Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -II

[brihaspati]

Was the British lathi that proved fatal for Tilak really accidental?

It was Lala lajpat rai and not Tilak who succumbed to British Lathi charge. It was about a decade after normal death of Tilak..

I stand corrected. Thanks!

[brihaspati]

The fact that the Congress is tilting towards Islamism Appeasement should be seen as a sign, that they are getting feedback from their Congress workers and others, that the Islamism pressure on society is increasing, and that Congress better bend to the storm, otherwise their vote-banks would break off.

Maybe in the eyes of those amongst us, who cannot feel the pulse of society (Muslim areas in India), the way a mass-based political party like Congress can and does, we fail to appreciate the strength of the storm, and think that Congress is leading the charge of more Islamism, but it can be that they are simply bending with the wind.

This just means we have to look harder for ways and means to put the genie back into the bottle!

My view is, that we should look for the bottle outside India. If we keep on looking in India, we would all be having flowing white beards and Taqiyah topis and still no bottle in sight.

Bending with the wind is not always the best way forward. Moreover, bending with the wind can mean that you become irrelevant as you are indistinguishable from the general mass of the trend. There is a third way to completely bending and flowing with wind, or resisting and getting broken - that is deflect and offer your sharpest point to the wind.

I will not discuss what I assess the Congress strategy - no tactic - is, at this stage, and whether it is really justified by any so-called grassroots/mass connection sense. Historically it was never really that mass-connected. Its means of apparently controlling the masses is more a matter of academic/media reconstruction [vote share continuously goes down from the first general elections/even the very first general one yielded some unsavoury indications of mass response and why the dual constituency system was immediately scrapped/as I showed on the "JLN" thread, only a tiny fraction of elite actually represented the pre-British legislatures that gave Cong legitimacy and continuity through Constituent Assembly].

It usually took the wrong steps in response to mass "threats" and almost always showed an innate fear of the "mass" reactions, and tried to control it or scuttle it and not bend with it. In this case if it has chosen to bend with a supposed storm - which by your post will therefore mean an Islamist wave - then its actions can only mean that it is trying to control the "opposite" force and not the Islamist one.

It is a wrong step and serious error. The British did so in the past - but they could afford to since this was not their "homeland". We cannot allow that history to repeat itself.

[Prem]

[It was Lala lajpat rai and not Tilak who succumbed to British Lathi charge. It was about a decade after normal death of Tilak..

Might be Ot , It was him who knew and understood Islamist very well and was very open about it. Had he been alive, PSers would not have been able to infest in India. His death Benefited Chacha.

[Pratyush]

The fact that the Congress is tilting towards Islamism Appeasement should be seen as a sign, that they are getting feedback from their Congress workers and others, that the Islamism pressure on society is increasing, and that Congress better bend to the storm, otherwise their vote-banks would break off.

Maybe in the eyes of those amongst us, who cannot feel the pulse of society (Muslim areas in India), the way a mass-based political party like Congress can and does, we fail to appreciate the strength of the storm, and think that Congress is leading the charge of more Islamism, but it can be that they are simply bending with the wind.

This just means we have to look harder for ways and means to put the genie back into the bottle!

My view is, that we should look for the bottle outside India. If we keep on looking in India, we would all be having flowing white beards and Taqiyah topis and still no bottle in sight.

I am unable to understand what the preservation a minority vote bank at the expense of an alienated majority will achieve for a political party. It may just end up wiping it out as a national party.

Also why exactly India ought to look outside the nation to put the genie (Islamism) back in the bottle? Isn't this going to reinforce the alienation of the minority community when they see that the nation they are a part off cannot address their concerns / grievances without bringing in outsiders.

Also if bringing in outsiders is the only way of communicating with this minority then one can justifiably raise the question regarding the commitment to the nation of this minority. What is the assurance that they will not be open to the seduction by the outsider's agenda when he is brought in.

The primary question is of control. Once you bring in outsider's you loose control over your own internal processes.

Either way you look at it, this looks sedious to me

[Samudragupta]

http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/n ... nid=166682

In 2001, the median age of Bangladesh population was about 18 years. From 1951, the death rate started declining but with little effect on birth rate. The population increased from 40.21 million in 1951, 89.9 million in 1981,109.9 million in 1991and 130.5 million in 2001. As the second phase of the theory of demographic transition has been passing through the composition of census data of 1974, 1981, 1991 and 2001 respectively, show the “baby boom” generation and slight edge of the population in the old ages.

In the context of the present characteristics of young population, the rapid population growth accompanied with the ageing of population has its impact on bio-social and socio-economic aspects of the population. The high population growth rate of Bangladesh is caused not only by current or high past fertility but also by the “momentum” created by the high fertility and falling mortality in the past five decades.

Past high fertility and falling mortality mean that women currently entering the child-bearing age group constitute a large proportion of the total female population, and this proportion will continue to increase in this mid-century.

In Bangladesh, the next generation of adult women will outnumber the previous one. Thus, even if the number of births per woman declines rapidly, the birth rates may stay high and the total number of births may be greater than before. Consequently, the growth rate may remain virtually unchanged. The reasons for this may perhaps be found in the changes that occurred during the previous decades in the age-sex distribution, which were highly unfavourable to a decline in the birth rate.

In Bangladesh, the potential exists for a second-generation “baby boom” resulting from this changing age structure. Unless compensated for by a rapid fall in the fertility of younger married women, who should be reached by more effective family planning programmes and benefited by other associated socio-economic improvements, birth rates and population growth rates are unlikely to fall. In considering the future policy direction for fertility regulation, it is important to take note of this emerging phenomenon.

During the transition from high to low fertility in Bangladesh, an unprecedented proportion of the population will be between the age 15 and 64 years, which are roughly the working ages. The working-age population will increase at a rate considerably higher than that of the total population, and initially the larger increments in absolute terms will be to the younger half the working ages. The rapid increase in the population in the younger working ages between 2010 and 2020 will pose a serious challenge to Bangladesh to generate sufficient employment opportunities.

In the coming several decades, however, the age structure in Bangladesh will be specially conducive to sustained social and economic development. Between the years 2010 and 2020, the dependency ratio will be low and the number persons for labour-force age will comprise a high proportion of the total population but will be expanding only slowly. The country trends cited above will vary somewhat, depending on her current level of fertility.

In Bangladesh, practically, there will be an increase in the proportion of the population in the higher age group (65 years and older). Despite such increase, this proportion will remain relatively small. The rapidly escalating numbers of elderly people and their increasing share in the population of the country have given rise to a number of considerations which have numerous implications for policy formulation.

Social and economic trends in the country suggest the possibility that parents will not be able to assume that their children will be in a position to care for them in their old age. In some rural areas, the migration of young adults to the cities raises questions about the care which elderly in the villages can expect. Public housing policies should take cognisance of the need to encourage three-and four-generation households. Policy makers should also consider the kinds of support required by the elderly who are living alone, or by families caring for elderly members, if the alternative of building old-age homes is to be avoided.

Appropriate retirement or employee provident fund schemes should be contemplated to ensure that a growing proportion of workers have a measure of income security when they leave work. Voluntary and charitable agencies should be encouraged to play an important role in caring for the aged. Such activities can be fostered by the government in providing financial and other support to the agencies so as to achieve greater results.

It is safe to assume that future fertility decline will not be as rapid as it was in the last decade. The overall growth of the population as well as the size and proportion of women of child-bearing age and the labour force and dependent age population will be greatly affected by the changing structure.

It is important to note the change in the absolute size of this population because it has many important implications for development and population welfare programmes. This, therefore, calls for a strengthening of the existing national family planning programme in terms of both quality and quantity to tackle the impending “baby boom” and to enable further reduction in population growth rates.

Similarly, the faster growth of labour-force in the coming years of this century will require long-term perspective planning for necessary adjustment in manpower planning as well as the economy in general. Changes in age structure would also imply changes in consumption patterns and level of saving and investment. Therefore, planning for production, consumption, investment, distribution and so forth should reflect the changes in age structure.

In Bangladesh population age-structure problems remain a priority concern though they have made marked progress in slowing birth rates, but are still grappling with a variety of complex population issues. The situation is disturbingly stagnant in Bangladesh, where population increases regularly block gains in per capita income and defer many needed improvements in the quality of life.

Between now and 2025, the country will witness its maximum population growth. Such growth threatens severe implications not only in the alleviation of poverty but also in such matters as food supplies, employment, housing, health care, forests and other natural resources, and the environment.

Urban congestion, overtaxed infrastructure, pollution and proliferating slums squatter areas have already become serious concerns in Bangladesh, and an expected doubling in the size of large cities in the near future could produce explosive situations. Moreover, the struggle to cope with sheer quantities may divert crucial attention from the larger need to shape a more sustainable future for making.

In conclusion, we can say that no matter what we do, the population will continue to increase over the 40 years, that with tomorrow's mother already born, even major fall in family size would mean that many more babies would be born in the following generation than the present one. As such, the age-structure of population is an important field for policy planning and policy implementers to study.

[RajeshA]

I am unable to understand what the preservation a minority vote bank at the expense of an alienated majority will achieve for a political party. It may just end up wiping it out as a national party.

There is no majority community. There is too much fragmentation there. The majority community does not define itself in opposition to a minority community, it is usually the other way round. If there is no state religion, there are no constraints on a minority community, and as such there is no social or administrative polity or institution or movement to "suppress" minority community, as such there are also no criteria for the majority community to let themselves be defined as in opposition to the minority community.

Also why exactly India ought to look outside the nation to put the genie (Islamism) back in the bottle? Isn't this going to reinforce the alienation of the minority community when they see that the nation they are a part off cannot address their concerns / grievances without bringing in outsiders.

Also if bringing in outsiders is the only way of communicating with this minority then one can justifiably raise the question regarding the commitment to the nation of this minority. What is the assurance that they will not be open to the seduction by the outsider's agenda when he is brought in.

The primary question is of control. Once you bring in outsider's you loose control over your own internal processes.

Either way you look at it, this looks sedious to me

The bottle is outside India. The genie is outside India. Only the stinking farts of the genie are inside India. Once you put the genie in the bottle, the genie would also stop farting into India.

[Pratyush]

^^^

Hmm......

Interesting point of view.

[ashokpachori]

The bottle is outside India. The genie is outside India. Only the stinking farts of the genie are inside India. Once you put the genie in the bottle, the genie would also stop farting into India.

Crux of the matter is same. Who will bell the cat (vote bank issue), or who has the Alladin´s lamp to produce the genie first?

[nandakumar]

[quote="RajeshA
There is no majority community. There is too much fragmentation there. The majority community does not define itself in opposition to a minority community, it is usually the other way round. [/quote]

Generally, people tend to identify themselves in somewhat narrower or parochial terms. it is only when faced with a larger and a more dominant opposing force that they seek enlarge their framework of social identity. And so it is with hindus. Within India there is no compelling reason for them to seek a purely hindu identity. They might fancy an identity that is drawn on narrower caste/regional/ clannish lines as a logical extension of their innate desire to define their identity under extremely tighter labels. But put them in a foreign locale they tend to ignore the original narrower definition of their identity but seek an identity that is pan Indian in its label. Thus an average Tambrahm identity, as an illustration, in relation to a Punjabi within the confines of India mutates into one of an Indic identity when he/she migrates to United States.

[Atri]

[It was Lala lajpat rai and not Tilak who succumbed to British Lathi charge. It was about a decade after normal death of Tilak..

Might be Ot , It was him who knew and understood Islamist very well and was very open about it. Had he been alive, PSers would not have been able to infest in India. His death Benefited Chacha.

The lal-bal-pal trio is the true way ahead, the perfect trikona yoga of the contemporary three power centres of India. In terms of river basins, confluence of Sindhu-Ganga-Godavari/narmada. i am fascinated at the clarity of thought displayed by Bipinchandra Pal in his "Nationality and empire".. have read quite a lot about lalaji but haven't read much what he himself wrote.. but the gist is perfectly coherent with pal and tilak.. 1920-26 was the time when PSers started their exponential ascent.. following devaguru's model, it is 2010...

[Prem]

Atri Ji.
Here is Lal-bal_pal trio.

In 1905 Rai went as a Congress delegate to London, where he fell under the influence of the Hindu revolutionary Shyamji Krishna Varma. Later, in the 1905 Congress session, Rai joined Bal Tilak and Bipin
Chandra Pal in support of a militant program around boycott, swadeshi (homemade goods), and swaraj (self-rule for India). In 1906 he tried to play the role of mediator between the moderates and the extremists in the Congress. The following year the Punjab government arrested and transported him without trial to Burma; he was released in time for the 1907 meetings of the National Congress, when Tilak backed him for the presidency. Rai refused to accept the office for fear of a split in the ranks of that body.Rai lived in the United States from 1914 until 1920. He founded the Indian Home Rule League in New York City and published several important volumes on the Indian problem. Soon after his return to India he was elected president of the Calcutta session of the Congress. In 1925 he entered the Imperial Legislature as a member of the "Swarajist" group. In 1926 he broke with the leaders of the Swarajist group and formed his own "Nationalist party" within the legislature.In 1928 Rai led the demonstrations against the Simon Commission on Indian constitutional reforms. He was injured by the police in a mass demonstration and died a few weeks later, mourned as a nationalist martyr

http://www.answers.com/topic/lala-lajpa ... z18oOr3R1D

[Pranav]

Morarji had told US he would act if Pak exploded a nuke bomb - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... z18oqyVMmM

Did Morarji realize that the window for action was before the Paks had acquired a bomb.

[ramana]

He would have done more than the fission bomb.. BTW its in his regime that the POK I was made compact.

[brihaspati]

X-posting from TSP thread

Gagan wrote:
Raghavendra wrote:
Morarji told US he would act if Pakistan exploded nuke bomb
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/morar ... b/728016/0

I may be wrong here, but on initial read of this article, it sounds as if the US was trying to bargain with India to formalize an agreement to not develop nuclear weapons in 1979.
Everyone seems to have thought that Morarji Desai was a weakling given his gandhian lifestyle, and it appears from the article that the US was telling India that Pakistan will develop Nuclear weapons unless India formalized an agreement with it (under US auspices)

Now this sounds almost as if the US was blackmailing Morarji, and he lost his cool with the US ambassador and told him that he would smash pakistan's bomb plans.

Oh! and Morarji had already said that he was not developing the n weapons program as long as he was PM.

Basically thats an important clue as to the length of any GOI. IG went down not because of the "emergency" atrocities - which at a similar period USA was finding sweet in many other countries, but because of IG's splitting up of Pak and the nuke interest. But her replacements also proved similarly unreliable. Hence they too had to go quickly. IG's return therefore coincides with a grudging acknowledgment of inevitability. However, thwarting the Khalistanis proved the disillusioner. Hence no further risks taken with the more volatile and hence unreliable potential eliminated first and then removal of matriarch. Without the matriarch probably the hope was that the successor would prove more gullible and pliable. Wrong again. One proved subversively Indic and the other showed matriarch's tendency to strike back around the mohalla. So the non-dynastic one could be removed with simple corruption issues - but the dynastic one had to be taken care of with more concrete methods.

The message is perhaps quite clear. They are shaky about the dynasty, and will do everything to control the succession and the scions. If the scion proves "elusive" and not sharing in "common strategic interests" then he/she is going to face "concrete" methods.

Question is with Indian capitalists poised to walk and shake markets across the ponds - do they want to stake their dreams and ambitions on such shaky dynastic bases? Will they ever be able to compete with the big sharks if the sharks have a handle on the political pivot? Or should hey start investing in something less amenable to "elimination" and "control"?

[Pranav]

NPR 9a news, reported only about 20,000 BJP volunteers protesting and blocking traffic in delhi against the gov on food price increase and corruptions. It took about a minute or more slot? 20K crowd is pretty easy and not a big news for India for NPR. Whatsup!?

Wonder why B Ramanji is espousing Hindu causes? I recall him batting for INCvadis all along.

An interesting factoid IMHO -

On 6 Dec, Digvijay Singh speaks at a function for the release of the book "26/11 - RSS ki Saazish" (http://indiannugget.blogspot.com/2010/1 ... mists.html).

On 10 Dec, a Wikileaks cable is released criticizing the Congress for its pandering (http://www.hindustantimes.com/Congress- ... 37106.aspx).

See also the post http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 55#p994955 about Wikileaks background.

What gives??

I was actually referring to the release of the wikileaks cable so soon after Digvijay attended the function. Add to that how Outlook magazine promoted the 2G tapes, and how it uncharacteristically carried the article by Madhu Kishwar slamming MMS. Also of interest is this uncharacteristic article in the Hindustan times: Modi Operandi by Ashok Malik - http://www.hindustantimes.com/Modi-oper ... 38428.aspx

It may be too early to take a definite view on this, but people are sensing some shift ...

[brihaspati]

The wikileaks upset the preparation round for RG to be brought in to replace MMS. The key to the political line that was being played out was keeping RG non-controversial - which has been upset now. I guess a lot more of Congressmen now are increasingly feeling shaky or doubtful about a future under the leadership of RG.

The excessive move against the supposed "Hindu right" is also making a lot of people shaky - because they don't feel sure about the outcome. What if it all boomerangs. What we are seeing is simply the traditional hedging strategy applied by the Congress. But this will not help.

Only person who appears to have a native cunning and instinctively know how far to go with the Indian "people" - and therefore kept out of "trouble" is the sister. The middle in the Congress should think seriously about that. I think they should realize that even leadership of a party should be chosen with a view towards the feelings of opponents or non-supporters of the party.

A lot of us currently outside their brand of politics, would welcome replacement of the brother with the sister. It is a compromise that is temporarily acceptable with a view towards the long term strategic future of the country. A dynasty never lasts for ever. If they are really patriotic, they must also compromise to the extent that when the time comes they and their opponents can agree on a path of honourable retreat for the family. Placing the sister will be an acknowledgment of this sentiment. Otherwise, goodbye dynasty!

[brihaspati]

Who makes up fascism in India according to experts ? Savarkar, Bose, RSS, BJP, with pieces of Gandhi included

The collection of pieces and deliberate selections from the key individuals quoted, the organizations mentioned - and their treatment at the hands of the rashtra, or their fate - all have an uncanny pattern. Forgetting BJP - which did not exist before 70's, all the others mentioned in the list on that link were thoroughly disliked and hated by the British.

When the post Independence rashtra's attitudes towards individuals and organizations uncannily coincide with pre-independence colonial masters - what does it tell about the fundamental character of the rashtra? Or its ideological leanings and identity or affiliations?

Once again, why is not the Muslim League or Jinnah;s statements not included in such lists? Why are ML constructs of racial superiority of Arab-Turk-Persian "derived" Muslims of India not fascistic enough? Why are ML organized goon brigades - made out of demobilized Muslim soldiers of the British's loyal very own BIA, and urban and rural lumpens, even middle class youth, not considered fascistic enough?

Finally, why are not British imperial and colonial policies not fascist enough in their racial constructions and treatment?

Note that all this is being done under the innocent garb of "projecting" "future trends"!

[Pranav]

If they are really patriotic, they must also compromise to the extent that when the time comes they and their opponents can agree on a path of honourable retreat for the family.

If they were even slightly patriotic they would get rid of EVMs. They have looted enough money to live in super-luxury for generations.

[Atri]

the word ‘Fascism’ is almost entirely meaningless. In conversation, of course, it is used even more wildly than in print. I have heard it applied to farmers, shopkeepers, Social Credit, corporal punishment, fox-hunting, bull-fighting, the 1922 Committee, the 1941 Committee, Kipling, Gandhi, Chiang Kai-Shek, homosexuality, Priestley's broadcasts, Youth Hostels, astrology, women, dogs and I do not know what else.

[brihaspati]

The summer 2011 withdrawal remains on schedule. As I have speculated, Americans simply may not be in a position to match up with their projected imagery of a very long term presence - even after 2014.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/world ... nted=print

The July 2011 date to begin withdrawing troops is at the heart of the political quandary Mr. Obama faces. In announcing his troop increase for Afghanistan a year ago, he insisted that the buildup would be limited to 18 months, and then withdrawals would begin — an effort to quiet his restive base of supporters and put pressure on Afghanistan to speed the training of its own troops.

But that training is time-consuming, and while Congressional Republicans have backed Mr. Obama’s Afghanistan strategy so far, he is facing opposition from members of his own party, who will undoubtedly increase the pressure on him next year to withdraw troops quickly.

The president’s new strategy review “seems as finely parsed as last year’s effort,” said Representative Jane Harmon, a California Democrat. “But this time, our ground game is a lot less convincing.” She added that “we need a clear public timetable to end our military mission in Afghanistan responsibly, and soon.”

The intelligence and military wings differ as usual, but the writing is on the wall:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/15/world ... %20&st=cse

The dispute between the military and intelligence agencies reflects how much the debate in Washington over the war is now centered on whether the United States can succeed in Afghanistan without the cooperation of Pakistan, which despite years of American pressure has resisted routing militants on its border.

The dispute also reflects the longstanding cultural differences between intelligence analysts, whose job is to warn of potential bad news, and military commanders, who are trained to promote “can do” optimism.

But in Afghanistan, the intelligence agencies play a strong role, with the largest Central Intelligence Agency station since the Vietnam War located in Kabul. C.I.A. operatives also command an Afghan paramilitary force in the thousands. In Pakistan, the C.I.A. is running a covert war using drone aircraft.

Both sides have found some areas of agreement in the period leading up to Mr. Obama’s review, which will be made public on Thursday. The intelligence reports, which rely heavily on assessments from the C.I.A. and the Defense Intelligence Agency, conclude that C.I.A. drone strikes on leaders of Al Qaeda in the tribal regions of Pakistan have had an impact and that security has improved in the parts of Helmand and Kandahar Provinces in southern Afghanistan where the United States has built up its troop presence. For their part, American commanders and Pentagon officials say they do not yet know if the war can be won without more cooperation from Pakistan. But after years and billions spent trying to win the support of the Pakistanis, they are now proceeding on the assumption that there will be limited help from them. The American commanders and officials readily describe the havens for insurgents in Pakistan as a major impediment to military operations.

“I’m not going to make any bones about it, they’ve got sanctuaries and they go back and forth across the border,” Maj. Gen. John F. Campbell, the commander of NATO forces in eastern Afghanistan, told reporters last week in the remote Kunar Province of Afghanistan. “They’re financed better, they’re better trained, they’re the ones who bring in the higher-end I.E.D.’s.” General Campbell was referring to improvised explosive devices, the military’s name for the insurgent-made bombs, the leading cause of American military deaths in Afghanistan.

[abhischekcc]

The news of the empire's demise has still not reached the empire.

[Samudragupta]

Some kind of status quo seems to have achieved in the Sindhu basin and Hindukush,TSPA seems to be the caretaker of the loose allignment of the forces of the Caliphate with the forces of Punjab.A loose treaty is already being seen among the believers..the army of Caliphate will not attack the Punjabi forces, in return the TSPA will not strike the Caliphate, instead effort to channelize the forces towards both East and West. Some amount of Dhamaka is required to break this status quo something like striking the PMA and neutarlizing the GC's.Any American attack on the Caliphate is going to make this Status quo stronger.

[brihaspati]

The Americans cannot maintain this dronacharya based campaign for long. Alternate, non-governmental collations of reports and experiences suggest that the Talebs have not really grown weaker or relinquished control of the 33 districts. The roads have become less safe and what is seen as under gov control during the day goes over to Taleb control during the night.

It is an uncanny reminder of similar phases of Chinese 8th route army campaigns in the non-mans land between them and the Japanese and the nationalists. This was the phase between 40-48 which ultimately led to nationalist defeat. it is a highly flexible form of warfare held together by ideological commitment and popular support in a relatively difficult terrain which neutralizes superior weapons systems.

[Samudragupta]

Biji,
What will happen if the ANA changes its tactics and turn into "Tajik Taliban" from the defensive line in the North, where It transforms itself into purely Tajik Force pulling out of the South with occasional raid in the Pustun Heartland and the Pustun being completely responsible for the losses taken in its side...Will the Pakistanis will be able to fight out a Tajik dominated and American backed force ruthlessly following its own tactics.

[brihaspati]

This was gamed a while ago as a possibility of a north-south split in AFG. But the northern forces may not be that powerful this time around. Moreover the crucial problem now is supplying them. Russia is stronger. Iran cannot be entirely crushed - not only because of China and Russia, but I would see a hidden interest within USA itself in preserving the Iranian state in its current form to keep the pressure on KSA and Israel. But then Iran will continue to use that window to hedge its bets in AFG to safeguard its Gulf interests. So that complicates the situation for the northerners.

Moreover, now Pak has much stronger support and supplies from PRC, so it may strongly support the Talebs against the US wishes. USA has shown itself to be running out of real leverage points on the current regime in Paki occupied lands. Given all this I do not assess the chances of the NA to be revivavble or able to sustain themselves against the southerners. The drugs trade has revived and all the usual international players are back in full force - they do not need the northern areas to ply their trade between the east and the west.

[brihaspati]

ramana ji has set an important puzzle in another thread about possible US role in using and promoting China-India rivalry. The email suggests modeling of MMS/SG as being under possible US influence.

But following up a different line of exploration based on the timelines of known and "estimated" moves in the lead up to 1962 suggests that while speculating/modeling why should we leave the reviving and "aspiring" Russia out of a similar model?

This particular pravda english version report might have already been quoted elsewhere:
http://english.pravda.ru/business/compa ... a_india-0/

The construction of the gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI project) can obviously become a very important project between Russia and India. The pipeline is expected to be 1,680 kilometers long as it starts in Turkmenia's Dovletabad gas field and ends in India's Fazilka, near Pakistan's border. The capacity of the pipeline is 33 billion cubic meters of gas.

The Russian Federation has refused from the perspective, but not comfortable for the USA Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, IPI, which was considered to be a competitor to TAPI.

TAPI could have been an incentive for Russia to come aboard the US plan to isolate Iran. Putin is definitely shrewd and seen the potential for temporary show of fallin in line. If Russia supports TAPI, it means Russia is already looking for a future role in AFG.

The war in Afghanistan continues, and allied troops do not seem to be able to stabilize the situation there. It is not ruled out that Russian troops will appear in Afghanistan some time in the future too.

The Russian military contingent may appear in Afghanistan under the pretext of the struggle against drug trafficking. Tens of thousands of people die in Russia because of Afghan heroine every year. Russia has already conducted joint military drills with India in Himalayas, near Pakistani borders.

Here the aspiration is made clear. But combined with the previous cue about TAPI, what it implies for the future aspirations of Putin - is quite significant.

In the north of Afghanistan, US troops conducted joint operations with Russian anti-drug agencies. It has already been decided that Russian border guards will return to the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

President Medvedev is certain that Russian companies have the required experience and basis to build TAPI gas pipeline. The pipeline can be launched already in 2013-2014, whereas 2014 is considered to be the year, when the Americans finish their mission in Afghanistan.

Some Indian experts believe, though, that TAPI will become the reason for NATO's and USA's long-time presence in the key spot of Eurasia.

"A part of the Afghan leg of the pipeline will be built under the ground to protect the pipe from possible attacks. It will be guarded by local communities, and they will be paid for that. Kabul hopes, though, that the USA and the North Atlantic Alliance will take efforts to guarantee security to the gas pipeline. This in its turn will give the West a good official reason to preserve its military presence in Afghanistan," M.K. Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat, told Regnum news agency.

This is the uncertain and complicated bit. Will the underground bit and the local community stuff be sufficient guarantee? What if as typical it becomes a milking machine for local militants? Will it keep TAPI economocally viable? Also Just as NATO/USA, will TAPI also not be an excuse for a new Russian presence too - and what does that bring as reaction/subversion from US? What does it hold for the future of TAPI then?

As for India's participation in the Russian privatization, we would like to remind that the Russian Federation government plans to sell over a hundred of federal state unitary enterprises in 2011-2013. In addition, there are plans to sell state-owned shareholdings of several joint stock companies.

It is planned to privatize the shareholdings of Rosneft (25 percent minus one share), RusHydro (7.97 percent minus one share), FISK (4.11 percent minus one share), Sovkomflot (50 percent minus one share), Sberbank (7.58 percent minus one share), VTB (35.5 percent minus one share), United Grain Company (100 percent till 2012), Rosagroleasing (50 percent minus one share - not earlier than 2013), RZD Russian Railways (25 percent minus one share - not earlier than 2013).

Apparently, India will be interested in the assets related to its national interests and adequate infrastructure. In addition to TAPI, it goes about CASA-1000 - the system to deliver electric power from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Can we rule out Russian involvement in Indian "affairs" just as US is modeled as? Is there anything that both Russia, and USA [and UK and China] hold on our political leadership that can make Indian governments apparently seemingly toe these two's requirements [within parameters of feasibility]? In the earlier part it could be a real or imagined threat of a "missing" Bose. Not anymore - since SCB realistically cannot be expected to be living anymore. But then what else could have been accumulated by the Russian secret services in parallel to whatever the US could come up with?

Brushing with CT theories - the accidental deaths of Sastri, a disputed ending of "Bose", Sanjay's plane mishap, and the two assassinations of IG and RG senior seems to point to a rather bizarre vulnerability in our key-position successions.The less "stable" prime-minsiterships almost all ended in quick or maligned and controversial exits.

[Rony]

Who makes up fascism in India according to experts ? Savarkar, Bose, RSS, BJP, with pieces of Gandhi included

The collection of pieces and deliberate selections from the key individuals quoted, the organizations mentioned - and their treatment at the hands of the rashtra, or their fate - all have an uncanny pattern. Forgetting BJP - which did not exist before 70's, all the others mentioned in the list on that link were thoroughly disliked and hated by the British.

When the post Independence rashtra's attitudes towards individuals and organizations uncannily coincide with pre-independence colonial masters - what does it tell about the fundamental character of the rashtra? Or its ideological leanings and identity or affiliations?

Once again, why is not the Muslim League or Jinnah;s statements not included in such lists? Why are ML constructs of racial superiority of Arab-Turk-Persian "derived" Muslims of India not fascistic enough? Why are ML organized goon brigades - made out of demobilized Muslim soldiers of the British's loyal very own BIA, and urban and rural lumpens, even middle class youth, not considered fascistic enough?

Finally, why are not British imperial and colonial policies not fascist enough in their racial constructions and treatment?

Note that all this is being done under the innocent garb of "projecting" "future trends"!

From the above link,

The readings below in that link includes Koenraad Elst's 'The Saffron Swastika: The Notion of "Hindu Fascism'. That is actually one the master pieces on the study of Hindutva. But that book as the title itself suggests is all about how "Hindu Fascism" is just a notion and a myth . The authors of that above link who ever they are took the details which suits them from that book but completely ignored the entire premise and purpose of that book. Its a classic case of closing your eyes even if the evidence against your viewpoint is overwhelming.

[svinayak]

Can we rule out Russian involvement in Indian "affairs" just as US is modeled as? Is there anything that both Russia, and USA [and UK and China] hold on our political leadership that can make Indian governments apparently seemingly toe these two's requirements [within parameters of feasibility]? In the earlier part it could be a real or imagined threat of a "missing" Bose. Not anymore - since SCB realistically cannot be expected to be living anymore. But then what else could have been accumulated by the Russian secret services in parallel to whatever the US could come up with?

Brushing with CT theories - the accidental deaths of Sastri, a disputed ending of "Bose", Sanjay's plane mishap, and the two assassinations of IG and RG senior seems to point to a rather bizarre vulnerability in our key-position successions.The less "stable" prime-minsiterships almost all ended in quick or maligned and controversial exits.

Good analysis and piece.
Indian land mass and geo strategic location is too important and hence major powers have meddled in India.

Indian political setup and media control is loose that other powers can influence from 'inside' and create 'events' which can change the future of the region.
The major changes they are looking for is country orientation (not aligned to one power) , not strong leaders who enjoy mass appeal inside India, relatively weak military and no independent power projection outside.

Indian political setup also plays along a little bit and tries to keep low profile allowing for some manipulations,

[brihaspati]

India actually helped China consolidate its control over Tibet. In October 1950 India refused to sponsor a Tibetan appeal to the United Nations and subverted El Salvador's attempt to sponsor such an appeal. Many governments, including the U.S., the British, and many Middle Eastern ones, were willing to follow India’s lead on this issue, and India’s opposition to the Tibetan appeal to the U.N. was, in fact, a major reason for its non-consideration. [Claude Arpi, The Fate of Tibet, When Big Insects Eat Small Insects, New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999.] Nehru refused U.S. proposals 1950 of Indo-U.S. cooperation in support of Tibetan resistance to China.[Tsering Sakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows, A History of Modern Tibet since 1947, London: Pimlico, 1999]

India persuaded the young Dalai Lama not to flee abroad and try to rally international support for Tibet, but to return to Tibet and reach an accommodation with China's Communist government, so-called 17-Point agreement of May 1951. Then in 1954 India formally recognized China's ownership of Tibet sending a cue to other countries. After the 1954 agreement between China and India regarding Tibet, the Indian government encouraged the Dalai Lama and his local Tibetan government to reclaim its autonomy under the 17-Point agreement. Until mid-1959 India allowed trade with Tibet to continue offsetting to a certain extent the hardship and inflation due to scarcity of basic goods. In mid 1957 the CIA began covert assistance to rebels in the Kham region of southeastern Tibet. Assistance rendered through this CIA program was actually quite limited totaling only 250 tons of munitions, equipment, and supplies between 1957 and 1961.[John K. Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival, New York: Public Affairs, 1999, p. 155. Kenneth Conboy and James Morrision, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, University Press of Kansas, 2002.]

Tibetan refugees in northern Indian cities (especially Darjeeling, Kalimpong, and Gangtok) in the 1950s also supported in various ways resistance movements inside Tibet. Covert operatives from various countries including the U.S., Nationalist China, and the PRC, were also active in those cities. By late 1958 Beijing began demanding that India expel key leaders of the Tibetan resistance based in India, and suppress activities supporting opposition to Chinese policies within Tibet. Nehru sought a middle course, restricting Tibetan activities, but refusing to expel Tibetan leaders. Once the Tibetan national rising began in Lhasa on 10 March 1959 even Nehru expressed sympathy with Tibet's struggle.

There is now available - a large amount of material on the inner workings of the period within CCP and how Mao planned it. Something changed drastically between 58-61 in the Russia-China-India triangular relationship that made Mao target Nehru in particular from mid 59, and it started even before the Lhasa uprising in 1959.

Until 58, Nehru appears to have maintained the illusion of cooperation apparently promised by Zhou en Lai in 1956. There are three external to India factors that must be taken into account.

(1) The 20th party Congress of the CPSU, in 1956 after Stalin's death in 1954. It became a denunciation of Stalinist politics that saw the beginning of the anti-Maoist so-called "right-deviation" within CCP and from this point onward Mao became increasiungly embattled for party control even though in nominal full control - leading to the 1966 purge of his enemies. 58-59 is also the Maoist experimental Great Leap period - which had mixed and often disastrous results. Mao could have used a "foreign aggression" to target both the "rightwing" (which is suspected to have had Zhou's sympathies) as well as his own disastrous economic misadventure.

(2) 58-59 probably also saw the beginning sof internal CPSU factional opposition to Khruschev and the start of the Breznevite reaction.

(3) 58-61 is the period when CIA briefly experimented with covert support in a token way to Tibetan rebels.

But Nehru had tried to maintain the illusion of cooperation and understanding even through the military occupation and progressive consolidation of control over Tibet by the PLA. Nehru explained the political reality in comments to parliament on 4 May: failure to grant the Dalai Lama asylum would have won the support of only a "few thousand" Indians, while "hundreds of millions" welcomed the granting of asylum. It was simply "impossible" not to grant asylum.[Nehru's statements to parliament, 30 March 1959, 27 April 1959, and press conference on 5 April 1959, all in Dalai Lama and India, New Delhi: Institute of National Affairs, 1959, p. 80, 103, 105, 120-21, 127]

Two crucial points still remain mysterious. Why did Nehru suddenly change tack from mid 1959? Why did CIA wind up the covert ops in 1961?

Conboy and Morrison's study indicate the possibility that a core around Nehru possibly had a vague idea of the CIA ops, and tacitly allowed it. This point remains controversial, and may also indicate that portions of the GOI acted according to its own separate agenda without full knowledge of JLN (maybe even to counter the effects of his disastrous policy for the nation).

Did the anti-Stalinization moves within Russia unleash something that made Nehru worried about the threat posed by Mao? Did openness for teh brief period between 56-59 in USSR, and attempt at redressing some of the atrocities of Stalin, even on information terms lead to renewed pressure on Nehru for his political survival? Something that Mao could now use against Nehru? Was this somthing that prompted the Congress to keep away a "Nehru" from power fro some time to reduce the vulnerability of the GOI? But was this also the cue for the requirement for Sastri to vanish and that a Nehru be brought in again so that the old power-influence-blackmail equations could be reveived again in foreign hands?

In many senses, it makes sense to see the subsequent developments as a tri-partite cold war struggle between two factions of the communists/state-capitalists and the western block - over the control and direction of the GOI.

[svinayak]

There is now available - a large amount of material on the inner workings of the period within CCP and how Mao planned it. Something changed drastically between 58-61 in the Russia-China-India triangular relationship that made Mao target Nehru in particular from mid 59, and it started even before the Lhasa uprising in 1959.

Until 58, Nehru appears to have maintained the illusion of cooperation apparently promised by Zhou en Lai in 1956. There are three external to India factors that must be taken into account.

Chau Enlai visited Nehru 5 times in the same period 58-61. Do you see any thing in that. They may have given them the confidence that JLN can be brought down

[brihaspati]

Zhou was a compromise candidate between the Maoist Left and the Liu Shao Qi Right. He had been more involved in party organization and less in the military. Mao most probably did not take Zhou into confidence. It now appears that Mao began to plan the 1962 campaign from late 1958. He deliberately postponed the military move until he thought his PLA positioning supplying was better prepared. Until that time he let Zhou carry on the diplomatic pretensions [need not be deliberate deception on Zhou's part].

Officially, within politbureau meetings Mao maintained that he wanted friendship with India but "unity through struggle" was to be the method. He particularly began to target Nehru in person from 1958.

Moreover, suddenly in 1959 Nehru moved on to the so-called "forward strategy" with respect to Chinese positions trying to occupy Tibet and bordering India.

The dramatic turnaround seems to be in late 58, early 59. This is the time both leaders suddenly change tack and Mao goes personally ballistic against Nehru. it is not exactly coincident with the Russian scene - no Russian trigger existed at this time point, whatever happened politically within CPSU was over in 56-and early 57. However, 57-59 was a period of temporary reversal of Stalinist policies especially with respect to political prisoners - when lots of gulag inmates were released, and documents relating to covert or secret party atrocities were opened up. Did Mao come to know of something that could have been used against Nehru? Was there any information that could not be made public by any of Russia, China, India or even the West but something that could be used on JLN? A shared secret that would be damaging to all four if publicized, but most damaging to Nehru? This appears to be the minimal hypothesis that explains most of the observations.

The more the period is studied, it appears to me that this was a turning point, and all that happened subsequently between the west-Russia-China dynamic over India stems from this.

[svinayak]

The more the period is studied, it appears to me that this was a turning point, and all that happened subsequently between the west-Russia-China dynamic over India stems from this.

Kennedy is the key. Kennedy made a choice and there is large lobby which opposed him.

http://www.rediff.com/money/2006/may/03mspec.htm

Kennedy had extraordinary interest in India, and saw the Indian success as a key to fight against Communism in Asia. Professor Galbraith was his chosen man for the job.

Professor Galbraith came to India with a formidable reputation. Earlier he had worked almost for a whole year in India at the invitation of Pandit Nehru and Professor (Prasanta Chandra) Mahalanobis (the originator of planned economic development and virtually the founder of the Indian Planning Commission). Nehru was impressed with his acute intellect and was on a very friendly terms with him.

It is to Professor Galbraith's credit that he persuaded Nehru to leave agriculture in the private sector. Seeing the collapse of Soviet agriculture and disaster of Chinese efforts at collectivisation, one could give credit to Professor Galbraith for dissuading Nehru from following that disastrous path. The later Indian success in the Green Revolution owes much to this policy orientation prescribed by Professor Galbraith.

That India did not have food riots like the Soviet Union or mega deaths like China, had much to do with this approach of leaving agriculture in private hands.

[ramana]

So it was a fear of India in a new US led Asian alliance/compact that made the PRC make its moves to discredit India before the event.

!958-59 period is interesting. Also when did the Soviets visit India

Maybe the PRC saw India being courted by two rivals powers and decided to wound the elepahnt before it gets into a pact? Or they thought the dfeat could lead to a redux of the Tasrist Russia after Tannenberg?

A babu told me the childlike fascination that the hardline CPM cadres have the PRC will come over the Himalayas to support a people's revolution.

[Samudragupta]

Did Mao come to know of something that could have been used against Nehru? Was there any information that could not be made public by any of Russia, China, India or even the West but something that could be used on JLN? A shared secret that would be damaging to all four if publicized, but most damaging to Nehru? This appears to be the minimal hypothesis that explains most of the observations.

Did Gulag also released a political(?) prisoner who was supposed to be dead in Taiwan long time back?

[brihaspati]

The original CPI-CPIM split was based on the Maoist versus CPSU line at the time - and revolved around the characterization of Indian "class character" and "stage of revolution". Actually the to-be-CPIML basically protested that CPIM was not going far enough and fast enough towards the Mao-style peasant-uprising based "people's revolution" - and came out. But this split gathered momentum only in the backdrop of 62 war. The peasant versus proletariat debate and "stages of revolution" debate had been raging from the Telengana debacle of 1948, but it does not seem to have picked up really until 1961 - when to-be-CPIM voices first began to make their point seriously in intraparty debates. (Interestingly none of these early pioneers retained frontline or key roles in the "success" period of the CPIM - in fact one of its later iconic frontman in the gov phase played hard to get for some time even after the formal split in 1964)

On the other hand it appears now that Mao suddenly talked of planning for the Indian campaign in the early part of 59, before HHDL even was planning his escape. But he indicated that the campaign would be mounted later - and for 2-3 years a propaganda campaign should be unleashed against Nehru. There are reported exchanges between Kruschev and Mao where the former was unwilling to pressurize Nehru over HHDL saying that it was Mao's fault that HHDL escaped.

The thing is if Mao realized that Russia would not back him fully, that USA was backing up or making overtures to India, why would he launch a military attack? He was too pragmatic a military leader and planner to do so. Why did CIA close down its Tibetan operations in 1961, if Kennedy or parts of US admin were indeed interested in India?

It is important to figure out the range of possibilities of pressure points that external forces can bring on to any GOI, and if it seems that India becomes particularly vulnerable if a Nehru is on the throne - than that needs special exploration.

[ramana]

He wanted to strike the IA and JLN before it got rebuilt in any potential alliance. Something like a pre-emptive strike to destroy the credibity/prospects of an alliance partner. This line appears most likely in light of his quick withdrawl in areas he didnt want and occupation of those areas that he wanted.

[brihaspati]

Did Mao come to know of something that could have been used against Nehru? Was there any information that could not be made public by any of Russia, China, India or even the West but something that could be used on JLN? A shared secret that would be damaging to all four if publicized, but most damaging to Nehru? This appears to be the minimal hypothesis that explains most of the observations.

Did Gulag also released a political(?) prisoner who was supposed to be dead in Taiwan long time back?

(1) Some people have speculated on this, if I am guessing identity correctly. But even release of sensitive information about him could be equally damaging. Mao could have pretended that he was in onto the secret to pressurize Nehru through his emissaries.
(2) Transfer of the real person into Maoist territory could be a way of getting rid of an embarrassment on Russian part, but a weapon in Mao's hands. It would force Nehru on the backfoot and unable to take counter -measures. The hurry would be in case the person concerned was not likely to survive long.
(3) USA would be forced to hold back too, because otherwise it could damage UK - person alive or information unrelated to the person but still sensitive, leaked.

I am not considering the "person" only as a possibility, but it could also be information related to India's obtaining freedom, Nehru and Congress role in it, etc. independent of the "person".

[svinayak]

He wanted to strike the IA and JLN before it got rebuilt in any potential alliance. Something like a pre-emptive strike to destroy the credibity/prospects of an alliance partner. This line appears most likely in light of his quick withdrawl in areas he didnt want and occupation of those areas that he wanted.

Also when the world powers were in crisis over the Cuban missiles.
India was taken out as a rival power from the asian block preemptively before consensus could be formed in US and other western nations.

[brihaspati]

As I have pointed out before, from Mao's side his problems were mounting. He had blundered in the Great Leap Forward, his opponents had formed a block that he termed the "right wing deviationists" within the party and he was increasingly losing control over the military wing and government even though nominally in the supreme position, and the cult of the personality had taken a beating in the communist world after de-stalinization started under Kruschev from the 20th congress of the CPSU.

But Mao had begun planning at this moment of crisis in 58-59 but held back from actual military strikes against India. The height of the famine disruption from the "Leap" would need the diversionary call to nationalist pride in 59 itself - not wait 3 more years until that storm died down. He waits for 3 more years in which his "right wing" opposition matures and gains strength further. 59 would have been a tactically more appropriate time to use as an excuse to reassert his control over the army.

There is a time inconsistency problem. What bothers is whether there is something out there that continues to be shared between the USA, UK, Russia, and Maoist China (still Maoist in structure) and the Congress, that brings in unknown pressures on the GOI and makes it do strange moves apparently conceding to some of the interests of all of these regimes.

[ramana]

Well there is the idea that India bought its freedom using the sterling reserves* commandeered by the British during World War II. It was this loss of wealth that caused the Hindu rate of growth in the early decades after 1947. It led to foreign exchange curbs on travellers.

True they got some armaments and unneeded stuff which could bolster the Commonwealth navies in case of any potential hostilties.

The revelation that INC was not really the freedom movement it claimed to be could reduce their sheen.

---
* Dean Rusk or Acheson in a radio show excerpt posted in BRF said that GB owed India ~ $10B -$15B and hence needed the Marshall plan to get out of the economic mess.

Maybe others who posted it might recall. The sum is quite significant in those days.

GB used it to pay US for its support!