Deterrence

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 Sep 2012 20:54

WOW! So we have a real Dilli Tomcat with us.

Any insights, nuggets vagehra, vagehra?

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 26 Sep 2012 23:41

ramana wrote:
{In case the first one is dud?}
{Would be very helpful when TTP comes marching down the Suleiman mountains!}
{So most likely its PRC developenmt being passed off as TSP's. That begs the question what role does PRC see for a Nasr type weapon?}

Ramanaji,

Premise - PRC passed off its fully developed machines to PRC. So there may not be any duds.

1. The twin-canisters are to ensure enough coverage of the battle-field. Especially when TTP types come in they are spread far and wide.

2. As and when TTP knocks slumabad dooors they will need these weapons. They may also work as area coverage missiles to protect clown jewels.

3. In PRC case, they might be for crowd control when next revolution comes home.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 27 Sep 2012 09:45

Ha Ha.

Well there's one thing. The Indian analysts do a good job of making sure nothing really gets "clarified" at these meets. And they also bring in the fact that Chicom is very much a part of this equation at some point.

And the grand old lady is excellent. Just excellent. She is often brought in as a moderator for these events. And she was there in 1971.

But there's one thing - In my discussions with our people I have found that the older generation have a hope if we can call it that , that the next generation will move beyond a certain distrust which characterizes our dealings with the Amrikis - even if they themselves are unable to do so.

It is a distrust and even dislike on both sides naturally borne out of the past. But according to quite a few people now they hope that a stronger more confident generation of Indians will be able to "interface" better with the younger Amrikis as well.

Of course that is easier said than done.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 12 Oct 2012 20:38

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Pakistan’s Dangerous Game - Gurmeet Kanwal

The Pakistan army’s continuing efforts to arm the 60-km Hatf-9 (Nasr) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) with nuclear warheads will adversely impact deterrence stability on the Indian subcontinent as tactical nuclear weapons are inherently destabilising and invariably escalatory. The Nasr missile was first tested in April 2011 and then again in May 2012 and is reported to be a replica of the Chinese M-20.

Even though 50,000 to 60,000 nuclear warheads were produced since the arguably senseless bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, some basic human survival instinct “repeatedly stayed the finger that might have pushed the button.” The world’s abhorrence for nuclear weapons is now so widespread and deep-rooted that even if battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) were to be used against a purely military target in a conflict in future, the effect would be strategic. In fact, the impact would be geo-strategic as the explosion of even a single nuclear weapon anywhere on earth would be one too many. The employment of nuclear weapons as useful weapons of war was always doubtful; it is even more questionable today. Given the widespread abhorrence of nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Rubicon cannot be lightly crossed now and whichever nation decides to cross it will have to bear the consequences.

According to William R. Van Cleave and S. T. Cohen, “… the term tactical nuclear weapons in the closest approximation refers to battlefield nuclear weapons, for battlefield use, and with deployment ranges and yields consistent with such use and confined essentially in each respect to the area of localised military operations.” Some air-dropped nuclear glide bombs, carried by fighter-bombers, have been known to have yields of over one megaton. Parts of NATO’s erstwhile TNW forces, including Pershing missiles, were on constant readiness alert as part of the Quick Reaction Alert force. The line dividing tactical (including theatre) and strategic nuclear weapons is rather blurred. While a strategic strike can be conducted with weapons of low yield, a tactical strike can be effected with virtually any class of nuclear weapons – though the results achieved may not be commensurate with the effort put in. For example, hitting a forward military airfield with an ICBM would be a gross overkill and would result in extremely high collateral damage. In fact, the phrase ‘tactical use of nuclear weapons’ would convey a more accurate sense of the intended use rather than ‘use of tactical nuclear weapons’.

In the public perception, the most popular TNWs have been the 8 inch (203 mm) M-110 and the 155 mm M-109 atomic artillery weapons (When we test again, we should test a few chotus also, with weaponize configurations of artillery based nuclear shells), and the Lance and Honest John SRBMs. At the upper end of the range scale were the Pershing missiles with a range of 160 to 835 km. These were intermediate range theatre SRBMs. The erstwhile Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces had their own corresponding TNWs. Among the better known ones were the FROG and Scud series of rockets and missiles. In addition, there was a category of weapons known as ‘mini-nukes’. These had yields from 0.05 to 0.5 kilotons. TNWs, particularly those of the US and its NATO allies, were nuclear warfighting weapons and formed an important part of NATO’s strategy of flexible response or ‘first use’ policy. These weapons were among the first that would have been used in the early stages of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.

During the Cold War, the proponents of TNWs justified their requirement on the following grounds: they deter the use of TNWs by the enemy; they provide flexible response over the whole range of possible military threats; they offer nuclear military options below the strategic level; they help to defeat large-scale conventional attacks; and, they serve the political purpose of demonstrating commitment to the allies. The opponents of TNWs asserted that these ‘more usable’ weapons would lower the nuclear threshold and make nuclear use more likely. Fears of collateral damage in the extensively populated and developed NATO heartland spurred European opposition to TNWs. Many European political and military leaders convincingly argued that NATO would be better off without TNWs. Alain Enthoven wrote: “Tactical nuclear weapons cannot defend Western Europe; they can only destroy it… there is no such thing as tactical nuclear war in the sense of sustained, purposive military operations…”

There are other compelling reasons too for leaving TNWs out of the nuclear arsenal. Firstly, these are extremely complex weapons (particularly sub-kiloton mini-nukes, because of the precision required in engineering) and are difficult and expensive to manufacture and support technically. Inducting them into service even in small numbers would considerably raise the budget of the strategic forces. Secondly, the command and control of TNWs needs to be decentralised at some point during war to enable their timely employment. Extremely tight control would make their possession redundant and degrade their deterrence value. Decentralised control would run the risk of their premature and even unauthorised use – Kissinger’s ‘mad major syndrome’. Thirdly, since the launchers must move frequently to avoid being targeted, dispersed storage and frequent transportation of TNWs under field conditions, increases the risk of accidents. Lastly, the employment of conventional artillery and air-to-ground precision weapons by the enemy may damage or destroy stored nuclear warheads.

India has correctly opted not to go down the TNW route, but Pakistan has chosen to acquire these dangerous weapons. According to Pakistani analysts, the Hatf-9 (Nasr) missile is their answer to India’s Cold Start doctrine as the use of TNWs will stop India’s armoured spearheads advancing into Pakistan in their tracks. They miss the centrality of India’s no first use doctrine completely: even one nuclear strike – whether in India or against Indian forces – will invite ‘massive punitive retaliation’, which Pakistan can ill afford.

It is now universally accepted that nuclear weapons are political weapons and are not weapons of ‘warfighting’. By extension, TNWs now have no role to play in combat. The international community must come together to stop Pakistan’s dangerous quest to acquire these destabilising weapons.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 12 Oct 2012 22:07

Tactical ya strategic is all super power dialog.

As late ACM Mehra said at Stanford its really low yield or high yield for use of nukes crosses a threshold and is thus strategic.
In Indian point of view any use of nukes is strategic. The response will be appropriate.

Pak thinks due to prevailing winds etc.etc India would be reluctant to use high yield and hence they can work under the escalation umbrella.
They will be in for a surprise and shouldn't go there.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 13 Oct 2012 01:36

ramana wrote:Tactical ya strategic is all super power dialog.

As late ACM Mehra said at Stanford its really low yield or high yield for use of nukes crosses a threshold and is thus strategic.
In Indian point of view any use of nukes is strategic. The response will be appropriate.

Pak thinks due to prevailing winds etc.etc India would be reluctant to use high yield and hence they can work under the escalation umbrella.
They will be in for a surprise and shouldn't go there.

From TSP perspective so called tactical nuclear weapons are in the mix to deter a conventional attack from starting. These are more psychological weapons aimed at the Indian politicians and not really battlefield weapons. TSP knows extremely well the limits of India. The idea here is to create fear, uncertainty and doubt in the Indian political mind on the space for conventional maneuver by Indian forces. From a TSP perspective, driving this instability into the mix makes sense. They are extremely fearful of an Indian conventional attack. Not saying anything on what TSP generals think on the actual use of nuclear weapons, strategic or tactical.

member_22872 · Post by **member_22872** » 13 Oct 2012 02:05

They maintain that, India back out from attacking TSP because they brought in Nukes at the time of Kargil and were ready to use. So, since they are already into producing these low yield tactical nukes, the TSP's thinking is that, for sure India will back down and cower and I think in the next war they will use them when cornered, our preparations should be made with an assumption that they will use them for sure.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 13 Oct 2012 07:46

Wrong thinking. ABV figured that if there is escalation elsewhere like IB without clearing them out of Kargil they would still be occupying the heights after any ceasefire and exchange of lands across the IB. So the pressure was to make them get out of the heights.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 13 Oct 2012 10:25

The TSPians should also know that retaliation will be massive. and massive here includes a bit of counterforce as well shall we say.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 13 Oct 2012 11:04

D Roy wrote:The TSPians should also know that retaliation will be massive. and massive here includes a bit of counterforce as well shall we say.

Counter-Paki.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 13 Oct 2012 15:27

^^^

The Indian Nuke posture clearly stipulates that India will respond disproportionally against any Nuke usage by any power. To the discussion of tactical or strategic is un necessary. If the TSP wants to continue with its tac-nuke fantasy. They really cant be stopped. Indian strategic thinkers need to be clear on what Indian goals are and how they work for the benefit of the Indian nation. Rather then look at a situation from Khan's POV.

pentaiah · Post by **pentaiah** » 13 Oct 2012 19:38

Is massive retaliation against use of nuke on our territory or against our forces any where?

member_22872 · Post by **member_22872** » 13 Oct 2012 19:50

In a conventional war, TSP's underestimating our response is alright for it is actually is beneficial to us. We can answer them like in Kargil and can kick them in their nuts. But when tactical nukes are in picture, I think them underestimating our response is not good for us because, in the event they underestimate our strategic response to any use of tactical nukes, we will end up going the escalation ladder, that means we must make good on our promised response and nuke them else, we will have great losses and not good in which ever angle you look.

I think in order to discourage that, we must have tactical nukes of our own, they have to be deterred in using it, even an iota of thinking on their part that they might get way with tactical nukes is not good. That thought process must be nipped in the bud.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 13 Oct 2012 19:51

As per my understanding of the doctrine. Any nuke attack on Indian main land or the Indian Military formations overseas or in occupation of TSP. Will invite a disproportionate response from India.

I could be wrong though.

The TSPians are seeking to create space where they can seek the use of Tac-Nukes. In my reading this is essentially a response to the Indian assertion, that a conventional war can by fought under a nuke overhang.

TSP by publicizing the Tac-Nuke usage is seeking to negate this posture of India. India would be well served to highlight it nuke doctrine every time TSP seeks to do so.

pentaiah · Post by **pentaiah** » 13 Oct 2012 21:19

The best case scenario is If we could demonstrate Neutron bomb capability to show that we can be proactive and tango too

Like this W66

Like this even better arty shell

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 13 Oct 2012 21:44

In a way the S-1 was that!

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 13 Oct 2012 22:36

There is no space. A nuke attack by Fizzle ya or TSPA on ingressing Indian forces will mean curtains for TSP and TSPA and Fizzle ya.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 14 Oct 2012 00:22

Pratyush wrote:As per my understanding of the doctrine. Any nuke attack on Indian main land or the Indian Military formations overseas or in occupation of TSP. Will invite a disproportionate response from India.

I could be wrong though.

The TSPians are seeking to create space where they can seek the use of Tac-Nukes. In my reading this is essentially a response to the Indian assertion, that a conventional war can by fought under a nuke overhang.

TSP by publicizing the Tac-Nuke usage is seeking to negate this posture of India. India would be well served to highlight it nuke doctrine every time TSP seeks to do so.

The challenge is a disproportional response, say 50 TN war heads for a tac nuke on Indian forces on TSP soil is an attack to "annihilate" large parts of TSP as we know it. While the TSP tac nuke attack is only to stop the advance of forces. If you do not dump 50 and say you only dump 5 war heads for 1 on our forces, you provide an opportunity for TSP to regroup and send in 10-20 incoming missiles no to Indian cities. The idea is to not fight a war but finish the opponent with a decapitating strike. However, it begs the question, is India willing to strike in this manner to an arguably defensive move by a weaker force? There is a huge difference between a 2-5 KT nuke attack on an armored column and an attack on population centers. TSP is betting on two things. 1. The presence of tactical nuclear weapons will dissuade advancing conventional forces. 2. In the event, these forces come in, an attack on purely military forces will not be responded to by an attack on population centers. For all the purva pasha we do on Islam, TSP is no alien to the Hindu frame of mind. TSP has their own perceptions of our bluffs.

member_22872 · Post by **member_22872** » 14 Oct 2012 00:59

The best deterrent against any nuke usage is one that can prevent it in the first place. Growing cold feet later, circumstances not allowing later say because of immense international pressure on the lines of "Mature up India, dont use strategic nukes on TSP, we dont want a nuke war, else we will be forced to take out your assets etc", trusting that TSP's tactical nukes are only to stop proactive deployment will hurt us because, once used we have too much to loose.
I think designing a strategy should be on the lines of solving a design problem, ie designing a war fighting mechanism or method assuming the worst case scenario, taking into consideration that TSP surely will use tactical nukes and what if we are stopped from using strategic nukes on them for what ever reason, then what.

nakul · Post by **nakul** » 14 Oct 2012 01:03

I have to give it to the nuclear planners of India. They have designed it such that even a person of Paki IQ can understand it. You attack us with 1 bomb, we destroy your whole country, no ifs and buts. This should be the maximalist position we should take. They have always underestimated the Hindu capacity to wage war. I hope they indulge us the same way in future. No scope for MMSesque pappi-jhappi with nuclear doctrine.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 14 Oct 2012 01:23

nakul wrote:No scope for MMSesque pappi-jhappi with nuclear doctrine.

This is not about MMS or pappi-jhappi or WKK behaviors. This is about values, or IOW: Dharma. Talking about massive retaliation to a first strike is one thing. Going over what it may mean in various scenarios is another. If all you want to do is wipe out TSP and its population, why wait for a first strike?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Oct 2012 03:28

ShauryaT, Please restate your point of view clearly. What do you think is the paki mindset? What do you find incredible with Indian doctrine?

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 14 Oct 2012 04:43

ramana wrote:ShauryaT, Please restate your point of view clearly. What do you think is the paki mindset? What do you find incredible with Indian doctrine?

In context of these battlefield weapons, my view of TSP's thinking is what I wrote above. 1. The presence of tactical nuclear weapons will dissuade advancing conventional forces. 2. In the event, these forces come in, an attack on purely military forces will not be responded to by an attack on population centers.

The "massive retaliation" articulation, which is not part of the doctrine, was first done by the late BM in 1999 and subsequently by many others. Credibility of the doctrine is in the eyes of the opponents and our opponents do not find, NFU and adherence to the minimum in the doctrine as credible. The assured retaliation part of the doctrine is credible. The degree of this assured retaliation to a battlefield type of attack is in question. Hope it is more clear now. Thanks.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Oct 2012 05:21

Yes. In addition to above they think that the fallout from large weapons will be driven towards India due to prevailing winds.
Right after the tests around May 20th or so, there was an article in Pioneer where the logic of small yeild weapons was stated. The purpose is to attack the basis of power in TSP with precision nuke strikes and destroy them. Such attacks ensure that those responsible will get to meet their 72 and not live to negotiate. And the low yield will ensure less fall out while they get their just desert in more ways than one.

nakul · Post by **nakul** » 16 Oct 2012 16:47

Bomb from Pak: We will hit back

Is India at particular risk of a possible terror strike using nuclear materials? What is our response mechanism like in such a scenario?

The retaliation against terrorist organisations can be nuclear or with conventional weapons. If we have ascertained that a nuclear strike from the Pakistan side is by a terrorist outfit, and we want to hit back using nuclear weapons, then we should inform Pakistan that we are not striking at the country but only to destroy a particular group. We know the sites of the terrorist outfits. We only need to decide the strength of the nuclear weapon to be used. It will obviously be tactical, of a particular yield that does not cause damage beyond, say, a brigade strength. But my preference would be to use conventional force in retaliation. I think in nine out of ten cases, this should suffice. We should continue hitting them till they raise the white flag.

There have been multiple discussions on the nuclear (or conventional, as in this case) reply to a Paki bum. Why don't we grab some Paki land? Bombs blasting on Paki soil is not going to benefit us as much as their land. Moreover, pakis being pakis will be ready to meet their 72 more easily than giving up their land. Hit them where it hurts the most. Some have suggested attacking SA for revenge but from an Indian point of view, grabbing Paki land (including PoK) will be most beneficial for us. This will be a slap to those who think that nuke war is a lose-lose scenario.

We are perhaps the only country who can do this meaningfully. I can't think of this kind of retaliation possible between other nuke armed neighbors/countries. A Paki land grab will keep them boxed in for years. Balochistan & PoK should be high on the possible lands for annexation.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 19 Oct 2012 07:11

x-post

Cuban missile crisis: how the US played Russian roulette with nuclear war

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 19 Oct 2012 08:21

x-post
Republicans better for India

The Democratic Party in the US has been in the forefront of pushing nonproliferation and, should he win a second term, Barack Obama is likely to make the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) his primary foreign policy goal at the very least to buttress his credentials as a campaigner for a nuclear weapons-free world for which he prematurely won the Nobel Prize for Peace. It is another matter that CTBT is peripheral to the central issue of the United States and Russia reducing their respective weapons/warheads stockpiles. Moreover, most of the extreme non-proliferationists in Washington are associated with the Democratic Party and part of the Obama Administration — persons such as Robert J Einhorn, special adviser in the State Department, an inveterate India-baiter, and Ellen Tauscher who, before assuming charge as assistant secretary of state, vowed to bring countries like India into the Non-Proliferation Treaty net.

The reason why the Obama Administration will pursue CTBT is because it diverts attention from drawing down America’s strategic inventory and presents an avenue for easy success. After all, the manner in which the Manmohan Singh government was persuaded to indefinitely extend the ‘voluntary moratorium’ wouldn’t have escaped Washington’s attention. A bit more push here, a lot more pressure there, and the US State Department may be forgiven for believing it will have the outgoing Congress coalition regime drag India into the NPT basket.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 20 Oct 2012 07:38

Panel Discussion: India's nuclear decision making 1964-74

Inder Malhotra, K.K. Nayyar, Bharat Karnad, K. Santhanam, Joseph Pilat, and R.R. Subrahmanian

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 20 Oct 2012 08:25

The above is a fascinating discussion, Please do spend time to listen/watch.

RoyG · Post by **RoyG** » 20 Oct 2012 10:41

Excellent video. Karnad's comment on Chidambaram's claim that India need not test for another 10 years is interesting. Seems like the consensus is that S1 fizzled. Kalam seems equally guilty. UPA wont test. Hopefully we wont wait another decade. It makes sense to test a series of yields ranging from 50-550kt without another voluntary moratorium in case of repeat fizzle.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 20 Oct 2012 11:18

Interesting indeed.

I have no inside knowledge of what Indian warheads are touted to yield and no knowledge of what BARC may be telling the armed forces when they "introduce" them to a warhead. But I believe that if I put myself in the position of a service chief, I would first ask "What can this warhead yield?" and then decide what can be done with it.

I do not believe that a service chief would ask "I need to destroy Beijing, what can you give me?". I believe that the question would be the opposite - "What have I got, and what can I do with what I have got?"

This is no way means that having something bigger is unnecessary. It only begs the question whether everyone is realistic about what there is. 16 to 21 kt for a warhead as Karnad says reminds me of a prediction made by Feynmann about the Hiroshima bomb - where he had stated that it had a P% probability of yielding 20 kt, Q % probability of yielding 15 kt, R% of yielding 10 kt, and S% of yielding 5 kt.

The issue breaks down to two different questions that should not be lumped together
1. What can the forces do with what they have, assuming that there is reasonable confidence in what they have
2. What can the nuclear establishment give them that is bigger.

Indian nuclear plans will be based on what can be done given current reliable arsenals. If something bigger turns up (after due testing) all current existing plans will have to be re written, targets reassigned etc.

But it would IMO be an assumption to say that the armed forces have been given overestimates for the warheads they have and have made plans that cannot work because they have been told lies about possible yield.

pentaiah · Post by **pentaiah** » 20 Oct 2012 20:25

So we are still in "tri sanku narakam"
Three blind men
One the scientific community not knowing what they did
Two the military not knowing what they can use
Three the political leadership and strategic community pretending to see things while being blind.

I say give BARC the LCA project , in one under ground test they will certify it to be flight worthy in sky..

Mera Bharat Mahan
Jai hind.
That truly means victory to the one who is behind

Oh by the way the panel has confirmed my suspicion (ok better ) belief that only the hidden hand protects us . did some one by mistake call it Ram bha rosa on the panel?

My respect for Arun_S ji has exponentially increased while the topi wallahs and bum makers of mavericks gang has exponentially decayed, looks like while claiming to have had made bums can't even produce a excel sheet leave alone excel

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 20 Oct 2012 21:06

India has no choice but to test again and the projects they have today would be useless unless they do a test. Its a case of when not if - unless GoI has got a work around via its close friends on strategic matters.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 22 Oct 2012 09:53

shiv wrote: Indian nuclear plans will be based on what can be done given current reliable arsenals. If something bigger turns up (after due testing) all current existing plans will have to be re written, targets reassigned etc.

But it would IMO be an assumption to say that the armed forces have been given overestimates for the warheads they have and have made plans that cannot work because they have been told lies about possible yield.

Shiv ji: It is reasonable to presume that current planning assumes the establishment view of the S1 having worked and then derivative works and maybe even other untested designs (tested only in simulations and at the component levels) are part of the warhead mix. I do not believe that the deployed warheads on much of the Agni series or the Shourya or the upcoming K4 would be the 20 KT variety. It is this belief (let us assume we do not know, for this information is not in public) combined with the fact that much of these designs are untested and the lone test itself has questions, puts a question mark on the credibility of the arsenal.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 Oct 2012 10:36

ShauryaT wrote:
shiv wrote: Indian nuclear plans will be based on what can be done given current reliable arsenals. If something bigger turns up (after due testing) all current existing plans will have to be re written, targets reassigned etc.

But it would IMO be an assumption to say that the armed forces have been given overestimates for the warheads they have and have made plans that cannot work because they have been told lies about possible yield.
Shiv ji: It is reasonable to presume that current planning assumes the establishment view of the S1 having worked and then derivative works and maybe even other untested designs (tested only in simulations and at the component levels) are part of the warhead mix. I do not believe that the deployed warheads on much of the Agni series or the Shourya or the upcoming K4 would be the 20 KT variety. It is this belief (let us assume we do not know, for this information is not in public) combined with the fact that much of these designs are untested and the lone test itself has questions, puts a question mark on the credibility of the arsenal.

Shaurya - there is a small element of doubt here that is based on how competent you blieve our engineers are.

Even if India had 100 warheads, we could not possibly test all 100. If we did test we could test maybe one in twenty (5%). Unless quality control is perfect even one in twenty may not be good enough. The engineering and chemistry skills for nukes is high.

If our engineers are competent and if our quality control is good then the 20kt warheads may work with or without more testing. There is an element of trust here that stops one from getting any more sure than that.

Assuming that engineers are skilled and assuming that they have done their job across a series of hurdles from purification, shaping, fuzing, arming, ruggedizing and storing and assuming that the delivery mechanism works, then we have a deterrent. If we trust Indian engineers as much as we trust German engineering and American experience, we can expect 90% of our warheads to work. Ultimately any discussion about deterrence is going to have to be based on the assumption that at least 1/3rd of warheads our will work.

Imagine for a minute that our people are such incompetent nincompoops that 95% of warheads do not work - or better still we have no warheads at all. The whole thing is a big bluff. Even then deterrence will work as long as Pakistan, China and other countries do not know the truth about Indian engineering and sincerely believe Chidambaram and Kalam, Deterrence will work.

The topic of deterrence revolves around the assumption that working warheads exist. IOf you believe that working warheads do not exist, and want to reassure everyone that there are no working warheads, then you are reassuring everyone that India has no deterrence.

The whole thing could be a big bluff. You and I will never know.

ramdas · Post by **ramdas** » 22 Oct 2012 13:00

Shyamji,

I agree that India has no choice but to test again if our current projects need to be relevant. Question is whether it will do so even if UPA in some form returns to power/ elements further to the left like Kejriwal and co. gain a big say in a future dispensation. Wont there be a danger of national projects in the nuclear/missile field getting frozen/rolled back in that case (depending on whether it is UPA/someone further left)?

Bharat Karnad says that so long as UPA is there, the consensus is that no test will happen. What do you think ? I hope that the statement "when we will test and not if" holds even in case the UPA continues for the foreseeable future.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 Oct 2012 13:55

UPA or no UPA, India is not going to test unless China/US or Crapistan test. I am certain of this.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 22 Oct 2012 15:16

Next Nork test is being watched very closely.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 22 Oct 2012 17:39

ramdas wrote:Shyamji,

I agree that India has no choice but to test again if our current projects need to be relevant. Question is whether it will do so even if UPA in some form returns to power/ elements further to the left like Kejriwal and co. gain a big say in a future dispensation. Wont there be a danger of national projects in the nuclear/missile field getting frozen/rolled back in that case (depending on whether it is UPA/someone further left)?

Bharat Karnad says that so long as UPA is there, the consensus is that no test will happen. What do you think ? I hope that the statement "when we will test and not if" holds even in case the UPA continues for the foreseeable future.

Take a step back and look at the fundamentals. Quite simply - Current N is not suitable for triad and we are developing things that can only be used once test is complete. PRC is indirectly warning us through press articles and joint manuvers opposite Pokhran with TSP to desist on testing. UPA is getting chappal beating politically.

GoI has 2 options:
1) Test (and at the same time get big national achievement moment - improving image etc - similar to war spirit in the country)
2) Find a way around testing - with all those super komputaa's with key allies who are willing to help.

Option 2 is apparently underway, but personally I wouldn't rule out option 1 and judging by the way PRC is reacting, they are not ruling it out either.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 Oct 2012 17:54

shyamd wrote:judging by the way PRC is reacting, they are not ruling it out either.

Nobody can rule out the simulation option. Every component of a nuclear arsenal gets old and date expired and they are being replaced by companies and people who did not make them originally and do not know what issues were faced originally. Companies hat supplied components and materials may have gone out of business and component specs may have changed creating situations where parts may react differently to storage and temperature change.

I wonder why NoKo is not getting a bang at all?