Bharat Rakshak

shiv wrote:

Sanku wrote: What are others going to do -- know that China can attack viciously with nuclear weapon. I somehow dont think they are quite unaware of the fact already. They will make their peace (a MAD peace) with China and move in US-USSR detente.

You are saying that other countries will start acting like Indian wimps after such a war. Not necessarily.

No I am NOT saying that. What I am saying is that other countries matrix of security is not going to be massively impacted by Chinese wiping out the Indians.

Not everybody needs to fall in a well to know the existence of a well -- so far this has been a trait GoI has followed under a particular stream of thought in Indian polity (no need to make this a India issue as well)

Even in India there is a clear understanding among a large segment -- unfortunately the national will is not fully reflected.

Sanku wrote: What I am saying is that other countries matrix of security is not going to be massively impacted by Chinese wiping out the Indians.

We are going to remain in disagreement on this point.

Sanku wrote: Even in India there is a clear understanding among a large segment -- unfortunately the national will is not fully reflected.

There is a serious enough difference of opinion that makes the use of words like "national will" a debatable issue. There is no national will to test. (There no national will to challenge Pakistan far that matter). If national will to test again has to be created, it has to be credible, logical and appear to give tangible benefit.

If there is national fear of what might happen if we don't test, then the national will to test might be created. Where is the national fear of what might happen if we don't test? That fear is restricted to a significant minority.

shiv wrote:

Sanku wrote:
The multiplicity of voices that you correctly raise as a issue will go away.

The sound of a big bum working is good enough indicator that everyone has shouted in unison.

In fact I put it to you that it would make things worse.

I do not agree, let us examine the clauses.

1. The day India tests again everyone who wanted India to test again will cheer, but will also point out that they were right all along and that those who were opposed to testing were anti national liars

Perhaps, so what? The important thing is that India has a demonstrably working solution, if that means that some prior mistakes are outed. So be it.

India is important, not individuals.

In any case the working weapon will form a new consensus -- even failure will ensure that we need to test again.

2. The international community, watching the repeat tests will understand that India was lying all these years and pretending to be a tiger when it was really a donkey.

They already know, everyone knows, its only in India and partially on BRF that we pretend otherwise.

Our deterrent is working on some what working TN and working Boosted fission.

That is what we have.

They will then judge that the Indian deterrent has been a bluff for many decades and know that India will be vulnerable after repeat tests because the deterrent is not up to the mark.

You are assuming second tests fail, if the second test work, why will they assume that we wont have a working TN?

They will know (assume) that we are confident enough now to try the exercise again and hence have moved forward. In any case they are likely to have a pretty good idea.

The test of TN in invaluable for us to prove our designs were right.

There would be a window of 5 to 10 years during which India could be pressured with intense efforts knowing that weaponization of newly tested designs would take that long.

Debatable, assume the device fails, well we are no worse off, assume it works, its a working weapon design already, just need to make them.

In any case there will be pressure, that is given, we need to factor it. However not a excuse to not do the right thing.

The simple act of sanctions plus transfer of nuclear technology among some US/China and Pakistan would keep India under intense pressure with no guaranteed deterrence.

Different from now how?

If India is a donkey in a tiger skin, there may be some merit in staying that way rather than openly saying "Look - i have been a donkey all these years - and suddenly I want to become a tiger"

No one is fooled sir, we are only fooling our own people.

shiv wrote:

Sanku wrote: What I am saying is that other countries matrix of security is not going to be massively impacted by Chinese wiping out the Indians.

We are going to remain in disagreement on this point.

I wish we didnt, but I cant help it if we are.

But you contradict yourself you know --

If there is national fear of what might happen if we don't test, then the national will to test might be created. Where is the national fear of what might happen if we don't test? That fear is restricted to a significant minority.

Surely you have said before that this is always a matter decided and led by a significant minority?

Even last time, its not like the farmer about to commit suicide in Satara was clamoring for the same? He had other pressing concerns on his mind.

Let me state one more viewpoint. No country in the world believes Indians when we claim that we have only 90 odd 20 kt fission weapons and are not building any more. No country in the world believes that Russia has not given us the technology and data we need. Only Indians (in a minority) believe both these ideas. They may be 400% right but self preservation for Pakistan and China demand that they don't believe that story. So they will merrily keep on increasing their arsenal. Countries will share data if it suits them to hold India back.

Under these circumstances, Indians who call for more tests and doubt India's arsenal will be considered as government agents who are paid to lie and spread misinformation so that India's adversaries believe that India is harmless and incapable.

For countries opposed to India it hardly matters what Indians might feel. All that matters is what they feel.

1. If Indians are confident and are not testing, then adversary nations have to build nukes and build them fast or India will get ahead
2. If Indians do not have confidence and test again, it means that all adversary nations too can restart testing because India has broken the taboo. No country fails to gain by testing. It's only the first country to break the ban that is used as the trigger for a flood of tests.

Either way testing again is not going to do anything other than boost the confidence of doubters within India. It is not going to increase the deterrence value of Indian nukes.

shiv wrote:Let me state one more viewpoint. No country in the world believes.

Sir countries (including India) in the world do not believe. They know.

The business of belief or disbelief is only for us poor mortals.

Sanku wrote:

If India is a donkey in a tiger skin, there may be some merit in staying that way rather than openly saying "Look - i have been a donkey all these years - and suddenly I want to become a tiger"

No one is fooled sir, we are only fooling our own people.

Exactly. We are now returning full circle from where i started. We do not have a deterrent because no one is fooled, and everyone is pretending. The idea that we start testing now to develop a deterrent now is, in my view a worthless exercise for a country that has lied about its deterrent for decades. Our leader wimps will simply lie again.

We could just as well give up nukes and continue with the run of luck we have had. With all the lies no one can deny that we have been incredibly lucky in not getting nuked. yet.

Of course what is funny is that even if we announced that we are giving up nukes, no one will believe us unless we allow international inspections. And no one will follow our example in giving up nukes. But that should not make any difference because we have never had deterrence anyway.

Aditya_V wrote:which they tried in 1989, when they were ready with F-16's in Chaklala to Nuke us thinking we were Nuke nood.

Saar, could you please elaborate a little more or share a link on this in a relevant thread?

Some more fodder for debate

Assume that every country, (Pakistan, China) know that India has no deterrent. Assume also that they know that Indian leader-wimps will bend and give in under pressure. They also know that too many nukes in a war leaves dirty fallout that makes land unusable for decades.

What is the minimum number of nukes to be launched at Indian targets to get to the following end points
1. Control of Arunachal Pradesh
2. Control of all of J&K with an option for Pakistanis to take control up to Delhi

What is the acceptable cost Pakistan/China should prepare for should they be mistaken and India has some working nukes? What would be acceptable cost to Pakistan and China in achieving these aims. If possible the method of calculating acceptable cost/losses should be stated.

What targets would be best to achieve these aims?

shiv wrote: Exactly. We are now returning full circle from where i started. We do not have a deterrent because no one is fooled, and everyone is pretending.

No Sir, not everyone is pretending and we do have a partial deterrent (will work somewhat under some conditions)

Only GoI and some factions of Indian polity are pretending for internal consumption.

The idea that we start testing now to develop a deterrent now is, in my view a worthless exercise for a country that has lied about its deterrent for decades. Our leader wimps will simply lie again.

Again its not binary, as you make it out to be, the right approach to view it is like (IMVHO) sort of activation energy.

The greater our deterrence, the greater is the activation energy against the use of nukes etc.

What a provable test would do is to increase the initial cost for the same.

We could just as well give up nukes and continue with the run of luck we have had. With all the lies no one can deny that we have been incredibly lucky in not getting nuked. yet.

No no luck, combination of some what deterrent, a working guarantee of Soviet Union at one point of time (it is important to note that we felt compelled to test shortly after USSR lost its marbles)

A mixture of semi-working solution + international Geo-politics ensured the survival so far.

However can not count to things to always be constant, need to ramp up for future.

Of course what is funny is that even if we announced that we are giving up nukes, no one will believe us unless we allow international inspections. And no one will follow our example in giving up nukes.

This I agree with fully.

But that should not make any difference because we have never had deterrence anyway.

Again only if you consider deterrence as binary, then yes, if you consider it increasing the I in ROI for enemy then no.

Its a dynamic situation, as Ramdas-ji has been saying.

Just having a nuke will not deter.

For a second Jhapad to be administered after taking one requires lot more than nuke

While small nations might be deterred by chotus

Big gangs require demonstrated, determined, leadership well equipped with a transparent systems that are visible to understand the full consequences of pheli Jhapad.

All this assuming
The opponent is rational
Opportunity costs/loss is unbearable
Most importantly
The opponent should feel something ( every thing of value) valuable is at risk if the first Jhapad is
tried.

Bluffing with a strong hand is better than bluffing oneself to lull with out fully prepared for consequences is repeat of 1962 in a very big scale.

pentaiah wrote:Bluffing with a strong hand is better than bluffing oneself to lull with out fully prepared for consequences is repeat of 1962 in a very big scale.

Well said.

pentaiah wrote: Bluffing with a strong hand is better than bluffing oneself to lull with out fully prepared for consequences is repeat of 1962 in a very big scale.

Why bluff if one has a strong hand? Which country with a strong nuclear hand bluffs? How does anyone know that it is a strong hand if the country is known to be bluffing?

In poker, a person who bluffs with a strong hand only feels more confident when he bluffs and may gamble for higher stakes. A person with a weak hand too may gamble and get away with it. So it is a matter of self confidence.

I have been suggesting for a long time that the call for India to test is by people who do not feel self confidence in the Indian deterrent although they have no control or say in that deterrent. Those who actually wield the deterrent are saying nothing or expressing confidence. No one is expressing doubt. They are not supposed to do that.

Those who doubt them are accusing the wielders of the deterrent as either people who bluff or people who have confidence in nothing. But those who deal with the deterrent cannot do anything but bluff. Whether they bluff with confidence or not is a matter of speculation.

What I am trying to say is that the reasons quoted for demanding testing again have less to do with deterrence and more to do with a feeling of self confidence that deterrence will be better if more tests are conducted. That means that the feeling of self confidence about deterrence does not exist now, in the absence of further testing. That says everything about feelings of confidence for Indians but says nothing about whether someone else is deterred or not.

It is logically wrong to conclude that just because I am not confident of India's deterrent, Pakistan and China are in full agreement with my lack of confidence in India's arsenal and are feeling more confident that they can use nuclear weapons against India. On what basis can Chinese and Pakistani feelings be based upon what I might feel?

A related post....

Anujan wrote:OT but wanted to add this.

The basic problem in India-Pak deterrence is that it does not resemble other deterrence. US and Soviet were averse to even a single highly populated city of theirs being nuke bummed. Because as someone put it "There are not enough bulldozers" (to clear the bodies). They knew that it would set their economy and civilization back by several decades at least, why they deal with cleanup and fallout.

Pakistan is not like US or the Soviets. I would argue that in terms of civilization being set back, the Jiahd factory that they have created in FATA and NWFP far exceeds the destruction of even a nuke in Peshawar. There is no human resource development or infrastructure development or economic integration of that region whatsoever. So Pakis are pretty much ready to sign off a huge swath of their country in return for a few dollars or a for causing pain to their adversaries. They dont care about nuclear escalation because they dont care about its consequences (a few abduls halaled when jernails and kernails are safe and their kids in UK and the US? why do they care?).

That is why India should have a covert capabilities to strike where it hurts the most. Bump off a few Jernails on a regular basis. Leak details in pure green newspapers about the escapades of the princelings in UK and US....

This is what is called mixed strategy.
There is reason that the Indian LGB is called Sudarshan.

Having a strong hand and yet not to follow through is the typical of Indian leadership.

I don't want to repeat the history which is well known.

Just one example

USA had a strong hand in Cuban crisis, so did SU both were bluffing a lot
but saner senses prevailed.

Because the consequences were unbearable hence deterrent worked.

That is the situation we should be placed in, our adversaries should understand that if they call our bluff the consequences will be unbearable, at this time our own leadership is split on our capacity to call the bluff.

One example in Kargil the fear of escalation restrained our calling of TSP bluff
That should never be the case
It should be aar par to quote. Akhand

Shiv

Testing does not necessarily mean our existing deterrent is incapable. It only means that we are enhacing our deterrent further and stating this to the outside world in no uncertain terms. Deterrence vis a vis TSP will continue and dissuasive ability vis a vis PRC will be upgraded to deterrence.

Another factor to keep in mind is that our requirements vis a vis PRC will grow as PRCs arsenal grows in quantity as well as quality (accuracy etc) and as PRC moves to deploy BMDs (they eventually will). These requirements are more economically fulfilled with thermonuclear weapons (as opposed to boosted fission weapons). This has to be kept in mind. It is this sort of upgrade that will happen when we test.

The mistake people make is emphasising on minimality of the deterrent rather than credibility. Credibility should come before minimality. That is the bottom line.

shiv wrote:

pentaiah wrote: Bluffing with a strong hand is better than bluffing oneself to lull with out fully prepared for consequences is repeat of 1962 in a very big scale.

Why bluff if one has a strong hand? Which country with a strong nuclear hand bluffs? How does anyone know that it is a strong hand if the country is known to be bluffing?

I wanted to use the Bay of Pigs example, but Pentaiah ji beat me to it.

Damn.

pentaiah wrote:
USA had a strong hand in Cuban crisis, so did SU both were bluffing a lot
but saner senses prevailed.

There was no bluffing in Cuban crisis

The USSR and USA had strong hands. USSR threatened to put nukes in Cuba. US threatened to use nukes.

Neither did. Both were actually scared to use nukes but worried that the other party was not scared.

There was no bluffing. It was serious because USSR was not sending dummies to Cuba and US was not sending butterflies into the air and calling them bombers. Only the threats were not carried out. That was called "deterrence".

The definition of deterrence that most people seem to understand came from these US-Soviet examples. I am saying that those examples do not necessarily hold for us.

Pakistan has nukes to deter India because it fears conventional defeat. India has nukes to deter China because we fear conventional defeat. India has not attacked Pakistan after that and China has not attacked India. That is called deterrence.

ramdas wrote:
Testing does not necessarily mean our existing deterrent is incapable.

Ramdas the logic that testing may be required to upgrade designs is different from the argument that India needs to test because it has no deterrent, or that India needs to test because I have no confidence in the deterrent, or that I am unhappy that it is only 20 kilotons and not 1 megaton.

You have rightly split away the reality of deterrence from the emotion of deterrent parameters.

One of the reasons that I seem to be arguing unreasonably against a perfectly reasonable demand to test a nuclear weapon like any other weapon might be tested is because no one seems to be able to express clearly why a country cannot be deterred by just one 10 kiloton nuclear bomb?

No country has expressed its willingness to be hit by even one nuke. Countries are willing to take conventional hits from adversaries, but do not want even one nuke to hit them and therefore promise to hit back with nukes where possible.

The logic of having huge megaton nukes as a nuclear response is based on logic that was started off by the cold war. US and Soviet nukes got so big and so numerous that nuclear war became unwinnable without causing too much collateral damage. That is what made those huge and numerous nukes unusable.

In fact the logical reasoning from here is that countries may be tempted to use 2 or 3 small kiloton nukes because they do so little widespread environmental damage, but cause great loss to the country that is hit by those nukes. Small fission nukes are lower tech, need less testing, available more freely and are more usable. The risk that a country armed with such small nukes might actually use them is far higher than a country that is ready to wipe out another country with megaton nukes because the latter will cause much damage to the source country and other countries via fallout.

The point is that deterrence is perfectly feasible with small and relatively untested nukes. The need for testing is more for design validation and stockpile stewardship.

Sanku wrote:
I wanted to use the Bay of Pigs example, but Pentaiah ji beat me to it.

Damn.

Sanku, FYI FWIW Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile crisis are two different events
Bay of Pigs

The Bay of Pigs Invasion was an unsuccessful action by a CIA-trained force of Cuban exiles to invade southern Cuba, with support and encouragement from the US government, in an attempt to overthrow the Cuban government of Fidel Castro.

Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban missile crisis—known as the October crisis in Cuba and the Caribbean crisis (Russian: Kарибский кризис, tr. Karibskiy krizis) in the USSR—was a 13-day confrontation between the Soviet Union and Cuba on one side, and the United States on the other, in October 1962. It is one of the major confrontations of the Cold War, and is generally regarded as the moment in which the Cold War came closest to turning into a nuclear conflict.[2] It is also the first documented instance of the threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD) being discussed as a determining factor in a major international arms agreement.[3][4]

Bay of Pigs==1965 war (USA=Pakistan)
Cuban Missile crisis==Kargil war (USA=India, USSR=Pakistan)

shiv wrote:

Sanku wrote:
I wanted to use the Bay of Pigs example, but Pentaiah ji beat me to it.

Damn.

Sanku, FYI FWIW Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile crisis are two different events

Oops indeed, blame a very night late post for the mix up. Thanks for correction.

shiv wrote:

ramdas wrote:
Testing does not necessarily mean our existing deterrent is incapable.

Ramdas the logic that testing may be required to upgrade designs is different from the argument that India needs to test because it has no deterrent, or that India needs to test because I have no confidence in the deterrent, or that I am unhappy that it is only 20 kilotons and not 1 megaton.

You have rightly split away the reality of deterrence from the emotion of deterrent parameters.

Shiv, with due respects, I do not think that those are unrelated things, yes they are different things, but related. Why do we want to test a new weapon? Because we want to make sure it works. Why do we want to make sure it works. Because we may need to use it, or would like everyone to know that we have a usable weapon of that magnitude should the need come. Why do we want others to know it or use the weapon?

Since the opponent may be able or willing to take some hit (pay some price) -- to destroy us -- if we show a bigger weapon, he knows that the price he will pay will be much much higher.

One of the reasons that I seem to be arguing unreasonably against a perfectly reasonable demand to test a nuclear weapon like any other weapon might be tested is because no one seems to be able to express clearly why a country cannot be deterred by just one 10 kiloton nuclear bomb?

With all due respect, I fail to see why you would say the above -- people have often expressed that countries will be willing to be hurt to a small degree to hurt others to a big degree.

Which dovetails into the next point

No country has expressed its willingness to be hit by even one nuke. Countries are willing to take conventional hits from adversaries, but do not want even one nuke to hit them and therefore promise to hit back with nukes where possible.

That is some what incorrect -- no country has expressed its willingness to be hit even by a small conventional attack -- its not like a nation will go on record and say "Yeah small battles are ok, we are willing to lose about a company to for this goal"

These things are never expressed -- they are stated through actions. And as far as actions are concerned, any country which has NFU, as in the sense already expressed that "its ok if you hit us, but hey, then its our turn"


Also any country which says they are open to First use against a Nuclear power are also saying -- "After we hit you, let us see what you can do to us"

BOTH stances express a willingness of being struck by nuclear weapons.

The point is that deterrence is perfectly feasible with small and relatively untested nukes. The need for testing is more for design validation and stockpile stewardship.

Small and large are relative terms -- barring India, other nations small outstrips Indias large still now.

Let us have a french size small deterrence say?

BTW IMVHO its irrelevant which name the test is carried out under -- if you want to say its for stewardship etc (to ensure that the H&D of the prior lot, who claimed the bum works when it didnt, is preserved) -- it is fine with me.

The important thing is to test, and have a working TN of high yield.

The rationalizations for the same can be many and be all right.

Sanku wrote:BTW IMVHO its irrelevant which name the test is carried out under -- if you want to say its for stewardship etc (to ensure that the H&D of the prior lot, who claimed the bum works when it didnt, is preserved) -- it is fine with me.

Ah now you understand something about people management. If you let your emotions and ego get in the way of what you want, others will let their emotions and ego in too.

It is absurd in my view to conduct tests and say that all previous ones were duds because someone else will say that same thing about the new tests in a few years jut to spite the new yahoos who claim success like they howled after that last tests. All tests worked. The new ones are for validation and stockpile stewardship.

shiv wrote:

Sanku wrote:BTW IMVHO its irrelevant which name the test is carried out under -- if you want to say its for stewardship etc (to ensure that the H&D of the prior lot, who claimed the bum works when it didnt, is preserved) -- it is fine with me.

Ah now you understand something about people management

My problem is simple

In 1974 we said it was (claimed by India ) 12 Kt the world said around or less than 8 Kt.
( later admitted to be as per design 10 Kt so some bluff by scientists )

In 1998 we said the fusion happened but the scientific community was fissioned into no fusion, no yield of 45Kt. Just around 20 Kt.

What we need in the Indian leadership political,military,strategic visionaries, and public is fusion on the capacity of deterring our enemies right now we have is fission and fissures on the yield. This problem with yield will only lead to yield to pressures by external entities inimical to our interests.

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Controversial yield

The yield of this test has remained controversial with unclear data provided by Indian sources. Although occasional press reports have given ranges from 20 kt to as low as 2 kt, the official yield was initially reported at 12 kt (post Operation Shakti claims have raised it to 13 kt). Outside seismic data and analysis of the crater features indicates a lower figure. Analysts usually estimate the yield at 4 to 6 kt using conventional seismic magnitude-to-yield conversion formulas. In recent years, both Homi Sethna and P.K. Iyengar conceded the official yield to be an exaggeration. Iyengar has variously stated that the yield was actually 8–10 kt, that the device was designed to yield 10 kt, and that the yield was 8 kt 'exactly as predicted'. Careful analysis of hard rock cratering effects establishes a tight bound around 8 kt for the yield.[3]

And the NPA ayatollahs cave congregation, preachers , high priests, pastors and parish.
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archiv ... -revisited

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Deterrent has to be unambiguous

It has three principal components
1) clear red lines when the deterrent options even preemptive might kick in.
2) clear deterrent power devices working and demonstrated unambiguously earlier and equipped to use.
3) A leadership that will follow through institutionalized SOPs , dictated by national consensus and secondary leadership in place for the execution phase, should the first one fail or is incapacitated.

Some smart Alec observed this in 1998 in this very forum
" with the shakti test series India has entered the nuclear high way where speeds are unlimited and the only exit out of the high way is exit 1D for disarmament. All we can do is watch our rear view mirrors and change lanes with out collusion but keep racing ahead even if the engine backfires with a loud bang"

We can test our Bum in Iran and promise them some ground nuts like technology for speeding up their Nuclear bum. After the tests, Iran is sure to get attacked and its nuclear capability reduced, while we have validated our 1998 tests. Ofcourse blame goes to Iran.
Two goals with one bum, Iran's nuclear ambition gets decimated(while we sit and eat popcorn), our bum gets validated.


PS: Had a tough day in office, maybe going crazy

shiv wrote:

nakul wrote:Sorry to butt in, but these nos are meaningless as the person who orders the firing of missiles will not know how powerful the retaliation will be. He can only guess.

Excellent point IMO.

That is why India cannot stop at nuking 2 Chinese cities. If India or Indian forces are nuked , India is bound to launch all 75 or 100 "puny" 20 kiloton nukes at selected Chinese targets. That means - for example - 30 to 50 Chinese cities will get one or more 20 kiloton hits each.

Let's say China responds with 300 nukes on 150 cities/towns.

Has China won?

I think that depends on what you mean by "won".

If you define "victory" as improving upon the status quo ante bellum, or at least retaining that status quo while the adversary is diminished from it, then no, China has not "won". That sort of "victory" is unavailable to any power through the use of nukes, and has always been, with the single exception of the US in WW2.

However, once the deterrence threshold is crossed the definition of victory itself changes. As you said in another post, there will be a lot of pain and suffering caused to both sides from using nukes, but no "glass parking lot". There will be a certain end state reached by each side of the conflict, that each side must subsequently recover from. Both sides (India and China) will be unable to carry on a conventional conflict in the immediate aftermath of an exchange such as you describe above; in that sense, any conventional conflict between them will end at the point when the first nuclear exchange takes place. But which will get back on its feet, and be able to restore governance, services, conventional defense, economic stability etc. sooner? If at all?

In the above-described exchange, China clearly has a far better chance of recovering in a shorter time than India does. Recovery to status quo ante bellum may take a very long time, and yes, they will be left in the dust by their erstwhile competitors such as the US, EU and Japan. It's not an attractive proposition...but still, the proposition faced by the adversary (India) is far less attractive. 30 Chinese cities taking a 20kT hit each is a very long way from 150 Indian cities taking a 200kT plus hit each. Given the present state of both parties, I think it's a fair bet the Chinese could possibly recover from such an exchange, but the current Indian union may never recover.

So yes, a China with the capacity to hit 150 Indian cities with 200 kT plus weapons establishes a stronger deterrence threshold than an India with the capacity to hit 30 Chinese cities with 20 kT weapons. Deterrence then becomes a question not of winning, but of having the ability to present the enemy with more to lose.

Deterrence is a mind-game, and with respect to China and India, it's hard to say whether our nuke tests have achieved anything at all. When we had a recessed deterrent, in fact, the Chinese behaved better towards us. After Sumdorong Chu in 1987 they became quite conciliatory in terms of direct confrontation (they were contributing to Pakistan's nuclear program at this time, but did not engage in any more direct conventional adventurism and provocation for 17 or 18 years.) In fact, it was only after the 1998 tests... starting from 2004 or so... that the PLA resumed border transgressions, building helipads and structures on our sides of the LAC, and began to deploy in POK even as Beijing resurrected the Tawang issue. Clearly the 1998 nuclear tests did not add to our deterrence vis-a-vis China, because Chinese actions since 2004 have shown more (not less) confidence that India would not risk being provoked into a conventional war that might go nuclear.

Why was this? Two explanations. One, the Chinese came to believe that the Indian nukes and/or delivery systems tested to date do not pose a serious enough threat to them. Two, they believe that our nukes and/or delivery systems may technically pose a serious threat to them, but they are convinced that India is even more deterred by far greater threat posed by China's own arsenal, so that we would never risk escalating a conventional war to the point of nuclear weapons use. Either way the Chinese have decided that they still have control over the escalation ladder.


No India-China, India-Pakistan or India-China-Pakistan war is going to start with a nuking match; that is a key differentiating factor between the deterrence paradigm that applies here, and the deterrence paradigm that existed between the US and USSR (which expected to be nuking each other very soon after open, direct war broke out between their two countries.) Our wars are going to begin with conventional (border territory grab) or sub-conventional (terrorist attack) provocations, and escalation to the point where one side is feeling enough pressure to consider nuclear weapons use will occur over a time-frame of weeks rather than hours or days (I believe this is true even for the Pakis, much as they might bluster otherwise.)

Thus, the conventional and subconventional path to war is of utmost importance in modeling any evaluation of deterrence in our context; war in our neighbourhood was never going to start with ICBMs flying at each others' cities or pitched tank battles in the Fulda Gap, but with 26/11s and border units taking fire from enemy positions in newly-contested slices of land. China has indicated its full confidence in being able to offer those types of provocations; Pakistan has been otherwise occupied on its western flank over the last decade, but apart from that, it has only increased the extent and intensity of its subconventional war against India since our 1998 tests.

To say that our 20kT arsenal gives us "deterrence" against our two primary adversaries is, therefore, an instance of specious reasoning. Between point (A): exercising options that concretely damage India, such as Pakistani sponsored terrorism and PLA salami-slicing; and point (B): India escalating conventional retaliation to the point where nuclear weapons use is likely; there is a certain distance. The Chinese/Paki estimate of that distance, is sufficiently comfortable for them to continue exercising the options at point A, while remaining confident that India will not move the needle significantly towards point B. In truth, our nuclear arsenal gives us deterrence against notional threats of pre-emptive first-strike by China or Pakistan, which may or may not have ever been real threats; but it doesn't offer any deterrence at all against the threats we actually face from China and Pakistan.This has nothing to do with the idea that China would "win" a nuclear exchange; it has to do with the belief that India will not start one, and thus affords a wide margin of opportunity to damage and contest and contain India without risking one.

Would that belief, in Chinese minds, be changed by the existence of a far larger and far more high-yield Indian arsenal? If so, then the need for further testing becomes a key component of achieving deterrence in our context.

Interesting thoughts Rudradev and let me post a few comments on selected portions

There will be a certain end state reached by each side of the conflict, that each side must subsequently recover from.
<snip>
In the above-described exchange, China clearly has a far better chance of recovering in a shorter time than India does. Recovery to status quo ante bellum may take a very long time

This is an accurate interpretation of what I had in my mind when I suggested that scenario.

What you have done in writing the words I have quoted is to conceive of life after failure of deterrence. That is, China has failed to deter India and India has failed to deter China and they have both done their darndest and after that there is some life left and that after-life would be better for China because China is capable of inflicting far more damage on India than India on China.

So what you are talking about is life after failure of deterrence, and not deterrence per se. But this is a valid thought process IMO but I must point out that there is a difference. Nuclear Deterrence is the possibility of avoiding getting hit by the other guy's nukes. It gives no guarantee that there will be no conventional warfare. The minute the other guy's nukes hit you, your deterrence has failed.

So if China nukes India, India's deterrence has failed

And if India nukes China in retaliation, China's deterrent has failed.

The question of life after nuclear war and the idea of whether my life is going to recover faster and better than the other party's life is fundamentally an acknowledgement that my own nuclear deterrent may fail - that is, my nuclear deterrent did not deter. Of what use are China's 500 odd megaton size nuclear warheads as a deterrent, or for that matter any size of deterrent if that deterrence is going to fail and one must prepare for life after failure of deterrence.

In fact once deterrence fails, the life of your nation is independent of the numbers and megatonnage of your own nuclear weapons but wholly dependent on the size of the other person's nuclear arsenal. If the other guys weapons are puny, your nations will suffer less and if the other guys arsenal is huge, your nation will suffer more. Suffering and pain is guaranteed either way, and even if you have 5000 weapons of 1 megaton each and are ready to turn the other party into a glass parking lot the amount of damage you receive depends on the other guy's capability.

If you feel that the other guy's capability is weak and that the other guy has only 50 bombs of 10 kilotons then you may feel that you are ready to take that much damage. But if you look at the other guys arsenal and find that it is 500 bombs of 1 megaton you may tell yourself "Hey I would be willing to take 50 bombs of 10 kilotons but not 500 bombs of 1 megaton each"

I believe that what you are suggesting is that India is looking at China and saying "Hey we are not ready to take 500 bombs of 1 megaton each" but you believe that China is looking at India and thinking "Hey we are ready to take India's puny 50 bombs of 10 kilotons, so let us provoke India". I believe that what you are suggesting is that China is not afraid of India's puny arsenal and should be made afraid so that they should say "Hey we were not scared of India's puny 50x10kt warheads, but now we are scared of India's 1000 one megaton warheads and we will stop provoking India in future". I do not find this an argument that reduces my fears in any way. I cannot see how an increase in my arsenal will reduce the pain I feel if I my country gets nuked by China.

We are already scared of China's nukes and Pakistans nukes. This question is only about what would scare them. We cannot stop being scared. Chinese and Pakistani nukes are not going to vanish if we get a bigger arsenal. So how would our fears become less if we get a bigger arsenal? Our fears remain exactly the same whether we have nukes or not. We can only hope that China and Pakistan are scared by us. What scares them is pure guesswork. How do you guess what scares them? You have already guessed that what we have does not scare them. At what stage in the development of our arsenal will they start getting scared and how would you assess that?

In case of Pakis, that their country , thier families and ideology can be destroyed.

In case of Chinese, that vast amounts of thier country will be destroyed- like 60% of thier population

rkirankr wrote:We can test our Bum in Iran and promise them some ground nuts like technology for speeding up their Nuclear bum. After the tests, Iran is sure to get attacked and its nuclear capability reduced, while we have validated our 1998 tests. Ofcourse blame goes to Iran.
Two goals with one bum, Iran's nuclear ambition gets decimated(while we sit and eat popcorn), our bum gets validated.


PS: Had a tough day in office, maybe going crazy

There are enough ways of:
1) testing and exhibition; or
2) testing and hiding
without getting Iran etc involved.

Unless off course one intends to involve Iran etc.

Testing IMO has a limited impact on Deterrence.

If anything Deterrence is dependent on targeting and targets.

Rudradev wrote: SNIP.....
Deterrence is a mind-game, and with respect to China and India, it's hard to say whether our nuke tests have achieved anything at all. When we had a recessed deterrent, in fact, the Chinese behaved better towards us. After Sumdorong Chu in 1987 they became quite conciliatory in terms of direct confrontation (they were contributing to Pakistan's nuclear program at this time, but did not engage in any more direct conventional adventurism and provocation for 17 or 18 years.) In fact, it was only after the 1998 tests... starting from 2004 or so... that the PLA resumed border transgressions, building helipads and structures on our sides of the LAC, and began to deploy in POK even as Beijing resurrected the Tawang issue. Clearly the 1998 nuclear tests did not add to our deterrence vis-a-vis China, because Chinese actions since 2004 have shown more (not less) confidence that India would not risk being provoked into a conventional war that might go nuclear.
SNIP.....

RD Ji,

I would like to point out, the by acting the way the PRC has acted. It has activated an other wise quite frontier, where it had enjoyed peace and tranquility, since 87. India may not have gone on the offensive against the PRC, but that is very different from backing down.

The PRC by these actions has made it impossible for the GOI to offer any concessions to the PRC on the diplomatic table. While ATM, militarily the balance of forces is such they will not accomplish much in a straight fight. Nukes or no Nukes. That being the case in this specific context, I feel that the deterrence holds.

There two points on which this discussion keeps getting stuck.

1. Some people believe that a nuclear deterrent should discourage conventional adventurism from China and Pakistan. This will never happen for reasons I stated in a long post in the last couple of days. We are never going to see a cessation of conventional hostilities no matter how big our nuclear arsenal gets. Talking means nothing. You have to use that arsenal and nuke someone. Only then people will get intimidated. No point holding out ones deterrent like a long penis and threatening to use it. No one will be bothered by that any more than Taliban is deterred by US deterrent

A nuclear arsenal is purely to deter nuclear war, nothing else. It is ineffective for deterring conventional conflict in the India, Pakistan China context. It is an outmoded cold war viewpoint that argued that nuclear weapons armed powers would not attack each other.

2. Another "cold war hangover" end point that many people are suggesting in this discussion is one of "Mutually Assured Destruction". That is to say "China has enough nukes to finish off India, so India too should get enough nukes to finish off China." This theory has a very comfortable history and a very reassuring end point. Because both countries are capable of finishing each other off, both countries will be too scared to do that and therefore sanity is more likely to prevail and everyone can live happily ever after, like the US and USSR.

I suggest here that this "happy, certain" end point of mutually assured destruction leading to "stable deterrence" is only one form of deterrence and an unsure one at that.

If assured destruction scares us why are we scared of Pakistan? Pakistan can hardly wipe us out, but is still deterring us. Maybe Indians really are cowards, but we do not want even one nuke on us, while we are absolutely certain that both China and Pakistan are willing to get hit by our puny nukes and are not scared at all by us. In our eyes they are bolder than we are.

I suggest that we are mistaken in imagining that the Pakistanis or Chinese are willing and eager to get hit by our puny nukes. I suggest that the threat of losing 25 0r 30 cities in a nuclear war is scary for anyone, not just India and we are needlessly imagining that the Chinese are not deterred. Deterrence lasts as long as no one nukes us. The Chinese have not nuked us yet. They are deterred.

The Chinese have not nuked us yet. They are deterred.

The above is an extremely valid point. One must accept that war is essentially a continuation of diplomacy and a tool of statecraft. That being the case, what is it the aim of any potential adversary that makes him contemplate the use of arms. What is the payoff, what are the costs that will be paid while that choice is being exercised.

So the question that has to be answered by us is what benefits will accrue to the PRC, when it chooses to nuke India. Which in turn will justify accepting an Indian counter strike on the PRC. The same question will apply to every nuke power. Once you are able to answer this question, you can reply how deterrence works and in what situation it may fail.

shiv wrote: A nuclear arsenal is purely to deter nuclear war, nothing else.

I fully agree with the above.

I also fully agree with the below

2.
I suggest here that this "happy, certain" end point of mutually assured destruction leading to "stable deterrence" is only one form of deterrence and an unsure one at that.

However as a consequence of agreeing with the above two, I completely disagree with the below

. The Chinese have not nuked us yet. They are deterred.

Our deterrence would only be FULLY tested, IFF a conventional war with China stars, goes through a escalation ladder, and turns out bad for China, and still China does not bring Nuclear weapons into picture.


Just like MAD is one form of deterrence, we have only tested one type deterrence, that is, one when things are relatively peaceful with few points of conflict.

Our deterrence remains to be tested in a whole host of scenarios.

The idea of having a robust credible deterrence is one which will work in a large (cant ever claim all) set of scenarios.

I dont think we have that -- yet, but I believe we can, soon.

We seem to be going in circles ...............................

However,

There will be a certain end state reached by each side of the conflict, that each side must subsequently recover from.
<snip>
In the above-described exchange, China clearly has a far better chance of recovering in a shorter time than India does. Recovery to status quo ante bellum may take a very long time

Provided someone allows such a recovery!!!!

I bet the US will never allow China to climb out of that hole IF China gets into one. And, IF China decides to launch even those punny Indian nukes will certainly put China in a hole - however small.

The issue WRT Indo-China is that China would ALWAYS keep India under her thumb without provoking a clash that would in any way push China behind in the rac with the US.

Sanku wrote: Our deterrence would only be FULLY tested, IFF a conventional war with China stars, goes through a escalation ladder, and turns out bad for China, and still China does not bring Nuclear weapons into picture.

Not possible to disagree with this on any count, but looking at it from a hypothetical Chinese viewpoint, one possible Chinese train of thought could be (among others- I am not implying that this is the only thought the Chinese might have)

1. China wants development, prosperity and respect. Not nuclear war.
2. If respect calls for war, it must not become nuclear
3. If the war might turn nuclear, better to avoid it.
4. If war is unavoidable, better to win it conventionally
5. If conventional victory could provoke nuclear retaliation - avoid war
6. If conventional war could lead to Chinese defeat and China needing to use a nuke - try not to get into such a situation in the first place

So China may avoid war but continue moves that earn it respect and prosperity. That would mean that deterrence holds but is never tested the way you expect. In fact credit would go to the Chinese for maturity if this is what transpires. If they keep getting into provocative wars with nuclear armed states, sooner or later a nuke will hit them. having nuclear weapons itself calls for reluctance to use them - at least for normal states.

I saw a news story that Hurricane sandy will cost the US 50 billion. is that correct? Only about a 100 dead. No major buildings gone. A few hours/days without electricity. The entire nation ready to help.

What if a 15 kiloton nuke explodes over Manhattan? What would be the cost?

Losing one city temporarily to a hurricane causes some upset. Losing 25 cities with 50 to 100,000 dead in each , and 100,000 injured should feel different no? For anyone, not just USA. I think the reason why deterrence held between the USSR and the US was an appreciation of how costly nuclear war is.

I just wonder how a government can actually run a country faced with such devastation. News that the nation that conducted these attacks has been destroyed is hardly likely to cause much cheer.

Deterrence works between equals in arsenal and equal in opportunity cost.

USA and USSR will lose against goat herding hut living,camel driving heroin growing countries like TSP
Afghanistan, Sudan, Mali, Rwanda , democratic republic of Congo etc.

50 billion for sandy was the overall opportunity cost not including the restoration costs which will be higher and will come to know later.

That is why creating a low cost monster of Taliban, Mujahadin, Al Qeda and the hosting master environment country called TSP will bite the whole world as you can from Wesr Asia to CAR India and Dagestan

....

It is going to be very interesting future, Klinton sahib fired multi million dollar missiles in Sudan and Afghanistan in the 1990s now the leadership has fancy toy called Dronacharya which they are planning to massively employ in future wars...

They want to conduct wars with out body bags coming home, with no drafts, so that public forgets that war is on going activity like computer game, they might even institute special medals for the men behind these remote controlled thumb employing warriors called
Purple thumbs like Purple Hearts

Purple thumbs as they become sore scoring hits