Deterrence

[ramdas]

Shyamji,

I agree with the fundamentals you have stated. There is an option 3: peace with PRC/TSP on their terms. Hope UPA does not go in for that under any circumstance. Given that, I feel option 2 has no credibility whatsoever. Computer simulations can go only so far, no further as Dr. Santhanam said.

For instance, how do we know that leads given by "friends' are accurate ? Testing is the only way out. Especially so if DPRK conducts a test and obtains a larger yield than anything we have obtained (which they eventually will after sufficient testing).

BTW, what do PRC threaten to do in case we test ? attack us ?

[shyamd]

Ramdas ji,
Peace with TSP is unlikely but more likely with PRC. But ultimately we always assume the worst case scenario and you can see that with the statements of the NSA and other key individuals I.e we will have credible deterrent.

I think option 2 is probably a temporary solution (assuming it is happening and our friends are helping us with honest). Test is a case of when and if. I think prior to 2014 elections is a good time for it. It will shift the attention of the people and create a nationalist sentiment. Hit while the people least expect it. If successful - sign CTBT. But there is a world wide program that Obama has created to eliminate N, so he'll probably take it personally- Just food for thought. All the nuclear powers have created committees to look at disarmament incl india

PRC are trying to brow beat us and stop us from testing. Some sort of action to prevent a test. Joint exercise with pak opposite Pokharan last year and we responded immediately with Brahmos test fire in pokharan right next to the border while they were exercising under army command (showing to their faces we will de-nuke them if we have to and the Brahmos has been deployed) and also conducted a major exercise. We will never be cowed down.

Ultimately whether they will test or not - will come down to a close circle of individuals. the enemies are still guessing who is in that circle. So the less we say the better.

[ramdas]

Shyamji,

Still I wonder what sort of action PRC can take to prevent us from testing. Unlikely they can take preemptive action. Nor can they launch a full fledged attack through TSP especially if we have a successful TN test.

As per Dr. Santhanam, we require 2-3 TN tests to have credible TN capability. I am also very disturbed about this idea of help from others. They could very well be leading us up a garden path: what then ? We should test till we achieve credible TN capability: even if it takes another dozen tests.

Of course, data from 1998 (even though it failed) would help us to avoid some wrong paths. There could be other wrong paths, though. They should have a conservative design meant to give medium to high yield rather than try for a cutting edge design.

[ramdas]

Shyamji,

Still I wonder what sort of action PRC can take to prevent us from testing. Unlikely they can take preemptive action. Nor can they launch a full fledged attack through TSP especially if we have a successful TN test.

As per Dr. Santhanam, we require 2-3 TN tests to have credible TN capability. I am also very disturbed about this idea of help from others. They could very well be leading us up a garden path: what then ? We should test till we achieve credible TN capability: even if it takes another dozen tests.

Of course, data from 1998 (even though it failed) would help us to avoid some wrong paths. There could be other wrong paths, though. They should have a conservative design meant to give medium to high yield rather than try for a cutting edge design.

[shyamd]

Shyamji,

Still I wonder what sort of action PRC can take to prevent us from testing. Unlikely they can take preemptive action. Nor can they launch a full fledged attack through TSP especially if we have a successful TN test.

Where can India test? Pokharan - just create a confrontation there or try and seize the site before we can test. But this will obviously push us to test even more and give us the excuse. Other than make threats they can't do much. But this is PRC 'gleat thinking' for you.

As per Dr. Santhanam, we require 2-3 TN tests to have credible TN capability. I am also very disturbed about this idea of help from others. They could very well be leading us up a garden path: what then ? We should test till we achieve credible TN capability: even if it takes another dozen tests.

Of course, data from 1998 (even though it failed) would help us to avoid some wrong paths. There could be other wrong paths, though. They should have a conservative design meant to give medium to high yield rather than try for a cutting edge design.

Can't talk much about it partly because I don't know the whole story but basically even that is covered - they have made many designs. But again we don't know which will work until we test. Test will happen. More a case of timing and all that. Soooo many factors to take into account - its not an easy decision for any govt.

[pentaiah]

What have I got, and what can I do with what I have got

That is a bad situation

The questions would go like this

Mr. PM you set the goal, we will design the strategy, the plan for execution, and will deliver with what we have been made to know and have.

Second
Assuming all the engineers scientists designers, instrumentation are equally competent there should not be difference on the outcomes. Ok or a contentious debate.....

The objective of 1998 tests were no longer ambiguous like PNE or weapon or technology demonstrator, of course unless we want to say fusion device was a tech demonstration?

Even the statement by Atal ji Maha bum was quietly withdrawn .....
Did the device fizzle or he fizzled?

We still have lot of work to do on the boosted or fusion devices.

Any way our leadership concept via Minimum deterrence is achieved as of now.
Besides Indian leadership thinks nuclear war will never be fought, any way the winds blow from west to east...

All our calculations must realistically be around proven 20 KT. Even those as statistical laws indicate 2/3 will work of which again 2/3 will be on target that means about 40 will work if 100 are launched that is device landing on the heads of mullahs in TSP

[shiv]

It is not PRC that is stopping India from testing. There has been an international consensus on avoiding all testing since well before 1998.

We have been through all this before. It has been said that two specific policies were aimed specifically at stopping India from developing a nuclear arsenal. The first was the declaration of the P5 as the only powers legitimately allowed to have nukes (a decision taken after 1974) The second was the stopping of all tests after 1992 or thereabouts, after allowing China and France to do a few more tests to perfect their arsenal.

No country had the guts to test after that until 1998 when India tested and that immediately made Pakis grow balls. Korea now is nearly out of control.

If India (or USA/Russia/China/UK/France) tests today, the feeling is that Pakistan, Korea and Iran will definitely start testing. After that it will get more and more difficult to prevent capable countries from testing out of fear. There is a sort of loose international order that has been established and India does not only not have the guts to break it, but India has also signed agreements on the supply of nuclear fuel for reactors in exchange for not testing.

India ain't gonna test anytime soon.

On a different note many on BRF feel India does not have an effective deterrent. This implies that the security community on India:
1. Know something that we don't know and we on BRF are wrong
or
2. We are right and the security apparatus of India is delusional, ignorant and negligent

[ShauryaT]

2. We are right and the security apparatus of India is delusional, ignorant and negligent

I hope you recognize that men such as Adm. Arun Prakash, who was COSC and hence part of the NCA chain, would not be giving a ear to those advocating tests, if these men of the security apparatus had adequate confidence in the type of arsenal provided to them. I think you are going overboard by the broad stroke polemics you have used above. The decision to maintain that S1 succeeded is done so by a narrow group of top weapon designers but doubted by the organization responsible to measure these tests. The views of the weapon designers has been upheld, IMO only because polity -across parties - finds that view more convenient. Historically, the uniformed personnel had been left so far out of the loop of nuclear decision making that it will take some time before they muster enough strength to question the designers and the polity masters themselves, officially. Higher defense management in India has much to be desired as you are well aware and policies on nuclear decisions, is no exception. You can potentially use the above adjectives on a range of policy issues, issues of procurement, integration, coordination. At the end of the day, the top policy makers of that time, will have to take the blame, if things go south. From my read, the users do have questions. Have they been asked officially is a matter of debate. This question came up in the video discussion, I posted in the previous page.

[alexis]

It is not PRC that is stopping India from testing. There has been an international consensus on avoiding all testing since well before 1998.

We have been through all this before. It has been said that two specific policies were aimed specifically at stopping India from developing a nuclear arsenal. The first was the declaration of the P5 as the only powers legitimately allowed to have nukes (a decision taken after 1974) The second was the stopping of all tests after 1992 or thereabouts, after allowing China and France to do a few more tests to perfect their arsenal.

No country had the guts to test after that until 1998 when India tested and that immediately made Pakis grow balls. Korea now is nearly out of control.

If India (or USA/Russia/China/UK/France) tests today, the feeling is that Pakistan, Korea and Iran will definitely start testing. After that it will get more and more difficult to prevent capable countries from testing out of fear. There is a sort of loose international order that has been established and India does not only not have the guts to break it, but India has also signed agreements on the supply of nuclear fuel for reactors in exchange for not testing.

India ain't gonna test anytime soon.

It is also in India's interest to prevent new nuclear states. So India will not test further giving an opportunity for newbies

[shiv]

I hope you recognize that men such as Adm. Arun Prakash, who was COSC and hence part of the NCA chain, would not be giving a ear to those advocating tests, if these men of the security apparatus had adequate confidence in the type of arsenal provided to them. I think you are going overboard by the broad stroke polemics you have used above.

Shaurya, I may have information that is not publicly available. That does not mean my information is correct. It could be all smoke and mirrors. Part of a much bigger game of bluff played by everyone in the loop.

But there are only two possibilities: one or zero

One: We have a deterrent
Zero: We have no deterrent

1. If we have a deterrent the need to test is to change the nature and efficacy of the deterrent
2. If we have no deterrent the need to test is because we do not have any deterrent

If the need to test is declared unnecesary the reasons could be:
1. The political-economic cost of testing is considered too high
2. The deterrent is perfect and/or it's all a big bluff

The point I want to make is to ask what in your view, or in anyone else's view is a "sufficient deterrent"?
If a deterrent is called "insufficient", how does it constitute a deterrent?

[ramdas]

I do not think it is a one or zero question: a deterrent based on 20kt weapons also raises the cost an adversary would have to pay if that adversary is about to have its way on our core strategic interests (for example, if the adversary threatens the territorial integrity of the nation). That cost will certainly deter the adversary to some extent.

However, only a deterrent with weapons of adequate demonstrated yield will raise the above cost to an extent where such an adversary will never think of trampling on our core strategic interests. Therefore the need for testing. For example, with 20 kt weapons on our side, PRC stands to lose large parts of just one city in return for destroying us as a civilization. This means that they can control the escalation of any conflict. This will change once we have a sufficient number of medium yield (200-300kt) thermonuclear weapons that can be fitted on MIRVed ballistic missiles.

To some extent, the establishment seems to understand this: hence the development of missiles like A-V with heavy payloads. But this has to be taken to its logical conclusion: i.e, we must have a number of MIRV-equipped A-V (with thermonuclear warheads) deployed by the end of this decade. Maybe they are relying on computer simulations, etc for now. But simulations become credible only when we have sufficient data from successful tests.

Hence, the sooner we stop paying respect to international taboos like no testing, the better. a few nuclear newbies like Iran do not affect the deterrent equation as far as we are concerned. Further, does anyone here seriously think that our not testing will restrain North Korea from testing (thereby giving an avenue for TSP to obtain better nukes: probably higher yield 100kt+ boosted fission/thermonuclear weapons as time progresses).

One red line certainly should be: if North Korea tests, we test as well.

[shiv]

However, only a deterrent with weapons of adequate demonstrated yield will raise the above cost to an extent where such an adversary will never think of trampling on our core strategic interests. Therefore the need for testing. For example, with 20 kt weapons on our side, PRC stands to lose large parts of just one city in return for destroying us as a civilization. This means that they can control the escalation of any conflict. This will change once we have a sufficient number of medium yield (200-300kt) thermonuclear weapons that can be fitted on MIRVed ballistic missiles.

To some extent, the establishment seems to understand this: hence the development of missiles like A-V with heavy payloads. But this has to be taken to its logical conclusion: i.e, we must have a number of MIRV-equipped A-V (with thermonuclear warheads) deployed by the end of this decade. Maybe they are relying on computer simulations, etc for now. But simulations become credible only when we have sufficient data from successful tests.

What you are saying is that if war starts tomorrow we will have no idea whether our "core strategic interests" will be threatened or not. And if it turns out that they are threatened, we do not have a sufficient deterrent

In short what you are saying is that the deterrent is insufficient. I am saying that an insufficient deterrent is no deterrent.

No point beating about the bush. I am unable to see the difference between a deterrent that goes half way and no deterrent. So the argument that is being made by you, ShauryaT and Karnad is that India has no deterrent. To my mind the next question is why any missiles are being developed. The possibility is that the whole thing is a bluff.

In some ways this only means that if a war turns nuclear tomorrow, we will lose the minute the first nuke is lobbed at us because our civilization can be destroyed and we cannot destroy the other civilization. Our deterrence will be sufficient only if we can destroy the other's civilization even if we are totally destroyed in the process.

Let me not argue with you about destroying civilizations, but I was personally not very convinced by Bharat Karnad's arguments about macho megaton nukes versus puny kiloton nukes. I have stated my views before but if you assume a war in which India lobs thirty 20 kiloton nukes at 15 cities in China and China lobs one hundred 200 kiloton nukes at 40 Indian cities who has won?

What is the reasoning which is used to declare victory and defeat?

If the other party has the ability to destroy our civilization why would that party feel safe and happy when they are threatened with even 20 or 30 puny nukes? What is the sense of victory and satisfaction that the other party gains by destroying the Indian civilization at the cost say 20 million dead and 10 cities destroyed or unlivable? The argument here is that the ability to destroy the other civilization is a deterrent, but the loss of 10 or 15 cities is not a deterrent. How does that calculus work? I have never managed to figure that one out.

[shiv]

If someone is willing to bite I would like to talk about a "small nuclear war" between India and China. I am talking about the possibility that there is a border war initiated by China, and Indian conventional forces overwhelm Chinese forces and grab huge chunks of Chinese territory. The Chinese use tactical nuclear weapons to eliminate Indian forces. India responds by nuking two Chinese cities. China nukes two cities Guwahati and Kolkata. Due to international pressure the the war ends there. Who has won?

If you look at at further escalation, India responds by launching everything it can, nuking 15 Chinese cities with 75 nukes. China then nukes 75 Indian cities and towns with 200 nukes. Who wins?

Let me take this a bit further. Imagine India develops 500 kt TN weapons and had 200 weapons to spare for China. India responds to a nulear attack by nuking 100 Chinese cities. China responds by nuking 130 Indian cities and towns. Who has won?

[nakul]

Sorry to butt in, but these nos are meaningless as the person who orders the firing of missiles will not know how powerful the retaliation will be. He can only guess. For a bystander, both lose.

[shiv]

Sorry to butt in, but these nos are meaningless as the person who orders the firing of missiles will not know how powerful the retaliation will be. He can only guess.

Excellent point IMO.

That is why India cannot stop at nuking 2 Chinese cities. If India or Indian forces are nuked , India is bound to launch all 75 or 100 "puny" 20 kiloton nukes at selected Chinese targets. That means - for example - 30 to 50 Chinese cities will get one or more 20 kiloton hits each.

Let's say China responds with 300 nukes on 150 cities/towns.

Has China won?

[nakul]

Has China won?

Bakis win even when one mujahid is left standing. Is it same for the Chinese?

[ShauryaT]

But there are only two possibilities: one or zero

One: We have a deterrent
Zero: We have no deterrent

I think we have had this debate before. A deterrent exists in the eyes of the beholder. Now, one can argue endlessly on what deters PRC and TSP. There is no perfect knowledge on what will deter the enemy for a given set of risks and threats. The ranges vary widely in the Indian context with some happy with 20 to some wanting 800 warheads and of varying yields. So, take your pick. My pick is to match PRC in quantity and quality and this is being conservative, for a realistic match would be to combing PRC+TSP arsenals and match those. An aggressive posture would be to hold the capability to fight a nuclear war with both. Anything less than the conservative estimates is tantamount to showing weakness, IMO - which is what our posture unfortunately conveys - weakness.

I do not know where you want to go with all of this. We have had much of this debate before and as fas as I am concerned, have read enough to make up my mind. I wish we were in a position to sit with PRC and TSP and jointly reduce our arsenals in a regional setting but until that happens, matching PRC is my pick. Why? IMO, what will deter PRC is the conviction that they will get back in kind as much as they can inflict and to me this is what will deter PRC in most scenarios.

One can come up with multiple scenarios by definition of the insane variety, for that is what this game is. The above IMO, will keep matters the most sane.

[shyamd]

Don't forget PRC's weakness - the 3 Gorges dams. If we take them out, mainland PRC will be in big trouble.

[ShauryaT]

Don't forget PRC's weakness - the 3 Gorges dams. If we take them out, mainland PRC will be in big trouble.

Sanity is the first victim of a nuclear war. If it comes to it, best not to assume a counter force or limited counter value to achieve deterrence, it would be highly optimistic. MAD was the cold war response to this insanity, I pray we in the region never go to those levels. However, whatever levels are in the region, GoI should match them. What deters is strength. The question then becomes, how much strength does one have to have to achieve this deterrence. The second question is can we afford it?

[shiv]

There is no perfect knowledge on what will deter the enemy for a given set of risks and threats. The ranges vary widely in the Indian context with some happy with 20 to some wanting 800 warheads and of varying yields. So, take your pick. My pick is to match PRC in quantity and quality and this is being conservative, for a realistic match would be to combing PRC+TSP arsenals and match those. An aggressive posture would be to hold the capability to fight a nuclear war with both. Anything less than the conservative estimates is tantamount to showing weakness, IMO - which is what our posture unfortunately conveys - weakness.

That is the entire problem as far as I can tell. If the posture conveys weakness then deterrence could fail with any number of weapons.

I am not arguing about numbers but merely saying that the posture counts for a lot. Numbers don't make up for posture.

The biggest reason for testing thermonuclear bombs is not yield. One can get 80 to 100 kt, even 200 kt from boosted fission, but there are a lot of savings of fissile material in TN. You get a lot more nukes with a lot less Pu if you can have reliable TNs. The fact that bangs will be bigger is a side effect, not the primary concern.

I recall reading that the same 12 fission kiloton trigger is used in a whole lot of US nuclear warheads from 200 kt to a megaton. Getting that standardization and dial a yield capability would be a good reason to test. Not to show resolve or demonstrate capability to have a 1 MT yield. The fact that China tested 1 MT is not the issue. If China has tested 100 kt TN weapons that means they can make a little fissile material go a long way. Megaton weapons are no more scary than kiloton weapons. But the technological capability offers a numerical advantage.

The number of nukes India has is limited by fissile material availability. We may never be able to match China given our stocks. But within those limits, TN would give us more numbers than fission or boosted fission. I am personally not convinced about the utility of reactor grade weapons. They are usable but apparently tend to pre detonate and cause fizzles. They are OK to fluff up numbers but I am not at all sure if one can get a guaranteed yield of more than 2-5 kilotons. I don't know. Even 2 kilotons can wipe out an airbase but nuclear posture depends on what one has. If we have 50 reactor grade warheads of 2 -5 kt then they will have to be reserved for specific targets.

[ShauryaT]

You are largely right. But, if I have to nitpick, I would say, Numbers alone do not make up for posture, but numbers are still important.

A TN warhead provides not only yield efficacies but also provides a more reliable and more destructive bang for the buck, if mated to MIRV missiles. MIRV is the replacement for the MT class, which can be few and far between for fortified C^3 centers. PRC tested their MIRV vehicle recently, they have already tested the warhead for it in 96 time frame.

Also agree cannot fill up numbers through RG bombs. A credible TN arsenal is essential for a credible deterrence for India, IMO.

[abhik]

....
In some ways this only means that if a war turns nuclear tomorrow, we will lose the minute the first nuke is lobbed at us because our civilization can be destroyed and we cannot destroy the other civilization. Our deterrence will be sufficient only if we can destroy the other's civilization even if we are totally destroyed in the process.

Let me not argue with you about destroying civilizations, but I was personally not very convinced by Bharat Karnad's arguments about macho megaton nukes versus puny kiloton nukes. I have stated my views before but if you assume a war in which India lobs thirty 20 kiloton nukes at 15 cities in China and China lobs one hundred 200 kiloton nukes at 40 Indian cities who has won?

What is the reasoning which is used to declare victory and defeat?

If the other party has the ability to destroy our civilization why would that party feel safe and happy when they are threatened with even 20 or 30 puny nukes? What is the sense of victory and satisfaction that the other party gains by destroying the Indian civilization at the cost say 20 million dead and 10 cities destroyed or unlivable? The argument here is that the ability to destroy the other civilization is a deterrent, but the loss of 10 or 15 cities is not a deterrent. How does that calculus work? I have never managed to figure that one out.

Obviously when a country has decided to use nukes against an enemy it knows will retaliate with the same has already accepted the potential losses of taking such a course. I get the feeling that your thoughts on this subject seem to begin at deterrence and finish at a nuclear exchange. Is that really the the end of the story, something like a fairy tail "and-they-lived-happily-ever-after"? No nuclear exchange between India, Pakistan and China is going to wipe out the entire population, industrial and Military(or anything close to it) given the relatively low number and mostly lower yield weapons. So what happens to the ones that are left? How will they cope with their situation? What will they do next with the strength they have left?
You think that after a nuclear exchange between India and China or pakistan which leaves us militarily much weaker, they are just going to stay put at their current positions? I expect the Chinese might try colonizing large parts India, expeling or enslaving the Indians from there and pakistani marauders raping and pillaging all they can. Would you follow a nuclear strategy that might leave leave your countrymen in such a plight?
So I feel there is quite a difference between and lobbing "50,000-killer" bombs on a few of the enemy cities and "turning the surface of their land to glass".

[shiv]

A TN warhead provides not only yield efficacies but also provides a more reliable and more destructive bang for the buck, if mated to MIRV missiles. MIRV is the replacement for the MT class, which can be few and far between for fortified C^3 centers. PRC tested their MIRV vehicle recently, they have already tested the warhead for it in 96 time frame.

Also agree cannot fill up numbers through RG bombs. A credible TN arsenal is essential for a credible deterrence for India, IMO.

`
Small quibble here Shaurya. In the absence of testing fission warheads are more likely to be reliable. TN warheads require more testing and refinement because of more exacting conditions. So plain fission makes sense for a "rough and ready" arsenal that can reliably produce some bang.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv ji: I did not write well. I was using the word reliable in context of delivery of the warheads mated to MIRV's to overcome BMD.

[shiv]

No nuclear exchange between India, Pakistan and China is going to wipe out the entire population, industrial and Military(or anything close to it) given the relatively low number and mostly lower yield weapons. So what happens to the ones that are left? How will they cope with their situation? What will they do next with the strength they have left?
You think that after a nuclear exchange between India and China or pakistan which leaves us militarily much weaker, they are just going to stay put at their current positions? I expect the Chinese might try colonizing large parts India, expeling or enslaving the Indians from there and pakistani marauders raping and pillaging all they can. Would you follow a nuclear strategy that might leave leave your countrymen in such a plight?
.

What you are doing in this post is adding one more factor to the two that have already come up

1. Deterrence - By definition deterrence is avoidance of nuclear war
2. Nuclear war == failure of deterrence
3. Post nuclear war situation - this is what you are talking about in the above post

Deterrence is one thing

Nuclear war that can comes when deterrence fails means inflicting maximum damage on an adversary as per Indian nuclear doctrine. The threat of that damage is what is supposed to be the deterrent. If the threat of that damage does not deter, then there is no deterrence.

So while the topic of what happens after nuclear war is interesting the thread is about how to deter. That is how to ensure that a nation that receives whatever nukes India has is incapable of continuing a war and colonizing because the damage inflicted make it too costly to keep mobilizing and supporting occupying forces inside India.

I think that such a discussion cannot be complete without asking what cost is imposed by nuclear bombs on say ten major cities in any country. To what extent can any country take ten hits on ten cities and still mobilize national resources, keep up national morale and continue an invasion of India. Major war requires national effort, or else Somalia would be a superpower, so the damage imposed on a nation need s to be aimed at imposing such a high repair cost that continuing war becomes impossible as the dying and injured in paralysed cities demand relief rather than contributing to the war effort and war economy

I see no public debate on such issues anywhere in India while these issues were thrashed out at length in the US and USSR 50 years ago.

[ShauryaT]

abhik's post reminded me of a thread Shiv ji had on dealing with the aftermath.

[shiv]

I think that no country with nuclear weapons that faces a nuclear threat can afford to remain blinkered about the effects of nuclear war.

Deterrence is invariably a psychological exercise. The infamous pisko. Deterrence is about deterring the other fellow and in order to deter him one must have a very good idea of what nuclear weapons can do and how they can best be used to put the adversary's ability to wage war out of action in a matter of days.

The ability to wage war is dependent on a few important factors

-leadership
-people who support that leadership and go and either fight the war or otherwise support war
-supply of fuel, food and war materiel
-national morale of a people who are ready to face the physical and economic consequences of war

An industrial center that is churning our war supplies on a "war footing" assumes the security of the people there and their ability to keep going to work every day and work in their factories, while they get their food, water and sanitary facilties. The leadership too depend on similar basic needs. And although a core leadership may hide in underground bunkers, the vast majority of the supporting population cannot be accommodated in bunkers.

If you blast the economic center of an industrial city, the city will be inundated with dead, dying and homeless people. Even if large parts of the city retain their power supply and water supply figures like 50,000 dead and 100,000 wounded frm a "puny" Hiroshima sized bomb cannot be ignored. The leadership hiding in some underground bunker will have to have remarkable control on their people if they can get the surviving people of a city of say 2 or 3 million people to ignore the dead and dying and bypass the inconveniences of several square kilometers of destroyed city and simply carry on producing war material for a war that is taking place thousands on kilometers away.

People will have lost relatives and friends. Children will not be sent to school and families will stay together or start searching for survivors among the wounded who pour into intact areas of the city. Those who can escape will escape and clog the roads out of the city. The homeless and thirsty near the periphery of the blast will loot whatever is available if they are hungry and thirsty and a separate security apparatus (eg Home guards) will be needed to check that.

All in all a wounded city will need more care rather than provide war support, How many cities must one take out like this before the soldiers on the frontline start seeing a loss of support from the rear lines? Before they hear that they may have lost their loved ones who they thought were safe? Fighting war to capture territory after 20 of of your own major cities have been nuked requires a degree of preplanning that ensures that every city can ignore and survive a nuclear bomb hit. That means telling people to be ready to be nuked while the nation fights a war. Only the US did that in the 50s and 60s. No one else has done that, and any nation that prepares its population for life after nuclear war is preparing to fight a nuclear war. But the damage that is done must ensure that the country suffers a great deal.

Unfortunately ideas like "glass parking lot" fall in the genre of smart American jargon like "Rolling Thunder" and "Highway of Death". The terminology sounds deadly but may not be either feasible, effective or desirable. To make a country suffer, you have to leave people alive so they can enjoy the deaths and mayhem that they get from nuclear bombs as a result of the war they have supported. They must wish they had never started the war. Killing everyone just does not cut it.

[Aditya_V]

Personally, Deterence for Chinese and Pakis, is only if India is able to take 95% of thier population in a matter of hours and still has Nukes to deter the world. And blackmail to hand thier relatives and children in UK and USA for execuetion. a few dozen missiles will not deter them.

[shiv]

Personally, Deterence for Chinese and Pakis, is only if India is able to take 95% of thier population in a matter of hours and still has Nukes to deter the world. And blackmail to hand thier relatives and children in UK and USA for execuetion. a few dozen missiles will not deter them.

So in your view deterrence does not exist as of now.

[Aditya_V]

Yes, thats why they really don't care enough about provoking us, We will not freely export Nukes and Delivery systems to say Vietnam like they do to Pakistan because they deterrence against us. If they belive we have enough weapons to wipe 95% of thier populations in a few minutes and this could result from one of thier Tallen and Deepen than the friends lobbying such a weapon at them, you will see thier support to Paki terrorism, Paki Missiles, Nukes and Delivery system Vanish.

As of now Chinese belive we are not strong enough.

While it is clear they have enough deterrence against us, we do not have enough deterence against them. Hence, the provocation is one sided.

Even with Pakis, if we have enough of Miltary power to take down fighting ability of thier navy and airforce within 4 hours, and take out many of missile launchers quickly, thier leadership will backpeddle on provoking us.

Thats why the F-16 BVR's hurt us so much and those who sold it knew it.

[nakul]

Just a little tip while considering deterrence. Deterrence is not just nuclear forces, a strong conventional military acts as a very good deterrence too. In most wars, nukes will not be involved. Conventional deterrence has to break down before nuclear deterrence breaks.

[shiv]

If they belive we have enough weapons to wipe 95% of thieer populations in a few minutes and this could result from one of thier Tallen and Deepen than the friends lobbying such a weapon at them, you will see thier support to Paki terrorism, Paki Missiles, Nukes and Delivery system Vanish.

Interesting. It seems that what you call as deterrence and what i understand as deterrence are completely different.

You are saying that if we have a certain nuclear capability, then Pakistan and China will both become scared of provoking us even in the conventional field - let alone nuclear provocation. They would simply be too scared of nuclear retaliation and even non nuclear provocation like terrorism would vanish. So you believe that building up a nuclear arsenal will deter non nuclear conflict/provocation.

I have always understood nuclear deterrence as deterring nuclear war but not necessarily conventional war.

In the cold war it was assumed that nuclear weapons would deter conventional war, but that is not true because China and the USSR have fought a border war. India and Pakistan have fought in Kargil. Vietnam was not deterred from fighting with China, and Argentina was not deterred from fighting with Britain. So clearly in a whole lot of cases, the presence of nuclear weapons in someone's arsenal has not stopped conventional conflict.

[shiv]

Just a little tip while considering deterrence. Deterrence is not just nuclear forces, a strong conventional military acts as a very good deterrence too. In most wars, nukes will not be involved. Conventional deterrence has to break down before nuclear deterrence breaks.

Yes. This corresponds to what I believe.

[Aditya_V]

If they belive we have enough weapons to wipe 95% of thieer populations in a few minutes and this could result from one of thier Tallen and Deepen than the friends lobbying such a weapon at them, you will see thier support to Paki terrorism, Paki Missiles, Nukes and Delivery system Vanish.

Interesting. It seems that what you call as deterrence and what i understand as deterrence are completely different.

You are saying that if we have a certain nuclear capability, then Pakistan and China will both become scared of provoking us even in the conventional field - let alone nuclear provocation. They would simply be too scared of nuclear retaliation and even non nuclear provocation like terrorism would vanish. So you believe that building up a nuclear arsenal will deter non nuclear conflict/provocation.

I have always understood nuclear deterrence as deterring nuclear war but not necessarily conventional war.

In the cold war it was assumed that nuclear weapons would deter conventional war, but that is not true because China and the USSR have fought a border war. India and Pakistan have fought in Kargil. Vietnam was not deterred from fighting with China, and Argentina was not deterred from fighting with Britain. So clearly in a whole lot of cases, the presence of nuclear weapons in someone's arsenal has not stopped conventional conflict.

If I am right part of reason for Argentina's loss was also a threat from UK about a Nuke attack from Margerat Thachther which made made the Agosta missiles useless. That is not to say Argentina did not suffer other convential losses, but the Nuke factor was a part of the the surrender. Even today Argentina is constrained by this

Argentina accuses UK of deploying nuclear weapons near Falkland Islands

Thatcher 'threatened to nuke Argentina'

Margaret Thatcher forced François Mitterrand to give her the codes to disable Argentina's deadly French-made missiles during the Falklands war by threatening to launch a nuclear warhead against Buenos Aires

"Excuse me. I had a difference to settle with the Iron Lady. That Thatcher, what an impossible woman!" the president said as he arrived, more than 45 minutes late, on May 7 1982. "With her four nuclear submarines in the south Atlantic, she's threatening to unleash an atomic weapon against Argentina if I don't provide her with the secret codes that will make the missiles we sold the Argentinians deaf and blind." He reminded Mr Magoudi that on May 4 an Exocet missile had struck HMS Sheffield. "To make matters worse, it was fired from a Super-Etendard jet," he said. "All the matériel was French!"

T

In the late 1990's Russia's convential forces were in a mess, but both China and NATO which tested its Nuclear detterence capability with a Polaris test from Norway's cost were dettered enough not to take them on directly. Nor did Japan try to take away the 2 islands disputed by it. The reason Philipines, Japan, South Korea take on Chna on Border disputes is they feel they have the US nuke umbrella protecting them.

Shiv ji, please see my post again, the next para were I talk about conventional ability also. We need both, but giving us enough teeth on the Nuclear front is essential. Until then China will not feel the deterrence capability especially fromt he tempation of arming Pakistan like the USA.

[pentaiah]

also even if 0.000005 KT nuke is used its a nuke war and should be no holds bar fight to the finish
only that works as deterrence all else is bekaar utterance hence quantity and quality maal is required at all times.

[Aditya_V]

also even if 0.000005 KT nuke is used its a nuke war and should be no holds bar fight to the finish
only that works as deterrence all else is bekaar utterance hence quantity and quality maal is required at all times.

Only if the enemy belives that what is left of his nation is too much to risk it, i.e very few villagers in remote regions survive.

In the case of PRC, they should feel that with reasonable possibilty that there will be no Han CHinese left and in the case of Pakis we have enough Nukes left to first a) Wipe out TSP b) negotiate with Saudi, Doha, UAE US and UK to get thier relatives of thier elite extradited and executed.

That will deter them from using Nukes, to keep other threats w.r.t TSP we need to show formidable convential superiority that thier airforce, Naval assets, artillery, missile launchers will be taken out and they will left to counting body parts of thier soldiers from aerial attacks.

Such a situation is what is required to achive lasting peace in the subcontinent.

[ShauryaT]

In the Asian region, between Asians, MAD does not apply, never has. Neither China wants destruction of India, and India does not of China and dare I say, neither does TSP of India or India of TSP.

[nakul]

^^^

MAD is for self destruction, not others. Ask whether China wants to destruct itself? Replace China with any other country.

[ShauryaT]

Nakul: Did not get your point?

[shiv]

If I am right part of reason for Argentina's loss was also a threat from UK about a Nuke attack from Margerat Thachther which made made the Agosta missiles useless. That is not to say Argentina did not suffer other convential losses, but the Nuke factor was a part of the the surrender. Even today Argentina is constrained by this
<snip>
The reason Philipines, Japan, South Korea take on Chna on Border disputes is they feel they have the US nuke umbrella protecting them.

Thanks for posting your views - they are educative for me in the sense that it shows that what I think and understand on an issue is not necessarily what others may think and understand.

The Argentina example shows that they may have worried about the nukes, but they seem to have had no such worries when they actually took over the islands. The worry started when Thatcher responded

As regards the Philippines, Japan SoKo etc - they have not actually fought wars but if they are challenging China because of US umbrella they are behaving like Pakistan - that is challenging a nuclear power because they have nuclear cover. The lesson from that could be that conventional war can be imposed if there are nukes in the background.

In every case the presence of nuclear weapons did not deter the challenging of a nuclear weapons power. This would support the idea that deterrence only deters the use of nuclear weapons, not conventional war.