Kargil War Thread - VI
Admins:
Sorry for expressing dissent...
I request you to consider prolonging the discussion a little more.. for piskological reasons...
if tsp thinks that they can win a battle with irregulars while not providing full military support, the ia should either treat the tsp army as "unprofessional", "irregular" or "illegal combatants"... that is where the capture of a general etc as an "illegal combatant" might not have been such a bad idea...
Sorry for expressing dissent...
I request you to consider prolonging the discussion a little more.. for piskological reasons...
if tsp thinks that they can win a battle with irregulars while not providing full military support, the ia should either treat the tsp army as "unprofessional", "irregular" or "illegal combatants"... that is where the capture of a general etc as an "illegal combatant" might not have been such a bad idea...
in the dch mode right?Lalmohan wrote:look through the back archives, there have already been stories on POW torture, and rescue in that threadrajpa wrote:Hmmm... Maybe I will move this whole thing to the scenarios thread..
i am thinking "i am pandu... pandu ranga.. " mode..

watch that space... cheers
Last edited by rajpa on 22 Nov 2006 14:41, edited 1 time in total.
Really old. But thought it was relevant.
'For 7 Months, We Weren't Told To Fly Any Mission'
'For 7 Months, We Weren't Told To Fly Any Mission'
Air vice marshal and the operations manager with the RAW's Aviation Research Centre (ARC) before and during the Kargil war, speaks on the intelligence inputs given to army and political leadership.
SAIKAT DATTA interviews Ashok Goel
Air Marshal Ashok Goel (retd) was the operations manager with the RAW’s Aviation Research Centre (ARC) before and during the Kargil war. At that time, he was an air vice marshal and a key participant in intelligence gathering operations. In an interview to Outlook, he speaks on the intelligence inputs given to army and political leadership. Excerpts:
What was the situation in the crucial months preceding the Kargil war?
In April ’98, the army and navy chiefs complained to the defence minister of not getting any intelligence from RAW. RAW chief Arvind Dave then called for a meeting, briefed all. We assured that their operational needs would be taken care of. After R.S. Bedi took over ARC, we cut down the transmission of intelligence data to service HQs from 10 days to 48 hours. Intelligence inputs were being given on a real-time basis.
What role did the ARC play before and during the war?
ARC acts when it gets a specific mission. Unfortunately, though General (V.P.) Malik speaks of intelligence failure in his book, the fact is that we were asked to do a mission in October 1998. After that, till May 7, 1999, army headquarters never asked us to fly any mission. Why was there a huge gap of seven months? Someone needs to answer that.
So was there any problem vis-a-vis intelligence gathering?
Perhaps, in October 1998 there was some direction from the political leadership to the intelligence agencies in the run-up to the bus yatra to maintain a low profile. Please understand that in India there is a major problem at the level of acceptance of intelligence. Political masters accept intelligence estimates in keeping with their political considerations. And at that time, the bus yatra fell in line with the political considerations. Anyway, intelligence is the best scapegoat because these agencies work in secrecy and don’t have PR outfits to set the record straight.
What happened after May 7, 1999? This was the time when Malik left for Poland and returned on May 20.
We flew the first mission on May 7 but bad weather prevented us from getting any results. But the missions on May 14, 16 and 18 were extremely successful. It firmly established the presence of Pakistani troops because our May 16 mission revealed six Pakistani Mi-17 helicopters parked in the Mushkoh valley. This was shown to then defence minister and he was shocked. What was shocking is that the army patrols had not been able to detect any of this. That should have convinced army headquarters that this was not a simple jehadi intrusion as claimed later by senior officers. In fact, General Malik called us to his office after the ceasefire and admitted that the ARC’s efforts had helped save the day.
Malik claims that he interpreted the intercepted calls by RAW of a conversation between Musharraf (on a visit in China) and Lt Gen Aziz Khan in Rawalpindi. The truth is this was intercepted and interpreted by RAW before being sent to Malik and the PMO.
But what irked the intelligence community most is Malik’s charge that there was no advance warning and, if any, these were all about "jehadi intrusions". The fact is that in October ’98, RAW got instructions from the PMO to "go slow" on intelligence operations in the light of Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee’s Lahore bus yatra. The Aviation Research Centre, RAW’s technical wing, had meanwhile conducted several flights on its Gulfstream aircraft for real-time intelligence on the Pakistani positions.
Got this through mail..
http://www.petitiononline.com/LtKalia/petition.htmlTo: Indian Government and Pakistan Government.
Appeal of Capt. Kalia's father to all Indian Citizens
Letter written by Dr. Kalia f/o Late Lt. Saurabh Kalia to: A.B.Vajpayee, Nawaz Sharif, K.R. Narayanan, V.P. Malik, George Fernandes
I am proud father of Amar Shaheed Lt. Saurabh Kalia of 4 JAT Regiment of the Indian Army who laid down his life at the prime age of 22 for the Nation while doing duty of guarding the frontiers at Kargil. The parents, the Indian Army but the whole nation lost a dedicated, honest and brave son. He was the first officer to detect and inform Pak intrusion. Pakistan captured him and his patrol party of 5 brave men alive on 15th May, 99 from our side of LOC. They were in their captivity for 3 weeks and subjected to unprecedented brutal torture as evident from their bodies handed over by Pakistan Army on 9th June, 99.They indulged in dastardly acts of burning bodies with cigarettes, piercing ears with hot rods, removing eyes before puncturing them, breaking most of the bones and teeth, chopping off various limbs and private organs of these soldiers besides inflicting unimaginable physical and mental tortures. They were shot dead ultimately. (A detailed postmortem report is with the Indian Army) This continued for about 22 days. Pakistan dared to humiliate India this way flouting all international norms. To what an extreme humanity can be degraded, Pakistan provided an example. However,the Indian soldiers did not break while undergoing all this unlimited barbarism. This speaks volumes of their patriotism, grit, determination, tenacity and valour and the whole nation should be proud of them. All over the country there is unprecedented anger and outrage at this tragedy. Sacrificing oneself for the nation is an honour every soldier would love to do but no parents, army or nation can accept what happened to these brave sons of India. I am afraid every parent would think twice to send their wards in the armed forces if we all fall short of our duty of safeguarding the PRISONERS OF WAR AND LET THEM MEET THE FATE OF LT. SAURABH KALIA. It may also send a demoralising signal to the Army personnel fighting for the Nation that our POWs in Pak cannot be taken care of. It is a matter of shame and disgust that most of Indian Human Rights Organisations by and large, showed apathy in this matter. Through this humble submission, may I appeal to all the civilised people irrespective of colour, caste, region, religion and political lineage to stir their conscience and rise to take this as a NATIONAL ISSUE? International Human Rights Organisations must be approached to expose and pressurise Pakistan to identify, book and punish all those who perpetrated this heinous crime to our men in uniform. If Pakistan is allowed to go unpunished in this case, everyone can imagine the consequences. This is the list of 5 other soldiers who preferred to die for the country rather than open their mouths in front of enemy.
1. Sep. Arjun Ram
s/o Sh. Chokka Ram
Village & PO Gudi.
Teh. & Dist. Nagaur
Rajasthan
2. Sep. Bhanwar Lal Bagaria
h/o Smt. Santosh Devi
Village Sivelara
Teh. & Dist. Sikar
Rajasthan
3. Sep. Bhikaram
h/o Smt. Bhawri Devi
Village Patasar
Teh. Pachpatva
Distt. Barmer
Rajasthan
4. Sep. Moola Ram
h/o Smt. Rameshwari Devi
Village Katori
Teh. Jayal
Dist. Nagaur
Rajasthan
5. Sep. Naresh Singh
h/o Smt. Kalpana Devi
Village Chhoti Tallam
Teh. Iglab
Dist. Aligarh
UP
Yours truly,
Dr. N.K. Kalia
Saurabh Nagar,
Palampur-176061
Himachal Pradesh
Tel: +91 (01894) 32065
Between the blah blah, there's this..
http://jang.com.pk/thenews/may2007-week ... pol1.htm#3
China, the other friend, on the other hand helped us to struggle with the remaking of first generation discarded missiles. Not a single one of the Anza missiles worked in Kargil.
http://jang.com.pk/thenews/may2007-week ... pol1.htm#3
China, the other friend, on the other hand helped us to struggle with the remaking of first generation discarded missiles. Not a single one of the Anza missiles worked in Kargil.
For archival:
IIRC Ray had mentioned the general was planning to write down a memoir.MN Kumar wrote:KARGIL: A RINGSIDE VIEW By Lt Gen Mohinder Puri, PVSM, UYSMThe timing of the Pak intrusion was intriguing and perhaps was the reason for its initial success, which took the Indian Army and the country by total surprise. The perfidy of launching an operation when efforts were being made after the Lahore summit to improve relations between the two sides should serve as a lesson regarding the degree of trust with which we must respond to peace overtures by our neighbour.
Quoting from above article:
[quote] number of issues keep getting raised on the operations in Kargil, some of the one’s meriting consideration will be discussed in this article. Enough has been written and debated on why the intrusions took place and why was the army not aware of this development. Military intelligence has limited depth in picking up information and much is left to other intelligence agencies for acquisition of information. During the operations air photos were supplied to us by Research and Analysis Wing but there was a total mismatch in the interpretation of the air photos with the maps mainly due to difference in the scales with the result we could not with accuracy locate the information available on the photos. Intelligence was a total failure. There was no worthwhile information coming our way and we were totally dependent on the troops in contact. Another contentious issue was whether it was correct to politically lay down stringent restrictions of not crossing the LoC. While we may have earned some brownie points, but strategically and tactically we lost more than we gained. By accepting, under international pressure to restrict operations to our side of the LoC, we have wily-nily given de facto recognition of the LoC as the international border. Statements made by political leaders that there will be no redrawing of borders merely reinforces this hypothesis. Tactically by not crossing the LoC we closed our options of conflict termination in an earlier timeframe and perhaps lost the opportunity to take a large number of prisoners who would have got entrapped by our encirclement. As a result we had to go through a slogging match to recover territory and evict the enemy from dominating heights, thus prolonging the operations and suffering avoidable casualties. Linked to this is our accepting the cease-fire when we were in a commanding position. By the time the cease-fire came we had the enemy on the run, but by accepting it we offered them the easy route to withdraw to their country. As expected the enemy did not respect the terms of the cease-fire and planted anti-personnel mines along their route of withdrawal; a route along which we had to move to clear the area upto the LoC. We suffered a large number of casualties, which reflects on the unsoldierly qualities of the Pak Army. The employment of air has been under active discussion at frequent intervals. Employment of air per se was a morale raising factor for our troops and conversely it had an adverse effect on the enemy. But its effectiveness was questionable. Like us, the pilots were not acclimatized to fight in this type of terrain and did not have the right ordnance to deliver on the target. When they did use the laser guided bombs, their effectiveness improved marginally , but not enough to have an impact on our ground operations or the enemy.
A number of issues have also been raised by Gen Musharaf in his book “In the Line of Fireâ€
[quote] number of issues keep getting raised on the operations in Kargil, some of the one’s meriting consideration will be discussed in this article. Enough has been written and debated on why the intrusions took place and why was the army not aware of this development. Military intelligence has limited depth in picking up information and much is left to other intelligence agencies for acquisition of information. During the operations air photos were supplied to us by Research and Analysis Wing but there was a total mismatch in the interpretation of the air photos with the maps mainly due to difference in the scales with the result we could not with accuracy locate the information available on the photos. Intelligence was a total failure. There was no worthwhile information coming our way and we were totally dependent on the troops in contact. Another contentious issue was whether it was correct to politically lay down stringent restrictions of not crossing the LoC. While we may have earned some brownie points, but strategically and tactically we lost more than we gained. By accepting, under international pressure to restrict operations to our side of the LoC, we have wily-nily given de facto recognition of the LoC as the international border. Statements made by political leaders that there will be no redrawing of borders merely reinforces this hypothesis. Tactically by not crossing the LoC we closed our options of conflict termination in an earlier timeframe and perhaps lost the opportunity to take a large number of prisoners who would have got entrapped by our encirclement. As a result we had to go through a slogging match to recover territory and evict the enemy from dominating heights, thus prolonging the operations and suffering avoidable casualties. Linked to this is our accepting the cease-fire when we were in a commanding position. By the time the cease-fire came we had the enemy on the run, but by accepting it we offered them the easy route to withdraw to their country. As expected the enemy did not respect the terms of the cease-fire and planted anti-personnel mines along their route of withdrawal; a route along which we had to move to clear the area upto the LoC. We suffered a large number of casualties, which reflects on the unsoldierly qualities of the Pak Army. The employment of air has been under active discussion at frequent intervals. Employment of air per se was a morale raising factor for our troops and conversely it had an adverse effect on the enemy. But its effectiveness was questionable. Like us, the pilots were not acclimatized to fight in this type of terrain and did not have the right ordnance to deliver on the target. When they did use the laser guided bombs, their effectiveness improved marginally , but not enough to have an impact on our ground operations or the enemy.
A number of issues have also been raised by Gen Musharaf in his book “In the Line of Fireâ€
I am glad we kept the Kargil thread alive even after all these years. So new factors for surprise are showing up.
ARC flights were curtailed to improve the atmospherics for the Lahore bus tour. These flights ban continued even after the tour was over till the time of the intrusions.
Both the Lt Gen and the Air Marshal speak of the lull due to the bus visit.
From the Lt Gen.:
From the Air Marshal:
To me the Oct '98 flight was a verification before the bus tour to see if there is perfidy in advance. And was TSP informed about the lull in flights by ARC as a CBM thought Track Pee efforts? That would emoblden them to carry out the intrusions. What timeframe were the snow gear purchased in Austria by TSP?
Another technical factor the Lt Gen is talking off is the difference in scale between photos and the maps that led to imprecise identifying of the intruder positions.
He isnt quite happy with the PGMs used.
The politico-military strategic factors that were in play on the Indian side are not yet known despite all these years.
ARC flights were curtailed to improve the atmospherics for the Lahore bus tour. These flights ban continued even after the tour was over till the time of the intrusions.
Both the Lt Gen and the Air Marshal speak of the lull due to the bus visit.
From the Lt Gen.:
The timing of the Pak intrusion was intriguing and perhaps was the reason for its initial success, which took the Indian Army and the country by total surprise. The perfidy of launching an operation when efforts were being made after the Lahore summit to improve relations between the two sides should serve as a lesson regarding the degree of trust with which we must respond to peace overtures by our neighbour.
From the Air Marshal:
andWhat role did the ARC play before and during the war?
ARC acts when it gets a specific mission. Unfortunately, though General (V.P.) Malik speaks of intelligence failure in his book, the fact is that we were asked to do a mission in October 1998. After that, till May 7, 1999, army headquarters never asked us to fly any mission. Why was there a huge gap of seven months? Someone needs to answer that.
So was there any problem vis-a-vis intelligence gathering?
Perhaps, in October 1998 there was some direction from the political leadership to the intelligence agencies in the run-up to the bus yatra to maintain a low profile. Please understand that in India there is a major problem at the level of acceptance of intelligence. Political masters accept intelligence estimates in keeping with their political considerations. And at that time, the bus yatra fell in line with the political considerations. Anyway, intelligence is the best scapegoat because these agencies work in secrecy and don’t have PR outfits to set the record straight.
One question I have is was there similar instruction to the IA not to rock th eboat before the Lahore bus visit? Or did the higher command get lulled after the Oct 98 flights?But what irked the intelligence community most is Malik’s charge that there was no advance warning and, if any, these were all about "jehadi intrusions". The fact is that in October ’98, RAW got instructions from the PMO to "go slow" on intelligence operations in the light of Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee’s Lahore bus yatra. The Aviation Research Centre, RAW’s technical wing, had meanwhile conducted several flights on its Gulfstream aircraft for real-time intelligence on the Pakistani positions.
To me the Oct '98 flight was a verification before the bus tour to see if there is perfidy in advance. And was TSP informed about the lull in flights by ARC as a CBM thought Track Pee efforts? That would emoblden them to carry out the intrusions. What timeframe were the snow gear purchased in Austria by TSP?
Another technical factor the Lt Gen is talking off is the difference in scale between photos and the maps that led to imprecise identifying of the intruder positions.
He isnt quite happy with the PGMs used.
The politico-military strategic factors that were in play on the Indian side are not yet known despite all these years.
Sorry for late response. That means it was the Afghan jihad vintage Stingers that were used against IAF in Kargil and did their damage.Vivek_A wrote:Between the blah blah, there's this..
http://jang.com.pk/thenews/may2007-week ... pol1.htm#3
China, the other friend, on the other hand helped us to struggle with the remaking of first generation discarded missiles. Not a single one of the Anza missiles worked in Kargil.
Ramana, he is alluding to the fact that the PGMs werent used in sufficient numbers to make a huge difference to the overall impact of airpower on the conflict. On the flip side (six men describing an Elephant as you say), the IAF had significant success interdicting supplies and logistics nodes (like Muntho Dhalo), but the individual sangars had enough ammo and food so they had to be taken at the tip of the bayonet.Another technical factor the Lt Gen is talking off is the difference in scale between photos and the maps that led to imprecise identifying of the intruder positions.
He isnt quite happy with the PGMs used.
The IAF effort would have probably told in a more extended conflict.
At the end of the day, the IAF wanted precise flying artillery, from the IAF- this is a role which was very hard to achive at Kargil, since we werent prepared for it, both doctrinally and technologically.
For instance, the IAF was told to conserve its PGMs since they would be severely required in an all out conflict to attack Pak 's more well defended targets, which would require a precise hit on the first pass itself.
X-Posted from IAF History thread....
would like a link to original IDSA site.Aditya G wrote:Recommened reading ....
http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_jul03/ ... sur01.html
The 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on the Use of Air Power
R. Sukumaran *
Abstract
The paper examines the utilisation of air power in the 1962 India-China war and in the 1999 Kargil conflict. The study reveals a certain continuity in the attitudes to the use of offensive air power in limited conflicts. Both in 1962 and in 1999, the use of air power was hedged about with various restrictions. Underlying these appears to be the belief that the use of offensive air power is fundamentally escalatory. Hence there is a hesitation to commit offensive air power assets.
Here you go:ramana wrote:X-Posted from IAF History thread....
would like a link to original IDSA site.
http://www.idsa.in/publications/strateg ... umaran.pdf
Salient points viz a viz Kargil:
- Use of air power should be seen as a 'normal' course of war, and not escalatory as it has been, ofcourse depending on the circumstances
- air force needs significant targets which safedsagar hardly presented. When the opportunity came, like in Muntho Dhalo, IAF did well
- process to raise request for air power from Army takes too much time loosing crucial lives in the process
- Stressing on sanctity of LoC, especially for air force was not in our interests
To argue that the use of air power is escalatory is to miss the point. There
is no uniform agreement on what causes escalation. Escalation is contextual.
It depends on the subliminal messages that are transmitted, both before and
during the action, by the actors involved. The message that India needs to
send is that our aims are limited. India will respond strongly to any aggression,
but in context. However, our action must be tailored carefully to the context
and be perceived as such. Punishment must swiftly follow the crime, or the
connection is lost. Limited war “reflects an attempt to affect the opponent’s
will, not to crush it.â€
Worth a read....... brought tears to my eyes....... glad not every Indian journo is a DDM
http://tinyurl.com/2naphx
http://tinyurl.com/2naphx
AdrijaAdrija wrote:Worth a read....... brought tears to my eyes....... glad not every Indian journo is a DDM
http://tinyurl.com/2naphx
The best find of 2007. I was in tears, too. How could you cry if you read this article....
NDTV is doing a great service to nation by informing Indian Public about their Military.
If Indian Jawan is an Unskilled labour, this JAWAN has my respect, undying gratitude.Many indeed joined, cause they wanted a job pure and simple but to say that a man would crawl up steep mountain slopes, braving bullets and shells, getting torn to bits, because the Government of India in their benign largesse was paying them Rs 15,000 a month, jawans Rs 7,000 ( they are equated with unskilled labour)!, is simply not understanding the strength of that Idea called India. Yes for many it is a job that feeds their family but if money translated into courage, a battalion of millionaire CEO's would have fought harder, a troop of our Bombay filmstars would have walked up the slopes smoking cigarettes cracking jokes.
This is the awakening of this nation. When our regionalism, differences disappear and we stand united as one nation, one people.When young Lt Kengruse joined his unit straight out of the academy, he was the leader of a group of men most of whom had seen many years of service in the army. For the Jats and Rajputs of 2 RajRif , Kengruse, a Naga boy, would have been as strange as a man from outer space but then for Bhup Singh from Jhunjunu and Ram Singh from Jodhpur, he was their Sahib.
So they put their lives in an envelope and gave it to Kengruse, him they would follow, if he made a mistake, they would pay with their blood. They ask only one thing, that he believe in them as much as they believe in him, that he dance with them at the Barakhana, that he eat their Churma, learn to sing their Ragini's, him they would trust and this is the fellowship of the soldier.
I hope we have some leaders who will read this article and atleast make the pay of these officers and jawan's more in line with reality.
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I'll never like NDTV. When they laud the sacrifices of soldiers, they only do it to kiss ass with the public. Then meanwhile they turn right around and start playing Tehelka-style games to bolster their Kangress cronies.Baljeet wrote:AdrijaAdrija wrote:Worth a read....... brought tears to my eyes....... glad not every Indian journo is a DDM
http://tinyurl.com/2naphx
The best find of 2007. I was in tears, too. How could you cry if you read this article....
NDTV is doing a great service to nation by informing Indian Public about their Military.
There is a rational and ethical disconnect, here.
Sorry, but the Leftist Neville Chamberlains are the ones who brought us Kargil in the first place. No point in supporting Leftists, who then bring us more Kargil disasters, which we then commiserate over, to the delight of NDTV media handlers who cash in at every stage in this Sisyphian cycle.
-a superb write up that captures the significance of KargilSo how does one describe this feat, for me the closest word that comes to mind is BALIDAN, its a word that has as far as I know no perfect equivalent in English. Sacrifice has nothing of the romance and nobility of the Hindi word and yet you realise that these 600, they were all like you and me. This bloodletting wasn't confined to a certain class or clan, these boys weren't a handpicked lot, it is what they achieved that made them select. And that is why Kargil touched such a cord among the common Indian. For the first time this lost generation saw their country differently, some were amazed that there were among them people who thought it was worth dying for, fighting for India. That this land had something, the spirit of Kargil, the real victory of Kargil, is that awakening,
The Siachen piece is great as well
http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/sh ... 0070031621
(Frozen Hell of Siachen)
http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/sh ... 0070031621
(Frozen Hell of Siachen)
Yes, both pieces are wonderfully written, It is indeed a gift some people have , they manage to put in words their innermost thoughts. That Kargil piece brought a lump in my throat, tears in my eyes.
Kudos Randeep Singh Nandal. Perhaps growing up in an army family helps, you develop an insight, empathy ...
Other articles by him:
Languid Liquid Afternoons
The love of the hills
Kudos Randeep Singh Nandal. Perhaps growing up in an army family helps, you develop an insight, empathy ...
Other articles by him:
Languid Liquid Afternoons
The love of the hills
SanjaySanjay M wrote:I'll never like NDTV. When they laud the sacrifices of soldiers, they only do it to kiss ass with the public. Then meanwhile they turn right around and start playing Tehelka-style games to bolster their Kangress cronies.Baljeet wrote: Adrija
The best find of 2007. I was in tears, too. How could you cry if you read this article....
NDTV is doing a great service to nation by informing Indian Public about their Military.
There is a rational and ethical disconnect, here.
Sorry, but the Leftist Neville Chamberlains are the ones who brought us Kargil in the first place. No point in supporting Leftists, who then bring us more Kargil disasters, which we then commiserate over, to the delight of NDTV media handlers who cash in at every stage in this Sisyphian cycle.
Your point of view and opinion is well respected. Your gripe with NDTV is with their business model, "working with the system" not so much with Vishnu Som and Randeep Nandal. I am sure most people will agree, "we could care less what they do for their rating, increasing their revenue". Their revenue does not come from heart wrenching stories but from the number of viewership and advertising Rupees. Their tehlka style game is to attract advertising rupees, their stories by Vishnu Som and Randeep Nandal shows where their heart is.
Business has no place for emotions just cold hearted numbers game.
Just my two cents.
I agree jagan boss.Jagan wrote:The Siachen piece is great as well
http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/sh ... 0070031621
(Frozen Hell of Siachen)
Throughout the history of Modern India there has not been a single politician who has run on the platform that "National Security of India is paramount, he will do everything in his power to make sure, this nation is secure, defenders of this nation, Internal and External security are well taken care of". We have politicians who are more interested in using the constituition as their mistress, close to 100 amendments in 60 years..damn. Providing measly welfare to people who hate welfare but want jobs, growth opportunity to progress and succeed in life.
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Baljeet,Baljeet wrote:Sanjay
Your point of view and opinion is well respected. Your gripe with NDTV is with their business model, "working with the system" not so much with Vishnu Som and Randeep Nandal. I am sure most people will agree, "we could care less what they do for their rating, increasing their revenue". Their revenue does not come from heart wrenching stories but from the number of viewership and advertising Rupees. Their tehlka style game is to attract advertising rupees, their stories by Vishnu Som and Randeep Nandal shows where their heart is.
Business has no place for emotions just cold hearted numbers game.
Just my two cents.
You are bang on point. Another point is, they do not have complete information.They depend on the guide to tell them every thing and they can still get it wrong. You need a proper military historian for this. The defence journalists in major papers are actually a double up. They do defence journalism also. Even if they have formal training, they are jack of the trades.
Kargil War Heroes
They'd promised their families they'd come back soon. They more than kept their word. Went as mere men. Came back as heroes. In coffins.
"THEY GAVE THEIR TODAY FOR OUR TOMORROW"
http://kashmir-information.com/kargilheroes/index.html
They'd promised their families they'd come back soon. They more than kept their word. Went as mere men. Came back as heroes. In coffins.
"THEY GAVE THEIR TODAY FOR OUR TOMORROW"
http://kashmir-information.com/kargilheroes/index.html
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Tremondous article. He felt and he wrote what he felt.Adrija wrote:Worth a read....... brought tears to my eyes....... glad not every Indian journo is a DDM
http://tinyurl.com/2naphx
Brought tears to my eyes.
The Army site lists the following casualities for its "VIKAS" regiment
Code: Select all
Army No Rank Name Arm/Service Operation Home State Click below to
63508 ASL Thupten Gyaltso VIKAS OP VIJAY(KARGIL) Jammu & Kashmir
67788 TPR Tenzin Namkha VIKAS OP VIJAY(KARGIL) Uttaranchal
68067 TPR Jigga VIKAS OP VIJAY(KARGIL) Uttar Pradesh
68136 TPR Dorjee Phuntsok VIKAS OP VIJAY(KARGIL) Arunachal Pradesh
68238 TPR Nyima Tashi VIKAS OP VIJAY(KARGIL) Arunachal Pradesh
Non Kargil
68551 TPR LAXMI PRASAD DAWADI VIKAS -- --
JC-183583 SUB BHUP SINGH VIKAS OP RAKSHAK(J&K) Haryana
JC-412080 SUB RAJ KUMAR VIKAS OP RAKSHAK(J&K) Haryana
14583243 NK SAROJ KUMAR VIKAS -- Bihar
14905551 HAV EKAL BHAGAT SINGH VIKAS OP RAKSHAK(J&K) Maharashtra
X-posted....
On the contrary there is body of opinon that Kargil happened due to the tests. The above reports is psy-ops on part of US admin officials and is allwed because the Indian side is still mum about the whole charade.Tamang wrote:Nuclear tests deterred India from 'punishing' Pakistan
The 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan marked a watershed in the nuclear history history in the sub-continent, and deterred New Delhi from 'punishing' its neighbour after Kargil war and the 2001 Parliament attack, US experts have opined at a major conference in Washington.
Related videos:pradeepe wrote:Tremondous article. He felt and he wrote what he felt.Adrija wrote:Worth a read....... brought tears to my eyes....... glad not every Indian journo is a DDM
http://tinyurl.com/2naphx
Brought tears to my eyes.
http://youtube.com/watch?v=cya_HIH2d2Y
http://youtube.com/watch?v=M4T2nPxQ3JU
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New book says Kargil plan was made before 1999
IANS
Published: May 04, 2008, 00:12
Islamabad: A new book reveals that Pakistan planned its costly Kargil military operation, which almost triggered a major war with India, years before it actually happened in the summer of 1999.
The book, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within, comes up with admissions by the assassinated Benazir Bhutto and former army chief Jehangir Karamat that Kargil was discussed in the mid-90s, The Daily Times reported yesterday.
Pakistan's former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz endorses this view.
President Pervez Musharraf is widely believed to be the man who planned and executed the Kargil operation in which hundreds of Islamist guerrillas seized the Kargil hill in Jammu and Kashmir, surprising India.
Bhutto told author Shuja Nawaz, a former journalist with The New York Times, that Musharraf had discussed Kargil with her when she was the prime minister and he headed the military operations at the army headquarters in Islamabad.
Several times
Bhutto said Musharraf, while presenting a war game, recommended a military incursion into Indian Kashmir and the seizure of its capital Srinagar.
Bhutto told him that Pakistan would not be able to sustain the gains and would be forced to withdraw its troops.
Karamat, who later served as the envoy to the US, said: "Kargil came up several times. The Drass-Kargil Road was an interdiction target for indirect artillery fire. During my tenure [as army chief from December 1996 to October 1998], India interdicted Neelam Valley road, cutting off Azad Jammu and Kashmir [Pakistani zone of Kashmir].
"We decided to move heavy weapons forward and carry out interdiction with direct fire. This was enormously effective. The Indians got the message and backed [off] on the Neelam Valley road."
Musharraf, who too spoke to the author, holds a different point of view.
He said: "I told her [Bhutto] the time window for the resolution of Kashmir dispute is short. Because, with [the] passage of time, the India-Pakistan equation, military equation and economic equation is going against us ... she minded that a lot.
"I told her that with time, the differential is increasing. Therefore, if at all, we have to do anything, we should be planning to do it in a short while. It was just that I had a more pro-active view on what we should be doing in Kashmir and she did not like that. There was no Kargil type of situation discussed."
Aziz told the author that the operation was planned well before 1999.
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‘Musharraf wanted to take over Srinagar’
[quote]
New book on Pak army says ‘Kargil was planned in 1994-96′
Khalid Hasan
Washington, May 03: A new book on the Pakistan army shows a discrepancy between the recollections of Benazir Bhutto and Gen Pervez Musharraf on the conduct of Pakistan-backed military operations in Kashmir.
The new book-Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within-by Shuja Nawaz reproduces the author’s conversations at different times between the late Pakistan Peoples’ Party chairwoman and the former chief of the Pakistan army. Bhutto told the author that in her second term, Musharraf, then head of military operations at army headquarters, while presenting a war game on Kashmir, recommended a military incursion into the Indian-administrated Kashmir and the taking over of Srinagar. Bhutto, however, reminded him that Pakistan would not be able to sustain the gains and would be forced to withdraw.
Musharraf’s recollection is different. He said, “I told her that the time window for the resolution of Kashmir dispute is short. Because, with (the) passage of time, the India-Pakistan equation, military equation and economic equation is going against us … she minded that a lot.â€
[quote]
New book on Pak army says ‘Kargil was planned in 1994-96′
Khalid Hasan
Washington, May 03: A new book on the Pakistan army shows a discrepancy between the recollections of Benazir Bhutto and Gen Pervez Musharraf on the conduct of Pakistan-backed military operations in Kashmir.
The new book-Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within-by Shuja Nawaz reproduces the author’s conversations at different times between the late Pakistan Peoples’ Party chairwoman and the former chief of the Pakistan army. Bhutto told the author that in her second term, Musharraf, then head of military operations at army headquarters, while presenting a war game on Kashmir, recommended a military incursion into the Indian-administrated Kashmir and the taking over of Srinagar. Bhutto, however, reminded him that Pakistan would not be able to sustain the gains and would be forced to withdraw.
Musharraf’s recollection is different. He said, “I told her that the time window for the resolution of Kashmir dispute is short. Because, with (the) passage of time, the India-Pakistan equation, military equation and economic equation is going against us … she minded that a lot.â€
Here's another beautifully written piece from rediff
http://specials.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/17batra.htm
http://specials.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/17batra.htm
from memory, other pak sources quoted on brf have revealed that kargil plans are older than vajpayee visit - operation tupac i think it was? B^3 had claimed that she put a stop to it during her 'coming out' last year
that sharief knew after point x is no surprise, many sources have talked about him being brought on board after it started.
this source claims that sharief could have stopped it. i doubt it - firstly, if it worked he could claim the glory. secondly, he probably assumed that the army would have eaten him if he intervened. by the time he involved clinton the chips were truly down, and according to strobe talbot i think it was, sharief showed up for the 4th july meeting with clinton with his family in town in case of coups back home
i will give credit to mushy for figuring out that the strategic window was closing, and it has now truly closed. the last throw of the dice did not work
that sharief knew after point x is no surprise, many sources have talked about him being brought on board after it started.
this source claims that sharief could have stopped it. i doubt it - firstly, if it worked he could claim the glory. secondly, he probably assumed that the army would have eaten him if he intervened. by the time he involved clinton the chips were truly down, and according to strobe talbot i think it was, sharief showed up for the 4th july meeting with clinton with his family in town in case of coups back home
i will give credit to mushy for figuring out that the strategic window was closing, and it has now truly closed. the last throw of the dice did not work