Bharat Rakshak

ramana wrote:
{In case the first one is dud?}
{Would be very helpful when TTP comes marching down the Suleiman mountains!}
{So most likely its PRC developenmt being passed off as TSP's. That begs the question what role does PRC see for a Nasr type weapon?}

The Pakistan army’s continuing efforts to arm the 60-km Hatf-9 (Nasr) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) with nuclear warheads will adversely impact deterrence stability on the Indian subcontinent as tactical nuclear weapons are inherently destabilising and invariably escalatory. The Nasr missile was first tested in April 2011 and then again in May 2012 and is reported to be a replica of the Chinese M-20.

Even though 50,000 to 60,000 nuclear warheads were produced since the arguably senseless bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, some basic human survival instinct “repeatedly stayed the finger that might have pushed the button.” The world’s abhorrence for nuclear weapons is now so widespread and deep-rooted that even if battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) were to be used against a purely military target in a conflict in future, the effect would be strategic. In fact, the impact would be geo-strategic as the explosion of even a single nuclear weapon anywhere on earth would be one too many. The employment of nuclear weapons as useful weapons of war was always doubtful; it is even more questionable today. Given the widespread abhorrence of nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Rubicon cannot be lightly crossed now and whichever nation decides to cross it will have to bear the consequences.

According to William R. Van Cleave and S. T. Cohen, “… the term tactical nuclear weapons in the closest approximation refers to battlefield nuclear weapons, for battlefield use, and with deployment ranges and yields consistent with such use and confined essentially in each respect to the area of localised military operations.” Some air-dropped nuclear glide bombs, carried by fighter-bombers, have been known to have yields of over one megaton. Parts of NATO’s erstwhile TNW forces, including Pershing missiles, were on constant readiness alert as part of the Quick Reaction Alert force. The line dividing tactical (including theatre) and strategic nuclear weapons is rather blurred. While a strategic strike can be conducted with weapons of low yield, a tactical strike can be effected with virtually any class of nuclear weapons – though the results achieved may not be commensurate with the effort put in. For example, hitting a forward military airfield with an ICBM would be a gross overkill and would result in extremely high collateral damage. In fact, the phrase ‘tactical use of nuclear weapons’ would convey a more accurate sense of the intended use rather than ‘use of tactical nuclear weapons’.

In the public perception, the most popular TNWs have been the 8 inch (203 mm) M-110 and the 155 mm M-109 atomic artillery weapons (When we test again, we should test a few chotus also, with weaponize configurations of artillery based nuclear shells), and the Lance and Honest John SRBMs. At the upper end of the range scale were the Pershing missiles with a range of 160 to 835 km. These were intermediate range theatre SRBMs. The erstwhile Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces had their own corresponding TNWs. Among the better known ones were the FROG and Scud series of rockets and missiles. In addition, there was a category of weapons known as ‘mini-nukes’. These had yields from 0.05 to 0.5 kilotons. TNWs, particularly those of the US and its NATO allies, were nuclear warfighting weapons and formed an important part of NATO’s strategy of flexible response or ‘first use’ policy. These weapons were among the first that would have been used in the early stages of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.

During the Cold War, the proponents of TNWs justified their requirement on the following grounds: they deter the use of TNWs by the enemy; they provide flexible response over the whole range of possible military threats; they offer nuclear military options below the strategic level; they help to defeat large-scale conventional attacks; and, they serve the political purpose of demonstrating commitment to the allies. The opponents of TNWs asserted that these ‘more usable’ weapons would lower the nuclear threshold and make nuclear use more likely. Fears of collateral damage in the extensively populated and developed NATO heartland spurred European opposition to TNWs. Many European political and military leaders convincingly argued that NATO would be better off without TNWs. Alain Enthoven wrote: “Tactical nuclear weapons cannot defend Western Europe; they can only destroy it… there is no such thing as tactical nuclear war in the sense of sustained, purposive military operations…”

There are other compelling reasons too for leaving TNWs out of the nuclear arsenal. Firstly, these are extremely complex weapons (particularly sub-kiloton mini-nukes, because of the precision required in engineering) and are difficult and expensive to manufacture and support technically. Inducting them into service even in small numbers would considerably raise the budget of the strategic forces. Secondly, the command and control of TNWs needs to be decentralised at some point during war to enable their timely employment. Extremely tight control would make their possession redundant and degrade their deterrence value. Decentralised control would run the risk of their premature and even unauthorised use – Kissinger’s ‘mad major syndrome’. Thirdly, since the launchers must move frequently to avoid being targeted, dispersed storage and frequent transportation of TNWs under field conditions, increases the risk of accidents. Lastly, the employment of conventional artillery and air-to-ground precision weapons by the enemy may damage or destroy stored nuclear warheads.

India has correctly opted not to go down the TNW route, but Pakistan has chosen to acquire these dangerous weapons. According to Pakistani analysts, the Hatf-9 (Nasr) missile is their answer to India’s Cold Start doctrine as the use of TNWs will stop India’s armoured spearheads advancing into Pakistan in their tracks. They miss the centrality of India’s no first use doctrine completely: even one nuclear strike – whether in India or against Indian forces – will invite ‘massive punitive retaliation’, which Pakistan can ill afford.

It is now universally accepted that nuclear weapons are political weapons and are not weapons of ‘warfighting’. By extension, TNWs now have no role to play in combat. The international community must come together to stop Pakistan’s dangerous quest to acquire these destabilising weapons.

ramana wrote:Tactical ya strategic is all super power dialog.

As late ACM Mehra said at Stanford its really low yield or high yield for use of nukes crosses a threshold and is thus strategic.
In Indian point of view any use of nukes is strategic. The response will be appropriate.

Pak thinks due to prevailing winds etc.etc India would be reluctant to use high yield and hence they can work under the escalation umbrella.
They will be in for a surprise and shouldn't go there.

D Roy wrote:The TSPians should also know that retaliation will be massive. and massive here includes a bit of counterforce as well shall we say.

Pratyush wrote:As per my understanding of the doctrine. Any nuke attack on Indian main land or the Indian Military formations overseas or in occupation of TSP. Will invite a disproportionate response from India.

I could be wrong though.

The TSPians are seeking to create space where they can seek the use of Tac-Nukes. In my reading this is essentially a response to the Indian assertion, that a conventional war can by fought under a nuke overhang.

TSP by publicizing the Tac-Nuke usage is seeking to negate this posture of India. India would be well served to highlight it nuke doctrine every time TSP seeks to do so.

nakul wrote:No scope for MMSesque pappi-jhappi with nuclear doctrine.

ramana wrote:ShauryaT, Please restate your point of view clearly. What do you think is the paki mindset? What do you find incredible with Indian doctrine?

Is India at particular risk of a possible terror strike using nuclear materials? What is our response mechanism like in such a scenario?

The retaliation against terrorist organisations can be nuclear or with conventional weapons. If we have ascertained that a nuclear strike from the Pakistan side is by a terrorist outfit, and we want to hit back using nuclear weapons, then we should inform Pakistan that we are not striking at the country but only to destroy a particular group. We know the sites of the terrorist outfits. We only need to decide the strength of the nuclear weapon to be used. It will obviously be tactical, of a particular yield that does not cause damage beyond, say, a brigade strength. But my preference would be to use conventional force in retaliation. I think in nine out of ten cases, this should suffice. We should continue hitting them till they raise the white flag.

The Democratic Party in the US has been in the forefront of pushing nonproliferation and, should he win a second term, Barack Obama is likely to make the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) his primary foreign policy goal at the very least to buttress his credentials as a campaigner for a nuclear weapons-free world for which he prematurely won the Nobel Prize for Peace. It is another matter that CTBT is peripheral to the central issue of the United States and Russia reducing their respective weapons/warheads stockpiles. Moreover, most of the extreme non-proliferationists in Washington are associated with the Democratic Party and part of the Obama Administration — persons such as Robert J Einhorn, special adviser in the State Department, an inveterate India-baiter, and Ellen Tauscher who, before assuming charge as assistant secretary of state, vowed to bring countries like India into the Non-Proliferation Treaty net.

The reason why the Obama Administration will pursue CTBT is because it diverts attention from drawing down America’s strategic inventory and presents an avenue for easy success. After all, the manner in which the Manmohan Singh government was persuaded to indefinitely extend the ‘voluntary moratorium’ wouldn’t have escaped Washington’s attention. A bit more push here, a lot more pressure there, and the US State Department may be forgiven for believing it will have the outgoing Congress coalition regime drag India into the NPT basket.

Panel Discussion: India's nuclear decision making 1964-74

Inder Malhotra, K.K. Nayyar, Bharat Karnad, K. Santhanam, Joseph Pilat, and R.R. Subrahmanian

shiv wrote: Indian nuclear plans will be based on what can be done given current reliable arsenals. If something bigger turns up (after due testing) all current existing plans will have to be re written, targets reassigned etc.

But it would IMO be an assumption to say that the armed forces have been given overestimates for the warheads they have and have made plans that cannot work because they have been told lies about possible yield.

ShauryaT wrote:

shiv wrote: Indian nuclear plans will be based on what can be done given current reliable arsenals. If something bigger turns up (after due testing) all current existing plans will have to be re written, targets reassigned etc.

But it would IMO be an assumption to say that the armed forces have been given overestimates for the warheads they have and have made plans that cannot work because they have been told lies about possible yield.

Shiv ji: It is reasonable to presume that current planning assumes the establishment view of the S1 having worked and then derivative works and maybe even other untested designs (tested only in simulations and at the component levels) are part of the warhead mix. I do not believe that the deployed warheads on much of the Agni series or the Shourya or the upcoming K4 would be the 20 KT variety. It is this belief (let us assume we do not know, for this information is not in public) combined with the fact that much of these designs are untested and the lone test itself has questions, puts a question mark on the credibility of the arsenal.

ramdas wrote:Shyamji,

I agree that India has no choice but to test again if our current projects need to be relevant. Question is whether it will do so even if UPA in some form returns to power/ elements further to the left like Kejriwal and co. gain a big say in a future dispensation. Wont there be a danger of national projects in the nuclear/missile field getting frozen/rolled back in that case (depending on whether it is UPA/someone further left)?

Bharat Karnad says that so long as UPA is there, the consensus is that no test will happen. What do you think ? I hope that the statement "when we will test and not if" holds even in case the UPA continues for the foreseeable future.

shyamd wrote:judging by the way PRC is reacting, they are not ruling it out either.