Riedel's Pakistan focus was not due to his confidence that the civilian government could control the military and intelligence services. In fact, he referred to Army Chief of Staff
Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani as a "liar" with regards to the activities of the secretive Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI), which is widely suspected of aiding the Taliban insurgency. Then Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair reportedly echoed Riedel's views on this matter.
Inside the administration, Blair argued that Obama was approaching Pakistan with
too many carrots and not enough sticks. He at one point
advocated bombing inside Pakistan and conducting raids there without the Pakistani government's approval. "I think Pakistan would be
completely, completely pissed off and they would probably take actions against us ... but
they would probably adjust,
" he once told Obama.
Obama, however, opted to pursue a less confrontational path.
...
"I know that I am speaking to you on a personal level when I say that my commitment to ending the ability of these groups to strike at our families is as much about my family's security as it is about yours,"
Obama wrote in a letter to Zardari delivered by National Security Advisor Jim Jones and counterterrorism advisor John Brennan.
Zardari's response to that letter reinforced what many in the administration already suspected: Pakistan's government was in the grips of an internal struggle over whether to embrace the United States
. Zardari's initial response focused heavily on India, though the Pakistani president only referred obliquely to his country's strategic rival. Woodward reports that the White House believed the
letter was written by the Pakistani military and the ISI. However, the Zardari government did end up accepting Obama's offer.
Obama's top advisors told the U.S. president that
he would have to accept something short of complete success in convincing Pakistan to turn away from its longstanding obsession with the military threat it perceives from India.
When Obama had a meeting with Zardari in May 2009, he told the Pakistani president the he did not want U.S. taxpayers to be funding Pakistan's military buildup against India
"We are trying to change our world view," Zardari told Obama, "but it's not going to happen overnight."
At times, Obama was downright puzzled by his advisors' advice regarding Pakistan. For example, intelligence reports confirmed that Pakistani officials were afraid that the United States would leave Afghanistan too early, as they believed had occurred after the end of the resistance to the Soviet regime in the 1980s. On the other hand, Pakistan worried that if the United States was too involved in Afghanistan, it might aid in the establishment of a larger Afghan army than Islamabad was comfortable with.
"What am I to believe?" Obama asked his senior staff. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Special Representative Richard Holbrooke, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates all told him
these were the types of contradictions that were commonplace when dealing with Pakistan.
...
Pakistan's Ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani, a key go-between, tried several times to explain to the Obama administration how to court Pakistani leaders, comparing the dynamic to
"a man who is trying to woo a woman."
"
We all know what he wants from her. Right?
" Haqqani said in a meeting with Jones, Deputy National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and the NSC's Gen. Doug Lute.
"But she has other ideas. She wants to be taken to the theater. She wants that nice new bottle of perfume," Haqqani told them. "If you get down on one knee and
give the ring, that's the big prize. And boy, you know, it works."
Haqqani said the
"ring" was official U.S. recognition of Pakistan's nuclear program as legitimate. He also warned that the Pakistanis would always ask for the moon as a starting point in negotiations. He compared it to the salesmanship of rug merchants.
"The guy starts at 10,000 and you settle for 1,200," Haqqani told the Obama team. "So be reasonable,
but never let the guy walk out of the shop without a sale."
...
