Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -II

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Pranav
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Pranav »

brihaspati wrote:
Pranav wrote:Do people think there is need for an economics thread in the strategic issues forum.

For example, India-China trade policy must take into account China's military relationships.
We can start the economic linkages with strat and military bindings here. If it appears to go out of hand then we can go for a separate thread? We may not have too much open-source information on the linkages.
Actually, have gone ahead and started a separate "Strategic Economics" thread (http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 43&start=0). From the first post of that thread:

1. How economic policy can be used to penalize terrorist states

2. How trade and investment policies can be used to provide incentives and dis-incentives to states which support terrorist states.

3. How to encourage development of strategic sectors of the economy - including semiconductor manufacturing, telecommunications equipment, aircraft industry etc.

4. How to protect economic sovereignty and welfare in a time of currency manipulation and trade wars.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Neshant »

I seriously doubt there will be any merger of any state into India.

Its not a desireable idea either given humungous population levels, religious extremeism, and the demographic problems it brings. Not to mention there's nothing in it for India to begin with.

India can probably help these countries along with their development through aid pacakges linked to good governance, diasaster relief, resource management, loans and setting a good example for development.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Samudragupta »

AL sees itself as the sole inheritor of the BN, rightly or wrongly it has invested heavily in the concept and fought two conflicts to sustain itself. The identity of Bengali is the master weapon it holds under its sleeve to engage the world around it and to balance any threats it feels will endanger its hold over the term. In a way BN holds the same value to Al what Islam holds to Pak Army and it will continue to work on this concept to extend its sphere of influence. Note the differnce of the term Bangladeshi Nationalism and Bengali Nationalism, while the later is a valid term based on the 19th century Euro Socio-Political model, the former is a comcept based on the predomonance of Territory or State as the basis for nationalism and while Al uses the first term, the Islamists tends to use the second.
Nationalism based on territorry is the weak concept compared to the othar factors like Language,ethinicity, ideology because territory or state can be the basis for a state but for the state to be a nation requires the state to actively invest in nationalising the resources of the state. The forced Germanization of the Poles in Prussia and forcing of French lenguage on the citizens of France after the establishment of Republic is an example of this concept. Generally to hide the inherent artificiality of this form of Nationalism the state controlling the territory transforms into expansionist behaviour, and tries to increase the borders of the state to take control of more resources and use it in the Nationalization of the State, a phenomenon widely seen in case of PRC.

In case of Al and Bangladesh it knows that it does not have anough resources to back up the expansionsit policies hence it camouflaged its Bangladeshi nationalism into "Bengali Nationalism" and It is the strategic aim of AL to destroy any alternate version of BN being devoloped in its periphery.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by vera_k »

While the Indian Union is more evolved and integrated than the European Union, there have been increasing moves to concentrate power at the federal level. This is most visible in regards to the accession of J&K and in moves to dismiss elected governments using Article 356.

If the Indian Union begins accepting new members again, I figure that there will have to be some delegation of federal powers to member states. But I daresay that the federal power will not be comfortable with such a move because of the implicit weakening of federal authority in such a move.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Pratyush »

Vera,

The constution of India as exists can accomplish the task quite effectively as it was seen form the accession of Sikkim to the union in 74.

If the union is to gain more members then the same model can be applied in future as well.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

The NYT news item about the possible fake identity representative of Taleban who was negotiating with the Afghan side and under US observations, also speculates about the man being really an ISI or Taleb agent. [ http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/23/world ... ef=taliban ]

Now this on the whole is most interesting from a different perspective. It means that the US has been present in the AFG theatre dealing with the Talebs for more than a decade now, but in all that time they were unable to penetrate the intelligence networks or organization of the Talebs. Without adopting CT theories about possibility of different frontends and organizations within the US state umbrella working to undermine each other for funds and other reasons - we cannot easily explain the failure. Even if one or more subunits of the US gov is interested in protecting the ISI or the Talebs, they will not do so to the extent that the US gov itself loses face internationally - since that makes a lot of politicians overlapping with biz and military interests very very angry.

How can the military operate successfully and maintain control without gaining intelligence penetration on ground within the opponent, especially after almost a decade of engaging with them? if this is the case with US intelligence, how reliable are their projections about the outcome and timeline of the campaign?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Neshant wrote:I seriously doubt there will be any merger of any state into India.

Its not a desireable idea either given humungous population levels, religious extremeism, and the demographic problems it brings. Not to mention there's nothing in it for India to begin with.

India can probably help these countries along with their development through aid pacakges linked to good governance, diasaster relief, resource management, loans and setting a good example for development.
The question comes back to whether mutually tolerant co-existence is feasible or possible. Even if we tolerate them - they will continuously be working against us. Out of a jealous guarding of their own identities - which in most cases they realize as artificial, recent invention etc., and therefore weak, they may and in fact do often allow other external stronger forces to use their territory as launching pads for moves to harass India.

We have tried this co-existence bit for a long long time. It is also about lack of Indian sovereignty over these regions which would have been necessary to prevent such activities.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by AKalam »

brihaspati wrote:
Neshant wrote:I seriously doubt there will be any merger of any state into India.

Its not a desireable idea either given humungous population levels, religious extremeism, and the demographic problems it brings. Not to mention there's nothing in it for India to begin with.

India can probably help these countries along with their development through aid pacakges linked to good governance, diasaster relief, resource management, loans and setting a good example for development.
The question comes back to whether mutually tolerant co-existence is feasible or possible. Even if we tolerate them - they will continuously be working against us. Out of a jealous guarding of their own identities - which in most cases they realize as artificial, recent invention etc., and therefore weak, they may and in fact do often allow other external stronger forces to use their territory as launching pads for moves to harass India.

We have tried this co-existence bit for a long long time. It is also about lack of Indian sovereignty over these regions which would have been necessary to prevent such activities.
Very nicely put, nature abhors vacuum, so is the case in geopolitics. Subcontinent is full of vacuum spaces for others to needle in and operate, such spaces should be eliminated so alien outsiders cannot gain any foothold.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by svinayak »

Pratyush wrote: The "anti-Indian" bogey was manufactured with the connivance of the Brits and the needs of dictators that took over in all the "countries" that were manufactured out of India.."

This is very interesting. Has there been a 'conspiracy' to ensure that non-progressive countries are in India's neighbourhood, so that the region does not grow economically, under some kind of Indian pre-eminence? Pakistan right from the outset, Sri Lanka under Jayawardene and like minded leaders, Bangladesh under the generals and Khaleda, and Burma as mentioned, are evidence in that direction.

Why is it that figures of the stature and ideology of Nehru, Radhakrishnan, Indira, Gujral( leaving aside for the moment their blunders, inadequacies etc) don't arise in these neighbouring countries? Progressive, pluralist regimes would naturally be attracted toward India. What was the role of the British in preventing this development?
-----------

The problem could be India it self. Rather then the leadership of the neioughbouring nations. Lets ignore Pakistans for the moment.

With India what you have is a naton that by its existance shows that a multi ethinic and religious state can exist and be sucessful in the long run.

Most of the nations on the peheriphary of India are nations that has gives primacy to one ethenic and linguistic group. What they fear is closeness from India and the fact that they will assimilated in to the Indian union. If they got too close to it. So they create tensions with India and keep on raising the India bogie.

I was friends with the elder son of a staffer from the BD embassy Delhi during my graduation. The fear he had was that BD will be assimilated by India. My old man during his interactions with Pakistanies and Lankans talks of the same fear amongst them. But with the Pakistanies he says that they are envious of India. This envy is missing from the lankans.

This could be one of the reasons why people like Nehru, Radhakrishnan, Indira, Gujral have little traction with the populations of the neioughbouring countries.

If you remember, during the tenure of Gujral, it was the Badmash who said of one of the Gujrals initiative, This amounts to," sieze thy neioughbout peacefully".
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Acharya wrote:
Pratyush wrote: The "anti-Indian" bogey was manufactured with the connivance of the Brits and the needs of dictators that took over in all the "countries" that were manufactured out of India.."

This is very interesting. Has there been a 'conspiracy' to ensure that non-progressive countries are in India's neighbourhood, so that the region does not grow economically, under some kind of Indian pre-eminence? Pakistan right from the outset, Sri Lanka under Jayawardene and like minded leaders, Bangladesh under the generals and Khaleda, and Burma as mentioned, are evidence in that direction.

Why is it that figures of the stature and ideology of Nehru, Radhakrishnan, Indira, Gujral( leaving aside for the moment their blunders, inadequacies etc) don't arise in these neighbouring countries? Progressive, pluralist regimes would naturally be attracted toward India. What was the role of the British in preventing this development?
-----------

The problem could be India it self. Rather then the leadership of the neioughbouring nations. Lets ignore Pakistans for the moment.

With India what you have is a naton that by its existance shows that a multi ethinic and religious state can exist and be sucessful in the long run.

Most of the nations on the peheriphary of India are nations that has gives primacy to one ethenic and linguistic group. What they fear is closeness from India and the fact that they will assimilated in to the Indian union. If they got too close to it. So they create tensions with India and keep on raising the India bogie.

I was friends with the elder son of a staffer from the BD embassy Delhi during my graduation. The fear he had was that BD will be assimilated by India. My old man during his interactions with Pakistanies and Lankans talks of the same fear amongst them. But with the Pakistanies he says that they are envious of India. This envy is missing from the lankans.

This could be one of the reasons why people like Nehru, Radhakrishnan, Indira, Gujral have little traction with the populations of the neioughbouring countries.

If you remember, during the tenure of Gujral, it was the Badmash who said of one of the Gujrals initiative, This amounts to," sieze thy neioughbout peacefully".
Perhaps more accurately, it is a two-fold fear of the elite in these regions who had risen up using the early British colonial project of encouraging as much heterogeneity as possible to prevent future unified resistance from the conquered.

The first fear is of course that incorporated into India they will lose the relevance of the special exclusive identities that have been invented - based on which the elite has been used to obtaining special privileges from the world order.

But a deeper possible fear is that - once the borders melt, a large proportion of the hitherto exclusively isolated and brainwashed populations may just find the reality way too different from what has been propagandized before. They may voluntarily be seduced by existing aspects of Indian life, philosophies, religions, and more importantly the very fear generated so far by propaganda that India does not allow diversity - may fall apart.

So what if the "evil" Indians actually do not treat the absorbed populations badly? That is even more dangerous that than active destruction of exclusivity!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Decentralized command structure and its implications : have we really thought about this model? More importantly, for the subcontinent and beyond the military?

There is a long standing debate among military historians or strategists about the value of "decentralized command structure". Starting from historical battles, dating from Roman times to WWII, opinions appear to be divided. Some blame loss and defeat in war to improper and inadequate centralization - some attribute success to the decentralization itself.

I find a lot more renewed interest now in the application of "decentralized command structure" in the military arena, with studies on the Hezbollah, the first Iraq war and the theories of a certain USAF officer, and other conflicts. But what is more interesting for me is the application of the concept not only to the military scenario but beyond it to political and politico-military conflicts (political conflicts that can mutate or mature or extend into military conflicts). I am not sure whether it is okay to quote the following [admins, if the site and its contents are not halaal, let me know]

http://www.demo14u.com/news137.html Air Marshal Ayaz A Khan (R) writes,
"Indian Army has eighteen Infantry, ten Mountain, three Armored, and two Artillery Divisions. Besides it has five Infantry, one parachute, thirteen Air Defense, and four Engineering Brigades, designated as independent formations. In addition there are two Air Defense Groups, and fourteen Army Aviation Helicopter units. This is a sizeable force, capable of launching major offensives from several fronts. The decentralized command structure will be an advantage, as compared to Pakistan's centralized Army command organization."

Looking beyond the rhetoric that needs to show an equal equal in the military arena if not superiority for Pak, what strikes is the specificity of the concept in the military scenario only in the military mind. The key advantages that are cited for "decentralized command structure" are the flexibility in and rapidity of response depending on context, allowing initiative at contact region, resourcefulness of local/contact personnel, etc. The opponents of the concept cite the potential problems in local initiatives diverging from the overall central target, distraction and possible damage to the central objectives by undesirable or wrong initiatives, lack of coordination with other independent initiatives.

This is basically not a debate only in the military arena, but exactly similar concerns hold on opposite sides of the "centrally planned command economy" (some of the early Soviet experiments in the middle part of Stalin's reign), versus completely decentralized free market based economies. Most practical economies evolve somewhere in between. Thus the "decentralized command structure" is the military approximation to the communist-dissenting economists who suggested using a "decentralized planned economy".

What the AM(R) is describing is however not really a "decentralized planned" structure. A full implementation of decentralized planned economy requires the "market" to still operate and be the chief mechanism by which market prices signal the trends and forces to the "central planners". The army structure being mentioned is really decentralized at most at the "upper levels", and the lower levels are not being shown as being allowed to take free initiative.

The difficulty in imposing a "decentralized command structure" in a single centrally planned army is because the army is supposed to be professional without any ideological affiliation. Which means there is no single grand vision or ideological vision shared by all regardless of rank that can allow the smallest functional unit to set up its own objectives, evaluate and implement them if necessary.

However note that if the army is after all the military face of a movement driven by ideology, then it can overcome this difficulty. Even if according to the above article, the Pak army does not have a decentralized command structure, most of the Jihadist organizations actually follow this concept - and their ideological drive is perfectly suited to such a structure.

Not sure whether I can point out in the open forum that there appears to be adoption or realization of the value of this approach in some other faith systems operating on the subcontinent. Those interested can look up criticisms or analysis of the Pentecostals in India from non-Pentecostals.

Is there a value in exploring this - to negate or even perhaps to adapt and adopt?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Pratyush »

B,

It is important to understand, (It is not cleat to me from the link provided ) if the authour is recommending autonomus commands in times of war. Or he is suggesting such at all times and them being capable of taking initiative to commence hostilities without the seeking the concurrence of the national command. If the opportunity presents it self to seek a tactial gain. (Think Kargil type adventure of the TSPA).

If it is the latter, then it is clear to all as to what the risks are.

If it the former, then IA and other modern militaries already practice it to a large extent.

But this as you mentioned in your post has wide applicability for a jihadist type force.

JMT
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Sanku »

Raja Ram wrote:Interesting to see that Gen. Ashfaq Kayani has come out with a select press briefing to say that the US wants Pakistan to be permanently destabilized and the goal is to denuclearise. In the backdrop of the leaks, I think he is making ground for two things

(i) Making sure that he gains complete control without being formally in power - whoever is the facade is determined by the powers that control pakistan - the current US choice is Zardari kept in check by Gilani. However, the Saudi choice seems to be Nawaz or Musharaff (hence he is jockeying -Kayani may prefere Mush) and China may prefer Musharaff too.

(ii) Create room for Pakistan to regain space and time with regard to Afghanistan, buy time to regroup and then get back to destroy India agenda in full earnest.

The private briefing and the leaked reports of it by the editors seem to indicate that they are making a move to wriggle out of a vice like grip that the US wants on the nuclear arsenal.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Sanku wrote:
Raja Ram wrote:Interesting to see that Gen. Ashfaq Kayani has come out with a select press briefing to say that the US wants Pakistan to be permanently destabilized and the goal is to denuclearise. In the backdrop of the leaks, I think he is making ground for two things

(i) Making sure that he gains complete control without being formally in power - whoever is the facade is determined by the powers that control pakistan - the current US choice is Zardari kept in check by Gilani. However, the Saudi choice seems to be Nawaz or Musharaff (hence he is jockeying -Kayani may prefere Mush) and China may prefer Musharaff too.

(ii) Create room for Pakistan to regain space and time with regard to Afghanistan, buy time to regroup and then get back to destroy India agenda in full earnest.

The private briefing and the leaked reports of it by the editors seem to indicate that they are making a move to wriggle out of a vice like grip that the US wants on the nuclear arsenal.
The USA is not infallible. It can boast of sharp wits and wags in its diplomatic service, and political party ambitious making it to the white house. But its decisions are still arrived at by a lumbering conglomerate of conflicting and competing interests - each fought for viciously by factions, lobbies and groups.

Why do we always assume that these American factions are somehow, omniscient, omnipresent and always correct in their calculations for the future. They may have a bigger and more penetrative intelligence gathering operation compared to other countries at this time point in world history, simply because of the resources spent on such activities. However, they may still be governed and moved by prejudices and preconceptions or biases that have solid religious, racial, and other irrational roots.

Many have given economic, and anti-Soviet supposed needs in the USA to back up Pak regimes. But if we really study US-Pak actual collaborations against the "Soviets", it only shows up as anything worthwhile for the USA for the stated purpose of fighting "communism" - in the late 80's. Before that Pak really had no strategic reach into USSR to be useful. The so-called anti-communist stance did not prevent Pak from supporting Mao internationally at a stage when US administration had not yet conceived of the plan to bring Mao on board against the "Russians".

There are certain clear preference patterns in US establishment, and those preference orderings will continue well into the future since entrenched interest groups with long term financial, business and power interests, have a certain inertia of their own.

Some of these preference patterns as relevant for India can be hypothesized as follows : (in order of highest preference to lowest)
(1) Religion : Christianity > Judaism > Islam (Sunni>>Shia) > Indic
(2) Regimes : authoritarian with a democratic legitimization > authoritarian without democratic legitimization > non-authoritarian with democratic legitimization
(3) Leadership : autocrat with democratic legitimization > autocrat without democratic legitimization > oligarchy with democratic legitimization
(4) Race : Anglo-Saxonic > White European "Nordic"> White European "non-Nordic" > White not including Iranians and Russians but including Jews> Russian > East Asian/Japanese > East Asian Hannic + Indo-Iranians +"Arab" +North Africans > non-North Africans + SE Asians

(1)+(2)+(3) will act together for a long time to psychologically predispose most of US decision makers to try and preserve Pak as long as possible. However the "possible" is the most notorious word in US foreign policy. It means as and when US admin sees more loss than can be compensated by psychological factors of (1)+(2)+(3) in backing up Pak, it will abandon Pak overnight.

I know that 26/11 is being discussed in the "leaks" thread and other threads as a possible arrangement between US intelligence and under cover operatives (or known double agents whose "doubleness" itself could be a matter of tactics by US intelligence itself) and Pak secret services and PA - as a means to both test as well as reassure the Pakis about the political willingness of GOI to retaliate in any manner.

However, if the US and Pak rely on the non-action by the GOI as far as retaliation goes, then they could be in for a deep miscalculation. What they are seeing - are reactions by big metropolises, each with long standing and well established long standing connections with organized criminal-financial-economic and business networks. So Mumbai did not penalize in any way those in political power, New Delhi did not do anything either as a city.

Is it not possible that the apparent non-chalance shown by Mumbai for example is a rather "arranged" reaction along the line sof the possible US-Pak collaboration itself? There are two possible errors. First that the overwhelming apparent favouring of financial profits over any trauma or retaliation may not be a political representative of the larger national political thinking in the generations that are coming up and who will make their political inclination felt in the coming decades. Second, that these very same "compromises" by the "cities" may in turn trigger a thought process by which the non-urban non-big-city population psychologically diassociates from what the "big glittering cities" represent politically.

The Americans as dabblers in the Judaeo-Christian legacy must be aware of the classic process by which individuals come to see the "city" as the "evil", the "corrupt", the "whore" which sleeps with anyone for profit, and without a "soul". What if continued virtual capitulation to proven evil foreign ideologies and interests or whims generate a similar feeling in Indians? Without the political power of the big cities (not necessarily in electoral terms but as financial and elite or media powerhouses for manufacture of consent) controlling public opinion, all calculations to control India in the future to benefit the US-Pak relationship may go out the window!

Perhaps already the enforced silence and meekness has taken its toll - by weakening the power of the compromisers and yielding to the hawks in persisting with "moves" in Afghanistan. Something had to give to preserve the complex balance of power within Indian decision making! Does the US really want to strengthen the hawks in Indian thinking even more?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

Good post
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Pratyush ji,
after I posted about the decentralized command structure in ideologically militant movements, someone pointed out the Guardian article here
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/no ... intcmp=239
I am taking quotes from this to show how exactly the Talibs are following a classic organizational strategy, and most of the factors I have maintained is eventually going to force the US forces to retreat : (if they continue to treat it as a purely military and developmental problem and not as an ideologically motivated sadistic search for power from psychopathic mullahs with a particularly refined sadistic ideology for a theology)
We were asked to wait for the district chief in the house of a burly, bearded man who spoke passable English with a hint of a London accent. For most of the time he lived in east London, he said, but he came to Afghanistan for three months of the year to fight. He was a mullah and had the rank of a mid-level Taliban commander.

"I work as a minicab driver there," he said. "I make good money, you know. But these people are my friends and my family and it's my duty to come to fight the jihad with them. "There are many people like me in London," he added. "We collect money for the jihad all year and come and fight if we can."


He shared the compound-style house in Dhani-Ghorri with his brothers and sisters and their families. The oldest brother, a senior cleric or maulvi, also lived in London. Of his two younger brothers, one lived in Dubai and the other [...] in Norway. The fighting season was coming to a close, they said, and the four of them were getting ready to return to their civilian lives abroad.
There goes all arguments of liberal valued society, prosperity - being the only sufficient method to guarantee turning away from sadism! Living one life-style with money and trappings of modern development had no impact on the theologically motivated sadistic existence.
When Lal Muhammad, the district chief, entered the room, all the men jumped to attention. Lal Muhammad is a short and stern 32-year-old madrassa teacher. In his crisp blue shalwar qameez and dark brown glasses it was easier to imagine him giving a class in theology than leading men in battle. He sat down with his legs crossed, savouring the silence and his authority. He would explain how in three years his band of Taliban had grown to supplant the government as the real rulers of the district.
This is the classic sign revealing that the real power and attraction behind this particular theology/ideology is a sadistic drive to gain personal power. It expands by attracting exactly those minds which have been twisted beyond all humanity in a mad quest for personal dominance and authority over others. It also indicates the power of the memes which have now become tolerated and "natural" to the populace so much so that they also do not find such sadism "unnatural". That preparing of ideological acceptance of such sadism in the populace is the real contribution of the theology and the real base of power of the Islamists.
Three years ago, he and a few other madrassa teachers started fighting small-scale skirmishes against the government. "There were people in the village and in the madrassa who liked the Taliban and wanted them back, but the government was strong then and they even controlled the countryside. We held meetings with the mullahs of the mosques. They supported us because we were fighting the foreigners, so we collected some weapons."
[...]
"In the first two operations the fighters were just madrassa teachers and students," said Lal Muhammad. "We arrested the police, burned their cars and distributed their weapons and the mujahideen started the fight. We met the mullahs again after that and told them we could now defend ourselves. They gave us their blessing."

As Lal Muhammad's reputation grew, others came to join him. "When the old Taliban heard about us they started joining us. Students from madrassa here and from Pakistan came to work in jihad and help us."

Eventually blessings arrived from the Taliban leadership in Quetta and two Komissyons – Taliban councils – were established, one civilian and one military. He continued to teach in the local madrassa not far from the village.
This again is classic early Islamic militant spread and later Maoist strategy - using difficult terrain, and pre-existing popular memes, as well as vacuum in government or state presence, to make a dash for personal power and authority. But the peculiarity of the Islamist framework and how it is particularly suited for these type of power-seekers, is evident in the above. Time and again, as I have tried to point out, the main reason that Islamist militancy appears to spring back from latency and apparent retreat - is because the mullahs are allowed to live and preach and continue with their institutions. Because they preserve the theology - they preserve the essential memes to revive the militant and sadistic seeking of personal power.
The second Taliban post was in an Uzbek village. During previous visits to the Taliban in the north I had seen that the movement was predominantly Pashtun, but in the last year Uzbek and Tajik units have started to emerge in Baghlan, Faryab and other provinces.

"They are in control in their areas," Lal Muhammad told me. "We armed them and gave them the weapons. They are independent in their area, but under the leadership of the Taliban movement."

Most of these fighters were young teenagers, but the commander was an old Uzbek who had fought in the civil war in the 1990s. Why was he fighting again? "Because the foreigners are here," he said.

After we left the village, Lal Muhammad told me: "Everywhere you see the Taliban you have to understand that the Taliban grow among the people. We can't survive in an area without the people's support, the mosque is our station, the houses are our station, the madrassa is our station. Each RPG rocket cost us 1300 afghanis ($26). Every day I do operations and use rockets. How could I do that if people weren't paying for us?
There goes the myth of subnationalism and Pashtunism putting an inherent check on Islamist sadism in AFG.
Back at the compound of the English Talib, many of the commanders who were in the orchard sat around Lal Muhammad. They included Haji Saleh, an old man in his sixties who said he first started fighting the foreigners 31 years ago. That time they were called Russian, he said, but they are the same, all kafirs.

Haji Saleh's job was laying mines. "I go at night to lay mines and traps in the road," he said. He worked with another fighter, Bilal, who was the electronics expert of the group.

Bilal, who was from eastern Afghanistan, was also called Engineer Sahib because he had an engineering degree from a university in Pakistan. Bilal spent the night teaching his comrades how to bring down helicopters ("Shoot at the rotors. Don't shoot when it's coming at you shoot at it from behind") and told me their comrades in Pakistan supplied them with Google Earth maps that they used to locate government bases and identify targets for their mortars.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Pratyush »

B,

The only way to defeat such an enemy is to drain the swamp within which the idealogy resides.

This brings me to the dialog between Col Kruts and Captan Wildman in the movie Apocalypse Now, regarding the applicability of moral terror and judgment how a force comfortable with the use of moral terror and freed from the judgment of modern society will be very effective in certain situations.

The only way Jhidism can be controlled is by using such methods.

JMT
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Samudragupta »

B ji,
I will be very interested to know the likely moves of these so called band of sadistic brothers if the source of money in this case from abroad is cutoff...will the sadistic power grabbing mentality will choose

some other motivational factor to renew its search for power or will the ideology overpower the merchantile mentality for power?
The following questions are coming to my mind,
1. What is the likely approach of the Mullahs? Is it going to be different that the so called Madrassa Teacher?
2. It seems that the Mullahs may not have joined directly with the movement...they have only "blessed" the others.
3. There exists a particular group of people who are completely indifferent to the happennings.... they like the Talibs but they are not against the strong Gov....it seems these group of people does not share the

same std of universal human pshychology and autocratic and totalitarian system is a type of divine destiny for this group.
4. There exists a very few group of people who are willing to do anything for the ideology and ideology provides them with the necessary motivation for changing and controlling the system
5. There exixts few group of people who provides a network of condut between the existing civilization and the system to channel resources for the system to expand their own power among the components

of the system.

The independent decentralised entity is not the people or the ideology or other motivation but the system which acting as an integrated entity is decentralized from the central authority, in this case i believe the

Sura. The system can act as a decentralized system if the above compoenents of the system works in sync with each other, any change in the balance of the system will desroy the ability of the system to

function as a decentralized entity. It is important to understand that the system may not necessarily have an ideology of its own but it can always evolve into one ideologically dominated system if the ideology

provides the system with enough material/ideological resources to expand its influence over the other existing decentralized systems. The components of the system also have different motivational factors to

work in sync with each other, the mullahs motivating factor is to control the indifferents, the teacher's motivation is to control the system itself, and the merchants motivation is to increase its relative power

against the other components and within component. All the three groups use the indifferents for their own motivations specially if the indifferents have a considerable amount of material resources of their

own.

The most important point is to define the objective, if the objective is to stop the system from functioning then it is sufficient to detroy the balance of the system. If the objective is to completely destroy the

system itself then each of the above components of the system has to be dealt separately and in its own unique method.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Samudragupta ji,
It is difficult to tackle decentralized militant movements, if and once their memes take root (or were already present) in the population base.

However, past movements that faced trouble or came to the point of extinction do provide a lot of clues, including the tribes that roamed the lands currently known as Afghanistan and the actual field methods by which Islamists originally expanded.

As I have tried to point out that the myth of invincibility of the Afghans were put forward more as a result of the failed Afghan campaigns of the Brits. It is not really historically true that the Aafghans were always "fiercely independent", etc etc. They did submit and abjectly grovel at the feet of invaders who maqtched them or perhaps surpassed them in cruelty and sadism. The descriptions of campaigns by Alexander and the Mongols show a clear example. Uncannily whenever Afghans finally submitted, they always did so to invaders who were genocidal. Both Alexander and the Mongols, typically erased to the ground any village/town/settlement that resisted - and they carried it out ruthlessly on Afghans. We know of descriptions by which hill strongholds were meticulously blockaded, bridges/causeways built, and the population killed to the last man woman and child. There are cries of help from brave Afghans to regimes outside that Afghans are being enslaved by the Mongols - who usually slaughtered every human in a settlement that resisted, and sometimes like the Romans, killed off all cats, dogs and animals in the city.

If the same methods are tried again against the Talebs, the Taleb movement will be finished off. But the reason for its success will not only just be reverse terror - but the fact that wiping out of settlements will also wipe off the theologians who maintain the study of Islamic history, campaigns, strategies of expansion, and the religious justification of it all.

The Long March undertaken by the Communists in China was a desperate measure to break out of tight encirclement and annihilation campaign by the Kuomindang armies. It is doubtful if the communists were unable to cross the Dadu, that they would have gone on to survive. The fifth encirclement campaign against the southern base area was specifically based on a pill-box ringed blockade and "annihilation" of the enclosed area bit by bit.

The Americans made the one blunder in dealing with the Talebs (but perhaps they were forced to) [just as they did with Vietnam and Korea - because they could not completely encircle and blockade either region, and both regions had an escape -supply route] was that they did not encircle and "annihilate".

If you look at the mullah's role, it is primarily that of the dormant preserver of memes and providers of legitimization. Without the mullah's the madrassa teachers do not have as much legitimacy in the eye of the population, and then they have to depend on distant and locally unseen commanders. The mullah mediates the crucial three way link to local population carefully soaked and steeped in Islamic thought over centuries, "divine" legitimization, ambitious activists seeking power and authority, and external resource and political providers. Finish the mullah and destroy his support netowk, his institution and money, the three way link gets broken or weakened to a great degree.

Just drying up the money and external resource is not enough (even if you manage to do it), for a country like AFG will always manage to find smuggling routes.

The two necessary things that will work are that (1) there is no population that can provide a base for the mullah and jihadis (2) complete encirclement and annihilation of all within a given circle, with special target being the mullah.

Actually, the Islamists have always been aware of this method - they have consistently targeted intellectuals and theologians or spiritual leaders of the non-muslim whenever they invaded/assassination campaigned in non-muslim regions. The '71 targeted elimination of Bengali intellectuals, more from among the the Hindus, by the Pakis and their Bangladeshi collaborators was solidly in Islamist tradition - although apologists try to pass it off as Pakiness.

It is difficult to mount such campaigns against Talebs - not because of reality or ground situation, but because the forces opposed to the Talebs are hamstrung by their own formal "humanitarian" values. These values can be cited by internal factional opponents to discredit any other faction that uses such "inhuman" methods against the Talebs. However, as history repeatedly shows, the Islamists or the mullahs have no such self-imposed restriction. Whenever opportunities arise, the entire Islmic population in a region switches over to Jihad or at least plays passive in not opposing such jihadi initiative undertaken by the ambitious among them. You have talked of "indifferents" - I would rather call them people who support jihadi violence on others as long as it brings material benefits for them, and play "indifferent". They do not oppose such jihad violently although they resist any opposition to jihad.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Pratyush ji,
unless it becomes more costly for the population that allows the Talebs to survive among them - compared to the costs of not allowing the Talebs to live on, the survival of the Talebs as a movement is guaranteed. So unless settlements and populations pay the price of not beheading each and every Taleban that roams around among them, the Talebs wil always grow back.

Basically the world has to tell the Pakis and the Afghans that unless we see Taleb or militant heads up on pikes we will hold the population itself as responsible, and that theyw ill not be seen as distinct from the Talebs themselves and therefore treated in the same manner.

Do you think if the PA commanders were told that the fate of Zia and Bhutto waits for them if the heads of the Taleb leadership do not appear on lamposts one fine crisp TFTA morning, that the Taleb movement will not be finished off?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RajeshA »

brihaspati garu,

I think, I've a scenario coming up in my ebook, which is nearing finishing, where the Indics can have their cake and eat it too!

It pertains somewhat to the current discussion.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RamaY »

^ Can't wait. Bring it on RajeshA garu.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RajeshA »

RamaY garu,
thanks for your pressure! :wink:

brihaspati garu,

Here is something for you: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk & Clergy!
But then you probably know it!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by abhishek_sharma »

From the Urdu Press: Baffled by Bihar

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/baffl ... ar/719728/
The landslide victory of the JD(U)-BJP combine in the Bihar assembly elections has evoked surprise, and in some cases even applause, in the Urdu press. Rashtriya Sahara editor Aziz Burney, in a signed piece on November 25, described the Bihar results as “hamari jeet, Sangh Parivar ki haar” (our victory, Sangh Parivar’s defeat), “our” alluding to Muslims. He writes: “We look at these results as our success because we have defeated the settled agenda of the Sangh Parivar and the BJP. We compelled them to think and understand that the country, which has to move on with democratic values, believes in communal harmony and national integration and not in their thinking based on religious hatred, or hatred for Muslims.”

Jamaat-e-Islami’s biweekly Daawat in a commentary on November 28, says: “More than the magic of vikas (development), the division of opposition votes has played an important role. The performance of Muslim candidates has been very disappointing... In spite of there being over 40 per cent Muslim voters in 50 constituencies and Muslims influencing the results in about 102 constituencies, only 19 Muslim candidates have won. In most Muslim-majority areas, BJP candidates have won because of the division of Muslim votes.” Delhi-based daily Hamara Samaj, after a detailed analysis of Muslim votes, asserts: “Now it has been proved that Muslims have completely rejected politics based on religion and caste and voted only for development and employment.”


Lucknow-based daily, Qaumi Khabrein in its November 25 editorial writes: “On the one hand, Nitish Kumar gave the proof of good governance. But on the other hand, he did not close his eyes to the grassroots realities of India, and particularly of Bihar — the arithmetic of castes — and proved to be a good ruler and a good politician.” The paper adds: “A seasoned player like Nitish will not sit quietly. He may need 10-12 more MLAs to get a majority for his party. If he succeeds in engineering defections in the opposition parties, he would not need BJP support. Thus in Bihar, the two allies have a ‘sleeping with the enemy’ type of relationship. It cannot be said who (and when) could knock the other out.”
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Pratyush »

brihaspati wrote:Pratyush ji,
unless it becomes more costly for the population that allows the Talebs to survive among them - compared to the costs of not allowing the Talebs to live on, the survival of the Talebs as a movement is guaranteed. So unless settlements and populations pay the price of not beheading each and every Taleban that roams around among them, the Talebs wil always grow back.

Basically the world has to tell the Pakis and the Afghans that unless we see Taleb or militant heads up on pikes we will hold the population itself as responsible, and that theyw ill not be seen as distinct from the Talebs themselves and therefore treated in the same manner.

Do you think if the PA commanders were told that the fate of Zia and Bhutto waits for them if the heads of the Taleb leadership do not appear on lamposts one fine crisp TFTA morning, that the Taleb movement will not be finished off?
B,

As usual you have captured the gist of my argument beautifuly. Along with the applicability of Moral Terror.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Sanku »

X-post
SSridhar wrote:Raja Ram & Ramana,

Kerry went to Islamabad after meeting Man Mohan Singh in New Delhi. Several things are falling into place now. While Kerry might have made an off-the-cuff remark on India compromising on Kashmir, the various mysterious ways in which GoI has behaved in recent times on the J&K issue, makes one think otherwise. Kerry's visit was also a few days before Ms. Nirupama Rao met her counterpart for the first time after 26/11.
Sirs I humbly submit that this pattern has been evidently visible since Havana, and some of us have been calling on it only to be ridiculed.

It is clear that apart from the policy of "drift other than economy" mentioned by SS and RR; a policy of "outsource decision making on all geo-pol issues and many internal home issues to US of A" is also being followed.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

Since the question of leadership at "Delhi" appears to be a recurrent theme, I looked back at my pattern search for "90 year cycle" in Indian history. So far I have not paid attention to patterns of leadership, but more at broad historical comparable trends. But looking back this is what appears:

1920-1950. The older Congress leadership basically gives up, yielding place to complete dominance by MKG. But more significantly the rulers at Delhi appear to be at the peak of their power, having come out as colonial representatives of those who won the WWI. They have already carried out the ruthless and draconian suppression of Indian opposition in the period 1914-1917 and 1917-1919 phase. They seem to be without any coherent threats to their power. They are also a symbolic hand of power based within a dynastic-oligarchic setup. They have also initiated supposed "reforms" in giving greater power to the people, and initiated "economic development". Although non-European scholars have questioned the real motives for some of the liberalization and trade/economic development initiatives as being guided by hard-nosed financial/economic calculations of the needs of the home island.

But within 30 years, this regime will find itself practically powerless and forced to evacuate. Within 30 years the then insignificant and non-militant congress will become the greatest contender for alternative power. As we will see, leadership of thsi period in power at Delhi is usually adjudged to have been the worst possible thing to happen and the destroyer of their own power base.

1830-1860. The EIC is at the peak of its power after having finally finished off the independent power base of the Marathas and the Sikhs, and practically rule Delhi because of the dependence they have forced on the Mughal dynasty. The Company's directors in India play around with their power. Within 30 years they will be erased. Moreover there come a profound change of regime based on a new class of collaborators from the Indian side and the rise of a new potent force that changes the course of Indian history - the rise of a middle class based on new forms of economic exchanges and administrative machinery.

1740-1770. A very interesting period in terms of leadership at Delhi. But those who were formally at power in Delhi at this stage (Mughal - shah muhammad) were already proven paper tigers even though the complete eclipse of the dynasty was not yet so much of a foregone conclusion. The Marathas had not formally finished the dynasty off, and the Mughal legal hold on the subcontinent practically was still so much in place that the Brits had to formally seek authorization from the Delhi court. But more interestingly, if we consider the Marathas as the replacement on the throne, and replacement as the emerging dominant power in India- even they would practically be halted within the next 30 years. The new class of collaborators between Indian merchant interests and the Brits would become the ascendant.

1650-1680. The whole Dara-Aur drama. But behind them was also a larger dynamic of forces. Behind Aur was the Islamist bandwagon. At the start of this period the "syncretic" appeared to be winning at Delhi and Aur was practically sidelined. But within 30 years the Aur had practically finished off that syncretic trend. Moreover the seeds of ultimate downfall of the dynasty had been sown in the Marathas.

At crucial points in Indian history Delhi seems to have made blunders by following dynasties. Thereby moving the power centre of India out of Delhi, but also bringing down traumatic foreign interventions, and chaotic redistribution of economic forces.

The diplomatic and other interactions of the Delhi regimes at these peculiar stages can be interesting aspects of study. How they desperately divide up into factions, some of which actively invite or collaborate with foreigna nd regional powers to bring down the hated "other" factions.

What if 2010-2040 shows a repeat of the old cycle for the current Delhi based power structure?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

Sanku wrote:X-post
SSridhar wrote:Raja Ram & Ramana,

Kerry went to Islamabad after meeting Man Mohan Singh in New Delhi. Several things are falling into place now. While Kerry might have made an off-the-cuff remark on India compromising on Kashmir, the various mysterious ways in which GoI has behaved in recent times on the J&K issue, makes one think otherwise. Kerry's visit was also a few days before Ms. Nirupama Rao met her counterpart for the first time after 26/11.
Sirs I humbly submit that this pattern has been evidently visible since Havana, and some of us have been calling on it only to be ridiculed.

It is clear that apart from the policy of "drift other than economy" mentioned by SS and RR; a policy of "outsource decision making on all geo-pol issues and many internal home issues to US of A" is also being followed.
Kahlidi's demise is act of God or God's agent.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Prem »

Not Onlee Kha-Lidhi but many prominent India haters have gone AKP=Allah Ko Pyare in last few years . The Karmic wheel is moving slowly , slowly, Mama Nature removing thorns slowly slowly and ,social, economic strength gaining slowly slowly. Some where in first decade of 1900, Swami Vivekanada in an interview mentioned that his mission on Earth was to restart the stuck Wheel of India's destiny and impact of this which will beging to be felt in about hundred years and wheel will reach its peak in 500 years . Going by his words,there is hell of lot more in the store for Indics , the ride has just begin. Onlee news i wait for now is that of Energy Independence before we celebrate parchand Holi . Its good being Indic with rebirth previlage so we dont miss the upcoming epoch making event by either participating or watching to heart's content . :wink:
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

Bji, Extending your ideas 1950-1980 is the era of Congress/Nehru family dominance and this was finished off by 2000 short by ten years due to assassinations. The era from 2004 is Sonia and her children's dominance of INC. If we use your projections they will have till 2030.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

ramana ji,

Nehru family predominance : precisely the cycle 1947-1977 the first 30 years of establishment of dynasty with unchallenged power. 1977-2007 is the "contested" period when the dynasty weakens and shares power with regional contenders - the second 30 year. 2007-2037 : the final period of decline - the last 30 years.

Similarly - 1857-1887, the first period of consolidation under Victoria on the subcontinent. 1887-1917, second phase of greater manipulation and trying to fend off regional power seekers and movements with some cooption into power of the "rebels", and finally the 1917-1947 - the obvious decline and preparation for erasure.

we can perhaps see similar phases in 1767-1797, 1797-1827, 1827-1857.
or 1677-1707, 1707-1737, 1737-1767,
or 1587-1617, 1617-1647, 1647-1677
or 1497-1527, 1527-1557, 1557-1587
or 1407-1437, 1437-1467, 1467-1497
1317-1347, 1347-1377, 1377-1407
1227-1257, 1257-1287, 1287-1317,
1137-1167, 1167-1197, 1197-1227 etc.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

So I get the 90 year cycle: unchallenged domination, sharing power, decline. Can we say the 30 year decline period is the gestation period for the new dispensation? Or that does not occur.

Incidentally 2037 would be 90 years after Independence.

BTW to reduce confusion and to educate can you please annotate those cycles?

Thanks, ramana
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

yes : the last 30 years is the gestation phase for the future power - rather we may see one force reaching peak in the first 30 years, while an insignificant birth happens that gathers force in the second phase, while the peak power declines a bit and is forced to compromise. In the final phase the peak power has to get ready to be replaced, while the mid-level "rebel" grows to take over.

2037 is the 90th year from 1947 - which is 90th from 1857, which is 90 the from 1767 (a very significant year for EIC and Marathas and Mughals). Same goes from the 90 year back - 1677 (Shivaji), to 1587 (consolidation of Akbar), 1497 (practically the end of the sultanate). The 2037-1947- falls into a long line of significant transformation and change of regime [not just rulers].

1767-1797 is the foundation of power of the EIC in India. This is however the peak apparent success of the Marathas. However, in the next cycle, 1797-1827 Marathas are finally checked, and the EIC moves towards defeating both Marathas and the Sikhs. In the final phase, EIC moves towards supremacy but get replaced by the "home" power formally - at the end (Crown rule replaces EIC rule).

1677-1707 - Aur dances supreme, and Mughs have the largest dominion. The empire of Shivaji is struggling to survive but still expands, although occupying only a corner of India. 1707-1737, Aur dies to start the breaking apart of Delhi control, leading to the massacre in 1739. But thsi is the time when Marathas finally emerge as the decisive power in central India. 1737-1767 however shows the loss of lower GV to the Brits and growth of Maratha empire which will shine in the next cycle.

the surprising cycle is 1587 starting one. 1587-1617 is the peak of Akbar's foundation of the mughal empire. 1617-1647 is however a bit of a retreat under Jehangir and Shah Jehan. Already the tradition of princes rebelling with the help of external forces (like Selim with Portuguese) are becoming a tradition. Mughal power retreats with the misadventures of the son and grandson of Akbar in the north-west. 1647 is a very significant year for Shivaji and Marathas. 1647-1677 - is the rise of Shivaji.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

So now I come to the big question: How were the Satavahanas and the Guptas, the Eastern or Vengi Chalukyas able to have long duration dynasties in each case about 450 -700 years? Did they transform their dynasties by adopting the rising challengers like the Vengis intermarried with the Cholas and contiuned till 1400?

If so why was this feature unavailable for the pre-Modern India as can be seen by the regular churning of dynasties?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

It seems to be a more prominent feature of the "north" and GV dynamic. Also earlier dynasties appear to have survived for longer than one 90 year cycle - typically two cycles if long lived. However, even within that - we do find the first 90 year cycle to be significant and the second is a kind of life on oxygen and life-support. The "samantas" - and secondary military-feudatory chiefs gain power, and perhaps even are coopted into the dynasty through marriage etc.

The Gupta's for example stretch (by current majority official history dating) roughly from 320 CE. the first 90 year cycle is the overall dominant phase. The second 90 year cycle is a rearguard and firefighting phase and break up. The first phase ends with Chandragupta II, around 413. But the second cycle, with Kumaragupta I and then Skandagupta - is interesting in that in the first phase Pushymitras rise, and in the second phase even though Pushyamitras are defeated, the Hunas cannot ultimately be stopped, and the expenditure of fighting them porobably breaks the back of the Gupta empire.

Moreover longer two-cycle/three cycle dynasties also seem to drain the land so deeply that the land goes into a deep political, military and financial recession from which it takes a very long time to recover. The fall of the Guptas is followed by a "dark period" for about 100-200 years. The next long dynasty to rise from this are the Palas in the east and Rashtrakutas in the west. We know how the competitions between them sort of prepared the grounds for the eventual overrunning by the muslims. Palas were also long lived as a dynasty - and we have Vanga now predominantly a "Muslim" land.

Vijaynagar lasted long...perhaps. But there was a change of lineage in between, and it took another 150 years for the next "liberator" to arise from its ashes. I should probably explore the Vengi and Chalukyas separately but in GDF? But the south's impact on teh north is crucial. Is it okay to have it here or in the history thread?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by ramana »

Lets have it hear so more can read and think about it.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by svinayak »

brihaspati wrote:It seems to be a more prominent feature of the "north" and GV dynamic. Also earlier dynasties appear to have survived for longer than one 90 year cycle - typically two cycles if long lived. However, even within that - we do find the first 90 year cycle to be significant and the second is a kind of life on oxygen and life-support. The "samantas" - and secondary military-feudatory chiefs gain power, and perhaps even are coopted into the dynasty through marriage etc.
THe modern world has social engineering and hence there is distortion.
In 1977 - 30 years after independence it was a revolution against the independence revolution.

2005 was reclaiming the country back after the wasted years.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by Samudragupta »

Brihaspati ji,

Do this time cycle have any scientific basis....because it seems to have a statistical basis...Can genetics be one of the reason because the ruling dynasty does not produce enough strategic leaders to continue and expand the dynasty and hence it falls?

Secondly generally it takes seven generations (210 years) for any stable class to move to the next higher class, provided the future requirements has been thought about when new members are added to the dynasty.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by RajeshA »

Dear BRFites,

My humble self has lately tried his hand at writing an ebook, after some garus here put the idea in my head, on the topic of "Peaceful Consolidation of Indian Subcontinent" and the "Challenge of Islamism in India" and much more! I have a version ready, which I am now ready to distribute. I've decided for the moment that I'll send it to BRFites who are interested by email only. Not everything in the ebook is for general viewing. :wink:

Should there be any interest, please let me know by publishing your email addresses here temporarily!

Thanks,
RajeshA
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Post by brihaspati »

geekhat link removed. Thanks
Last edited by brihaspati on 04 Dec 2010 21:53, edited 1 time in total.
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