Should we discontinue EVMs?

[ArmenT]

Hey Rahul,

We achieved what you are looking for, Indian EVMs are vulnerable and we are writing a research paper on it. Recently we came across a paper in IIT chennai written by you, we would like to have your email Id to further discuss on this issue.. I will let you know about myself by email. respond to [email protected] ASAP.

For all the members of the forum.. you will soon hear the news on indian EVMs been hacked and the design completely cracked..

Would it be possible for me to have a preprint of your paper too. Would love to see what you're talking about.

[vhkprasad]

Shall make it available before mid march, Meanwhile go thru a book "Democracy at Risk" Can we trust EVMs? recently published.

[Pranav]

Available information about Indian EVMs suggests that the source code is accessible to only 4 or 5 people at the PSU, and that the binary code is not verified in India after the chips arrive from the US-based manufacturer.

Your assertion has been refuted many times, including on the same page on this thread. The binary code is verified for each and every chip.

So called "refutation" is just some people's imaginings about processes followed and the honesty of personnel appointed by govt controlled PSUs. On the other hand we have an insider who explicitly stated on video that PSUs cannot read the binary.

Also, you still haven't come up with how these supposedly rigged EVMs are setup individually to favor a particular candidate. Remember the machines are randomly sent from a warehouse and the candidates names are arranged somewhat randomly on the machine as well and the candidates are allowed to verify the machines the previous day and put their own seals on the machines and their own locks and guards around the building where the machines are stored before election day.

All that has been spelled out, please look at my previous posts.

[ArmenT]

So called "refutation" is just some people's imaginings about processes followed and the honesty of personnel appointed by the regime. On the other hand we have an insider who explicitly stated on video that PSUs can not / do not read the binary.

Your answer to that was given here.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 41#p765641
It is impossible to read the binary itself once the security bits have been set, without decapping the chip and using some specialized equipment. This is a *FEATURE* of the chips used (details of which are also available from the manufacturer's site). However, it is possible to get the hash key of the binary that is burned on the chip, after the security bits have been set, which allows one to verify that the code on it is indeed correct.

The only question here is whether the binary that was sent to the manufacturers has a trojan in it already or not. To do this means that there would need to be some co-operation between all the folks that wrote the code and made the binary. That's why I was advocating for open source code, so people could compile the code for themselves and verify the hashes.

Anyway, it will be interesting to read the paper, so I'll hold my breath until then

[Pranav]

So called "refutation" is just some people's imaginings about processes followed and the honesty of personnel appointed by the regime. On the other hand we have an insider who explicitly stated on video that PSUs can not / do not read the binary.

Your answer to that was given here.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 41#p765641
It is impossible to read the binary itself once the security bits have been set, without decapping the chip and using some specialized equipment. This is a *FEATURE* of the chips used (details of which are also available from the manufacturer's site). However, it is possible to get the hash key of the binary that is burned on the chip, after the security bits have been set, which allows one to verify that the code on it is indeed correct.

That reply was not satisfactory. There is no official information contradicting Indiresan's statement. Until official information to the contrary becomes available, I will rely on the video.

How would you generate the hash without reading the binary?

In any case hashes are of no use if the 4-5 people who have access to the source code are compromised.

[ArmenT]

Your answer to that was given here.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 41#p765641
It is impossible to read the binary itself once the security bits have been set, without decapping the chip and using some specialized equipment. This is a *FEATURE* of the chips used (details of which are also available from the manufacturer's site). However, it is possible to get the hash key of the binary that is burned on the chip, after the security bits have been set, which allows one to verify that the code on it is indeed correct.

That reply was not satisfactory. There is no official information contradicting Indiresan's statement. Until official information to the contrary becomes available, I will rely on the video.

How would you generate the hash without reading the binary?

In any case hashes are of no use if the 4-5 people who have access to the source code are compromised.

Not sure what official information you want. The manufacturers of those chips state that fact on their websites. Just because Dr. Indresan didn't mention it in his video doesn't mean it isn't done. What he said is perfectly correct in that you can't read the binary, but it is possible to read the hash of the binary. The reason for checking the hash on the chip before adding to the board is so that they can verify the chip is working before soldering it on. No hash or incorrect hash means that the chip is likely not working correctly.

As for generating the hash, what people do is before they send the binary to be burnt into the chip, they compute the hash themselves. Remember my earlier post about ordering a custom red-painted car and getting a blue one. This is something similar. If you're going to argue that people can simply custom make the chip to return the required hash, that has been covered before as well.

By the way, there are two manufacturers using different chips, so it would have to be 4-5 in each manufacturer + the QA dept that looks at the code and validates that the code is indeed working. In any case, all this business would have been easy to settle one way or another if they just released the sources.

[Pranav]

Not sure what official information you want. The manufacturers of those chips state that fact on their websites. Just because Dr. Indresan didn't mention it in his video doesn't mean it isn't done. What he said is perfectly correct in that you can't read the binary, but it is possible to read the hash of the binary. The reason for checking the hash on the chip before adding to the board is so that they can verify the chip is working before soldering it on. No hash or incorrect hash means that the chip is likely not working correctly.

As for generating the hash, what people do is before they send the binary to be burnt into the chip, they compute the hash themselves. Remember my earlier post about ordering a custom red-painted car and getting a blue one. This is something similar. If you're going to argue that people can simply custom make the chip to return the required hash, that has been covered before as well.

By the way, there are two manufacturers using different chips, so it would have to be 4-5 in each manufacturer + the QA dept that looks at the code and validates that the code is indeed working. In any case, all this business would have been easy to settle one way or another if they just released the sources.

I will look at any official information from EC or the PSUs. Until then, Indiresan's statement stands.

Sure they can compute the hash from the binaries they get by compiling the source code, but the whole idea is to check the binary on the chips. This was what you had said:

However, it is possible to get the hash key of the binary that is burned on the chip, after the security bits have been set, which allows one to verify that the code on it is indeed correct.

The count of 4-5 people includes the QA team, by the way.

[ArmenT]

Yes, they can get the hash codes from the binaries on the chip after the security bits have been set. This is from the manufacturer's specs (not EC, but Renesas and Microchip Inc.) That's how ECIL checks that the chip is working before they even try to solder it on to the board.

[Pranav]

Yes, they can get the hash codes from the binaries on the chip after the security bits have been set. This is from the manufacturer's specs (not EC, but Renesas and Microchip Inc.)

So is the hash code burned into the chip by the manufacturer?

[Dileep]

Hey Rahul,

We achieved what you are looking for, Indian EVMs are vulnerable and we are writing a research paper on it. Recently we came across a paper in IIT chennai written by you, we would like to have your email Id to further discuss on this issue.. I will let you know about myself by email. respond to [email protected] ASAP.

For all the members of the forum.. you will soon hear the news on indian EVMs been hacked and the design completely cracked..

Dear Mr. Prasad,

I assume you are Hari Prasad, the CEO of NetIndia Hyderabad, though you didn't confirm that when I asked earlier on the forum. I also assume that when you say a 'research paper', it is going to be a peer reviewed technical paper.

I am glad that you took the initiative to do that. Issues like this must be handled in the proper way, like what you are doing by making the research paper.

I look forward to seeing your paper published. I wish and request you, if it is not a big hassle, to allow me to review it at an earliest opportunity. Disclosure and Confidentiality requirements would strictly be followed at your terms.

I copy this in e-mail to you as well.

[ArmenT]

@pranav: No, it is always computed from the ROM contents at run-time. It is done this way to assure that the chip isn't damaged.

[Dileep]

Guys,

Re-hashing the old arguments again is not going to help anyone. All the points and counterpoints on code security and verification are made countless times already.

Let us wait for the inputs from Mr. Prasad's paper.

[ArmenT]

Agree completely sir. By the way, I also asked Mr. Prasad if I could have a look earlier than that and he said it will be available by mid-march .

@vhkprasad: The book you recommended seems to have been released last week. Amazon doesn't seem to carry it though . Who can it be ordered through?

[Pranav]

@pranav: No, it is always computed from the ROM contents at run-time. It is done this way to assure that the chip isn't damaged.

Well, there are many loopholes that are imaginable. Manufacturer just has to make sure that the right hash code is given out. And these loopholes would be very much feasible to pull off, especially when governance of a billion plus population is at stake.

I agree with Dileep that all arguments have been exhausted by now.

[Raja Bose]

@vhkprasad, Would be really interested in reading your paper. Hope you can post it on this thread, otherwise if you can provide a copy via email that would be fine too.

Like Dileep said, instead of rehashing old arguments again and again, it would be more fruitful to look at any new material/revelations/techniques which have not been covered on this thread till now. I hope our Mehta ji is following this thread even though he is on a temporary vanavas.

Any system can be hacked....what must be investigated (and proven, if true) is whether it can be done in practical circumstances.

[AjayKK]

The electronic voting machines (EVMs) are being used in violation of the Information Technology Act 2000 ?

CHANDIGARH: The electronic voting machines (EVMs) are being used in violation of the Information Technology Act 2000, a research paper has revealed.

Author of the research paper, advocate Ajay Jagga, told The Times of India, on Sunday that as per IT Act, 2000, a verifiable audit trail has to be provided in case of any electronic record, which is now admissible as evidence as per Evidence Act but in case of electronic voting, the voter does not get any receipt with regard to his voting.

The research paper recently attracted the attention of experts when a conference on "EVMs: How trustworthy?" in Chennai passed a unanimous resolution on February 13 asking Jagga to approach the Election Commission of India (ECI) for bringing the electronic voting procedure in tune with IT Act, 2000.

Jagga said he would soon approach ECI seeking formation of legal committee to remove the illegality or will knock the doors of court.

The lawyer said, "Unless the voter gets a receipt like the one we get in ATM or after the use of debit or credit cards, all electronic transactions including a vote, are illegal." What is the evidence that the vote cast has really been recorded and that it has been recorded in the manner the voter intended, he asked.

For the purpose and to protect the secrecy of ballot, all such receipts, after the voter has checked his transaction, should be put in a box which should remain with ECI to be produced as evidence in case of a dispute, he said. The government amended the relevant laws in 1989 to equate EVM with ballot and ballot box to facilitate transition from ballot paper to EVM but the IT Act 2000 created a new complication that has to be immediately resolved in the interest of fairness of things, Jagga pointed out.

The lawyer also proved that the machine can be tampered with which has been accepted by the government itself in its letter to withdraw patent applications filed by Electronics Corporation of India and Bharat Electronics Ltd, makers of the machine. The PSUs withdrew their patent applications on the ground that the machine may not be tamper-proof, he said, adding that America and Germany had to return to ballot paper after their machines were found wanting.

Wasn't the hack-demo halted abruptly by EC stating the fact the ECIL and BEL hold the patent and the patented device cannot be broken into?

[ramana]

Pioneer Op-ed, 23 Feb 2010

There’s a Trojan in the EVM!

Tuesday, February 23, 2010


There’s a Trojan in the EVM!

A Surya Prakash

The debate on the integrity of the electoral process when electronic voting machines are used to cast votes got a fillip recently when a group of concerned citizens organised workshops in New Delhi and Chennai and invited some international experts who have played a part in the abolition of electronic voting in some countries of Europe and in a majority of the States in the US.

Among these experts was Mr Rop Gonggrijp, a computer hacker from the Netherlands who hacked a machine on a live television show and became instrumental in the banning of EVMs in his country; Mr Alex Halderman, professor of computer science at the University of Michigan and an authority on electronic voting security; and, Mr Till Jaeger, the attorney who argued against the use of EVMs before the German Federal Constitutional Court leading to the order banning of these machines in Germany. The Indian viewpoint on the vulnerability of EVMs was offered by Mr Hari Prasad, a noted ‘hactivist’ from Hyderabad, who first raised the red flag about the integrity of the EVM-based election process.

According to Mr Gonggrijp and Mr Halderman, EVMs can be tampered with either at the manufacturing stage or when they are stored in State capitals for deployment in elections or at the polling booths. They are convinced that Indian EVMs are no different from those that were deployed in the Netherlands, Germany or Ireland, before they were discarded in those countries. One of the ways to rig an election is to introduce a Trojan in the display section of the control unit. This chip would give ‘fixed’ results on the EVM screen. In other words, whatever the voters’ preference, the control unit would display numbers as per the hacker’s plan.

Mr Gonggrijp is a prominent campaigner for election transparency and verifiability, and his technical opinion appears to have clinched the issue against electronic voting in Germany as well. “When the vote count happens inside a machine and there is no way in which the result can be cross-checked, the election ceases to be transparent,” he says. The lack of transparency appears to be the Achilles heel of electronic voting. Nobody knows what goes on inside these machines. This is the point on which the German Constitutional Court has held the deployment of EVMs as un-constitutional. It says the Constitution emphasises the public nature of elections and requires all essential steps to be open to public scrutiny.

While all these experts are categorical in their rejection of electronic voting devices, EVMs enjoy a great deal of credibility and public trust in India. This is so because the campaign about the unreliability of these machines is yet to get off the ground. However, politicians of various hues appear to be wary of these machines and have even accused rivals of ‘manipulating’ them, albeit without a shred of evidence to establish mischief.

However, there are those like Mr Hari Prasad who have been demanding that the Election Commission offer opportunities for them to demonstrate the vulnerability of EVMs. The EC initially went along with the idea but developed cold feet and abruptly stopped one such exercise by Mr Prasad and his colleagues last September. Why did the EC back out?

Two other Indians who have plunged into this campaign are Mr Subramanian Swamy, whose petition against EVMs is currently before the Delhi High Court, and Mr GVL Narasimha Rao, election analyst and author of Democracy at Risk — Can We Trust Our Electronic Voting Machines?. This book outlines the story of EVMs in India, Europe and the US, and describes how the non-response of the EC to questions raised by Mr Gonggrijp and Mr Hari Prasad has contributed in no small measure to the growing concern in political parties about the reliability of voting machines.

According to Mr Rao, among those who have raised doubts about EVMs are Mr LK Advani, leader of the BJP, Mr Ghulam Nabi Azad, Union Minister and Congress leader who attributed his party’s defeat in Odisha last year to “manipulation” of EVMs, Mr Prakash Karat, general secretary of the CPI(M), Mr Sharad Yadav, president of the JD(U), Mr Mulayam Singh Yadav, president of the SP, Ms Mamata Bannerjee, president of Trinamool Congress, Mr Chandrababu Naidu, leader of the Telugu Desam, Ms Jayalalithaa, leader of the AIADMK, and leaders of the Pattali Makkal Katchi. One look at this list and you realise that there is a doubting Thomas everywhere — in every one of the three known national coalitions and in different regions.

Mr Karat has formally written to the EC. He has said there are several questions in regard to the reliability of EVMs. Among them are: Possibility of incorporating a Trojan in the chip; possibility of manipulation of the chip at the manufacturing stage; lack of EC control over the technical process; and lack of third party inspection. He has said the EC must control the manufacture of EVMs, allow third party inspection and randomly shift EVMs from State to State.

After talking to experts, Mr Rao lists eight situations in which EVMs can be rigged. The EC has sought to counter these arguments by saying that the Indian EVMs are standalone machines which are not part of any network. Therefore, any surmise based on operating system based EVMs would be completely erroneous.

These arguments have been countered by Mr Ulrich Wiesner, a physicist and software engineer, who was the petitioner before the Constitutional Court in Germany. In a statement that is part of the rejoinder affidavit filed by Mr Swamy in the Delhi High Court, Mr Wiesner has said that EVMs in the Netherlands, Germany and Ireland were also standalone machines with no connection to the Internet. He says, “It is common sense that someone who has sufficient access to open the machines and replace the software or hardware can implement virtually any functionality … that would not be spotted by tests.”

The EC is a public body with a fat budget. If it is to command the confidence of all stake-holders in the democratic process, it must function in a transparent manner and answer the questions raised by these citizens and experts. The inflexible and non-transparent attitude of the commission is lending credence to the argument that possibly it has no answers or, worse, it has something to hide.

To me the most intriguing part is all the parties complain of EVM fraud. If so who accomplishes the fraud- the chip maker?

And is Mr Hari Prasad our member vhkprasad?

[Raja Bose]

Pioneer Op-ed, 23 Feb 2010
There’s a Trojan in the EVM!

A Surya Prakash
The EC is a public body with a fat budget

OT, but interesting to see that Indian newspapers consider such kind of Amirkhani English sentence construction, editorial worthy.

The main argument seems to be rest on the fact that the process can be tampered with. Very well, it is also well known how the process can be secured. Given the extremely simple construction of the EVM and the burgeoning Indian IT industry, that should not be a technical challenge...and since this is an issue of utmost national importance, money should not be a challenge either. That should be the goal of the exercise - every technology has dual uses, doesn't mean we should go back to the Stone Age.

[vera_k]

To me the most intriguing part is all the parties complain of EVM fraud. If so who accomplishes the fraud- the chip maker?

No. The fraud would be committed by the people assigning EVMs to booths in constituencies. I think {not sure} these are state employees seconded to the EC.

[Sachin]

No. The fraud would be committed by the people assigning EVMs to booths in constituencies. I think {not sure} these are state employees seconded to the EC.

The EVMs allotted to the booths are tested before the polling begins. Also the fact that the EVMs are in perfect working order is verified and counter signed by representatives of every candidate. Also which booth gets which EVMs are also logged and tracked. The District Collector is answerible to the EC if some goof up happens.

I am not an electronics expert, so cannot comment on how (or how not) a chip can be tampered. But I feel the alogrithsm, chip designs used in the EVM needs to be open source, and can be verifiable by any one.

[vera_k]

The EVMs allotted to the booths are tested before the polling begins. Also the fact that the EVMs are in perfect working order is verified and counter signed by representatives of every candidate. Also which booth gets which EVMs are also logged and tracked. The District Collector is answerible to the EC if some goof up happens.

That is no guarantee if the crookedness kicks in after a dozen or so votes have been cast. Do you know if the EVM assignment to booths is randomised in some way?

[ASPuar]

Y'know what, the thing that smells about all this is the following:

1. If even one party has a doubt about the EVM's we should switch back to paper ballots, because this is too big an issue to take on just trust. The absolute and total refusal of the CEC to even consider any such request is fishy (especially since he was a noted and died in the wool Gandhi family supporter, and comes from a family of said retainers of Gandhi clan).

2. In the US, a bill is being passed to make funds available to cater for people who might want to vote by paper if they dont trust the EVM's.

3. In many western countries, VVPAT systems (Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail), are being adopted, so that some reconciliation can be made. This can be in the form of a printout saying "You have voted for X" party.

Everything is ok, but the refusal to recognise this as an issue by the EC is mysterious, and gives rise to speculation.

[ASPuar]

I agree with rohit 100% (maybe because me too am an electronics engineer)

But there is no way you can convince an EVMphobe about that. You can have any amount of technical security, but still you can argue to work around it. For example, assume we have a system as you have mentioned. Can't someone load a new program, rig the votes, and then load the old program after counting?

It is not technology that is the weak link. It is the trust of the official machinery that run the election. If the election officials could be trusted (with necessary checks, balances and deterrents to beat the human nature), the EVMs can be trusted. If the pandu who guard the EVMs could be bribed so that a bribed ECIL engineer can load a new programme to the EVMs, no amount of technology can save you.

Herein lies the rub.

Can we trust our bureaucracy, politicised, and highly invested in the political climate as it, to do the right thing, when running these elections?

[ASPuar]

Among RMji's election promises:

Conduct ten 3000 kiloton atmospheric nuclear tests and forty 100 to 3000 kiloton plus ground nuclear tests to be at par with China

RMji seems to be a latter day Vladimir Zhirinovskiy....

Anyway, his strange proclivities aside, he makes a valid point as far as this EVM is concerned. If even the slightest shadow of a doubt exists, it should be addressed.

[AjayKK]

Y'know what, the thing that smells about all this is the following:

Everything is ok, but the refusal to recognise this as an issue by the EC is mysterious, and gives rise to speculation.

This is one of the main points in the discussion, the behaviour of the Election Commission..
Even though the machine "Provides for the printing of voter wise voting data", no effort is made to ensure the voter that his vote has been cast correctly! And then, the EC stopping the demo of S Swamy and Hari Prasad on the false grounds that it violated the patents.

Question to gurus -Dileep,ArmenT,RB etal : If a PCT(Patnt Cooperation Treaty) National Phase application of the EVM has been withdrawn, what does it exactly mean ?

[AjayKK]

Here is the EVM link on the WIPO site in which ECIL is the applicant:

http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/en/wo.jsp?IA= ... LAY=STATUS

Read the bibliographic data, description, claims...

The ability to print voter wise info is present in the above link.

[ArmenT]

Question to gurus -Dileep,ArmenT,RB etal : If a PCT(Patnt Cooperation Treaty) National Phase application of the EVM has been withdrawn, what does it exactly mean ?

I'm no lawyer, but sounds like they objected because the patent hasn't been approved yet? One they get the patent(s), then the design is open to anyone who wants to take a look, but no one else can infringe upon it. Perhaps they're worried that someone else can start making a clone if the design gets out before the patent papers come through. Seems like a silly excuse though (i.e.) they could probably go ahead with the demo by making S. Swamy and Hari Prasad sign some NDA agreements. Then again, I'm not a lawyer and everything I said above is basically my guess only.

Feel free to correct me as needed.

[Raja Bose]

The patent doesn't need to be issued - it just needs to be published in order to be considered part of prior art. Basically the patent will automatically get published after 18 months from date of filing of the utility patent application. If the time period of the test was before those 18 months had expired, then there might be an issue. But they could have made them sign NDAs, OSA, their chaddis, what-not...don't see any reason to stop the tests in the middle.

[Dileep]

Part of the problem is the legacy "that is secret" paranoia of the babus.

In reality, there is absolutely no harm in publishing the complete design, including source code of the EVMS. But if you do, there will be huge cry of "sell off", "it is all public, hence unsecure" etc. At least they should have got NDAs signed and given the info to the competent people.

It is stoopid babucracy IMO.

[Pranav]

No. The fraud would be committed by the people assigning EVMs to booths in constituencies. I think {not sure} these are state employees seconded to the EC.

The EVMs allotted to the booths are tested before the polling begins. Also the fact that the EVMs are in perfect working order is verified and counter signed by representatives of every candidate. Also which booth gets which EVMs are also logged and tracked. The District Collector is answerible to the EC if some goof up happens.

I am not an electronics expert, so cannot comment on how (or how not) a chip can be tampered. But I feel the alogrithsm, chip designs used in the EVM needs to be open source, and can be verifiable by any one.

It is possible to have a trojan that behaves correctly during the testing, but not during actual voting. Such a trojan would need to be activated by accessing the machine at the District warehouse for a minute or two after the candidates of the national parties have been decided.

The counter-argument to this basically relies on faith in the honesty of government Baboos, watch-men etc.

[Dileep]

It is possible to have a trojan that behaves correctly during the testing, but not during actual voting. Such a trojan would need to be activated by accessing the machine at the District warehouse for a minute or two after the candidates of the national parties have been decided.

The counter-argument to this basically relies on faith in the honesty of government Baboos, watch-men etc.

All these points are already discussed to the death and refuted in the past pages.

[Raja Bose]

The EVMs allotted to the booths are tested before the polling begins. Also the fact that the EVMs are in perfect working order is verified and counter signed by representatives of every candidate. Also which booth gets which EVMs are also logged and tracked. The District Collector is answerible to the EC if some goof up happens.

I am not an electronics expert, so cannot comment on how (or how not) a chip can be tampered. But I feel the alogrithsm, chip designs used in the EVM needs to be open source, and can be verifiable by any one.

It is possible to have a trojan that behaves correctly during the testing, but not during actual voting. Such a trojan would need to be activated by accessing the machine at the District warehouse for a minute or two after the candidates of the national parties have been decided.

The counter-argument to this basically relies on faith in the honesty of government Baboos, watch-men etc.

All discussed, shredded and debated to death on the last umpteen pages of this pious thread.

See! I can also increase my post count like Chankian Dileep.

OMIGOSH! I actually exceeded Dileep's post count!

[Pranav]

It is possible to have a trojan that behaves correctly during the testing, but not during actual voting. Such a trojan would need to be activated by accessing the machine at the District warehouse for a minute or two after the candidates of the national parties have been decided.

The counter-argument to this basically relies on faith in the honesty of government Baboos, watch-men etc.

All these points are already discussed to the death and refuted in the past pages.

All discussed, shredded and debated to death on the last umpteen pages of this pious thread.

Hmm? ... I'm sure readers will form their own opinions on the value of this "refutation".

[niran]

Hmm? ... I'm sure readers will form their own opinions on the value of this "refutation".

of course, and rest assured you are not going to like one bit.
post increase

[ArmenT]

Shall make it available before mid march.

Any progress on this front sir?

[Raja Bose]

For a fleeting moment, I was jumping with joy that Rahul ji is back! Alas it was a false positive

Yes, Mr. Prasad, is the EVM hacking document that you had promised, ready?

[vhkprasad]

Guys,

Please wait one more week, I am sure you will appreciate the effort, mean while check this to believe that old EVMs software is burnt on UVROM and the code is been deciphered by us.... and to our findings it's the same code in the masked chip of new EVMs. I am confident that our paper will convince everybody on our concerns in present EVMs.

http://tinyurl.com/ye5opek
http://tinyurl.com/y8v96np

Some of us may say there are checks & balances and even ECI told the same ... don't you think technology should defend technology, Ideal conditions are possible in ideal situations not if situations are under somebody control.

[vera_k]

^^^

If that is true, then the Indiresan committee report is pointless. It relies on the timestamping feature in the new EVMs to prove that the EVM cannot be compromised.

[ArmenT]

^^^^
Is that a picture of the actual EVM board, or one that you guys reverse-engineered?

[vhkprasad]

it's the photograph of old EVMs made in 1989. shall post soon the rest of them along with our paper.