US military, technology, arms, tactics

[TSJones]

some US response to Iran's ICBM development efforts...

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/bomb-us-h ... 00864.html

[brar_w]

With such massive infrastructure and investment in what have been dubbed as missile 'cities', you need to leverage their own investments rather than think of using really massive weapons. Since they have done all the hard work of digging in, you have to make sure they stay there which though not easy, is far simpler than destroying everything thats inside.

[TSJones]

new BMD kill vehicle in the works.......

http://spacenews.com/new-u-s-kill-vehic ... t-in-2019/

Currently the MDA has 30 deployed GMD interceptors: 26 at Fort Greely, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. In March 2013, the Defense Department announced plans to place an additional 14 interceptors at Fort Greely to counter a growing North Korean threat.

Look out Russia and China! We're going to overwhelm you..........

[Nick_S]

Which aircraft are most mission ready

The mission-capable rates for the Air Force’s entire fleet of nearly 5,500 aircraft range from 46.98 percent for the B-1B bomber to 100 percent for the C-21C

The average age of the fleet is 27 years — with some as old as 53 — but the oldest planes are not those with the lowest availability rate. For example, the venerable B-52 bomber has a 72 percent up rate, while the CV-22 Osprey, averaging under 4 years old, is “up” only 55 percent of the time, due to “some near-term challenges in aircraft availability and maintenance man-hours per flying hour

[brar_w]

Two thing that impact (among others of course) mission capability rates computed annually, is the number of deployments for a particular type and the size of the inventory. The more deployments you have for a given system, the more (in the case of the US) you can pull resources from the OCO (overseas contingencies operations) accounts, and the more O&S quantities you can consume. If I am deployed for 2 months, for those two months I can generate extremely high mission capability rates (100% wouldn't be unheard of) simply by consuming a very large O&S pie and by raiding reserves if need be.

Fleet strength impacts these data as well since a very small fleet is impacted more severely by scheduled maintenance cycles for even a portion of the fleet. The B-2 is an example here since it being a strategic asset has to go through a lengthy depot level overhaul once every 7 years. Each aircraft stays in one lengthy overhaul of 400 days once in a 7 year period undergoing this overhaul (it will soon be one 365 day overhaul every 9 years). This means that for that fleet the theoretical ceiling for a mission capability rate is effectively between 80-85%. This obviously is further impacted by budgetary considerations, and system reliability and ultimately doctrinal need.

Mission capability, though a valuable metric only tells us how much readiness a particular armed forces is in. For example, the US can sustain a 75% MC rate for a fighter X, but another air-force may only be able to afford 50% and the latter may be able to meet its national security needs perfectly by doing so. The more important, statistic to look at to determine aircraft capability in this regard is the reliability rate...i.e how often an aircraft, available to go out and conduct its mission, does so successfully without stoppages...Here component failure rates are important things to track. Availability/Capability rates only give us a picture of reliability mixed with level of funding, staffing and the logistical capabilities of the suppliers and operators.

[ramana]

Wash Post reporver was whining on radion about Predator and Reaper availiability numbers.
Apparently its not good at all.
Some thing agout a starater generator has bugs in it.

[brar_w]

There may be reliability issues but there are ways to overcome that through brute force, particularly at a time of significant combat utilization. For the UAV types, the fleet readiness is not being impacted by reliability or availability but by finding enough people to fly them.

The starter generator issue discovery was a function of an upswing in reaper crashes of late and that may or may not impact availability significantly until much later, if such a thing is not remedied.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/che ... ms-emerge/

The Air Force determined that 60 Reapers in its fleet were carrying the buggy starter-generators. So far, the new backup part has been installed on 47 of those aircraft, according to Baker, the colonel in charge of the drone capabilities division.

Since then, Baker said, there have been 17 “saves” — or incidents in which the primary generator failed mid-flight. In each case, he added, the backup generator kicked in and the drone was able to land safely.

What would have been nice, and where the report has been found wanting is a comparison of utilization rate, or combat flight hours along with the number of accidents. The RPA fleet, unlike its manned counterpart flies a disproportionately high amount of time relative to its air-frame life in combat as opposed to peacetime and given the USAF's and US Army's RPA community and how it has grown, a lot of the defects and course corrections are on the fly and often short-sighted..We'll probably see a good two generation of combat drones before they start getting as reliable or as safe as measured from crashes per XXXX simply given the trade-offs involved.

[RoyG]

there is no way the US has deployed or even thinking of deploying any assets to defend against Russia or Chinese ICBM attacks. It's not there and furthermore it is a sham for these countries to threaten the US for developing anti ICBM capability against North Korea. Putin has admitted that the US cannot stop an overwhelming Russian launch of MIRV's.

the US's main strength is the ability to take a first hit and then respond with immense retaliation and we are feverishly working towards that goal with 24x7 on demand launch services for micro satellites as well as other measures to replace certain services to enable a more complete retaliation. We know our surface fleet is highly vulnerable to a first strike and we are taking certain measures there as well.

don't like that? too bad, we are not going to be sitting ducks.

That may be the case NOW. North Korea will take another 30 years at this rate to stockpile enough fissile material and make advances in rocketry and material sciences to penetrate current ABM defences and land a few on California and perhaps a few other Western states.

Nobody buys your bullsh*t.

[brar_w]

there is no way the US has deployed or even thinking of deploying any assets to defend against Russia or Chinese ICBM attacks. It's not there and furthermore it is a sham for these countries to threaten the US for developing anti ICBM capability against North Korea. Putin has admitted that the US cannot stop an overwhelming Russian launch of MIRV's.

the US's main strength is the ability to take a first hit and then respond with immense retaliation and we are feverishly working towards that goal with 24x7 on demand launch services for micro satellites as well as other measures to replace certain services to enable a more complete retaliation. We know our surface fleet is highly vulnerable to a first strike and we are taking certain measures there as well.

don't like that? too bad, we are not going to be sitting ducks.

That may be the case NOW. North Korea will take another 30 years at this rate to stockpile enough fissile material and make advances in rocketry and material sciences to penetrate current ABM defences and land a few on California and perhaps a few other Western states.

Nobody buys your bullsh*t.

Expanding the ballistic missile shield to threaten Russian strategic deterrence would have no real benefits either to US's own strategic deterrence or to arms control worldwide. Russia will simply make larger, missiles with more countermeasures forcing the US to itself increase its strategic forces and in the end would lead to nowhere other than an arms race. In the end, once the budget of the entire thing is factored in it would actually be counterproductive. Kinetic option for an ABM against a peer adversary that has as much or more number of warheads to you is a loosing proposition unless a nation is willing to severely compromise its own conventional capability in favor of an ABM shield. The MDA budget is approximately $8 Billion per year..and it aint going to grow significantly beyond $10 Billion irrespective of who comes to power in the Whitehouse.

Similarly, the siphoning off of budget towards regional capability than homeland defense capability was a match with the threat and the slowing down of it as per the own national security estimates. Simply put, NOKO ICBM threat, was not advancing at a pace that justified that path allowing the MDA to commit more resources to theater or regional systems. With this diminished capability, not only did they move projects for homeland defense to the right, but outright cancelled the only Anti-ICBM system in the Standard Missile leaving it essentially out of the context of mainland US defense...To begin developing a capability to threaten even Russia's old systems, they would need hundreds of more sites and would need them at a speed that outpaces russia's own strategic capability modernization. If that is not possible, they would need to concurrently develop the next generation of GMD capability and at the same time add hundreds of new silos at different sites within CONUS. There is no money, nor the political will to do that and no one in the strategic circles is even suggesting that...Even though shot-doctrine is something that is a tightly held secret, it doesn't take much to figure out that it would be way different against a missile coming from Russia than one from Iran or North Korea simply given the level of technology and capability the russians possess.

Finally, the terminal posture is simply non-existent against Russia's threat. If they were out to develop a capability against russia's missiles they would be approaching it much the same way they have been approaching the other challenges i.e. developing a layered capability which they aren't. There is no boost phase program on at the moment. The assent phase programs have also been cancelled and there is no terminal phase interceptor for an ICBM. The only reason you stick to just one interception method for an ICBM is if you have high degree of confidence to stay many steps ahead of the threat in terms of the countermeasures game..You won't take that risk if you were designing something to combat russia, or even china given that these nations (especially russia) have high end capability to develop sophisticated countermeasures and to essentially saturate a one-dimensional system. You would also have to build redundancy in your systems if you were to confront or develop a system to survive a near peer first strike...That means multiple survivable radars and not an experimental floating limited FOV discrimination radar, and not just one future discrimination site...Its an engineering challenge and its quite clear that the only way to win in a countermeasures game is to layer up and let the earth's own atmosphere take care of some of those challenges. That isn't happening at all.

The only valid point that I often see in russian arguments is that they are researching and developing capabilities for ABM. However, when has that ever stopped? Have the russians stopped researching ABM? or deploying it for that matter.

North Korea will take another 30 years at this rate to stockpile enough fissile material and make advances in rocketry and material sciences to penetrate current ABM defences and land a few on California and perhaps a few other Western states.

Its extremely tough to estimate what NoKO is or will be capable of 5, 10 or 15 years from now, let alone 30 years from now. Also, they haven't really changed deployment plans and given a realistic shot-doctrine they need that for only a handful of launches missiles. Given that much of the SA system is not optimum for high end countermeasure discrimination a conservative shot doctrine is warranted just to be safe. The current X band SBX has to be forward deployed and is more of an experimental system used for testing that has been forward deployed when needed but it isn't always there to provide the required capability like an operational system would. When the discrimination capability improves with the new S band radar in alaska they can perhaps be in a position to get more success against more incoming warheads without adding more interceptors..Until then they are planning for around 40-44 interceptors on one coast (none on the east coast) and that would provide an insurance policy against a small salvo of incoming warheads and countermeasures.

For the US to reverse course, and actually begin to take money away from capability that actually counters the A2AD tactics its adversaries in the Middile East and the Pacific are adopting and begin to invest money for homeland anti-ICBM capability and then suffer the consequences that come with it (an arms race) would be devastating to its own conventional capability. There is a reason why not many (if any) are suggesting such radical shifts in strategy.

[TSJones]

we're looking for sites in the eastern US to locate missile BMD's to guard against Iranian ICBMs as well. could be Michigan, Ohio, or New York. I'm betting Fort Drum New York.

[brar_w]

we're looking for sites in the eastern US to locate missile BMD's to guard against Iranian ICBMs as well. could be Michigan, Ohio, or New York. I'm betting Fort Drum New York.

That has mixed support in the Congress, especially for a fixed system and the military itself, quite pulbicly came out against it a few years ago given the hit the conventional capability would have to take to pay for it. The point however is that an anti-ICBM capability that could protect large cities from assured destruction would have to have a terminal element and there is quite a strong possibility that the best way to go would be to have a terminal capability, if only one intercept point was given as a choice. Mid course is good when you have a small interceptor inventory but need to protect very large swaths of land. On the flip side, mid-course is effected more severely by advances in your enemy's countermeasures and therefore requires constant upgrades at all levels of the ABM capability.

How does deploying hundreds, if not thousands of interceptors both covering mid-course, and terminal defense become a smart course of action? That just eats into your conventional capability since the counter is quite predictable since it would allow treaties to be walked away from, ICBM development to be started forcing you to yourself build up your strategic capability. It works well when you have a huge technology gap between you and your adversary but when you don't (like in the case of USA v Russia, or even USA v China) then you make no real difference to your strategic relationship but end up severely degrading your own conventional abilities. Now if left-of launch capabilities can be developed at a much faster pace than your opponent's similar capability,s or if you somehow leap ahead in directed energy and high speed EMRG, than things could be different but there is simply not an investment trail to suggest such a posture. When that is the case (strategic competitiveness) the best course of action is to build a credible strategic deterrence of your own.

It would be interesting to see how many ABM interceptors Russia has deployed around Moscow. Could well be more than the 30 some GMD's systems currently deployed on the two-sites.

[RoyG]

The only valid point that I often see in russian arguments is that they are researching and developing capabilities for ABM. However, when has that ever stopped? Have the russians stopped researching ABM? or deploying it for that matter.

Again, this is the whole point. Future ABM defenses aren't going to just depend on missiles. They will rope in laser, blackout, etc. It has to be seen as an architecture which will mature from infancy. The US has already secured some real estate in Poland and Romania and is stationing its ships in the Mediterranean. These sites could easily be scaled up and could field even more powerful missile systems in the future.

Moreover, the Russians are way behind in ABM tech. They don't possess the computing technology, sensors, development architecture, and funding to make it viable.

For now they're safe. The current lot of SM missiles won't even scratch them. Future will probably be a diff story.

I'm wondering how current ABM defences, especially the GBI would fare against the Chinese inventory coming across the pacific...

[Singha]

if scaled up, quite well I would venture.

[TSJones]

i really don't think that many missiles will be placed in the eastern US:

http://spacenews.com/potential-east-coa ... -in-maine/

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has narrowed the list of potential East Coast interceptor sites down to three locations, eliminating a base in Maine.

In a Jan. 15 press release, the agency said the Naval Air Station Portsmouth SERE Training Area in Maine “presented irreversible environmental impacts, significant constructability concerns, and extensive costs associated with developing infrastructure in a remote area.”

The current Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which serves as the primary U.S. territorial missile shield, has interceptors at sites in California and Alaska that could shoot down North Korean missiles. The MDA, at the urging of House Republicans, is studying options for a third site in the eastern United States to counter a potential Iranian missile threat.

The price tag for an East Coast site is expected to be at least $3 billion. Defense Department officials have downplayed how quickly a potential site may be needed and have warned that the funding could detract from higher-priority programs.

Currently, the MDA is considering three sites:

Fort Drum, New York
Camp Ravenna Joint Training Center, Ohio
Fort Custer Training Center, Michigan

3 billion....not that expensive or extensive.....

[brar_w]

^ The MDA did an environmental impact study to determine potential sites for east coast defense. However, the military and even the MDA have pointed to better investments in technology development and even testing instead of paying for this. They contend that its better to not raid R&D and testing since these are the most important parts of missile defense capability..they want that to continue at a pace they are on and if the Iranian three increases and the national security estimates point to that they can put something up fairly quickly. Defense Hawks, particularly Mccain love to bring this up because they think MDA is under-funded by 20-25% as per his own estimates. Its however, difficult to determine whether his rhetoric is purely there to offset what he feels is neglect of the MDA budget or he genuinely wants these sites. Regardless, even he has toned down since Carter became SecDef. Carter practically wrote the book on missile defense capability and policy.

3 billion....not that expensive or extensive.....

Thats nearly 40% of MDA's budget and its O&S cost would eat into testing plus you would have to do redundant testing to get the system online. MDA has been measured in its response. They would like to peg the limited Anti-ICBM capability with the threat estimate and no more. For them, more GMD sites mean zilch when it come to protecting forward deployed troops in the Asia Pacific region, or protecting Guam, or even places in the middle-east. The US Army has never really cozied up to idea of buying its interceptors using its own money . The early plan was for the MDA to develop and test, missile defense systems before transferring them on to the services to acquire. However, now as more and more systems are deployed post-development the MDA is being forced to pay all or majority of the cost for deployments. The THAAD interceptors are purely funded from the MDA's budget and not the US Army's budget. This impacts future R&D as procurement is a larger amount than development or testing. Hence, the MDA has been measured in its endorsement for more interceptor sites unless they are urgently needed because the threat estimates point to so.

[brar_w]

I'm wondering how current ABM defences, especially the GBI would fare against the Chinese inventory coming across the pacific...

40 odd interceptors won't throttle chinese strategic deterrence simply given the number and the associated shot doctrine. Barring a few experimental systems, the US Situational Awareness for an ICBM attack is still designed for detecting missiles in order to counter by launching your own nukes. Discriminating MIRV's mixed with decoys wasn't t the main focus of the system when it was designed. This translates to a very conservative shot doctrine for obvious reasons. The current roadmap is essentially geared towards fending off a few relatively modest ICBM's launched as a salvo towards CONUS or Hawaii.

The only valid point that I often see in russian arguments is that they are researching and developing capabilities for ABM. However, when has that ever stopped? Have the russians stopped researching ABM? or deploying it for that matter.

Again, this is the whole point. Future ABM defenses aren't going to just depend on missiles. They will rope in laser, blackout, etc. It has to be seen as an architecture which will mature from infancy. The US has already secured some real estate in Poland and Romania and is stationing its ships in the Mediterranean. These sites could easily be scaled up and could field even more powerful missile systems in the future.

Moreover, the Russians are way behind in ABM tech. They don't possess the computing technology, sensors, development architecture, and funding to make it viable.

For now they're safe. The current lot of SM missiles won't even scratch them. Future will probably be a diff story.

I'm wondering how current ABM defences, especially the GBI would fare against the Chinese inventory coming across the pacific...

Lets take it one at a time.

Lasers : There is a huge technical challenge to get lasers on the ground to shoot at targets in space or even near space. Hence most if not all ABM efforts that involve lasers have focused on boost phase intercepts since here, you can get to altitudes where some of these issues are mitigated. In that case both the Russians, and the US had experimentation over the years. The US did successfully shoot down a Ballistic missile in the boost phase using a DEW however there were many challenges that made the system bad -

A) Power and Cooling, and reload capability

B ) One missile at a time only

C) Works well against liquid fueled systems, but not as well against solid fueled ones

D) System is not survivable

E) Can be defeated by relatively simple means such as decoy launches (two first stages) and by attacking the platform

All these things essentially put an end to the YAL as probably they did to the Soviet/Russian system for a boost phase intercept. There is no program, anywhere in the world currently ongoing that is looking at the challenges of putting a multi megawatt class system on the ground to shoot at incoming ballistic missile warheads that are themselves hardened for re-entry. Even if such a system were to be developed, how many would be required to defend even a high population area against multiple incoming warheads? Technical challenges aside, there are serious handicaps with such a system.

The US has already secured some real estate in Poland and Romania and is stationing its ships in the Mediterranean. These sites could easily be scaled up and could field even more powerful missile systems in the future.

With the EPAA, there are a few arguments that are valid, and others that aren't. The position is negotiable and has been negotiated in the past. For example, earlier plans involved placement of a Ground Based Mid Course defense system in Europe. There were reservations expressed by Russia and they went with AEGIS. Then the SM3 Block IIB that could for some trajectories have been problematic for the Russian launches (some) but that interceptor has now been cancelled as well. Now comes the baseline capability of the radar.

The radar practically does not threaten the russian air capability (fighters) given the nature and its low altitude capability (at something like 200 km as the low base) unlike Russian S400's that still peeks into NATO territory from kaliningrad. Things such as number of deployed interceptors in Romania, and Poland can be negotiated and if they negotiate VLS number then you are again down to a trade between ballistic and air..If the US tries to project air-defenses into Russian territory, using the SM6 they would essentially be trading away ABM capability since they would have to publicly discuss adding VLS cells (Russians can see this using their satellites).

As far as ships in the mediteranian or anywhere else, none of the AEGIS ships have an interceptor that can intercept an ICBM level leave alone intercept all the trajectories possible out of russia and towards targets of interest. The only interceptor that could have been capable was cancelled and is unlikely to resurface for surface ship use (USN has a ban on liquid fuel rockets).

If this is scaled for example if a future US administration adds more VLS cells to Romania or Poland, or if the SM3 Block IIB re-surfaces as a ship borne anti ICBM system than the russians can cry arms control and it would be more valid than their arguments now. The US however minces no words when it says that it is building up a regional ballistic missile defense capability using pre-positioned radars and interceptors on land and on ships. This is different from knocking out ICBM's over CONUS.

The best way in that case would be as has been mentioned by many a strategic think tankers, would be to share interceptor VBO with the Russians. That in my opinion can be a compromise position if the US wants to expand EPAA and the russians have reservations.

Meanwhile, how many Russian ABM interceptors are currently deployed around Moscow? Plus how many S400 regiments in operational usage with a claimed ABM capability?

Moreover, the Russians are way behind in ABM tech. They don't possess the computing technology, sensors, development architecture, and funding to make it viable.

Oh no, they claim quite robust ABM capability.

if scaled up, quite well I would venture.

First thing to look at is which part of the world is best suited to take out Russian ICBM's in the mid course with interceptors outside of CONUS or US territory. Most that have done the physics, agree that it is not Poland or Romania but somewhere around north Africa. If you apply calculations to these sites you'll see that even if the SM3 had a 5km/s interceptor (which it does not), it would not be able to tackle any trajectory headed towards CONUS from the sites in Poland or Romania. This assumes that these interceptors are launched form the first sign of booster cut off. Even if we assume that they develop a really big and fat kill vehicle, and start launching interceptors before boost phase is complete, they still can't catch an ICBM effectively.


The thing though is that the European GMD capability (placing 2 stage or 3-stage mid course interceptors like those in California in Europe) was cancelled, replaced by a less capable AEGIS Ashore system. The SM3 Block IIB has been cancelled. Higher frequency sensors in Europe that would have aided in decoy and warhead discrimination (such as the stacked AN/TPY-2) have been cancelled and replaced by modest but inferior capability in the forward deployed AN/TPY-2 in Turkey, and lower frequency (s-Band) AEGIS sensor in Romania and Poland. Similarly in the homeland defense mission a more capable GaN X-Band wide FOV radar in Alaska was cancelled in favor of an S-Band GaN system that by its very nature would not be as good at discriminating as the X band sensor would have been.

In addition to all this the sensors of other NATO players such as the new radar France is developing are lower frequency so add very little to the challenge of discrimination. Discrimination is important because the lack of high quality of discrimination means the system can be countered more easily using decoys.

All this has had no impact on russian ICBM plans. They are still developing and modernizing their ICBM capability since its key to their strategic deterrence and it can be argued that Russia of today, values strategic deterrence much more than Soviet Union back in the day. Similarly, Russians pulling away S400 deployment, or scaling back their S500 plans or even reducing currently deployed ABM capability around moscow is unlikely to impact US Nuclear forces modernization plans. Those plans are being debated on cost, and whether a triad can be replaced by a diad for the medium term.

None of that is factoring in Russian ABM capability and how tweaking that impacts their investments. Finally the SM system, no matter how much you scale up cannot provide a layered defense to the CONUS from Russian ICBM's. There is no evidence that there is some secret terminal defense capability against ICBM's in development or deployed. Its not even doing the rounds of the conspiracy theory forums or the usual arms control hangouts. Without a terminal defense capability, you are essentially relying on mid-course defense and a limited number of interceptors to fend off even the most modern rusisan ICBM's that come with a ship load of decoys and possibly other countermeasures as well. Is that a valid strategy to fend off Russian ICBM's? If its valid, why is a more deeper layered strategy being adopted to counter regional threats from SRBM's through IRBMs even though those threats are less capable technically than a potential Russian salvo of warheads and decoys headed towards CONUS?

It would be naive to think that Russians would decelerate their ICBM development based on US ABM capability rollback. On the contrary, its in Russia's interest to maintain a credible and strong strategic deterrence. Similarly, the US that has less of a need for as much investment (as a %age of GDP) into its nuclear forces, still has a strategic reason to keep its deterrence credible. Both the nation's are at a stage where legacy cold-war systems need to be modernized. That is purely a function of replacement cycles. Much like defense budgets, strategic capability is a function of national security policy and will be emphasized accordingly irrespective of what happens elsewhere.

This all assumes that New-start survives a renewal. Not sure that wold be the case..Now lets assume, the US deployed 100's if not 1000's of interceptors on CONUS to protect against Russian warheads. Lets also assume that some magic happens in directed energy and small laser can overcome technical challenges through the atmosphere and defeat hardened warheads that are designed to survive re-entry. Lets also assume that the US deploys hundreds, if not thousands of terminal defense interceptors after spending billions to develop a terminal system that can defend against an incoming ICBM (lasers will always run into saturation issues so are at best complementary systems in a raid scenario). Lets also assume, that the US builds redundancy into its sensors all across the kill chain (instead of relying on one-off operational sensors, and even test-articles used at times of high alerts ) in order to make them survivable against Russian first strike.

What will all this build up lead to (it has to be transparent since you can't deploy things in secret for obvious reasons)? The Russians will be out of new-start even before any of these systems are deployed. They would also considerably boost their ABM capability and would up the number of warheads, having been de-shackled from the MIRV deployment treaty obligations. What would the US response be? More ABM to counter Russian anti-ABM, and more ICBM's to counter Russian ABM.

This will lead to a considerable erosion in US conventional capability which it values far more given it has an anti-access challenge in the Pacific and a potential anti-access challenge in the regional sense in the Middle East. This scenario will not benefit US strategic interests in any shape or form. Its really tough to argue that limited ICBM defense is not in US's strategic interests however its also extremely tough to argue that large-scale ICBM defense is in US's geopolitical interest given that the looming threat is being kicked out of the Asia-Pacific region altogether as China becomes more and more assertive than winning some cold-war like strategic battle with the Russians. Countering the A2AD challenge in the Pacific, would require massive conventional capability build up over the next 30 years, and taking money away from this and pouring it into the programs mentioned in the hypothetical escalatory scenario above will be a sureshot way of handing strategic victory to the Chinese.

Its best to decouple Missile defense from the arms control, and political arguments and focus on what it essentially is - A Technical/Engineering challenge with financial and policy implications.

[KrishnaK]

This will lead to a considerable erosion in US conventional capability which it values far more given it has an anti-access challenge in the Pacific and a potential anti-access challenge in the regional sense in the Middle East. This scenario will not benefit US strategic interests in any shape or form. Its really tough to argue that limited ICBM defense is not in US's strategic interests however its also extremely tough to argue that large-scale ICBM defense is in US's geopolitical interest given that the looming threat is being kicked out of the Asia-Pacific region altogether as China becomes more and more assertive than winning some cold-war like strategic battle with the Russians. Countering the A2AD challenge in the Pacific, would require massive conventional capability build up over the next 30 years, and taking money away from this and pouring it into the programs mentioned in the hypothetical escalatory scenario will be a sureshot way of handing strategic victory to the Chinese.

That the US expends considerable energies on holding Russia in check is a matter of faith to many on this forum. While that seems fanciful, that the US wants to contain India is also held as an article of faith, when there is absolutely NO evidence to prove it. Not in American or Indian literature. Your very long but cogent analysis is going to get no traction I'm afraid. The same litany will chanted continually - MIC complex, dollar hegemony upheld by military force, economic end game, anglo-saxons rampaging the world.....

[brar_w]

The argument boils down to a shifting of investment priority from conventional weapons, to strategic ones (such as nuclear forces/capability and anti-ICBM capability). For the US, the challenges are regional i.e. developing capability to counter A2AD build up in europe, monitor A2AD force build up in the Middle east,and the big gorilla in CHINA that has its entire defense posture focused towards kicking the US out of Asia-Pacific and becoming a regional hegemon on way to becoming a more assertive superpower with clear intentions of redrawing regional borders.

Countering Russia's warheads, and providing a credible layered defense to do so, would not only take away from the conventional capability required to prevent things mentioned above, but would also throw the US into an unnecessary strategic arms race with Russia which would be pointless given how much the US economy would depend upon the Pacific (it already does) and how remaining a credible player in the asia-pacific region is important to long term US national security. Russia is no Soviet Union, and engagement is still a very valid long term strategy. Even if the US finds it tough to work with Putin now, it doesn't mean 5 years from now the relationship would not improve. Putin is also term-limited still iirc. There is simply no need to completely switch up your national defense posture to somehow leave confrontation as the only means to deal with Russia when there is absolutely no need to do so.

Building and scaling up the ABM system to target Russian warheads DOES NOT guarantee a credible defense against them (both due to technical challenges, and due to escalatory responses). It DOES however guarantee a strategic arms race that would naturally erode your capability to overcome other national security priorities. Russia's own analysis of the SDI pointed to this very thing. However, with the SDI the main threat was the Soviet Union, and secondary threats had a huge technological gap with the US. Now, the primary long term strategic adversary is China, and trends point to technological parity in the medium-long term. The best way to hold back Russian nukes is to have nukes of your own.

In a nut shell, there is ZERO benefit to the US actually developing a multi-layered defense against incoming Russian warheads. Not only is it likely to be too costly, politically unjustifiable (how many cities would be open to having huge missiles stationed around their boundaries? ), but it would have severe strategic consequences in diminishing the US's abilities to meet its national security obligations in the Pacific. The cold-war is over..the next 50 years for the US are more likely to be defined by how the power shifts in the Pacific as opposed to Eastern Europe. Against, Russia, deterrence works, has for decades.

[Philip]

USN's brand new LCS breakdown woes.
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/25/polit ... -problems/

Breakdowns leave 2 of Navy's newest ships stuck in port

By Brad Lendon and Zachary Cohen, CNN
Updated 1124 GMT (1924 HKT) January 26, 2016

The littoral combat ship USS Independence (LCS 2) conducts maneuvers with the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise 2014.

Sailors assigned to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35 prepare an MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aircraft system for flight operations aboard the littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3).

Sailors assigned to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35 prepare an MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aircraft system for flight operations aboard the littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3).
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"Both investigations into the equipment casualties for USS Fort Worth and USS Milwaukee are ongoing, but it is unlikely the causes are related," said Lt. Cmdr. Tim Hawkins, a Navy spokesman.

Unlike the Milwaukee, which broke down just days after it was commissioned, the Fort Worth is a fairly tested ship that has participated in nine exercises with navies around the world and conducted operations in the South China Sea without issue, he said.

This successful track record lowers the chances of a common thread between the problems it experienced this month and those of the brand-new USS Milwaukee.

The Navy's littoral combat ships come in two variants: the monohull and the trimaran. With a draft of between 14 and 15 feet and a speed of 40 knots, the ships are designed to operate in littoral environments, or shallower coastal areas.

The Fort Worth and the Milwaukee are monohull ships, as is the USS Freedom (LCS 1). Trimarans on active duty are the USS Independence (LCS 2) and USS Coronado (LCS 4).

While the ships are having their on-board problems, they are also facing a lack of support at the Pentagon, specifically from Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.

In December, Carter ordered the Navy to cut its projected fleet of the ships from 52 to 40, saying resources that would have been devoted to the 12 proposed LCSs would be better expended on Navy ships with better firepower, as well as submarines and aircraft.

"This plan reduces, somewhat, the number of LCS available for presence operations, but that need will be met by higher-end ships, and it will ensure that the warfighting forces in our submarine, surface and aviation fleets have the necessary capabilities and posture to defeat even our most advanced potential adversaries," read a December 14 letter from Carter to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus.

Carter's plan isn't being heartily embraced by the Navy's top uniformed officers, who are offering some defense for the LCS.

"It's got survivability and lethality ... and it has a terrific role to play across that entire spectrum of operations," Adm. John Richardson, the chief of naval operations, is quoted as saying by Breaking Defense.

"LCS fits right in the middle of the modern warfight, great powers or not," Rear Adm. Peter Fanta, the Navy's director of surface warfare, is quoted as saying in the same article.

Role of the LCS overseas

And less than a year ago, the Navy was touting the role the LCS would play in regions like the South China Sea, where China is building facilities on reclaimed land sites in the Spratly Islands, and where the ship now idled in Singapore, the Fort Worth, made an important show-the-flag patrol last May.

"Routine operations like the one Fort Worth just completed in the South China Sea will be the new normal as we welcome four LCSs to the region in the coming years. Deployment of multiple LCSs to Southeast Asia underscores the importance of this 'region on the rise' and the value persistent presence brings," Capt. Fred Kacher, commodore of the Navy's Destroyer Squadron 7, said in a news release at the time.

Despite experiencing two incidents in as many months, Hawkins said, the Navy's long-term strategic plan for using littoral combat ships has not changed.

"The Navy still plans to rotationally deploy four littoral combat ships to Singapore by 2018 as part of a broader effort to base the most advanced and capable naval forces in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region over the next four years," he said.

[brar_w]

[brar_w]

Video Shows Earth-Penetrating Capability of B61-12 Nuclear Bomb

[TSJones]

the bugs will be worked out of those new ships. in general, the US Navy does not require sea going tugs to accompany its missions, unlike Russia.

[brar_w]

The bugs have been a result of poor program management and inexperienced ship-builders, plus the latest one is suspected to be due to human error which could have happened on any craft.With LCS its also about the wide split between the Navy leadership that (justified to a point) wants forward presence, and Ashton Carter (also justified) who claims that they are focusing too much on presence and not enough on capability.

Both arguments have merit, however the issue is unlikely to be resolved soon given that Obama decided to put a politico in charge of the Navy. To Carter and Bob Work's credit, they have just convinced Congress, and Obama to spend approximately $15 Billion next year on third-offset technologies, and have also put an increasing amount (15-30 Billion per year) in the FYDP in order to begin integrating these technologies. They see, the USN with the F-18E/F, UCLASS requirements, and now the LCS as dragging their feet and focusing too much on quantity as opposed to a better mix of quantity and quality. The Navy has also started to create some noise of it wanting to get out of the BMD mission which is likely to further irk those that look at things like joint fighting ops. The CNO however, is much more open to having a frank discussion with other service chiefs and the brains of the pentagon on technologies compared to his processor that had a notional ship-number that he wanted to meet and would have gladly raided the NAVAIR capability to achieve that number. To the Navy's credit, they are staying true to their roots of opposing every idea not thought by them. During the second-offset strategy debate the USN was the first to raise their objections and not buy in to Precision guided near zero miss-weapons only to buy them once the USAF made the bulk of the investments required to develop them

With the new SSBN slowly inching towards contract awards, and a host of new technologies being readied for testing (more powerful DEW's, and EMRG prototypes) the Navy leadership may want to sync up with that of the pentagon if they want to crete a steady stream of funding for all this. This is unlikely to happen with the current president so most are simply buying time.

http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/why-ch ... st-option/

For the USN's part they want their big investment projects to be, the SSBN (Ohio Class Replacement), 2-SSN per year production with a potential 3- a year production if possible along with 1 SSBN construction, Ford class carrier, and the next destroyer and cruiser. They don't mind watering down NAVAIR, by reducing UCLASS capability, or moving F-35C large scale procurement to beyond 2020. Also, LCS for them is a cheap $300-500 Million ship that they only reluctantly agreed to up-gun into a frigate. For them, this is a forward presence ship that does its mission and gives them access to ports that would not allow more powerful ships. Carter and co (and his processor) want these ships to be more capable which the Navy sees as defeating their purpose.

[TSJones]

I worry that these new ships do not have the weapons to adequately defend themselves should serious opposition come looking for trouble. Specifically, the lack of longer range missiles.

It seems to me that it would not have been too difficult to have built say, a few missile cells for longer range missiles. don't get me wrong, I don't want them to get into slug fests with heavier ships; I just want the opposition to have to think about getting a 500 lb war head nailing them at the water line or the ship's bridge.

[brar_w]

Well, the Congress is forcing a frigate version of the LCS on the USN and in the next few months the US will be experimenting with the latest Harpoon version, and the NSM on the existing fleet. Lockheed is also on its own dime developing a capability for the LRASM. The problem the USN sees is that they have invested in distributed lethality for this very purpose. The LCS will be operating within their networked bubble, and you don't need organic capability every-time when you can provide offensive capability as and when needed from the surface, sub-surface or the air using their own or USAF's assets (B-1's with LRASM's in this case). They see up-gunning the LCS as a waste of resources that could be spent elsewhere (in the submarine fleet in this case given the branch roots of the last two CNO's). In an ideal world, everone would love to see the LCS as a mini Burke..but that's not the purpose of this class or why the USN wants to buy it. I don't completely agree with the USN's needs assessment but they contend that there are a lot many missions supporting CENTCOM, AFRICOM and even NORTHCOM where such a ship is perfectly suited. They'd argue that as they thin out in the pacific given the top heavy nature of the current destroyers and cruisers, these ships can work better with regional partners since they can be forward based in places like Singapore where political acceptance to base larger more capable ships would be uncomfortable (politically)

It seems to me that it would not have been too difficult to have built say, a few missile cells for longer range missiles. don't get me wrong, I don't want them to get into slug fests with heavier ships; I just want the opposition to have to think about getting a 500 lb war head nailing them at the water line or the ship's bridge.

[TSJones]

The problem the USN sees is that they have invested in distributed lethality for this very purpose. The LCS will be operating within their networked bubble, and you don't need organic capability every-time when you can provide offensive capability as and when needed from the surface, sub-surface or the air using their own or USAF's assets (B-1's with LRASM's in this case). They see up-gunning the LCS as a waste of resources that could be spent elsewhere (in the submarine fleet in this case given the branch roots of the last two CNO's).

oh, yeah, 10-4, copy that. Over.

From wiki....battle of Leyte Gulf: Off Samar

The destroyer USS Johnston was the closest to the enemy. On his own initiative, Lieutenant Commander Ernest E. Evans(Medal of Honor; Posthumous) steered his hopelessly outclassed ship into the Japanese fleet at flank speed. The Johnston fired its torpedoes at the heavy cruiser Kumano, damaging her and forcing her out of line. Seeing this, Sprague gave the order "small boys attack", sending the rest of Taffy 3's screening ships into the fray. Taffy 3's two other destroyers, Hoel and Heermann, and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts, attacked with suicidal determination, drawing fire and disrupting the Japanese formation as ships turned to avoid their torpedoes. As the ships approached the enemy columns, Lt. Comdr. Copeland (Navy Cross; he should have received the Medal of Honor but he didn't die) of the Roberts told all hands via bull horn that this would be "a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival could not be expected."[21] As the Japanese fleet continued to approach, Hoel and Roberts were hit multiple times, and quickly sank. After expending all of its torpedoes, Johnston continued to fight with its 5-inch guns, until it was sunk by a group of Japanese destroyers.

forever and ever. Amen.

[TSJones]

...earthquakes strike new Jersey and in Britain too......

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zehgg0gVWvc

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EtmZiNwB6wc

naw....just the short stubby J-35 doing its thang and setting off sirens all over the place....... darn those short stubby planes!

when I was a kid living in west Texas we got sonic booms all the time, breaking windows, etc. very loud clap like thunder....there was a b-58 hustler afb near Lubbock and those cats were screaming fast over west texas......

I think Curtis Lemay dug it, he was always practicing attacks back then......I never got to see a b-58 hustler up close until My dad and I were driving by Kokomo, In. and you could see the planes taxing for take off a 100 yards from the highway. you coulda knocked me over with a feather...I was stoked....

[brar_w]

Raytheon kill vehicle succeeds in developmental flight test - Mission validates thruster redesign for enhanced ballistic missile defense

VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, Calif., Jan. 28, 2016 /PRNewswire/ -- A Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) successfully completed a data-gathering mission during a Missile Defense Agency flight test. The mission's objective was to observe in-flight performance of redesigned components and gain valuable information on evolving threat classes.

EKVs are designed to destroy incoming ballistic threats while they are still in space. As part of the MDA test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, a ballistic missile target was launched and purposely not intercepted to demonstrate for maximum maneuvering and data collection.

The successful mission proved the effectiveness of a recent redesign of the EKV thrusters, which provides the control necessary for lethal impact with incoming threats while safely outside of the Earth's atmosphere. The testing was supported by Raytheon's sea-based X-band radar (SBX) and AN/TPY-2 radar – both play critical roles in supporting the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.

"This was a remarkable data-collection opportunity," said Dr. Taylor W. Lawrence, president of Raytheon Missile Systems. "These are among our industry's most complex systems. Testing is critically important to ensuring the advancement of reliable kill vehicles for the protection of the U.S. homeland."

Raytheon is simultaneously managing four kill vehicle programs – the EKV, Standard Missile-3 kinetic vehicle, Redesigned Kill Vehicle, and Multi-Object Kill Vehicle. The Raytheon kill vehicle family has a combined record of more than 30 successful space intercepts.

About the EKV
Backed by decades of kill vehicle technology expertise, the Raytheon-made EKV is designed to destroy incoming ballistic missile threats by directly colliding with them, a concept often described as "hit to kill."

The EKV has an advanced, multi-color sensor used to detect and discriminate incoming warheads from other objects.
The EKV has its own propulsion, communications link, discrimination algorithms, guidance and control system and computers to support target selection and intercept.
The EKV is deployed and operational today.

Homeland Missile Defense System Successful in Non-Intercept Flight Test

WASHINGTON — The Ground-based Midcourse Defense System completed a successful non-intercept flight test designed to evaluate the performance of redesigned thrusters in its interceptor’s kill vehicle, the Missile Defense Agency announced Thursday night.

The agency, along with the US Air Force 30th Space Wing, the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense and US Northern Command, launched a long-range ground-based interceptor from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and was able to evaluate alternate divert thrusters in the new version of the GMD’s ground-based interceptor.

The GMD system is designed to protect the homeland from possible ballistic missile threats from North Korea and Iran.

The divert thrusters were redesigned to address fundamental problems experienced in the previous version of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) – a key component of the interceptors designed to destroy targets in high-speed collisions after separating from a booster rocket.

The EKV struggled in tests and the acquisition plan for more ground-based interceptors – a total of 44 in California and Alaska – was threatened after interceptor test failures in 2010 and 2013. In the July 2013 test, the kill vehicle failed to separate from the booster rocket. In June 2014, however, the agency notched a successful intercept test, bringing its success record to four of seven tests and saving the program.

During the test Thursday, “a target representing an intermediate-range ballistic missile was air-launched from a US Air Force C-17 aircraft over the broad ocean area west of Hawaii,” MDA described.

An Raytheon-manufactured AN/TPY-2 radar in forward-based mode at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii detected the target and sent the tracking information to the battle management system. A Raytheon-made Sea-Based X-band radar, in the ocean northeast of Hawaii also identified and tracked the target.

The GMD system received the tracking data and identified a fire control solution to engage the target. The test also demonstrated technology to discriminate countermeasures carried by the target missile, according to the agency.

When the GBI was launched from Vandenberg, the kill vehicle performed “scripted maneuvers to demonstrate performance of alternate divert thrusters,” the MDA states. “Upon entering terminal phase, the kill vehicle initiated a planned burn sequence to evaluate the alternate divert thrusters until fuel was exhausted, intentionally precluding an intercept.”

Information from the test will be used to increase confidence of future intercept performance, the agency notes.

Aerojet Rocketdyne, the designer and manufacture of the “liquid Divert and Attitude Control System (DACS) on the EKV, said in a statement that the successful test represents three years of “hard work and dedication” on design improvements made at the company’s Los Angeles site.

“On this flight, we validated key design improvements in the divert and attitude control system, demonstrating improved performance, reliability and producibility,” Michael Bright, Aerojet Rocketdyne vice president of missile defense and strategic systems, said in the statement.

Three companies are also in the midst of redesigning the GMD kill vehicle that can take out multiple warheads with a single interceptor, completing their first program planning reviews with the MDA in November, which marked a critical step toward determining key elements of the designs.

[brar_w]

Lockheed Pushes Lrasm As Navy Looks To Rearm

As the U.S. Navy moves to restore and expand its ability to counter hostile warships, Lockheed Martin is positioning its air-launched Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (Lrasm) to meet pending surface-warfare and land-attack requirements.

The strategy includes proposing a surface-launched version of Lrasm to arm Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and modified-LCS frigates as part of the Navy’s “distributed lethality” concept to give more of its warships an offensive capability.

Raytheon is expected to offer versions of its Tomahawk Block IV for the future surface-warfare and land-attack requirements on larger warships. Competition to arm the LCS/frigate is expected to come from Boeing with a reduced-weight Harpoon and Raytheon with Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile (NSM).

Developed under a Darpa/Office of Naval Research program, and now being transitioned to the Navy, Lrasm is a version of the U.S. Air Force’s Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile—Extended Range (Jassm-ER) conventional cruise missile.Designed to autonomously locate and attack a vessel within a well-defended group of enemy ships, the stealthy weapon has a BAE Systems long-range sensor that combines passive radio-frequency sensing with an electro-optical terminal seeker that matches imagery of the ship to a target database.

Lockheed is to produce 110 AGM-158C air-launched Lrasms to provide an early operational capability on Air Force Rockwell B-1Bs in fiscal 2018 and Navy Boeing F/A-18E/Fs in 2019 to meet an urgent operational need from Pacific Command for an anti-ship missile.

With its transition to the Navy, Lrasm is now the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 1 weapon, and is an interim capability. The Navy plans to launch the long-term OASuW Increment 2 program in fiscal 2017 to field a new anti-ship missile on its ships.

Although primarily for surface platforms, Increment 2 could be used on additional aircraft, such as the maritime-patrol Boeing P-8A, says Scott Callaway, surface-launched Lrasm program manager. Lockheed’s approach is to offer a “highly common” multiplatform missile that can be launched from aircraft and ships, including the LCS/frigate.

In addition to three end-to-end air-launched flight tests completed successfully under the Darpa-led demonstration program, Lockheed conducted two surface launches of Lrasm in 2013 and 2014—one funded by the Pentagon research agency and one on internal research and development (IRAD) funds.For these tests, the Lrasm Increment 1 missile was mated to an off-the-shelf Mk.114 Asroc booster and fired from the Navy’s Mk.41 vertical-launch system (VLS) into cruise flight, using the Navy’s Lockheed-developed Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System.

“We proved VLS integration and demonstrated how we could modify Lrasm and plan and execute an anti-surface-warfare flight, all on IRAD funds,” says Callaway. “We modified the missile structure to attach the booster and demonstrated booster separation, after which it’s the same missile.”

Because LCS cannot use the Mk.41 VLS, Lockheed has designed a “top-side” launcher enabling Lrasm to be mounted on the deck of an LCS or frigate derivative. “We have developed a launcher concept built on a Harpoon truss structure with the same footprint on deck as a Harpoon launcher,” he says.

The Navy’s desire to increase surface-ship lethality has prompted demand for longer-range missiles on LCS vessels, but they were not designed to carry such missiles and the Navy has to analyze the structural requirements to fit appropriate launchers, says Rear Adm. Brian Antonio, LCS program executive officer.

NSM has a range of more than 100 nm, and LCS 4, USS Coronado, demonstrated the launch of the missile in October 2014. Boeing has developed a kit to reduce the weight and almost double the range of Harpoon, and the Navy is looking at the viability of installing the missile on LCS 1, USS Freedom and LCS 4. But Harpoon would be the “worst-case” weight option, says Joe North, vice president of littoral ships and systems for Lockheed Martin, which is one of two LCS lead contractors.

Lockheed responded to a Navy request for information on frigate over-the-horizon missiles in 2015 and a request for proposals is expected later this year, says Callaway. This is the nearest-term of three budget lines for new missiles. The others are next-generation surface-warfare capability, or OASuW Increment 2, and later the next-generation land-attack capability, to replace Tactical Tomahawk.

Ahead of the OASuW competition, Lockheed has proposed to the Navy a company-funded, end-to-end flight demonstration this year of its surface-launched Increment 2 Lrasm, from the Mk.41 VLS or top-side launcher, and is awaiting availability of a test ship, says Callaway.


For the land-attack requirement, Lockheed would add the Jassm-ER’s capability to attack hardened targets to the Lrasm. “That is not in the early operational capability Increment 1 missile, but we can port the software over,” he says.

In a land-attack mission, the missile would navigate via GPS to a fixed target and use the same electro-optical terminal seeker to match the target, rather than ship, image, he says. “We have the software ready to demonstrate in Lrasm this year,” he says.

[Singha]

why dont they think of unmanned ships with LCS payload(will be smaller and higher endurance due to no need for living spaces, so use some of it for extra diesel tanks)....this will push the distributed lethality to its true level.

if they can make a global hawk take off and land automatically and control it from other side of world, surely the fleet commander on the cvn or lhd would be able to control a swarm of these ships as the expendable fwd eyes and ears ? infact I would say armed with programmble radar reflector masts and a good speedy engine these could mimic the rcs, sonar noise and electronic emissions of the ddg51 ships and serve as decoys and honeypots

[brar_w]

That would be a rather waste wouldnt it? A lot of the size, weight and capability of a ship is to support the people inside and help them conduct their mission. If one was to design a dedicated unmanned ship, it would be a lot smaller than the LCS and would still be able to conduct the same mission.

Also, the Frigate version of the LCS, and other upgrades such as weapons are a congressionally mandated thing being forced on the USN by the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. The USN want the LCS as a cheap ship that does a few missions well, a few OK and don't do others. They are there to increase the USN's presence. What the OSD and the SecDef want is a ship that hangs around with the larger ships and the USN's contention is that if the LCS gets more expensive because it gets more capable, it makes less of a case for the ship. Carter responded to this by cutting future LCS numbers in the future outlook and adding more money on subs, aviation and on other ships.

[VinodTK]

In a daring move, US warship patrols disputed South China Sea

An American warship on Saturday patrolled the disputed South China Sea claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam, “to challenge excessive maritime claims” that restrict the rights and freedoms of the US and others.

The daring freedom of navigation operation by the US, mainly aimed at China, was first reported by The Wall Street Journal in a lead story.

“A US warship conducted a patrol Saturday around an island in the South China Sea claimed by China and two of its neighbors, another in a series of operations intended to challenge Beijing’s maritime and territorial claims in the region,” the daily said.

The Pentagon confirmed its operation in South China Sea.

“I can confirm the Department of Defense conducted a freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea on Jan 30 (Jan 29 EST), specifically in the vicinity of Triton Island in the Paracel Islands, to challenge excessive maritime claims,” Commander Bill Urban, a Pentagon spokesman, told PTI in response to a question.

This operation challenged attempts by the three claimants, China, Taiwan and Vietnam, to restrict navigation rights and freedoms around the features they claim by policies that require prior permission or notification of transit within territorial seas, he said. The excessive claims regarding Triton Island are inconsistent with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

“During the operation, the USS Curtis Wilbur, transited in innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island,” Urban said, adding that this operation was about challenging excessive maritime claims that restrict the rights and freedoms of the US and others, not about territorial claims to land features.

According to the daily, the operation lasted about three hours, during which there were no Chinese army or navy seen in the area. “We saw nothing that was unusual in terms of the reaction,” a senior defense official was quoted as saying.

The US takes no position on competing sovereignty claims between the parties to naturally-formed land features in the South China Sea, Urban reiterated.

However, Urban said that US does take a strong position on protecting the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all countries and that all maritime claims must comply with international law.

“No claimants were notified prior to the transit, which is consistent with our normal process and international law,” he said. This operation demonstrates, as US President Barack Obama and Defense Secretary have stated, the US will fly, sail and operate anywhere international law allows.

“That is true in the South China Sea, as in other places around the globe,” Urban said.

Since 1979, the US Freedom of Navigation program has demonstrated non-acquiescence to excessive maritime claims by coastal states all around the world. The program includes both consultations and representation by US diplomats and operational activities by US military forces.f

[Singha]

I fully agree the unmanned LCS-U would be smaller, but use some space to put in ER diesel tanks to enhance the on-station time to twice or thrice. the oiler ships who would need to refuel a swarm of these would be quite vulnerable if needing to do it often.

at a high tempo of ops the CVNs need to take on aviation fuel and munitions every 3 days iirc. the supply ships would be the highest value targets for subs to mission kill the CBG and force it off station.

[brar_w]

It was only going to be a matter of time since the SM6's predecessors had this capability as well. I guess they'd be doing a more ballistic profile to get speed and range and may perhaps even incorporate a terminal maneuver. The most important fact is that all the current endoatmoshperhic missiles on a DDG now (TLAM, SM6 and SM2, potentially LRASM) are capable of attacking a ship from varying ranges and at different speeds..This extends the saturation capability and provides the necessary flexibility imho to exercise the distributed lethality to its fullest...

Pentagon Budget Requests $2B for Tomahawks, $2.9B for SM-6

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon’s budget submission will contain a request for $2 billion spread over the next five years to purchase 4,000 Tomahawk weapons while funding the development of more advanced capabilities.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter revealed the Tomahawk buy during a Tuesday visit to Naval Air Station, China Lake, California, while also noting that the budget will commit almost $1.5 billion to development of two other advanced weapons.

Then on Wednesday, the Secretary announced the budget will also include $2.9 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for the SM-6 interceptor, both to purchase 650 of the weapons and to advance them to become an anti-ship missile for the first time.

Developed by Raytheon, the Tomahawk is a mainstay for ship-based weaponry, but has been restricted to striking at fixed targets. However, company executives revealed last January that Raytheon has invested in a multi-modal seeker that would allow the missiles to hit moving targets.

“We want to diversify the kinds of targets that they can hit, from land attack, which is probably how you first met the Tomahawk many years ago, to an anti-ship version so that we continue to diversify our suite of anti-ship missiles,” Carter said Tuesday. “Again, in the spirit of making everything we have lethal.”The company estimated last year that that adding a moving target capability would cost about $250,000 for each missile, which already cost $1.1 million each.

While not explicitly mentioning the new Tomahawk sensors, Carter did note that the department is using this fiscal year 2017 budget request to ensure “we’re making investments in weapons and sensors and capabilities.”

Carter previously revealed that the Pentagon will request $1.8 billion in 2017 to buy more than 45,000 precision-guided munitions, which are being expanded at fast rates dues to the ongoing fight against the Islamic State group, commonly known as ISIS or ISIL.Added to that is “about $927 million over the FYDP” for the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, or LRASM, and another $418 million over the FYDP for the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile – Extended Range (AARGM-ER) weapon, Carter said.

The secretary indicated that improving lethality to munitions is something of a theme for the budget, adding that the investments represent “big, big, big money for munitions, very important.”

That theme continued with the SM-6 news, giving another Raytheon product a major boost in the budget.

A Pentagon official told Defense News that the department has successfully modified the SM-6 to be an anti-ship missile, rather than just a ballistic missile defense weapon.

‎‎"This new anti-ship mode makes the SM-6 highly lethal due to its speed and agility and nearly overnight doubles the purpose of every such missile used across our fleet of Aegis destroyers," the official said. "This is an example of what the secretary sees as thinking differently and how through innovation we will continue to improve the unparalleled capabilities of the US Navy."

According to media reports, Carter also pledged that the budget will request funding for nine Virginia-class attack submarines and 10 Aegis destroyers over the next five years. It will also include money to purchase 10 F-35C models for the Navy and 3 F-35B models for the Marines over what had been planned. This occurs as the Air Force is looking to draw down its planned FY17 buy of the F-35A model by five planes, sources told Defense News.

And in good news for Boeing, Carter said the budget plan also calls for 16 F/A-18 Super Hornets over the FYDP. Boeing has been desperate to keep production flowing on the Super Hornet, produced in its St. Louis facilities.

Pentagon chief unveils plans to buy more high-end ships, fighters

Defense Secretary Ash Carter on Wednesday said the U.S. Navy would buy more high-end submarines, destroyers, fighter jets and unmanned underwater vehicles in coming years, using $8 billion saved by scaling back orders for smaller, less capable Littoral Combat Ships.

Carter said the Pentagon's five-year budget plan also included $2.9 billion to modify Raytheon Co's new SM-6 missiles for use as powerful anti-ship weapons and buy 625 more of the weapons, which are now used for missile defense.

In fiscal 2017, the Navy would spend $587 million to buy 125 SM-6 missiles, according to a senior defense official.
Secret testing last month had proven the Navy's ability to use the new Raytheon missiles as offensive anti-ship weapons, Carter told sailors at the Navy's massive San Diego base.

The move will dramatically bolster the military capabilities of the U.S. warships that carry them at a time when China and other countries are rapidly developing anti-ship weapons.

Carter embarked on a three-day tour of U.S. military bases on Tuesday after providing a preview of the Obama administration's $582.7 billion fiscal 2017 defense budget ahead of the formal rollout next week.

The Pentagon's budget reshapes spending priorities to reflect a new strategic environment marked by a return to greater power competition from Russia and China, and other threats such as Iran, North Korea and Islamic States.

Carter said the Pentagon's five-year plan would fund nine Virginia-class submarines and 10 DDG-51 destroyers over the next five years. Both ships are built by Huntington Ingalls and General Dynamics Corp.

He said the Navy would also buy 13 more Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 fighter jets than planned over the next five years - 10 for the Navy and three for the Marine Corps - as well as 16 more Boeing Co F/A-18E/F fighters.

It would also spend $600 million over the next five years to buy variable-size payload unmanned underwater vehicles.

Carter defended his plan to truncate orders of the two-model Littoral Ship program at 40 ships instead of 52, saying the current security environment demanded more sophisticated capabilities. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus had argued forcefully for the larger fleet of LCS ships, which are designed for surface and anti-submarine warfare, as well as mine-hunting missions.

U.S. officials said the Navy would buy two LCS ships in fiscal 2017, with orders dropping to one a year in subsequent years. Lockheed and Australia's Austal build two different models of the LCS ships.

And then there is THIS

And that's not all. The US has already run tests with the SM missile and the F-35 fighter-bomber, in which an SM missile has been fired from a ship but with no target identified. An F-35 in flight took control of the missile in midair, and then as the missile proceeded downrange, handed control of that missile to another F-35. Thus you could imagine a small, hardened launcher on an island popping up a missile and flinging it way into China, where it gets vectored on to target by a stealthy F-35.

The ability of the SM-6 to perform many roles — shooting down airborne targets, hitting ships, attacking deep inland, hitting ballistic missiles and even satellites — means that it could be the perfect way to turn that first island chain into a major headache for Chinese military planners.

[TSJones]

...meet the new $13 billion aircraft carrier......

http://www.cnet.com/pictures/meet-the-n ... t-carrier/

...doomed I'm sure by a chinese icbm.....

[Singha]

the airwing will be another $5b over 100 airframes atleast maybe more.

thats about the annual opex+capex defence budget of a good sized country and far more than most militaries.

all hail the great khan! *sound of a million horses rearing and stamping their feet*

[brar_w]

I think the curve for the carrier class looks like $13 Billion for the first in class, $11.5 for the second and about $10 Billion for the third and they would break into the single digits with the fourth onwards. Long term, the design was going to cost more than the last Nimitz class carrier procured ($6-$7 Billion), with savings coming in the life cycle domain. The air-wing cost is also significant but that just moves from one carrier to another so thats a continuous process as opposed to building an air wing specific to the carrier. The Nimitz to Ford transition is significant in that there is a new Cat system that is likely to still be in service for decades, a new AAG that will likely also stay in service for decades and new sensors etc. The capability increase in terms of serviceability, manpower reduction and sortie generation capability alone more than justified the jump in price and the growing pains in developing something better even if the cost estimates were off by 20-25%.

[enaiel]

Not sure if this was posted before, but Aviation Week has a copy of the 48-page annual project report on the F-35 JSF by Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation (DOT&E).

http://aviationweek.com/site-files/avia ... Report.pdf

It has some interesting observations on the current state of the Block 2B:

The program terminated Block 2B developmental flight testing in May 2015, delivering Block 2B capability with deficiencies and limited combat capability. The Marine Corps declared IOC at the end of July 2015. However, if used in combat, the Block 2B F-35 will need support from command and control elements to avoid threats, assist in target acquisition, and control weapons employment for the limited weapons carriage available (i.e., two bombs, two air-to-air missiles). Block 2B deficiencies in fusion, electronic warfare, and weapons employment result in ambiguous threat displays, limited ability to respond to threats, and a requirement for off-board sources to provide accurate coordinates for precision attack. Since Block 2B F-35 aircraft are limited to two air-to-air missiles, they will require other support if operations are contested by enemy fighter aircraft.

But you don't hear anyone from Marine Corps bad mouthing the aircraft to the press. Instead, they raised a squadron of these "deficient" fighters, and inducted them. And this is what they said during the induction ceremony:

http://www.marines.mil/News/NewsDisplay ... ional.aspx

“I am pleased to announce that VMFA-121 has achieved Initial Operational Capability in the F-35B, as defined by requirements outlined in the June 2014 Joint Report to Congressional Defense Committees,” said Gen. Joseph Dunford, Commandant of the Marine Corps. “VMFA-121 has ten aircraft in the Block 2B configuration with the requisite performance envelope and weapons clearances, to include the training, sustainment capabilities, and infrastructure to deploy to an austere site or a ship. It is capable of conducting Close Air Support, Offensive and Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, Assault Support Escort and Armed Reconnaissance as part of a Marine Air Ground Task Force, or in support of the Joint Force.”

Dunford stated that he has his full confidence in the F-35B’s ability to support Marines in combat, predicated on years of concurrent developmental testing and operational flying.

...

“The success of VMFA-121 is a reflection of the hard work and effort by the Marines in the squadron, those involved in the program over many years, and the support we have received from across the Department of the Navy, the Joint Program Office, our industry partners, and the Under Secretary of Defense. Achieving IOC has truly been a team effort,” concluded Dunford.

The U.S. Marine Corps has trained and qualified more than 50 Marine F-35B pilots and certified about 500 maintenance personnel to assume autonomous, organic-level maintenance support for the F-35B.

This was all done before the IOC of a "deficient" fighter, way before any FOC was achieved. India has a lot to learn from the US on how to nurture a domestic MIC.

[brar_w]

But you don't hear anyone from Marine Corps bad mouthing the aircraft to the press. Instead, they raised a squadron of these "deficient" fighters, and inducted them. And this is what they said during the induction ceremony:

The problem here is that the DOTE rarely ever likes anything that the operators do and they make absolutely ridiculous assertions and demand insane levels of testing. I had posted earlier about DOTE demanding an entire year's worth of torpedo launches to test one simple software change which would have disrupted an entire year of training by the USN. The USMC clearly articulated that the block 2B capability was "LIMITED" and that when they compared the state of the F-35B Block 2B, with a heavily utilized, old and hard to repair unit harriers, they were happy with the interim capability offered by the F-35B. The word LIMITED is in the Commandant's release as well.

Software deficiencies are the norm in large projects. When they prop up, within the million lines of code its the operator to make the call whether to -

A ) Invest in solving these deficiencies

B ) Deferring the capability to the final build and moving over developmental resources there

C) Send the platform back until each and every software glitch is corrected

DOTE reports are borderline ridiculous at times and the man in charge is a congressionally appointed puppet that the congress itself ignores after their purpose (arm twisting) has been served. As an example..I once heard a DOTE official brag that the JSTARS should not be an operational platform (and this was 3 years ago) since it went from development to deployment, where it performed exceedingly well in the Gulf War and was never given to the testers after it proved itself to be a capable platform - Actual combat performance be damned. He made the comments at a think tank organized event when the future replacement of the JSTARS was being debated

The problem with DOTE is that they have to take a contrarian view to the operators that do the testing since if they don't their entire existence as a parallel institution would be brought to question. They don't do tests of their but merely provide there own interpretation of operator led activities leading up to the IOTE which is again sanctioned by them but conducted by the operator. We all know the sensationalization that was reported based on their previous reports on the CV performance of a tail hook, and how the F-35 could not hover since it would melt LHD decks etc. All those assertions have been proven wrong over time in actual testing. They do have a purpose and that is to draw a response from the operators on the queries raised in there reports, however the media latches on to the DOTE reports but rarely do they publish in-depth the operator perspective and response to them, which they do at congressional hearings point-by-point.

There are however organized movements within each US services that go hard after a particular hardware or strategic decisions. A decade ago it was an all out war when the ex-Tomcat community went after the Super Hornet program. Recently it was the USAF's ex A-10 community, and a few A-10 pilots (that had never seen any near peer conflict and only bombed the Taliban in a permissive environment) going after the F-35 and even went totally personal in attacking (and fund raising to mount a smear campaign) the USAF's leadership including the CSAF. There was also an all out war against the F-16 back at the time including some high profile statements and even resignations by influential members of the F-15 community. There's a lot of agenda driven politics to go around in the US as with most free countries just as it is in India..Its however a bit diluted because people take sides and there are tons of projects to both criticize and organize for.

On top of all this there are the trust fund funded POGOs of the world that have a long term vision of essentially gutting the pentagon as an institution.

[brar_w]

An artist's depiction of Northrop Grumman's 6th generation fighter, and a middle finger to Boeing+Lockheed in the end -