Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

[chetak]

rohit,
what is structure/layout of missile squadron in iaf? no of launchers/loaders/radars etc? how are they deployed in wartime scenario (spread over a line xx km long or concentrated at a point or arranged in square like formation across xx * yy km)?
or is it too much to ask these details on public forum?

why do you need to know this??

[mody]

I have for long wondered how we can even leverage our supposed advantageous position on the Saltoro ridge to force a military solution to the siachen problem. This can help us reduce the number of troops and resources that we have to deploy to maintain our hold on the area. With the danger of two front war and of china attacking along the DBO axis to help the pakis in the siachen area and try and force a tri-nation boundary at KK pass, it is imperative that we think in terms of offensive action that we can take, that can put us on the western side of the saltoro ridge, make the paki presence at Gyari untenable and move the pakis a safe distance westwards. Offcourse the most ideal solution would be take control of all of Baltistan, so that siachen becomes a non-issue and we would be position to shut down KKH with artillery fire, whenever we want. This would also elevate some of the pressure that we are feeling from the Chinese in ladakh.

With Doval Doctrine, Baltistan makes perfect sense. present ANA skirmishes with Paki may move toward GB from Afghan side. GB is in revolt and now many J& K expatriate groups are gunning after Paki on SM etc. With new Chopper power,we can bring the heavy guns in Siachen field and bury Paki for ever there on cold heights.

I guess a partial answer to my question is that the solution is control of all of Baltistan and not just getting to the other side of the Saltoro ridge.
We may be able to destroy Gyari and make all other paki posts on the Saltoro ridge and adjoining areas untenable, but then we won't be able to occupy those areas either. Our position on the west of the saltoro ridge and the lower areas to the west, would be sitting ducks against any paki action from their side. The pakis would be able to move back to the areas that we had removed them from, unless we continue to maintain the same level of troops on the Saltoro ridge, with the enhanced fire power, that we would have employed in removing the pakis from the region. This would mean no real gains for us.

The only real solution to the siachen issue and also many other issues in extreme north J&K is to take full control of Baltistan. Gilgit might be much more difficult, plus our forces would get really stretched. But Baltistan should be possible, with the right amount of planning and strategizing. Hope Doval is able to seal a deal with the dragon to let the status quo be converted to defacto border. Then we can try to lure the tactically brilliant pakis to try another kargil, giving us the opportunity to open up the Kargil-Skardu road. I believe there also existed an old Srinagar-Skardu road. The same could be opened in due time.

[member_29190]

This is bit of a wild imagination, wonder if it practical to create a missile with say 2 ton warhead( clustered).

A 150 KM missile with 2 ton payload. A cruise missile delivers 300KG. 2 ton with clustered 300KG warhead would do it more efficiently instead of 6 CM.

Imagine one( or 6) of these falling on a airbase or troop concentration.

[member_29190]

Is it possible to mass produce these and deploy along the borders of Tibet? Since they are cheap light but highly accurate with "sophisticated inertial navigation and electro-mechanical actuation system" in large numbers they destroy chineez infrstructure and halt their movements?

Until 2 Mountain Strike Corps are raised?

It should be inducted in hundreds( if not thousand), even if MSC is raised. The tibetian flatlands is perfect for targeting Chinese troop concentration.
On the other hand, given our areas are mountains, the PLA cannot retaliate in kind. They have to use PLA-AF.

This is similar to how Houtis in Yemen are targetting Saudi areas from their mountainous hideout.

It is perfect for the Chinese front. It will gives us the much needed force equalizier.

[adityadange]

I guess a partial answer to my question is that the solution is control of all of Baltistan and not just getting to the other side of the Saltoro ridge.
We may be able to destroy Gyari and make all other paki posts on the Saltoro ridge and adjoining areas untenable, but then we won't be able to occupy those areas either. Our position on the west of the saltoro ridge and the lower areas to the west, would be sitting ducks against any paki action from their side. The pakis would be able to move back to the areas that we had removed them from, unless we continue to maintain the same level of troops on the Saltoro ridge, with the enhanced fire power, that we would have employed in removing the pakis from the region. This would mean no real gains for us.

The only real solution to the siachen issue and also many other issues in extreme north J&K is to take full control of Baltistan. Gilgit might be much more difficult, plus our forces would get really stretched. But Baltistan should be possible, with the right amount of planning and strategizing. Hope Doval is able to seal a deal with the dragon to let the status quo be converted to defacto border. Then we can try to lure the tactically brilliant pakis to try another kargil, giving us the opportunity to open up the Kargil-Skardu road. I believe there also existed an old Srinagar-Skardu road. The same could be opened in due time.

Mody sir,
why do we need to stay in the vally of gyari area? at the risk of being labeled as BRF's crazy king, let me propose an alternative.
one axis of our forces will climb down saltoro into gyari. another axis will head from turtuk towards khaplu and cut paki reinforcements to gyari(google maps shows there exist a road from turtuk to khaplu via tyakshi-thang-franao-hassanabad chorbat). then the axis coming from siachen would hold positions on peaks of haldi-hushe-Masherbrum line in POK and extend to indira col. i am not at all sure what strategic and tactical advantages this would bring to us but
1. the area around haldi-hushe line seem less snowy than saltoro so our troops may get better conditions
2. it may free few peaks near batalik if we control hassanabad chorbat
in short, what i am suggesting is to shift the defense line towards west by some 30-40 km
disclaimer: i havent considered at all if this is practically possible/feasible. this is only a theory.

[adityadange]

rohit,
what is structure/layout of missile squadron in iaf? no of launchers/loaders/radars etc? how are they deployed in wartime scenario (spread over a line xx km long or concentrated at a point or arranged in square like formation across xx * yy km)?
or is it too much to ask these details on public forum?

why do you need to know this??

i dont need to but i want to.

[shiv]

rohit,
what is structure/layout of missile squadron in iaf? no of launchers/loaders/radars etc? how are they deployed in wartime scenario (spread over a line xx km long or concentrated at a point or arranged in square like formation across xx * yy km)?
or is it too much to ask these details on public forum?

Here is some info from a brochure

[vaibhav.n]

The Surface Clearance Device (SCD) clears surface laid mines and threats found within the path of the full width of the vehicle, from roads, tracks and rough terrain to produce a cleared route for follow-on vehicles. Independent segments of a full width blade follow the ground contours to move threats wide and clear of the vehicle. The SCD is fitted with a Full Width Mine Disrupter System (FWMDS) which is designed to tumble and detonate any tilt mines encountered, increasing overall protection and maximising operational efficiency. An Magnetic System Duplicator (MSD) can be fitted to help protect the equipment from the effect of magnetic influence fused mines.

The product is battle proven and is in service with, amongst others, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force and the Swiss, Spanish, Swedish, Norwegian and Chilean Armed Forces.

Working in partnership with Bharat Earth Moving Limited (BEML) based in Bangalore, Pearson Engineering has been successful at recent Indian Army trials for the selection of a Surface Mine Clearance System‎ for the clearance of surface laid mines and other ordnance. The Indian Army will operate the system on their BMP tracked infantry fighting vehicles.

The contract between the Indian Ministry of Defence and BEML was signed in March 2016 for the delivery of 41 complete sets, with first deliveries scheduled to commence this year.

http://www.pearson-eng.com/pearson-engi ... urosatory/

[ramana]

nit, A 300 kg warhead will have about 50% explosive and other than deeply buried or widely dispersed targets will be destroyed. Key is a reliable fuze that works all the time. Cluster bombs look good but even the 300 kg warhead packed with say 5kg bomb-lets would take care of widely dispersed targets.
Think of targets as point or area targets.

[nachiket]

And takes away that much burden from IAF. In fact, I don't see why IAF should not have 9-10 Prahaar Regiments or Squadrons as part of overall strike matrix.

How would the IAF use it? It has half the range of Brahmos, and it is a tactical missile that would need to be deployed closer to the battlefield and move with the forces as they advance. Makes sense to be under Army control only.

[Lalmohan]

cluster bombs are illegal?

[nachiket]

cluster bombs are illegal?

India hasn't signed that treaty. Neither have the US or China AFAIK.

[member_29190]

When I say cluster, i mean cluster of weapons: cluster bombs, pgm, IRNS guided glide weapons etc.

The idea is to deliver heavy load over an area of concentration in the shortest possible time.

Easier than producing 6 CM or delivering it through aircrafts.

[mody]

I guess a partial answer to my question is that the solution is control of all of Baltistan and not just getting to the other side of the Saltoro ridge.
We may be able to destroy Gyari and make all other paki posts on the Saltoro ridge and adjoining areas untenable, but then we won't be able to occupy those areas either. Our position on the west of the saltoro ridge and the lower areas to the west, would be sitting ducks against any paki action from their side. The pakis would be able to move back to the areas that we had removed them from, unless we continue to maintain the same level of troops on the Saltoro ridge, with the enhanced fire power, that we would have employed in removing the pakis from the region. This would mean no real gains for us.

The only real solution to the siachen issue and also many other issues in extreme north J&K is to take full control of Baltistan. Gilgit might be much more difficult, plus our forces would get really stretched. But Baltistan should be possible, with the right amount of planning and strategizing. Hope Doval is able to seal a deal with the dragon to let the status quo be converted to defacto border. Then we can try to lure the tactically brilliant pakis to try another kargil, giving us the opportunity to open up the Kargil-Skardu road. I believe there also existed an old Srinagar-Skardu road. The same could be opened in due time.

Mody sir,
why do we need to stay in the vally of gyari area? at the risk of being labeled as BRF's crazy king, let me propose an alternative.
one axis of our forces will climb down saltoro into gyari. another axis will head from turtuk towards khaplu and cut paki reinforcements to gyari(google maps shows there exist a road from turtuk to khaplu via tyakshi-thang-franao-hassanabad chorbat). then the axis coming from siachen would hold positions on peaks of haldi-hushe-Masherbrum line in POK and extend to indira col. i am not at all sure what strategic and tactical advantages this would bring to us but
1. the area around haldi-hushe line seem less snowy than saltoro so our troops may get better conditions
2. it may free few peaks near batalik if we control hassanabad chorbat
in short, what i am suggesting is to shift the defense line towards west by some 30-40 km
disclaimer: i havent considered at all if this is practically possible/feasible. this is only a theory.

My original query was, if we can use our current tactical advantage in the siachen-Saltoro ridge area to completely remove the pakis from the area and thereby reduce our troop concentration and number posts significantly from this sector.
However, this seems difficult. Even if we remove the pakis from the western side of Saltoro ridge and from their staging area around Gyari, we will have to continue to maintain the same level of troop concentration and number of posts to keep them at bay. In fact both would need to be increased, in order to keep the pakis from staging a comeback.
Also, a way to reduce the number of posts on the forbidding heights of saltoro ridge would be, that we occupy some of the posts that we seize from the pakis and also the area around Gyari. However, these posts and camps would be very vulnerable from arty fire from the paki side and we would not be able to defend the area. They have direct access to the area, whereas our main concentration would be on the eastern side of Saltoro ridge.
Hence, any operation to remove the pakis from siachen-saltoro sector in general, would not yield any real benefits, unless the operation is continued to the point, where we capture Skardu and all of Baltistan. This should be the aim, not just to solve the siachen problem but, also to be able to target the KKH and checkmate the Chinese designs in the area, which is much more important.

[mody]

And takes away that much burden from IAF. In fact, I don't see why IAF should not have 9-10 Prahaar Regiments or Squadrons as part of overall strike matrix.

How would the IAF use it? It has half the range of Brahmos, and it is a tactical missile that would need to be deployed closer to the battlefield and move with the forces as they advance. Makes sense to be under Army control only.

Agree on this point. Prahar makes much more sense for the Army then the airforce. Its a mobile unit, that can move with the army columns. Also, its not that airbases and ammo dumps can be attacked by the airforce alone and not the army. The army can very well use the prahar to target airbases and also radar installations.

[abhik]

BTW how many weapon systems currently in development are actually driven by the IA? One gets the impression that Prahar, Arjun, ATAGS, manportable ATGM, multi caliber rifle etc are all being developed by DRDO with ??? on the army involvement.

[ShauryaT]

http://www.claws.in/1587/rebalancing-and-resizing-the-army-brig-nk-bhatia.html

Two committees have been formed in the past few weeks to recommend policy reforms specifically relating to manpower issues of the Armed Forces. The first one is Defence Minister appointed committee headed by Lt Gen DB Sheketkar which will recommend measures to “Rebalance” defence allocation between revenue and capital expenditure and specifically recommend cutting down manpower without impacting the operational preparedness.The second committee ordered by Chief of Army Staff relates to “Right Size” the Army. As the name states it aims to study the teeth to tail ratio of all organizations and recommend rationalizing of manpower to achieve savings and balance revenue and capital expenditure......

Defence pay and allowances as percentage of Defence expenditure is 41.12 percent of budget, while Operations and Maintenance expenditure and Equipment Procurement and Infrastructure Construction expenditure was 15.26 percent and 43.62 percent of Defence Budget respectively in FY 2012-13.In case of the Army, expenditure on pay and allowances during FY 2012-13 was 65 percent of its revenue expenditure. The corresponding percentages for the Air Force and Navy were 46 percent and 43 percent respectively. ......

The need to carry out reforms at level of JCO’s needs to be seriously considered beginning with direct recruitment of a part of JCO’s through an all India competitive exam. There is an abundant supply of educationally and professionally qualified manpower available for direct recruitment at subordinate levels. ...

Similarly, induction of technically qualified JCOs would bring about a quantum change in the profile of technical arms/services......

[Viv S]

Deleted Image

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>

Unless the above came from open source, would request you to not post such official letters. OSA has the habit of attaching itself to most benign cases.

[adityadange]

My original query was, if we can use our current tactical advantage in the siachen-Saltoro ridge area to completely remove the pakis from the area and thereby reduce our troop concentration and number posts significantly from this sector.
However, this seems difficult. Even if we remove the pakis from the western side of Saltoro ridge and from their staging area around Gyari, we will have to continue to maintain the same level of troop concentration and number of posts to keep them at bay. In fact both would need to be increased, in order to keep the pakis from staging a comeback.
Also, a way to reduce the number of posts on the forbidding heights of saltoro ridge would be, that we occupy some of the posts that we seize from the pakis and also the area around Gyari. However, these posts and camps would be very vulnerable from arty fire from the paki side and we would not be able to defend the area. They have direct access to the area, whereas our main concentration would be on the eastern side of Saltoro ridge.
Hence, any operation to remove the pakis from siachen-saltoro sector in general, would not yield any real benefits, unless the operation is continued to the point, where we capture Skardu and all of Baltistan. This should be the aim, not just to solve the siachen problem but, also to be able to target the KKH and checkmate the Chinese designs in the area, which is much more important.

i guess now i got your point completely and agree with it. cutting gyari wont help unless we cut its logistic line from skardu or at least from khaplu.

[Khalsa]

<SNIP>

Unless the above came from open source, would request you to not post such official letters. OSA has the habit of attaching itself to most benign cases.

Rohit
whats OSA ?

Interesting letter by the way.
However its not uncommon... many times have seen much more happen.
Healthy Argument at best (the letter above).

[vaibhav.n]

OSA - Official Secrets Act

Rohit,
The are prestitutes whose speciality is getting confidential letters over watsapp and also on their blog. I agree with your point of view but this is small stuff.

http://manamanchhina.blogspot.nl/?m=1

90 Inf Bde is a peace location. Could have been pushed up during Op Vijay.

[rohitvats]

OSA - Official Secrets Act

Rohit,
The are prestitutes whose speciality is getting confidential letters over watsapp and also on their blog. I agree with your point of view but this is small stuff.
http://manamanchhina.blogspot.nl/?m=1
90 Inf Bde is a peace location. Could have been pushed up during Op Vijay.

Presstitutes are covered by the nature of their job and all that. Not you and me.

As for the blog, he is one mean, arrogant, rude and idiot of a fellow. Part of the same cabal which was running down VKS. Many like him are entertained by armed forces personnel as a matter of courtesy and professional relationship. But these chaps then start thinking of themselves as 'quasi-fauji' and start poking their noses into matters which concern inner working of the army and have nothing to do with journalism. Nor is their any requirement for many of these matters to be covered in the news or blogs in the first place. For some serving and retired army personnel, they serve as cat's paw. And end up hurting the institution of the army or defense services.

I remember him trying to brow-beat, along with Vishnu Som, supposedly a serving army officer on Twitter. Look at the stuff he's put up on his blog - there is no need for any or most of it to be in public domain.

And their being 'security or defense' correspondent involves only catching sound-bytes on this or that matter. Or using their contacts to tap into grape-vine. Otherwise, they don't know jack-shit about national security.

[nirav]

Once the document has been made public by the press, I doubt if civilians would be targeted under OSA for reading/discussing that document.

I also doubt that journos have a blanket immunity from OSA.

[rohitvats]

Once the document has been made public by the press, I doubt if civilians would be targeted under OSA for reading/discussing that document.

I also doubt that journos have a blanket immunity from OSA.

I'm referring to a situation where 'we' share a document like this. Sharing something already in public domain I think is OK.

[nirav]

Yes you are right. We have no business obtaining and sharing such information and if one does he must face action.
The letter posted by Viv S, if obtained by him personally,would be a violation.
If obtained from the web,which is probably what happened,i doubt if its a violation in principle of OSA.

Anyway, now that its gone makes no sense to discuss it.

[Khalsa]

he is wanna be Rohit.
His thirst to be a defence reporter must be so little that he must have fizzled out soon.

how do you compensate ? by finding something that is provocative but totally unrelated.... hence his silly blog posting of internal army stuff..

[nits]

Interesting Data - How pay, pensions and sloth eat up India’s defence funds ( Source - IDRW)

[ramana]

How does GOI allocate budget for its retirees? Does each ministry carry the funds allocated for the retirees?
Maybe time for India to create a Dept. of Veterans and put the pensions in that ministry.

[nits]

Ramana Sir - That will me more of an accounting change... Real change will be either

1) Pays and Pensions does not get calculated as part of Defence Budget
2) As you said above have separate Ministry \ department but dont take its budget again from Defence Budget

At end of day its more about having that extra money. Also i heard \ read MP interview and he said Defence Budget is not made based on current requirement of Armed forces as whatever we plan to buy we will pay for them in next 2-3 years as whole process takes that long... Current year budget will be for payments which are due this year for contracts signed 1-3 years back...

Current demands and there payments will be provisioned in future budget where there payment due date lies...

[Raja Bose]

Yes you are right. We have no business obtaining and sharing such information and if one does he must face action.
The letter posted by Viv S, if obtained by him personally,would be a violation.
If obtained from the web,which is probably what happened,i doubt if its a violation in principle of OSA.

Anyway, now that its gone makes no sense to discuss it.

The image in question was deleted after it didn't yield any results on Google image search. Such things are best not shared here even if they have been originally 'leaked' by somebody else.

[nirav]

^ok.

@Viv S : where did you get it from ?

[wig]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation ... 55641.html
Top level changes in Army on cards

As changes in the Army’s top hierarchy are on the cards following the retirement of senior officers, two Lieutenant Generals have proceeded on leave because the government is still to decide their new assignments even though posting orders of officers selected to replace them have already been issued.
Sources said Lt Gen Bipin Rawat, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, is tipped to take over as the new Vice-Chief when the incumbent, Lt Gen MMS Rai, retires at the end of next month.
While the posting orders are yet to be issued, two names are doing the rounds to take over as the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, from Lt Gen KJ Singh. These are Lt Gen DR Soni, an Armoured Corps officer who till now was commanding the Bathinda-based 10 Corps, and Lt Gen Surinder Singh, a Guards officer commanding 33 Corps in the north-east.
Lt Gen Ashwini Kumar, an Army Air Defence Corps officer, has been appointed as the General Officer Commanding, 10 Corps, in place of Lt Gen Soni. Lt Gen Soni and Lt Gen PS Mehta, GOC, 21 Corps in Bhopal, have been “sent” on leave for about a month till the government decides their new postings.
Officers appointed to replace Lt Gen Soni and Lt Gen Mehta, who have been attached to Headquarters South Western Command and Army Headquarters, are expected to assume charge this week. While Lt Gen Soni is expected to be elevated as an Army Commander, Lt Gen Mehta is tipped to get a staff appointment.
Army sources said that it is not unusual for officers to be sent on “cooling-off” leave till fresh posting orders are issued. Central Army Commander Lt Gen BS Negi, too, was attached to Headquarters Northern Command after completion of his tenure as GOC, 14 Corps, and remained on leave for about a month before proceeding for his current assignment. Similarly, Northern Army Commander Lt Gen DS Hooda had spent a month-long cooling period before taking over in July 2014.
The Chief of Staff, Western Command, Lt Gen Gurdip Singh is also retiring at the end of this month. A Major General posted at Headquarters Eastern Command is expected to take over from him on promotion

[abhishek_sharma]

CO’s ‘letter bomb’ to Brigade Commander blows up after 17 years via Twitter

For those veterans, serving officers and defence commentators who felt that voicing professional opinion in the army was an increasingly risky proposition, a bold though anguished letter of a Commanding Officer (CO) surfacing after 17 years has brought a sharp and public focus to the issue.

Former Northern Army commander Lt Gen HS Panag (retd) tweeted on Wednesday the CO’s letter to his then Brigade Commander and it attracted immediate attention and comment from the vocal community of veterans because the CO had dared to put on record his views: That his Commander’s professional counselling letter to him was to be “treated with the contempt it deserves”.

The CO also accepted responsibility for the encounter and had put in his papers early. Gleeful veterans rejoiced at the letter going public, declaring it “probably the most badass letter from a CO ever”!

Former 15 Corps Commander, Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd) tweeted: “Some moral courage one must say. Haven’t seen anything like this in 40 years.”


Reacting to then Pathankot-headquartered 90 Infantry Brigade Commander KS Dalal’s counselling missive of September 16, 1999, the then CO of 5 Sikh Col Jaipalan Santhanam wrote back the same month: “The allegations made in your letter are just your opinions and conjectures. You are entitled to it. The simple facts are that the unit got information about the militants through its own sources, established contact, maintained contact, used minimum force to avoid civilian carnage, suffered minimum casualties, did not lose its nerve or chutzpah, evacuated its casualties in an efficient manner, captured and killed the militants. Your comments and conclusions are the typical manifestation of a shaken and unnerved hierarchy trying to pass the buck and cover its tracks. So be it.”


Sons of an army officer, Colonel Santhanam and all four of his siblings joined the army, with one, Kashinathan, awarded a Shaurya Chakra posthumously. Colonel Santhanam wrote further: “But remember Commanders do not demand victories from their subordinates; they create environment/situations where possibilities of success increase. They stand by their subordinates. It’s incredible that neither you nor the GOC have found the time to meet the officers, JCOs and the men and have a word with them, and instead started issuing threats and unsubstantiated charges even before the heat of the encounter has died down. If this be the attitude of the elders, the day is not far off when no CO or junior leader will ever dare to display the courage or initiative to establish contact and close in with the enemy. Acceptance of responsibility is the crux of leadership. I accept responsibility for the whole incident and if need be, offer my resignation and premature release from service,” wrote Col Santhanam.

Col Santhanam did put in his papers for premature resignation and is now a managing director of a security and consulting services firm in Bangalore. Col Santhanam refused comment though his brother, Col Narsimhan Santhanam (retd) told HT: “I don’t know how the letter has come out in public domain.”

Lt Gen Panag told HT: “Yes, this is not a common letter. While the subordinate officers do accept the views of seniors, they are also expected to voice professional opinion. But there is the fear of being ‘fixed’ by seniors if contrary views are expressed.” Adds his brother, Maj Gen CS Panag (retd), who also served with 5 Sikh: “Yes, the CO did put in his papers after the tiff with the Brigade Commander.”

[abhishek_sharma]

Indian Army warns Rs 40,000 crore Arunachal border road could be a liability if tensions break out with China

[sum]

The Army is sticking to the old tactic of not developing border areas to ensure minimal damage and to cut off easy access for the enemy in case of an infiltration.

I thought we had long gone past this defensive mindset into something more realistic and aggresive?

[Manish_Sharma]

If army said no then it should be NO !

Strange if the govt. still goes on with it, that to with General Retired Sh. V.K. Singh as NE minister.

[shiv]

If army said no then it should be NO !

How can that be? BRF knows better. Move aside Indian army. It's bad enough BRF having to decide for the Air Force. Now the army as well?

On a more serious note - I agree with you. One of the things that we have never talked about is that suppose the Chinese pour in huge motorized/mechanized forces from their great roads - those forces can be halted in bad terrain.,

But if we give them roads and bridges - we will have to meet them head on with forces equal or larger than what tthey can bring in - or else they will use our roads to come deep into India. And we simply do not have the forces to do that. So the when the Army says something we must sit up and take note

JMT

[nirav]

The issue of whether India should develop road infrastructure in northeast is a vital question that needs to be discussed.

It has been 44 years since the Chinese attacked.
Since then the "strategy" of denying them an advantage of our developed roads has ensured that OUR states in the northeast suffered.

While it might have made strategic sense then in the 1960s, we have come far along wrt military capability to continue using the 4 decade old strategy of denying road infrastructure to the PLA that never came.

We can not and should not let the scars of 62 affect development of our state's for so long.

The MSC 1&2 are a step in the right direction, and so is development of road infrastructure.
Also it might not end up being blasphemous to consider usage of the vastly superior road network on the Chinese side as a strategy and plan and work on changes in military force planning to achieve that.

Denying our populace basic infrastructure based on strategic thinking of 62 is just plain wrong.

[tsarkar]

If army said no then it should be NO !

How can that be? BRF knows better. Move aside Indian army. It's bad enough BRF having to decide for the Air Force. Now the army as well?

On a more serious note - I agree with you. One of the things that we have never talked about is that suppose the Chinese pour in huge motorized/mechanized forces from their great roads - those forces can be halted in bad terrain.,

But if we give them roads and bridges - we will have to meet them head on with forces equal or larger than what tthey can bring in - or else they will use our roads to come deep into India. And we simply do not have the forces to do that. So the when the Army says something we must sit up and take note

JMT

Roads can always be demolished or ambushed. Military examples exists of LTTE or Maoists or the German defence of Netherlands roads during Operation Market Garden. Mountain roads are even easier to demolish.

Having said that, even with two Mountain Strike Corps, and yet to materialise artillery and helicopters, our forces are not evenly matched in the Chinese border. So the Army's concerns have merit.

However a defensive mentality to deny benefits to citizens or have a line of communication to reinforce border areas is not in the larger national strategic interest. Neither is it good for morale.

The Pakistan Navy in 1971 removed fuel & ordnance from its ships in harbour to prevent secondary explosions after missile hits. It undoubtedly saved the tanker PNS Dacca after the missile hit. However, taking away ability to fight resulted in a serious lack of morale.

It's like wearing rags because someone might rob your clothes. A better option is improving the ability to defend oneself. For example, raising more Arunachal Scouts Battalions to defend home & hearth.