda at its best
Pakistan has a strong reason for doing what it does. At present, all Pakistani positions west of Gayari are cut off from their supply route. The entire middle of the Pakistani defence line below the Saltoro ridge has been effectively hollowed out. This implies that the Pakistani posture on the glacier is at its weakest. With Gayari gone, the Pakistani logistical advantage in the Saltoro range is gone. Yet, quite incredibly, there are some Indian analysts who feel like suggesting the possibility of Pakistan joining up with China to cut off Siachen in a pincer east-to-west movement.
For India, yet another significant development is on the China front, wherein the country’s increasing presence in the Pakistani held India territory of Gilgit-Baltistan is a cause for concern. This has happened in addition to Pakistan’s unilateral and illegal conceding of the Shaksgam region to China way back in 1963. Now if we vacate the Saltoro Ridge, China will gleefully exploit the attendant free run north of the vacated areas and will definitely put the new-found bonanza to strategic use; all the more reason for India to move cautiously on demilitarisation.
There is one more important aspect that needs to be kept constantly in focus while dealing with Siachen. Avalanche or no avalanche, Pakistan will always look upon Indian presence of the Saltoro ridge as a forcible occupation. No agreement will be strong enough to deter Pakistan from attempting, at some point in time, to restore what they perceive to be a national shame. Pakistan is not averse to building international pressure against India on the subject, especially so, by firing the gun from the shoulder of its trusted ally, the United States or by involving China as a partner in the dispute. It is, presently, actively pursuing both options.
INDIAN EXPENDITURE and effort to regain the Saltoro Ridge, if demilitarised, would escalate as a geometric or logarithmic progression. In fact, cost escalation for India will begin the moment any unfortunate decision to demilitarise is taken. Building a new line of defence further down which will require more infrastructure and troops involving prohibitive expenditure. As and when the conflict escalates, the money saved over the years will go down the gutter in nanoseconds. A much larger number of soldiers will be called upon to sacrifice their lives than the few who are becoming unfortunate victims of the weather at present. More dangerously, this may trigger a sub-continental conflict.
In all matters concerning territorial dispute, India’s sole objective is security. Pakistan’s proposal that both sides withdraw to positions prior to the occupation of the Saltoro Ridge is unacceptable. India, while dealing with Pakistan, must always keep in mind the mistakes of returning Hajipir pass.
