Managing Chinese Threat

[krisna]

Chinese historian: "To exaggerate the size of China’s historical territory is not patriotic" – Full Text

Chinese textbooks do attempt to hammer home the idea that Tibet is a part of China–often using some rather specious historical arguments in the process–but most scholars in the PRC look back to the mid-Qing takeover of Tibet as the true beginning of “Chinese” sovereignty over the region and the official position is that it begins during “China’s Yuan dynasty.” (ahem.)

The notion that Tibet was not under direct Tang administrative is perhaps less controversial, but it’s sure to get some attention nevertheless, especially since Professor Ge also is the Director of the Institute of Chinese Historical Geography. For the CCP, it seems any weakening of China’s “historical” sovereignty over the Tibetan plateau is a slippery slope that can only lead to a Dalai Lama Day parade through the streets of Lhasa

When discussing the peaceful rise of China and the history of the great powers of the world, it is natural to think of ancient China. Can ancient China be considered a “Great Power”? If so, how big was it? This is a prerequisite for knowing the history and comparing development. But up to now, people have held on to not a few misunderstandings.

First of all, “China” (Zhongguo) only officially became the name of our country with the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. Before this, the idea of China (“Zhongguo”) was not clearly conceptualized. The concept of “China” has continued to expand. From referring specifically to the central plains of China, the concept has since grown to now refer generally to a whole nation. Even during the late Qing, “China” would sometimes be used as a name to refer to the Qing State, including all the territory with in the boundaries of the Qing Empire, but other times it would only refer to the “18 Interior Provinces” and not include Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Therefore, if we want to understand the extent of ancient China’s territory, we can only speak of how large was the actual territory controlled by a particular dynasty at a particular moment. For example: How big was the Qin Dynasty? How big was the Tang Dynasty? How big was the Qing Dynasty? If you want to say how large was “China” at a certain time, you need to explain how “China” is conceptualized, including explaining which Dynasty or regime is being discussed.

*For example, if we ask: How big was 8th century China and if we speak about the borders of the Tang Dynasty, we cannot include the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. This was ruled by Tubo/Tufan (吐蕃), and so does not count. Tubo/Tufan was a sovereignty independent of the Tang Dynasty. At least it was not administered by the Tang Dynasty. Otherwise, there would have been no need for Tang Taizong to marry Princess Wencheng to the Tibetan king; there would have been no need to erect the Tang-Tubo/Tufan alliance tablet. It would be a defiance of history if we claim that since the Tang Dynasty, Tibet has always been a part of China – the fact that the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau subsequently became a part of the Chinese dynasties does not substantiate such a claim. Of course, to look back from the perspective of contemporary borders, China’s current territory contains many areas that, from the perspective of 8th century political control, were independent of the authority of the Tang court including Tuobo/Tufan, Nanzhao [in Yunnan], and Bohai.

Second, it goes without saying that since the different dynasties lasted both a long time and a short time, it also goes without saying their territory similarly fluctuated. This is especially so of those dynasties that greatly expanded the scope of their borders from the beginning to the end of their rule, the territory under their control could vary considerably over time. Take for example the Western Han. In the beginning, their western border extended to the Hexi/Gansu corridor. Later, it expanded to Lake Balkhash only to then shrink back to the Yumen Pass in the latter years of the dynasty. In the early years [of the Han] the southern boundaries reached only as far as the Southern Ling Mountains. Even what is now Guangxi and Guangdong was under the contol of the Nan Yue. Yet by the middle and later periods, control in the south extended as far as what is today Vietnam.

After Tang Taizong defeated the Eastern Turks, the northern reaches of the Tang Empire extended all the way to the area around Lake Baikal. But when the Turks later regrouped, Tang control retreated to the Yinshan Mountains (in today’s Mongolia). Up to the reign of the Yongzheng Emperor during the Qing Dynasty, China’s borders did not include Xinjiang and it was not until the middle of the 18th century that the Qianlong Emperor was able to pacify the regions to the north and south of Tian Shan and extend Qing territory as far as Lake Balkhash and the Pamir Plateau. However, beginning around 1860, the northern reaches of Heilongjiang, the area east of the Ussuri River, and the northwest part of what is today Xinjiang—over 1,000,000 square kilometers of territory—was seized by Russia. In the 20th century, China for all practical purposes lost 1,500,000 square kilometers of territory that is Outer Mongolia.

Moreover, we must differentiate between territory that was actually under administrative control of a dynasty, that which was a vassal state, and that which was “within the reaches of our prestige.” [Within a dynasty’s sphere of influence?] For example, take the later stages of the Western Han. Even though the leader of the Xiongnu surrendered to the Western Han, Han Wudi was not able to incorporate the Xiongnu into the Han Empire. Moreover, he had to pay off the leader of the Xiongnu in order to have a guarantee that there would be not attacks across a border marked by the Great Wall. As a result, the borders of the Han Empire did not extend beyond the Yin Mountains and the Xiongnu were never a part of Han territory.

In another example, several times the children and grandchildren of Ghengis Khan marched westward, their cavalry sweeping over Asia and Europe. But by the time that Ghengis’ grandson, Khubilai, established the Yuan Dynasty, Ghengis’ other descendants had already split apart his empire, after which they became known as the Four Khanates. These other Khanates and the Yuan court were independent political entities, only that their rulers had the same ancestors. The borders of the Yuan Empire did not include parts of Xinjiang and the southern territory belonged to another Khanate, never mind Central Asia, Western Asia, and Europe.

Another example is Vietnam, the larger part of which was under the administrative control of the Han and Tang Dynasties. But beginning in the 10th century, Vietnam founded its own independent kingdom, after which, during the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties, it was a vassal state. Of course, this is not the same as complete independence, therefore before France made Vietnam a French colony, France had to force the Qing government to relinquish its sovereignty and claims over Vietnam. Nevertheless, we are not able–at least after the 10th century—to regard Vietnam as a part of “China.” Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, Burma are also in a similar category.

Now, what of the countries of South East Asia and Japan that have never officially been the vassals of any dynasty? Chinese history books call them “Tributary States.” Actually, it was either international trade under the “tribute” banner or else it was only temporary visits. Most of what the books call “Tributary States” are like this. What is more, we have only the one-sided views of the Qing court records that were based on past precedents and written for the court’s own aggrandizement. For example, people also called Russia, France, Portugal, and the “Red Hairs” as tribute states. (During the Ming, Dutch people were called “Red Hair Foreigners,” After the mid-Qing they also called the English, “Red Hair Foreigners”) Can we possibly accept that these states were also vassals of the Qing?

Until now, there are those people who feel that the more they exaggerate the territory of historical “China” or China’s successive dynasties and kingdoms the more patriotic they are. Actually, it is exactly the opposite. If China really wishes to rise peacefully, we must understand the true facts of history, only then will we be able to know the sum of our history, learn from our experiences, and so be on a solid footing to face the future.

(* Note: the third paragraph was translated by the good people at Letters from China, which is why it reads better than the rest of the text.)

The Qing Empire incorporated large swaths of territory that had never been fully under “Chinese” control, including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. Not surprisingly, it is those areas that give the current regime in Beijing the most headaches today.

dated article 2007 on googling.

[VinodTK]

India, China to set up mechanism to curb LAC violations

[ramana]

From Ram Narayanan, pne of my gurus!

I am reproducing below Nitin Pai's brilliant article on "Let's focus on geoeconomics, please," (which appeared in Business Standard), in which he concludes that the rebuilding of economic, cultural and political relationships that India historically shared with countries to its East has never been more important.

Nitin Pai is the young, fellow and more at the Takshashila Institution, and live-wire editor of Pragati - The Indian National Interest Review, which is creating waves in the Indian strategic scene.

While agreeing with his general thesis and conclusions, I had taken issue with two of the three factors which he says will shape the Asian balance.

Following are the points raised by me and Nitin's response:

RAM: The first factor may not hold. Suppose China decides to teach India "another" lesson and, without warning of any sort of course, in a lightning move (or a blitzkrieg) tries to occupy Arunachal Pradesh (or Tawang within AP). Is the Indian military strong enough to stop them without losing any territory? If India does lose some territory, how will the so-called nuclear deterrence play out? Let's remember that nuclear deterrence did not stop the Pakistanis from taking Kargil and it was only the Indian army plus strong intervention by President Clinton which brought Pakistan's Kargil misadventure to a satisfactory end from India's viewpoint.

NITIN: Here's the thing: the other side of the coin of nuclear no-first-use is a surprise first use. Now if you are in Beijing, you would have to evaluate the benefits of 'teaching a lesson' or 'occupying Arunachal' against the risk of (a) Indian defences being better than 1962 (b) Indians deciding to use/threaten nuclear attack. That raises the costs considerably, and in my opinion, the Chinese aren't about to wreck their emergence by getting into such a game.

China's worst strategic nightmare is a US-India military alliance. 'Teaching a lesson' by doing another 1962 might be the best way to bring it about.

China is not Pakistan. They don't do misadventures. Of course there's a risk that someone silly will do something silly and start a war...but modern communications are likely to put brakes on that before things escalate.

Finally, India's border defences have been robust since 1967. We are no pushovers today, as we were in 1962.

RAM: As for the second factor viz. "the small- and medium-sized countries of East Asia would look towards India to help them counter the pressures arising from China’s geopolitical assertiveness", let's not forget that India's GDP is only a quarter of China's and India's defence budget is just a fraction of China's. Therefore, apart from the imperative need to raise India's rate of growth to surpass that of China which is for the long term, China can be expected to be less assertive with its neighbours only and only if the US, Japan, Korea, ASEAN, Australia, and India act jointly.

NITIN: Not all need to act jointly, and need not act jointly all the time. For instance, if Vietnam is being bullied, mere US support can check China's assertiveness in that theatre. India's presence adds to Vietnam's security.

But given the geopolitics of the region, where countries have their own bilateral tensions in addition to tensions with China, I do not think an overall bloc against China is possible. I do think that within the East Asian dynamic, some countries will gravitate towards each other more often than others. Ergo, US, Japan, India, S Korea, Vietnam and Australia are likely to cooperate more in future. Indonesia is a swing power. Thailand will bandwagon onto whichever side is stronger.

Now, read on.

Cheers,

Ram

http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... se/449588/

Nitin Pai: Let's focus on geoeconomics, please

Rebuilding economic, cultural and political relationships that India historically shared with countries to its East has never been more important

Nitin Pai / September 19, 2011, 0:18 IST

The Asian Balance turns one today. It had promised to “devote itself to chronicling and interpreting the unfolding geopolitics of East Asia. It will be an unabashed advocate of Looking East far beyond the Straits of Malacca”. If anniversaries are a good time for some reflection, recent events make it even more necessary.

I had argued that three factors would shape the Asian balance. First, nuclear deterrence would shift the India-China context away from direct military conflict along the disputed land borders to theatres in and around the Indian Ocean. Second, the small- and medium-sized countries of East Asia would look towards India to help them counter the pressures arising from China’s geopolitical assertiveness. Third, the whole effort to create “one workable grouping (such as the East Asia Summit) is premised on the unfounded hope that a powerful China will play by the rules it promises to”.

Therefore, “rebuilding the economic, cultural and political relationships that India historically shared with the countries and the peoples to its East has never been more important to our future than it is today”. So how has India fared on this front? Fairly well geopolitically, but quite poorly from the geoeconomic angle.

It is not uncommon to hear Indian commentators lament how China is expanding its presence in countries traditionally considered close to India, how it has hardened its posture on the border dispute, and how it continues to prop up the Pakistani military-jihadi complex. New Delhi could do little about much of this because, by and large, it lacks direct levers. The structural geopolitics of the subcontinent leads to our neighbours welcoming an outside power to balance India.

Seen from the confines of a subcontinental mindset, New Delhi appears to have few options between resigned hand-wringing and reckless aggressiveness, both accompanied by rhetorical frenzy. But if you realise that the game board of the raja-mandala is global, New Delhi doesn’t look that helpless any more.

In the past year, India has done well to start engaging countries in China’s vicinity in geopolitically meaningful ways. Beijing has noticed. Recently, off Vietnamese shores, an “unidentified caller” warned an Indian naval ship that it was trespassing in Chinese waters. China claims most of the South China Sea as its own. Beijing had also lodged a diplomatic protest with New Delhi warning against oil and gas exploration by ONGC Videsh and Petro Vietnam in that maritime region.

So far, India has not backed off in the face of Chinese pressure. To the extent that New Delhi persists on this course, it will both increase India’s own negotiating leverage with China and signal India’s resolve to East Asian countries. For instance, New Delhi responded to China’s démarche on oil exploration by asking it to stop activities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Can a weakened United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government hold its nerve if, as is likely, China escalates tensions? Can the understaffed ministry of external affairs create and devote sufficient human resources to its East Asian desks? Can the Indian media tone down hyperventilating coverage of the happenings along the India-China border? In the coming months, the answers to these questions will determine if India can capitalise on the modest gains made last year.

On the other hand, New Delhi has failed to anticipate, understand and respond to China’s economic situation. Three decades of economic growth have increased the productivity of China’s urban workforce, putting upward pressure on wages. But given its export-oriented economy, Beijing must keep wages down to remain competitive. China’s political leaders managed to achieve this by suppressing demands for higher pay and by keeping the currency undervalued.

The last two years have shown that both these strategies are increasingly untenable: even if irony of a Communist Party acting against the interests of workers is lost in contemporary China, cases of labour unrest are growing. Meanwhile, the United States continues to keep a watchful eye on China’s currency management. We do not know how Beijing will manage to wriggle out of this squeeze, not least because a combination of an ageing society and lower educational levels in rural areas means that the problem will worsen. What we do know is that this creates opportunities for other countries, including India.

With wages in China rising, manufacturers are seeking alternative locations for their factories. India could take advantage of this: if the UPA government creates an investment-friendly atmosphere. Instead, we see environmental regulations being used as political and rent-seeking tools, solutions to the vexed land acquisition that risk worsening the problem and, above all, a complete surrender on the issue of labour reform.

Last year I wrote, “... the seas east of Singapore hold the key to the lands west of the Indus.” I should have added that the rules made on the banks of the Yamuna hold the keys to those seas.

The author is founder and fellow for geopolitics at the Takshashila Institution and editor of Pragati – The Indian National Interest Review

[rajrang]

Indo-Pacific region

http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/mar ... o-pacific/

[rajrang]

The S.China Sea is at the epi-center of the indo-pacific region. Expect increased use of the phrase "indo-pacific region" in international deliberations, a region that includes a collection of countries whose vital national interests will be threatened by Chinese arrogance in the S. China sea. A coalition of threatened countries could ensure freedom of navigation in this area.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pacific

[kmkraoind]

"Bundling Strategy" over South China Sea will be disillusioned - Xinhua

Some analysts have projected the Indian move as a retaliatory response to Chinese moving into the Kashmir area under Pakistani control to assist Pakistan in the development of its infrastructure in the area.

No matter what it is, India’s aggressive move in South China Sea will complicate the regional situation, strain the testy Sino-Indian ties and will eventually bode ill for its own interests.

Another non-claimant but an active player is none other than Japan. Immediately after brawling with China over Diaoyu islands in East China Sea, it is ready to take a chance to wade into the unfolded South China Sea tussle targeting China as a tit-for-tat response. Not being a party to the conflicting claims in the sea, Japan’s entry into the dispute is much likely to enrage Beijing and test the relationship between China and its newly elected government.

Japan has just held discussions with Philippine diplomats on “resolving South China Sea territorial disputes.” A Japanese diplomat said afterwards that Japan has an interest in ensuring the vast ocean “remains safe and open to commerce.”

Even if the Philippines reaches out to Japan, and Vietnam tries to draw India to its side, the so-called “third party” invited to the South China Sea disputes can hardly match China in the regional strength and influence, let alone counterbalance and contain China as they expected. After all, China’s smaller neighbors need to maintain trade relations with it, and therefrom they profit.

It seems Chinese are scaring and pissing all their of neighbors, either moving them towards US-Japan-India's triad. Meanwhile Philippine's VP's statement.

Philippines seeks ASEAN help to blunt China - AFP

[Nihat]

Indeed , we have spoken of the Chinese influence in Nepal, B'desh and Sri Lanka with some concern in the past so it's great fun to see China showing some degree of concern regarding a potential US-India- Japan-Vietnam- SK- Taiwan effort, bottling up China in their own backyard without explicitly threatening them.

[shyamd]

The key here imo is projecting India as the anchor to the alliance. If India goes down then all of these SE Asian nations will be under the thumb of the PRC- . So its in the interests of all parties nearby to join this alliance seriously. Also its always worth reminding the people of the situation in Tibet and other areas where people are oppressed.

[ShauryaT]

The Great Game in the East

As Beijing turns its gaze south towards the Indian Ocean, and India looks east to the Pacific Ocean, their policies intersect in Burma. Whether this rivalry leads to conflict or not, it is bound to integrate the hitherto remote and closed borderlands of China’s south-west, Burma’s north and India’s northeast with the global economy.

Thant reminds us that southern Burma was once the hub of Asia until its military rulers decided to lock down the nation in the early 1960s. Irrespective of the current Western policies of isolating Burma, the Indian and Chinese engagement with the region is likely to let the nation retake its rightful position at the crossroads of Asia.

Thant’s book is a must-read for all Indians interested in the changing geopolitics of its eastern frontiers. While India’s security elite has recognized the strategic importance of Burma, it has fallen behind China in the intensity of its engagement.

Towards the end of the book, Thant recalls Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s letter to Jawaharlal Nehru in 1950 underlining the threats that a just reunited China might present India on its northern and eastern borders.

A much stronger and economically powerful China poses a much bigger geopolitical challenge, and a potential opportunity, for India on its eastern frontiers, both land and maritime. Thant’s Where China Meets India is a great place to start if you want to understand those grand new imperatives.

[Agnimitra]

MKB blogs: China deputes its security czar to Pakistan

The 2-day visit by Chinese interior minister and CCP politburo member Meng Jianzhu to Pakistan, which concludes today, has been in connection with the celebration of 2011 as the Pak-China Friendship Year. Beijing deputed its security czar to celebrate friendship with Pakistan. Although China and Pakistan vowed that the recent rioting in Xinjiang only steeled their resolve to strengthen security cooperation, Meng’s visit underlines that all-weather friendship entails top-notch security cooperation. Pakistan got the point alright, but put on a brave face.

Clearly, China is on a set course. It intends to finesse and fine tune security cooperation with Pakistan within the framework of dialogue rather than pressure Pakistan showing irritation or displaying rancour. The deputation of Meng to Islamabad signifies that Beijing remains confident of Pakistan’s sincerity and is conscious of its limitations.

Nothing need be read into the timing of Meng’s visit insofar as this is a scheduled visit. However, Pakistan sought to play up Meng’s remarks affirming friendship and solidarity as barbs directed against the US in the present climate of US-Pakistan rift. Some of Meng’s remarks indeed may resonate all the way to Washington - such as extending ’support to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity” of Pakistan, during his call on PM Yusuf Gilani. Meng is an experienced politician who would know how his words could play out in the prevailing regional context.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton apparently sought China’s help in moderating Pakistani policies during her meeting with her Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi in New York on Monday. But Chinese report says merely that they “exchanged views” on “international and regional concerns” and it instead focuses on Yang’s demarche regarding the US decision to go ahead with a 5.8 billion dollar arms deal with Taiwan.

How China dances around the US-Pakistan rift in the coming days and weeks will be a fun thing to watch. The US has been persistently engaging China to become a ’stakeholder’ in South Asia and here is a splendid occasion presenting itself if Beijing is interested. Surely, Pakistan rolled out the red carpet for Meng and all top three leaders held his hand — President Asif Zardari, PM Gilani and army chief Pervez Kayani. In a protocol gesture, Zardari hosted a dinner for Meng.

There was a time when exchanges such as Meng’s visit to Pakistan caused heartburn among Indian pundits who viewed them as hostile ‘India-centric’ activities by China. Clearly, something has fundamentally changed in the alchemy of Sino-Pakistan relationship. The change has been gradual, incremental and imperceptible but occasions such as Meng’s visit bring it to the surface. Curiously, Pakistani reports on Meng’s remarks also made no efforts to score propaganda points against India.

Meng’s visit to Pakistan wasn’t a big-ticket item in the Chinese media. On the contrary, Montek Singh Ahluwalia’s visit to Beijing and the first session of the China-India Strategic Economic Dialogue is. In fact, India figured as one of the lead stories in the People’s Daily. Something to think about China’s priorities and concerns as a rising power in a rapidly changing international and regional environment. {Gosh I'm feeling all warm and fuzzy inside under this Chinese media attention. China is now welcome to convert TSP into its backyard.}

[shyamd]

India to develop torpedo testing centre in Kyrgyzstan

AKA visited it in 2008. The offer was longstanding. India offered $4.5 million to rent the site in 2008. the Kyrgyz said no. Now deal is on. The MoD will send some guys soon - this was released in the press I think.

India's mil aid to Tajik I shall detail it later.

[rohitvats]

Frankly, I feel that should the proverbial sh*t hit the fan and China decides to get 'agressive' in South China Sea (SCS), we are up the sh*t creek. Given the way higher defence management functions in India, I'm not sure whether all the options have been gamed and if there is some sort of shooting match, India has a plan ready.

It is one thing to talk about doing to Chinese west of Malacca Straits what they might do to us in SCS and totally different to gave prepared for it. I know these things are not going to be made public but I hope against hope that the 'mandarins' at Foreign Ministry have consulted people in the Navy and other Services to chalk out contigency options.

[shyamd]

Arun_s guru, once said that IN had enough legs to defeat PLAN in SCS. Unfortunately all his posts on the subject have been deleted. I wonder if mods can make available his posts?

[Pratyush]

The analysis by Arun_S may have been relevant in 2002-03. But in 2011, it is not. The PLAN is stronger then the IN today and it will continue to grow stronger with time.

PS:- quantity has a quality of its own, especially when you are fighting closer to home.

[sum]

There was a time when exchanges such as Meng’s visit to Pakistan caused heartburn among Indian pundits who viewed them as hostile ‘India-centric’ activities by China. Clearly, something has fundamentally changed in the alchemy of Sino-Pakistan relationship. The change has been gradual, incremental and imperceptible but occasions such as Meng’s visit bring it to the surface. Curiously, Pakistani reports on Meng’s remarks also made no efforts to score propaganda points against India.

Meng’s visit to Pakistan wasn’t a big-ticket item in the Chinese media. On the contrary, Montek Singh Ahluwalia’s visit to Beijing and the first session of the China-India Strategic Economic Dialogue is. In fact, India figured as one of the lead stories in the People’s Daily.

MKB seems to be a China *and* a Paki bhakt ( tough not to expect the Chinese part from a card carrying CPI(M) member)....
everything but a Desi bhakt despite being a INDIAN diplomat for his entire life?

[rohitvats]

The analysis by Arun_S may have been relevant in 2002-03. But in 2011, it is not. The PLAN is stronger then the IN today and it will continue to grow stronger with time.

PS:- quantity has a quality of its own, especially when you are fighting closer to home.

More than anything else, it is the land based Naval Air Arm and PLAAF that I'm worried about. The way I see it, the AD component of IN ships is not heared for saturated air-attacks - it more in line to deal with LRMP a/c and limited anti-ship operations from something like PAF Mirages. PLAAF can launch really saturated anti-ship assaults from their shore-based aircraft.

As I said earlier, India needs to be mentally prepared to take on Chinese at our terms. I hope the dhoti-walas do not develop cold feet other wise it will be 1962 w/o Chinese having done much.

[RajeshA]

rohitvats ji,

1962 taught us a lot. It buckled us up! Half a century later, we need to become fully awake, and it would be best if we are awakened by a skirmish then by a war, we may yet not be prepared for!

[Varoon Shekhar]

MKB seems to be a China *and* a Paki bhakt ( tough not to expect the Chinese part from a card carrying CPI(M) member)....
everything but a Desi bhakt despite being a INDIAN diplomat for his entire life?

Yes, he does seem to be excessive in giving 'testimonials' to Pakistan, to China, even the Taliban. Everyone except India! But he pounces on any perceived Indian inequity, neglect or slip-of-the-tongue with respect to any of these entities. He has not as yet, strongly condemned the Lashkar-E-Toiba and other Islamic militants operating from Pakistan, apart from blandly referring to "Pakistan based militants".

[shyamd]

Has anyone noticed the spate of leaks over the last week by GoI?

So far last week MEA leaked a note about incursions, obviously the vietnam issue, then today NSCS leaked to the press stuff about PRC industry taking over indian manufacturing centreand damaging the Indian economy. So there seems to be an ongoing and sustained effort here. Today the Dep. NSCS was on Times Now saying the PRC govt should address the trade imbalance (incidentally one of the focuses of the strategic panel). A5 - WIP, A2 plus, Shourya tests. Brahmos on NE border. All in the space of 2 weeks? Someone turning up the heat a little?

MoD made a similar press release (not a leak) about terror camps being reactivated inside Pakistan proper.

Wonder whats going on.

[RamaY]

NITIN: Here's the thing: the other side of the coin of nuclear no-first-use is a surprise first use. Now if you are in Beijing, you would have to evaluate the benefits of 'teaching a lesson' or 'occupying Arunachal' against the risk of (a) Indian defences being better than 1962 (b) Indians deciding to use/threaten nuclear attack. That raises the costs considerably, and in my opinion, the Chinese aren't about to wreck their emergence by getting into such a game.

China's worst strategic nightmare is a US-India military alliance. 'Teaching a lesson' by doing another 1962 might be the best way to bring it about.

China is not Pakistan. They don't do misadventures. Of course there's a risk that someone silly will do something silly and start a war...but modern communications are likely to put brakes on that before things escalate.

Finally, India's border defences have been robust since 1967. We are no pushovers today, as we were in 1962.

This is silly logic in my humble opinion.

1. If the other side of no-first-use is a 'surprise first use', then what about PRC's nuke posture. Imagine a scenario where PRC does an adventure and India responds with a first use. I presume it would be tactical nuke given the game. What will be world reaction of PRC responds with its own nuke on a military/economic/political target in India?

2. Given the Indian strategic pre-supposition that "Chinese do not do misadventures" and Indian passiveness in securing their NE border regions, isn't it in PRC's interest to do a misadventure to exploit India's unpreparedness?

3. If 1950 (Chinese occupation of Tibet), 1962 (Chinese aggression on India), 1980s (PRC's overt supply of nukes to Pakistan), and 1990s (PRC support to NK nukes) etc didn't result in a Indo-US alliance then what is the probability of such an alliance if Chinese do another misadventure? How about a scenario where China makes concessions to other smaller-neighbors while teaching India a lesson? Would that invite a indo-us alliance?

[Prasad]

Too many 'teach a lesson' being bandied about here. Can someone paint a realistic picture of what this 'teach a lesson' would entail before launching into a series of what-if's. Has it been sketched out as to in what sector we are weaker than the chinese forces and what we can realistically defend? From what vivek and rohit have been saying vis a vis our positions in the NE, this teach a lesson thing is too far in the past. In fact, '87 I think it was when another such attempt was pushed back and the reason even in 62 that the chinese pulled back was because it was undefendable. Given that our forces are much stronger, not to mention better communication and capability on our side, both recon and operations, unless PRC tosses a few nukes into Arunachal or sikkim or launches large scale army level strikes, we are not going to be scared. So I don't see where this is going.. imvvho of course.

[ShauryaT]

Growing US interest in India - The evolving global balance of power By G. Parthasarathy

THE rapid growth of what China calls its “Comprehensive National Power” has been accompanied by strong manifestations of what the Soviets used to call as “Great Han Chauvinism”. Responding to concerns expressed about China’s growing “assertiveness” in relations with its smaller neighbours, its Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi nonchalantly told his Singaporean counterpart in December 2010, with the arrogance reminiscent of the rulers of the Ming dynasty: “China is a big country and other countries are just small countries and that’s just a fact”.

The past two years have seen China resorting to coercion and even use of force in enforcing its maritime boundary claims with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The same assertiveness, bordering on arrogance, is manifested in China’s dealings with India which it treats as what is yet another “‘small country” in its neighbourhood.

Leaving aside Chinese manoeuvres to undermine India in forums like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, China has actively colluded with Pakistan in blocking international efforts to get the Jaish-e-Mohammed, which masterminded the attack on our Parliament, declared as an international terrorist organization by the UN Security Council. It had acted identically in blocking efforts to get the Lashkar-e-Toiba outlawed, prior to the 26/11 outrage. More importantly, China now acts as though the PoK and the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan are an integral part of Pakistan, with only Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir being a “disputed” territory. The “Chief Minister”” of Gilgit-Baltistan, Syed Mehdi Shah, twice visited China in the recent past and was received at the highest levels. Contrast this with the entire issue of stapled visas for residents, including military officers, serving in J&K. Moreover, planned Chinese investment for infrastructure and hydro-electric projects in Gilgit-Baltistan is estimated to be of the order of $10 billion, with growing suspicions that the tunnels being built are really meant for nuclear weapon and missile silos. All this is happening when Pakistan is tearing itself apart under the weight of its internal contradictions, combined with the stupidity of its military in cultivating radical Islamic groups to “bleed’’ India and force the Americans out of Afghanistan.

These were among the issues considered by a high-level non-official group from the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Aspen Institute India (AII). The group has now come out with a detailed report on shaping the contours of a US-India partnership to deal with global challenges. The Indian participants included former National Security Adviser (NSA) Brajesh Mishra and former Ambassadors to the US, K.S. Bajpai and Naresh Chandra. The American side included luminaries like former Director of Intelligence Denis Blair, Bush Administration NSA Stephen Headley and Ambassador Robert Blackwill. The CFR-AII report comes at a time when the US is finding that its two Cold War allies, China and Pakistan, are either directly challenging its global pre-eminence, or supporting terrorists killing its soldiers in Afghanistan.

The CFR-AII report notes that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies “support terrorist groups that target India, Afghanistan and ISAF forces in Afghanistan”. After the Abbotabad raid which eliminated Osama bin Laden, the US is finding that General Kayani, whom it had touted for long as a “tough professional”, is now arranging for the Haqqani group to even attack its embassy in Kabul. The report states: “Pakistan is showing alarming signs of systemic decline. Its economy continues to underperform peers in Asia.” It significantly notes that the US should “condition military aid to Pakistan on concrete anti-terrorist measures by the Pakistan military against groups targeting India and the US”.

The American decision to declare the Indian Mujahideen as a Pakistan-backed international terrorist organization should be seen in this context. The “Dialogue with Pakistan Mantra”’ is alluded to, though Americans have no answer to the question whether “dialogue” will induce Pakistan to change its behaviour. The report dwells on the need for a regional framework, including the US, China, Russia, Iran, the Central Asian Republics, India and Pakistan to evolve measures for stability in Afghanistan.

Predictably, the report asserts that India and the US have no intention of “confrontation with China, or to forge a coalition for China’s containment”. But the sub-text is clear. It advocates a strengthened India-US partnership for a viable “balance of power” in Asia, covering the Indian Ocean— which is described as “home to critical global lines of communication, with an estimated 50% of the world’s container products and 70% of the ship-borne oil and petroleum transiting through its waters,” and the Asia-Pacific region. Interestingly, Hillary Clinton recently referred to the Asia-Pacific as the “Indo-Pacific,” quite obviously having taken note of India’s growing ties with Australia, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. It is also clear that India-US differences will remain on relations with Iran and on the NATO propensity for selective regime change under the rubric of “Responsibility to Protect”.

The report is upbeat on US-India economic ties and makes significant recommendations for enhancing cooperation in areas like space, defence production and defence R&D. Goldman Sachs estimates that the Indian economy will expand at an average rate of 8.4% through 2020. The report stresses the significant potential for cooperation in areas like infrastructure, transportation, energy and agriculture. While it calls for US support for Indian membership of export control forums like the NSG, the MTCR, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, should India really show interest in joining these cartels, especially given the US-led move to get the NSG to ban the export of reprocessing and enrichment technology to India, because it is not a signatory to the NPT?

No Indian interest is served in joining such forums, where it is considered less equal than others. We need to bide our time and see how US pressures influence our other partners like France and Russia, which do not share the American aversion for the transfer of important reprocessing technology to India. Moreover, both France and Russia appear unhappy, but ready to live the provisions of India’s Nuclear Liability Act, even though they may require higher insurance cover for their nuclear power plants.

The CFR-Aspen India report carries wide-ranging recommendations which South Block should look at seriously. With its economy set for a continuing high growth path, India now has the luxury of having multiple partners, without having to compromise the autonomy of its decision making. Ironically, the wheels of history appear to have turned a full circle. The US, which partnered China and Pakistan for over four decades at the cost of India, now finds merit in partnering a democratic and economically vibrant India in facing an assertive China and a jihadi Pakistan.

[ShauryaT]

Eastern Alliance

Beijing’s calculus

The visit this week to Pakistan by Meng Jianchu, Chinese vice-premier in charge of public security, has provided the context for a more open discussion in Pakistan on the need to formalise new alliances, especially with Beijing, amidst a potential confrontation with Washington.

It is clear that Meng’s trip to Islamabad was scheduled before the current crisis and was probably aimed at eliciting stronger cooperation in dealing with the challenge of militancy and terrorism in China’s restive far western province of Xinjiang that borders Pakistan.

Delhi might be right in assuming that Beijing will not rush into a tighter embrace with Pakistan, despite the public diplomatic support it has offered Rawalpindi in the last few months. That should not, however, mean China has no strategic interest in bailing out Pakistan from its current isolation.

Beijing must be expected to decide on the content of a formal alliance with Rawalpindi and the timing of its announcement on the basis of its own assessment of the changing dynamic of US-Pakistan ties and its long-term implications for the future of Afghanistan and the balance of power in the subcontinent and Southwest Asia.

[ShauryaT]

Is China a bigger threat than Pakistan?

NDTV Big Fight Video Link. Panelists were Ambassador Gose, Brajesh Mishra, Ronen Sen, C. Raja Mohan and someone from Army.

[ramana]

ShauryaT, All the hawks are at CPR finally. We now have an alternate body of opinion to the sarkari one at IDSA.

I think we need a thread in GDF where we can disseminate and deconstruct the CPR world view. Can you start that?

[ShauryaT]

ShauryaT, All the hawks are at CPR finally. We now have an alternate body of opinion to the sarkari one at IDSA.

I think we need a thread in GDF where we can disseminate and deconstruct the CPR world view. Can you start that?

With pleasure, since I respect almost all of them and they represent the best of Indian interests, even if we disagree sometimes. I was just telling RD the other day on my desire to increase interaction with this group.

[Anurag]

Is China a bigger threat than Pakistan to India?

http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/the-bi ... eststories

[rajrang]

"Pakistan is perceived as China's new Xinjiang and Myanmar as China's Xizang in economic, military, and strategic terms."

http://www.hindustantimes.com/Where-Chi ... 52584.aspx

[devesh]

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=15660

China’s war potential a threat to India: Lt Gen (Retd) Sinha

R Dutta Choudhury
GUWAHATI, Sept 30 – China’s growing war potential poses a threat to the security of India and the possibility of United Liberation Front of Asom, (ULFA) commander-in-chief Paresh Baruah receiving help from that country cannot be ruled out, said former Governor of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir, Lt Gen (Reid) SK Sinha.
Sinha also said that India must take adequate steps like some western countries did todeal with the threat of Islamic militancy.

Following are excerpts from an interview with The Assam Tribune:

Assam Tribune: How do you rate the security scenario of Assam and other parts of North East at present?

SK Sinha: The security sit-uation in the North East today is much better than in the past although the China factor looms large and is a matter of grave concern. China’s grow-ing war potential poses a threat. No matter how friend-ly a neighbour may be, we must always be prepared to counter its potential threat. Policy changes can take place in a short time frame but de-veloping defence potential takes time. Diplomacy in terms of good relations with countries of South East Asia, defence preparedness, and economic development should be the corner stones of India’s policy in the North East.

AT: One faction of the ULFA has come to the negotiation table but will the talks be suc-cessful as the other faction headed by Paresh Baruah is still at large?

Sinha: It is good that we are having talks with ULFA leaders and they seem to have abandoned their previous hard stand. Suspension of operations has taken place. Paresh Baruah continues to pursue his own agenda and may be getting generous support from China. The phase of insurgency in Assam of the Eighties and Nineties is long over as popular support of the people for the ULFA no longer exists as in the old days. Paresh Baruah group is now a terrorist outfit instead of being an insurgency movement. Peace and development in

Assam along with stern action against the terrorists should be pursued.

AT: The Government of India has started talks with a number of militant groups of the North East but don’t you think that the slow progress of talks will complicate the situation?

Sinha: We should not worry too much about the slow pace of talks as long as talks are proceeding in the right directions. I am hopeful that the final outcome of these talks will satisfy all stake holders.

AT: Do you think that there is a threat to the North East from Islamic militant groups?

Sinha: Not only the North East but the whole country and for that matter the entire world, faces a threat from Islamic militants. We as a nation must prepare ourselves todeal with this threat as indeed many countries in the West are doing effectively.

[Philip]

Not sure whether Kaplan's feature has been debated in depth.One correction,it is the "Indo-China Sea",not SC.Sea! Read the piece in full,here is the introduction.One cannot agree more with Kaplan as all the evidence of the extraordinary PLAN expansion over the lastd ecade points to the PRC intending to rule the high seas both in the Pacific and the IOR,not forgetting that it (a Chinese co.) already runs the Panama Canal .

Under the controversial Law Number 5, secretly implemented by the Balladares regime, the Chinese Hutchison Whampoa company has the right of first refusal on other Canal facilities, including past strategic facilities and former U.S. bases such as the Rodman Naval Station port.

.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... f_conflict

The 21st century's defining battleground is going to be on water
BY ROBERT D. KAPLAN | SEPT/OCT 2011

Europe is a landscape; East Asia a seascape. Therein lies a crucial difference between the 20th and 21st centuries. The most contested areas of the globe in the last century lay on dry land in Europe, particularly in the flat expanse that rendered the eastern and western borders of Germany artificial and exposed to the inexorable march of armies. But over the span of the decades, the demographic and economic axis of the Earth has shifted measurably to the opposite end of Eurasia, where the spaces between major population centers are overwhelmingly maritime.

Because of the way geography illuminates and sets priorities, these physical contours of East Asia augur a naval century -- naval being defined here in the broad sense to include both sea and air battle formations now that they have become increasingly inextricable. Why? China, which, especially now that its land borders are more secure than at any time since the height of the Qing dynasty at the end of the 18th century, is engaged in an undeniable naval expansion. It is through sea power that China will psychologically erase two centuries of foreign transgressions on its territory -- forcing every country around it to react.

.... for it is in Southeast Asia, with its 615 million people, where China's 1.3 billion people converge with the Indian subcontinent's 1.5 billion people. And the geographical meeting place of these states, and their militaries, is maritime: the South China Sea

[Prem]

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/ ... VV20110518
China denies it is conduit for North Korea-Iran weapons trade

Reuters) - China rejected Wednesday reported allegations by U.N. diplomats that it was a trans-shipment point for banned nuclear missile technology between North Korea and Iran.
U.N. diplomats said in the report, obtained by Reuters over the weekend, that North Korea appeared to have been exchanging ballistic missile technology and expertise with Iran in violation of Security Council sanctions.The report did not identify China, but said North Korean-Iranian missile trade went via a country neighboring North Korea, which diplomats at the United Nations told Reuters was China."I completely deny such a view," Assistant Chinese Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue told reporters at a briefing. He did not elaborate.

[ShauryaT]

I read the Kaplan book and it has an interesting take to it. It also describes this maritime geography as an Islamic arc, with Hindu India wedged in. So, it is a double whammy for India with PLAN in the mix. It also states that PRC activity in the larger IOR would be nothing new and that as far as the African coast, Chinese influences was evident, since time immemorial.

There is something about the winds and its patterns in the Indian ocean, which makes this area from Africa/ME to SE Asia almost seem like a lake that allowed trade and commerce to flourish in the region. India has a huge opportunity and it is hers to loose.

[shyamd]

Kalaikunda fighters in charge of Andaman and Nicobar Islands defences

Jayanta GuptaJayanta Gupta, TNN | Oct 3, 2011, 06.22AM IST

The air base at Kalaikunda will now play an extremely crucial role in the country's defences.
KALAIKUNDA: The air base at Kalaikunda will now play an extremely crucial role in the country's defences.

Aircraft based here will be involved in air defence over the strategic Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Bay of Bengal. The tri-services command at the A&N Islands will be in charge of the squadrons of Su-30 MKIs and other advanced aircraft based at Kalaikunda for this specific purpose. This decision was taken when plans for basing Sukhois in the Andamans got scuttled after the 2004 tsunami in which the IAF lost assets. "Till now, Kalaikunda - while performing several other duties - has been a bridge with the Andamans. The role of the base will grow and aircraft based here will play a vital role in patrolling the skies over the Andamans and the Bay of Bengal. Kalaikunda will play several roles that include air defence, training and building better co-operation in the region for a possible Nato-like alliance with India playing the pivotal role," an official said.

The Kalaikunda airbase is nestled among forests of Sal in the Maoist badlands of West Midnapore. Set up by the Americans for its Superfortress bombers operating during the Burma campaign, the facility has grown steadily in importance over the years. "A large area falls within the responsibility of this base. There are several bases in the northeast but along the eastern coast, the closest one is in Chennai. It is our job to handle the defences along the coast and the Bay of Bengal region. We play host to several foreign air forces interested in joint exercises with the IAF," the official added.

"This is a very compact base built in classical American style. The Americans used to operate flights from Kalaikunda, Dudhkundi and Salua. Today, we have a radar station at Salua and Dudhkundi has been converted into an air-to-ground firing range. Over the years, Kalaikunda has developed into a major location for international air exercises. Soon, we shall have the Republic of Singapore Air Force visiting Kalaikunda. The base is close to Bay of Bengal where air-to-air firing can take place," says Air Commodore R Radhish, AOC, Air Force Station, Kalaikunda.

But Kalaikunda goes well beyond an exercise hub. Apart from the MiG-27 ground attack aircraft and MiG-21 Fn fighters of the OCU, squadrons of Su-30 MKIs and other advanced varieties from the IAF's fleet call on Kalaikunda on a regular basis. A squadron of Su-30 MKIs is now at the base.

Over the last few years, Delhi has started to realize that China is as great a threat as Pakistan and there has been a rush to upgrade facilities in the eastern and northeastern sector. Fighters from Kalaikunda can fly to the Andamans and beyond for longrange patrols. Unlike older aircraft, the Su-30 MKIs can fly at very slow speeds (nearly that of a helicopter) and carry out surveillance before zooming away at twice the speed of sound.

"In case of some mischief by our northern neighbour, this is the place where our defences can fall back to. Also this base is playing a crucial role in developing regional cooperation. There may come a time when a Nato-like organization develops here with India playing the role of the US. If this happens, our assets would no longer have to be on their toes for 365 days a year. Pilots of the Nato countries have to be on active duty for only 90 days at a stretch," an IAF official said.

Dharmic alliance ??? The dream coming real?

[menon s]

Fear and Loathing in Beijing? Chinese Suspicion of U.S. Intentions
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cac ... e7a57876ea

[Christopher Sidor]

In the first half of 20th century, till the outbreak of WWII, i.e. 1900-1939, US and UK played a dance which was worthy of recounting. US did not interfere in any of European affairs or in any of the European colonial issues. That does not mean that US was aloof from the world and lived an isolated life. Far from it, US was instrumental in getting the Russia-Japanese war to an end and the resultant peace treaty had a lot of heavy lifting done by the yanks. But basically US did not threaten UK and derived massive benefits from the then preeminent power of time, UK. Especially after the american civil war, in which UK stayed neutral, US developed very close economic relationship with UK and the whole of Europe. Add to this was the fact that UK saw most of her threats emanating from continental Europe, in the form of Germany, Russia and so on.

Now it is worth speculating what would have happened, if UK did not have any enemies in Europe or did not face any threat originating from Europe. Would it have been as accommodating to US rise as it had been? We should not forget that in the period between WWI and 1933 the British admiralty justified the existence of its naval fleet, in absence of any naval threat from germany or soviet union, by citing the size of american naval fleet. That is why in the US-UK-Japan naval limitation treaty, US and UK had 1:1 quota. i.e. for every 1 tonnage of naval ship which US was allowed to have, UK would also have 1 tonnage of naval ship. So if US had naval ships whose tonnage added upto 220 tons then UK was entitled to have a navy whose ships tonnage added up to 220 tons.

Fast forward today, now also China and US form the biggest trading and investing partnership in the world. Biggest by any yard stick. But the difference is crucial. US does not face any threat from East. It does face the threat of terrorism, but terrorism by in itself will not be able to defeat US or make it stumble. And before 9/11 and Al-qeda came along there were many more terrorist who had stuck US either on its shore (26-February-1993 World Trade Center bombing) or had attempted to target it outside continental US (23-Oct-1983 Beirut Bombings of US Marine Barracks). So basically what US sees is no threat other than the perceived one by China. This is in sharp contrast to what UK faced up to 1939.

If we accept this line of reasoning one startling conclusion would arise. It would appear that the fall of Berlin wall in 1989 or the end of Cold War, essentially robbed China of very important strategic buffer. Till there was Soviet Union in place, US would have seen it as the primary enemy and not China. China could continue to develop while US and Soviet Union would face off each other or till Soviet Union and USA would bleed each other dry. If Soviet Union had still existed, US would require China to threaten, one of Soviet Unions longest and continuous land frontier.

So unlike UK, which was distracted by what was going on in East of UK and consequently missed the significance of what was happening West of UK, US was able to devote full attention to the rise of its rival. Why is this musing important as far as India is concerned?

If US and China develop a variant of Cold war, it would give India buffer to operate. We would be in a position where US was between 1865-1914, i.e. from the end of american Civil war till the start of WWI. And chances are that we might see such a situation developing. US did not come to the side of UK till had overtaken it economically and financially. i.e between 1865 and 1914 US did not expend any of its blood and treasure for UK's benefit.
Recently a american had commented that US would require India to come to its assistance post 2020. The year 2020 is significant, as by this time, China would have the world's biggest submarine fleet. It is also estimated that by this time, China would have developed significant amphibious capability. Capability which will take the end game of Taiwan Strait issue to its logical conclusion.

[RajeshA]

Christopher Sidor ji,

brilliant post! absolutely brilliant!

[aditya]

"Complexity" and "Sensitivity" of India-China relations

Bhadrakumari logic at the best, ludicrous balderdash at the worst.

Assuming the article is itself not part of some SuperDuperUltraChankiyaan strategy, I for one am shivering in my dhoti at the defensiveness and subservience of Indian diplomacy.

They claim, in every bilateral meeting, Chinese brings up the topic of "anti-China" reportage in Indian media which they believe is supported and fed by Ministry of External Affairs.

Indian diplomats have been trying hard to make Chinese understand that Indian media doesn't follow briefing given by publicity division because they behave independent of government.

If the Chinese are actually that dumb to not figure this out on their own, the blame should be laid on the few articles in the Indian media focusing on Chinese intrusions? And it's Indian diplomats' jobs to "try hard to make Chinese understand"?

Every time the MEA gives a clarification, a section of the Indian media finds the official Indian response to any issue involving China "timid and complacent". But, MEA spokesmen keeps repeating to reporters who care to listen, that, "The India-China relations are very important, very complex and very sensitive."

Indian media's reportage on the border issue is not at all appreciated by China.

So the Indian media is supposed to behave like children hiding Hajmola from Masterji?

The sources wanted media to not sensationalise such incursions, since it is taking from both sides

What next? Indian officials referring to Arunachal Pradesh with its Chinese name?

[member_19969]

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/arti ... dian-ocean

[ramana]

http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=177

THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH
China’s Response to a Rising India

An Interview with M. Taylor Fravel (An Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.)
By Erin Fried
October 4, 2011

Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers—China and India is the eleventh volume in the Strategic Asia series and explores how key Asian states and regions are responding to the rise of China and India. NBR spoke with M. Taylor Fravel, Strategic Asia contributing author, National Asia Research Associate, and associate professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who argues that China views India’s rise as a largely positive development that promotes China’s own interests and objectives more than it threatens or challenges them. [See below for more information on the book Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers—China and India ]

You note that in two areas, GDP and defense spending, India is not a rising power in material terms when compared to China. How does China view the rise of its fellow Asian giant?

In a global context, China views India as a rising power when measured in terms of wealth. India, for example, is described as rising in relative terms when compared to the United States and many other countries. At the same time, Chinese experts do not necessarily view India as rising with respect to China. In 1990, the Chinese and Indian economies were roughly the same size. Today, China’s economy is more than three times as large as India’s, and the gap between the two continues to widen. A similar yawning gap characterizes the levels of defense spending in each country.

In your chapter, you discuss China’s interest in having India both help check U.S. power and reinforce China’s position on issues such as climate change and trade negotiations. However, you also acknowledge that tension still exists between the two countries related to the border dispute and the issue of access to the Indian Ocean. How does China view India militarily?

To be clear, China does not see India as an ally in the geopolitical sense—the two are not security partners. But China does view India as a rising power that can help China limit the potential influence of the United States in various arenas, especially in international institutions.

Regarding the military dimension of the border dispute, Chinese military writings continue to express concern about the potential for an armed conflict with India. Nevertheless, Beijing approaches such a conflict from a position of considerable strength. With a few exceptions, China already controls the disputed territory that it values most, principally the territory in the western sector known as Aksai Chin. In other words, China is more or less satisfied with the status quo in terms of the actual control of disputed territory. In addition, because of the geography of the region, India faces real challenges in projecting military power over disputed areas, especially those held by China. China occupies the high ground and its forces can move easily across the Tibetan plateau. By contrast, India must seek to transport its forces uphill into high-altitude areas and cannot easily shift troops laterally along its border with China.

In the Indian Ocean, China views any limits on its ability to access this body of water as a potential threat, especially in the event of an armed conflict in East Asia. Beijing also acknowledges the capabilities of India’s navy and its ambitions in the Indian Ocean. For now, however, China is not seeking to match these capabilities. Instead, in the words of one Chinese analyst, China seeks access to the Indian Ocean “indirectly” by strengthening its commercial and political relationships with other littoral states, especially Pakistan and Burma.

You note that China does not view India as a major security threat, despite its growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. In his chapter, “India Comes to Terms with a Rising China,” Harsh Pant points out that India sees China as “enemy number one.” How will China act to dispel misperceptions that could clearly impede its ability to work with India on several important issues?

Just because one country views another as its “enemy number one” does not mean that such a perception is mutual. More generally, it is important to understand the broader context in which these perceptions have formed. China and India exist in a structural situation where China is much stronger and wealthier than India. In general terms, China can threaten India more than India can threaten China. As a result, Beijing may underestimate concerns in New Delhi about growing Chinese power. For this same reason, New Delhi may exaggerate the threat posed by China, as China sees the United States and not India as its principal strategic competitor.

Within the last year, Chinese experts have demonstrated a growing sensitivity to the increasingly negative views of China within India and have encouraged their government to take action to reverse this trend. These experts have floated a variety of proposals to improve what they describe as “strategic trust,” including increased support for what each country views as its core interests, dialogues on areas where interests may conflict, and genuine progress moving to resolve the border dispute. Nevertheless, the underlying asymmetry of power suggests that India’s perceptions will be hard to dispel.

In the security arena, access to the Indian Ocean remains a major concern for China. You list several other areas where relations between the two countries are strained—for example, India’s desire for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. How does China’s strategy toward India consider these challenges and abate them?

China’s strategy is to find all the areas where it can cooperate with India and to do so. That is, Beijing pursues comprehensive economic, political, and international engagement with New Delhi to buffer the overall relationship from specific challenges and sources of friction, such as India’s bid to join the UN Security Council as a permanent member. Such comprehensive engagement seeks to create a situation in which both countries have a vested interest in sustaining generally cooperative ties by increasing the costs of reverting to a more confrontational relationship. To be sure, many points of friction still exist, but China’s emphasis on comprehensive engagement is intended to immunize the relationship from these potential challenges and to prevent any one of them from defining the terms of the relationship.

Erin Fried is the Program Coordinator for the Political and Security Affairs (PSA) group at NBR.

http://www.nbr.org/Publications/issue.aspx?id=235
Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers - China and India

Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner and Jessica Keough, eds.

Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers—China and India explores how Asian states are responding to the rise of China and India and the strategies these states are pursuing to preserve their national interests. In each chapter, a leading expert investigates how a country or region perceives China’s and India's growth based on geopolitical, economic, cultural, military, and historical interactions and draws implications for U.S. interests and leadership in the Asia-Pacific.

Table of Contents

The United States and Asia’s Rising Giants (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=525)
Ashley J. Tellis

International Order and the Rise of Asia: History and Theory (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=526)
Kenneth B. Pyle

China Views India’s Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=527)
M. Taylor Fravel

India Comes to Terms with a Rising China (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=528)
Harsh V. Pant

Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle with China (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=529)
Michael J. Green

Coping with Giants: South Korea’s Responses to China’s and India’s Rise (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=530)
Chung Min Lee

Grand Stakes: Australia’s Future between China and India (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=531)
Rory Medcalf

Challenges and Opportunities: Russia and the Rise of China and India (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=532)
Dmitri Trenin

Great Games in Central Asia (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=533) S. Enders Wimbush

India Next Door, China Over the Horizon: The View from South Asia (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=534)
Teresita C. Schaffer

The Rise of China and India: Challenging or Reinforcing Southeast Asia’s Autonomy? (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=535)
Carlyle A. Thayer

Strategic Asia by the Numbers 2011-12 (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=536)

_______________________

From RamN

[wasu]

From Aamir's Sarfarosh to Sachiin's Aazaan, enemy changes from Pak to China.

http://www.bollywoodhungama.com/feature ... index.html

Till 12 years back whenever an enemy nation had to be pointed out in a Hindi movie, the reference words were 'padosi mulk'. It all changed with Aamir Khan's Sarfarosh (1999) when for the first time ever this 'padosi mulk' also got a name - Pakistan. There was a sense of taking 'one step forward' for Bollywood since never before had a movie been so vociferous in pointing out the epicentre of trouble and mischief.

Circa 2011 and things seem to be taking a different track. Though 26/11 still refuses to be erased from memory of Indians, there is a different perspective being put on the state of affairs, especially when it comes to terrorism. The film which is doing that is Sachiin Joshi's Aazaan and this time around the key enemy being pointed out is not Pakistan but China.