Bharat Rakshak

shiv wrote: This explains why India has not made more than 60 warheads. They are of no use to India. It is clear that India does not need nuclear weapons. Especially the 4 kt fizzles we have.

Please elaborate. Am confused onlee. How would not having nukes prevent a holocaust. East Pakistanis did not have nukes and that did not help them.

The logical response would be to manufacture tens of thousands of thermonuclear 200 kt x 6 MIRV ICBMs.

Pranav wrote:

shiv wrote: This explains why India has not made more than 60 warheads. They are of no use to India. It is clear that India does not need nuclear weapons. Especially the 4 kt fizzles we have.

Please elaborate. Am confused onlee. How would not having nukes prevent a holocaust. East Pakistanis did not have nukes and that did not help them.

The logical response would be to manufacture tens of thousands of thermonuclear 200 kt x 6 MIRV ICBMs.

Please don't take my words as the truth. I might be wrong. I merely stated one view to hear other views. I am sure manufacturing "tens of thousands of thermonuclear 200 kt x 6 MIRV ICBMs" would have its uses.

Pranav wrote:

shiv wrote: This explains why India has not made more than 60 warheads. They are of no use to India. It is clear that India does not need nuclear weapons. Especially the 4 kt fizzles we have.

Please elaborate. Am confused onlee. How would not having nukes prevent a holocaust. East Pakistanis did not have nukes and that did not help them.

The logical response would be to manufacture tens of thousands of thermonuclear 200 kt x 6 MIRV ICBMs.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel_and ... estruction

Israel has approx 400 TNW. Those are enough to take out whole of West Asia in case a single JDAM goes on an Israeli city.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samson_Option
Israel has never tested any TNW. But no one doubts their capability.
India needs twice that to take care of whole of Asia(specially West Asia) in case TSP starts something foolish.
2K number is as not all will survive for second strike. For TSP alone 20 TNW are enough as they'll cause enough destruction that AFG and Iran will take their fair share of the mangled TSP pie.

Tens of thousands of TNW are a tall order even for US. It may be good for Guiness book of world record but has diminishing return.
However twice/thrice of Israel is possible as Indian budget is way greater than Israel's, and so is the threat to India.

Regarding number of weapons that India could possible possess is about 800 per one calculation. This is done a verrrrry long time back. So in the time period since then a lot more sagar madhan happenned and hence we may have crossed four digit figure a long time back.

http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf

By the way that 800 is also conservative estimate onleee

Added later: It is about 240 bums per annum for India's count.

Planning Guidance for response to Nuclear Detonation
Prepared by Dept of Homeland security USA
Very informative

Karna_A wrote:That's wrong information that India can only deliver by planes.

If you count future planned systems, then yes we have many delivery platforms including mobile ballistic missile launchers and also a nuclear ballistic missile sub. Perhaps someday these platforms will become operational.

But we live in the here and now. And in the real world, today, India does NOT have a credible nuclear deterrent. We have perhaps a few dozen bombs which can only be delivered by aircraft like the Mirage-2000 and SU-30MKI. For reasons already discussed, I think we all agree that in a real nuclear war, our aircraft-delivered bombs would almost certainly never get used. The only viable deterrent we have is a tiny handful of Agni or Privthi missiles that have allegedly been modified to carry small nuclear warheads (10-20kt yield). If given sufficient warning, these warheads could be mounted onto the missiles and dispersed into the countryside on road or rail-mobile launch vehicles. But in the event of war, even if all four of five of these missiles and their warheads miraculously worked (and also reached their targets), they wouldn't do enough damage to cripple Pakistan.

What this means is that in a nuclear war with Pakistan, even with plenty of advance warning and preparation time, we'd still lose. India would take 10-20x as much damage and 20-30x as many casualties. That's the best case scenario; if the Pakis struck first in a surprise attack we'd come off even worse.

This is the reality we face in the here and now, thanks to unforgivable and criminal negligence of successive Indian govt's. It's unbelievable that 36 years after testing our first atomic bomb and being in a state of near-war with Pakistan and China this entire time, we still don't have a serious nuclear deterrent. Clearly, no Indian gov't has ever been really serious about this issue, instead preferring to remain vague and count on our enemies' uncertainty, hoping they don't ever call our bluff.

Y Kanan,

You should read Bharat Karnad's book about the exact situation. You are completely mistaken. The systems that will come in the coming years are A-III's and beyond. For TSP, the main syatems are A-I's and Prithvis. The A-I has never had a failure.

Bharat Karnad says that around 200+ warheads are expected in the 2010-12 timeframe with sizaeble numbers of A-I, A-II (even A-III) by 2012. He clearly points out that in a nuclear war with pakistan, TSP will lose because its core pop. centers will be destroyed.

Claiming TSP superiority is ignorance, or worse, anti-national behaviour.

Y Kanan,

Even by the most minimal estimates, there are at least 25-50 (say, 35) A-I's and 200 prithvis. (see Bharat Karnad's book for the prithvis). Even if 35 Prithvis have nukes, there are 70+ missile based, TSP specific warheads. These are mobile platforms.

TSP creates 20* our casualties only if they deliver 70*20=1400 warheads. No way TSP has anything like that. HAVE COMMON SENSE. I do not count A-II's even though they are deployed. Will count them once successful tests resolving quality control probs are done- hopefully by may this year. That will add another 30 or so warheads even by the most minimal estimates. A careful study of Bharat Karnad's book is an ABSOLUTE MUST for anybody to understand which way the deterrent is headed.

Check also K. Santhanam's statements about the TN controversy. He claims that the 25 kt fission weapon is WIDELY DEPLOYED ON A NUMBER OF PLATFORMS". 20-30 nukes is clearly not "widely deployed".

What is true is that against China, there is no deterrent till Agni III is deployed in sizeable numbers. This according to Bharat Karnad, is to happen by 2012......other dates BK gave regarding Nuke subs etc seem to be accurate- this means the same is true about this as well.

The following is conclusive proof that TSP does not have nuke superiority over us: Had that been the case, they would have initiated nuke war and won. They would hardly care about codemnations from the international community. QED.

ramdas wrote:You should read Bharat Karnad's book about the exact situation. You are completely mistaken. The systems that will come in the coming years are A-III's and beyond. For TSP, the main syatems are A-I's and Prithvis. The A-I has never had a failure.

Bharat Karnad says that around 200+ warheads are expected in the 2010-12 timeframe with sizaeble numbers of A-I, A-II (even A-III) by 2012. He clearly points out that in a nuclear war with pakistan, TSP will lose because its core pop. centers will be destroyed.

Actually, I think I will get that book because it sounds like it's got a lot of good specifics, something hard to find in the mainstream press. My impression of our nuclear deterrent consisting almost entirely of non-deployed nuclear warheads that can only be delivered by plane, is not something I pulled out of thin air. This is the prevailing wisdom out there. But I welcome any new info, assuming it's credible.

Claiming TSP superiority is ignorance, or worse, anti-national behaviour.

Don't do that you sound like a Paki.

ramdas wrote:Even by the most minimal estimates, there are at least 25-50 (say, 35) A-I's and 200 prithvis. (see Bharat Karnad's book for the prithvis). Even if 35 Prithvis have nukes, there are 70+ missile based, TSP specific warheads. These are mobile platforms.

TSP creates 20* our casualties only if they deliver 70*20=1400 warheads. No way TSP has anything like that. HAVE COMMON SENSE. I do not count A-II's even though they are deployed. Will count them once successful tests resolving quality control probs are done- hopefully by may this year. That will add another 30 or so warheads even by the most minimal estimates. A careful study of Bharat Karnad's book is an ABSOLUTE MUST for anybody to understand which way the deterrent is headed.

Check also K. Santhanam's statements about the TN controversy. He claims that the 25 kt fission weapon is WIDELY DEPLOYED ON A NUMBER OF PLATFORMS". 20-30 nukes is clearly not "widely deployed".

What is true is that against China, there is no deterrent till Agni III is deployed in sizeable numbers. This according to Bharat Karnad, is to happen by 2012......other dates BK gave regarding Nuke subs etc seem to be accurate- this means the same is true about this as well.

You may be forgetting that most of our Prithvis are designed to carry conventional warheads. Mating a nuclear warhead to one of these missiles is no simple matter; this isn't something you just slap in and go. A credible nuclear deterrent requires dedicated missile squadrons - mobile missile units equipped with Prithvis and Agnis fitted and regularly tested to carry specific nuclear warheads, hardened underground silos with functional missiles and warheads ready to fire on short notice. This is the bare minimum for a survivable nuclear "second-strike" capability (a submarine-based nuclear deterrent can come later).

Do you honestly believe that right now, at this moment, there are Prithvi and\or Agni missiles hidden out there in our nation's countryside, ready to fire? I'll bet money there isn't a single one actually deployed. Do you really think that even with advanced warning, we could deliver more than a handful of nukes using our ballistic missiles? Do we even have a large # of lightweight atomic warheads already assembled and functional, ready to be quickly mated to Prithvi or Agni missiles? Just because we've tested or envisioned these capabilities doesn't mean we have fielded them, indeed there's no concrete indications we've done so.

I hope I'm wrong and India is hiding a vast secret from the world. But nuclear deterrents are supposed to, well, DETER. If we have these capabilities it would be nice if we made it known, even in a subtle fashion. You can't very well deter with ambiguity...

Interesting exchange of views - but I have been having a series of tangential thoughts on the issue some of which I am in the process of putting down in the deterrence thread.

There are some assumptions that are being made with regard to India and Pakistan. It is thought that Pakistan has a certain nuclear capability - let me say Pakistan has X deliverable nukes. The discussion here revolves around India's ability to counter or deter Pakistan. The arguments I see seem to revolve around the number of ready-deliverable warheads that India has "up front" and ready to use. The assumption is that "Since Pakistan has X deliverable warheads India needs X * Y warheads (where Y is greater than 1) to deter Pakistan.

Two assumptions are being made here

1) Pakistan is going to be deterred by India promising to nuke the crap out of Pakistan by virtue of wielding more warheads that will survive a first strike to do more damage
2) That Pakistan is magically aware of the number of warheads India has, and India in turn is magically aware of the number "X" - which is the number of warheads Pakistan possesses so that India can make X times some number of warheads so we have enough to destroy Pakhanasatan.

There are some serious, possibly fatal flaws in this reasoning. Assumption 1 above is a typical cold war MAD type argument. Assumption 2 is what kills Assumption 1. Neither India nor Pakistan have made the number of warhead public. Nothing is known about how many warheads each side has. Under the circumstances how does one develop a response to defeat the other side comprehensively?

Let me give you the answer. The first thing is to not worry about how many warheads the other guy has, but to blindly and single mindedly expand your arsenal to such a large number of warheads that you will have many hundreds or thousands of warheads ready to be launched the moment there if a first strike from Pakistan. So whether Pakistan has 100 or 1000 warheads, India need not tie itself down to Pakistani numbers but blindly keep making nukes and missiles till we have 10,000 of them. 500 of them should be enough to comprehensively devastate Pakistan, even if 9500 Indian warheads are destroyed or not launched. Right?

Wrong.

The same old number problem arises again. We want to deter Pakistan and Pakistan wants to deter India. Assume Indian leaders are cowards and traitors, and assume that Pakistanis are all militaristic, courageous and patriotic. They want to deter India and are willing to go all the way to deter India. If Pakistan wants to deter India. Pakistan must prove that it has a large enough arsenal to comprehensively defeat India. If it takes Indian 500 bombs to devastate Pakistan, then surely Pakistan will need at least 1000 or more warheads to deter and scare India.

Where is the Paki gloating and advertising of their warheads? Where are the Pakis making public declarations of the number of warheads it will take to destroy India completely? All public accounts of Paki warheads do not suggest that they have enough to take India down and Pakis are not protesting or disputing that. They too seem to want to keep their numbers close to their chests.

What could be the reason/s for Pakis wanting to keep their nuke numbers secret when exactly the opposite action is required for real deterrence? I can think of a few reasons - all of which can explain the current situation wrt Pakistan

1) Pakistanis know that Indians are cowards and will be deterred by just a handful of Pakistani nukes and so they will declare only 100 while they actually have 1000
2) The Pakistanis don't have any nukes at all. They are bluffing.
3) The concept of MAD is outdated and deterrence can be achieved with a small and effective nuclear arsenal
4) It is not politically expedient in this day and age to appear to be producing tens of thousands of warheads.

Now folks if you have read this far please put me on your ignore list and move on if you wish, but if you prefer to explain why my reasoning may be wrong I would like to know which one or more of the above 4 possibilities regarding Pakistani calculations may be the most likely scenario.

Do you honestly believe that right now, at this moment, there are Prithvi and\or Agni missiles hidden out there in our nation's countryside, ready to fire? I'll bet money there isn't a single one actually deployed

Kanan ji,
Our country tested Nuclear weapons without anyone getting a hint. Do you think it happened just like that? We have some rules in place which makes sure our prized assets are in capable hands. Our nukes are moved around the country more often than you think. They are never kept at the same place for more than a xxx days. Without any leakage.Again, do you think it happens just like that?
Our scientists survived a technology denial regime and are in par with the world. We do have very committed people than what you envision by looking at babus and netalog. Do not let the MMS or Sonia types create any unfounded apprehensions in you. We do have setbacks but we are not incompetent. Our country has the back to take on both China and Pakistan at the same time. Do you think China would let us sleep if they knew that India is far from a Credible Nuclear Deterrent? They would have chewed away the North east of our country by now. They know what we have and what we are capable of. So,Lets not get fooled by some self professed strategic analyst who predicts that India has 70 to 80 nuclear weapons, none mated. Its absurd. Indians are lot greedier than you think when it comes to having weapons.

shiv wrote: What could be the reason/s for Pakis wanting to keep their nuke numbers secret when exactly the opposite action is required for real deterrence? I can think of a few reasons - all of which can explain the current situation wrt Pakistan

Shiv ji
You can add one more if you please
5. Pakistan has 50 nuclear weapons. None working because the triggers are with Unkil. He took away after 9/11 and promised to return it one day. They havent kept the promise so far. So without trigger the nuclear weapon is one big ass paper weight.

You may be forgetting that most of our Prithvis are designed to carry conventional warheads. Mating a nuclear warhead to one of these missiles is no simple matter; this isn't something you just slap in and go. A credible nuclear deterrent requires dedicated missile squadrons - mobile missile units equipped with Prithvis and Agnis fitted and regularly tested to carry specific nuclear warheads, hardened underground silos with functional missiles and warheads ready to fire on short notice. This is the bare minimum for a survivable nuclear "second-strike" capability (a submarine-based nuclear deterrent can come later).

1. indeed. BK points out that there is a specific nuke warhead designed for Prithvi. Just like A-I/A-II/A-III were tested with dummy nuclear warheads (every component except fissile core), the same has been done for Prithvi as far back as 1994. For a long time, this was deemed sufficient for TSP according to BK.
As for A-I onwards, they were tested each time only with dummy nuclear warheads. There is no other purpose for the Agni series.

2. Certainly the prithvi, A-I and A-II are deployed with the forces (there are missile groups specifically raised for each type of missile 334, 335 for A-I AFAIK...and so on..). They are obviously not lying around as puja articles or decorations. Operational testing of these by the SFC has been going on. The last such test was as recent as March 28 (it was an A-I). Should the govt. come and inform you/ NPA's about precise details ? BK's book has the closest one can get to such details. It is a must read.

3. Production of these missiles seems to have shifted to BDL. Owing to quality control issues, the SFC tests of A-II failed last year. This is why the A-II deployments will not be credible till a couple of successful tests are done.

4. Prithvi and A-I are clearly pak specific. A-II is neither here nor there. It can bolster pak specific arsenal once A-III is available (IOC shld be by end of this year....better nos. by two years).

5. What is the indication that TSP has fielded a great arsenal ? I am sure they have some Ghauri/ Shaheen i/II deployed. But what is the special indication in TSP's case that is missing in our case ? Maybe more information about their activities comes out in NPA publications, etc. One reason could also be unkil's extensive presence there.

One major question regarding Pakistan's capabilities is weather their bums are ballistic missile deliverable?
-If their bum is a CHIC-4 implosion derivative, then it is.
-If their bum is a gun design, then only an aircraft or a cruise missile can deliver it.

Important implications regarding reach of pakistani N capabilities.

Y. Kanan wrote: Actually, I think I will get that book because it sounds like it's got a lot of good specifics, something hard to find in the mainstream press. My impression of our nuclear deterrent consisting almost entirely of non-deployed nuclear warheads that can only be delivered by plane,{..is wrong to put it mildly} is not something I pulled out of thin air. {fine, do present the source}

You may be forgetting that most of our Prithvis are designed to carry conventional warheads. {as well as nuclear warheads} Mating a nuclear warhead to one of these missiles is no simple matter; this isn't something you just slap in and go. {why do you think was the dhanush missiles deployed on certain patrol boats and INS Rajput ?} A credible nuclear deterrent requires dedicated missile squadrons {ever heard of the 333rd, 334th and 335th missile groups ? in addition there are the units with IAF} - mobile missile units equipped with Prithvis and Agnis fitted and regularly tested to carry specific nuclear warheads, {by your own admission you don't visit the mil forum in years, if you did you might have known that such tests are carried out on a regular basis} hardened underground silos with functional missiles and warheads ready to fire on short notice. {that would be stuck in 1960's thinking. no modern ICBM is launched from silos. all modern land based designs are mobile ones.} This is the bare minimum for a survivable nuclear "second-strike" capability {incorrect assessment}(a submarine-based nuclear deterrent can come later).

Do you honestly believe that right now, at this moment, there are Prithvi and\or Agni missiles hidden out there in our nation's countryside, ready to fire? {oh yes.} I'll bet money there isn't a single one actually deployed. {you will lose that one, many times over } Do you really think that even with advanced warning, we could deliver more than a handful of nukes using our ballistic missiles? {may be, may be not. how do YOU know ?} Do we even have a large # of lightweight atomic warheads already assembled and functional, ready to be quickly mated to Prithvi or Agni missiles? {above question repeated here}Just because we've tested or envisioned these capabilities doesn't mean we have fielded them, indeed there's no concrete indications we've done so. {till 11th may 98 there was NO evidence, let alone concrete ones that we had weaponisable designs. I know what you would have said on 10th may 1998. }

I hope I'm wrong and India is hiding a vast secret from the world. But nuclear deterrents are supposed to, well, DETER. If we have these capabilities it would be nice if we made it known, even in a subtle fashion. You can't very well deter with ambiguity...{it's working quite fine thank you. if our condition was half as bad as you make it out to be we would have been nuked by now in 2001 and in 2008.

the ambiguity is only for the ill-informed}

just FYI, this is from 2004 :
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/Volume13/sanjay.html

At present, it can be assumed that India ’s land-based missile deterrent is based around:

*

Agni-II IRBM (3,500 km range, 200 kT warhead) – 18 to 36 missiles in service.
*

Agni-I MRBM (900 km range, 200 kT warhead) – 8 to 16 missiles in service.
*

Prithvi-II SRBM (330 km range, 15 kT warhead) – 150 to 180 missile produced (12 nuclear armed).

the IAF nuke assets are in addition to this. by now the prithvis have probably been replaced in this role by the agni-1.
and you can rest assured that the production capability hasn't been sitting idle for the last 6 years. even if we assume a sedate production rate of 10/year, that's between 50-60 missiles.

May I ask, with the utmost respect, why an aircraft would not be able to deliver a nuclear load on Pakistan? Because if aircraft cannot get though to deliver anything -even conventional bombs is useless and VayuShakti is pure mast-ur-bhashan. No?

well aircrafts cannot deliver nukes because India's deterence is 'supposedly' based on aircrafts.
if it was 'believed' to be based on missiles you would have heard that missiles are unreliable, inaccurate and untested and only aircraft delivered nukes (like PAF F-16's) ensure complete deterrence.

Has the Dhanush been deployed on a Rajput class?
This is serious stuff.

After this there should be no misconceptions as to India's or IN's intentions !

(One rajput class was supposed to receive a universal launcher upgrade in place of its helo lift or the aft SAM system. I thought this would house VL Brahmos only. This Dhanush news means that the Shaurya is in too. This means that we are looking at a 1000Km strike range for the IN and that to with N warheads )

This is pretty old news if I am not mistaken (Rahul?)

It was tested off INS Subhadra in November 2004. clicky

First test off INS Rajput was in December 2005, me thinks.

Wiki INS Rajput page lists Dhanush as operationally deployed Armament. See end of This

Maybe Kanan has decided to play contrarian/Devil's advocate...not necessarily bad, subsequent discussion clears the air for many people here (including any Baki lurkers).

Gagan wrote:One major question regarding Pakistan's capabilities is weather their bums are ballistic missile deliverable?
-If their bum is a CHIC-4 implosion derivative, then it is.
-If their bum is a gun design, then only an aircraft or a cruise missile can deliver it.

It is a fact that China provided the blueprints for a missile warhead to Pakistan. The blueprints for this warhead were recovered by the US and IAEA from Libya. They had been supplied by AQ Khan. They were still wrapped in plastic from a Rawalpindi dry cleaners.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dy ... ge=printer

The packet of documents, some of which included text in Chinese, contained detailed, step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit atop a large ballistic missile. They also included technical instructions for manufacturing components for the device, the officials and experts said.

"It was just what you'd have on the factory floor. It tells you what torque to use on the bolts and what glue to use on the parts," one weapons expert who had reviewed the blueprints said in an interview. He described the designs as "very, very old" but "very well engineered."

Certainly the prithvi, A-I and A-II are deployed with the forces (there are missile groups specifically raised for each type of missile 334, 335 for A-I AFAIK...and so on..). They are obviously not lying around as puja articles or decorations. Operational testing of these by the SFC has been going on. The last such test was as recent as March 28 (it was an A-I). Should the govt. come and inform you/ NPA's about precise details ? BK's book has the closest one can get to such details. It is a must read.

Sir,
Which book of BK are you referring to?

I had bought the 2005 edition "Nuclear Weapons and Indian security" last year but couldn't find so man details.

There is a 2008 book "India's Nuclear policy".. by BK

Manu wrote:Maybe Kanan has decided to play contrarian/Devil's advocate...not necessarily bad, subsequent discussion clears the air for many people here (including any Baki lurkers).

I admit, I may be somewhat guilty of that...

Some key followup points:

1) 1998 Pokrhan tests: You guys have got me there. India did indeed manage to hide some very extensive operations from prying eyes. So yes I'll accede we may have some very important capabilites being kept top secret

2) Shiv I'm confused by many of your rebuttals as they seem to have little resemblance to anything I actually said - sometimes I can't tell if they're directed at me or pulled from thin air. Suffice to say, all I've been advocating is that India move to a missile-based nuclear force (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarine launched missiles, etc) for the simple reason that missiles are the most survivable platform (ie: they don't need airbases and can be hidden\moved around, etc). I don't think we need 10x more warheads than Pakistan, thousands of missiles, etc. Nor do I think we should abandon nuclear arms (I don't know where you got that idea!). As for your comment about why aircraft are unreliable as a nuclear deterrent, the answer is simple: every Indian airbase would be taken out in the first minutes of any nuclear exchange. Our countries are just too close to each other - no warning time.

3) Claims of Prithvi and Agni missiles already fitted with 200kt warheads: are these plutonium-based weapons? I didn't think you could get such yields from uranium-based fission warheads. My knowledge is limited here.

shiv wrote: 1) Pakistan is going to be deterred by India promising to nuke the crap out of Pakistan by virtue of wielding more warheads that will survive a first strike to do more damage
2) That Pakistan is magically aware of the number of warheads India has, and India in turn is magically aware of the number "X" - which is the number of warheads Pakistan possesses so that India can make X times some number of warheads so we have enough to destroy Pakhanasatan.


We want to deter Pakistan and Pakistan wants to deter India. Assume Indian leaders are cowards and traitors, and assume that Pakistanis are all militaristic, courageous and patriotic. They want to deter India and are willing to go all the way to deter India. If Pakistan wants to deter India. Pakistan must prove that it has a large enough arsenal to comprehensively defeat India. If it takes Indian 500 bombs to devastate Pakistan, then surely Pakistan will need at least 1000 or more warheads to deter and scare India.


1) Pakistanis know that Indians are cowards and will be deterred by just a handful of Pakistani nukes and so they will declare only 100 while they actually have 1000
2) The Pakistanis don't have any nukes at all. They are bluffing.
3) The concept of MAD is outdated and deterrence can be achieved with a small and effective nuclear arsenal
4) It is not politically expedient in this day and age to appear to be producing tens of thousands of warheads.

Now folks if you have read this far please put me on your ignore list and move on if you wish, but if you prefer to explain why my reasoning may be wrong I would like to know which one or more of the above 4 possibilities regarding Pakistani calculations may be the most likely scenario.

This is a clash of civilizations and not mere India-Pakistan war.
There is an Indian civilization that is in war with Middle eastern radical islamic civilization since last 1000 years.
Indian civilization too has numerous Islamic citizens but mostly they are moderate Barelvis, Bohras etc.
TSP knows that India has capability to take down the whole of TSP, and India knows that TSP has the capability to give a lasting wound to India, so there is a stalemate. What TSP is trying right now is to have enough nooks to take down most of India.
The real thing for India to realize here is that the clash is not just between TSP and India. Clash is between 2 civilizations, so while TSP has to get enough material to destroy Indian civilization, India has to get enough material to not only destroy TSP but rest of West Asian civilization as well, for proper deterrence.
Because the real danger here is maybe there will be a TSP General in future for whom it'll be acceptable to have TSP=India so that rest of Islamic Civilization survives since TSP is just one of 50+ Islamic nations.
So for real deterrence India must have the nookes sufficient to destroy all of West Asia and then foister Indian brand of Islam on the West Asia.
If India = TSP, who knows 40-50 years from now a wounded India will have to face Nook BD or Nook AFG or even a Nook UAE/KSA, even if TSP is no longer there.

Presently India does not have that capability and TSP generals are also not that Islamic messihahs, but things would change once the present crop of TSPA colonels and brigadiers become 3 star generals.

An Indian capability to take down the whole of Islamic civilization will Guarantee nook peace in South Asia. That's the only way of calling the TSP nook Bluff. Equal equal for TSP-India is like comparing Vietnam with China or Cuba with US or Hamas with Israel.

Altair wrote:

Do you honestly believe that right now, at this moment, there are Prithvi and\or Agni missiles hidden out there in our nation's countryside, ready to fire? I'll bet money there isn't a single one actually deployed

Kanan ji,
Our country tested Nuclear weapons without anyone getting a hint. Do you think it happened just like that? We have some rules in place which makes sure our prized assets are in capable hands. Our nukes are moved around the country more often than you think. They are never kept at the same place for more than a xxx days. Without any leakage.Again, do you think it happens just like that?

Kanan has raised some legitimate practical questions which are akin to asking pre 26/11 following questions:
(They should be analyzed and not rubbished.)
(a) What are the 100 most important and famous buildings in India, and are the defended properly from terrorists similar to ones that attacked Akshardham and Parliament?
(b) Are the guns and BPJs given to state police of sufficeient quantity and quality so as to stop piglets
(c) How much time will it take for NSG to reach any of the top 100 buildings in India
(d) Does NSG even have the internal architecture maps of those buildings. In Bluestar, Akshardham etc. this info was lacking.
(e) Does NSG have all latest tech and training as per international standards.


The bravery of Indian soldiers and commandoes has never been in doubt. What is doubtful is the political lethargy even in most important national matters.
Similarly in nook realm the ability of Indian scientists is not in doubt. What is however highly probable is that after a nook attack a corrupt selfish politician, taking Ram Gopal Verma for VIP rounds of the affected place so he can make a d-Company funded movie starring his son.

In 1967 the Israeli Air Force rendered Egyptian air bases ineffective in a tactic that nobody had used before in the history of air warfare. The war lasted only 6 days and the tactic worked. Even the Israelis were never able to repeat that. In the 1991 Gulf War the Iraqi Air force outnumbered 6 to 1 and after years of "no fly zones" over Iraq still managed to survive for several days, shot down a couple of allied aircraft and was not knocked out in five minutes. In no other war has any air force been rendered totally ineffective. Not even the Vietnamese Air force.

But in an India Pakistan war, Indian air bases are sure to be knocked out and rendered ineffective in the first five minutes. This is not about Pakistani competence. It is about believing that Indians are incompetent. It falls well in line with another observation I have - which is totally OT. Some other time. Some other place.

In 1967 the Israeli Air Force rendered Egyptian air bases ineffective in a tactic that nobody had used before in the history of air warfare. The war lasted only 6 days and the tactic worked. Even the Israelis were never able to repeat that

With all due respect, I believe 1971 Indian Air Force's complete air superiority after just a few days in the eastern sector (not to mention complete rout of enemy within less than 2 weeks) was superb too... but your point remains valid

The Israeli airstrike in 1967 had a precursor in WWII when Nazi Germany destroyed Soviet air planes in a pre-emptive strike.

If Pak's nuke is a bluff like N3-ji summarized few years ago, sacrifising thousands of Indian lives to TSPA's terror strategy is not only naive but also treason. If GOI knew that TSP-nuke is a bluff, assuming atleast one GOI-babu reads BRF, India should have brought TSPA down by now.

If Pak's nuke is a rented-boom by PRC or Unkil, they are real boom as far as India is concerned, for ever. Even if India becomes the best butt-buddy of PRC and Unkil they would not let go of TSPA-non-state actor as a leverage against India for time infinite.

If Pak's nuke is a real boom then a minimum 50-100 nukes can be expected in the event of war. Since India is TSPA's only and mortal enemy, and the situation demanded a nuke attack, TSPA will not stop with 1 or 0.72 nukes. It will dump everything it has on India. TSPA has proven time and again that it is not a stupid as far as hurting India is concerned. TSPA very well knows that it will be wiped out of the face of earth in case of an attack against India.

If, in an impossible WKK type scenari, India doesn't erase TSP from the face earth even after a nuke attack, then India doesn't deserve to exist as a nation or civilization. They are a 1.2++ billion burden to Bhoo-mata.

shiv wrote:
But in an India Pakistan war, Indian air bases are sure to be knocked out and rendered ineffective in the first five minutes. This is not about Pakistani competence. It is about believing that Indians are incompetent. It falls well in line with another observation I have - which is totally OT. Some other time. Some other place.

IAF taken out in 5 minutes or 1 day is just wishful thinking. So is the thinking that TSP is nook nude. These are 2 extremes none of which bear any discussion relevance.
It's hard to believe that TSP can somehow takeout Tezpur or Andaman among other far flung places.

However, the question is how would India react if top leadership is taken out say in a Republic day attack? Will Eastern Command wait for directions when none will ever come? I am sure the Nook command and control has done these kind of scenarios and prepared for them. After all this is what they are supposed to do day in and out.
http://books.google.com/books?id=zm6-5u ... gh&f=false

As per link above, possibly India was not prepared in 1990 for delivery of nooks.

Also as per link below, in 1990 VP singh realized that in case of nook war and PM taken out, "there was no formal procedure in India as to who would do what"
http://www.scribd.com/doc/28722929/The- ... ar-Weapons
A month is a long time in War preparations and this is 20 years back. It would seem that India is today way better prepared for TSP level threat, but may or may not be for China level.

Pakistan’s Ghauri ballistic missiles greatly increase
the reach of its ballistic missile forces, though the
missile is assessed to have a circular error probability
(CEP) of 2,500 m. This is larger than the lethal radius
(1,500 to 2,000 m) of a 10 kt warhead against most
targets, and therefore this missile would likely also be
used to attack large cities where its CEP would have
little consequence.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... pub832.pdf

Further...

Pakistan has not indicated what its targeting
strategy would be in the event of nuclear use, but one
can make some inferences based on its nuclear arsenal.
Its arsenal is not large enough to allow comprehensive
strikes against India’s conventional military forces. For
example, there are approximately 20 Indian military
airfields within 300-400 km of the Pakistani border.
With a 10 kt warhead, it might take three warheads
per airfield to destroy all of the aircraft on these bases.
This would run to 60 weapons, which might be as
many weapons as are contained in the entire Pakistani
stockpile. Similarly, attacks on army divisions might
require nine weapons per division. Indeed, if one of
the grave situations described above occurred and
Pakistan felt it necessary to launch initial nuclear
attacks, it is not clear that the conventional military
balance would be of much interest. Given that the
numbers of weapons on each side could be roughly
equal, attacks on India’s nuclear forces would only be
of interest if India configures its forces so that strikes
with a small number of Pakistani weapons have the
ability to eliminate a large number of Indian nuclear
91
weapons. If India is reasonably prudent in configuring
its nuclear forces, a Pakistani nuclear attack on them
would be unattractive, since more than one Pakistani
weapon would have to be used for every Indian
weapon eliminated.
Therefore it is likely that Pakistan will target
mainly Indian cities. Pakistan’s heavy reliance on the
short-range Ghaznavi/M-11 indicates that its nuclear
targeting strategy’s object is principally to destroy
Delhi. Given Delhi’s large size and the relatively limited
destructive power of 10 kt weapons, it would take at
least 10 and perhaps up to 20 such weapons to destroy
or damage enough of the city so that it would cease
to function.2 This statement may come as a surprise
to those accustomed by the Hiroshima experience to
think that one nuclear weapon will be sufficient to
destroy an entire city. However, Hiroshima was a city
of about one quarter million people and 24 km2 in area.
In contrast, Delhi is a city of 12.8 million people with
an area of 1,055 km,2 which means that Delhi today is
about 50 times larger (in population and area) than was
Hiroshima in 1945. A single 10 kt weapon, which was
airburst at a near optimal height, would have a lethal
area of about 6 km2 (this is also approximately the area
in which most structures would be destroyed). Even
if one considers the area where structures suffer some
significant damage (as opposed to being destroyed, i.e.,
where the blast effects are 2 psi or greater), the damage
area of such a weapon would be around 20 km2. An
attack on Delhi using twenty 10 kt airburst weapons
would kill approximately 1.5 million people and injure
perhaps another 3 million.

Will some guru kindly have mercy on mango jingos and outline pointwise / bulletwise the exact capabilities of Pakistan wrt its nuclear weapons capabilities. Specifically
1. Number and type of N bombs
2. The status of the Uranium enrichment plants
3. The status of plutonium production
4. Command and control, the US's role
5. Pakistan's ability to deliver these weapons - JDAMs, Aircraft or missile.
6. Pakistan's missile capabilities - real ranges, CEPs, issues etc.
7. China's role - both past and present.

How about BRF accumulating the vast knowledge floating around, chaiwala-panwala info and coming out with a bi-annual article on SRR?

This will have to be done by those who have chaiwallas and panwallas. Destroying the myths that have been built up around pakistan, weather good or bad is important, for a more realistic assessment of that country.

Gagan ,

6. Pakistan's missile capabilities - real ranges, CEPs, issues etc.

You can see all these Paki missiles and their CEPs, issues etc in this link.
http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/
But the problem here is most of them are sourced from single source, Duncan Lennox. So the veracity of them need to be cross checked. Becoz, the M-11 missile is reported here to have CEP of 600m whereas the Paki M-11 version is quoted to have 200m -300m CEP.

However Ghauri/Hatf-5's accuracy was confirmed by many sources as 2500m CEP.

As a paanwalla info, Pakis currently interested in MKI-ing the second stage of Hatf-6 missile.


7. China's role - both past and present.
Past role:
"The overriding theme in Pakistan’s ballistic missile development is foreign assistance, most notably from China and North Korea. Over the years, China has provided considerable technology and expertise to its ally. Many of Pakistan’s missile designs and technology have come from Chinese plans, or have been reverse-engineered from Chinese M-11 missiles sold to Pakistan.[1] China has also helped Pakistan build a turnkey ballistic missile production facility at Tarwanah. In addition, North Korea has sold Pakistan a large amount of missile technology, including a small number of No-dong missiles, as was recently acknowledged by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto."[From the same website.]

Present role:
Indians, Russians and US are very keenly watching their missile development. So it will be very hard for China to pass off-the-shelf missiles but it could help in developing variants of the existing missile in increasing the range and other parameters by means of assistance.

Op-Ed in Pioneer, 28 April 2010

EDITS | Wednesday, April 28, 2010 | Email | Print |


Onus is on Pakistan

Ashok K Mehta

Nobel Peace Prize winner US President Barack ‘No-Bomb’ Obama has taken several initiatives in nuclear diplomacy. Earlier this month, he hosted the first ever Nuclear Security Summit — which some call nuclear theatrics — to ensure that no nuclear device or nuclear material falls into terrorist hands and that all fissile material is secured within four years. Without naming Pakistan, during his presentation at the summit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh highlighted the threat of terrorist groups accessing weapons of mass destruction. It is around this incubator of nuclear terrorism that intentions and resources of non-state and state actors intersect.

While Mr Obama considers Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as secure and sees “no nuclear crisis anywhere in South Asia”, US experts are not so sure. Presidential adviser Bruce Reidel cites the nightmare scenario of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba acquiring a nuclear device —no guesses who the No 1 target is. Mr Bob Graham, head of US Commission on WMD, Proliferation and Terrorism, testifying before a congressional hearing last week, said that Pakistan may slip over nuclear weapons to the Taliban for use against India in the event of escalated tension between the two countries. British counter-terrorism expert Shaun Gregory has said that Pakistan’s nuclear complex has been attacked thrice between 2008 and 2009.

The US has spent $ 100 million in augmenting the security of Pakistan’s nuclear capability and, despite denials, has contingency plans for responding to 15 crisis scenarios by its Northern Command, including the employment of the Conventional Prompt Global Strike Weapon capable of pinpointing its target within 60 minutes. Located next door to the terrorist launch site, one hopes that India, the most likely victim of a nuclear attack, has suitable contingency plans in its Strategic Nuclear Command. To start with, how does New Delhi deter a terrorist group, ostensibly a non-state actor, from doing what it has vowed to do — annihilate India using the ultimate terrorist weapon? Fundamentally, a non-state actor is existentially non-deterable.

After 26/11 and other cross-border misadventures, Pakistan has lost the fig-leaf of deniability vis-à-vis state linkages with terrorist groups it calls strategic assets. India and other potential victim states of nuclear terrorism must hold the state responsible for the actions of its non-state groups. Obtaining a UN convention or resolution on culpability of states harbouring terrorist groups will be as difficult as securing an acceptable definition of terrorism. Saner and responsible states must keep trying to find links between terrorist groups and the host state, and create conditions of traditional deterrence.

Since 26/11, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram has been periodically stating that another major terrorist attack will invite a swift and decisive response (provided it is categorically established that it was launched from Pakistan is unstated). Another Kasab may not fall into the bag. Ultimately, it is Pakistan that has to be deterred through a clear declaratory policy outlining the consequences of actions by a non-state actor.

The Nuclear Security Summit was another opportunity for India to prove its bona fides as a responsible state with nuclear weapons outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty but yet following the rules of the non-proliferation regime. While Mr Singh announced the establishment of a global centre for nuclear energy partnership in New Delhi, Chinese President Hu Jintao said that his country would set up a centre for nuclear security. Not to be left behind, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani offered to host an international fuel cycle service facility in Pakistan. A Pentagon study is examining the universalisation of ‘No First Use’ and a world without nuclear weapons.

In one of the ‘Global Zero’ models, delegitimisation of nuclear weapons and getting the US and Russia to reduce their weapon stocks to 1,000 each, and implementation of NFU are seen as pre-conditions for arriving at a start point aiming for ‘Nuclear Zero’. At some stage, all states with nuclear weapons will be required to reduce their stocks to 100 bombs each. The alternative to numbers, the megatonnage of weapons, is also being considered, but numbers are likely to trump yields.

The ‘Nuclear Zero’ concept is not a bolt from the blue. Its illustrious pathfinders include Rajiv Gandhi who had put forward an ambitious action plan in 1988 for nuclear disarmament by 2010. Its more recent votaries are the ‘Gang of Four’: Former US Secretaries of State George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defence Secretary William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon with his five-point action plan. Just as chemical weapons were delegitimised, it is theoretically possible for nuclear weapons to be declared taboo.

The Australia-Japan sponsored International Commission on Disarmament has recommended that the US and Russia’s stock of 23,000 nuclear weapons be scaled down to 2000 by 2025. It suggests that all nuclear weapon states declare NFU and reduce their weapon stocks proportionately when the US and Russia reach 1,000 each. As for the three elephants — India, Pakistan and Israel — outside the nuclear tent, it recommends that they be made to join the NPT but not as nuclear weapon states. As India will never get to enter the nuclear club as a nuclear weapon state, it must join the party bypassing the NPT but conforming to its non-proliferation regime.

India still has some time to review its position on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty till the US and China ratify it. Revisiting its nuclear policy of credible minimum deterrence in light of the threat of nuclear terrorism is urgently required. Iran held its own parallel summit with a catchy title: ‘Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapons for None’. The next Nuclear Security Summit is to be held in South Korea in 2012. States are required to comply by an action plan that will make the world safer against a terrorist nuclear attack. Al Qaeda for a long time and Lashkar more recently are seeking nuclear weapons for use against the US, Israel and India. The threat of loose nukes or dirty bombs must be taken seriously by New Delhi, especially after Lashkar chief Hafiz Saeed’s latest jihad over river waters.

Since the attack on Parliament House in 2001 and despite several pledges by Pakistani leaders that their soil will not be used for terrorist attacks on India, Mumbai happened. New Delhi has failed to get Islamabad to rein in the jihadis. The challenge for India is to thwart the ultimate preventable catastrophe by holding Pakistan responsible for any nuclear misadventure by so-called non-state actors.

Very good article with lot of things to think about. Essentially it grapples with how to deter a non-state actor which acquires nukes. This is a current problem. His line of thinking is to deter the state that hosts the non state actor and make it reponsible for the safety of its weapons. Loose nukes is not a fig leaf.

http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/218654

Former Senator Bob Graham and former Senator Jim Talent spoke to reporters and answered questions about the release of the commission's evaluation of the government’s ability to protect the U.S. from the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

X-posted..

Looks like the strat community was pondering about deterring the non-state actors when they got distracted by the spy scandal.

Hari Seldon wrote:

Juggi G wrote:The Islamic Bomb-Makers and The Islamic Bomb-Seekers ?
By B Raman

Islamic bomb-makers? Islamic bomb-seekers? Has Sri Bahukutumbi Raman gone off his rocker? Am sorry to say that this is indeed the brazen display of fascist thinking, of blatant communal scare-mongering, of right-wing islamophobia that paints islam in a negative light, that learned commentators have previously warned this forum about.

......

How times change and return to square one. Jai ho, I guess.

Nightwatch on Noko replanning to take Seoul in case of hostilities. At first galnce looks OT for the thread but bear with me

North Korea: The JoongAng Daily reported 27 April that, according to a high-ranking source, North Korea's military recently decided to do away with the so-called "Five-to-Seven" military plans dating from the 1980s to adopt a new plan, In the new plan, North Korea would try to occupy Seoul early, the source explained, adding that Seoul believes North Korea made the change to better deal with the upgraded weapons systems of the U.S. and South Korean forces.
...
Comment: Among intelligence warning specialists, this is called the Sadat Gambit. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat started the 1973 War with Israel to win the peace, not the war. The result of that is that Egypt is second only to Israel as a recipient of US military assistance of all kinds.


Old hands who worked the North Korean warning of war problem will recall that a bid to take Seoul only, while serious, always was factored into warning estimates and was considered a lesser and included intermediate stage of a war for control of the peninsula. If the North stopped or could be stopped at Seoul, the North would lose the war.

For the US, a North Korean halt at Seoul would allow time for a massive and country-breaking three-dimensional, non-stop counterattack against the North. The South Koreans never accepted this reasoning and always required a strong forward defense of Seoul in the short distance between it and the Demilitarized Zone. The UN Command long ago made provision for defending Seoul from this kind of attack, but that does not mean that improvements are unnecessary.


Note to non-warning analysts: The problem with the Sadat Gambit is that the attacker does not control the end game. It is a form of limited war in which the attacker can never be sure the other side will not counterattack, envelope the attacking forces and press the counterattack to its fullest. It is a high risk use of military force to achieve a political breakthrough after the shooting stops.


Sadat gambled correctly that international intervention would bring about a ceasefire which he leveraged to rebuild Egypt and make peace with Israel. His calculation would have been disastrous had Israel retained the capability and the will to counterattack.


On the Golan Front, Syria almost lost everything. After making initial gains, the Syrian Army failed to capture the Golan Heights owing to a heroic defense by the Golani Brigade and the Paracommandos. Once reinforcements arrived, the IDF defeated the Syrian Army and had a down-hill, unobstructed drive all the way to Damascus.


Pakistan repeatedly has used a more limited and less risky form of the same gambit to grab Indian territory just across the border while waiting for international intervention to stop the fighting. In two general wars with India, the Pakistanis executed such operations to create negotiating leverage while avoiding head-on fighting and certain destruction by the much larger and more capable Indian Army.[/b]


On the other hand, Indian strategists have deliberated the feasibility of limited war as away to avoid an escalation to an exchange of nuclear weapons with Pakistan that must occur in every future general war. The limited war plans always founder on the near certainty that Pakistan simply will not accept Indian terms for limited war and will shoot nuclear missiles at Indian cities.


....

The obvious riposte to this equally obvious propaganda ploy is for the UN Command to announce that once it appears that the North is making war preparations, the UN Command will attack on tactical warning and that the North's surrender will be unconditional.


On balance, without additional evidence, it is difficult to accept the Joongang Daily report at face value as a "new" North Korean strategy. North Korean leaders have proven time and again that they do not lightly risk the national patrimony. They fritter away resources on the fringes at low risk, but this strategy involves risking everything on a UN response that is far from certain without complex and redundant back channel communications between the warring sides.

So replace NoKo = TSP

Repalce SoKo with = India

Replace taking Seoul = Nuking India

And replace UN Command will launch on warning = India will launch on warning in case of detection of any nuke preparations and there will be no surrender accepted. Total destruction.

Now lets see the bluff carried out.

What happens if
..IN gets better of Pk and rapidly thrusts deep into pure-land
.. PK uses taKtikal nook on their side of IB to alter the balance of power and to save itself from total destruction.

.....as a result of cold start on account of another 2611

This is reverse of what Ravi is proposing.

All use of nukes whether tactical or strategic, whether on India or Indian troops in TSP is strategic and will invoke an appropriate response. The reason is since WWII there is a de-facto moratorium on non use of nukes and if it is broken then it is a new level and has to be dealt with appropriately.

Refer to CMD drafted by NDA and continued by UPA govt.