US military, technology, arms, tactics

[Mort Walker]

If new starts were a concern to the executive branch, congress, armed services and defense contractors, then the FY21 NDAA should have been ready for signature on 30 SEP 2020. Previous NDAAs too have not been ready for signature until December. In the last 10 years, the NDAA has been signed only once before the start of the FY. FY2019 was signed Sep. 2018.

The first quarter of FY21 is ending on 31 DEC 2020 and CRs are continuing for all agencies. This is no more disruptive than previous years and if veto proof majorities are there, then defense contractors have nothing to worry about. Everyone has learned to live with the NDAA being passed in late December - and have planned as such based on previous actions. The covid relief bill also known as "Consolidated Appropriations Act" contains some DoD O&M related to pay and military construction.

BTW, Rand Paul is threatening to filibuster the FY21 NDAA override.

[brar_w]

If new starts were a concern to the executive branch, congress, armed services and defense contractors, then the FY21 NDAA should have been ready for signature on 30 SEP 2020.

Precisely. That they are a concern is why SecDef's under Trump and Obama have constantly wanted funding to be provided in a timely fashion and CR usage to be brought down if not eliminated. They have constantly hammered this point. So have the chairs. It is available in official testimony and a whole host of other media reports. But because of the BCA, the process has meant that getting a bi-partisan NDAA in a timely fashion has been impossible so the focus has been on A) getting it passed with least possible disruption - That is not prolonging CRs and B ) Eliminating riders which jeopardize the whole thing and threaten it altogether. This has been true even before the BCA and one of the reasons that they've gone 59 years without missing a single NDAA.

The first quarter of FY21 is ending on 31 DEC 2020 and CRs are continuing for all agencies.

Yup. CRs are disruptive for all agencies, and the larger the agency the larger the disruption.

This is no more disruptive than previous years..

It "can be" more disruptive than previous years if the process drags on and the Congressional term ends. While the fundamentals of a new clean sheet bill won't change (you still need a consensus and they will fall back on what they've already done), the process may well add a considerable amount of time. Something that is COMPLETELY pointless. No section 230 or any of the other stuff is going to get through. Not enough Republicans, and not enough Democrats want to link it to the NDAA. If they wanted to they would have added it. So not enough votes.

So the gimickry and tweets shall remain and we may have a very small disruption (a matter of a week) or we may have a longer disruption but the fundamentals will not change one bit (which is the point I have been trying to drive home). It's just that the longer CR will simply mean new-starts get delayed even beyond what is usually expected due to the BCA NDAA process,, and programmatic ramp up, that requires congressional approval stands still, awaiting a new appropriation bill. And all this for no tangible gain whatsoever.

BTW, Rand Paul is threatening to filibuster the FY21 NDAA override.

Wouldn't expect anything less. But as I've said multiple times, this discussion is pointless because fundamentals of the bill have been negotiated already and since its the last of the BCA budgets, nothing happening in Georgia will change that. So at worst this stunt will cause an additional few weeks of delay. At best it will just be sorted out next week if the Congress shuts the door on Trump with a veto proof majority once again. I don't think McConnel really wants to be the one Senate majority leader in 6 decades who couldn't clear the NDAA in a given term. And all because of someone who has already lost the election and is packing up and getting ready to leave. It's not a hill any of these elected officials (who still plan to be in office come Jan 20) would prefer to die on.

[Mort Walker]

I wouldn't worry about the BCA. The executive and congressional branches have worked around this increasing DoD's discretionary base. As I said, lots of pork for each district including ordering more aircraft than requested by the services. There is a lesson in all of this for India, fund domestic military production so that parliament always has an interest in funding weapon systems as they are guaranteed large scale kick backs.

[brar_w]

As I said, lots of pork for each district including ordering more aircraft than requested by the services.

This is true only in a very specific number of cases where the Congress is fundamentally in disagreement to the direction of the PB and wants a certain thing done a certain way. At a macro level this is very much an exception and not the norm. But they are within their right to do so. If a Navy wants to retire 5 ships, it needs to make a case for it. Congress may not agree with that assessment .

Like for example, a service wanting to divest a fleet with no replacement ready and Congress wanting to hedge. The way this gets reported "Congress adds more aircraft than requested" is deeply flawed because it compares the Presidential request to the enacted funding and reports the delta (usually a surplus) as Congress adding more than what was asked.

This is not how the process works. There are two requests that come from the services. One is through OMB and the PB i.e. a formal submissions of the budget. The other is a in an official Unfunded Priorities List which goes line item by line item and is submitted, through proper channels, by each service chief and service secretary. I would say better than 2/3 of the Congressional adds are consistent with the PB+UPL ask. For the most part Congress is just combing through the UPL's and deciding which priorities it A) wants to fund, and B ) can fund given top line limitations or BCA 60 vote (senate) threshold limitations.

It's just that the BCA budgets have a UPL component which gets spun around to make it appear that Congress is just throwing more aircraft or bullets, or missiles than what was requested. This is not the case for the most part.

For example, the USAF has consistently maintained that it needs between 60-80 F-35A's a year to efficiently recapitalize its air-wings and manage its fleet bed down. Yet it has never had that many included that in any of the PB's since the program entered high LRIP. It is usually split something like 48-12 between the PB and UPL.

See this. If you looked at just the Aviation Week (editor's) spread-sheet (that I had posted earlier), it would appear that the USAF asked for 48 F-35A's and received 60 so Congress must have gifted them the aircraft that the service never asked for.



Whereas if one looks at the UPL the USAF submitted, one would find that the service had 12 additional F-35A's included in there. So all the Congress really did was sign off on that request.



So in a BCA era it is not sufficient to compare the NDAA to the PB of that year. One has to look at PB+UPL because this is how the services break down their procurement and to a lesser extent R&D requests.

[Mort Walker]

Yes, there are UPLs are presented by the services. Many other operational agencies like DoE and DoT have UPLs that don't make the light of day in congress nor through the executive branch, since defense lobbyists aren't pushing them.

I have yet to see any congress opposing a PB, but many times, not always, congress has sacrificed O&M for acquisitions. What would really be interesting is looking at re-programming of DoD appropriations toward the end of the FY.

[brar_w]

Yes, there are UPLs are presented by the services. Many other operational agencies like DoE and DoT have UPLs that don't make the light of day in congress nor through the executive branch, since defense lobbyists aren't pushing them.

UPL's are tricky for the DOD as well. In BCA times they are more important because they are substantial owning to PB request limitations and the 60-vote senate threshold ( you don't know what the topline is going to be at PB submission unless you have a 2-year deal in place). Not everything gets funded. The services are taking a risk when they exclude something from the PB and add it in the UPL. For one, the Congress could come to the conclusion that the item requested isn't a priority at all (and services can at times do a bad job of explaining why X is more important than Y), and secondly, what they may strike down (to offset if required) the accepted priority item may not be what the services want to trade. So it is not just a gimme in that the services present and UPL and it gets accepted.

I have yet to see any congress opposing a PB, but many times, not always, congress has sacrificed O&M for acquisitions.

There is always friction between acquisition, R&D, and readiness - or simply your short, medium and long term priorities. How this balance is struck is as much on the executive as it is on Congress. A strong executive will work within the budget limitations (like the BCA) and prioritize a right balance. There you see considerable contrast between administrations. Obama SecDefs were able/willing to protect R&D to a greater extent than acquisition and were able to protect readiness the least. In fact they raided many readiness accounts to pay for R&D. Mattis came in and prioritized readiness on par with acquisition and ramped up R&D. But he benefitted from top-line growth and part of his readiness focus was on account of the previous administration having dialed spending back on readiness. So in effect the higher topline gave them a better balance.

Where the Congress tips the scales the most (due to vested interests) is in fleet divestments. Service chiefs now have basically little power to divest a fleet which is OK when budgets are growing (as they tend to in a cyclical fashion) but when you again get back to a flat trend-line (which barely keeps up with inflation) then divestments are a great way for services to balance the future force needs with current readiness.

[Mort Walker]

^^^At least DoD and defense contractors have UPLs which actually get presented. Other agencies not so much. DoE takes a pretty good hit. Case in point was Fermilab funding in the Obama administration, which actually got cut.

You are right that O&M gets hit on the executive side too. The PB for O&M was actually cut, IIRC for the FY21 NDAA, by $4.1 billion. MILPERS did see an increase for FY21, probably due to being an election year in 2020.

[brar_w]

You are right that O&M gets hit on the executive side too. The PB for O&M was actually cut, IIRC for the FY21 NDAA, by $4.1 billion. MILPERS did see an increase for FY21, probably due to being an election year in 2020.

Comparing FY20 and FY21 is tricky because it was part of an agreed upon 2-year deal where the toplines were defined and you were getting flat (once adjusting for inflation) where as the FY20 was on an upswing still. Also, FY19 and 20 were heavy O&M focused budgets because that was the directive from Mattis across all the branches and got them to their readiness goals. So it was expected to begin reverting to more reasonable levels in subsequent, largely flat, budgets. Basically everything besides R&D took a hit in FY21 (PB request). They increased R&D fairly substantially as this was consistent (and planned) given the China focus. So because they were given a topline on account of the two-year deal, they had to find cuts in the President's request (what they had projected the topline number would look like in FY21 a year earlier in their FY20 request) and they basically chopped everything but dramatically increased R&D. But a lot of the procurement was added back by Congress as UPL's are procurement biased (and designed to be) so the overall reductions were not as severe as one might find in the PB.

[Mort Walker]

O&M is suppose to increase with new acquisitions (readiness) , but is planned to decline from FY23 to FY25, and RDT&E PB is projected to see a planned decline from FY22 to FY25.

With the new administration coming in the PB for O&M may see an increase, but procurement may see a decline.

[brar_w]

O&M is suppose to increase with new acquisitions (readiness) , but is planned to decline from FY23 to FY25, and RDT&E PB is projected to see a planned decline from FY22 to FY25.

With the new administration coming in the PB for O&M may see an increase, but procurement may see a decline.

O&M won't necessarily increase with new acquisition especially when you are letting go of O&M hogs in favor of newer kit. Like the US Navy retiring the entire legacy Hornet fleet which was a huge burden on its depots. Or the USAF divesting itself of some of its most tired bombers and the Navy doing the same with its cruiser fleet.

FYDP projections are also mostly inaccurate and don't usually pan out. FYDP O&M projections in an Esper budget are also not worthy of much attention as they were planning a much larger divestment than the Congress had an appetite for. So they would argue that they would cut a sizable chunk of the legacy cold-war era fleet and won't raise civilian workforce pay as dramatically and thus won't need as much money in the out-years. That would be Esper's argument as to why the O&M projections from FY20 and FY21 were different (in addition to flatter all round budgets). But that is wishful thinking and even they know it won't pan out the way they've noted in the FYDP (it's a starting point in stating your position). Congress determines what they can and can't retire and how much, if any, civilian pay increases take place so its all a bit of wishful thinking really.

and RDT&E PB is projected to see a planned decline from FY22 to FY25

RDT&E projections actually increase (i.e. Trump wanted more for R&D for these overlapping 4 years in his FY21 request then he projected he would need in his FY20 request) in the 4-year period that the PB-20 and PB-21 budgets share (PB20 FYDP compared to PB21 FYDP). By $27 Billion over 4 years. O&M and Procurement decreases (over the shared 4-year period) by $26 Billion and $18 Billion respectively. But these ratios and increases or decreases are largely irrelevant as A) Priorities change, B ) Under-funding procurement in the request and having it added back via UPL is a tactic that has worked in the BCA era so that could be assumed in the out - years etc etc.

If one were to approach this logically then one would come to the conclusion that the next 5 or so budgets should see a sizable increase in procurement (or conversely, if budgets flat out or decrease then procurement is protected the most), a flattening of O&S and a steady state R&D funding. This is because many next generation programs are transitioning from development to procurement. Whether it is the F-35 full rate production, B-21 exiting R&D and getting into rate production, Columbia class submarine, and the ICBM in the out years (these are just a few). So biasing towards protecting procurement is probably a safe-bet if the make up of Congress doesn't significantly change in 2022, there is no BCA 2.0, and the geo-political forces don't adversely impact this (like a war). But if any of these things change then obviously a different balance would be struck between these three competing priority buckets.

I would also think that classified procurement and R&D will begin to draw down in the coming years. Ever since Obama 2nd term, and into Trump the classified procurement and research accounts have just kept on growing, and doing so, faster than the rest of the budget. Particularly USAF's classified procurement account. So that will end up going back to other priorities that hadn't been growing as fast.

[Mort Walker]

In the next 3-5 FYs, the USN is not retiring all of its F/A-18 variants - just the A/B/C, but has acquired more in recent FYs. Neither is USAF going to retire its B-52s and B-1Bs. The F-117A is planned for phase out. With the newer acquisitions of the F-35, KC-46, and B-21 should see the O&M budget increase particularly on the logistics side and DoD organic support. DoD has somewhere over 806,000 civilian federal (not contract) employees. Many of these people work at various deployed logistics bases and DoD labs across the US and are not simply bureaucrats in DC at the Pentagon. DoD has always got the most bang for the buck on the technical side from organic combined civilian and military personnel.

I stand by my statement of the PB of RDT&E declining from FY22 to FY25.
Please see pdf page 15/308, Table 1-2, page 7, Chapter 1 of DoD's FY21 PB Green Book:
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals ... n_Book.pdf

RDT&E in millions of $:
FY22: 104,839
FY23: 101,821
FY24: 100,254
FY25: 99,961

Of course the manipulations around BCA is always an issue that DoD and defense contractors have figured out. As you can see from our discussions, there is a lot of politics in DoD's budgetary planning. Which brings us back to the importance of the repeal of Section 230. It will at least get some attention with a veto and an override.

[brar_w]

In the next 3-5 FYs, the USN is not retiring all of its F/A-18 variants - just the A/B/C

If you read what I wrote again you'd realize that I mention that they've removed the Hornet fleet (that is the A-C fleet is). Which is all gone from the CV. And it was the oldest and most depot-clogging fleet in the USN. Higher procurement amounts offset older, tired, and maintaince intensive platforms with fresher tails.

Neither is USAF going to retire its B-52s and B-1Bs.The F-117A is planned for phase out

B-52 is old only in calendar years. It is not as utilized a platform as the B-1B. And a chunk of the B-1 fleet is going out in the FYDP and beyond. Congress has allowed them to retire 17 B-1s.The USAF does not operate any combat coded F-117's. A few support as adversary and red-air but the entire combat fleet was divested long ago.

B-21 will not spool up in the FYDP. Majority of its bases will be stood up outside the FYDP. Same with sustainment.

Look, I'm not trying to argue that the O&S is going up or down. Historically, O&M accounts have exceeded inflation and civilian pay increases is a major contributor to that. So I'm not arguing that at all.

What I'm saying is that the administration (Trump or Biden it really doesn't matter) presents a FYDP which is an extremely inaccurate gauge of what will actually happen. Looking at the FYDP for insight into future spending is a rather pointless task. How pointless? Just look at the difference between what the Trump administration projected it would spend between FY21 and FY24 in its FY20 request and how it updated those 4-year FYDP estimates the very next year.

They are all over the place.

See below:

RDT&E projections actually increase (i.e. Trump wanted more for R&D for these overlapping 4 years in his FY21 request then he projected he would need in his FY20 request) in the 4-year period that the PB-20 and PB-21 budgets share (PB20 FYDP compared to PB21 FYDP). By $27 Billion over 4 years. O&M and Procurement decreases (over the shared 4-year period) by $26 Billion and $18 Billion respectively. But these ratios and increases or decreases are largely irrelevant as A) Priorities change, B ) Under-funding procurement in the request and having it added back via UPL is a tactic that has worked in the BCA era so that could be assumed in the out - years etc etc.

So in just 12-months the Trump administration backtracked, and added $27 Billion to its four year (the ones that overlapped) FYDP estimates for R&D, reduced O&S and procurement estimates by $26 billion and 18 billion. So again, how reliable are FYDP projections then?

stand by my statement of the PB of RDT&E declining from FY22 to FY25.
Please see pdf page 15/308, Table 1-2, page 7, Chapter 1 of DoD's FY21 PB Green Book:
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals ... n_Book.pdf

RDT&E in millions of $:
FY22: 104,839
FY23: 101,821
FY24: 100,254
FY25: 99,961

That is one way to look at it. That is, absolute amounts of RDT&E funding being projected in the FYDP. Does this tell me that Trump's DOD (as a matter of strategy) is clamping down on Research and Development? No. Far from it.

Looking at the absolute amounts and trend does not paint a very accurate picture (in terms of telling us whether RDT&E is being emphasized or not) because they are not worth the paper they are printed on and because you have ebbs and flows in R&D funding as major modernization investments either transition into EMD/SDD (which raises R&D considerably) or transition out of EMD (which reduces R&D). Because nearly 2/3 of the cost of a major defense programs RDT&E resides in its SDD/EMD phase, it is the largest sub-categroy of RDT&E funding. In this cyclical nature you eventually have to draw down R&D and increase procurement which is the essence of modernization.

So a lot of this is natural. Big ticket programs move from R&D accounts and into procurement accounts. B-21, F-35 FOM etc are all going to be re-balance. Columbia class procurement is in the FYDP as that program transitions from R&D into hardware production. Same for several other big RDT&E bills which are expected to exit development and bring rate production in the FYDP.

So If absolute numbers don’t real mean much historically then we are left to see how these projections change in between budgets and how they are split up because that gives us insight into what a particular administration wants to emphasize as a strategy .

How can we find this trend in the budget?

You do this by looking at RDT&E sub-sections to see what is growing, what is staying stable, and what is reducing. Specifically in the FY21 FYDP and out years, the Operational System Development and SDD accounts are reduced considerably (and are exclusively responsible in the trend of RDT&E absolute #$ in this time period) while basic Science and Technology RDT&E accounts are almost flat while prototying and adv component dev is actually growing slightly.

So what does this nuance tell us? It tells us that many big/large SDD bills are ending or reducing (or expected to) as those programs enter initial or full-rate production. So a lot of the modernization programs are now mature or soon to be mature (within the FYDP) and don't have the high EMD/SDD bills. But the ones that "come next" are being worked upon, hence the increase in adv component development and prototying and the relatively stable S&T accounts. But because those are far out into the future their funding levels are relatively low and will continue to drag down total RDT&E spending until those programs are mature enough to enter EMD/SDD at which time RDT&E will again begin to rise. It is a modernization cycle. You spend a loang time developing next gen systems, and then you take a long time in fielding them. So it is cyclical.

But to my earlier point, the Trump administration actually boosted R&D spending in its FYDP projections. It went and added roughly $27 Billion over the FYDP in its FY21 projections than what it had projected in its FY20. That, when viewed together with the breakdown of RDT&E accounts paints a more accurate picture of how the RDT&E spending is being projected to change.

This is the reason why I mentioned:

If one were to approach this logically then one would come to the conclusion that the next 5 or so budgets should see a sizable increase in procurement (or conversely, if budgets flat out or decrease then procurement is protected the most), a flattening of O&S and a steady state R&D funding. This is because many next generation programs are transitioning from development to procurement.

So this is the logical interpretation. Not that research is reducing. But more like some "Expensive research" is ending because a chunk of it is expected to be completed within or leading up to the FYDP, and "cheaper research" is staying stable or growing because S&T and advanced tech development and prototyping is the seed corn for WHAT COMES NEXT. In fact, if FYDP projections are to be assumed as a proxy for an administration's "strategy" (if they have one), then the change between FY20 and FY21 actually points to the Trump administration actually accelerating "Next Next Generation" R&D and this is reflected in the advanced prototying accounts getting a boost. And we have tangible evidence of that. From the classified R&D and procurement accounts and actually public revelations like first flight of a 6th generation fighter, and numerous other programs related to Next-Next.



This ebb and flow trend isn't restricted to just R&D. It shows up in procurement. A large chunk of the $18 billion or so reduction in projected FYDP procurement is because of "strategic shifts" that the trump administration (Esper and mattis prior to that) have made which impact the FYDP and likewise natural transition of programs. Some examples:

- The Trump administration proposed closing out the Super Hornet procurement after 2022. So this ends 2 dozen new fighters (each year) for the Navy as they've fielded the fleet they need (in fact they've bought more than they originally planned)

- The P-8 fleet bed-down gets completed in the FYDP

- I'll have to check again but I believe the E-2D transition also ends for the Navy within this FYDP

- Army aviation is going to transition from buying legacy helicopters to developing the FVL and thus is proposing a possible procurement holiday in procurement

- The Navy's fleet mix is being changed and future surface combatants are not yet ramping production so Esper proposed slowing the buy rate for 3-4 years and then spooling up procurement again once those ship classes are ready to be ordered in quantity

Not saying that the Congress (or Biden for that matter) will buy into that strategy or logic but some of these explain why the procurement projections were shown to reduce from what the administration had projected in their FY20 FYDP over the shared projection period (FY21 through FY24).

And lastly, the most important point from Trump's projection is that the defense budget is always cyclical and that FY18 through FY21 saw a sizable increase in defense spending. That funded a ton of modernization which will be bedding down in the next 2-3 years. FY22 through FY25 is more of a flattening of the budget (which actually translates to a slight inflation adjusted reduction) even under Trump's strategy. So as budgets flatten, the ratio between readiness, modernization, and R&D will again have to be adjusted by future administrations (Biden in this case but >50% is up to Congress).

As you can see from our discussions, there is a lot of politics in DoD's budgetary planning.

Yes budgets are matter of politics in democracies.

This is why looking at the FYDP projections is a complete waste of time. The delta between requested (via OMB and DOD submission (PB) ) and enacted is SIGNIFICANT and basically renders any FYD projections as useless (and projections themselves are often significantly altered).

FYDP are only useful if one wants to get inside the heads of DOD leadership and a potential administration. That is, determine what are they thinking of emphasizing and at the expense of what. That's about it. They are fairly inaccurate way of actually projecting DOD spend into the future years and beyond.

[brar_w]

Here is an illustration of the point from the past post. Source for both is the Green book. For 2020, and for 2021. And it shows totals for RDT&E.



So between the 2020 budget and the 2021 budget submission, Trump added $27.5 Billion in R&D to the projected 2021-2024 time-frame. He expected to spend (ask for) $386 Billion over this time-frame to support the larger RDT&E account, but in just a year modified the projection and planned to ask for $413 Billion over the same period (2021 through 2024). This is why drawing far sweeping conclusions from FYDP projections are pointless. If he added nearly 8% to a 4 year R&D projection in just a year, what is to stop him from asking for another 8% increase the very next year - and that just throws off any conclusion. Trends within these accounts are more important. Trends particularly in where the increase or decrease is taking place or rather projected to take place. They are relatively more stable and point to some sort of strategic bets being made within the R&D account. Of course we can't fully understand those because the largest item in there isn't broken down further as a large chunk of it is classified RDT&E funding and a large chunk of the classified RDT&E funding is USAF classified RDT&E funding spread between 6.7 and 6.4. And we know from historic, enacted budgets, that classified USAF RDT&E has ballooned pretty much since 2016 through 2021 so it has to begin drawing down as those systems and technologies are fielded.

But at a macro level, if budgets follow the logical modernization pathway, the RDT&E budget will have one or two corrections and then basically remain steady which is pretty much what is being asked for (though the two years' submissions are different they follow the same trend). This is normal and expected. Doesn't matter if Trump or Biden got elected, RDT&E were expected to come off of their peak and hold steady. This is because some expensive EMD/SDD phases were ending while what was ramping up was not offsetting this re-balance of program funding (from research to procurement). Prototyping and advanced concept demonstrations are cheaper than full blown EMD phases. But they too are a leading indicator of a future RDT&E increase. But that will likely manifest in the late 2020's to early 2030's timeframe as big ticket items like the 6th generation fighters, the next attack submarine, the the new cruiser become full fledged EMD programs.

[brar_w]

Some cool strafing practice footage.

NDIAN OCEAN (Dec. 19, 2020) U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lightning IIs assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 164 (Reinforced), 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit fire GAU-22 canons during a live-fire training exercise. The F-35Bs are providing close-air support to Operation Octave Quartz.

[NRao]

Here is your PACAF Photo of the Week!

A B-1B Lancer conducts a Bomber Task Force mission over the Sea of Japan, Dec. 16, 2020. #BTF missions build interoperability and demonstrate seamless, joint combat capabilities with our allies and partners. #FreeAndOpenIndoPacific

[Rakesh]

Some cool strafing practice footage.

Question for you in link below and please respond in that thread. Thank You.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=6308&p=2476007#p2476007

[Mort Walker]

What I'm saying is that the administration (Trump or Biden it really doesn't matter) presents a FYDP which is an extremely inaccurate gauge of what will actually happen. Looking at the FYDP for insight into future spending is a rather pointless task. How pointless? Just look at the difference between what the Trump administration projected it would spend between FY21 and FY24 in its FY20 request and how it updated those 4-year FYDP estimates the very next year.

FYDP are only useful if one wants to get inside the heads of DOD leadership and a potential administration. That is, determine what are they thinking of emphasizing and at the expense of what. That's about it. They are fairly inaccurate way of actually projecting DOD spend into the future years and beyond.

I disagree that the FYDP is extremely inaccurate. FYDP sets overall goals and priorities for the agency. Like all other executive branch agencies, DoD is required to present a budget to congress. To get inside the “heads” of leadership is to understand that there is a lot of pork in every congressional district and direct lobbying by defense contractors, or more often their surrogates, to congress, the OMB and president to change funding amounts based on “threat” perception.

The budget of $740 billion does not include the VA and retirees. The recent $1.4 trillion omnibus spending bill had tens-of-billions for DoD O&M.

As far as RDT&E, one wonders what planners are doing when the C-17 needs replacement and the E-3 fleet needs replacement over the decade. The latter has probably gone through many modifications and block changes with the E-3G becoming operational over the last few years, but it really needs to be on larger airframe. No mention of it in the FY21 NDAA.

Yes budgets are matter of politics in democracies.

The US is not a democracy, but a republic.

DoD is very adept to recognize political changes, therefore the delay of FY21 NDAA to the end of January makes little difference.

[brar_w]

I disagree that the FYDP is extremely inaccurate.

FYDP is prone to volatility. So while it gives an agency direction, to someone just downloading the green book and looking at 3-5 year trends using it is playing with danger as it can swing dramatically from year to year (I've clearly shown one example of this just comparing FY20 and FY21, one can find more within the same years or a different year pair). You can't establish any trends based on just a peek at the global numbers as they can have dramatic swings from one year to another (covering the same period). What direction are you giving if within a course of 11 months you've just changed your FYDP R&D projection by 8%? This is internally. Not Congress proposed change. Trump's DOD and OMB did this.

So it is pretty useless, and frankly a waste of time, to look at the green book and draw far sweeping conclusions on where any particular component is headed. If one does a more in-depth, and nuanced inspection of each of these categories, then it helps formulate some sort of picture but the global numbers need to be baselined with what has happened (where the DOD is in its modernization cycle) and past. Huge surges in R&D funding for example are usually followed by a correction as programs achieve and move past their milestones. They just transition from predominantly residing in one category to residing in another. But if you look into the details and see what is moving and in which direction, you can get some idea of what they are up to (as the chart in my prior post illustrates).

Administrations are also prone to making the FYDP look better or worst depending on how they want to approach their negotiation. For example, I'm sure the FY22 budget materials that Trump admin will hand over to the new administration will add to the FYDP compared to last year. Just so that they the admin can say they would have funded XYZ at so and so levels.

Finally, the difference between requested in enacted tells us something about a given administrations negotiation strategy. What is obviously more important is enacted and it isn't unheard of to see the services and the DOD play with how they table their requests which again may make the green book analysis (global numbers for a particular category) a bad way to establish global trends. If you plan to backload a significant amount ($$) of your procurement funding via UPL's then how can the green book indicate what your acquisition strategy is? The same applies, though to a lesser extent, to R&D. And O&M assumptions (like force draw down, or slowdown in pace of civilian pay) likewise doesn't need to happen, or even the administration doesn't need to believe that it will happen. But they present it just as a negotiating position. So even there the admin's FYDP projection don't really tell us what is likely to happen even if we assume its the same administration that will execute the FYDP.

In his budget submissions (FYDP) trump assumes O&M will reduce fairly significantly. Why are they assuming this? Their logic is because of force structure reduction (offloading legacy capacity) and lower civilian pay rise. Will this happen to the level they assume? Hell no. Do they know this? Yes they do. But it is put into the budget as an assumption because they will bargain the broader budget with Congress. It's a starting point. To use that starting point as some sort of base to formulate any analysis on a 3-5 year investment horizon is playing with danger. That's why no DOD or budget analyst really plays that game.

As far as RDT&E, one wonders what planners are doing when the C-17 needs replacement and the E-3 fleet needs replacement over the decade.

There is no C-17 replacement in the near to medium term. Far term programs were initiated but those are smaller scale efforts commensurate with something that will be fielding in the late 2030s or even later. UK will most likely offload some of its C-17 and those will likely be bought by the USAF as they need one additional C-17 squadron (it was a need identified after the production was terminated). There is no other identified need for that level of airlift between now and the time that the replacement would be needed. If something comes up, I'm sure Lockheed and Airbus will jump straight in and offer an interim A-400 option.

but it really needs to be on larger airframe. No mention of it in the FY21 NDAA.

No one familiar with the USAF thinking or strategy even expected it in the FY21 budget.

The USAF has decided not to recapitalize the E-3 and E8 fleet with a like for like replacement. So while the platforms will be in service for a while (possibly late 2030s for the E-3s) they will be replaced by the USAFs ABMS command and control network and a collection of manned and unmanned distributed sensors. They are de-coupling the sensors from the battle management. I'm sure the USAF classified RDT&E budget has plenty in it regarding this and the various ABMS on ramps (we only here about the unclassified ones) are focusing on how to perform this mission in a post 2030/2040 environment in a way that is more survivable, sustainable and effective. Since it is closely linked to Air dominance, they will likely not to make any major muscle movements until the Next generation air dominance program is mature and they have a good baseline of what that family of systems would be (and wouldn't be) capable of. With the first NGAD demonstrator already flying, and the Skyborg prototypes to take to the sky by mid-2021, those pieces will begin to fall in place.

https://aviationweek.com/special-topics ... wacs-fleet

[Vips]

US Army’s supergun proves deadly accurate at 40 miles.

According to the UK’s Daily Mail, a “supergun” being trialled by the US military has successfully fired an artillery shell to hit a precise target at a distance of more than 43 miles (70 kilometres) away. Breaking the record for the longest precision-guided cannon shot in history, the “extended-range cannon artillery system” was tested at a firing range in Arizona, the Mail reported.

The weapon has now achieved its designed range — following a successful shot over a distance of 40 miles (65 kilometres) back in March of this year.


The supergun was developed with the aim of being able to shell enemy positions from a safe distance, well beyond the range of any potential retaliatory strikes, the Mail reported. The US army has said that the new piece of heavy artillery will be readied for deployment onto the battlefield by the year 2023.“I don’t think our adversaries have the ability to hit a target on the nose at 43 miles,” Brigadier-General John Rafferty — who is in command of the long-range artillery development project — told The Times.

The successful shot — made at Arizona’s Yuma Proving Ground — followed two undertaken on the same day which failed.Strong winds meant that the first attempt fell short of its target, while the second failed due to an unspecified malfunction.

The experimental supergun is also testing a new design of guided artillery shell — the Excalibur S — which is also being trialled by the US Navy. Developed by Raytheon, a US-based defence contractor, the Excalibur S is equipped with a GPS system that allows it to accurately course correct and laser seeker technology that enables it to even hit moving targets.

[brar_w]

Not any super gun just a modified 155 Paladin. The previous page has the details.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=7088&start=1960#p2475433

[Mort Walker]

In his budget submissions (FYDP) trump assumes O&M will reduce fairly significantly. Why are they assuming this? Their logic is because of force structure reduction (offloading legacy capacity) and lower civilian pay rise. Will this happen to the level they assume? Hell no. Do they know this? Yes they do. But it is put into the budget as an assumption because they will bargain the broader budget with Congress. It's a starting point. To use that starting point as some sort of base to formulate any analysis on a 3-5 year investment horizon is playing with danger. That's why no DOD or budget analyst really plays that game.

It is unlikely O&M will reduce drastically. Civilian and military pay raises have gone up faster in the Trump era than previous 8 years of the Obama administration. For FY21, OMB originally proposed 3% uniformed increase along with 1% civilian increase (later withdrawn by OMB after the election). Even then, those pay raises aren't a major contributor to the O&M budget in terms of percentage. What does impact O&M are DHP (Tricare) expenses which is nearly $50 billion/annually, and maintenance contracts issued to the major defense contractors. Offloading of legacy capacity and force reductions do impact O&M, but the acquisition of newer platforms once deployed to forward bases with will see a rise in O&M cost. The only place where any real savings can be had is on the O&S side. RDT&E and MILPERS may have reached its peak in FY21 after going up the last 5-6 years. Acquisitions/Procurement won't be reduced as they create tremendous employment.

The Aviation Week article is misses a key point. The E-3 is known as the "Sentry". Aside from AEW and command and control, it performs a silent sentry duty of surveillance which is very significant.

[brar_w]

It is unlikely O&M will reduce drastically. Civilian and military pay raises have gone up faster in the Trump era than previous 8 years of the Obama administration. For FY21, OMB originally proposed 3% uniformed increase along with 1% civilian increase (later withdrawn by OMB after the election). Even then, those pay raises aren't a major contributor to the O&M budget in terms of percentage. What does impact O&M are DHP (Tricare) expenses which is nearly $50 billion/annually, and maintenance contracts issued to the major defense contractors. Offloading of legacy capacity and force reductions do impact O&M, but the acquisition of newer platforms once deployed to forward bases with will see a rise in O&M cost. The only place where any real savings can be had is on the O&S side. RDT&E and MILPERS may have reached its peak in FY21 after going up the last 5-6 years. Acquisitions/Procurement won't be reduced as they create tremendous employment.

No one, including the trump administration, actually believes that O&M will reduce. I certainly don’t and I hope they the third time repeating this would make that clear. But this is their position and unless one were all in on it ( which they probably themselves aren’t) there is no way to take their FYDP projections seriously.

And to a lesser extent this applies to R&D and procurement as well. They themselves have introduced wild swings in it as I have quite clearly demonstrated so it is foolish to think that they have a set policy on R&D reflected in their official submissions. They don’t as was evident from them adding nearly 27 billion dollars to RDTE into the four year period. Nothing changed in terms of strategy within the 12 months which would have led them to add that projection. Only that they will update the FYDP when they fee appropriate and ready so no point in investing long time trading too much into the top line projections.

But as I previously wrote going back to my very first post touching this, RDTE will correct and then be at a steady state in most but the extreme instances (huge budget windfall or dramatic cuts being those extreme scenarios). You don’t need to look at the FYDP for that. All one needs to look at is the pace of modernization and where in their program life cycle major modernization programs are.

The Aviation Week article is misses a key point. The E-3 is known as the "Sentry". Aside from AEW and command and control, it performs a silent sentry duty of surveillance which is very significant.

AvWeek isn’t repeating anything that is controversial but merely stating the fairly well known position of the USAF. No one seriously expects any E-3 replacement anytime in the future. I would think the USAF would know exactly for what it uses the E-3 as it develops newer concepts of operation and technologies to support those missions in the post E-3 era. The USAF has a much broader ISR portfolio which continues to grow thanks to both aggressive classified R&D and significant classified procurement. One can see where they've prioritized investment in this portfolio and where they are happy to upgrade platforms and have them last into the next decade and even beyond.

I see the offense defense mission being de coupled with the high threat missions leading them towards ABMS and a more survivable solution. Other missions will continue to be performed by the E-3 fleet and they can recapitalize those in the mid to late 2030s (the fleet doesn't need recapitalization till 2035 IIRC). If they find some cash in the interim perhaps they could rehost (take existing 40/45 systems and re-host them on a new airframe) on a younger airframe since they have a 767 as part of their acquisition pipeline. Other options could be to offload missions via a leasing arrangement to support certain mission needs around the homeland for example. NATO could also divest some of its fleet and buy E-7 or some other smaller platform and the USAF could scoop those aircraft and use them to bolster its own units and keep them flying longer. It’s all possible without any significant R&D ie buy a new platform for rehost or buy a new platform and system off the shelf for the lower end mission. But any even small decision is likely years away and well outside the FYDP. That’s not a major resource drain.

It is developing the sort of tech and platforms and networks needed for future high threat need that consume resources and entail technological risk. If I were to bet, I’d bet that this is consuming quite a bit of classified investments. Air dominance, battle management and C2 in a survivable fashion in a post 2030/2040 environment, particularly one around the Pacific threats is going to be a very difficult and expensive nut to crack so understandably the focus is to move away from the legacy architecture and vulnerable platforms and single points of failure. So this is their focus. And they have chosen pragmatic approaches (or those have been chosen for them) for the other stuff (like buying the F-15EX for example for the Homeland DCA mission performed by the Guard). Certainly if one were to break off missions that the E-3 perofrms today, then a case can be made to just lease that capability on a utilization model. But they aren't even at that stage yet and something like that is probably years into the future from even being considered.

[Mort Walker]

The E-3G upgrade to Block 40/45 didn't start deploying until 2015. See: Upgraded E-3 Sentry deploys to combat theater

Even though Block 40/45 deployment in the last 5 years is recent, the airframe is already over 40 years old and needs an upgrade and the logical path is the E-767. A lot of flying hours have been put on these aircraft. Even the E-767 operated by JASDF want to upgrade to the Block 40/45 standard. Don't know if RSAF, France, RAF, and NATO have undergone the same upgrade. I think France was looking into it.

A variety of classified ISR platforms with SAR capability are going to be important, but they would have to be large enough to carry a variety of sensors and have long endurance. That is something the E-3G has.

[brar_w]

When the major upgrade was done on the E-3 fleet (for those who did the upgrade) the upgrades were claimed to sustain the fleet through 2035. That was the design. France, the US and the NATO fleet will go through that time. So that is what information we have at the moment. Anyways, the official USAF position (as articulated by the ACC boss just a couple of years ago when the block 40/45 upgrade hadn't yet finished) is that the fleet will last into the 2030s. There is absolutely no reason why one would doubt that. And of course, this also explains why there is nothing in the budget for a rehost or any other arrangement to augment the fleet.

Yes they could re-host the payload on a 767 at a future date. Nothing from Boeing, and nothing from USAF points to that being considered for in the 2020s. This is probably because the upgrades keep the fleet going till the 2030s so no need to worry about something like that right now when a portion of the fleet is just introducing the latest variant. In fact the last of the USAF E-3 fleet was only upgraded to 40/45 std this year. The USAF is also not stopping buying the 767 for another decade to a decade and a half as KC-X rolls into KC-Y. So they have options if they need a younger air-frame. And of course other commercial solutions for the homeland defense missions can be explored like straight leases and a utilization model like they are now thinking about doing for tanking and lift.

With the JSTARS now cancelled and platforms beginning to retire, a major chunk of the E-3 mission is likely to be offloaded to multiple distributed platforms. There is no doubt in my mind that that set of the mission is actively being invested in. In fact, I sense that a lot of money is going towards developing that capability right now. That is obviously going to be in the classified USAF RDT&E accounts which are substantial. What remains in terms of the lower end missions, and homeland defense needs, can be recapitalized in the next decade. No need to rush on that front when there are far far more pressing issues at hand.

Don't know if RSAF, France, RAF, and NATO have undergone the same upgrade. I think France was looking into it.

France too doesn't expect to need a replacement before 2035.

The French air force expects the mid-life upgrade to its 707-based AWACS to be relevant through to 2035, and France is already starting to consider what type of platform will come next.

LINK

Same with the NATO fleet:

NATO’s E-3 AWACS fleet is predicted to retire around 2035. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Allies declared that “by 2035, the Alliance needs to have a follow-on capability to the E-3 AWACS. LINK

Some nations did not sign up for the E-3 upgrades. The UK is probably the most prominent. They are selling off that fleet for scrap have already placed orders for the E-7 which will be co-located along with their P-8 fleet.

A variety of classified ISR platforms with SAR capability are going to be important, but they would have to be large enough to carry a variety of sensors and have long endurance. That is something the E-3G has.

There is plenty of work happening in the open and classified realm to replace this capability without reverting to the same architecture. I'm sure we'll know if what the distributed capability and platfroms powering the ABMS system look like over time.

[Mort Walker]

The cancellation of JSTARS and retirement of the 30 year old fleet, although planned to go to other platforms like drones may suffice, but I would say it is an incorrect analogy for the E-3. There are defense contractors who may push the FYDP in the direction of "offloading to distributed platforms", but.....

Airborne platforms with high gain GaN arrays in multiple wavelengths have the ability for considerably improved detection on the surveillance aspect. The E-2D AN/APY-9 is partially in that direction as a PESA system with a solid state transmitter and digital RF receiver. The IAI EL/W-2090 is also along these design elements. The improved clutter suppression and high receiver sensitivity below the thermal noise floor already exists.

The E-7 Wedgetail with its top hat design with AESA offers improved reliability and maintainability, but little is known about its radar in the public domain.

[brar_w]

The USAF has a stated position. Many folks including the past two ACC bosses have opined on this topic and this is where they are headed. So anyone is free to read into them as they wish. They wargame these things and survivability concerns continue to drive the main resistance. If you can't protect your high value assets within a reasonable resource allocation then it is time to look to do the same mission differently I suppose. On the JSTARS they couldn't make the case even after having very capable GaN radars fully evaluated and the radar winner down-selected. Both radars were flying and one still continues to fly. With AWACS the problem is going to be even worst because it is a physically larger platform (JSTARS had it happened would most likely have been a business jet platform). And I think the USAF is probably in the best position to judge survivability of its platforms and the cost the enemy can impose in case they go down one path vs another since they have to do the asset protection themselves (there's no sister service that owns this mission or an ally that can come in and help out extensively). So if the ACC (the ultimate user of the capability) has doubts on its own ability to keep this node survivable, I'm sure the other forces in the loop would take notice and back other more survivable options. It's a natural thing to do.

Same with the E-7 which the USAF hasn't yet shown any interest in (it is just a compact version of the same concept). That option remains open for them to buy and lease. But nothing is in the works. For the high end mission they simply can't make the case of how these single high value platforms will have the survivability to support a very stealthy penetrating fleet (P-ISR (RQ-180), P-LRS (B-21), P-Counter Air (NGAD), F-35, F-22 etc etc). So things will have to be done differently. For the other, lower risk missions where survivability is less threatened (like homeland defense for example or in other COCOMS like CENTCON for example) the E-3's are going to get them well over a decade (out to 2035). And they can just move to a younger platform or buy the E-7 if and when they need to recapitalize that misison segment. What remains (mid to low threat environments) isn't a very demanding or costly mission to recap.

NATO itself is looking at exploring a distributed way of doing the E-3 mission in the post 2035 environment. It's right in there on there own website. [And NATO is an exclusively Atlantic and Europe centric force].

NATO’s E-3 AWACS fleet is predicted to retire around 2035. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Allies declared that “by 2035, the Alliance needs to have a follow-on capability to the E-3 AWACS. Based on high6level military requirements, we have decided to collectively start the process of defining options for future NATO surveillance and control capabilities.” This effort has since been carried forward as the Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) initiative.

In February 2017, NATO defence ministers agreed to embark upon the AFSC Concept Stage, comprised of a series of studies to evaluate new technologies and explore a system-of-systems approach, including potential combinations of air, ground, space or unmanned systems networked together to collect and share information. These studies will eventually help to inform decisions by NATO, individual Allies or multinational groups to acquire new systems in the future. All NATO Allies currently cooperate in the planning and resourcing of AFSC. [Link provided in my previous post]

No one is saying that larger platforms with higher power radars won't play a role in any of this. What they are talking about is distributing the mission across air, land, sea and space based sensors and de-coupling the sensors from the battle managers. So yes, you could see a large UAV with a large sensor being part of this solution. Or they could do things very differently and rely on different capability. These are all options. What they seem to have ditched is a traditional AWACS and JSTARS like platforms with dozens of crew and a large vulnerable platform that can't defend itself against surprise attacks from low-observable aircraft armed with very long range future interceptors (both the Chinese and Russians already field such weapons or are rapidly developing them).

The pacific is a very different AOR than a war in Europe. Everything will have to be done differently because of the long range fires capability of China, the vast distances involved, and the lack of assured basing and base survivability compared to a European theater for which majority of the legacy kit has been designed around.

Of course 30-40 years of technology evolution and a whole host of classified investment may put them in a fairly decent position to do such wargaming and red-teaming and figure out how to do this mission. The ABMS on-ramps that are happening in the open / unclassified realm may have a much larger component in the classified realm. Unless one knows what's in development in the classified realm there is no way to pass an educated judgement on the efficacy of a distributed, and de-centralized approach to long range SA and battle management. Just because you don't agree with it doesn't mean that something and somebody must be conspiring against your solution which is apparently the only thing that would suffice and every thing else must be on account of defense industry lobbying against it.

So this goes back to where we starting down the E-3 rabbit hole. You didn't find any funding for its replacement after searching through budget docs etc. As I had mentioned, and as is backed up with common searchable information, the USAF doesn't plan on replacing the E-3's till weill into the 2030s with the latest round of upgrades allowing the platform to serve out till 2035. That coupled with the stated position of the USAF of wanting to do this mission differently in the future is the reason why there is nothing for a traditional AWACS replacement in there. And also why know one else is surprised about that.

[brar_w]

Year end F-35 stats from Lockheed. They've delivered 123 F-35's in 2020 including 74 to the US services. Original target was 140 aircraft but US and international supply chain disruptions due to COVID made them reduce that forecast down in Q3. They'll have to quickly catch up next year as 2021 is also when the Full rate production is likely to be green lighted..

The 123rd aircraft is an F-35A conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant, built at the Cameri, Italy, Final Assembly and Checkout (FACO) facility and delivered to the Italian Air Force. In 2020, 74 F-35s were delivered to the United States military, 31 to international partner nations and 18 to Foreign Military Sales customers.

In response to COVID-19 related supplier delays, in May the initial annual delivery goal was revised from 141 to 117-123 aircraft to strategically avoid surging, which would increase production-related costs and create future delays and disruption. LINK

[Mort Walker]

LM is stating Lot 14 cost of F-35A is now down to $77.9 million/aircraft.
https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/docu ... r_2020.pdf

[brar_w]

Yes that was announced last year once the final contracts, between the Pentagon and LM (and suppliers), for the Lots 12 through 14 deliveries were definitized. They signed up to deliver 169 F-35's as part of Lot 14. Full Rate production will give them slight improvement in EOS (FRP lots will be part of the next negotiated contract for) but some of those savings will be offset by block-4 hardware costs (while Lot-12 through 14 covers early block 4 hardware some of it will come in the second half of block 4 implementation) so they may be in the $80 Million or thereabouts given all that.

[Mort Walker]

On the JSTARS they couldn't make the case even after having very capable GaN radars fully evaluated and the radar winner down-selected. Both radars were flying and one still continues to fly. With AWACS the problem is going to be even worst because it is a physically larger platform (JSTARS had it happened would most likely have been a business jet platform). And I think the USAF is probably in the best position to judge survivability of its platforms and the cost the enemy can impose in case they go down one path vs another since they have to do the asset protection themselves (there's no sister service that owns this mission or an ally that can come in and help out extensively). So if the ACC (the ultimate user of the capability) has doubts on its own ability to keep this node survivable, I'm sure the other forces in the loop would take notice and back other more survivable options. It's a natural thing to do.

JSTARS operated in hostile areas and survivability was important. It never had a high gain antenna, compared to the E-3 or E-2, from the beginning, nor was it for that use. The E-8 had the AN/APY-3 and AN/APY-7 Ku band radars. They were designed to distinguish ground based targets. With remote sensing and drone platforms, its mission can be distributed. Again, the comparison to the E-3 with its AN/APY-2 S band radar is inaccurate, a longer range radar which operates further from the battle theater. More than likely, the E-3 isn't seeing a replacement is because platforms like the E-7, in terms of actual radar performance, may not be there. However, the E-7 may be more reliable and cost effective in with its modern design. The existing E-3 which allied forces have are getting long in the tooth for maintainability. Cost and reliability are the factors driving them to other platforms. It explains why ACC isn't phasing out the E-3 in the near term.

[brar_w]

Again, the comparison to the E-3 with its AN/APY-2 S band radar is inaccurate, a longer range radar which operates further from the battle theater. More than likely, the E-3 isn't seeing a replacement is because platforms like the E-7, in terms of actual radar performance, may not be there.

I think most folks even remotely familiar with these platforms would the know the difference. But the summary aside, what I am telling you is that what the official position is. And this is not just multiple, USAF leaders wanting, advocating and backing this approach but those of the collective NATO group as well (NATO even spells it out on its website). All wanting to offload some or a sizable chunk of the mission to distributed survivable platforms. But more importantly wanting to de-couple the battle management portion from the sensing portion. As a glimpse of the latter, the USAF recently asked industry to come up with a "flying AOC" concept. These experiments will be pivotal to ABMS and how this de-coupling will occur.

But of course they could all be wrong. Maybe they don't know how to measure platform survivability, or they are underestimating their own ability to protect their platforms. Or they just don't have the technical expertise to develop capable radars. And no one else, outside the US and the European NATO group, in possession of those radar technologies, will sell them those radars either. Or perhaps they are overestimating the capability of their competitors when it comes to stealth or long range targeting of very large, emitting, high value targets. Who really knows? It gets exhausting trying to find all possible reasons after one ignores the obvious ones which are openly claimed and even published on user group websites. And no none of them are saying that the E-3 simply vanishes into thin air. There is room for a platform like that. Many missions don't need that level of survivability. But many others will especially when you are the vulnerable link in an otherwise signature optimized VLO fleet which is growing quite rapidly and would have grown significantly by the mid to late 2030s (it will be in the thousand of aircraft). So for that difficult portion of the conflict they need something else. And a widebody airliner with its huge signature isn't really it based on everything we know so far. That may not fit your world view and fixation on AWACS but this is the stated position of USAF and NATO so it is the best we have to work with.

You can continue to sift through the few thousands of pages of budget and supporting material and look for R&D funding for an E-3 AWACS or develop other theories around the USAF just not having access to the tech required to put a competent sensor on an airliner or just not confident in their R&D to develop something or buy it from elsewhere. And then ascribe all the possible reasons to the lack of funding to everything other than what is officially claimed and widely reported in that they do not want to do the mission the same way they have done it for 4 decades.

Cost and reliability are the factors driving them to other platforms. It explains why ACC isn't phasing out the E-3 in the near term.

Many NATO users, and the USAF have very recently upgraded (or are doing so) their aircraft with the full intention of those upgrades seeing the platform through 2035 when they will be retired. This is the official stated time-frame for the platforms retirement. NATO says as much on its own website. The USAF likewise states the same and this has been widely reported. Again, official position and not someone throwing out guesses out there.

And the same applies to the ACC. It expects a suitable SoS to be mature enough to be brought online by that time. It is most likely investing very heavily in getting to that end-state much like others in Europe who also have similar timelines. We won't see into that research for a quite a while still. Certainly for those who look into this, ABMS technologies, and the ISR and AWACS mission are ripe candidates for consuming a heavy chunk of the classified R&D accounts because they'll be needing a fairly giant leap in capability to get where they are wanting to go as they divest first the JSTARS fleet, and later the E-3 fleet. Will they get there? Who knows. They can fail catastrophically as is the case with any high-risk strategy. All I'm saying is that this is what they want and this is very likely what they are investing very heavily to get. They are not looking at China's capability in stealth and long range targeting today. They are trying to predict where China will be in the 2035-2065 time-frame because anything that replaces the E-3 will have to be relevant over that period, and possibly beyond.

More than likely, the E-3 isn't seeing a replacement is because platforms like the E-7, in terms of actual radar performance, may not be there.

Why would the USAF consider the stock E-7 as an E-3 replacement? The E-7 was developed in the early 2000s. Why would such a system, be relevant to replace a platform that doesn't need replacement for 15 more years? I mean if the USAF wanted an airliner with a large radar and packed with a dozen or so people, and do so by 2035, I'm sure it would ask for something that was a lot newer than the E-7 which has been in service since 2009 and was developed specifically for Australia (though it has been widely exported since). That wouldn't make much sense unless of course they need it more for homeland defense missions and not for the very high end fight. The decision to upgrade the AWACS fleet was taken long ago and the last of the upgrades actually concluded this very year. It isn't like they were asleep and decided to keep the E-3 for 15 more years. They developed an upgraded program and executed it and this was planned quite a while back because the aircraft with the upgrades met the USAF's needs since it is affordable. A half-baked interim solution (like another airliner in this timeframe) would simply starve funds away from more long term solutions so the current course they are on is very much the right way to approach it. So they are doing well to keep the E-3 (its the same with France and most NATO) until the next generation of technologies are mature and demonstrated in a relevant environment. Some of those early demos are happening now. More will come over next 5-10 years.

From the LCA Thread:

More excuses. Purchase orders can be placed before FOC and IOC. It was done by the US congress in 2001 for the F-35 program to purchase 477 F-35 variants.

The US Congress did no such thing. Lockheed and P&W were awarded an EMD/SDD contract to develop the program. Each individual Low-Rate-Initial Production contract was awarded separately, on an annual basis (though they do get delayed) as per the process for Pre-Milestone C designated programs. Even now, while European and many other partners negotiate and order using the multi-year procurement contracting vehicles, the US DOD orders are definitized one year at a time. This is why the US users (USAF, and DON) were left out of the international block buy which was the first of its kind in the program. They will get on the block-buy vehicle once full-rate production is approved which will likely happen in the summer of 2021 so that will be when the first DOD MYP is put into place (USAF). That's the law and unless the law is changed they couldn't/can't engage in a blanket order for XXX F-35's either in 2001 or in 2020. And this was why they didn't do it.

As the F-35 moves towards full-rate production in three years, the US Air Force and Navy plan to transition from purchasing the aircraft in one-year blocks to multiyear procurement contracts, according to a Selected Acquisition Report released in in late March.

The USAF plans to start the first round of multiyear procurement deals with a three-year contract in 2021, followed by successive five-year procurements beginning in fiscal 2024 until the end of the programme.

The USN plans to continue one-year procurements through fiscal year 2023, followed by successive five-year procurements from fiscal year 2024 until the end of the programme.

Multiyear procurement contracts are a special mechanism that Congress permits the DOD to use for a limited number of programmes at full-rate production to reduce costs by several percent. In total, the DOD plans to purchase 2,456 F-35s: 1,763 F-35As for the USAF; 353 F-35Bs and 67 F-35Cs for the Marine Corps; and 273 F-35Cs for the USN.

https://www.flightglobal.com/systems-an ... 82.article

[brar_w]

Update on the Extended Range Cannon Artillery program. They are getting close to finalizing the configuration of the Excalibur required to fully support ERCA requirements. Wouldn't be surprised if the XM1113 70 km shots with the long range PGK are also attempted soon with the idea to finalize both configurations and put into production by end of 2021 for 2023 Initial Operational capability.

Army long-range cannon gets direct hit on target 43 miles away

Via SPF:

[Mort Walker]

OK. I'm mistaken about the SDD purchase of the F-35A of 477 aircraft. The low rate of production of the SDD was I believe nearly 20 aircraft. Nevertheless, commitment toward the F-35 was made and IOC just happened recently according to LM f35.com.

[Mort Walker]

And no none of them are saying that the E-3 simply vanishes into thin air. There is room for a platform like that. Many missions don't need that level of survivability. But many others will especially when you are the vulnerable link in an otherwise signature optimized VLO fleet which is growing quite rapidly and would have grown significantly by the mid to late 2030s (it will be in the thousand of aircraft). So for that difficult portion of the conflict they need something else. And a widebody airliner with its huge signature isn't really it based on everything we know so far. That may not fit your world view and fixation on AWACS but this is the stated position of USAF and NATO so it is the best we have to work with.

A large widebody airliner is needed to get the high gain antenna (in a varying wavelengths), comms equipment and other sensors integrated. It would be that or develop a large VLO type aircraft such as the airframe of a B-2 or B-21 to carry the high gain antenna and sensors. This has nothing to do with fixation, but everything to do with detection, target identification and tracking.

[brar_w]

OK. I'm mistaken about the SDD purchase of the F-35A of 477 aircraft. The low rate of production of the SDD was I believe nearly 20 aircraft. Nevertheless, commitment toward the F-35 was made and IOC just happened recently according to LM f35.com.

EMD/SDD funded development and any development testing related activity like non LRIP hardware and test hardware. So only the test fleet (which will never be combat coded) like dev test aircraft, static test aircraft, RCS measurement aircraft etc, was funded via SDD which is the standard practice (you need test aircraft to begin development and developmental testing).

Once the decision was made to put the F-35 into serial production (first serially produced LRIP (LOT)) then each contract was awarded separately one LOT at a time with the Congress and the DOD following the rules to do this until M-C was achieved. That's how the first dozen lots have been ordered by the US Congress.

In the best case scenario, the USAF enters into a multi-year procurement starting only in lot 15 or 16. The DON a few years behind them. Partners who are not bound by US laws and milestones moved into contractually obligated multi-year procurement starting Lot 12 (hence the weird Lot 12 - 14 contract negotiation where partner orders in LOT 12 , 13 and 14, were firm while US orders were to be placed separately each year with DOD and Congressional say in what those will look like - though they were negotiated and toplines for the fixed price contract announced together). This is how it is. Congress and the DOD maintains the right to adjust annual numbers as it orders one year at a point till such time as FRP is approved after which it is free to explore block buy to reduce cost. An example of a block buy is the F/A-18 E/F program. F-35 is headed there as well.

A large widebody airliner is needed to get the high gain antenna (in a varying wavelengths), comms equipment and other sensors integrated. It would be that or develop a large VLO type aircraft such as the airframe of B-2 or B-21 to carry the high gain antenna and sensors. This has nothing to do with fixation, but everything to do with detection, target identification and tracking.

And unless you are aware of 100% of the classified work happening which is attempting to de-couple BM from sensing, and to distribute sensing itself on multiple platforms as opposed to a large monolithic airliner, you can't really say (with any sort of accuracy) whether they know what they are doing or not. What if they decide that they don't need one giant radar that can see 500 km?

What if they approach the mission differently as they are basically saying they want to? If you start with a partial answer to a problem and work backwards into requirements i.e. - "I need a very large gain antenna and a platform that can accommodate it"- then you will end up with the same solution. But I think they are very much open to solving for a problem in terms of mission need. The need seems to be to provide situational awareness, and targeting information beyond the organic sensor capability of a penetrating force of VLO fighters, UAV's, Bombers etc. I am sure that they are exploring multiple ways to do that. Particularly on how best to do so right at the edge of the battlespace where you have to worry about very long range targeting of large sensors, and non signature optimized aircraft. It is a very challenging and expensive problem to solve.

Trying to fit a high power GaN antenna on a widebody is in contrast much simpler. All three radar OEMs in the are delivering GaN radars for US and export customers and the scale at which they are doing so is probably equivalent to (mil side) the rest of the world put together across a whole host of radar types and bands. So offering a new sensor that can see much much farther isn't the hard bit. But if it doesn't solve their underlying concerns, then no operator led organization (like the ACC) will sanction it. Their entire air-superiority assurance in the 2030-2060 timeframe is basially dependent on these bets (or at least some of them) paying off so its only natural for them to be fully invested in NGAD and ABMS and trying to create that more survivable fleet given the unique challenges of fighting in the Pacific (unlike Europe where you have other options). They are constructing a family of systems which is expected to both be a penetrating force and a survivable force when standing off. The Penetrating force comprises of a VLO bomber, VLO fighters (5th and 6th gen), Penetrating ISR platfroms (RQ-180) and probably many others in the family of systems that are in the works or planned for the future. Linking them is going to be ABMS which envisions an IoT approach. So what provides the "eye in the sky" and "battle management" for this group of capabilties may look very different from a son of the E-3 or even the E-10 redux.

If I were to guess, I'd say that nothing on this is going anywhere until A) 6th generation fighter demonstrators (only one has flown but as far back as 2015 this program was referred to in the plural so more will likely come) are put through their paces and their concept of operation better defined through experimentation and demonstration and B ) The full extent of the ABMS experiments, demonstrations, and on-ramps are revealed (and not just details on the ones they talk about but also those they don't yet talk about). Given the highly classified USAF RDT&E accounts and their sheer size (and their ever growing nature in the last many years), I don't think we will know in the 2-5 year horizon. Things on the success or failure of this approach may begin to come into the light around the mid to late 2020s as these programs become too big to keep in the dark.

Until then, we simply don't know what these demonstrations, and technologies are leading the USAF towards but absence knowledge we can fall back on what the thinking is in terms of what they are looking to do and that is exactly what I mentioned.

[NRao]

China to return seized U.S. drone, says Washington 'hyping up' incident

[NRao]

U.S. Navy Requests Prototypes of Largest Submarine-Deployed Underwater Drone

The U.S. Navy has announced plans to build out its undersea vehicle arsenal with the development of a new larger unmanned undersea vehicle in its snakehead program.

Unmanned drones are viewed as part of the future of the navy and these new undersea vehicles will be capable of being covertly deployed and recovered by nuclear submarines. The drones themselves will serve a variety of purposes, largely standing as a versatile platform to carry multiple mission packages.

The Naval Sea Systems Command, NAVSEA, has officially submitted a request for proposals or RFP for phase 2 of their Snakehead unmanned vehicle program. A request for proposal essentially stands as an invitation for contractors to submit pricing and designs to the command for selection.

Once all of the proposals are received, the Navy is planning on making its final pick near the end of 2021, likely by September.

Perpetual Motion Machine Attempts Through History
The new vehicle stands in a class of large-displacement unmanned undersea vehicles, or LDUUV. These larger unmanned drones have incredibly long autonomous runtimes, allowing for intelligence collection, mine neutralization, and other mission packages.


One of the mission packages for the new LDUUV will equip it will sonars and bathymetric sensors that will allow it to develop detailed seabed maps and depth diagrams. This sort of data is critical to submarine operations as well as remote naval navigation.

In theory, submarines would be able to deploy the unmanned vehicle to scout out their path ahead, closely mapping their optimal path of travel in order to avoid potential hazards in the sea.



While the navy has publically put out their request for proposal for the new vehicle, there's very little other details about what the vehicle will contain or what companies are putting their hat in the ring for constructing it.

In today's age of advanced naval warfare, the U.S. Navy not only has squadrons for manned surface ships but also for unmanned ones as well. For example, the Unmanned Undersea Vehicles Squadron One, or UUVRON-1, was the first dedicated squadron for these unmanned vehicles. They currently utilize two LDUUVs that were previously developed, one being the Sea Horse, a 28-foot 5-ton vehicle and another called the Sea Stalker, which is a modified Sea Horse with various other mission packages.

For now, the new vehicle will continue being developed with updates expected to come in 2021.

[Rakesh]

Female CO Will Command Aircraft Carrier for First Time
https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press ... irst-time/
23 December 2020

[Mort Walker]

And unless you are aware of 100% of the classified work happening which is attempting to de-couple BM from sensing, and to distribute sensing itself on multiple platforms as opposed to a large monolithic airliner, you can't really say (with any sort of accuracy) whether they know what they are doing or not. What if they decide that they don't need one giant radar that can see 500 km?

What if they approach the mission differently as they are basically saying they want to? If you start with a partial answer to a problem and work backwards into requirements i.e. - "I need a very large gain antenna and a platform that can accommodate it"- then you will end up with the same solution. But I think they are very much open to solving for a problem in terms of mission need. The need seems to be to provide situational awareness, and targeting information beyond the organic sensor capability of a penetrating force of VLO fighters, UAV's, Bombers etc. I am sure that they are exploring multiple ways to do that. Particularly on how best to do so right at the edge of the battlespace where you have to worry about very long range targeting of large sensors, and non signature optimized aircraft. It is a very challenging and expensive problem to solve.

If decoupling BM from sensing was the goal, more of the E-3 fleet would see retirement as it is an expensive platform to maintain and train crews.

No. High gain antennas are not necessarily for range, but to distinguish VLO aircraft and ships. To identify and determine accurate velocity information when in a high ground clutter condition. Low Velocity Detection (LVD) has always been a priority in radar design, particularly now with the proliferation of armed UAVs and helos. Modern digital receivers can see two to three times below the thermal noise floor. This has been a significant development over the last decade.

They are constructing a family of systems which is expected to both be a penetrating force and a survivable force when standing off. The Penetrating force comprises of a VLO bomber, VLO fighters (5th and 6th gen), Penetrating ISR platfroms (RQ-180) and probably many others in the family of systems that are in the works or planned for the future. Linking them is going to be ABMS which envisions an IoT approach. So what provides the "eye in the sky" and "battle management" for this group of capabilties may look very different from a son of the E-3 or even the E-10 redux.

The ABMS alternative with a distributed IoT type approach is all good, but the limitation will always be sensor capability. You're not going to get around that problem. I suspect at some point in time (5-7 years) we will see an E-10 type revival and it may be in parts of the classified programs.

[brar_w]

If decoupling BM from sensing was the goal, more of the E-3 fleet would see retirement as it is an expensive platform to maintain and train crews.

That may well happen. But the leap from going from experimentation, demonstration and capability development to fielding the set capability is not an easy or a quick path. So conservatively, the level of "flying AOC" or a fully hashed out ABMS product, required to allow this to happen may be years away. In fact it would be foolish to expect this to be ready and in line ahead of NGAD. It may trail NGAD which actually goes well with when the E-3 fleet is slated for retirement based on the last upgrades (mid 2030s).

The ABMS alternative with a distributed IoT type approach is all good, but the limitation will always be sensor capability.

That is not the limitation because ABMS is not concerned with that. It is an IoT approach to link current, and future sensors in a way that J-series connectivity just doesn't allow. So the sensing piece is not the programs concern directly. Its allied efforts are indeed creating a new generation of scalable sensors for everything from surveillance to GMTI etc so it is just not concerned with stitching a large fire-control level connctivity amongst existing sensors and shooters and using AI to battle-manage. It is also investing in scalable next generation sensors across the entire spectrum of mission sets.

Any limitation in sensor nodes within this family-of-systems will be addressed separately and obviously available to the benefit of all. As I said, since 2010 the direction has been very clear. A Penetrating long range Bomber is now entering production. A Penetrating Counter Air demonstrator has already flown. A Penetrating ISR platform is also now operational. Even the force of F-35's and F-22's is now expanding and will reach 1,000+ aircraft strong in 3-5 years. So this is not about operating a handful of F117s and B-2s anymore. It is about literally a parallel VLO family of systems which collectively will be larger than many Air Forces put together. So supporting this is going to require some creative thinking. Don't expect them to stop at that or think that the USAF, which has had long range surveillance and battle management capability for more than 4 decades will just disregard incorporating this role and mission in this family of systems. It just won't be done like it was in the 1970's. Given the capability and limitations of this family-of-systems (which is only as strong as its weakest link) it would have to be done differently. If there is anything the USAF leadership has been consistent on in the last few years it has been this. And no one is saying that they won't need a host platform. ABMS reduces the reliance on bespoke host platforms by stitching together sensors that would in the past not be able to share information due to LOS limitations or data-link latency, bandwidth unavailability, processing limitations or incompatibility etc. But beyond that, they too envision adding additional nodes to it as the NGAD FOS no doubt will focusing in on its own mission set.

I suspect at some point in time (5-7 years) we will see an E-10 type revival and it may be in parts of the classified programs.

Of course there is always a possibility that they have something in the works to put a giant radar on an airliner and calling it a day and that the very top of the USAF leadership commenting about moving away from such an approach is just a lie or a bluff. I suppose one believes what one wants to believe.