Should we discontinue EVMs?

Dileep · Post by **Dileep** » 05 Apr 2010 08:31

Hmm, made in 1989. Are they being used anymore? And are you SURE this is a PRODUCTION MODEL used by the ECI?

And how can it be the same code in the masked chip in the new EVM? It is a different controller. and even if it is 'source code identical' what does that show?

Nothing.

Waiting for your report.

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 05 Apr 2010 11:33

Mr. Prasad,

Waiting for your full paper. I still dont see the link b/w the pics you posted and the current EVMs being used.

Dileep · Post by **Dileep** » 05 Apr 2010 12:34

RB, a crazy thought occured while I came to work today. Maybe we can make a design ourselves, and get someone (maybe Mr. Prasad's company) manufacture the design to our spec and THEN demonstrate compromising it beating the check/balance system we establish. The design will be true to the available info on the EVM.

vhkprasad · Post by **vhkprasad** » 05 Apr 2010 16:12

These EVMs are still in use and the one I posted is been used in recent Maharashtra Elections, And the similarity isboth the controllers in old and new machines are from same chip vendor. It's the same functional flow in both the machines except minor add ons.

Our point is to prove that these machines are prone to attack and can go unnoticed under present system. Prof. Indiresan committee has done just a black-box testing to certify which is not sufficient. None of the officials in ECI have any expertise to identify the insider attack, and we want to demonstrate the same before ECI soon.

As I said in my earlier post under ideal conditions and when all the citizens and Netas are good samaritans then yes, nobody left to hack these machines. ECI had called us back for exposing our claims and we will be attending them to present our observations. I hope this time they allow us with open mind and we convince or get convinced by them. The effort is to fill the holes if any are left per our findings/assumptions.

Mr. Dileep you can do a design if you feel so after a week... and i love your spirit.

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 06 Apr 2010 01:55

Dileep wrote:RB, a crazy thought occured while I came to work today. Maybe we can make a design ourselves, and get someone (maybe Mr. Prasad's company) manufacture the design to our spec and THEN demonstrate compromising it beating the check/balance system we establish. The design will be true to the available info on the EVM.

That is a good idea. But, first I am interested to see exactly which space of vulnerabilities Mr.Prasad is looking at and exploiting- is it still the kind which hactivists in massa have been doing (like the fella I had contacted and whose response I had posted on this thread) or is it something else. The former usually falls flat when exposed to process based checks and balances (and that includes RM's theories) - after all if one has 400% access to everything, hacking any system is a cinch.

For the process part, you already provided an example. For the tech part, we may not even need a board manufactured and probably can bread board this stuff unless the board is a pawn

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 06 Apr 2010 02:04

vhkprasad wrote: As I said in my earlier post under ideal conditions and when all the citizens and Netas are good samaritans then yes, nobody left to hack these machines. ECI had called us back for exposing our claims and we will be attending them to present our observations. I hope this time they allow us with open mind and we convince or get convinced by them. The effort is to fill the holes if any are left per our findings/assumptions.

Mr. Dileep you can do a design if you feel so after a week... and i love your spirit.

Mr. Prasad, Good luck and please keep us updated

Currently my curiosity is about the following points (for which I am waiting to read your paper):

1) Is the exploit solely a technical one or does it exploit holes in the process (manufacturing, storage, deployment, verification and testing).

2) If the exploit involves technical holes, which hardware has it been performed on? What is the delta between that hardware and the ones used in national elections? - a comparative BOM will help ofcourse.

3) If the exploit involves process holes, how many personnel need be involved at each stage and the level of access required. What is the probability that such acts gets undetected completely gives the massive scale of deployment and the practicalities involved.

Sachin · Post by **Sachin** » 06 Apr 2010 09:38

Bengaluru city had its first round of Corporation Elections (Brihat Bangalore Municipal Corporation) for the first time, after its reorganisation (a couple of adjoining Municipal Councils were made part of the city etc., wards reorganised etc.).
Point #1: BJP has won the elections with a very huge margin. Humble Farmer's party really had to eat the humble pie, and so did the Congress. CPI(M) !?, what CPI(M)? .
Point #2: Electronic Voting Machines were used all across the elections. BJP had also raised concerns about EVM tampering in the last national elections. Keeping that in mind, the EVMs used for the Corporation elections can also be checked.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 13 Apr 2010 01:47

Chandra Babu Naidu wants

EVMs Scrapped

Muppalla · Post by **Muppalla** » 14 Apr 2010 07:27

http://www.indianevm.com

You can download GVL's book from here

http://www.indianevm.com/book_democracy ... k_2010.pdf

GVLNRAO · Post by **GVLNRAO** » 14 Apr 2010 10:23

Muppalla wrote:http://www.indianevm.com

You can download GVL's book from here

http://www.indianevm.com/book_democracy ... k_2010.pdf

I have joined this Forum as suggested by VHK Prasad. The shocking facts that came to light in the wake of our sustained efforts show beyond any doubt that the Indian democracy is at risk and imperiled. Glad that this forum has been discussing the issue for a long time.

Please do visit the www.indianevm.com which has up-to-date information on the ongoing effort to create wider awareness.

Do share your thoughts and give your suggestions on www.indianevm.com to carry this fight forward or write to [email protected]

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Apr 2010 10:43

Welcome Sri GVLNRao garu!

Please also participate in other threads too.

AjayKK · Post by **AjayKK** » 14 Apr 2010 15:12

The book "Democracy at Risk" is well written. The conduct of the EC does not appear to be open or truthful.

I have not finished it, but this excerpt provides a view into to the conduct of EC.

Chapter 8: Farce of Enquiry by Election Commission

To give you a glimpse of what happened at these meetings, I have reproduced below a summary ofdeliberations that took place at the meetings between petitioners in the Supreme Court led by V.V. Rao and the Election Commission representatives on August 17 and September 13 and the correspondence exchanged between them.

August 17, 2009, 4.30 P.M Nirvachan Sadan

In the meeting held on August 17, petitioners requested the Commission to clarify several concerns regarding the vulnerability of the EVMs raised in their writ petition. After initial introduction and discussions, the following conversation took place in the meeting.

Navin Chawla (Chief Election Commissioner, EC): Instead of wasting time, you should cut short the discussion and demonstrate tamperability of the EVMs.

Hari Prasad (Managing Director, Net India; petitioners): Please put an EVM on the table so that I can practically explain vulnerabilities of EVMs. We would also like to ask some technical questions.

Navin Chawla (impatiently intervenes): I would like you to raise all such questions later in writing. Instead, I want you to demonstrate the tamperability of EVMs.

Hari Prasad: The way you (Election Commission) are asking us to demonstrate is illogical. This is also against the fundamentals of security testing. This is not how ethical hacking is done. We will suggest a procedure for ethical hacking. The manner you want the demonstration done is not viable.

Prof. Indiresan (Technical Expert, Election Commission): I cannot comment on that. You should prove the tamperability of ECI-EVM as suggested by the CEC, Mr. Navin Chawla.

Hari Prasad: We are prepared to give a demonstration. But we have to agree on rules and procedures. Give us a few EVMs and allow us to tamper those using "reverse engineering" technique with the help of necessary tools. Then tell us which of the EVMs have been tampered. If
you fail to detect the tampered EVMs, you have to accept that tampering is possible. I am certain that when we tamper them, even the Commission's technical experts cannot detect which machines have been tampered.

Navin Chawla: All right. We would allow you to tamper some EVMs. You can use your tools over many days. But it will be in our premises.

Hari Prasad: We are willing to do the ethical hacking in your premises. We will also suggest a procedure that we propose to adopt for ethical hacking. That will be the basis on which ethical hacking will be done.

Navin Chawla: We welcome any suggestions that can strengthen the security of EVMs. Whatever questions you have, give in writing and the Commission will furnish replies in writing.

Following the August 17 meeting, in a letter dated August 28, 2009, the petitioners had submitted to the Election Commission a list of questions concerning the process, design, manufacturing and administration of EVMs and a "Suggested Procedure for demonstration of the tamperability of the Electronic Voting Machines". Petitioners had expected the Election Commission to furnish its response before the next meeting scheduled on September 3. But any reply was not provided to the petitioners.

September 3, 2009, 3.30 P.M Nirvachan Sadan

Here are some details of how the discussions proceeded on September 3, 2009.

J.P. Prakash, Deputy Election Commissioner (Dy. EC): Let us see the demonstration right away.

Hari Prasad: We have to first define what constitutes tamperability and agree on a demonstration procedure. We have submitted a procedure for demonstration. Without commenting on these, how can we begin to show tamperability? Your approach is illogical and unscientific.

Prof. Indiresan: Demonstrate the tamperability of EVMs at various stages of the electoral process; like polling station Level, Returning Officer level, manufacturer level etc.

J.P. Prakash: As you have alleged tamperability, we would like you to begin demonstration.

Hari Prasad: As you have not agreed on procedure for demonstration, let me begin today inspection of your machines and explain the vulnerabilities at different stages as suggested by Prof. Indiresan.

Prof. Indiresan: I will touch your feet if you tamper the EVMs without replacing the microchips.

This unseemly challenge from the venerable professor surprised the petitioners. Indiresan had made irresponsible and insensitive statements earlier to defend the reliability of EVMs. In a television interview on CNN-IBN, the ageing professor had said, "This (doubting the reliability of EVMs) is like, you know, asking Sita to prove her virginity by having Agni Pariksha." Here he was making yet another wild statement.

Hari Prasad: It is elementary that the program inside the microchip cannot be altered as it is one time programmable. But, in the manner Election Commission conducts its field level checks, there is no way you can find out if a hacker replaces the entire microchip or the mother board inside the control unit of the EVM.

Prof. Indiresan: I agree that it is theoretically possible. But can anyone replace the microchips in all 13.8 Lakh EVMs in the country?

(Indiresan is missing the point. One doesn't have to tamper with all the EVMs to win elections. Elections are won by small margins. And even if a few EVMs are managed to alter the votes in one's favour, it can possibly turn a loser into the winner and vice versa.)

J.P. Prakash: Let us start the process of demonstration.

Hari Prasad: Let me begin the process today by inspecting the old and new EVMs used in
elections which would be the first stage of demonstration i.e inspection and analysis. Can you bring a few new and old EVM to examine and inspect?

J.P. Prakash: Bring whatever EVMs they want to examine.
Hari Prasad: I want these EVMs opened so that we can comment on their vulnerabilities.

There was a sense of unease among the ECIL/ BEL engineers who did not want to open the machines. When Hari Prasad said that no machine can be hacked without opening it, the reluctant BEL engineers were told by the Election Commission officials and Prof. Indiresan to allow the petitioners' technical representatives to examine and inspect the EVMs to make necessary
preparations for their tamperability demonstration.

The technical team led by Hari Prasad continued their inspection of the ballot and control units and began to note down the details of card and circuit level checks on plain paper provided by the Election Commission. Hari Prasad and his colleagues looked at each other several times during this process. While noting down the details of the old EVMs, they animatedly discussed the technical flaws and vulnerabilities of the EVMs, which were overheard by the engineers of manufacturers and EC's expert committee members. That was perhaps a tactical mistake they had made as their confidence and the expressions on their faces showed that tampering these
EVMs would be child's play for them.

(After the meeting, they told me that they were indeed surprised that the architecture of the ECI-EVMs is extremely dated and the 'look alike' EVMs that they had built for demonstrations were far superior to the ECI-EVMs. Hari Prasad was emphatic that it did not require their level of skill to hack the ECI-EVMs and even an ordinary technician can tamper with the ECI- EVM's easily.)

As the technical team of petitioners progressed, the BEL Engineers continued to be wary of the inspection being carried out. They suddenly became jittery and rushed to the deputy commissioners and Prof. Indiresan to stall the inspection process lest they be exposed.

J.P. Prakash: Let us stop the inspection of EVMs here.

Hari Prasad: Why?

J.P. Prakash: We need to take the consent of the Election Commissioners before going ahead with the demonstration. For the first time, since the Election Commission began to dare
anyone to demonstrate the tamperability of EVMs, it was clear that the Election Commission and its technical experts had blinked.

They appeared to have suddenly lost all their faith in the EVMs which they had claimed to be fully tamper-proof.

J.P. Prakash: (Adopting a conciliatory tone) The Election Commission has an open mind and would welcome any suggestions to improve the EVMs. There is no technology that
cannot be improved upon.

Prof. Indiresan: (Betraying a deep sense of anxiety) We want you to submit all your written notes made during the process of inspection.

Jayant Das (Senior Advocate, Supreme Court): On what grounds are you asking us to return the notes? You have invited us for a demonstration and allow us to do it.

Subramanian Swamy: You have been asking everyone, including politicians like me who have written to you over the past two months daring us to demonstrate their vulnerability. Why are you scuttling the process now?

Seeing the jitteriness of the EVM manufacturers and the members of the expert committee was a sight to be watched. For the first time, petitioners saw the Election Commission representatives in a totally panicked state. Clearly, the confidence they had exhibited hitherto in the EVMs, thanks to the repeated assurances given to them by the expert committee, had been shaken.

Delay Tactics & Change in Stance

The next opportunity for a discussion and demonstration that the Commission officials had
promised to the petitioners did not materialize for over three months despite repeated reminders from the petitioners.

This conduct of the babus cannot be dismissed as " Oh, they are babus, always secretive onleee"
Kudos to the petitioners and writer of the book for bringing this info in the open.

vhkprasad · Post by **vhkprasad** » 14 Apr 2010 16:24

AjayKK wrote: Delay Tactics & Change in Stance

The next opportunity for a discussion and demonstration that the Commission officials had
promised to the petitioners did not materialize for over three months despite repeated reminders from the petitioners.

The commission has invited us back with a condition that we should do "Normal Tampering". We will update the entire communication between us and ECI in http://www.indianevm.com soon.

muraliravi · Post by **muraliravi** » 14 Apr 2010 19:18

vhkprasad wrote:
AjayKK wrote: Delay Tactics & Change in Stance

The next opportunity for a discussion and demonstration that the Commission officials had
promised to the petitioners did not materialize for over three months despite repeated reminders from the petitioners.

The commission has invited us back with a condition that we should do "Normal Tampering". We will update the entire communication between us and ECI in http://www.indianevm.com soon.

Thats great news. Prasad sir, any idea when you would meeting the commission?

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 15 Apr 2010 02:03

Chandra Babu Naidu wants
EVMs Scrapped

as the EVMs could be tampered with and hacked, why should India alone use such machines?

And if ballot boxes can be/are be tampered with, should they too be done away with?

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 15 Apr 2010 07:23

Gerard wrote:
Chandra Babu Naidu wants
EVMs Scrapped

as the EVMs could be tampered with and hacked, why should India alone use such machines?
And if ballot boxes can be/are be tampered with, should they too be done away with?

Have to compare detectability and scale, and the number of people that need to be involved.

Dileep · Post by **Dileep** » 15 Apr 2010 07:38

I would not take the officials being jittery being an indication of guilt.

The officials are not technically qualified people. Moreover, they are the product of the 'official secrets paranoia'. They also might have been intimidated by the technical jargon used by the experts. I know, because I have used that tactics often to intimidate MBA types.

I am waiting for the research paper that Mr. Prasad promised me, delayed, re-promised on 12th April etc. Mr. Prasad, what is the new date?

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 15 Apr 2010 07:47

GVLNRAO wrote: Please do visit the http://www.indianevm.com which has up-to-date information on the ongoing effort to create wider awareness.

Do share your thoughts and give your suggestions on http://www.indianevm.com to carry this fight forward or write to [email protected]

Welcome to B-R!

The indianevm.com site seems to be still mainly under construction - atleast the interesting parts!

vhkprasad wrote: The commission has invited us back with a condition that we should do "Normal Tampering". We will update the entire communication between us and ECI in http://www.indianevm.com soon.

Mr. Prasad, Still waiting for your paper? Is it ready to be released? Thanks.

Pranav wrote: Have to compare detectability and scale, and the number of people that need to be involved.

Exactly. And that depends on what is the specific hack that is being demonstrated - this is exactly the point where EVM hackers in US have failed because their methods required conditions which make them vulnerable to getting caught in the act hence, while the hack is possible, it is not possible in practical terms on a large scale. I guess we will wait for Mr. Prasad to release his paper - that should hopefully answer a lot of questions.

Dileep · Post by **Dileep** » 15 Apr 2010 08:07

GVLNRao, I read your article http://www.indianevm.com/articles/ten-r ... n-evms.pdf. Do you want to debate the ten points here? At least till the paper by VHKPrasad comes out?

Muppalla · Post by **Muppalla** » 15 Apr 2010 08:14

Raja Bose wrote: Exactly. And that depends on what is the specific hack that is being demonstrated - this is exactly the point where EVM hackers in US have failed because their methods required conditions which make them vulnerable to getting caught in the act hence, while the hack is possible, it is not possible in practical terms on a large scale. I guess we will wait for Mr. Prasad to release his paper - that should hopefully answer a lot of questions.

In Indian election scenario all it needs is small scale and not largescale. These days real surveys are done by political parties. All you need is to hack 2% each of the 10% constituencies of entire India to produce a favorable results. Infact my number may be exaggerated. Since INC is winner here - all INC needs to do is 2% of booths in AP, Maha and Delhi (or another small state) states.

If there is a practical way to hack then yes I would say it was implemented. I am still not convinced that EVMs are hackable. I am willing to be convinced ( so far I am not even in the club to get convinced).

See the following factors from the INC's perspective -
(1) Considerable number of manchurian candidates are created/availabe in key states
(a) AP - Chiranjeevi (in fact here it was a seven party fight here)
(b) Maha - MNS
(c) TN - innumerable
(2) needless to say Caste plays vital role - all the parties possess booth level caste and other demographic details. They know which boots needs to be taken care off.
(3) INC votebanks are very clear and they spend 20000000 times more than anyone else. They bring their banks in large numbers to booths.

The vote margins are not huge these days after the electorate is split into seven or eight parites and some junkie independents.

Calculations are very clear for them and all they need to do it is in those booths (just a small percent of them) where they know that their votes are less.

If we are convinced that EVMs are riggable then I am sure we can even find which constituencies are suspect. By the way you can buy booth level details of entire election from EC site.

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 15 Apr 2010 09:40

^^^ What is the magnitude of the 2%? Considering that Indian elections are the largest in the world, 2% wont be trivial, no? That is why I am interested in learning whether Mr. Prasad's demonstrations only provide a technical hack or does it also look into process subversion too (at various stages) because the latter is equally or more important.

Sachin · Post by **Sachin** » 15 Apr 2010 10:46

vhkprasad wrote:The commission has invited us back with a condition that we should do "Normal Tampering".

Can you explain what they (or you) mean by "Normal Tempering"? As people already noted here, we should also confirm whether any tampering can be done in a large scale (or atleast in a scale which can alter the election results) without triggering any alarms in the election process. The processes laid out for conducting an election could also be checked to see they have any loop holes.

GVLNRAO · Post by **GVLNRAO** » 15 Apr 2010 19:37

Yes. we can discuss the 10 points I have mentioned in my article on Indianevm.com. Please read the article and raise any questions that you may have to debate, agree and disagree any of these points. You can read the paper at http://www.indianevm.com/articles/ten-r ... n-evms.pdf

GVLNRAO · Post by **GVLNRAO** » 15 Apr 2010 19:39

ramana wrote:Welcome Sri GVLNRao garu!

Please also participate in other threads too.

Dear Mr. Ramana, thank you for welcoming to the Forum. I find that this group is discussing something exciting. I look forward to particpate in other threads also.

GVLNRAO · Post by **GVLNRAO** » 15 Apr 2010 19:41

Dileep wrote:GVLNRao, I read your article http://www.indianevm.com/articles/ten-r ... n-evms.pdf. Do you want to debate the ten points here? At least till the paper by VHKPrasad comes out?

Yes. we can discuss the 10 points I have mentioned in my article on Indianevm.com. Please read the article and raise any questions that you may have to debate, agree and disagree any of these points. You can read the paper at http://www.indianevm.com/articles/ten-r ... n-evms.pdf

muraliravi · Post by **muraliravi** » 16 Apr 2010 01:08

GVLNRAO wrote:
Dileep wrote:GVLNRao, I read your article http://www.indianevm.com/articles/ten-r ... n-evms.pdf. Do you want to debate the ten points here? At least till the paper by VHKPrasad comes out?
Yes. we can discuss the 10 points I have mentioned in my article on Indianevm.com. Please read the article and raise any questions that you may have to debate, agree and disagree any of these points. You can read the paper at http://www.indianevm.com/articles/ten-r ... n-evms.pdf

GVLNRAO ji,

I have a couple of question on your article and book (lets see these are summary question for which i did not find answers or explanations in your book)

1. While you say that pollsters have been getting it wrong after introduction of EVM's including yourself. How were able to predict accurately the Gujarat, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh election of 2007-08 within 5% accuracy. (these are the ones that I have at the top of my head, I am maybe missing your predictions for couple of other states).

2. Did you compare you survey results for the Lok Sabha elections at a more minute level than the parliamentary district level. For example in a "X" seat (parliamentary seat), you had predicted 100000 votes for party "A" and 95000 for Party "B".

But in the actual result, maybe party "A" got 95000 and "B" got 100000. When EC announces results they do also have a split up of the 100000 or the 95000 as to how much came from each booth or village. When you surveyed also you would have a split up (maybe not at booth level, but at assembly seat level within each parliament seat). How do those numbers compare. Was that also way off, or were they within error limits.

The reason I am asking this, is because, if you have 2-3% error at all booths (thats normal) in your prediction, the end result might just go totally opposite. So did you find the final lok sabha results at booth/village level also very different from the survey.

vhkprasad · Post by **vhkprasad** » 16 Apr 2010 01:28

Dileep wrote: I am waiting for the research paper that Mr. Prasad promised me, delayed, re-promised on 12th April etc. Mr. Prasad, what is the new date?

It's a research paper done along with two other people.. we are almost done, because of other priorities it is been delayed. your curiosity inspires me.

Sachin wrote: Can you explain what they (or you) mean by "Normal Tempering"? As people already noted here, we should also confirm whether any tampering can be done in a large scale (or atleast in a scale which can alter the election results) without triggering any alarms in the election process. The processes laid out for conducting an election could also be checked to see they have any loop holes.

Even I heard for the first time that there will be a "Normal Tampering" & there might be "Abnormal Tampering". They meant it to convey us that tampering should happen without opening the box by simple key press. And yes under Ideal conditions no body can tamper these machines, anybody can simply certify...

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 16 Apr 2010 05:16

^^^ Mr. Prasad, In that case I hope you are probing and trying to find weaknesses in the EVM manufacturing, storage and deployment process itself since it will be a critical part in determining whether and when the tampering can be done without attracting attention or getting caught.

Any electronic device can be hacked provided full access is given (the other extreme of the ideal case). What is interesting in this case is whether such hack can be done in practical circumstances on a large enough scale without getting caught.

Never knew there was something called "Normal" tampering!

Muppalla · Post by **Muppalla** » 16 Apr 2010 05:45

Raja Bose wrote:^^^ What is the magnitude of the 2%? Considering that Indian elections are the largest in the world, 2% wont be trivial, no? That is why I am interested in learning whether Mr. Prasad's demonstrations only provide a technical hack or does it also look into process subversion too (at various stages) because the latter is equally or more important.

Total Number of polling stations - 835000
2% is just - 16700

This is overall India figure and it is not that vast. Infact it not even necessary to deal with all of India in the scenario I wrote above. Just do the hack/tamper/whatever in 2% of those in two to three states for changing the fortunes. Overall about 4000 chosen booths from all over India will give a favorable results to INC.

If (big if) there is a way to even "abnormally tamper" the EVMs then my take is it is done. The "electoral management" engine of INC is capable. Even when paper was used they used to do the same engineering. Only difference is those are visible and if "EVMs are tamperable" no one will even know to protest.

Remember " T.N.Sheshanism " was basically successful against booth capturing and there was a decline in INC. If EVM normal/abnormal tamperability is provable the we need a similar hero like "T.N.Seshan" to stop tampering.

GVLNRAO · Post by **GVLNRAO** » 16 Apr 2010 07:58

Gerard wrote:
Chandra Babu Naidu wants
EVMs Scrapped

as the EVMs could be tampered with and hacked, why should India alone use such machines?
And if ballot boxes can be/are be tampered with, should they too be done away with?

In the case of ballot boxes, tampering if any, can be detected by even ordinary polling agents and local political functionaries. In the case of electronic voting machines, I bet that even the three election commissioners, their deputies and their expert committee members can't detect tampering and establish fraud if at all it happens. This is a challenge that they are not willing to accept. If they cannot detect tampering, how can we trust them? That is the fundamental question. They believe that the EVMs can be protected by keeping them in lock and key, sealing them and checking their functionality before use, not realising the possibility of tampering EVMs despite all these conditions.

First let us understand the loopholes in the EVMs. Let there be a debate on how these shortcomings can be overcome such that everybody can trust election results.

GVLNRAO · Post by **GVLNRAO** » 16 Apr 2010 08:37

muraliravi wrote:
GVLNRAO wrote:

Yes. we can discuss the 10 points I have mentioned in my article on Indianevm.com. Please read the article and raise any questions that you may have to debate, agree and disagree any of these points. You can read the paper at http://www.indianevm.com/articles/ten-r ... n-evms.pdf
GVLNRAO ji,

I have a couple of question on your article and book (lets see these are summary question for which i did not find answers or explanations in your book)

1. While you say that pollsters have been getting it wrong after introduction of EVM's including yourself. How were able to predict accurately the Gujarat, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh election of 2007-08 within 5% accuracy. (these are the ones that I have at the top of my head, I am maybe missing your predictions for couple of other states).

2. Did you compare you survey results for the Lok Sabha elections at a more minute level than the parliamentary district level. For example in a "X" seat (parliamentary seat), you had predicted 100000 votes for party "A" and 95000 for Party "B".

But in the actual result, maybe party "A" got 95000 and "B" got 100000. When EC announces results they do also have a split up of the 100000 or the 95000 as to how much came from each booth or village. When you surveyed also you would have a split up (maybe not at booth level, but at assembly seat level within each parliament seat). How do those numbers compare. Was that also way off, or were they within error limits.

The reason I am asking this, is because, if you have 2-3% error at all booths (thats normal) in your prediction, the end result might just go totally opposite. So did you find the final lok sabha results at booth/village level also very different from the survey.

The fact that we were able to predict elections very accurately in uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh etc. (which were published in my columns in the MINT newspaper) assembly elections and not in the Lok Sabha elections of 2004 and 2009 is indeed intriguing. Traditionally, it has been easier to predict Lok sabha elections and difficult to predict assembly elections due to the complexity of voting patterns in assembly elections. Precisely for this reason, I could predict election results for 1996, 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections for the Times of India with the highest degree of precision possible. That has changed since 2004 not just for me, but for all the pollsters. But all this can only be treated as circumstantial evidence and a basis that should warrant going into reasons for such abnormal electoral trends.

The fact that assembly election results have gone on predicted lines establishes one factor: that the voting machines, despite their repeated failures in the field as highlighted in Chapter "EVM Failures" of my book, do tend to function normally and give out correct results when they are not tampered. This raises doubts if the tampering of EVMs led to "surprising" and "unexpected" Lok Sabha election results.

Firstly, it is is easier to manipulate Lok Sabha elections than assembly elections as the number of constituencies is manageable. Second, the number of candidates is also relatively smaller and third, the stakes are much higher. Finally, if one big election is manipulated in a series of elections, it has much lower chance of detection rather than manipulating all the elections and all the constitunecies, which would lead to a public outcry. Let me state categorically all this does not offer any clinching evidence that EVMs have indeed been manipulated but does raise serious concerns.

Regarding any attempt to micro-analyse accuracy of survey results at the constituency and polling station levels, let me say that surveys do not allow such micro analysis as the sample sizes at such levels are so low that the margin of error tends to be very high. The margin of error of 2 to 3% at the state level and further down disaggregation is not statistically reliable.

ArmenT · Post by **ArmenT** » 16 Apr 2010 10:06

Folks, a certain mechanism to tamper with the vote just occurred to me. Dunno if my theory is wrong or right, so feel free to point out what's wrong with this scenario.

As I understand it, two people need to press their buttons close to simultaneously (i.e. within N seconds of each other) to register a vote. One is the officer in charge of the voting machine and the other is the person casting the vote. Also, once a vote has been cast, the machine doesn't allow casting a second vote within 30 seconds to prevent fraud. So far, so good... right?

My question is, is there any clear indicator that a vote has been successfully registered on the machine (i.e.) say a red light changes to green or whatever to indicate that the vote has been registered? If not, here's one way to potentially manipulate the vote.

As I understand it, party workers from various parties are allowed to be near the booths as well, ostensibly to supervise that the voting is fair. Say one of the election officers is a supporter of party X and the corresponding party worker for party X has some way to signal to the election officer if there are a group of people standing in the line guaranteed to vote for party X and more importantly, if there is a group of people guaranteed to vote for rival party Y (usually these blocks of people tend to stand in groups together in line). The trick is that the election officer does not push his button for people guaranteed to vote for party Y. Hence, those votes never get registered since two people didn't push their buttons simultaneously. The corrupt election officer doesn't need to do this all the time, just enough times to make some votes not count. If there isn't a clear indicator showing that the vote has been registered, the voter has no idea that their vote wasn't counted. In close election areas, this could perhaps lead to favoring one candidate over others.

The weakness here is that the EVM only dumps out counts of how many votes have been successfully cast, NOT how many times buttons were pushed, but not counted because both buttons weren't pushed simultaneously. Since there isn't a separate way to count how many people attempted to vote that day, this could potentially work.

With a scheme like this, it isn't necessary for a EVM machine itself to be tampered with, since this method exploits a weakness in its process (i.e.) not printing the # of failed attempts to vote.

Of course, for this scheme to work depends on the following to be true:
1. That there is no clear indication method to show the voter that his/her vote has been registered on the machine -- Can someone confirm if this is true or not? IMHO best way to handle this would be to have a larger LED outside that could change color to show that a vote has been counted, so all observers can see that the machine has indeed counted a person's vote. A setup like this would require the EVM operators to carry more batteries to the voting place though.
2. That no one is counting the number of people who entered the voting booth.
3. That arrangements have been made for an election officer who favors party X to be sent to a location where the election race is close. Also have to assume that the corrupt election officer is kept happy after the election and is the type that keeps his/her mouth shut and the same is true for all the people from party X who know the details about this.

What do you guys think about this scheme?

Sachin · Post by **Sachin** » 16 Apr 2010 10:12

ArmenT wrote:As I understand it, two people need to press their buttons close to simultaneously (i.e. within N seconds of each other) to register a vote.

I dont think this is true. When a chap enters the polling booth, the polling agents, polling officers check up the credentials, put the mark on the finger etc. Once the bonafide is verified, the presiding officer (the senior officer) presses a key on his console which activates the EVM (the set kept inside the closed area). Now he cannot cancel this out, and the person who has to go and vote would move into the closed booth and press his button of choice. He gets a clear beep sound (and a light indication) that his vote has been cast. And for the next person to vote, the same process gets repeated. At no stage does the voter and the presiding officer have to press the buttons simultaneously (so that presiding officer can skip the process of pressing the button and make the vote invalid).

Dileep · Post by **Dileep** » 16 Apr 2010 11:55

There is a light and a beep that signals the 'ready' and 'voted' states, which is clearly visible/audible for the poll staff and the agents, so the scenario made by ArmenT doesn't occur.

GVLN, I will come back with questions. Thanks for responding.

VHKPrasad, I try

ArmenT · Post by **ArmenT** » 16 Apr 2010 12:22

Thanks for the quick answers guys.

Dileep · Post by **Dileep** » 17 Apr 2010 11:32

From the article by GVLN Rao on his website, which he agreed to debate here. My comments in this colour

1. The Whole World has Discarded Similar EVMs
2. Use of EVMs is Unconstitutional and Illegal Too!
3. EVM Software Isn’t Safe
4. …..Nor is The Hardware
5. EVMs are Sitting Ducks
6. “Insider” Fraud a Concern
7. Storage and Counting are Concerns
8. Vote of No Confidence
9. EC is Clueless on Technology
10. Trust Deficit

1. The Whole World has Discarded Similar EVMs
<snip>
{1/4 of the whole world don't have a fair vote. Does that mean we shouldn't as well? Also, there is no other country that have the enormity of our election process. This argument is just rhetoric.}

2. Use of EVMs is Unconstitutional and Illegal Too!

<snip>
{So is homosexuality and oral sex. It doesn't mean anything.}

3. EVM Software Isn’t Safe

The electronic voting machines are safe and secure only if the source code used in the EVMs is genuine. {That is totally wrong. It is an incorrect stance from the EC, which they shouldn't have. But it is an easier way of explaining to people without technical background} Shockingly, the EVM manufacturers, the BEL and ECIL, have shared the ‘top secret’ EVM software program with two foreign companies, Microchip (USA) and Renesas (Japan) to copy it onto microcontrollers used in EVMs. This process could have been done securely in-house by the Indian manufacturers.

{First of all, it is not the 'source code' that is given to the manufacturer. It is the executable code. Of course you can de-assemble the code and figure how the thing works. If the programming is OTP, then it could have been done in house. Mask programming can not be done in house. That must be done by the chip supplier. In any case, it is OK to get the chips programmed by the supplier, provided the code in the delivered chips are verified on a sample basis.}

Worse, when the foreign companies deliver microcontrollers fused with software code to the EVM manufacturers, the EVM manufacturers cannot “read back” their contents as they are either OTP-ROM or masked chips. {It is not because they are OTP or Masked. It is because they employ a security feature to do so. Those chips which employ this system will have a method of verifying the code by means of a hash or checksum. I am not sure if this is employed in the EVMs made by BEL/ECIL}

Amusingly, the software given to foreign companies is not even made available with the Election Commission, ostensibly for security reasons. With such
ridiculous decisions, the Election Commission and the public sector manufacturers have rendered security of the EVMs a mockery. Adopting an open standards policy by making the software public and allowing parties to test the software installed in the EVMs would have offered better protection.

{I support publishing of the architecture of the machine, but not publishing the source code. That is because of the 'paranoia factor by the uninformed'. The source may be give for audit by qualified people under NDA}

4. …..Nor is The Hardware

The danger for EVM manipulations is not just from its software. Even the hardware isn’t safe. Dr. Alex Halderman, professor of computer science in the University of Michigan says, “EVMs used in the West require software attacks as they are sophisticated voting machines and their hardware cannot be replaced cheaply. In contrast, the Indian EVMs can easily be replaced either in part or as wholesale units.”

{Here is where the system of handling comes into picture. It is not an easy task to get exact replicas of the machines made, and inserted into the system, WITHOUT ANY LEAKS. We have dissected this approach on this thread a lot, and found that it is impossible to pull off}

One crucial part that can be faked is microcontrollers used in the EVMs in which the software is copied. EVM manufacturers have greatly facilitated fraud by using generic microcontrollers rather than more secure ASIC or FPGA microcontrollers.

{I support COTS processors, because you can mitigate any argument of a 'hidden trojan' which is difficult to disprove in a custom chip. In a COTS chip, all you need to secure is the code, which is easier.}

Not just only microcontrollers, mother boards (cards which contain microcontrollers) and entire EVMs can be replaced. Neither the Election Commission nor the manufacturers have undertaken any hardware or software audit till date. As a result, such manipulation attempts would go undetected.

{All these arguments fall into one class. Replacing the hardware. It is impossible to pull off through the system}

To detect such fraud, the upgraded EVMs have a provision to interface with an Authentication Unit that would allow the manufacturers to verify whether the EVM being used in the election is the same that they have supplied to the Election Commission. The EVM manufacturers developed an “Authentication Unit” engaging the services of SecureSpin, a Bangalore based software services firm. The Unit was developed and tested in 2006 but when the project was ready for implementation, the project was mysteriously shelved at the instance of the Election Commission. Several questions posed to the Election Commission for taking this decision went unanswered.

{Then the question will come, "who authenticates the authenticating machine?" Also, if you assume that the hardware/software could be replaced, then the perpertrators could very well make it to authenticate itself. So, this proposal is useless}

5. EVMs are Sitting Ducks

The Indian EVMs can be hacked both before and after elections to alter election results. Apart from manipulating the EVM software and replacing many hardware parts discussed above, discussions with knowledgeable sources revealed that Indian EVMs can be hacked in many ways. I mention just two of them below.
{Of course they can be hacked. The question is, can it be done in the scale needed, without any leaks? The answer is NO}

Each EVM contains two EEPROMs inside the Control Unit in which the voting data is stored. They are completely unsecured and the data inside EEPROMs can be manipulated from an external source. It is very easy to read (data from) the EEPROMs and manipulate them.

{When, and How? To manipulate the EEPROM, you have to open the unit, make electrical connections to the chip and do some activity. This should be done AFTER the close of the poll, and BEFORE counting. Can you do this given the security detail in place? If you can, then manipulating the ballot boxes is EASIER and CHEAPER.}

The second and the most deadly way to hack Indian EVMs is by inserting a chip with Trojan inside the display section of the Control unit. This requires access to the EVM for just two minutes and these replacement units can be made for a few hundred rupees. Bypassing completely all inbuilt securities, this chip would manipulate the results and give out “fixed” results on the EVM screen. The Election Commission is completely oblivious to such possibilities. A demonstration of these vulnerabilities is on the cards.

{The "display section" is a simple panel of LED displays. A 'chip' can dop nothing there. You have to make a board module to the exact size of the original display module and replace it. Now, you come back to the "hardware replacement" argument, which is already addressed.}

6. “Insider” Fraud a Concern

Personal accounts from some well placed political sources and experts say that there are some “insiders” demanding vast sums (Rs. 5 Crore for each assembly constituency) to fix election results. Who are these insiders? Unlike in the traditional ballot system where only the election officials were the “insiders”, electronic voting machine regime has spawned a long chain of insiders, all of whom are outside the ambit and control of the Election Commission of India. There is every possibility that some of these “insiders” are involved in murky activities in fixing elections. The whole world—except us in India--is alive to the dangers of insider fraud in elections. The “insiders” include the public sector manufacturers of India’s electronic voting machines namely, the Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Electronics Corporation of India (ECIL), the foreign companies supplying microcontrollers, private players (some of which are allegedly owned by some political leaders) for carrying out checking and maintenance of electronic voting machines during
elections.

{Here you glaze over one factor. BEL/ECIL have no control on which machine goes to which constituency. Any tampering done before the finalization of candidates will not work, because the position of the candidate is not known. So, what exactly can they do?}

7. Storage and Counting are Concerns

The EVMs are stored at the district headquarters or in a decentralized manner in different locations. Election Commission’s concern for EVM safety becomes apparent only during elections, where as security experts say that voting machines must remain in a secure environment throughout their life cycle. There could be many malpractices associated with electronic counting. “Everybody watches polling closely. Nobody watches counting as closely),” says Bev Harris, an American activist.
{There could be malpractices with electronic counting, but the possibility of malpractice is several times higher in a ballot}

Our Election Commission takes three months to conduct parliamentary elections but wants counting to be over in just three hours! In the rush to declare results and the winners, several serious lapses go unnoticed in the counting process. As a result, parties cannot give it the kind of attention that this activity deserves. Massive discrepancies between votes polled and counted in a large number of polling stations across the country raise serious concerns in this regard.

{It is my opinion that announcement of results must be as fast as possible. I don't see any advantage in doing otherwise, except to faxcilitate more corruption}

8. Vote of No Confidence

The political class cutting across all sides of the divide has just one verdict: “we don’t trust the EVMs”. This vote of “no confidence” stems from the personal experiences of parties and leaders as well as the nature of results thrown up by the EVMs. Parties are looking at EVMs with great suspicion and dread the prospect of EVMs “defeating” them. This mistrust in EVMs is not confined to any single party and is all pervasive.

Almost all mainstream political parties, including the BJP, Congress, left parties, regional parties like the Telugu Desam party (TDP), AIADMK, Samajwadi party, Rastriya Lok Dal (RLD), Janata Dal (United) etc. have all expressed reservation about EVMs in the aftermath of 2009 Lok Sabha polls. Even the Congress party that decisively won the 2009 general elections alleged that the EVMs have been manipulated in Orissa.

Today, it is difficult to find parties that vouch for the continued use of EVMs in Indian elections. On the contrary, there is a flood of opposition to the EVMs from the political class.

{Of course! The political parties lost the feeling of "in control" with the EVMs. thjey could capture the boot and do whatnot with the ballots, but that is no longer possible. No wonder they object.}

9. EC is Clueless on Technology

The Election Commission has adopted the EVM technology about which it has practically no knowledge. As a result, it has little control over many aspects of the election process.

{Well, most of the government activity, be it economic, commercial, or defense, is done by babus who have no domain knowledge. For example, does the defense minister, ministry officials, and most of the air force brass understand how a radar or missile work? Does that hamper anything.}

None of the election commissioners, neither the present commissioners nor their predecessors, have proper understanding of the EVM technology. The only source of technical understanding for the Election Commission is a Committee of experts led by its chairman, Prof. P.V. Indiresan. Even the Expert Committee seems very weak in its capacities and understanding. Alex Halderman, professor of computer science at the University of Michigan and an expert on the security of voting systems who was present in New Delhi for the launch of the book, Democracy at Risk, Can We Trust our EVMS? commented, “When I read the 2006 technical report prepared by the Expert Committee of the Election Commission. I scribbled on it that there was a
cause for alarm and quickly decided to agree to come here.” That speaks volumes for the quality and rigor of security testing done on the Indian EVMs.

{And you make all these points. Do you know the technology inside out? I guess not. You can not demand that everyone who deals with the devices must be an expert. and about the report, I don't know neither Prof Halderman or Prof Indiresan, so can't comment on that. But I know a lot of activist type academics who will cheat their own intellect in support of their ideology}

10. Trust Deficit

Election Commission’s conduct in the wake of the serious reservations expressed by people has been unbecoming of a constitutional body. It has uttered many lies – our EVMs are “tamper proof”, they are “different” etc. etc. It has refused to provide any clarifications sought to the petitioners in the Supreme Court, despite a reference from the Supreme Court of India. It has taken several questionable decisions for which it has refused to offer any explanations. For instance, it does not explain why old EVMs were used in Lok Sabha elections despite the recommendations of its own Expert Committee. It does not explain why as many as 4.48 Lakh new EVMs (which are more secure as per the Expert Committee) were not used in any Congress party or UPA ruled
states? Why and where it had allowed use of state government owned EVMs? The non-transparent conduct of Election Commission in the use of EVMs and the farce of an “enquiry” it has conducted following serious reservations on EVMs does not inspire confidence in its unbiased functioning.

{I agree that the EC handled it in the way of burocrats, not technocrats. But how else they would do? They ARE burocrats!}

Now, everything boils down to two arguments:

1. The software can be modified or replaced.
2. The hardware can be replaced or modified.

Neither can be done in a scale needed, without getting caught. Plain and simple. But the real killer is elsewhere.

Even if these were pulled off, there is the triffle problem of manipulating the tampered EVM units to the appropriate constituency, and making sure that the candidates appear in the specific order on the ballot paper. OR, alternatively, execute an "Activation" where you configure/program the EVM with the right candidate you want to be favoured. that too, without being found. We have spent pages and pages of discussion on those points.

Do you have anything to offer in that area, GVLN?

vera_k · Post by **vera_k** » 17 Apr 2010 12:14

^^^

There is a third possibility.

Assume the manufacturing process is compromised such that two types of EVMs are manufactured, one with tampered code and the other one with genuine code. Since the process is compromised, any verification of the code based on checksum is meaningless as the people verifying would have been bribed to look the other way or the tools used to verify have been built to report the expected checksum regardless of the actual value.

All that the tampered code does, is to reverse the count of votes collected by the two candidates who polled the most votes on the machine. The machine does not need activation to do this as this is the default behaviour of this model of EVM.

The attack is carried out by the officials assigning EVMs to polling booths. The tampered EVMs would be sent to the polling booths that are the strongholds of the party that is to be defeated in the election, while the rest of the polling booths would be sent the standard untampered EVMs.

Dileep · Post by **Dileep** » 17 Apr 2010 12:35

Vera, that attack involves a number of people at the manufacturer which is impossible to contain. After that, you have the following difficulties:

1. Reliably track these machines through changes in officials and locations. Remember these machines gets used in multiple elections. At any point it can get caught. There is a big chain of officials who handles these. How can it be contained?
2. Pass the mock poll.

AjayKK · Post by **AjayKK** » 17 Apr 2010 14:03

2. Use of EVMs is Unconstitutional and Illegal Too!

Accordingly, a voter has the right to know that his vote which he exercised as a part of freedom of expression has really gone in favour of the candidate whom he/she has chosen. This right, fundamental in nature, is absent in the electronic voting system. In the traditional paper ballot system, that fundamental right was
preserved because a voter knew exactly how his/ her vote was recorded and counted.

The EC-EVMs have a feature by which they can print out a confirmation slip. This can then be deposited in a ballot box. Yet the process has not been implemented!

4. …..Nor is The Hardware
To detect such fraud, the upgraded EVMs have a provision to interface with an Authentication Unit that would allow the manufacturers to verify whether the EVM being used in the election is the same that they have supplied to the Election Commission. The EVM manufacturers developed an “Authentication Unit” engaging the services of SecureSpin, a Bangalore based software services firm. The Unit was developed and tested in 2006 but when the project was ready for implementation, the project was mysteriously shelved at the instance of the Election Commission. Several questions posed to the Election Commission for taking this decision went unanswered.

Why dis the EC scrap this proposal, any idea?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Almost all mainstream political parties, including the BJP, Congress, left parties, regional parties like the Telugu Desam party (TDP), AIADMK, Samajwadi party, Rastriya Lok Dal (RLD), Janata Dal (United) etc. have all expressed reservation about EVMs in the aftermath of 2009 Lok Sabha polls. Even the Congress party that decisively won the 2009 general elections alleged that the EVMs have been manipulated in Orissa.

A lot of parties express displeasure with the EVMs. They spend crores per LS seat, yet there is a simple method to bypass EVMs. It can handle only *64* candidates. In any seat, there are 2-3 national part candidates, 2-3 state part candidates, some independents. In my LS constituency, there were 18!

If any major party feels that EVMs are not good or secured, they have to file 64 dummies to eject out EVMs and ensure ballot paper election.

The cost : Rs. 10,000 * 70 dummies = Rs 7 lakhs only!

In my LS constituency, one co-op Bank chairman lost the seat to another Dilli connected candidate. The co-op Bank chairman was ready to spend close to the figure quoted, yet the Dilli connection won. The chairman was ready to spent a amount which is of a magnitude higher than this Rs 7 lakhs, but a national or state party does not want to !

The point is, if you can't beat the system (since EC wants "peeerooof" without opening, some hacking that is!) then use it to beat itself. File the dummy candidates in such a manner that their applications are valid and none are rejected. Surely the gov of the day CANNOT limit the number of candidates citing EVM limit. That will be an Emergency type unconstitutional amendment and will be shot down.

Ironically, one BJP MP who lost the election and is mentioned in GVL N Rao's book was suggested the same. His answer at that time: "We will rather not indulge in this. Let's see!"

Well either you keep seeing for the next few years or employ the limitation of the EVM to beat it . There isn't a moral high stand which will get you elected to the Parliament, if your opponent has tampered the EVMs. One wishes the parties quoted above realise this.

---------------
Jai ho and in defence of a level playing field.

ArmenT · Post by **ArmenT** » 17 Apr 2010 21:19

Dileep wrote:From the article by GVLN Rao on his website, which he agreed to debate here. My comments in this colour
3. EVM Software Isn’t Safe

The electronic voting machines are safe and secure only if the source code used in the EVMs is genuine. {That is totally wrong. It is an incorrect stance from the EC, which they shouldn't have. But it is an easier way of explaining to people without technical background} Shockingly, the EVM manufacturers, the BEL and ECIL, have shared the ‘top secret’ EVM software program with two foreign companies, Microchip (USA) and Renesas (Japan) to copy it onto microcontrollers used in EVMs. This process could have been done securely in-house by the Indian manufacturers.

{First of all, it is not the 'source code' that is given to the manufacturer. It is the executable code. Of course you can de-assemble the code and figure how the thing works. If the programming is OTP, then it could have been done in house. Mask programming can not be done in house. That must be done by the chip supplier. In any case, it is OK to get the chips programmed by the supplier, provided the code in the delivered chips are verified on a sample basis.}

There is one more advantage to having a mask ROM. It prevents the possibility of a rogue employee messing with the program on the chip, after it was delivered from the manufacturer. With mask ROM, the program code is encoded into the chip's hardware and the only way to program it is during the manufacturing process. If the program needs to be changed, one needs to design and manufacture whole new photo-masks (which is a non-trivial process) and then manufacture new chips using the new photo-masks. The old chips need to be thrown away, as they cannot be reprogrammed. This completely nullifies one argument that some people have said before, i.e. someone in BEL or ECIL replacing the software after the sample is verified and before putting the chips on the EVM. With a mask ROM, this is impossible.