Deterrence

[ShauryaT]

Yes, but I am just not able to wrap around my head, why is MIRV destabilizing in an India China context. I mean, apart from the fact that PRC is well on its way to do the same with the Jl2 and DF 41 - even without them the sheer number of IRBM;s that PRC has, the only way India can match them is through an MIRV route, without spending massive amounts. Also, there are so many other variables in the picture that such a blanket statement, without an assessment of the details is probably as you say a bull shit article.

Thought, I will x-post though.

[ramana]

ShauryaT and Shiv,

The fallacy about the article is it looks at Asia as a two person game between PRC and India. PRC sees itself as a Pacific power and will match what US is doing. So regardless of what India does or does not do PRC will MIRV if not already. So Mr Narang should stuff it.

Secondly one does not know what the future will bring about. One more financial meltdown which JP Morgan is showing signs of can make Mr Narang seek jobs in Asia. Further satellite detection can make sea based boats vulnerable a few decades from now. So India and even US has to hedge for all eventualities. And its feasible that Mr Narang will be grateful that India did hedge.

and

ShauryaT, The recieved wisdom for a two person game is that with increasingly accurate missiles, land based MIRVs are destabilizing as they can invite a first strike. So the writers are coming from that point of view. However if the two person game is between PRC and India then its another matter for it depends on the capabilites of PRC only: accuracy, sat recon capability, and large numbers to assign to India. India already has a NFU posture which increases the stability. Also the BMD is a stability enhancing move on India's side for it assures some protection to its missiles.

So again the writers are looking at it from US perspective and giving wrong advice. They are screaming wolf after seeing a stuffed toy.

[ramana]

First will post three posts by Pargha and follow up with a discussion that was off the board. Will post with permission.

quote="ramana"
I understand JLN strategy. He gave up POK as a CBM to TSP to keep them happy that they got one third of Kashmir. Instead it made them even more hungry to think they can grab more.

But, Ramana, JLN had seen in close quarters for at least two decades the perfidy of Jinnah, his cohorts and the Muslim League. For him to expect that Pakistan would be satisfied with POK and would venture no further was a first rate failure, especially when the most coveted Vale of Kashmir remained with India. JLN even had to be goaded into action on the eve of October 26, 1947 by Vallabhai Patel as he was procrastinating under one pretext or another. We have none other than FM Manekshaw's account of that. Anyway, that is OT here. On the discussion going on here, I believe that anyone who has taken a cursory glance of the map beyond point NJ9842 and who has been following the Pakistani perfidy and its collaboration with China would not demand withdrawal from Siachen and Saltoro.

A gentle reminder, gentlemen: Nehru and Patel had a political vision of integrating J&K, but neither had any military experience; Indian field commanders like Cariappa, Sen and Timmayya had some lower-operational experience and full commitment to the emerging India, but none of them had higher-operational and strategic planning experience (to put things in perspective, Cariappa, the senior-most Indian officer had only commanded a Brigade in World War II).

And so the C-in-C of the Indian Army at this time was General Lockhart, an Englishman; as were many other senior staff officers in Delhi and Rawalpindi. Strategic planning translates political objectives into military objectives, and this link was totally compromised. The British political objective was to finish their withdrawal as peacefully as possible, and leave back a sort-of-friendly military culture that could be manipulated together to fight the Soviets.

(When Gen Timmayya said he would need three months to push the Pakistanis out of M'bad and clean out POK, he was talking strictly from an operational perspective.)

Both Nehru and Patel realized the deception (which overplayed the logistical difficulties of supplying the field units engaged in mop-up operations, and hence advised a cease-fire to consolidate the initial gains) when the Indian commanders returned. Nehru cut short LTG Bucher's tenure as C-in-C just before Operation Polo and appointed Gen Cariappa as the first Indian COAS to prevent any more meddling in the middle. Nehru wasn't shy about using military force to resolve conflicts - as the liberation of Hyderabad and Goa and integration of the NE states can attest.

IIRC, Premier Chou Enlai expected that after the integration of the NE states in the 1950s, Nehru would turn his eyes back on the northern J&K. The liberation and annexation of Goa was an unexpected surprise for the Chinese. After that the 1962 India-China War became inevitable, because the CCP hardliners started pressuring Mao to move on Macau and Hong Kong "just like Nehru was doing in the West". For Mao these were important back-doors for hard-currency, unofficial diplomacy and technical and political espionage, no way was he going to kill these golden-gooses; the only alternative was to publicly shame Nehru and shock the hardliners into silence.

The 1962 defeat did more to encourage Pakistani (mis-)adventurism - manifested in the 1965 War - than any other event of Nehru Premiership.[/quote]

and

Indian forces were stationed on Saltoro ridge to prevent the TSP from occupying further after the Paki nuke test in 1984 in Lop Nor. Air Cde Jasjit Singh the former director of IDSA has written that and no one has refuted him from the 'withdraw from Siachen' brigade.

AFAIK, the Chinese tested a nuclear weapon for the Pakistanis in 1989/90, in reaction to Exercise Chequerboard and Exercise Brasstacks. The 1987 EX Chequerboard took the Chinese by surprise, no one expected Indians to be able to move so fast. The Chinese ordered the Paks to relieve the pressure on the North-East by pressurizing India in the North-West, but the Paks pleaded helplessness in face of Exercise Brasstacks (1986-87). After the tensions were diffused through political/diplomatic maneuvering, the Chinese and Paks resolved to never let such a situation develop again: That is when the Chinese decided to give the Pakistanis a working nuclear weapon (to defeat EX Brasstracks styled coercion), and made the biggest strategic miscalculation in the modern ages.

Here is how I see Operation Meghdoot fit in:

1979 - Deng launches the Sino-Viet War "Spank Child to Teach Parent", i.e. attack a weaker Vietnam to weaken the Soviets. The Chinese put 1.5 million troops on alert in the Sino-Soviet border, including troops in East Turkestan and Lop Nur (close to Ladakh). The Chinese terminate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.

1979-84 - The Sino-Viet conflict continues to flare on and off (including the Chinese devastation of the northern provinces of Vietnam), and the Soviets do little/nothing to relieve pressure on the Viets. The Soviets are stuck in the Afghan quagmire, which India had tried to dissuade them from.

Some Indian planners (incl LTG Hoon, I suspect) fear that the Chinese may mistake them as a "Child" next. The Pakistani behavior in northern J&K increasingly looks like the Khmer Rogue behavior in the Cambodia-Vietnam border; the Chinese had been supporting the Khmer Rogue, just like they had been supporting the Pakistanis. A London-based alpine gear vendor informs the Indians of a suspicious 1500 parka orders from the Pakistanis; the Indian official promptly doubles the order and Operation Meghdoot start off in April 1984. Incidentally this was also the month of a major Chinese offensive in Vietnam. The operation is a tactical success, but any larger moves to exploit the tactical gains come to a halt with domestic troubles (co-incidentally the Chinese offensive fails).

1986-87 - PM Indira Gandhi has been assassinated, a lady that Paks and China feared and respected after the 1971 War. The Soviets and their Afghan allies are faring very badly; the Afghan Jihad, supported by the Paks and the Chinese is working out well. India is very unstable domestically (because of the raging Punjab Troubles) and internationally (because the Soviets are weakening). The new PM, Rajiv Gandhi, authorizes a show of strength: Exercises Brasstacks and Chequerboard.

I have noted the significance of those exercises in the Chinese decision to arm the Pakistanis with nuclear weapons. I believe it is the biggest international mistake of Deng's leadership - it went against thousands of years of Chinese strategic tradition of denying bordering barbarians, whether friendly or hostile, the access to sensitive technology. Nuclear weapons today is the iron-smelting technology while the non-weapons states are still stuck in the bronze or stone age.

and

Pargha- I have some disagreements with the way events which you posted - IG was assasinated on 31/10/84.

The Chinese gave Pakis Nukes because of our self restraint was taken as weakness in ability. Pakis thought that bombing Delhi Mumbai Like Hiroshima/ Nagasaki and we would be forced to Surrender Kashmir and India would disintergrate.

In Fact, once the CIA learnt the India had weaponised in 1990, they sent a urgent warning to GHQ after a Paki F-16 with a loaded Nuke was ready to Bomb Delhi at Chaklala Airbase.

Paki, Chinese and USA perfidy in the period 1988-93 has been completly whitewashed by our Secular Media.

[D Roy]

For Mao these were important back-doors for hard-currency, unofficial diplomacy and technical and political espionage

Exports. Huge backdoor channel for rebadging and export of goods.

[ramana]

That Arunachalam plan of assured retaliation is the best option that India has to handle any intransigence by any challenger.

[Manish_Sharma]

^^Ramana ji, where can I read about it?

came across this link searching googleswara mahraj:

http://goo.gl/hzcVd

still reading it......

[ramana]

^^Ramana ji, can I read about it?

came across this link searching googleswara mahraj:

http://goo.gl/hzcVd

still reading it......

Thats the one. It ensures certain retaliation. This precludes first strike for they cant be sure that they got everything.

BTW both powers had similar "dead man's Hand" type systems.

That Rosen guy is BSing.

[Austin]

Survivability of China's Sea-Based Nuclear Forces

pdf

[ShauryaT]

For US, India is doormat to Asia

Assuming the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) has done its job, the government must by be aware of the fact that North Korea is preparing to conduct its third nuclear test, this time of a Chinese-designed boosted fission device. Transferred in toto to Pakistan by Beijing, Islamabad has, in turn, passed it on to Pyongyang for validation by an actual explosive test. China ceaselessly exploits North Korea’s status as a pariah state beyond the pale which can do things other states cannot without incurring cost.

From the Chinese perspective, this will further tighten the nuclear screws on India by bringing Pakistan a step closer to the thermonuclear weapons threshold that India crossed in 1998, but not fully. The flawed Indian design did not produce the enhanced yield but has, ever since, been sought to be corrected and configured into a usable weapon, not by actual explosive testing but by simulation.

Dr R. Chidambaram, science and technology adviser to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, has been a votary of obtaining nuclear weapons by simulation. But he cannot, in good conscience, guarantee that fusion weapons so produced will actually work as they are supposed to, in real time, in real life. Surprisingly, the users of these weapons — the Strategic Forces Command and the military Chiefs of Staff — are not making any noise about it, though a minor defect in any conventional weapon has them hitting the rafters.

To begin preparing the ground for testing, as prelude to the next round of strategic dialogue, Delhi should issue a demarche to Washington, making it clear that the next North Korean nuclear test will be considered a Chinese-cum-Pakistani nuclear weapon explosive test that is likely to break India’s restraint on nuclear testing. Reminding America about its complicity in China nuclear-missile-arming Pakistan, the demarche should also lead to asking the Americans, point blank, just how an infirm Indian thermonuclear weapons capability will help maintain Asia’s balance of power. It is not a question to which India will get a straight answer because the grand US design, as I have maintained from the time the nuclear deal was being negotiated, is to push India, in small stages, into strategic dependency whereby India ultimately has to rely on Washington for its thermonuclear security because its own fusion weapons lack credibility.

By laying down the next North Korean nuclear test as tripwire, India should start hitting the brakes when, for example, the US government — as it is prone to do — goes from friendly to bully in pursuit of its own agenda in double quick time. For instance, for Washington to insist that energy-deficient India must cut off its oil imports from Iran and opt for the “Mission Impossible” TAPI pipeline (Turkmen gas to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan), while allowing Taiwan, Japan and South Korea to import oil and gas from Iran, is a bit rich.

It is very likely that sooner or later Washington and Tehran will come to an understanding, even as India’s stand against Iran will jeopardise our leverage and goodwill in Tehran. All the effort India has made to fill the economic vacuum in Iran by ramping up trade will amount to nought. India learnt nothing from freezing relations with Burma to please the West. Nearly 25 years later, Delhi is scrambling to recover its position, only to find the Chinese too well entrenched.

Curtailing China’s ambitions is a convergent interest and, as Leon Panetta, the American defence secretary, said at the Shangrila Dialogue in Singapore, India “will play a decisive role” in Asia’s future. But this role will not materialise if India permits itself to be nudged and elbowed into accepting US terms. Two cases in point: the US insistence, in the main, on India signing CISMOA (Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement) and LSA (Logistics Support Agreement) ignores the fact that India does not as yet perceive the US as completely trustworthy. Why not formalise workable technical solutions that have permitted joint military exercises to-date, instead?

The other issue is American attempts to shape Indian military requirements. The Indian Army asked for a certain number of Javelin anti-tank, “fire- and-forget” missiles, costing roughly $150,000 a piece. Washington, on its own, pared down that order by half. Who is to decide on the quantity and quality of weapons purchased from the US for hard cash — the Indian military or the US government?

A senior US defence official travelling with Mr Panetta on his week-long visit to Asia explained this as a “snafu”, as reflecting “old thinking” and not new ideas in the process of being “phased in”. US ambassador Nancy Powell has talked of $8 billion worth of arms deals with American companies in the pipeline. Delhi has to ensure the “old” US thinking does not get factored into new arms contracts.

The United States cannot be blamed though for trying to get its way. The blame rests entirely with the Indian government for allowing itself to be pushed around. Alas, the Congress coalition government with Manmohan Singh as figurehead Prime Minister is so dead in the water that it cannot even summon the will to resist US-imposed strictures on stuff India is paying hard cash for. It is frightening to think how much policy ground will be ceded to the US and other foreign governments till the next general elections by an Indian government that has apparently given up protecting this country’s sovereign prerogatives and interests.

The Washington round of the strategic dialogue, other than the demarche on North Korean test, should be about fleshing out cooperative military ways and means to distract China and weaken its tendency to hegemonism in South China Sea and elsewhere, and fast-tracking co-development of new military technologies and weapons development, bypassing a series of arms deals that Mr Panetta outlined as a prelude. Delhi has to be mindful of America’s short-term outlook that can hurt India’s strategic position in the long-term, if Delhi does not push back. On issues where Indian interests are compromised, the US should be told, in plain words, to back off. Given the stakes in Asia, it will.

The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.

The question is will offices in Lutyen's Delhi arise from their sleep?

[Kanson]

Yes, but I am just not able to wrap around my head, why is MIRV destabilizing in an India China context. I mean, apart from the fact that PRC is well on its way to do the same with the Jl2 and DF 41 - even without them the sheer number of IRBM;s that PRC has, the only way India can match them is through an MIRV route, without spending massive amounts. Also, there are so many other variables in the picture that such a blanket statement, without an assessment of the details is probably as you say a bull shit article.

Thought, I will x-post though.

MIRV is destabilizing in all context. Vipin can dictate such talks to India as it wont hurt like if he do to China. He is sounding more like a US States Dept/DoD demanding a statement from India. China has done much worse and their policy is much opaque.

Many reasons he quoted to support his arguments are only good for debates.

[merlin]

You cannot wake up those pretending to sleep.

[ramana]

Blair's memoirs claim he was told that Pak could launch N strike on India in 8 secs

Is that credible? and more importantly TSP is conveying a nuke threat and a P-5 power UK is calmly tranmitting it instead of saying all hell will break loose if TSP does naything like that. Looks like UK was abtetting the terrorists.

Pakistan could launch a nuclear strike on India within eight seconds, claimed an army general in Islamabad in 2001, a warning that is described in the latest volume of diaries by a key aide of former Prime Minister Tony Blair.

The general asked Blair's former communications director, Alistair Campbell, to remind India of Pakistan's nuclear capability amid fears in Islamabad that Delhi was "determined to take them out".

Britain became so concerned about Pakistan's threat that Blair's senior foreign policy adviser, Sir David Manning, later warned in a paper that Pakistan was prepared to "go nuclear".

The warnings are relayed by Campbell in a section in his latest diaries, The Burden of Power, which are being serialised in the Guardian on Saturday and Monday.

The diaries start on the day of the 9/11 attacks and end with Campbell's decision to stand down in August 2003 after the Iraq war.

The nuclear warnings came during a visit by Blair to the Indian subcontinent after the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

Campbell was told about the eight-second threat over a dinner in Islamabad on October 5, 2001 hosted by Pervez Musharraf, then Pakistan's president.

{Note this is after J&K Assy was attacked on 1 Oct 2001. And way before the Lok Sabha was attacked on Dec 13th 2001.}

Campbell writes: "At dinner I was between two five-star generals who spent most of the time listing atrocities for which they held the Indians responsible, killing their own people and trying to blame 'freedom fighters'.


{What is a five star general in TSP? Greater than a general or field marshal?}[/i}

"They were pretty convinced that one day there would be a nuclear war because India, despite its vast population and despite being seven times bigger, was unstable and determined to take them out".

He adds: "When the time came to leave, the livelier of the two generals asked me to remind the Indians: 'It takes us eight seconds to get the missiles over,' then flashed a huge toothy grin".

{Ghost of Zia ullo Haq? Recall the British actor Terry Thomas, in "Mad Mad World" with same face structure and tooty grin?}

Blair visited Pakistan less than a month after the 9/11 attacks as Britain and the US attempted to shore up support in Islamabad before the bombing of Afghanistan, which started on October 7, 2001.

Campbell writes that the Pakistani leadership seemed to be keen for Britain and the US to capture Osama bin Laden, though he added it was difficult to be sure.

The Guardian notes that relations between Islamabad and New Delhi plummeted after the Blair visit when terrorists attacked the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001, killing seven people. Five of the attackers died.

India blamed Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed terror groups fighting Indian rule in Kashmir militants, for the attack.

The tensions became so great that Richard Armitage, the US deputy secretary of state, was sent to the region in May 2002.

Blair returned to the Indian subcontinent in January 2002, shortly after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, amid one of the tensest nuclear standoffs between Indian and Pakistan since independence in 1947.

In the preparations for the visit, Manning prepared a paper for Blair that warned of the real threat of a nuclear conflict.

In an extract from his diaries for January 4, 2002, Campbell wrote: "DM had a paper, making clear our belief that the Pakistanis would 'go nuclear' and if they did, that they wouldn't be averse to unleashing them on a big scale".

"TB was genuinely alarmed by it and said to David 'They wouldn't really be prepared to go for nuclear weapons over Kashmir would they?' DM said the problem was there wasn't a clear understanding of strategy and so situations tended to develop and escalate quickly, and you couldn't really rule anything out".

{DM seems to be a dimwit in nuclear matters. What did he convey to TSP if they go nuclear or was he silent thus agreeing to TSP blackmail?

A few days after the visit, the India-Pakistan standoff was discussed by the British war cabinet.

In an extract for his diaries on January 10, 2002, Campbell wrote: "CDS (chief of the defence staff Admiral Sir Michael Boyce) said if India and Pakistan go to war, we will be up the creek without a paddle.

"Geoff (Hoon) said there may have to be limited compulsory call-up of Territorial Army reserves. TB gave a pretty gloomy assessment re India/Pakistan, said (the Indian prime minister Atal Bihari) Vajpayee was really upset at the way (Pakistan's president) Musharraf treated him.

"Military dispositions remained the same, with more than a million troops there (in Kashmir). He assessed that the Indians believed that they could absorb 500,000 deaths. Pakistani capability was far greater than the Indians believed".

Again psy-ops to paint TB as some sub-continent savior. By being silent they encouraged the TSP intransigence.

[svinayak]

Blair's memoirs claim he was told that Pak could launch N strike on India in 8 secs

Is that credible? and more importantly TSP is conveying a nuke threat and a P-5 power UK is calmly tranmitting it instead of saying all hell will break loose if TSP does naything like that. Looks like UK was abtetting the terrorists.


Pakistan could launch a nuclear strike on India within eight seconds, claimed an army general in Islamabad in 2001, a warning that is described in the latest volume of diaries by a key aide of former Prime Minister Tony Blair.


Again psy-ops to paint TB as some sub-continent savior. By being silent they encouraged the TSP intransigence.

This is also from a country which is a unstable military run govt and where coups are regular.
So they have internalized that this Paki state has one enemy and is not a threat to the rest of the world.
Hence they can receive such threats and still be calm. P5 can continue to fund and support this state what ever may be the condition

[shyamd]

Lol... those generals are just showing off how tough they are. If they tried to launch a missile TSP would cease to exist and those generals would prbably be sitting in Dubai, London or US Canada. Jokers ... we should just ignore. And when has UK had serious influence in the subcontinent recently? Even the US can't get Kashmir to be included as part of AfPak emissary mandate!

[ShauryaT]

Lol... those generals are just showing off how tough they are. If they tried to launch a missile TSP would cease to exist and those generals would prbably be sitting in Dubai, London or US Canada. Jokers ... we should just ignore. And when has UK had serious influence in the subcontinent recently? Even the US can't get Kashmir to be included as part of AfPak emissary mandate!

But Acharya's point is valid. the West or anyone else simply does not care. They will make all the right noises, but when the balloon goes up, we are all alone. The west could care less, if 500K die in the region or 50 million. They will simply stay out of the mess. Let us be under no illusion whatsoever on this score. They will provide arms to TSP, if it serves their interest, or they will stop if it does not. They will invade Afghanistan, when they are angry or they will leave the region in 10-20 years, regardless of mission failure. It is upto us to manage this region and all others are simply looking to serve their narrow interests, based on usually short term needs as perceived by the guy sitting in office at that time.

[RamaY]

^ so India's deterrence lies in making Pakistan a worlds problem, not Indias.

How to do that? Facilitate 2014 withdrawal and the let Afghanistan fall for Taliban2. If Taliban 1 resulted in 911, Taliban 2 should be n911?

[ShauryaT]

^ so India's deterrence lies in making Pakistan a worlds problem, not Indias.

How to do that? Facilitate 2014 withdrawal and the let Afghanistan fall for Taliban2. If Taliban 1 resulted in 911, Taliban 2 should be n911?

No, give them Agni V. (half joking but half serious)

[shyamd]

ShauryaT ji, 100% correct. Today in NSC, NSAB there is a debate on whether to cut a deal with Unkil to form alliance against PRC. But at the same time they don't have the heart to form the alliance because of exactly what you said. So right now policy = confusion. But what we are doing is retaining the option to join the alliance. Nixing this BD base shows that we don't want them here yet and we will control our destiny. Which is good because when the going gets tough we are all on our own. I think they should form regional alliance in SE Asia and corner off PRC - which will happen post 2013 I think

Even KSA acquired nukes for the same reason, US will not be in the middle of nuclear war.

[Aditya_V]

The biggest point which comes out is TSP generals are not rational people whom you can deal with in a humane manner. The general should be named for threatening to use Nukes to defend terrorists and along with his descendants that gene pool should be eliminated.

[ramana]

book Review by Shasi Tharoor:

LINK

Black Lentils when he has to write it.

[ShauryaT]

Managing Indian nuclear forces

Secured a copy of Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara’s book — ‘Managing India’s Nuclear Forces’.
The only original stuff — and the core of the book — is in the penultimate two chapters dealing with nuclear force management and operationalization. His implication, however, that the Indian nuclear forces are stuck somewhere between “launch readiness” and “combat preparedness” while, perhaps, correct within the theoretical parameters of his choosing, surely does not mirror reality in that the Strategic Fores Command (SFC) must surely have worked out the more practical aspects of weapons use.

I was particularly struck, moreover, by how closely Koithara adheres to the official US viewpont, now subscribed to by the powerful non-proliferation lobby in Washington as well that India does not need (1) to resume nuclear testing, (2) proven, reliable, and upgraded, nuclear and thermonuclear armaments, (3) a force elastic enough to keep pace with the qualitative and quantitative Chinese strategic force augmentation (continue to keep the deterrence minimal, he advises, in effect), and (4) delivery options, such as MIRVs, etc!!
Wonder, in the event, whether and how seriously to take the VADM.

[ShauryaT]

INS: Indian Nuclear Service

The Task Force on National Security, chaired by Naresh Chandra, the all-purpose bureaucrat, had an open-ended brief. The one area, however, the Task Force was expressly told to keep off by the National Security Adviser related to the country’s nuclear deterrent in all its aspects.

This may be because the Manmohan Singh regime is intent on leaving a legacy — a spruced-up nuclear secretariat — and it didn’t want the Task Force to muck around, disturbing and complicating the efforts already underway with its recommendations. The former Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command (SFC), Lt. Gen. B.S. Nagal, was hired after his retirement to, in effect, fashion in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) an Indian version of the professional and effective Pakistani nuclear secretariat — Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Chaklala.

What Lt. Gen. Nagal picked up about nuclear strategic issues during his tenure at SFC is hard to say. As an infantry officer (Jat Regiment), he has left no paper trail in terms of articles in professional journals, etc. to betray his thinking, certainly nothing on strategic subjects. Then again, maybe he was selected because of the PMO’s confidence that he would implement plans it had chalked out.

Actually, as I have argued in my books and other writings, Pakistan SPD’s professionalism and competence in nuclear strategic matters is principally the result of painstaking and rigorous efforts over a long period of time to seed and nurture a force manned by a specialist cadre, and this is no bad thing for our SFC and the nuclear cell in the PMO to emulate. It will be an improvement on what presently exists. The capacity for deterrence heuristics requires considerable acquaintance with nuclear deterrence history and practice, enabling the SFC and the PMO nuclear cell to give the intellectual lead in shaping nuclear strategy or to input creatively into nuclear policy construction.

The central point about the success of the SPD and every other nuclear force is that the nuclear secretariat is run by a corps of officers with real expertise — top to bottom — who are recruited after intensive tests and psychological profiling, including their ability to handle extreme stress. In a recent book, Vice-Admiral Verghese Koithara (retd) delves into some of the complexities of operationalising the nuclear arsenal and refers to appropriate “socialisation” of the personnel involved without, however, once mentioning the need for a dedicated nuclear officer cadre. Such a body of officers is at the core of professionalising the nuclear forces.

Indeed, without a specialist cadre that is fully versed and immersed in all aspects of nuclear deterrence — from designs of nuclear weapons and missiles to conceiving and designing command and control networks, from nuances in deterrence theory to practical problems of mobility, and from nuclear forensics to technology for secure command links — the country will be stuck with what we have: a Strategic Forces Command with military officers on its rolls who are professionals in conventional warfare but rank amateurs in the nuclear field. They have to perforce learn on the job, only for such learning to go waste once their three-year term ends, and they are posted elsewhere.

Appointments at all SFC levels are considered by the regular military officers as posting to be ticked before returning to the parent service. There’s simply no incentive for them to even seriously consider becoming experts. This is not how a professional and competent SFC and secretariat will be obtained.

And yet such a strategic force leadership is an absolute imperative because someone needs to keep their head about them in a crisis when, as umpteen incidents have revealed in the past, that the Indian government panics and loses its composure or goes comatose at the first sign of trouble.

The lack of nuclear specialists in SFC ranks should concern the military but apparently it doesn’t. Most uniformed officers are contemptuous of Indian Administrative Service officers looking after child and family welfare one day, rural electrification the next, and on the third day landing up as defence secretary with not a clue and nothing to recommend such posting other than their ability to negotiate the bureaucratic maze of regulations and rules of business. This is no different from the SFC staffing pattern. Conventional military officers manning the SFC, whatever their individual service records, come into the Command with minimal to non-existent familiarity with nuclear security issues. This doesn’t, of course, stop the SFC top brass from assuming airs of nuclear strategist and expert, any more than it prevents IAS officers from talking with authority on things they know little about.

On nuclear security matters, everybody in and out of uniform seems to have an opinion. It is the mark of a generalist culture which pervades the military as well, and is the reason why it will be difficult to wean the conventional military services away from the system of rotational postings in the SFC. Nuclear security discipline-specialisation can happen only if a “nuclear forces” option is made available to newly minted officers at the National Defence Academy stage with a follow-on course before commissioning exclusively into SFC service.

We will know soon enough what Lt. Gen. Nagal has been up to at the PMO. But whatever he is doing, it wouldn’t have hurt to have the Task Force on National Security report on the nuclear forces. Much of what the Task Force has recommended in the conventional military sphere seems reasonable and, even though there was no nuclear security-knowledgeable person as such in the group, it would have been useful to juxtapose their thoughts on the restructuring and functioning of the SFC with what the PMO is doing to revamp nuclear decision-making and nuclear command and control systems.

The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

[ramana]

We have to understand very clearly that the FSU-US detente does not apply to India and its neighborhood. Its arms control without prestroika or glasnost.

TSP gets its main nuke weapons realted support from China. Earlier it got some enrichment technology from Europe.

The US supports China for its own reasons.

China does not talk to India. There is no prestroika nor glasnost here.

TSP regularly threatens India with nukes. The redlines are getting more and more ridiculous. If TSP feels irregular they want to launch nukes on India.

US keeps cautioning India and tries to hamstring Indian leadership and decision making.

US Non Prolif Ayotollahs keep bringing in detente type ideas when they do not apply in this case.
They keep pushing the idea of TSP arming without restraints.

[nakul]

http://www.firstpost.com/india/nuclear- ... 25029.html


Nuclear weapons have deterred world powers from threatening India

“On at least three occasions before 1998 other powers used the explicit or implicit threat of nuclear weapons to try and change India’s behaviour,” Menon said without elaborating.

“Since we became a declared nuclear weapons state in 1998 we have not faced such threats,” Menon told an audience comprising college students and a handful of diplomats.

Observing that nuclear weapons contribute to the country’s security in an uncertain and anarchic world, he said, “the possession of nuclear weapons has, empirically speaking, deterred others from attempting nuclear coercion or blackmail against India.”

“And when the division of the world into nuclear weapon haves and have-nots was sought to be made permanent in the nineties it became clear that possession of nuclear weapons was necessary if our attempts to promote a nuclear weapon free world were to be taken seriously and have some effect,” he said.

[shyamd]

^^ Don't tell that to eye-Ran. Please post in full.

[ramana]

The three occassions are TSP in 1987 Brass tacks, 1990 Kashmir crisis.

Which is the other? 1971 USS Enterprise?

[shyamd]

Guess so...

[nakul]

Nuclear weapons have deterred world powers from issuing “explicit or implicit threats” to blackmail India to toe a particular line, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon said here today.

“On at least three occasions before 1998 other powers used the explicit or implicit threat of nuclear weapons to try and change India’s behaviour,” Menon said without elaborating.

Addressing the National Outreach Conference on Global Nuclear Disarmament, he said the global powers did not succeed in changing India’s behaviour because of the “hard-headed leadership we were fortunate to have.”

“Since we became a declared nuclear weapons state in 1998 we have not faced such threats,” Menon told an audience comprising college students and a handful of diplomats.

National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon. Reuters

He said nuclear weapons contribute to the country’s security in an uncertain and anarchic world.

“There is no question that these weapons have done so, to the extent that they were expected to when we decided to become a nuclear weapon state,” Menon said.

Observing that nuclear weapons contribute to the country’s security in an uncertain and anarchic world, he said, “the possession of nuclear weapons has, empirically speaking, deterred others from attempting nuclear coercion or blackmail against India.”

The NSA underlined that from the very beginning India has made it clear that its nuclear weapons were for deterrence and not “war-fighting weapons”.

In an apparent reference to Pakistan, he said unlike certain other nuclear weapon states, India’s weapons were not meant to redress a military imbalance, or to some perceived inferiority in conventional military terms, or to serve some tactical or operational military need on the battlefield.

Menon said that having nuclear weapons also added weight to India’s argument for universal disarmament on the global fora.

“We spent 24 years after our first peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 urging and working for universal nuclear disarmament and a nuclear free world,” he said.

He said India argued for a nuclear weapons free world out of conviction that such a scenario would enhance national security and that of the rest of the world.

“But sadly this was a conviction and view that obtained much lip sympathy and verbal support but was actually flouted in practice with increasing impunity by others,” Menon said.

“And when the division of the world into nuclear weapon haves and have-nots was sought to be made permanent in the nineties it became clear that possession of nuclear weapons was necessary if our attempts to promote a nuclear weapon free world were to be taken seriously and have some effect,” he
said.

Menon said today many countries and people were willing to support and work for a nuclear weapon free world than ever before.

He pointed out that US President Barack Obama, during his visit to India in November 2010, spoke of a shared commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.

“So, the apparent paradox of India as a nuclear weapon state advocating a nuclear weapon free world is simply explained. We do think that we would be more secure in a world that is truly free of nuclear weapons,” he said.

“But until we arrive at that happy state, we have no choice, and a responsibility towards our own people, to have nuclear weapons to protect them from nuclear threats,” Menon said.

Menon said the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (RGAP) for a nuclear weapon free and a non-violent world order was the only feasible and practical plan that would reconcile the demands of morality, security and survival in the nuclear age.

He said the RGAP remained the only practical plan for universal non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. “Rajiv Gandhi was also the one who made it possible for India to convert her undoubted technical capability in atomic energy into a nuclear weapon programme,” he said.

Menon said India was the only nuclear weapon state with a practical plan, involving timeframes and legally binding obligations, to achieve a nuclear weapon free world.

The National Outreach Conference on Global Nuclear Disarmament has been organised by the Indian Council of World Affairs in collaboration with Mani Shankar Aiyar, who heads the Prime Minister’s informal group on the RGAP.

http://www.firstpost.com/india/nuclear- ... 25029.html

[svinayak]

Nuclear weapons have deterred world powers from issuing “explicit or implicit threats” to blackmail India to toe a particular line, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon said here today.

“On at least three occasions before 1998 other powers used the explicit or implicit threat of nuclear weapons to try and change India’s behaviour,” Menon said without elaborating.

Addressing the National Outreach Conference on Global Nuclear Disarmament, he said the global powers did not succeed in changing India’s behaviour because of the “hard-headed leadership we were fortunate to have.”

“Since we became a declared nuclear weapons state in 1998 we have not faced such threats,” Menon told an audience comprising college students and a handful of diplomats.

National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon. Reuters


http://www.firstpost.com/india/nuclear- ... 25029.html

They may have forced India to go nuclear with these threats. By these threats they hoped to sanction India and put it under permanent coercen


The behavior change on Indian happened permanently when India when nuclear.

By pumping PRC and Pakistan was more than 10 years they were worried that that these powers will take a unilateral action with war against India.

They could not hold these two countries since west was dependent on Oil and Mfg goods from PRC. They were gaining control over the media to change public opinion in their favor.
There was no option but to force India to test.

[Prem]

We know Nixon and Paki threaten us with Nuke . Hu was the third party and when ?

[shiv]

Wasn't it Pakistan that made the threat every time, with the threat having been conveyed to us by others in one or two instances?

[disha]

Wasn't it Pakistan that made the threat every time, with the threat having been conveyed to us by others in one or two instances?

Sir, Menon saar clearly says "world powers" indulged in implicit and explicit threat. I would bakis (discount) bakis from the "world power" equation, they do have a bum which does explode but is more pindi channa type.

The world powers here can be further reduced to US, China and UK.

[SSridhar]

The NSA used the words 'at least' and 'world powers'.

In 1987, Pakistan conveyed the threat twice. The first such threat came when the Indian High Commissioner Mr. S.K.Singh was told by the Defence Minister of Pakistan in January, 1987 that Pakistan was capable ‘of inflicting unacceptable damage to India’. The second came within a few months during an interview by Kuldip Nayer with A.Q.Khan.

In 1990, the threat was conveyed thrice by Pakistan. In February 1990, the visiting Pakistani COAS, Gen. Yakub Khan referred to ‘fire from the sky’ in conversation with the then Indian prime Minister, Mr. V.P.Singh. The Kargil Committee report says, "In January 1990, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Yakub Khan, visited Delhi and spoke to the Indian Foreign Minister, I.K. Gujral and the Prime Minister V.P. Singh in terms which they regarded as verging on an ultimatum". A few months later, in May 1990, the nuclear threat was conveyed through the US.

[SSridhar]

But, the question is why does the NSA say that the nuclear threats stopped after 1998 ? Recently, it was disclosed that in October 2001, Pakistan conveyed to India an eight-second nuclear response through the Communications Director of the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. A country that keeps on lowering its threshold as a result of ever widening & unbridgeable gap between itself and its arch enemy and whose economy is in unrecoverable tailspin, will only issue more nuclear threats.

[ramana]

Isn't 8 secs too soon? makes you wonder if its a medical condition.

[D Roy]

Samdurung Chu incident. 1987.

[Pratyush]

I think it will be best if let the powers that be reveal when India recieved nuke threat from global powers and when.

We all know about TSP and its threats. The same is clear about the PRC as well. As the war of 62 and the troop mobilization of 71, along with close cooperation between TSP and PRC. So the PRC & TSP ought to be treated as to parts of the same threat.

So that can be discounted as well. Having said so, what are the other occasions.

Surely they can't be referring to Goa?

[nakul]

Revealed: Pakistan, US blackmailed India with nukes

Although National Security Advisor Shiv Shanker Menon shied away from naming the countries that tried thrice to nuclear blackmail New Delhi, the nuclear establishment here has revealed that Pakistan twice explicitly threatened to use nuclear devices against India while the American threat was more of implicit nature during the 1971 India-Pakistan war.

Top government sources said Pakistan threatened to nuke India in 1987 during large scale Indian Army mobilisation under then General K Sundarji for war game 'Operation Brasstacks' in the Rajasthan deserts. The war game conducted from November 1986 to March 1987, saw Pakistan Army and Air Force mobilisation in response by then President Zia-ul-Haq.

In an interview to journalist Kuldip Nayar in January 1987, Pak nuke scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan said, "Nobody can undo Pakistan... We are here to stay. Be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened." The threat, Indian officials say, was conveyed through diplomatic and other channels.

The second time India was subjected to N-blackmail when then Pak PM Benazir Bhutto sent her foreign minister Lt Gen Sahabzada Yaqub Khan to India on January 21, 1990 to pressurise New Delhi on Kashmir issues.

With Kashmir separatist movement at its peak, Khan told his Indian counterpart IK Gujral that "war clouds would hover over the sub-continent if timely action was not taken."

While these two threats were direct, the US under Richard Nixon administration gave India an implicit threat by moving the USS Enterprise, world's first nuclear- powered carrier, into Bay of Bengal on December 11, 1971 during India-Pakistan war with collapse of Dhaka being imminent. India, however, did not budge and the war ended with a decisive victory for New Delhi on December 16, 1971.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-new ... 17921.aspx

[RKumar]

If indeed India was blackmailed in 1971, 1987 and 1991 then this forced me to think why India delayed test of it bum until 1998?

Any thought on this gurus??

An who is stopping us to detonate sub-kiloton devices as

On 13 May, at 12.21 p.m.IST 6:51 UTC, two sub-kiloton devices (Shakti IV and V) were detonated. Due to their very low yield, these explosions were not detected by any seismic station.

[SSridhar]

. . . why India delayed test of it bum until 1998?

RKumar, two reasons. One was our economic situation and the other was our well-known fear/inability to take decisive action which is probably precipitated by too much analysis.