Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

[SSridhar]

Singapore, China looking at reducing risk of unplanned sea encounters - Straits Times

Singapore and China are working on some exploratory ideas to minimise the risk of unplanned encounters at sea, amid increased fears of potential clashes between Chinese and foreign militaries in the contentious South China Sea.

Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said he discussed the ideas with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi at their meeting yesterday, and that both sides would work on them in the coming months.

Speaking to reporters later without taking questions, Dr Balakrishnan said both sides had "very frank, useful and constructive" discussions on the South China Sea disputes and that Singapore, though not a claimant state, has to fulfil its role as country coordinator of China-Asean relations.

"We reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability and freedom of navigation and overflight. This is an essential lifeline for China and all Asean countries because so much of our trade and energy flow through this area.

"So we all have a big stake in ensuring peace and stability," said Dr Balakrishnan, who is making his first visit to China since becoming Foreign Minister on Oct 1 last year.

He added that both also discussed the importance of complying with the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and speeding up negotiations on formulating a Code of Conduct.

The South China Sea faces competing territorial claims from China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Tensions have risen of late as Beijing builds new islands and deploys military equipment, while US Navy vessels and planes conduct freedom of navigation and overflight missions.

In an op-ed article published in the China Daily yesterday, Dr Balakrishnan said Singapore "will work objectively with all parties to promote positive and forward-looking Asean-China relations" by "sensibly managing" the disputes.

Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement that Dr Balakrishnan also conveyed the concerns expressed by Asean foreign ministers at their retreat last Saturday as well as "the importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint in the conduct of activities to lower the temperature and prevent incidents in the South China Sea".

Mr Wang told reporters he believes Singapore could play a positive and constructive role though he stressed that it is not an issue between China and Asean.

"Also, some Asean members oppose 'specific forces' from stirring up the issue," said Mr Wang, as he advocated China's dual-track policy of conducting direct negotiations with claimant states and working with Asean members on maintaining peace and stability.

Dr Balakrishnan stressed that the areas of convergence and opportunities for collaboration between China and Asean "are far, far greater" than the areas of differences as both sides mark 25 years of relations this year through activities including a commemorative summit in Vientiane, Laos, in September.

Sino-Singapore cooperation, such as progress on the upgrade of the bilateral free trade pact and also the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative, which is the third government-led project between both sides, also figured in Dr Balakrishnan's meetings with Mr Wang and Vice-President Li Yuanchao yesterday.

He is due to meet State Councillor Yang Jiechi and Cyberspace Administration head Lu Wei today before ending his trip.

It is China's ploy to enter into bilateral agreements with each ASEAN member state, something that must be avoided by the ASEAN as a block. It is the position of Laos & Cambodia which is circumspect.

[NRao]

The new Aurangazeb.

China's Xi Says Shares 'Common Destiny' With Vietnam, Looks To Repair Ties

Those Kilos .............

[SSridhar]

U.S. push for joint patrols in Indo-Pacific region - Dinakar Peri, The Hindu

The United States continues to push India towards joint naval patrols and multilateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific region.

A senior U.S. Admiral on Wednesday called upon to convert the increasingly complex naval exercises between the two countries into coordinated patrols.

Stating that India has an advanced military across all domains and the Indian Navy has a long history of capability on the high seas Admiral Harry Harris, U.S. Pacific Commander said: “We should be exercising together and we should be turning those exercises into coordinated operations.”

“On joint patrols the U.S. Ambassador and I have advocated working together,” he said in response to a question from The Hindu while speaking at the Raisina dialogue jointly organised by the Ministry of External Affairs and Observer Research Foundation.

However, he did not specify where the patrols would be conducted. Whether those operations are in the Indian Ocean, be it in the Northern or Eastern part, or Pacific Ocean, Admiral Harris said: “that’s left to our leaders to decide”.

He echoed U.S. Ambassador Richard Verma’s vision: “In the not too distant future, American and Indian Navy vessels steaming together will become a common and welcome sight throughout Indo-Asia-Pacific waters, as we work together to maintain freedom of the seas for all nations.”

Admiral Harris revealed that in the first ever trilateral dialogue between India, Japan and Australia held last year, the three sides discussed “maritime security — including freedom of navigation patrols — and trilateral cooperation” in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

This development is significant as all three countries have been traditionally reluctant to take any measures that could antagonise China.

Quadrilateral format

In this he added that the trilateral should be expanded to a quadrilateral format.

“An idea to consider is perhaps expanding this trilateral to a quadrilateral venue between India-Japan-Australia and the United States,” he said adding that “we are all united in supporting the international rules-based order.”

The Malabar bilateral naval exercises have been last year expanded to trilateral format including Japan.

[SSridhar]

China set to hike military spending - Atul Aneja, The Hindu

China appears set to substantially hike its defence budget — a move that may have been triggered by the growing tensions in the South China Sea with the U.S., and rising cost of end-of-service payments to troops.

The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP) quoted a source in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as saying that the defence budget, expected to be announced by the National People’s Congress (NPC) when it convenes for a legislative session on Saturday, could be hiked by as much as 20 per cent. In case that happens, it would be the sharpest military increase since 2007.

But scaling down the expectations, the state-run Global Times said, quoting Ni Lexiong, a Shanghai-based military analyst, that the 2016 military budget will see an “appropriate” increase to meet national defence needs without putting other countries on high alert. “I think the budget reported in the SCMP might be too high,” Mr. Ni observed.

Analysts cite two factors that may explain the anticipated military spending increase. First, the Chinese armed forces are undergoing a structural change. Nearly 300,000 personnel are expected to leave the armed forces by 2017-end, in tune with the reorganisation of the PLA around newly formed, and leaner, theatre commands.

Consequently, considerable amount of funds are required to meet the end-of-service, and retirement payments during this phase.

Further, growing tensions with the U.S. and Japan in the East and South China Seas are also significant drivers. In January, a U.S. navy missile destroyer — Curtis Wilbur — sailed within 12 nautical miles of the China-controlled Triton islands in the Paracel island chain of the South China Sea, leading to calls within China for additional military preparedness.

Tensions in S. China Sea

The U.S. Navy’s Pacific Command has asserted that it would step up the so-called “freedom of navigation missions” in international waters of the South China Sea — a move that Beijing says is provocative and a challenge to its territorial sovereignty.

Observers say that China can be expected to beef up defensive weaponry in the South China Sea. ImageSat International, a private company, has already taken images showing the deployment of eight missile launchers and a radar system at the China-administered Woody Island, also in the Paracel chain.

Tensions with Japan are also expected to trigger additional deployment of Chinese firepower in the East China Sea, where Beijing and Tokyo have a territorial dispute over Diaoyu Islands, known as the Senkaku in Japan. The friction between the two countries is reflected in the record Japanese defence budget of $41.1 billion this year.

The possibility of the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system, following the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile technology tests this year, add another dimension, pushing China to adopt counter-measures.

[SSridhar]

No scope for India-U.S. joint patrols at this time: Parrikar - Dinakar Peri, The Hindu

Days after a top U.S. Admiral expressed keenness in co-ordinated patrols between India and U.S,, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said on Friday that there was no scope for such patrols at this point of time.

“As of now India has not taken part in joint patrols but we do participate in joint exercises. So the issue of joint patrols at this time does not arise,” Mr. Parrikar told a press conference here.

Earlier this week Admiral Harry Harris, U.S. Pacific Commander speaking at a seminar here called for turning exercises into coordinated patrols and pitched for quadrilateral cooperation between India, Japan, Australia and the U.S.

He said that if such a decision was taken “we will brief the media that we have taken this in the interest of the country.” Responding to a question from The Hindu if the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), one of the three foundational agreements, would be signed with the U.S., Mr. Parrikar said any decision would depend on national interest.

U.S. Defence Secretary Ashton Carter is scheduled to visit India in April during which the agreements are expected to be discussed.

[JE Menon]

It will happen.

So will joint development of weapons and manufacturing in India.

Pressure is not from the US. It's on both from circumstance. They just have more money at this point. We have to be super careful managing it.

Pace may vary but a close entanglement is inevitable. The trick is entanglement with everyone.

[SSridhar]

It will happen.

So will joint development of weapons and manufacturing in India.

Pressure is not from the US. It's on both from circumstance. They just have more money at this point. We have to be super careful managing it.

Pace may vary but a close entanglement is inevitable. The trick is entanglement with everyone.

JEM, absolutely spot on.

[JE Menon]

SS,

An anecdote: when we tested, POK 2, and the US immediately came down on us with sanctions, I had observed that this was about to be the beginning of a beautiful relationship (borrowing from Casablanca) and that we would soon even be cooperating on nuclear weapons development. There was laughing and sarcasm from a resident American on the forum (not the current one) and from several of our own.

Who wants to bet now that we are not doing exactly that quietly?

The thing is that neither of us knows, or quite agrees, about who's going to play Rick and who the inspector. Perhaps in the style of some ancient Indian dance drama we will just switch roles in mid-play.

[SSridhar]

Xi tells Taiwan to stop dreaming of independence - Atul Aneja, The Hindu

Chinese President Xi Jinping has warned Taiwan not to aspire for independence. His unambiguous assertion comes at a time when a new government that has put the exercise of sovereignty on its agenda has been voted into power in Taipei.

Safeguarding sovereignty

“We will resolutely contain ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist activities in any form,” President Xi was quoted as saying during his meeting with lawmakers from Shanghai, who had arrived to participate in the annual session of the National People’s Congress, the country’s Parliament.

“We will safeguard the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and never allow the historical tragedy of national secession to happen again. This is the common wish and firm will of all Chinese people. It is also our solemn commitment and our responsibility to history and the people.” “Our policy toward Taiwan,” Mr. Xi told legislators, “is clear and consistent, and it will not change along with the change in Taiwan’s political situation.”

Mr. Xi’s blunt warning follows the landslide election of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s President. Her position has been strengthened by the strong showing of her Democratic Progressive Party in the parliamentary polls.

Ms. Tsai, who replaces China-friendly Nationalist Party President Ma Ying-jeou, will not assume office till May. Her predecessor steered a series of agreements with China during his eight years in power, resulting in closer economic ties.

Taiwan split from mainland China in 1945. Following the Communist revolution in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists formed their government on the island in that year. “Compatriots from both sides of the Taiwan Strait are expecting the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and we should not disappoint them,” Mr. Xi observed, adding: “We will adhere to the 1992 Consensus as a political foundation, and continuously advance the peaceful development of cross-Strait ties.”

[devesh]

Joint Patrols, co-development of 5th-gen engine.....this is all empty talk. Any of those seriously strategic moves will ONLY come to fruition IF AND ONLY IF India has full freedom of maneuvering in Pak. In other words, Pak is not longer the faithful munna which is obliged by the USA and its allies.

Until that day arrives, all talk of joint patrols is just that.

And if the Indian State goes forward with allowing USA deep reach into India through agreements like CISMOA and others, the State is not long for the world...

[SSridhar]

The Escalating South China Sea Dispute - Lessons for India - Abhijit Singh, IDSA Comment

In recent days, the fight for dominance in the South China Sea has escalated. A few days after a Washington-based think-tank released a report which featured satellite imagery showing further development of several of the Spratly Islands, China landed fighter aircrafts on the Woody Island, a subset of the Paracel group of islands. More worryingly, China has placed HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles on the Woody Island, providing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the capability to target aircrafts in the South China Sea’s contested spaces.

Needless to say, there has been much speculation over China’s ‘strategic’ intentions in the South China Sea. The act of placing missiles on a disputed territory has been widely interpreted as hardening of Beijing’s maritime posture – not just on account of the direct threat the missiles pose to foreign air-operations in the South China Sea, but also because the new armament complements PLA’s existing air warfare capability on the Woody Island. For regional watchers, the fact that the missiles on Woody Island support Chinese J-11 fighter operations is a sign that Beijing may be looking to enhance its political and military control over the South China Sea. Not surprisingly, the rhetoric from Washington painted the Chinese move as an aggressive act intended to fortify a long-held territory and promote Beijing’s territorial claims in contested waters. Chinese analysts, meanwhile, portray the deployment of military assets on the Paracels as a defensive measure to protect the PLA facilities on the island from other disputants.

There are four reasons why these developments should interest India. First, regardless of the claims and counter-claims by the United States and China, it is clear that Beijing operates from a position of strength in the South China Sea, wherein it has physical control over critical islands in the region. China has shown the US and its allies that what matters in a maritime territorial dispute is the actual ‘possession’ of the islands, and as long as the PLA exercises military control over the features it will exploit their location to support broader territorial claims. For New Delhi, which has been concerned about the security of its trade-flows and energy interests in the South China Sea, however, China’s placement of missiles might hold a hidden message. Greater militarisation of the disputed islands could translate into less freedom of navigation for foreign warships in the South China Sea, as the range of ‘permitted’ maritime operations will now be defined by Beijing. Even commercial vessels might now ply at China’s sufferance.

Second, China’s preferred means to exert its authority over contested maritime territory is through indirect control. In the immediate aftermath of the new radar installations in the Spratlys and deployment of missiles on the Woody Island, it looks increasingly likely that Beijing would impose an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, ensuring the PLA’s dominance over the surrounding air-space and seas. At present, the likelihood of such an eventuality might only be confined to the Pacific littorals. Yet, there is no discounting its occurrence in other maritime areas where China might have strategic interests – including critical spaces in the Indian Ocean.

For Indian observers, it is useful to extrapolate known Chinese position in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and assess Beijing’s likely strategic behaviour after the PLA has established a foothold in critical Indian Ocean states. Could the PLA, for instance, play a role in assisting Sri Lanka, Pakistan or Maldives in securing vital sea and air spaces in the Indian Ocean? What could the implications of such a move be for India? As a key security provider in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi appreciates the need for greater stability in the region. Will India, however, accept an expanded Chinese role in securing important spaces in its primary area of interest?

Here, Indian analysts might take note of the Chinese maritime tactics in the South China Sea. Notwithstanding its military deployments on disputed islands, China’s real ‘implements’ of aggression are the maritime militias in the South China Sea. Earlier this month, Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin, commander of the US 7th Fleet, lamented China's use of paramilitary agencies in territorial disputes, complicating the US attempts to avoid violence in disputed areas. According to the US naval sources, the presence of Chinese non-military vessels, including its coast guard and fisheries fleets, have jeopardised naval operations in the region because such vessels are not governed by agreements like the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). As China’s unconventional forces respond with greater aggression to perceived challenges in the region, American analysts point to the possibility of a dramatic rise in the risk of an inadvertent conflict.

China’s maritime militias, however, aren’t autonomous agencies, but centrally-controlled organisations that work in tandem to enforce China’s writ in its near-waters. Their regular employment in dominating maritime spaces is an instructive pointer for Indian watchers. With the expansion of Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean, the presence of non-grey hulls in the IOR is likely to rise. Admittedly, this wouldn’t be to the same degree as witnessed in the Southeast Asia. But even a relative increase could complicate the security situation in littoral South Asia. Already, Beijing’s distant water fishing fleet is now the world’s largest and is heavily subsidised. China’s rise as a fishing power, however, has been linked to its geopolitical aspirations. With rising Chinese non-military presence in the Bay of Bengal, India’s maritime agencies would be faced with the unenviable task of regulating their maritime activity. {The Chinese are already doing this in the Indo-China sea by dictating to other littoral nations there as to when and where thry shoud do fishing etc} Indeed, just as the US is now calling for a new Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to include state-aligned maritime assets, India might need a fresh set of rules of engagement to deal with increased Chinese non-military presence in the IOR.

Third, Indian maritime policymakers might well recognise the fact that once China finds itself in a position of maritime advantage, diplomatic engagement has limited utility as a bargaining tactic. The missiles placement at the Woody Island came within a day of the US President Barack Obama’s meeting with ASEAN leaders at California, where the participants sought to evolve a consensus for a peaceful solution to the disputes in the South China Sea, and the need for common norms and rules of behaviour. China’s latest military move, the US analysts say, is an obvious attempt at normalising the idea of Chinese military assets and advanced defenses in contested territories.

This also underscores the contested nature of the maritime domain in Asia. Regional observers cannot help noticing the practiced ease with which China and the US play the ritual of cooperation and conflict at sea. Just days after the passage of the USS Curtis Wilbur for the second freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) patrols near the Triton Island in the Paracel group, the US Chief of Naval Operations consulted with his Chinese counterpart about unplanned encounters at sea. Both naval chiefs appeared satisfied with the implementation of the code. Yet, only a few days later, China had placed missiles on the Woody, and Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the U.S Pacific Command, announced that the security situation had worsened to a point where the US Navy was contemplating intensifying the FONOPs. India’s maritime managers would note the need to factor in greater strategic and operational uncertainty into future security operations.

Lastly, there is a need for India to strike a balance between maritime security imperatives in the Indian Ocean, and its legal stand on freedoms enjoyed by user states in territorial waters. New Delhi’s real dilemma is that while it opposes Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, it also disagrees with Washington’s interpretation of maritime law and the freedoms enjoyed by foreign warships in littoral spaces. In particular, India does not concur with US attempts at claiming a “right to uninterrupted passage” in coastal waters without the prior permission of the subject state – especially in areas that are deemed to be within a nation’s territorial waters. New Delhi’s view on the subject, in fact, broadly corresponds with Beijing – particularly on the need for prior notification by foreign warships before entering a coastal state’s territorial waters or EEZ claiming innocent passage.

For India, unannounced forays through territorial waters and EEZs – ‘innocent passage’ or absolute ‘freedom of navigation’ - are ethically (if not legally) untenable. Even though the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) permits continuous and expeditious passage in coastal waters - necessitated by needs of navigation – the law does not appear to legitimise the practice of conducting maritime operations for political purposes. India therefore has reservations about supporting a US naval manoeuvre in the South China Sea as it could potentially encourage similar behaviour by the PLA Navy in the Andaman Seas.

[SSridhar]

Changing Contexts of Chinese Military Strategy and Doctrine - Prashant Kumar Singh, IDSA Monograph Series

This monograph identifies the contexts which have shaped China's military strategy and doctrine. It argues that these have evolved through Party-Military relations as well as through the Chinese leadership's assessment of the international balance of power. In this framework, the monograph has traced the PLA's strategic and doctrinal transformation from a defensive one to one of limited offence, having global aspirations, affecting further changes in China's military strategy and doctrine.

Download Monograph

[SSridhar]

Step by step, China expands its military in disputed sea - NYT

When the aircraft carrier John C Stennis and four other US warships sailed into the South China Sea last week for what were described as routine exercises, the message was clear: the United States is the dominant military power in the region and plans to keep it that way.

But numerous Chinese naval ships were operating nearby, the US navy said, noticeably more than in past years. A Chinese officer told the state-run news media that the ships were there to "monitor, identify, follow and expel" foreign vessels and aircraft, depending on how close they came "to our islands."

The encounter, which passed without incident, was the latest episode in a wary stand-off between the United States and China over two contested island chains known as the Paracels and the Spratlys.

Since taking office three years ago, President Xi Jinping has used the isles to expand China's military footprint in the region, taking one step after another to build and equip outposts far from the Chinese mainland over protests from its neighbors and from Washington.

The scale of the multibillion-dollar effort has raised tensions in the region and strengthened China's disputed claim to the entirety of the South China Sea, home to some of the world's busiest shipping lanes.

The build-up has also challenged the military status quo in the Western Pacific since the end of World War II, bringing China closer to its goal of establishing a security buffer extending far from its coast — a dream of Chinese strategists since the Korean War.

"China wants a bathtub," said Marc Lanteigne, a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs who studies Chinese foreign policy, drawing a comparison with US dominance in the Caribbean. "China wants waters that are theirs, that they can operate military and police vessels in, without having to worry about the presence of the US or the Philippines or Vietnamese or Indian naval forces."

The build-up has proceeded incrementally but remarkably swiftly given that China and its neighbors have been locked in a stalemate over the islands that has simmered for decades. Dredging of sand to build artificial islands atop coral reefs in the Spratlys began as early as 2014 but accelerated last year, and the isles now feature deepwater harbors and long runways suitable for warships and fighter jets.

Handout satellite photos shows a before-and-after view of Chinese construction on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands in the disputed South China sea. (CNES, Distribution Airbus DS, via IHS via NYT)

Then surface-to-air missile batteries appeared last month in the Paracels, more than 300 miles to the north. Now satellite photos show what seem to be powerful radar facilities, potentially extending the kill zone of missiles on the Chinese mainland that are devised to sink aircraft carriers.

The new fortifications pose little threat to the US military, which could easily destroy them in a conflict.

But US officials are increasingly worried that the build-up, if unchecked, will give China de facto control of an expanse of sea the size of Mexico and military superiority over neighbors with competing claims to the waters. That, some say, could prompt a regional arms race and increase the risk of conflict.

While officials in Washington say China is nowhere near gaining the capacity to keep US forces out of the South China Sea, analysts say the build-up will make it more difficult for the US navy to quickly defend allies with weaker militaries, like the Philippines. The deployment of fighter jets, anti-ship missiles and more powerful radar in particular could embolden the Chinese Navy while giving US commanders pause, they said.

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee last month, Admiral Harry B Harris Jr, commander of the United States Pacific Command, warned that China's actions were "changing the operational landscape in the South China Sea." And in written answers submitted to the committee, the Obama administration's top intelligence official, James R Clapper, forecast that China would "have significant capacity to quickly project substantial military power to the region" by early next year.

Although China has not finished construction, he wrote, it can already deploy fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, coastal defense cruise missiles as well as large warships and sizable Coast Guard vessels to the new artificial islands in the Spratlys.

Clapper also confirmed that military radar had been installed more than 600 miles from the Chinese island province of Hainan on Cuarteron Reef, the southernmost of the seven artificial islets. In theory, that could improve the ability of China's so-called carrier-killer missile, the DF-21D, to strike faraway targets and complicate US navy efforts to develop countermeasures against it.

Last month, Vietnam lodged a formal protest after satellite photos indicated that China had deployed HQ-9 surface-to-air missile batteries on the largest island in the Paracels, Woody Island. Vietnam claims both the Paracels and the Spratlys, and nationalist sentiment has been running high since the appearance of a Chinese oil drilling platform near the Paracels led to anti-Chinese demonstrations and riots two years ago.

China's build-up in the Spratlys has also angered the Philippines. Chinese forces wrested control of Scarborough Shoal in the Spratlys from the Philippines after an extended stand-off four years ago, a move that President Benigno S Aquino III later compared to Nazi Germany's annexation of Czechoslovakia.

Senator John McCain, the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, warned recently that China seemed poised to expel Philippine forces from another outpost and urged the Obama administration to clarify how it would respond. Last month, Chinese vessels drew protests by blocking Philippine fishing boats from reaching a disputed atoll.

Analysts said the build-up had made it easier for Chinese ships to operate for long periods in the Spratlys without returning to the Chinese mainland.

"Now Chinese ships can stay out in the Spratlys whenever they want, pretty confidently," said Gregory B Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Poling said the new radar installations on Cuarteron Reef could give China the ability to see over the horizon and perhaps track targets as far away as the vital Malacca Strait hundreds of miles to the southwest.

At his summit meeting with President Barack Obama in September, Xi pledged not to "pursue militarization" of the Spratlys, but he did not include the Paracels, and Beijing has since insisted that it is entitled to "limited defensive facilities" across the South China Sea, comparing them to United States bases in Hawaii.

Chinese analysts argue that the build-up preserves peace by deterring others with territorial claims to the sea, including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan. "The main reason for the construction is to tell other countries to stop their provocations, because if they continue to push, we have the capability to push back," said Xu Liping, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

US officials said they expected China to build large fuel storage tanks on the islands next, which would allow its fighter jets to remain in the region longer, and then to declare an "air defense identification zone" over the South China Sea as it did for a contested part of the East China Sea in late 2013.

China claimed the right to require aircraft entering the zone to identify themselves and to take military action against those that did not follow orders. Japan and the United States refused to recognize the claim or cooperate.

The Obama administration has struggled, however, to come up with a policy to slow or stop what it has called China's militarization of the South China Sea.

A senior defense official, who requested anonymity to speak more freely about US policy, noted that while China might be gaining in the "maritime arena," its progress had also prompted neighbors like the Philippines and Vietnam to expand military ties with the United States.

In recent months, the Pentagon has also stepped up "freedom of navigation" patrols in the South China Sea, sending US warships and aircraft into territory claimed by Beijing to assert Washington's view that these areas remain international waters and airspace.

But China has responded by using the patrols to argue that it is the United States that is militarizing the South China Sea — and by continuing to build.

"China was the first country to discover, name, develop and manage the South China Sea islands," the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, told a news conference on Tuesday. "History will prove who is a mere guest and who is a real host."

[sanjaykumar]

Childish logic.

[SSridhar]

What a dangerous formulation!

‘China should become part of SAARC structure’ - The Hindu

Globalisation is putting pressure on the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to change its traditional ways of working, according to Imtiaz Ahmed, Executive Director of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), a 23-year-old South Asian regional think tank.

Trade linkage

“The way globalisation is working, whether you like it or not, the borders are not the same they used to be. Now, it is almost impossible to keep your business within your borders. You need to link and re-link with a lot of other countries. That is going to impact on South Asia incredibly. How quickly we are going to take advantage of that depends on us,” Prof. Ahmed told The Hindu recently.

The message behind the trend of globalisation is that the region has to include China, which, he called, has now become a “South Asian country” for all practical purposes.

This is because the South Asian countries, be it India, Pakistan, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, were having very close and strong ties with China in terms of trade and development.

Emphasising the need for changes in the two fundamental provisions of the SAARC Charter, he said a time-frame had to be fixed for the continuance of the two provisions — decisions at all levels to be based on unanimity and exclusion of bilateral issues. It was all right to have these stipulations 30 years ago at the time of establishment of the SAARC but “you cannot have them frozen”.

On the structure of the SAARC secretariat, Prof. Ahmed called for the appointment of a former Prime Minister or President from any one of the member-countries of the region as Secretary General.

Clearly, there is Chinese penetration into this think-tank.

[SSridhar]

Watch out for China’s naval aggression - G.Parthasarathy, BusinessLine

It is a truism that in any country including India, the coastal population inevitably focuses attention on maritime security, while those far from the sea remain fixated on the land borders. India’s security challenges across its land borders with Pakistan and China have only accentuated this trend.

Moreover, with its focus on import substitution rather than export promotion, India’s share in world trade fell significantly in the first four decades after independence. With its economy collapsing in 1990, India was forced to drastically change its outlook towards domestic, regional and global economic issues.

What followed has been the growing integration of India with the global economy, and its emergence as a growing market for trade and investment. We have since moved from an economy afflicted by what was once pejoratively described as the “Hindu rate of growth,” to becoming a vibrant, emerging economy.

We have wisely embarked on increasingly integrating our economy, with the fastest growing economies of the world, in East and Southeast Asia. We now have comprehensive economic partnerships with the 10 Members of ASEAN, ranging from Myanmar to the Philippines, as also with Japan and South Korea.

Playing spoiler

We are negotiating a free trade agreement with Australia and have endeavoured to undertake similar arrangements with our SAARC partners. Moreover, ASEAN-led forums like the East Asia Summit have led to an Indian strategic role across the Bay of Bengal, which traverses the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, crossing the disputed waters of the South China Sea.

Progress on economic integration in South Asia has, however, been slow, primarily because of Pakistani recalcitrance. Significantly, tensions and disputes with China have not adversely affected a blossoming trade and investment relationship between India and China, the world’s two most populous countries.

Despite these developments, India cannot ignore the fact that China has acted as a spoiler in every effort New Delhi has made to enhance its role in its eastern neighbourhood. Beijing vigorously opposed our participation in economic and security forums linked with ASEAN, including the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. China continues to maintain links across its borders with Myanmar, with some of our northeastern separatist outfits.

India encircled

We are now steadily moving towards a more proactive response to counter these Chinese efforts. Concerted diplomatic efforts, with partners like the US and Japan, have enabled us to strengthen the security of our eastern sea-lanes. China has not succeeded in its efforts to secure a predominant role in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or Maldives. This will, however, remain a continuing challenge for us.

While India has fashioned policies to safeguard its eastern shores, the same cannot be said for what is transpiring in our western neighbourhood, across the Arabia Sea. It is here that we cannot now overlook the implications of China’s new thrust, at not only establishing a virtually permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, but also by its doing so in collusion with Pakistan.

New Delhi should carefully note Chinese moves to outflank us on our western shores, through a network of roads and ports. The Chinese strategic objectives are based on a Silk Road Economic Belt that links China with Central Asia, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, the Persian Gulf States, Russia and the Baltic States.

Beijing’s 21st century Maritime Silk Route, in turn, extends from China’s coast to Europe through the Indian Ocean. China is simultaneously building ports across the Indian Ocean, in Asia and Africa. What India cannot afford to ignore is that while the Silk Road envelopes both its eastern and western neighbours, this road links up with the Maritime Silk Road and the Indian Ocean, in the Pakistani Port of Gwadar, located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

Controlling Persian Gulf

Gwadar is perilously close to India’s sea-lanes, linking India to oil rich Persian Gulf, from where we get over 70 per cent of oil supplies.

China has now secured virtual control of the port facilities in Gwadar, after pledging $ 46 billion to Pakistan, to promote its ambitious Silk Road and its Maritime Silk Route projects. Over a decade ago, President Musharraf told an audience in Islamabad, just after the visit of then Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji that in the event of a conflict with Pakistan, India would find the Chinese navy positioned in Gwadar.

Given its difficulties in obtaining bases in countries like Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, China feels Pakistan is a crucial partner. It can have base facilities, strategically positioned close to the Straits of Hormuz and astride India’s vital sea-lanes to the oil-rich Persian Gulf, where around 7 million Indians live.

China has simultaneously commenced an effort to strengthen Pakistan’s navy, with the supply of 4 frigates and 8 submarines, to reinforce these efforts.

China’s interest in having a military presence astride the Straits of Hormuz arises from the fact that this narrow 2 mile wide corridor is the route for the transportation of 17 million barrels of oil per day (mbpd), with 15.2 mbpd traversing thereafter through the Straits of Malacca, which includes 80 per cent of Japan’s oil supplies. The entire Indian Ocean Region, extending to the Gulf of Aden, accounts for 40 per cent of the world’s oil production and 57 per cent of the world’s oil trade.

Not surprisingly, the US has positioned its powerful 5th Fleet in Bahrain to oversee the security of these vital sea-lanes. The nature and extent of American interest in this Region could well change, as the US itself is becoming a net exporter of oil and gas. {That is why the IN must be developed to fill that vacuum if and when it arises} Stability in this region is being adversely affected by Iranian-Saudi rivalries.

Ideally, it would be useful if the major Asian oil importers- India, China, Japan and South Korea- cooperated on developments that threaten the security of vital sea-lanes and energy corridors. But this may be too much to expect, anytime soon.

The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan

[kmkraoind]

Growing Muscle of PLAAF - Lt Gen (Dr) V K Saxena (Retd) from Vivekananda International Foundation. Its a 19-page pdf file.

http://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/f ... -plaaf.pdf

[Prem]

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/world ... .html?_r=0
As India Collaborates With Japan on Islands, It Looks to Check China

PORT BLAIR, India — India and Japan are in talks to collaborate on upgrading civilian infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, an Indian archipelago seen as a critical asset to counter China’s efforts to expand its maritime reach into the Indian Ocean.first project being discussed is a modest one — a 15-megawatt diesel power plant on South Andaman Island, as described in a proposal submitted late last month to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.But the collaboration signals a significant policy shift for India, which has not previously accepted offers of foreign investment on the archipelago. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are northwest of the Strait of Malacca, offering control of a so-called choke point that is one of China’s greatest marine vulnerabilities.It is also testimony to the unfolding relationship between India and Japan, which is also funding a $744 million road building project in the northeastern Indian border regions of Mizoram, Assam and Meghalaya. Like the Andaman and Nicobar chain, the northeastern region is a strategic area that has remained relatively undeveloped because of its separation from the mainland.A senior Indian official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, said that China’s project would be answered by “a more decentralized, local but organic response.”The official described proposed infrastructure projects in the Andamans as “not of a big scale, and not of a big value,” but added that New Delhi is intent on developing its “frontier” regions.The idea that the frontier should be left undeveloped, I think people have rejected that approach,” the official said. “There is a realization that it doesn’t help to leave part of any part of India undeveloped.”Japan’s vision for contributions in the island chain goes far beyond the proposed power plant. The plan was submitted in Tokyo more than a year after Japan’s ambassador made a visit to Port Blair on South Andaman Island and, in a meeting with the territory’s top official, offered financing for “bridges and ports.”“We usually start with small projects and go bigger,” he said.He said construction of the power station could start in the next fiscal year, which begins in April.
Defense analysts from the West regard the island chain with envy and a degree of confusion.
“Almost every year, I see some senior Indian military official say we have major, major plans in store for the Andamans, and you’re going to see them soon,” said Jeff M. Smith, author of “Cold Peace,” a book on the Chinese-Indian rivalry. “Everybody waits for the big story to hit on the Andamans, year after year, and it doesn’t happen.”A decision to accept Japanese investment there, he said, “would be a sign that the Modi government is getting out of this feedback loop and moving on some of these aspirations.”.Airstrips at the northern and southern tips of the archipelago are being lengthened to accommodate the long-range surveillance planes.Japan is hardly the only country interested in taking a role in developing the island chain. India and the United States are said to be close to concluding a maritime logistics agreement, meaning that American ships might be allowed to make port calls in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the future, defense analysts say.The chain’s location provides a “perfect geographic position” for maritime aerial surveillance, said Rory Medcalf, head of the National Security College at Australian National University.“If India were more open to allowing friendly foreign countries access and awareness in the Andamans, it would find them more forthcoming as well,” he said.In Port Blair, there is the feeling that the outside world, once distant, is drawing nearer.The front page of the Andaman Express, a daily newspaper, is typically devoted to small-town news, like motorcycle accidents and stove explosions. But a report last fall on the rumored presence of a Chinese naval submarine in Andaman waters mentioned, almost as an aside, that the archipelago “would become the primary target of the People’s Liberation Army if China and India go to war.”

[SSridhar]

Chinese patrols enter Indian territory - The Hindu

Personnel of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China transgressed into the Indian territory in Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir, twice in the past four days. An official in the security establishment said that with the new border defence mechanism in place, the issue was resolved in no time along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

While the first incident was reported on March 8, there was a face-off between the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and the Chinese PLA on Friday as well.

The official said that as the summer had set in, both the sides had initiated long-range patrolling and the recent transgressions were reported along the undefined boundary with China.

On March 8, Chinese troops entered almost 6 km deep inside the Indian territory near the Pangong lake in Ladakh.

The incident led to a stand-off between security personnel of the two sides.

A platoon of at least 11 PLA men, led by a colonel-rank officer, crossed over the LAC at ‘Finger VIII’ Sirjap-I area close to the Pangong lake, said the official.

The Chinese soldiers entered in four vehicles from across the Thakung border post of India and reached 5.5 km deep inside Indian territory, he said.

Friday’s incident was also reported near the Thakung post in Ladakh with the two sides engaged in an eyeball-to-eyeball situation.

“We showed them banners and told them that they had entered the Indian territory. They retreated immediately and the matter was resolved,” said the official.

He also explained that it was incorrect to call the incidents as “incursions.”

“Both the sides have undertaken long-range patrolling and with no demarcation of the border, we often transgress into each other’s territory. “Such incidents reach their peak in summers as active patrolling is done after the snow has melted,” said the official.

After a period of lull, while the Chinese Army was undergoing massive internal changes, the aggression has re-started. Summer is a convenient excuse too.

[SSridhar]

X-post from India-Japan thread

As India collaborates with Japan on Islands, it looks to check China - Ellen Barry, NYT

PORT BLAIR, India: India and Japan are in talks to collaborate on upgrading civilian infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, an Indian archipelago seen as a critical asset to counter China's efforts to expand its maritime reach into the Indian Ocean.

The first project being discussed is a modest one — a 15-megawatt diesel power plant on South Andaman Island, as described in a proposal submitted late last month to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But the collaboration signals a significant policy shift for India, which has not previously accepted offers of foreign investment on the archipelago. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are northwest of the Strait of Malacca, offering control of a so-called choke point that is one of China's greatest marine vulnerabilities.

It is also testimony to the unfolding relationship between India and Japan, which is also funding a $744 million road building project in the northeastern Indian border regions of Mizoram, Assam and Meghalaya. Like the Andaman and Nicobar chain, the northeastern region is a strategic area that has remained relatively undeveloped because of its separation from the mainland.

Japan's marshaling of official development assistance in the region has drawn less attention than the effort that China calls "One Belt, One Road," a network of roads, railways and ports intended to link China to the rest of Asia and to Europe.

But it fits logically into the web of strategic projects taking shape as Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India enters into closer relationships with Japan, Australia and the United States, as well as regional powers like Vietnam, to counter China's growing influence.

A senior Indian official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, said that China's project would be answered by "a more decentralized, local but organic response."

The official described proposed infrastructure projects in the Andamans as "not of a big scale, and not of a big value," but added that New Delhi is intent on developing its "frontier" regions.

"The idea that the frontier should be left undeveloped, I think people have rejected that approach," the official said. "There is a realization that it doesn't help to leave part of any part of India undeveloped."

Japan's vision for contributions in the island chain goes far beyond the proposed power plant. The plan was submitted in Tokyo more than a year after Japan's ambassador made a visit to Port Blair on South Andaman Island and, in a meeting with the territory's top official, offered financing for "bridges and ports."

Akio Isomata, minister for economic affairs in the Japanese Embassy, said the country's aid agency, Japan International Cooperation Agency, could only respond to "formal requests" from the Indian government.

He added that Japan would consider "any other requests" on the Andaman and Nicobar chain or elsewhere and was eager to use official development assistance to enhance India's "connectivity" with countries that are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

"We usually start with small projects and go bigger," he said.

He said construction of the power station could start in the next fiscal year, which begins in April.

The Andaman and Nicobar chain is made up of 572 islands, all but 34 of them uninhabited, stretching around 470 miles north to south.

Used as a penal colony by the British Raj, the island chain was occupied by Japan for three years during World War II, a period that older islanders recall with dread. Jawaharlal Nehru, a former prime minister of India, secured the archipelago for his country in the hurried distribution of property that accompanied the British withdrawal from the subcontinent, beating out bids by Australia and Pakistan.

The islands' importance has increased along with China's naval expansion. The chain's location makes it an ideal base for tracking naval movements in the Strait of Malacca, a long, narrow funnel between Malaysia and Indonesia. The strait provides passage for China's fuel imports from Africa and the Middle East, around 80 percent of its total fuel imports.

Nevertheless, change has come slowly to the islands, where almost all the undeveloped land is set aside for indigenous tribes and wildlife. A plan to lay undersea optical fiber cable from Chennai on India's east coast, so that residents can finally have high-speed Internet access, has been under discussion for more than a decade. Until last year, no flights landed after dark because there were no runway lights at the Port Blair airport.

Defense analysts from the West regard the island chain with envy and a degree of confusion.

"Almost every year, I see some senior Indian military official say we have major, major plans in store for the Andamans, and you're going to see them soon," said Jeff M. Smith, author of "Cold Peace," a book on the Chinese-Indian rivalry. "Everybody waits for the big story to hit on the Andamans, year after year, and it doesn't happen." {Accurate}

A decision to accept Japanese investment there, he said, "would be a sign that the Modi government is getting out of this feedback loop and moving on some of these aspirations."

India has taken "serious note" of the presence of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean in recent years, Adm. Robin K. Dhowan, the chief of India's navy staff, told a news channel in 2014. In January, India announced that it would deploy Israeli-made aerial "Searcher" drones and two Boeing P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft, developed for anti-submarine warfare, to the Andaman and Nicobar chain.

Airstrips at the northern and southern tips of the archipelago are being lengthened to accommodate the long-range surveillance planes.

Japan is hardly the only country interested in taking a role in developing the island chain. India and the United States are said to be close to concluding a maritime logistics agreement, meaning that U.S. ships might be allowed to make port calls in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the future, defense analysts say.

The chain's location provides a "perfect geographic position" for maritime aerial surveillance, said Rory Medcalf, head of the National Security College at Australian National University.

"If India were more open to allowing friendly foreign countries access and awareness in the Andamans, it would find them more forthcoming as well," he said.

In Port Blair, there is the feeling that the outside world, once distant, is drawing nearer.

The front page of the Andaman Express, a daily newspaper, is typically devoted to small-town news about motorcycle accidents and stove explosions. But a recent report on the presence of a Chinese naval submarine in Andaman waters mentioned, almost as an aside, that the archipelago "would become the primary target of the People's Liberation Army if China and India go to war."

Talk like that has brought an edge of apprehension to the quiet life on the island, said R V R Murthy, a professor of history at Mahatma Gandhi Government College. Murthy lives on a hilltop, and in January, when officials in New Delhi announced the positioning of aerial drones at Port Blair's airport, he could peer down from his house and spot them.

"In the old days," he said, a little wistfully, "this was the safest place in the world."

[SSridhar]

US in talks to base long-range bombers in Australia - Straits Times

The United States is in talks to base long-range bombers in Australia, US defence officials said, within striking distance of the South China Sea.

The deployments could include B-1 bombers and an expansion of B-52 bomber missions, said Lieutenant-Colonel Damien Pickart, a spokesman for the US Air Force in the Pacific. He stressed that discussions were continuing and no decisions had yet been reached.

"These bomber rotations provide opportunities for our airmen to advance and strengthen our regional alliances and provide (Pacific Air Forces) and US Pacific Command leaders with a credible global strike and deterrence capability to help maintain peace and security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region," he said.

The US does not currently fly B-1 bombers from Australia, but does conduct periodic B-52 missions.

Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull declined to comment on the discussions. "I can just assure you that everything we do in this area is very carefully determined to ensure that our respective military forces work together as closely as possible in our mutual national interests," he told reporters yesterday.

Should an agreement be reached, it would position further US military aircraft close to the disputed South China Sea and risk angering China, analysts said.

China yesterday expressed concern over the prospect of having the bombers based in Australia. "Cooperation among relevant countries should protect regional peace and stability, and not target the interests of third parties," said its Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei.

China claims almost all of the South China Sea, but Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have overlapping claims.

In recent years, an increasingly assertive Beijing has been backing up its territorial claims with land reclamation, as well as construction of ports and airstrips on the tiny reefs and islands of the Spratlys and the Paracels.

Analysts said the build-up had made it easier for Chinese ships to operate for long periods in the Spratlys without returning to the Chinese mainland. "Now Chinese ships can stay out in the Spratlys whenever they want, pretty confidently," said Mr Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

China's activities in the South China Sea again came under the spotlight this week, with new satellite imagery showing a marked expansion of dredging and land filling at North Island in the Paracels.

The satellite imagery from March 2 shows new terrain linking North Island with Middle Island, along a long and straight reef structure that could accommodate a runway and parallel taxiway, according to an article on The Diplomat website. The dimensions of the new terrain were equivalent to those recently built by China at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys, said the article.

The new landfill is 12km north of Woody Island, which grabbed headlines last month with reports that China had deployed HQ-9 surface- to-air missiles there.

The deployment, said analysts, is aimed at sending a message to Washington. The US Navy has been carrying out freedom of navigation exercises, sailing and flying near disputed islands to underscore its rights to operate in the seas.

Last week, it sent aircraft carrier John C. Stennis and four other American warships into the South China Sea for what were described as routine exercises.

But numerous Chinese naval ships were operating nearby, the US Navy said, noticeably more than in past years.

A Chinese officer told the state media that the ships were there to "monitor, identify, follow and expel" foreign vessels and aircraft, depending on how close they came to "our islands".

The encounter, which passed without incident, was the latest episode in a wary stand-off between the two major powers over the South China Sea.

[SSridhar]

IAF reactivates two landing grounds in Arunachal Pradesh - The Hindu

Boosting the nation’s rapid airlift capability for forward operations and troop deployment, the Indian Air Force re-activated two upgraded Advanced Landing Grounds (ALG) at Ziro and Along in Arunachal Pradesh on Saturday.

“The ALGs will further enhance our existing operational capabilities in Eastern Air Command,” Air Marshal C. Hari Kumar, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Air Command said during the inauguration of ALG at Ziro.

He later inaugurated the ALG at Along. Further underscoring the significance he said that “the capacity build-up will enable operations by some of our new inductions including the C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft”.

This will give the ability to rapidly airlift troops in case of hostilities or a standoff. India has belatedly embarked on a major drive to operationalise the ALGs which have not been in use for decades.

In the mid-eighties Vayudoot Airlines had operated from Ziro airfield and the IAF too had operated a flying detachment from for air maintenance. Subsequently the airfield fell out of use.

Following an approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in June 2009, the IAF began an ambitious plan to upgrade and operationalise the existing eight ALGs.

The IAF took over the Ziro airfield from Airport Authority of India (AAI) in August 2010.

The ALGs for upgradation include Tuting, Mechuka, Along, Tawang, Ziro, Pasighat, Walong and Vijaynagar in Arunachal Pradesh. The outlay plan for the upgradation of ALGs alone is nearly Rs. 1,000 crore.

Officials said that three more ALGs — Mechuka, Pasighat, Tuting — are scheduled to be inaugurated in the next three months. The ALG at Tawang, which was taken up in 2014, is ongoing and is expected to be ready by September this year.

With the inauguration of the ALGs at Ziro and Along, altogether three ALGs have since got upgraded with paved runway surfaces and other facilities, officials added.

[SSridhar]

Chinese Army troops spotted along Line of Control in Pakistan-occupied - PTI

After frequent incursions in Ladakh area, Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops have been spotted at forward posts along the Line of Control (LoC) on the Pakistani side of Kashmir, ringing alarm bells in the security grid.

The Army has spotted presence of senior PLA officials at the forward posts opposite Nowgam sector in North Kashmir after which some intercepts of Pakistani army officers suggested that the Chinese troops have come to create some infrastructure along the LoC, sources in the know of developments said today.

Army has officially maintained complete silence on the issue but have been constantly updating various intelligence agencies about the presence of PLA troops along the Line of Control, the sources said.

The PLA troops were first spotted in the later part of the last year and ever since their presence was witnessed opposite Tangdhar sector as well. In this area, Chinese government-owned China Gezhouba Group Company Limited has been building a Jhelum-Neelum 970 MW Hydel power project.

The hydel project is being built in response to India's Kishanganga power project being built in Bandipore of North Kashmir. The Indian project is designed to divert water from the Kishanganga River to a power plant in the Jhelum River basin and will have an installed capacity of 330 MW. Construction on the project began in 2007 and is expected to be complete this year.

The intercepts also suggested that Chinese PLA would be digging some tunnels in Leepa Valley, located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), to build an all-weather road which will serve as an alternate route to reach Karakoram Highway.

The visit by PLA officials is seen by experts as part of Beijing's 46 billion dollar China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC) under which Gwadar port in Karachi is linked to Chinese Xinjiang province through Karakoram highway, an area under illegal occupation of China.

As the CPEC project was given final shape, India had last year registered its protest against the presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit and Baltistan, an area in PoK, saying that it was unacceptable to India.

In the meantime, some of the experts in the nation's security grid have been giving serious thoughts to the presence of PLA in close proximity with Pakistani army officials. Chinese officials have maintained that CPEC was an economical package to link Asia with Eurasia.

Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, who has been part of think-tank on Indian policy towards China, feels that the over growing presence of Chinese PLA was a cause of worry for India.

"What we know is that China is going to raise three divisions of its PLA under a local name in PoK that will guard the Chinese interests in occupied Kashmir. One needs to understand the game plan of Beijing," he said.

Reports emerging from PoK were suggesting that PLA under a local name will establish a security wing in the PoK so that India does not protest. The new three divisions, around 30,000 men, will be deployed in and around the installations built by the Chinese firms, the sources said, adding this way Beijing can also justify its presence along the LoC in northern part of Kashmir.

[vasu raya]

Omar questions separatists' silence over Chinese troops in PoK

Former Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah on Sunday hit out at separatist groups for maintaining silence over the presence of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops along the Line of Control in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

"How is it that Kashmiri leaders who have so much to say about Indian troops in J&K have nothing to say about Chinese troops across the LoC?" Omar tweeted.

After frequent incursions in Ladakh area, PLA troops have been spotted at forward posts along the Line of Control (LoC) on the Pakistani side of Kashmir, ringing alarm bells in the security establishment.

The Army spotted senior PLA officials at the forward posts opposite Nowgam sector in North Kashmir after which some intercepts of Pakistani army officers suggested that the Chinese troops have come to create some infrastructure along the LoC, sources in the know of developments said.

now infidels are on the other side too ...

[SSridhar]

Officers rue ‘timid’ strategy on China - Josy Joseph, The Hindu

India will be making only incremental improvement to its military infrastructure along the border with China, even as its most ambitious plan for dealing with the neighbour’s military prowess is stuck because of a resource crunch.

Military officers describe the China strategy as “timid” and no match to the aggressive modernisation of border capabilities and overhaul of military structure by the neighbour. “The momentum is lost,” a senior officer said on the adverse impact of lack of resources for the upgrade of military infrastructure.

The Indian Air Force, which re-launched two upgraded advanced landing grounds (ALGs) in Arunachal Pradesh on Saturday, will upgrade six more of those World War II vintage strips in the border State. The entire project, approved in 2009 and budgeted at about Rs. 1,000 crore, has been inching ahead to provide better logistical access for airdropping troops and equipment in forward areas.

The IAF has upgraded three of the ALGs with paved runway surfaces and facilities such as aprons for ground manoeuvring and air traffic control towers. It says the new runway surfaces and other infrastructure are at par with any other modern airfield in the country.

Three more ALGs — Mechuka, Pasighat, Tuting — are scheduled to be inaugurated in the next three months.

“Those are good moves, but not good enough,” a senior military officer dealing with the China border says, pointing out that these are incremental but not enough to catch up with the Chinese modernisation and threat from across the border.

Military officers argue that the Indian military’s most ambitious plan to deal with Chinese challenge — raising a dedicated Mountain Strike Corps — is languishing for lack of government attention and financial allocation.The 17 Corps, which would be country’s fourth strike corps, is now temporarily headquartered in Ranchi. “There are not much resources available to complete the raising,” a source said.

The UPA government had sanctioned the strike corps in 2013, projecting a total expense of over Rs. 64,000 crore and nearly 90,000 personnel.

According to reports, the Army started equipping it with War Wastage Reserves, in the expectation that budgetary support would follow.

The Chief of the Army Staff, General Dalbir Singh, has said that the strike corps would be ready by 2021.

However, officers said that they were far from reaching that target.

“We have a complete division in Panagarh, and that is it,” one of them said.

A strike corps would require at least two full divisions. With no significant budget increase this year, there is no hope that the second division can be raised anytime soon, they say.

Many officers point out that the policy focus that was brought on dealing with China border in recent years has slowed down significantly.

[SSridhar]

China is attempting to setup a parallel UNCLOS

China to set up maritime 'judicial centre' amid sea disputes - Straits Times

China plans to set up an"international maritime judicial centre" to help protect the country's sovereignty and rights at sea, its top judge said on Sunday (Mar 13).

Giving a work report at the annual meeting of China's largely rubber-stamp parliament, chief justice Zhou Qiang said courts across China were working to implement the national strategy of building China into a "maritime power".

"(We) must resolutely safeguard China's national sovereignty, maritime rights and other core interests," he said."(We) must improve the work of maritime courts and build an international maritime judicial centre." He gave no details. It is not clear when the judicial centre may start working, where it would be located or what kinds of cases it would accept.

China disputes a group of uninhabited islets with Japan in the East China Sea, and also claims most of the South China Sea. Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei also have competing claims there.

The Philippines has lodged a case with an arbitration court in The Hague about its dispute with China in the South China Sea, angering China which has pledged not to participate.

China's increasingly assertive claims in the South China Sea, along with its rapidly modernising navy, have rattled nerves around the region.

Zhou said about 16,000 maritime cases were heard by Chinese courts last year, the most in the world. China has the largest number of maritime courts globally, he added.

Zhou pointed to a 2014 case at a south-eastern China maritime court involving a collision between a Chinese trawler and a Panama-flagged cargo ship in waters near the islets China disputes with Japan in the East China Sea.

The case, which was ended via mediation, clearly showed China's jurisdiction over the region, he said.

It is one thing to challenge the WB & ADB but quite another to challenge the UN.

[SSridhar]

China evades response to presence of its troops in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir - PTI

China today dodged a direct response to reports of presence of PLA troops at a forward post in the PoK and said it "regretted" that the media keeps "popping up" stories of incursions into the Indian side of the LAC.

"I have not heard about the incident you mentioned," the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kong said at a media briefing here, replying to a question about the presence of People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops at a forward post opposite Nowgam sector in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

In response to another question on reports of recent incursions of PLA troops on the Indian side in the Ladakh sector, Kong said "there is no such thing as going beyond the border".

"We deeply regret that the media keeps popping up the relevant issue. The bilateral relationship (between India and China) has maintained sound momentum of development. Friendly cooperation is the mainstream of the bilateral relationship.

"We hope that the relevant media would report objectively about China-India relations and do more to improve the friendly relationship between the two sides," he said.

At the same time Lu reiterated Beijing's stand on the Kashmir issue, saying that "China's position on Kashmir issue is consistent".

"We believe that the relevant issue was left over by history between India and Pakistan. We maintain that the two countries should properly resolve it through negotiations and consultations," he added.

Asked whether presence of PLA troops is connected to the work related to the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, over which India has conveyed its protest, Lu merely reiterated China's stand on the Kashmir issue.

India has conveyed its protest to China on the corridor connecting China's Xinjiang province with Pakistan's Gwadar port as it goes through PoK along the Karakoram Highway.

China in the past maintained that the corridor which is part of its Silk Road initiative is aimed at improving the people's livelihoods and in no way affects status of the Kashmir issue.

Both the sides have established Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to discuss the issue of incursions and aggressive border patrols by their troops along the 3,488-km long disputed border.

In June 2015, China denied the presence of PLA soldiers in POK or GB and claimed that ‘uniformed labourers’ were possibly misinterpreted as soldiers. It also claimed that with India possessing advanced imaging satellites, China could not have moved its Army into POK or GB without detection.

When questioned, in c. 2011, as to why China disputed India’s presence in oil exploration in South China Sea while she herself was building dams and roads in disputed POK, Mr. Sun, Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a very unconvincing and convoluted answer. He said that the South China Sea dispute was “very complex” and involved many parties. China was trying to discuss the issue with other countries with overlapping claims. In POK, China's “only focus” was on the development of the local economy. “It doesn't mean” that China had ratified Pakistan's claim to the territory. “The dispute [over the POK] is between India and Pakistan. So, whenever there are disputes or tensions, China will not be judgmental. Therefore, I don't think they should be mixed”.

[SSridhar]

China, Pakistan ties driven by rivalry with India: US experts - PTI

The strategic alliance between China and Pakistan is primarily driven by their rivalry with India, eminent US experts have said, with one of them expressing concern over Sino-India border tensions.

"China's close ties with Pakistan also raise tension in the subcontinent. The China-Pakistan relationship has always been strategic in nature driven by their mutual rivalry with India," Katherine C Tobin, commissioner of the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, said during a hearing on China in South Asia.

Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation - a top American think-tank - said that the current policy of the US is "hands-off approach" when it comes to tensions between India and China.

"I think the US has taken a very hands-off approach, but there may be some room for contingency planning back here in the US if the Sino-India border disputes were to ratchet up," Curtis said.

"And certainly we have seen on two occasions in the last two years or three years rather, once in the spring of 2013, once in the fall of 2014, that tensions ratcheted up in terms of unusual troop movements by the Chinese PLA forces in the Ladakh region," she said.

"So, it's certainly something that I think we need to pay attention to. I'm not saying the US needs to get involved per se, but we should at least have an idea of how the US might react if the tensions were to escalate quickly along the border," Curtis said.

China, she argued, seeks to build strategic and military ties with Pakistan in order to contain Indian power and to prevent India from extending its influence outward and essentially prevent it from focusing its attention and military resources towards China.

China's relations with India are marked by mutual suspicion, said James F Moriarty, senior advisor for South Asia at Bowerr Group Asia.

"China's relations with Pakistan evolved into an extremely close economic and security partnership. And China's relations with the remaining countries of South Asia remained cordial, but largely lacked substance," he said.

An increasingly close US-India relationship will be key to the US success in the Indo-Pacific region, Moriarty said.

The fast growing economies in strategic locations of the other countries of South Asia require that the US also maintains close positive relations with those countries, he said.

When the US interest in those countries do not coincide with India's, the US should pursue its own interest while being as transparent as possible within India over policy differences, he argued.

"Think carefully before punishing Pakistan. The United States cannot afford not to have decent working relations with a nuclear armed nation facing serious terrorism issues, and one that is already a leading source of migrant flows into Europe," Moriarty said.

[UlanBatori]

Chinese Navy in the South Seas

Argentina sinks Chinese ship.

I suppose it has to be a "ship" if it travelled to those regions. Part of a fleet too.
What next? Marvinas become Hong Dong? Pakistani Expeditionary Force headed to south seas led by Aircraft Carrier "Ghazni"? Carrying 1,200,000 F-17 Thundaar JSF (Joint Sea Terrorist) VTOL fighters?

[adityadange]

I fail to understand how come a chinese fishing ship travel that far? Going by the report it says there were other chinese ships too. So why sink single ship?

[Bade]

The Indian Spy Who Fell for Tibet - Samanth Subramanian, NY Times

[SSridhar]

Myanmar in China’s Push into the Indian Ocean - Joshy M Paul, IDSA

China, of late, has been pitching to increase its influence in the Indian Ocean through Myanmar by building a deep-water port, which includes a special economic zone (SEZ) at the cost of US$280 million. The project is coming up at Kyaukphyu in the troubled southwestern Rakhine Province of Myanmar. The Kyaukphyu SEZ project was awarded to a six-member international consortium headed by one of China’s biggest conglomerates, Citic Group, through a “fair and open bid” in December 2015.1 Four other Chinese industrial and investment groups and one of Thailand’s biggest conglomerates, Charoen Phokphand, are the other members of the consortium. The project is expected to contribute about $10 billion to Myanmar’s annual GDP by 2025, while 90 per cent of the project managers would be Myanmar citizens. The Kyaukphyu project would provide China an effective connectivity with the Indian Ocean than any of the so called “string of pearls”, including the Gwadar port in Pakistan.

The current military government of Myanmar has set aside 1708 hectares (4289.32 acres) for the Kyaukphyu SEZ, which would comprise two deep-sea ports of 148 hectares and 95 hectares, a 978-hectare industrial zone, and a high-end housing project covering 494 hectares. The project is adjacent to the landing point of the dual pipeline that transports gas and crude oil to China {China has commissioned, by c. 2015, a 2402 Km gas and oil pipeline from Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu and Maday island respectively to its Yunnan and Chongqing provinces. The carriers from West Asia disgorge at these ports for the 10 M tonne refinery in Yunnan.}. During President Thein Sein’s visit to Beijing in May 2011, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between Myanmar’s rail transport ministry and China’s state-owned Railway Engineering Corporation to build a rail line linking Kyaukphyu with Kunming, capital of the Yunnan Province of China. Later, in July 2014, the construction ministry of Myanmar announced that the No. 2 Union Highway and the Kyaukphyu-Magway route will be upgraded for better connectivity with the SEZ.

Since Kyaukphyu SEZ is an economic-cum-strategic asset for China, it seeks to avoid provoking local resistance similar to the ones it experienced in Sri Lanka and Africa and even in Myanmar earlier. Efforts have been made to ensure that the Chinese-led consortium collaborates with the Myanmar Government and accommodates the interests of the local community. According to U Myint Thein, Deputy Rail Transportation Minister of Myanmar, who also chairs the Kyaukphyu SEZ management committee, local residents have been invited to join a monitoring group that will watch out for any potential social, economic or environmental damage. He added that the SEZ was a long-term development project that enjoyed public support and would provide local job opportunities.2

Courting National League for Democracy

It is noteworthy that after the reformist government of President Thein Sein re­placed the military junta in 2011, Chinese investment in the na­tion had plummeted – from approximately $12 billion between 2008 and 2011 to just $407 million in 2012-13 due to the suspension of $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project by the Myanmar Government in view of strong domestic opposition. The then Myanmar Government instead encouraged Western investment to modernise the nation. Until 2012, Chinese state-owned companies had dominated Myanmar's oil and gas sector. However, of the total 36 oil and gas blocks Myanmar awarded to 47 companies in 2013-14, none were given to any Chinese firm. During this period, Thai, Singaporean and Hong Kong companies were among the top three direct investors in Myanmar.

China is careful of the regime change in Myanmar. Generally Beijing works well with dictators and gets concession for trade and investment. However, the latest episode in Sri Lanka, where it lost strategic ground to India after the new president Maithripala Sirisena renegotiated the $1.4 billion Colombo port city project after a nine-month suspension of the project. China had earlier faced trouble in Myanmar itself in the form of local protests against the Letpadaung copper mine project in the northwest of the country. Before, in 2010, Myanmar Government had to suspend a $3.6 billion Chinese-led Myitsone Dam project because of the local opposition, as almost 90 per cent of the power was expected to have gone to China. Beijing now wants to avoid similar situation in the case of Kyaukphyu project given its huge strategic value.

With the new democratic government coming to power,3 China wants to regain the position it once enjoyed under the military government in Myanmar by expanding investments in growth-oriented sectors like infrastructure particularly construction of railways, roads and ports. Despite setbacks in the past years, China has been making concerted efforts to again enhance its engagement with Myanmar. Beijing had invited Suu Kyi to China in June 2015 where she met President Xi Jinping, an unusual event as opposition leaders wouldn’t get to meet the president. According to Xinhua, which provided few details of the meeting, China looks at its relationship with Myanmar “from a strategic and long-term perspective.”4 The five-day visit was at the invitation of the Chinese Communist Party and the purpose was to engage Suu Kyi and her party National League for Democracy (NLD). The Chinese Government has also hosted politicians from the troubled Rakhine Province, where the Kyaukphyu SEZ project is located.

In fact, China had started building ties with NLD from 2011 onward and three successive Chinese ambassadors (Li Junhua, Yang Houlan and Hong Liang) are known to have since held meetings with Suu Kyi. Chinese officials, scholars, journalists and businessmen too have been frequenting the NLD headquarters in Yangon.

For Suu Kyi, Chinese investment cannot be ignored. She wants to convert Myanmar into a major economy in Southeast Asia and balance both the West and China in terms of economic assistance. According to Myanmar’s Directorate of Investment and Company Administration, China is the largest investor in Myanmar with $15.41 billion in cumulative investment by the end of 2015. Chinese investment accounted for 26.06 per cent of the total investment of $59.15 billion.5 Again, according to the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC), the foreign direct investment (FDI) is expected to reach $5 billion by end of the fiscal year in March 2016. The FDI is also expected to show 14 per cent annualised growth from now until 2030, pushing the aggregate amount to $100 billion in the next 15 years.

In an interview to the Xinhua News Agency after winning the elections, Suu Kyi while welcoming investments from all countries including China emphasised the need for foreign investors to gain the trust and confidence of the people of Myanmar. She also reportedly praised China’s OBOR initiative, expressing hope that it would benefit all sides.6 Interestingly, Suu Kyi has already indicated that the new government will review previously awarded projects, including the Kyaukphyu project.7

The Indian Ocean still remains somewhat of an enigma to China. Its efforts at securing a direct access to it are unlikely to see an early fruition.

Joshy M. Paul is Assistant Professor, Department of International Studies and History, School of Law, Christ University, Bangalore.

[SSridhar]

China’s Military Reforms: Is All Well With the PLA? - Mandip Singh, IDSA

The announcement of military reforms has been touted in the official Chinese media as a major transformational change in the history of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While the transformation itself is of a large magnitude, it is the ‘reform’ that requires deeper analyses. Three clear deductions emerge:

It signals the vice like grip of President Xi Jinping over the PLA;
It defines the structures for future operations by the PLA; and
It ensures accountability, loyalty and control of the Party over the military.

While this may be good news for the Communist Party of China (CPC), the flip side, which doesn’t find any mention in the official media, is the fallout of this ‘transformational’ change.

Firstly, these changes are to be effective by 2020. Five years is a long time in a rapidly changing China. The first major overhaul in the Central Military Commission (CMC) is due in 2017 when as many as half the present generals of the CMC retire. With over two scores of senior leaders and officials facing charges of corruption, the choice of the new generation of leadership will be a major challenge. Undoubtedly, loyalty to Xi will be the sole criterion – this over seniority and experience. The cascading effect on succession in the newly formed battle zones and corps has the potential to cause turmoil. After all, membership of the Central Committee of the CPC is not only coveted but a clear indication of proximity to the ruling elite in China. As many as 67 members of the Central Committee are from the PLA and of these 41 are full members and 26 alternate members. All of them will be re-elected to the 19th Party Congress in 2017.

Secondly, Military Theatre Command (MTC) Commanders (erstwhile Military Area Command Commanders) hold the military region (MR) level grade. With the creation of these joint MTCs and the dissolution of the four PLA departments, these commanders are likely to be upgraded to the CMC grade and be part of the CMC. This would give them a status equal to the chiefs of the five services - PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF), PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) and PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) - in a ‘reformed’ CMC in 2017. All of these would be Xi’s men and they will see him through till the end of his tenure in 2022. In other words, the total control over the PLA by the CPC is foregone. Recall the unease that preceded the anointment of Xi prior to the 18th Party Congress when there was a call for a ‘Nationalist’ army which could break from the shackles of the Party and have a national character. That glimmer or spark has since been extinguished for good.

Thirdly, the absolute control of the party over the PLA suggests that lobbying and parochialism continues to be prevalent in the system. It is no secret that China’s external threats emanate from the sea and that Taiwan, the South China Sea and East China Sea are its immediate concerns. Yet the joint commands continue to be headed by army men, who have little or no experience of operations at sea or in the skies, leaving aspiring PLAN and PLAAF commanders subjugated to their army bosses. In fact, the joint photograph after the historic November 26, 2015 meeting says it all; out of 70 generals in that photograph, 59 are from the ground forces and only six officers from the navy and five from the air force. One can safely assume that almost all key department heads, oversight commissions bosses and committee ‘honchos’ in the reformed PLA will be from ground forces.

In sum, if the PLA doesn’t change its ‘army-centric’ character and make way for professionals who have experience and expertise in their domain, the higher defence organisation will continue to be weak and the reform only in name. In fact, some analysts argue that the recently released list of commanders and political commissioners of the new MTCs suggest that Xi may not yet have his complete say in shaking up the deeply embedded army bureaucracy.

Fourthly, the lay off and downsizing of 3,00,000 personnel has already shown signs of disquiet within the PLA. While the PLA has announced that as many as 1,30,000 are likely to be absorbed laterally, the fate of 1,70,000 troops is uncertain. The government has hurriedly announced a five per cent reservation of jobs in all ministries for PLA, indicating that some of the ‘laid off’ PLA personnel may get civilian jobs. But senior generals have warned of the need to streamline and plan the downsizing lest it should cause rumblings in the lower ranks of the PLA. This could be a cause of concern particularly at a time when the economy is facing stress and the growth rates are witnessing a dropping annual ‘new normal’.

Lastly and perhaps most profoundly, is the curtailment of the perks, privileges and clout of the PLA. No military which has held absolute power can ‘transform’ its environmental and working culture overnight. The trappings of power and control over resources, and lavish lifestyles and unquestioned privileges cannot be given up so easily by a military used to controlling the strings of power. The miaosha or ‘instant kill’ of as many as 146 ‘tigers’ (officials above provincial minister rank) suggests that seniority offers little protection; the rule by fear has brought decision making, even routine projects, to a standstill. The cleansing of corrupt generals, some who owe allegiance to cliques within the Party, cannot be without fallout and retribution against the ruling cliques. Whether these shall come to the fore will be evident when lobbying and jostling begins at the 19th Party Congress in 2017.

Not all is certainly well in the higher echelons of the PLA. There is always resistance to change and transitions and transformations are seldom smooth.

[salaam]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 494882.cms

[SSridhar]

China, Nepal agree to build first strategic rail link - PTI

China on Monday agreed to Nepal Prime Minister KP Oli's request to build a strategic railway link between the two countries through Tibet to reduce land-locked Nepal's total dependence on India, as the two sides cemented their ties by signing 10 agreements including a landmark transit trade deal.

Oli, who arrived here on Sunday on his maiden seven-day visit to China, was given a red carpet welcome by Premier Li Keqiang at the Great Hall of the People. He also called on Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Oli's high-profile visit comes as Nepal seeks to open more supply routes from China amid fears of a repeat of recent nearly six-month long crippling blockade when the Indian-origin Madhesis blocked Nepal's trade-routes with India, throwing normal life out of gear.

During the talks, the two prime ministers made a comprehensive review of bilateral relations and expressed satisfaction over steadily growing relations between the two countries.

"The two sides exchanged substantive views on further strengthening and consolidating mutual trust and understanding as well as promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields," according to a press release issued by Nepalese foreign ministry.

Trade diversification, cross border connectivity and infrastructure development, cooperation on energy, tourism, finance, education and culture were among the matters that figured prominently during the talks, it said.

During his talks with Li, Oli mooted extension of China's strategic railway link with Tibet further to Nepal.

Briefing the media after Li-Oli talks, Hou Yanqi, deputy head of the Chinese foreign ministry, said: "Nepal Prime Minister wanted to explore two rail lines."

Hou said the government would encourage Chinese firms to look at the internal rail plan and that China was already planning to extend the railway from the Tibetan city of Shigatse to Gyirong on the Nepal border.

"Of course, a further extension from Gyirong is an even long-term plan. It's up to geographic and technical conditions, financing ability. We believe that far in the future the two countries will be connected by rail," she said.

The two countries sealed 10 agreements including the much- publicised transit trade treaty which will end Nepal's total dependency on Indian sea ports for third-country trade.

The other agreements included a feasibility study on the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), China's assistance to build a new airport and a border bridge.

The other agreements included a treaty on economic and technical cooperation to build a Regional International Airport Project at Pokhara, Nepal's famous tourist site.

[deejay]

South Front has a video analysis of anti terror Chinese alliance including Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Video has snapshots of Chinese military drills, command centers etc.

[NRao]

China has a string of pearls on BR too? So many China threads!!

U.S. Casts Wary Eye on Australian Port Leased by Chinese

By JANE PERLEZ
MARCH 20, 2016
DARWIN, Australia — The port in this remote northern Australian outpost is little more than a graying old wharf jutting into crocodile-infested waters. On a recent day, there was stifling heat but not a ship in sight. “Our pissy little port,” as John Robinson, a flamboyant local tycoon, calls it.

The financially hurting government of the Northern Territory was happy to lease it to a Chinese company in October for the bargain price of $361 million, raising money for local infrastructure projects.

“We are the last frontier; you take what you can get,” said Mr. Robinson, who is known as Foxy. “The Northern Territory doesn’t have the money for development. Australia doesn’t have it. We need the major players like China.”

But the decision has catapulted the port of Darwin into a geopolitical tussle pulling in the United States, China and Australia.

This month, the United States said it was concerned that China’s “port access could facilitate intelligence collection on U.S. and Australian military forces stationed nearby.”

It may not look like much, but the scruffy port is a strategic gateway to the South China Sea, where China is challenging the United States, and it serves as a host base for the United States Marines, who train here six months a year.

Critics contend that the Chinese bought a front-row seat to spy on American and Australian naval operations.

“There is a deep Chinese interest, driving interest, in understanding how Western military forces operate, right down to the fine details associated with how a ship operates, how it is loaded and unloaded, the types of signals a ship will emit through a variety of sensors and systems,” Peter Jennings, a former Australian defense official who is now the executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told a parliamentary inquiry.

China has invested in more than two dozen foreign ports around the world, including a port in Djibouti adjacent to an American military base. But the 99-year Darwin lease was the first time the Chinese had bought into a port of a close American ally hosting American troops.

The Australian government did not consult with Washington, and the parliamentary inquiry showed that the corruption-plagued and unpopular government of the Northern Territory, of which Darwin is the capital, had rushed to lease the port to raise money for new projects before an election.

Australia’s defense secretary, Dennis Richardson, rejected the criticism, saying the Chinese could find out what they wanted by “sitting on a stool at the fish-and-chip shop on the wharf” and noting the vessels that entered the harbor.

The lease to the Chinese company, a shipping and energy conglomerate called Landbridge Group, highlighted the competing pressures in Australia between its more than 70-year alliance with the United States and its flourishing trade ties with China.

Australia’s attitude to China swings between greed and fear, people here say. On one hand, huge sales of minerals, property and food to China have kept the country recession proof, and have proved lucrative for the powerful Australian business community and the government.

On the other, the government relies on its deep defense ties with Washington, including close intelligence cooperation, to keep the sparsely populated country safe.

Despite its unimpressive real estate, the port here, which was hit with more Japanese bombs in 1942 than Pearl Harbor, has long had strategic value.

Australia is considering running freedom-of-navigation patrols of the South China Sea from here, according to the American State Department. And this month, the Pentagon asked the national government to base B-1 bombers in the Northern Territory.

American officials say they believe the lease by Landbridge was a strategic deal, not a commercial one. They cited the length of the lease and the fact that Landbridge paid 20 percent more than the two closest bidders.

Among the specific worries, Mr. Jennings said, is that fuel storage tanks used by the American military are inside the area leased to Landbridge. Future construction by the Australian navy for new facilities would be limited to parts of the harbor not under the company’s management, he said.

Australians appear to be worried as well. In an illustration of its pique, the United States commissioned a poll of Australians that found nearly half believed the lease posed “a lot of risk” to national security, and nine in 10 said it involved at least some risk.

The lease was reviewed by midlevel Defense Department officials, who found no problem, the department said. But the review is less stringent for private companies like Landbridge than for state-owned companies, a distinction that means little in China, where private companies often work hand in glove with the government.

The Australian government changed that policy on Friday, saying that from now on, the Federal Investment Review Board would assess all sales of state-owned critical infrastructure to private companies.

The Landbridge website cites the company’s close ties to the government. Its chairman and founder, Ye Cheng, was honored as one of the top “10 individuals caring about the development of national defense” by the Shandong provincial government in 2013.

Landbridge, which is based in Rizhao, Shandong Province, has worked with state-owned companies like China National Petroleum Corporation, which supplies oil to Landbridge and allows it to sell fuel at retail gasoline pumps under the corporation’s name.

“A strong enterprise does not forget to repay the country, while a profitable enterprise does not forget national defense,” the company says on its website.

In an interview in Beijing, Mr. Ye said the investment fit into the company’s strategy to expand its shipping and energy interests and served China’s foreign policy goal known as One Belt, One Road.

[NRao]

PetroChina reports 70% drop in 2015 profits

That is a rather sharp drop.

[NRao]

Chinese businessman admits conspiring to hack US military contractors

C-17?

[SSridhar]

Milestones on Beijing’s OBOR plan - Atul Aneja, The Hindu

In tune with its economic rise, China has taken a conscious decision to cement its place as a “great power” on the global stage. Chinese aspirations have followed the careful crafting of a “grand strategy” designed to best ensure Beijing’s peaceful rise. The core of this strategy is Eurasia and its instrumentality is the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. With an economically dynamic China as its nucleus and in partnership with resource-rich Russia, Beijing has decided to knit the rest of Eurasia with roads, railways, cyber-connected hubs, smart cities, and industrial parks. With the financial reins of the initiative firmly in grasp through the $40-billion Silk Road fund and the 57-nation Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China has begun the journey to generate “new growth engines” along all the flanks of the new Silk Road. So far, the European, Central Asian, and African integration with China is on a fast track.

Obstacles in Asia-Pacific

But the initiative is facing serious obstacles in the Asia-Pacific. The crises in the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea, where the interests of China and the U.S. collide, are emblematic of a tense geopolitical tug of war in the Pacific.

The Chinese are not the first to recognise Eurasia as the gateway to achieve global influence. In his 1904 seminal article to the Royal Geographical Society titled “The geographical pivot of history”, Halford John Mackinder zeroed in on the area from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic as the heartland of what he called the “World Island”. Those who ruled the heartland commanded the “World Island” comprising Asia, Europe and Africa.

Mackinder’s thesis has been forcefully amplified by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a powerful advocate of a globalist America and an influential figure in the Obama White House. In his book The Grand Chessboard, Mr. Brzezinski described Eurasia as “the centre of world power”, which the U.S. must not neglect despite the Soviet Union’s collapse.

While recognising the connection between Eurasia and global eminence, the Chinese are nevertheless scripting a differentiated, if not a unique, discourse. Instead of pursuing the blood and iron path of former colonial powers, they are trying to achieve a great power status through a cooperative and collegiate approach by combining financial and economic heft with eastern soft power attributes.

At a media conference marathon held earlier in March, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi laid bare Beijing’s approach to acquire pole position among modern nation states. “China has the confidence to find a path to great power status, different from the one followed by traditional powers,” he said. “How? It is different in that China will not play the bully. Rather, we will abide by the purposes and principles of the UN charter; and China will not engage in zero sum games. Rather we will pursue win-win cooperation with all the countries of the world.” Referring to the OBOR initiative, Mr. Wang stressed that President Xi Jinping’s pet project was an “open initiative” and not a form of “Monroe Doctrine” to expand Beijing’s dominance.

Growing ties with Europe

The OBOR initiative has provided China significant manoeuvring space to permeate and shake up Europe’s post-war architecture premised on the U.S.-led Atlantic Alliance. The Chinese managed to draw Europe, which has been unable to extricate itself from the pitfalls of the 2008 financial crisis, into the OBOR paradigm through the formation of the AIIB. Britain, defying exhortations from Washington, jumped onto the AIIB bandwagon, and others including Germany and France followed soon after. Cracks in the post-war alliance system, led by Washington, only widened after Australia, New Zealand and South Korea also signed up to the AIIB. It was therefore hardly surprising when Mr. Wang described China’s growing ties with Europe, amplified by Beijing’s membership of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as “the highlight of Chinese diplomacy in 2015” as well as a symbol of an emerging multipolar world.

As China begins its assertion in Eurasia, it is the Asian flank that remains the weakest link. It is in the Asia-Pacific that China confronts the U.S., which is reinforcing six decades of “Pax Pacifica” through President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” doctrine.

Consequently, the Chinese are engaged in feverish diplomacy to undermine the Pivot, which is being reinforced by two vectors: the nuclear tensions in the Korean peninsula and the crisis in the South China Sea. On the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese are unequivocal in advocating denuclearisation, but also insist that Pyongyang’s nuclear disarmament must be tied up with the signing of a formal peace treaty between North and South Korea. If this happens, it would remove a major rationale for the U.S. Pivot. Simultaneously, a formal peace treaty could premise the rapid integration of the Korean peninsula in the OBOR initiative.

Significantly, the Chinese focus on denuclearisation follows two major outcomes of international diplomacy that have benefited Beijing. China fully backed Russia in disarming Syria of chemical weapons. This proved critical in averting a likely “regime change” in Damascus. The nuclear deal with Iran, in which both Russia and China played a major part, not only removed the chances of a military attack but also opened the door for Iran’s integration with the Eurasian core through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the OBOR initiative.

While competition for energy sources may play a small part, the South China Sea has become an open contest for the exercise of hegemony in the Asia-Pacific between the U.S. and China. Many fear that growing tensions will open the door of the Thucydides trap — a state of open war following a contest between an established and an emerging power.

In any case, as it reinforces its European flank through the powerful attraction of the OBOR initiative, China’s grand strategy of cooperative dominance over Eurasia faces its toughest test in Asia.