US and PRC relationship & India

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ramana
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by ramana »

Mapping the Indo-Pacific

Shyam Saran

Posted: Sat Oct 29 2011,

Over the past year, the term “Indo-Pacific” has gained currency in strategic discourse in India. From a geopolitical perspective it represents the inclusion of the Western Pacific within the range of India’s security interests, thus stretching beyond the traditional focus on the Indian Ocean theatre.

It is a logical corollary to India’s Look East policy having graduated to an Engage East policy. The fastest growing component of India’s external economic relations is its engagement with ASEAN, China and Japan and, more lately, Australia. This has resulted in a growing density of maritime traffic through the Indian Ocean and radiating all along the Western Pacific littoral. These have created a seamless stretch of ocean space linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In another sense, it is also a reflection of the concept of the Asia-Pacific, which hitherto excluded India, expanding westwards to encompass the subcontinent as its integral part. As India’s regional and global profile increases, it will inevitably gravitate towards the centre of this expanded geopolitical and geo-economic space. The concept of an Indo-Pacific theatre fits in neatly with this evolving trend.


The extension of India’s strategic perspective to include the Pacific will undoubtedly have a number of consequences. China has already reacted by asking India to stay away from the South China Sea, which we have politely and rightly rejected. By contrast, most Southeast Asian countries and Japan welcome a larger presence of Indian naval assets in the region. If the ongoing upgrade of India-Australia ties endures, then it is likely that the stretch of ocean which lies between the two countries will become a shared responsibility along with Indonesia. India has, in the recent past, developed a network of security arrangements with several countries in the region. We expect this to continue.

As an interesting aside to the recent controversy over India’s forays into the South China Sea, I wish to draw attention to a recent article by Zhang Wenmu in the Global Times, which appears to draw back from the severe threats issued to India. Zhang says: “Unlike Japan, India’s intervention into the affairs of the South China Sea is at the most to just show its presence there. India’s top priority in terms of national security lies in the Indian Ocean instead of the South China Sea.” So there is nothing for China to get exercised about!

What about the United States, which is and is committed to remain the pre-eminent power in the Pacific and deploys a strong presence in the Indian Ocean? In a speech at Honolulu in October 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used the phrase “Indo-Pacific” to describe a newly emerged and integrated theatre. She spoke about how the US was “expanding our work with the Indian navy in the Pacific because we understand how important the Indo-Pacific basin is to global trade and commerce.” This is an explicit and significant reflection of the growing strategic convergence between the two countries with respect to the region.

Clinton has gone even further in the latest issue of the journal Foreign Policy. She has used phraseology which is new and has important implications. She writes: “The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics, stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the Western shores of the Americas. The region spans two oceans — the Pacific and the Indian — that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy.”

{Varu veeru ayyaru! In English They became us!}

It may be noted that here is a categorical American acknowledgement that the Asia-Pacific fully encompasses the Indian subcontinent. It also acknowledges that the Indian and Pacific Oceans constitute an inter-linked geopolitical space, not only because it is important to “global trade and commerce” but also because they impact on strategy. Lest this message be missed, Clinton goes on further to say: “How we translate the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans into an operational concept is a question that we need to answer if we are to adapt to the new challenges in the region.”

This is an important statement and one which, frankly, could have issued from an Indian strategist, so accurately does it reflect how we perceive our own role in the region. What is important is the assertion, which is new, that it is not only necessary to acknowledge the inter-linkage between the two oceans but how this is to be translated into an “operational concept”. Here is an agenda item not only for our strategic dialogue with the US and major stake-holders in the region. I would not exclude China, but it will have to decide whether it is ready to embrace an inclusive approach to dealing with the new challenges or insists on an exclusionary strategy, based on a narrow definition of its own security interests.

It is also noteworthy that the US, which has avoided the use of the term “Indian subcontinent” in favour of the more politically correct “South Asia”, has reverted to the earlier formulation. This is significant because it figures in a very important policy document at the level of the secretary of state. I do not think it is random. It has been my argument that while South Asia is divided into several independent and sovereign entities, the region is a single geopolitical unit by virtue of history, geography and cultural affinity. As the largest state in the region, India’s security perspective necessarily transcends these political boundaries. In that sense, the term Indian subcontinent reflects a living reality and not a throw back to some outdated colonial artifice. That the US is belatedly acknowledging this reality is a good sign.

The writer is a former foreign secretary
express@expressindia.com
Shyam Saranji KS garu really thoguht you were a phenom!!!

Well deserved praise.

BTW this article is a fitting endpiece for the one that started this thread!!!

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 62#p637762
RKumar

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by RKumar »

US observation satellites hacked
According to a report from Bloomberg Businessweek, in 2007 and 2008, repeated attacks were made on the control systems of two US satellites, Terra AM-1 and Landsat 7, used for Earth climate and terrain observations and mapping. Bloomberg refers to excerpts in a final draft of the annual report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, due for publication next month.

The satellites are controlled via the Svalbard Satellite Station (SvalSat) on the Arctic island of Spitsbergen. The Terra AM-1 satellite is understood to have been under the hackers' control for a total of eleven minutes in the course of two attacks in June and October 2008. Landsat 7 is reported to have been in the hackers' hands for a total of "12 or more minutes", during attacks in October 2007 and July 2008. During each of these incidents, it would have been possible for the hackers to fake data, control or even crash the satellites.

As the SvalSat station uses the internet for its control protocol and to communicate with NASA, the report suggests that the attack was internet-based. The article states that the nature of the attack appears to point to the Chinese military, though it stops short of making a direct accusation
Not sure if I have posted in right thread, may be we can create a separate thread for "China hacking power house"
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by ramana »

Nightwatch comments

Nightwatch 31 Oct 2011
Bangladesh-Russia: Bangladesh and Russia are expected to sign agreements for the construction of Bangladesh's first nuclear power plant, Rosatom Chief Sergei Kiriyenko said in a television interview on 31 October.

Comment: Bangladesh is desperate to expand its energy supplies without increasing its dependence on fossil fuels and hydro-power. The Russians have never had much influence in Bangladesh, but this project offers the prospect of pride of place because it could enable the Dhaka government to use Russian aid to blunt Chinese pressures. A Russian option for Bangladesh would be good news.
Khya se Khya hogaya!
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by RamaY »

^ I wonder...

Imagine BD builds numerous nuke plants in the mouth of Bay of Bengal. Would a Fukushima in this area any less worrisome to tamilnadu population than a kundankulam in TN?
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Singha »

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home ... 632311.cms

interesting piskology about the opium war and how it still rankles in the chinese psyche
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by devesh »

the Opium War offers huge propagandu value for West, and if required, for India. all the mythical BS about middle kingdom, dragon's fortress, etc goes out the window when you realize that simple addiction, lack of mental will, and the mercantile mentality of coastal traders enslaved China to outsiders. and to top it all off, the Opium was produced in India, but India itself never faced anything like the addiction problems in China. that is the greatest insult: the producing nation was unscathed from the ravages of Opium, but China couldn't resist even in the face of defeat and subordination....
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Klaus »

Senator Carl Levin accuses Beijing of tolerating a "brazenly open market" with respect to counterfeit electronics which end up in US military hardware.
Levin slammed China's embassy for denying committee investigators the necessary visas to travel to mainland China and quoted one official as saying the probe concerned "sensitive" issues that could be "damaging" to bilateral relations.

Senator John McCain, the top Republican on Levin's committee, noted that counterfeit electronics - used parts made to look new and are sold as new - had turned up at the US Missile Defense Agency, in a submarine-hunting helicopter, and in a military cargo jet.

The legislators spoke out one day before the armed services committee was to hold a hearing into the issue, with government investigators, officials from Raytheon, L-3 Communications and Boeing, as well as the head of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, Army Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly due to testify.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Prem »

Weighing Pentagon Cuts, Panetta Faces Deep Pressures
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/world ... .html?_r=1
WASHINGTON — Under orders to cut the Pentagon budget by more than $450 billion over the next decade, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta is considering reductions in spending categories once thought sacrosanct, especially in medical and retirement benefits, as well as further shrinking the number of troops and reducing new weapons purchases.Mr. Panetta also held out the possibility of cutting the number of American troops based in Europe, with the United States compensating for any withdrawal by helping NATO allies improve their militaries. That effort would free up money so the United States could maintain or increase its forces in Asia, a high priority for the Obama administration, and sustain a presence in the Persian Gulf after the withdrawal from Iraq this year, he said.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by devesh »

US is drinking its own coolaid. what is "Asia" without Persian Gulf? what is "Persian Gulf" without ME Oil? what is "ME Oil" without control of Europe? it is a chain. control of all these nodes is what kept American dominance. loose one of them, control over all others weakens too....the fact that US is thinking about getting out of Europe itself is the fist sign of deep distress. once they are no longer "actively" posting troops in Europe, stage is clear for Russia and Germany to restart their games again. once that happens, entire area from Turkey to Central Asia becomes a play ground b/c Russia and Russia's possible linkage with Germany is involved. once that happens, Persian Gulf+IOR come into play. once that happens, Pacific comes into play.

there is no such thing called "withdrawing" from one region to another. that is nothing more than a delusion.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by shiv »

[/quote]


What is it about white man's culture that stops him from stating the obvious? The Chinese government is not just "tolerating" this. They actively encourage and foster it. They are similarly wishy washy about Pakhanastan.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by JE Menon »

>>What is it about white man's culture that stops him from stating the obvious?

The underlying sense that he can do nothing about it short of a confrontation, which he fears he cannot win in the manner he is used to. This applies to the Pak scenario as well. So, like all who weaken themselves in mind, before they are finally beaten, he tries appeasement, entreaty, even modest threats - yet he already knows none of this will work. But he does not have the balls, or has not summoned them up yet, to do what he must do: impose punitive taxes on all imports from China. And that involves a degree of self-inflicated pain that they are not willing to countenance either. Therefore: defeat. Slow and easier than what it might otherwise be, but defeat it will be.

I suspect, however, this is not the white man's culture alone.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by kmkraoind »

China's No. 1 target is the US, next is India: Bush

Posting in full. It seem US political establishment is not at good terms with PRC.
MUMBAI: Former US president George W Bush on Tuesday delivered a blunt warning to Indians about the intentions of China. The former president who has courted trouble in the past with his aggressive and overthe-top assertions said China was looking to upstage India.

"China's No. 1 target is the US, next is India," he told a group of select CEOs at a late dinner meet on Tuesday. Bush, the two-term president whose reign saw a dramatic improvement in Indo-US relations, also said his country's patience with Pakistan was wearing thin, according to one of the participants.

"If the US had not befriended Pak, Pak would have become more dangerous.
But now US patience is wearing off," he said. In the course of a free-wheeling discussion, Bush also touched upon a number of important topics. He cautioned businessmen never to do business with Russia and said the EU would have a completely different look in five years but the euro would stay.

"If Iran goes after Israel, the US will go after Iran," Bush said, referring to the tense stand-off in the Middle-East over Iran's nuclear weapons programme. "While making history, timing is most important," he added. Those attending the dinner meet included HDFC Chairman Deepak Parekh and ICICI Bank Chairman KV Kamath.

Closed-door dinner

RPG promoter Harsh Goenka, GVK group promoter GVK Rao, Bajaj Auto chairman Rahul Bajaj and IIFL promoter Nirmal Jain were also present. "This event was kept a secret because the main condition from George W Bush's office was that there will be no announcements about this engagement and no media coverage given to it.

Even the list of guests was kept secret," said a senior executive from ICICI Lombard. The visit was organised ICICI Lombard and Fairfax Financial Holdings, a Torontobased company that owns 26% of the Indian general insurance company, and was attended by their top officials from India and the US.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Pratyush »

With India a Subordinate power the US can indifinitely prolong its domination of the Asia-Pacific.

IMO, that is the only motivation the US has. It helps that the PRC did 62 on India and still has an active dispute with Indian and Vietnam.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Agnimitra »

This one appears in the Asia Times today:

A crack in the wall
Numerous small businesses in China, their narrow profit margins hurt by rising costs, a downturn in export orders and a credit squeeze, are going bust. The government help cannot hide that the factories and workers with which China's economic miracle began are now outdated.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Christopher Sidor »

kmkraoind wrote:China's No. 1 target is the US, next is India: Bush

Posting in full. It seem US political establishment is not at good terms with PRC.
MUMBAI: Former US president George W Bush on Tuesday delivered a blunt warning to Indians about the intentions of China. The former president who has courted trouble in the past with his aggressive and overthe-top assertions said China was looking to upstage India.

"China's No. 1 target is the US, next is India," he told a group of select CEOs at a late dinner meet on Tuesday. Bush, the two-term president whose reign saw a dramatic improvement in Indo-US relations, also said his country's patience with Pakistan was wearing thin, according to one of the participants.

"If the US had not befriended Pak, Pak would have become more dangerous.
But now US patience is wearing off," he said. In the course of a free-wheeling discussion, Bush also touched upon a number of important topics. He cautioned businessmen never to do business with Russia and said the EU would have a completely different look in five years but the euro would stay.

"If Iran goes after Israel, the US will go after Iran," Bush said, referring to the tense stand-off in the Middle-East over Iran's nuclear weapons programme. "While making history, timing is most important," he added. Those attending the dinner meet included HDFC Chairman Deepak Parekh and ICICI Bank Chairman KV Kamath.

Closed-door dinner

RPG promoter Harsh Goenka, GVK group promoter GVK Rao, Bajaj Auto chairman Rahul Bajaj and IIFL promoter Nirmal Jain were also present. "This event was kept a secret because the main condition from George W Bush's office was that there will be no announcements about this engagement and no media coverage given to it.

Even the list of guests was kept secret," said a senior executive from ICICI Lombard. The visit was organised ICICI Lombard and Fairfax Financial Holdings, a Torontobased company that owns 26% of the Indian general insurance company, and was attended by their top officials from India and the US.
Britain's rise as an imperial and consequently world power can be traced to two interlinked events. First was a decline by the Spanish empire, the original European empire on which sun never used to set. And second was the defeat of the Spanish Armada. The Defeat of Spanish Armada led people to question the power to Spain and its empire crumbled soon after. The reason was, if Spain could not subdue a heretic ruler of a nation (Britain was ruled by a protestant and Spain by a catholic) less than 1000 kms from its shores, then how could its navy rule the waves. After all Spanish navy lost heavily in the adventure against England, close to 35% of its fleet that had been sent to invade England was lost.

China does not have to defeat US. All it has to do is deny USN the use of Western pacific, that's all. Its target is not USA but Taiwan. If it takes Taiwan, it essentially means that USA cannot protect Taiwan and consequently Japan, Korea or any of the other countries either in West Asia or any other part of the world for that matter. China has no intention of taking war to shores of USA, just as Britain did not take its war to the shores of Spain.

But yes after Taiwan, it is India. With Taiwan under its belt, China will be able to secure its shoreline and have a unsinkable air craft carrier which can be used to defends its Eastern shore. Consider that the Taiwan strait is only some 90 kms across. But the distance from Japan/Philipines to Taiwan is almost triple or more. This frees China's army, its air force and other resources to tackle the only rival in Asia which will be a threat to it, India.

Now coming back to Pakistan, Pakistan was a dangerous country before the so called US befriended it. It remained a dangerous country after US befriended it. The failure of US was its inability to create an alternative to Pakistan. Add to it is that fact that the only coercive act which US can do is bomb Pakistan to stone age. US or any of its allies will be unable to do an Iraq on Pakistan, not due to its nukes, but because of its population size.

Let us again rewind history. After the Pressler Amendment Pakistan went without a decade of american aid and grants either in economic sphere or in military sphere. Still Pakistan did not mend its way. After the 9/11 America spend over a decade giving aid and grants to Pakistan's military and its civilians. Yet again Pakistan failed to do a course correction.
Chankya had said, first talk and induce a misbehaved person to change his behavior, if the person persists with his misbehavior then punish him, if he still does not alter his misbehavior then kill him. With Pakistan talking/inducement have been tried and have failed. Coercion and punishment have also been tried and that also has failed.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Agnimitra »

The umbilical cord that connects the US and PRC capitalism is manifesting in interesting ways:

China's richest keep firm eye on exit door
China's wealthiest citizens, having profited from the maxim that "to get rich is glorious" are now following another, more personal, guideline - "get rich, then get out". An estimated 60% of those deemed rich in China are planning to emigrate, with the United States their favorite destination. - Olivia Chung
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by PratikDas »

US Marine base for Darwin
BARACK OBAMA is to announce that the US will begin rotating Marines through an Australian base in Darwin in a permanent new military presence, intensifying the alliance in a sign of heightened concern about China.
''This is all about the rise of China, the modernisation of the People's Liberation Army and, particularly, it's about the increased vulnerability of US forces in Japan and Guam to the new generation of Chinese missiles,'' said Alan Dupont, the Michael Hintze professor of international security at Sydney University.
''The new Chinese missiles could threaten them in a way they've never been able to before, so the US is starting to reposition them to make them less vulnerable. Australia's 'tyranny of distance' is now a distinct strategic advantage.''
Professor Dupont, a former Australian Defence official and intelligence analyst, said the ''Australian strategic rationale is that we are also hedging against increasing Chinese military power and their capacity to destabilise maritime trade routes. And we want to get closer to the US.

''There's no doubt at all the Chinese will have serious reservations about this''
Mr Obama and Ms Gillard are not expected to argue that China is a factor in the decision. ''This is a strong gesture that even in the face of budget constraints, the US reaction to the winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan deployment is not to go home but to pivot'' into the Asia-Pacific, according to the former deputy secretary of state in the Obama administration, Jim Steinberg.

But Hugh White, a professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University and a former deputy secretary of defence, said the decision would have deep consequences for Australia's relations with China.

''I think this is a very significant and potentially very risky move for Australia. In the view from Beijing, everything the US is doing in the western Pacific is designed to bolster resistance to the Chinese challenge to US primacy.

''In Washington and in Beijing, this will be seen as Australia aligning itself with an American strategy to contain China.''
Mr Obama and Ms Gillard are to say the US will not build a new base for the Marines but will use the Robertson Barracks, the Australian base near Darwin. But the base is home to about 4500 Australian soldiers and has capacity for only a couple of hundred more. The facilities will need to be expanded to accommodate the US Marines on rotation, whose numbers are expected to build.

Such a decision has been under consideration for some years. The Marines are to use the base for training. ''They want to be able to fly helicopters, drop out of planes and shoot at things, and you can't do that in crowded Okinawa,'' in the words of Mike Green, a former top Asia adviser in the George W. Bush administration.

The Greens oppose any expansion of the US military presence in Australia. By using an existing Australian base rather than building a new US one, the Pentagon considers the new presence will be more ''politically sustainable''.

The then US defence secretary, Robert Gates, said last November in Melbourne: ''We don't want to do things that would be politically difficult for the Australian government. We want to enhance the alliance, not create controversy.''
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by atma »

More bark than bite?
Last month, for example, the Chinese Ministry of Defense published on its website an essay warning that Japan and India were entering into the disputes over the South China Sea, where Beijing claims most of the potentially energy-rich ocean floor.

"The South China Sea presents far greater strategic needs for Japan than it does for China," said the essay by Zhang Wenmu, a professor of strategic studies at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, who is well-known for his hawkish views. "Only major strategic needs can produce structural strategic conflict."

For now at least, China's leaders appear keen to avoid serious flare-ups with neighbors, and indeed have faced criticism at home for "being too soft over the South China Sea dispute," said Wang, the scholar from Seton Hall University.

"Strong statements are often used by Beijing to compensate for the resulting weakness of its actual policies," he said.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/ ... CY20111110
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Christopher Sidor »

To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan --- Published in New York Times, Dated 10-Nov-2011

Till now the question as defined by PLA/PLAAF/PLAAN honchos used to be, would America be willing to sacrifice Seattle for Taipei ?

It turns out that the question will be modified to would america sacrifice Seattle and its economic well being for Taipei, if current trends and forecasts hold?

We can expect this clamor in US to get louder and louder.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Rishirishi »

How is the Chinese debt held? I am under the impression that most of it is held in US tresury bonds. Are the bonds tracked? would it be possible for US to declare the bonds void? without hurting bond holders outside US?
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by abhishek_sharma »

From Henry Kissinger's "On China"
By 1962, barely a decade after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, China had fought a war with United States in Korea and engaged in two military confrontations involving the United States over the offshore islands of Taiwan. It had restored Chinese authority to imperial China's historic frontiers (with the exception of Mongolia and Taiwan) by reoccupying Xinjiang and Tibet. The famine triggered by the Great Leap forward had barely been overcome. Nevertheless, Mao did not shrink from another military conflict when he considered China's definition of its historic borders was being challenged by India.

...

By the end of Qing Dynasty in 1912, with China's governance severely strained, the Chinese government's presence in Tibet had shrunk. Shortly after the collapse of the dynasty, British authorities in India convened a conference in the hill station of Simla with Chinese and Tibetan representatives, with the goal of demarcating the borders between India and Tibet. The Chinese government, having no effective force with which to contest these developments, objected on the principle to the cession of any territory to which China had a historic claim. Beijing's attitude to the conference was reflected by its representative in Calcutta -- then the seat of Britain's Indian administration -- Lu Hsing-chi: "Our country is at present in an enfeebled condition; our external relations are involved and difficult and our finances embarrassed. Nevertheless, Tibet is of paramount importance to both [Sinchuan and Yunnan, provinces in southwest China] and we must exert ourselves to the utmost during this conference." The Chinese delegate at the conference solved their dilemma by initialing but not signing, the resulting document. Tibetan and British delegates signed the document. In diplomatic practice, initialing freezes the text; it signifies that the negotiations have been concluded. Signing the document puts it into force. China maintained that the Tibetan representatives lacked the legal standing to sign the border agreement, since Tibet was part of China and not entitled to the exercise of sovereignty.



Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru claimed a cultural and sentimental interest in Tibet based on historical links between India’s classical Buddhist culture and Tibetan Buddhism. But he was prepared to acknowledge Chinese sovereignty in Tibet so long as substantial autonomy was maintained. In pursuit of this policy, Nehru declined to support petition to table the issue of Tibet’s political status at the U.N.



Indian commanders were given the authority to fire on Chinese forces at their discretion, on the theory that the Chinese were intruders on Indian territory. They were reinforced in that policy after the first clashes in 1959 when Mao, in order to avoid a crisis, ordered Chinese forces to withdraw some twenty kilometers. Indian planners drew the conclusion that Chinese forces would not resist a forward movement by India; rather they would use it as an excuse to disengage. Indian forces were ordered to, in the words of the official Indian historian of the war, “patrol as far forward as possible from our [India’s] present position toward the International Border as recognized by us …[and] prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also to dominate any Chinese posts already established on our territory.”

It proved a miscalculation. Mao at once canceled the previous withdrawal orders. But he was still cautious, telling a meeting of the Central Military Commission in Beijing: “ Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation.” It was not yet an order for military confrontation; rather a kind of alert to prepare a strategic plan. A such it triggered the familiar Chinese style of dealing with strategic decisions: thorough analysis; careful preparation; attention to psychological and political factors; quest for surprise; and rapid conclusion.

In meetings of the Central Military Commission and of top leaders, Mao commented on Nehru’s Forward policy with one of his epigrams: “A person sleeping in a comfortable bed is not easily roused by someone else’s snoring.” In other words, Chinese forces in the Himalayas had been too passive in responding to the Indian Forward Policy—which, in the Chinese perception, was taking place on Chinese soil. …
The Central Military Commission ordered an end of Chinese withdrawals, declaring that any new Indian outposts should be resisted by building Chinese outposts near them, encircling them. Moa summed it up: “You wave a gun, and I’ll wave a gun. We’ll stand face to face and can each practice our courage.” Mao defined the policy as “armed coexistence”. It was, in effect, the exercise of wei qi in the Himalayas.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by abhishek_sharma »

Continuing from above:
Precise instructions were issued. The goal was still declared to be avoid a larger conflict. Chinese troops were not authorized to fire unless Indian forces come closer than fifty meters to their positions. Beyond that, military actions could be initiated only on orders from higher authorities.

Indian planners noted that China had stopped withdrawing but also observed Chinese restraint in firing. They concluded that another probe would do the trick. Rather than contest empty land, the goal became “to push back the Chinese posts they already occupied.”

Since the two objectives of China’s stated policy – to prevent further Indian advances and to avoid bloodshed –were not being met, Chinese leaders began to consider whether a sudden blow might force India to the negotiating table and end the tit for tat.

In pursuit of that objective, Chinese leaders were concerned that the United States might use the looming Sino-Indian conflict to unleash Taiwan against the mainland. Another worry was that the American diplomacy seeking to block Hanoi’s effort to turn Laos into a base area for the war in Vietnam might be a forerunner of an eventual American attack on southern China via Laos. Chinese leaders could not believe that America would involve itself to the extent it did in Indochina (even then, before the major escalation had started) for local strategic stakes.

The Chinese leaders managed to obtain reassurance on both points, in the process demonstrating the comprehensive way in which Chinese policy was being planned. The Warsaw talks were the venue chosen to determine American intentions in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese ambassador to these talks was recalled from vacation and instructed to ask for a meeting. There he claimed that Beijing had noted preparations in Taiwan for a landing on the mainland. The American ambassador, who had not heard of any such preparations –since they were not, in fact, taking place –was instructed to reply that the United States desired peace and “under present circumstances” would not support a Nationalist offensive. The Chinese ambassador at these talks, Wang Bingman, noted in his memoirs that this information played a “very big role” in Beijing’s final decision to proceed with operations in the Himalayas. There is no evidence that the United States government asked itself what policy might have produced the request for a special meeting. It was the difference between a segmented and a comprehensive approach to policymaking.

The Laotian problem solved itself. At the Geneva Conference of 1962, the neutralization of Laos and withdrawal of American forces from It removed Chinese concerns.

With these reassurances in hand, Mao, in early 1962, assembled Chinese leaders to announce the final decision, which was for war:

“We fought a war with old Chiang [Kai-shek]. We fought a war with Japan, and with America. With none of these did we fear. And in each case we won. Now the Indians want to fight a war with us. Naturally, we don’t have fear. We cannot give ground, once we give ground it would be tantamount to letting them seize a big piece of land equivalent to Fujian province … Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough. Courtesy emphasizes reciprocity.”


On October 6, a decision in principle was taken. The strategic plan was for a massive assault to produce a shock that would impel a negotiation or at least an end to the Indian military probing for the foreseeable future.

Before the final decision to order the offensive , word was received from Khrushchev that, in case of war, the Soviet Union would back China under the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1950. It was a decision totally out of keeping with Soviet-Chinese relations in the previous years and the neutrality heretofore practiced by the Kremlin on the issue of Indian relations with China. A plausible explanation is that Khrushchev, aware of the imminence of a showdown over Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons to Cuba, wanted to assure himself of Chinese support in the Caribbean crisis. He never returned to the offer once the Cuban crisis was over.



At the end of the war, Mao had withstood –and in this case, prevailed in ---another major crisis, even while a famine was barely ended in China. It was in a way a replay of the American experience in the Korean War: an underestimation of China by its adversary; unchallenged intelligence estimates about Chinese capabilities; and coupled with grave errors in grasping how China interprets its security environments and how it reacts to military threats.

At the same time, the 1962 war added another formidable adversary for China at a moment when relations with the Soviet Union had gone beyond the point of no return. For the Soviet offer of support proved as fleeting as the Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba.

As soon as the military clashes in the Himalayas escalated, Moscow adopted a posture of neutrality. To rub salt into Chinese wounds, Khrushchev justified his neutrality with the proposition that he was promoting the loathed principle of peaceful coexistence. A December 1962 editorial in the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, angrily noted that this marked the first time a Communist state had not sided with another Communist state against a “bourgeois” country: “For a communist the minimum requirement is that he should make a clear distinction between the enemy and ourselves, and he should be ruthless to the enemy and kind to his own comrades.” The editorial added a somewhat plaintive call for China’s allies to “examine their conscience and ask themselves what has become of their Marxism-Leninism and what has become of their proletarian internationalism.”

By 1964, the Soviets dropped even the pretense of neutrality. Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, Mikhail Suslov, a member of the Politburo and party ideologist, accused the Chinese of aggression against India at a moment of maximum difficult for the Soviet Union:

“It is a fact that precisely at the height of Caribbean crisis the Chinese People’s Republic extended the armed conflict on the Chinese-Indian border. No matter how the Chinese leaders have tried since then to justify their conduct at the time they cannot escape the responsibility for the fact that through their actions they in effect aided the most reactionary circles of imperialism. ”

China, having barely overcome a vast famine, now had declared adversaries on all frontiers.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by PratikDas »

TOI: Enough is enough, behave like 'grown up' economy: Obama to China
"We're going to continue to be firm that China operate by the same rules as everyone else," Obama told reporters after hosting the 21-nation APEC summit in his native Honolulu. "We don't want them taking advantage of the United States."

China shot back that it refused to abide by international economic rules that it had no part in writing.

"First we have to know whose rules we are talking about," Pang Sen, a deputy director-general at China's Foreign Ministry said.

"If the rules are made collectively through agreement and China is a part of it, then China will abide by them. If rules are decided by one or even several countries, China does not have the obligation to abide by that."
[Pratik] There is a lesson for India in this. This is how powerful countries communicate. [/Pratik]
JE Menon
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by JE Menon »

This is exactly how we communicated on the NPT/CTBT issues, not to mention world trade and environmental issues.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Christopher Sidor »

abhishek_sharma wrote:Continuing from above:
Precise instructions were issued. The goal was still declared to be avoid a larger conflict. Chinese troops were not authorized to fire unless Indian forces come closer than fifty meters to their positions. Beyond that, military actions could be initiated only on orders from higher authorities.

Indian planners noted that China had stopped withdrawing but also observed Chinese restraint in firing. They concluded that another probe would do the trick. Rather than contest empty land, the goal became “to push back the Chinese posts they already occupied.”

Since the two objectives of China’s stated policy – to prevent further Indian advances and to avoid bloodshed –were not being met, Chinese leaders began to consider whether a sudden blow might force India to the negotiating table and end the tit for tat.

In pursuit of that objective, Chinese leaders were concerned that the United States might use the looming Sino-Indian conflict to unleash Taiwan against the mainland. Another worry was that the American diplomacy seeking to block Hanoi’s effort to turn Laos into a base area for the war in Vietnam might be a forerunner of an eventual American attack on southern China via Laos. Chinese leaders could not believe that America would involve itself to the extent it did in Indochina (even then, before the major escalation had started) for local strategic stakes.

The Chinese leaders managed to obtain reassurance on both points, in the process demonstrating the comprehensive way in which Chinese policy was being planned. The Warsaw talks were the venue chosen to determine American intentions in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese ambassador to these talks was recalled from vacation and instructed to ask for a meeting. There he claimed that Beijing had noted preparations in Taiwan for a landing on the mainland. The American ambassador, who had not heard of any such preparations –since they were not, in fact, taking place –was instructed to reply that the United States desired peace and “under present circumstances” would not support a Nationalist offensive. The Chinese ambassador at these talks, Wang Bingman, noted in his memoirs that this information played a “very big role” in Beijing’s final decision to proceed with operations in the Himalayas. There is no evidence that the United States government asked itself what policy might have produced the request for a special meeting. It was the difference between a segmented and a comprehensive approach to policymaking.

The Laotian problem solved itself. At the Geneva Conference of 1962, the neutralization of Laos and withdrawal of American forces from It removed Chinese concerns.

With these reassurances in hand, Mao, in early 1962, assembled Chinese leaders to announce the final decision, which was for war:

“We fought a war with old Chiang [Kai-shek]. We fought a war with Japan, and with America. With none of these did we fear. And in each case we won. Now the Indians want to fight a war with us. Naturally, we don’t have fear. We cannot give ground, once we give ground it would be tantamount to letting them seize a big piece of land equivalent to Fujian province … Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough. Courtesy emphasizes reciprocity.”


On October 6, a decision in principle was taken. The strategic plan was for a massive assault to produce a shock that would impel a negotiation or at least an end to the Indian military probing for the foreseeable future.

Before the final decision to order the offensive , word was received from Khrushchev that, in case of war, the Soviet Union would back China under the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1950. It was a decision totally out of keeping with Soviet-Chinese relations in the previous years and the neutrality heretofore practiced by the Kremlin on the issue of Indian relations with China. A plausible explanation is that Khrushchev, aware of the imminence of a showdown over Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons to Cuba, wanted to assure himself of Chinese support in the Caribbean crisis. He never returned to the offer once the Cuban crisis was over.



At the end of the war, Mao had withstood –and in this case, prevailed in ---another major crisis, even while a famine was barely ended in China. It was in a way a replay of the American experience in the Korean War: an underestimation of China by its adversary; unchallenged intelligence estimates about Chinese capabilities; and coupled with grave errors in grasping how China interprets its security environments and how it reacts to military threats.

At the same time, the 1962 war added another formidable adversary for China at a moment when relations with the Soviet Union had gone beyond the point of no return. For the Soviet offer of support proved as fleeting as the Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba.

As soon as the military clashes in the Himalayas escalated, Moscow adopted a posture of neutrality. To rub salt into Chinese wounds, Khrushchev justified his neutrality with the proposition that he was promoting the loathed principle of peaceful coexistence. A December 1962 editorial in the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, angrily noted that this marked the first time a Communist state had not sided with another Communist state against a “bourgeois” country: “For a communist the minimum requirement is that he should make a clear distinction between the enemy and ourselves, and he should be ruthless to the enemy and kind to his own comrades.” The editorial added a somewhat plaintive call for China’s allies to “examine their conscience and ask themselves what has become of their Marxism-Leninism and what has become of their proletarian internationalism.”

By 1964, the Soviets dropped even the pretense of neutrality. Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, Mikhail Suslov, a member of the Politburo and party ideologist, accused the Chinese of aggression against India at a moment of maximum difficult for the Soviet Union:

“It is a fact that precisely at the height of Caribbean crisis the Chinese People’s Republic extended the armed conflict on the Chinese-Indian border. No matter how the Chinese leaders have tried since then to justify their conduct at the time they cannot escape the responsibility for the fact that through their actions they in effect aided the most reactionary circles of imperialism. ”

China, having barely overcome a vast famine, now had declared adversaries on all frontiers.
In other words USA and Soviet Union gave assurances to China, that if it proceeded against India, they would stay out and would not go against it. Something to chew on.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by svinayak »

It was a war meant to put JLN down from his international pedestal.
The ruling elite of the global powers like USSR, USA and PRC had by then developed antipathy to JLN after more than a decade of his international presence.
Some of this shows up in many books of 1961 after the Goa acquisition such as India And Pakistan A Political Analysis By Hugh Tinker.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Pranav »

Thanks to Abhishek for posting that interesting excerpt from Kissinger's book.
Christopher Sidor wrote: In other words USA and Soviet Union gave assurances to China, that if it proceeded against India, they would stay out and would not go against it. Something to chew on.
Acharya wrote:It was a war meant to put JLN down from his international pedestal.
It could also have been a successful effort to foster enduring Indo-Chinese hostility.

Both Nehru and Mao were lacking in maturity. Although Nehru was the greater buffoon by far. Colonial powers did a good job of installing mentally colonized incompetents.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by ramana »

Newsinsight.net NVS writes

LINK:
http://www.newsinsight.net/archivedebat ... recno=2220
Down the slippery slope
China is on its way to losing the second cold war, says N.V.Subramanian.

18 November 2011: Can China take on the democratic world led by the United States and win? And if it cannot, why isn't it giving up and saving itself?

China is not the first great power to have appeared on the wrong side of history. In the last century, there were two, and both bit the dust. But in comparing the three totalitarian powers, there is more to be gained by paralleling Soviet Russia and China than dragging Nazi Germany (and imperial Japan) into the analysis.

At least up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, communism was the reigning ideology in both the USSR and China. During Nikita Khrushchev's time, China felt itself more communist than Soviet Russia, and their differences and rivalries started from there.

Those differences played up in another form when Mikhail Gorbachev messed up Soviet Russia's transition to Russia. The Chinese flat out criticized Russia's accent on glasnost (political openness) than on perestroika (economic reforms) and blamed Gorbachev for being politically feeble-minded.

China's greatest dictator after Mao, Deng Xiaoping, learnt some lessons from the Soviet collapse. He implemented it in the social contract signed with the sullen survivors of the Tiananmen Square massacre. They would make no demands for political freedom. On the other hand, the Chinese communist party (CPC) would determinedly make China an economic powerhouse.

The dark side of this Faustian bargain was known to all, and especially to Deng and his successors. If China failed to become an economic powerhouse, the CPC would not be able to contain democratic unrests. It would lose its authority to rule China.

And for China to become an economic powerhouse, Deng was willing to bend ideologies to unrecognizable form. Thus he justified the so-called economic reforms as "socialism with Chinese characteristics". And he most infamously interrogated, "What matters the colour of the cat so long it catches mice?"

But to become an economic powerhouse, China needed a peaceful environment near home and good equations with the world at large. Deng mandated, therefore, that China's rise ought to be quiet and peaceful, and that there was no room for aggression in foreign and military policies.

In time, great power China would become its own compelling deterrent force.

As theories go, this had merit. China did not want a second cold war to accompany its rise. Seeing the collapse of the Soviet Union, it understood it could not win the second cold war. If it lost that war, China having not the equivalent of satellite states would feel the most brunt on its central control of troublesome provinces. Tibet and Xinjiang would certainly spin out of control. The one-China policy would collapse. Hong Kong would go.

Worst of all, one-party rule would end
.

Without provoking a second cold war, China had other means of expansion. For example, Pakistan was a client state that would do anything to torment and contain India. China made Pakistan a nuclear-power state. Similarly, it propped up North Korea against South Korea and Japan. It cultivated the military regime of Burma. It did deals with the worst dictators in Africa and South America. Resource extraction became its obsession.

But somewhere along the line, China felt confident to abandon Deng Xiaoping's cautious ways. The PLA became more aggressive, conducting an anti-satellite test, flying its first stealth aircraft when the US defence secretary was in Beijing, going gung ho over anti-US anti-ship weapons, speeding to become a carrier-based navy, and so on. Rivalries with India were accelerated over the contentious Sino-Indian border, and the South China Sea became a major flashpoint between China and its Asia-Pacific neighbours.

Why did China abandon Deng's stealthy-rise strategy and pick up fights with its Asian neighbours? One way to look at it is that the PLA is getting more aggressive, or that the political leadership thinks the time is right for China to show aggression. America is in decline and, therefore, why not close the gap in one giant leap?

The problem with this is that China stands on weak economic foundations at least insofar as aggressive posturing goes. China can't threaten those very countries which are amongst the biggest markets for Chinese goods. A solely exports' based economy carries risks in a situation of worldwide financial downturn. And if domestic demand is suppressed to cushion the ill-effects of growth, then it worsens the economic situation, as it has for China.

Indeed, China stares at the fearsome prospect of being unable to honour its compact with the Tiananmen Square massacre generation.

Which takes you back to Deng Xiaoping. China's real problem is that it does not have anyone the equal of Deng to control and calibrate events in the country. Next year, a grossly inexperienced and worldly unwise leadership perhaps as mediocre as the present one assumes power. It will not be able to contain the new nationalistic Chinese aggression and it will have no skills to convince the world that China wants peace.

The US decision to return to Asia is perhaps the single-most important development strategy-wise after the end of the Cold War. President Barack Obama made no bones about it, calling the US a Pacific power over and over again. This may well be the beginning of a second cold war that Deng Xiaoping was so keen to avoid.

China certainly won't be able to win this cold war. But China will have no one to blame but itself. The consequences of losing that war will be disastrous for China. But the way Chinese polity is built (opaque and uninfluenceable from outside), these are consequences that cannot be averted, reversed or minimized.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Prem »

Chinese absurdity have made them stuck in paradox. They fall globally if they rise and fall internally if they dont. there only way out is India but they are stuck with Poakittanus ( germs) like a street dog and its female partner , both facing opposite directions while joined in the middle .... and made Chinese century to shrink into a decade or so. Pakistan might turn out to be the ultimate Monkey Trap for PRC, set up by the USA.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by svinayak »

China Might Have Over-Reached Itself wsj

There are times when seemingly unrelated anecdotes are more revealing than reams of data. This just might be one of those times, when it comes to U.S. relations with China, China's economic future, and the geopolitics of Chinese economic expansion.

Start with the political scene in America. First, the Democratic-controlled senate overwhelmingly passes a bill that would require the U.S. to respond to China's undervaluation of its currency by imposing significant tariffs on Chinese goods, and a majority of members of the House of Representatives promise to do the same if their leaders bring the bill to the floor for a vote. Then Mitt Romney, the leading contender for the Republican presidential nomination, uses one of the endless debates among prospective Republican candidates to announce that if elected he would name China a currency manipulator, complain to the World Trade Organization, and impose tariffs on any made-in-China goods that rely on stolen intellectual property.

Then President Obama decides to use his swing through Asia to warn China to "follow the rules," allow its currency to appreciate more rapidly, and respect intellectual property rights. And this time he seems to offer more than talk. For one thing, he has set about crafting an Asian trade bloc, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that doesn't include China. This, on top of a new trade agreement with South Korea. It is a long way from the general agreement at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Honolulu to a new free-trade zone, but this is the first tangible reaction to its trade policies that the Chinese regime has confronted.
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Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Post by Prabu »

Good to see Dragon loosing support with Asian Neighbor's . At last we are doing good in China front !
India defeats China to be on UN oversight body
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