Geopolitics/Geoeconomics Thread - June 2015

[drnayar]

Dave Rubin of “The Rubin Report” shares a DM clip of Marco Rubio explaining to Catherine Herridge how Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stabbed the U.S. in the back with his attempts at trying to "hustle" the United States

Host Shocked as Rubio Explains How Ukraine Double Crossed the U.S..

[VinodTK]

US proposes axing Canada from Five Eyes?

TOI correspondent from Washington: Donald Trump's MAGA-infused US is rupturing a long-standing Anglophone alliance.

From vice-president JD Vance describing Britain as the world's first "truly Islamist country" to have nuclear weapons (because of its growing immigrant Muslim population) to Peter Navarro reportedly proposing expulsion of the largely liberal Canada from the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network, there are growing signs that the Trump govt is ready to dump Washington's English-speaking allies if they do not embrace MAGA principles of curtailing immigration.

Hours after Trump publicly trolled Canada's PM Justin Trudeau by referring to him as 'Governor Trudeau' in his pursuit of making it the 51st American state, the US' northern neighbour got another shock Tuesday from news that a top Trump aide has proposed jettisoning Canada from the Five Eyes intelligence network, one of the closest and most successful intel alliance that also includes UK, Australia and New Zealand.
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[ricky_v]

with all the recent developments, there has been a flurry of good articles, the below one is from robert kaplan, i would recommend reading in full

https://archive.is/gt9rO

The disagreement over budget allocations points to a more profound issue: Too many Americans, as evinced in the populist rhetoric of Trump and Vance, just do not care deeply about defending Europe anymore.

NATO survived the decades after the Cold War and the rebirth of Russian imperialism—a period that has included the rise of roiling populism and identity politics in the West—largely because the alliance was led by people who either had a keen memory of World War II and the early Cold War years or grew up with and admired people who did. But that living historical memory is evaporating. In the process, Americans have rediscovered an older, more archaic aspect of their own identity—one that Europeans neglected for too long. Europe has always known that the United States is a continent facing the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, but it has never sufficiently internalized that knowledge to affect its own behavior.

U.S. identity, at least since the early 20th century, has been shaped by two broad phenomena: one geographical and the other Wilsonian. The geographical one seems obvious, but for too many people—especially European elites—it really isn’t.

The temperate zone of North America, which largely comprises the United States, is perfectly apportioned for nationhood, with deep-water ports along the East Coast and routes through the Appalachians to the vast rich soils of the prairie. The water-starved Great American Desert, now known as the Great Plains, arose as a true natural barrier, but a transcontinental railroad was built to carry a population through the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. Geography wrought a cohesive nation separated from the outer world by two oceans, and there was so much going on inside it—with all of its problems and possibilities—that the rest of the world could remain obscure.
Yet once the Pacific was reached, there was not one but two coastlines to consider, not to mention the Gulf Coast between Florida and Texas. This opened up great sea lines of communication to both Europe and Asia and enabled a robust trade with the outer world.

Here is where the other aspect of U.S. identity comes in: Wilsonianism—shorthand for the ideology of seeing the achievement of freedom far beyond U.S. shores as essential to the country’s own security. Although Woodrow Wilson, the 28th U.S. president, failed to bring the United States into an international order following World War I, he created a goal for the country to strive for—just as steamships and aircraft were beginning to bring it into much closer proximity with Europe. It would take World War II and its aftermath, making Washington the world’s preeminent power, to achieve the Wilsonian ideal of establishing a bastion of freedom and democracy in a large part of the European continent.

As obvious and desirable as this all seemed in the postwar years, it was not altogether natural in geographical terms. It required a knowledge of the sacrifices that the United States had made for the sake of a better world, combined with historical kinship based on Washington’s European roots—philosophical roots more than blood and soil ones. This all required reading, something that elites take for granted but shouldn’t. For as eight decades have passed, this tradition can only now be valued through books and education, since the lived memory of the establishment of the Atlantic alliance is gone, just as the Cold War is fading from consciousnesses.

Trump is not an heir to this tradition.

He doesn’t really read. He is post-literate—that is, he exists in a world of social media and smartphones but has not immersed himself in the study of narrative history, even superficially.

Thus, he is unappreciative of the postwar saga of the West. NATO is a mere acronym to him, not a connotation of humankind’s largest-ever military alliance, which emerged out of the struggle against Nazi fascism. He likely knows nothing about the Atlantic Charter—signed by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada, in August 1941—that laid out an inspiring vision for a postwar world, or about the building of a postwar order by great U.S. diplomats and statesmen, such as Averell Harriman and George Kennan.

The U.S. foreign-policy elite has cut its teeth on such inspirational history. Trump and his followers are likely unfamiliar with much of this. And because of the evolution of technology, he may not be the last president of his kind.

Since Trump is ahistorical, he has only geography to fall back upon. He imagines the United States as a continent existing on its own, and he registers the comparative closeness of such places as Greenland and Panama, which he has vowed to acquire. In Trump’s mind, Greenland and the Panama Canal are organic extensions of the logic of U.S. geography, especially in an age that will likely see more naval activity in the Arctic.

Another factor to consider is that technology has been shrinking geography itself. This is an easy change to miss, since it has been so gradual. Crises in one part of the world can affect crises in other parts as never before. The well-read, historical mind sees this development as a reason for the United States to bolster alliances the world over. But in Trump’s more primitive and deterministic worldview, it is a time to bolster regional spheres of influence in a more claustrophobic world that will be in perpetual conflict.

As for Europe, it is becoming weaker and more divided, threatened by Russia to the east and political turmoil in response to migration from the Middle East and Africa to the south. As I wrote in my 2018 book, The Return of Marco Polo’s World, “[a]s Europe disappears, Eurasia coheres.” Europe, I explained, would eventually merge with a Eurasian power system. The war in Ukraine, which has brought Russia into deeper alliances with China, Iran, and North Korea, has borne this theory out. In today’s smaller world, Europe cannot separate itself from the upheavals of Afro-Eurasia, making it less valuable in Trump’s new map. This is what happens when Wilsonianism dies.


The problem is deeper than that. Trump seems to see China as its own continent and power bloc, much like the United States. The U.S. president might have a trade war with China, or he might not. He might even try to improve relations with Beijing. The point is that China registers in Trump’s view of an Earth divided according to regions—whereas Europe, despite NATO and the European Union, is insufficiently united to amount to much of anything.

huntington's clash of civilisations is back.. or maybe it never left, point being that technology has made it so that attempts to hold up the "rules-based order" are becoming increasingly difficult, and justifications and values obtained for the resources spent for its upkeeping diminished, so things are reverting back to regions or spheres of influence

[chanakyaa]

(PDF) WAR AND THEFT: THE TAKEOVER OF UKRAINE’S AGRICULTURAL LAND

The war in Ukraine has been at the center stage of foreign policy and media reports since February 2022. Little attention, however, has been given to a major issue, which is at the core of the conflict – who controls the agricultural land in the country known as the “breadbasket of Europe?”

This report addresses this gap – identifying the interests controlling Ukraine’s agricultural land and presenting an analysis of the dynamics at play around land tenure in the country. This includes the highly controversial land reform that took place in 2021 as part of the structural adjustment program
initiated under the auspices of Western financial institutions, after the installation of a pro-European Union (EU) government following the Maidan Revolution in 2014.

With 33 million hectares of arable land, Ukraine has large swaths of the most fertile farmland in the world.1 Misguided privatization and corrupt governance since the early 1990s have concentrated land in the hands of a new oligarchic class. Around 4.3 million hectares are under large-scale agriculture, with the bulk, three million hectares, in the hands of just a dozen large agribusiness firms.2 In addition, according to the government, about five million hectares – the size of two Crimea – have been “stolen” by private interests from the state of Ukraine.3 The total amount of land controlled by oligarchs, corrupt individuals, and large agribusinesses is thus over nine million hectares, exceeding 28 percent of the country’s arable land. The rest is used by over eight million Ukrainian farmers
...

[ramana]

Link: https://x.com/rahulkanwal/status/190448 ... jIUeg&s=19

"Building up China, was for a long time, a strategic objective of the West, building them up as a society, praising their achievements, history, and running us (#India) down was equally a strategic compulsion of the West," Union Minister @DrSJaishankar

[bala]

As Global Order Shifts, What Are the Challenges? New Alliances? Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan explains.

What shape will the new Global Order take? Who is aligning with whom — and why?

youtube.com/watch?v=uQbWfohMQiI

00:00 – Intro
00:36 – Global churning – slow & steady
08:55 – Islamization of Europe
15:30 – The Middle East collapse
19:20 – Ukraine map activities
23:57 – China economy facing problems
28:20 – The biggest challenge
29:02 – What are the alternatives?
34:15 – Tariff deals
47:23 - Will India need to join Five Eyes alliance for future security or potentially create its own "5 Is" group?
48:31 - What is going on between Serbia-Hungary-Slovakia?
49:33 - Need to increase force on border if there is internal turmoil in China
50:16 - View on India version of Starlink for Defence and acquiring F35A?
51:54 - West Bank protest against Hamas
52:48 - Putin visit to India, a message for Trump to stand with Modi ji
53:54 - Will in future Europe seeks India’s help to protect Christians against Islam?

[Cyrano]

A significant portion of Ukraine's fertile lands are in the Donbass region, and the frontlines run right through these lands. With the millions of tons of munitions that have pockmarked the battlefields and several more millions of unexploded munitions and landmines, the agricultural output from large swaths of these regions might be severely affected and quality degraded due to soil pollution for years to come.

No one is talking about this because Ukraine is trying to put-on lipstick for the highest bidder and the west has a history of brushing inconvenient truths under the carpet.

[A_Gupta]

When India enters a “strategic partnership” with a country, e.g., Thailand, what additionally happens relative to a regular diplomatic relationship?

[Cyrano]

Good question. If I may hazard a guess, usually a multi domain agenda is drawn up, covering civil cooperation, for ex setting up an IIT or AIIMS, sharing of weather and remote sensing satillite data for agriculture, disaster management etc, digital stack like Rupay, DMT, 5G stack, cultural stuff like funding for restoration of ancient temples etc, student exchange programs and some simplification of rules to improve ease of doing business bilaterally, tariffs, intervention during disasters etc, connectivity projects covering ports, rail, road, tech like locos, VB trains, Kavach etc etc as per needs and opportunities.

On the military and intelligence side it can be joint exercises, training of military officers, port of call agreements for naval/air assets, simplified procedures for real time intelligence sharing, anti narco ops, arms sales etc.

Timelines are set for the agreed items and initiatives with persons responsible identified on both sides and then progress is followed up and reported by the regular diplomats to respective govts, usually reviewed in the next (annual) summit. It's the last part that sets apart a strategic partnership from a simple diplomatic relationship. Proactive and long term than reactive and transactional.

If anyone has more insight please do add.

[A_Gupta]

^^^ I read the text of the Indo-Russian declaration of strategic partnership, and I think you got it all. Let's watch what happens with the just signed Indo-Thai strategic partnership.

I get the impression that India's links to ASEAN get affected by the instability in Myanmar and now the issues with Bangladesh. IMO, ASEAN has fallen too much into the orbit of China, and I wish India was more effective in competing there.

[A_Gupta]

I think the (world minus India) vs Trump can be on this thread. India-US has its own thread. If not correct, moderator, please advise what threads to use.

Germany may pull gold reserves from New York amid Trump policy fears: Report
https://www.cnbctv18.com/market/commodi ... 585093.htm
For decades, Germany has stored around 1,200 tonnes of its gold—about 30% of its total reserves—deep within the vaults of the US Federal Reserve in Manhattan.

These reserves, currently valued at approximately €113 billion (₹9.83 lakh crore), were historically kept overseas to ensure quick dollar liquidity during financial emergencies.

However, senior members of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which is expected to play a major role in Germany's next government, are rethinking that strategy.


According to Bild, the move is driven by fears that Washington can no longer be considered a consistently reliable partner.

“Of course, the question has arisen again,” said Marco Wanderwitz, a former German minister and CDU member who has long advocated for either regular inspections or the repatriation of the gold.

CDU European Parliament member Markus Ferber echoed this view, stating, “I demand regular checks of Germany’s gold reserves. Official representatives of the Bundesbank must personally count the bars and document their results.”
...
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Michael Jäger from the Taxpayers Association of Europe also supported relocation, suggesting that Germany should “bring all gold reserves to Frankfurt or at least to Europe as quickly as possible.”

As far as I can tell:
"Italy holds approximately 1,061 metric tons of gold in the US Federal Reserve".
Switzerland has gold reserves of 1040 metric tons. " A significant portion of the gold held by the SNB is stored in the vault at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York." -- can't find out how much, though. And Italy as a member of the EU might follow Germany's lead, but Switzerland has no such need.

[A_Gupta]

https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazine ... as-europe/

Canada is the world’s fifth largest producer and seventh largest exporter of natural gas. However, unlike most other natural gas exporters, Canada’s market is limited to a single customer – the United States.

President Donald Trump’s on-again off-again tariffs on Canadian exports have many implications but a key one is that Canada must expand its natural gas markets to other countries, not only in Asia, but also to those in the European Union.

[vera_k]

Many M&A deals start when a corp finds that the majority of its business is hostage to 1 large customer. And that it would be better for both sides if the customer acquired the smaller corp. Canada's perhaps in that position wrt the USA, hence the straightforward suggestion that Canada become part of the USA.

What does this picture look like for Canadian exports overall?

[Vayutuvan]

https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazine ... as-europe/

President Donald Trump’s on-again off-again tariffs on Canadian exports have many implications but a key one is that Canada must expand its natural gas markets to other countries, not only in Asia, but also to those in the European Union.

That is a problem because of transportation cost. In any case, Norway wouldn't want Canadian O&G as they themselves have more than enough. Parts of the pipeline from Canada to the US is already built but part got stopped because it goes through native american lands. That can be revived then gas can flow from Canada all the way down to NOLA, IIRC.

[A_Gupta]

https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/ ... us-imports

European Union countries will seek to present a united front in the coming days against US President Donald Trump’s tariffs, likely approving a first set of targeted countermeasures on up to US$28 billion of US imports from dental floss to diamonds.

[A_Gupta]

Many M&A deals start when a corp finds that the majority of its business is hostage to 1 large customer. And that it would be better for both sides if the customer acquired the smaller corp. Canada's perhaps in that position wrt the USA, hence the straightforward suggestion that Canada become part of the USA.

What does this picture look like for Canadian exports overall?

Putting LNG on a ship for a sea voyage requires additional port infrastructure. The US has been building out its export capacity in various facilities on the Gulf of Mexico America, mainly aimed at the European market, while Canada has its Pacific coast facilities ready or almost ready for export to Asia (i.e, target date to start exports is 2025).

Now that the age of economic cooperation between Canada and the USA is over, Canada may invest in east coast facilities to export to Europe.

Corporations merging is one thing, countries merging is entirely another thing. Brings back unpleasant memories of the various European East India Companies with the more powerful taking over the less all over Asia.

[vera_k]

Corporations merging is one thing, countries merging is entirely another thing.

It struck me that the US president is a businessman first, statesman second.

[A_Gupta]

Trump was a businessman who drove his casinos into bankruptcy. I mean a place where people come and lose money. So “businessman” is a euphemism.

[Vayutuvan]

Trump was a businessman who drove his casinos into bankruptcy. I mean a place where people come and lose money. So “businessman” is a euphemism.

OT. Please take it to "Understanding the US" thread. I have to say a few things about this.

[A_Gupta]

What sovereignty or independence do you have when one man can cause you Rs 19 lakh crores loss of value in a couple of days?

[A_Gupta]

Everyone including Pakistan has numerous cases against China in the WTO.
https://youtu.be/SJYWft4hzHk?si=GJ2blpr1JspzmXTt

[A_Gupta]

Important speech by the Prime Minister of Singapore.
https://youtu.be/c5GMKzJVQJM?si=PD97iSRUSc54lnpI

[vera_k]

^

Singapore's Prime Minister addressed the challenges posed by a shifting global economy, emphasizing that the era of rules-based globalization is over, primarily due to the United States' recent tariff announcements. He noted that while the U.S. has historically supported free trade, the current protectionist measures threaten to destabilize international markets and disadvantage smaller countries like Singapore. The tariffs, particularly harsh on China, could lead to a global trade war, impacting not only economies but also international relations and cooperation. The Prime Minister acknowledged that Singapore's economy will face significant challenges, including reduced external demand and potential job losses, and outlined measures to support affected businesses and workers. He called for unity and resilience among Singaporeans, emphasizing the need to adapt to a changing world and forge new trade partnerships. Additionally, he highlighted ongoing efforts to strengthen ASEAN's economic integration and collaboration with like-minded countries. The Prime Minister reassured citizens of the government's commitment to navigating these turbulent times while maintaining Singapore's status as a global business hub. Ultimately, he encouraged a spirit of determination and innovation to overcome impending challenges.

[A_Gupta]

The EU has said it offered the US a “zero-for-zero” tariff deal on cars and industrial goods weeks before Donald Trump launched his trade war, but that it would “not wait endlessly” to defend itself.

Maros Šefčovič, the EU commissioner for trade, said he had proposed zero tariffs on cars and a range of industrial goods, such as pharmaceutical products, rubber and machinery, during his first meeting with the US commerce secretary, Howard Lutnick, on 19 February.
...
...
The European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, said the EU had offered “zero-for-zero tariffs for industrial goods” and that offer remained on the table.

However, at a press conference on Monday evening, Trump did not appear keen on the offer.

He told reporters that zero-zero tariffs were not going to happen, adding: “The European Union’s been very bad to us. They’re going to have to buy their energy from us, because they need it and they’re going to have to buy it from us. They can buy it, we can knock off $350bn in one week.”

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/ ... nouncement

[ramana]

India Vietnam trade flows

https://www.ibef.org/indian-exports/india-vietnam-trade

India should explore trade with Vietnam
It's badly hit by tariffs. I know there is a heavy Chinese investment in Vietnam.
We need to add them to Greater BIMSTEC.
Can't let them go deeper into Chinese orbit.

[A_Gupta]

China announces 84% retaliatory tariffs on US goods
https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/09/business ... index.html

China increased its intended levy on US imports by another 50 percentage points from the initial amount that is set to take effect on Thursday, matching the additional charge that US President Donald Trump has already imposed on Chinese goods.

[drnayar]

India Vietnam trade flows

https://www.ibef.org/indian-exports/india-vietnam-trade

India should explore trade with Vietnam
It's badly hit by tariffs. I know there is a heavy Chinese investment in Vietnam.
We need to add them to Greater BIMSTEC.
Can't let them go deeper into Chinese orbit.

i think a good idea would be to replace vietnams share in the US market ! .. same for the Beedi s.. a FTA with US effectively locking in and utilizing the current trade war in favour of India. Like it or not US is a far bigger consumer market compared to vietnam and stay likely that way for next 50 years.

[uddu]

Vietnam imports a large share of components manufactured in China. So its going to be a making it easier for China to export into India through Vietnam.
S Jaishankar: India's Goal is to Formulate Bilateral Trade Agreement with US | Trump Tariffs

[A_Gupta]

In 1950 India was about 4% of the world economy. Over the 1960s and 70s it shrank as a share of world economy. Now Indis is roughly back where it was at independence, about 4% of the world economy.

Yet India has much more weight in the world today than it did in 1947. How did this come to be? I wish I could give the best answer a prize; but all I can say is that I'll enjoy reading it.

[uddu]

India's Strategic Masterplan: Sanjeev Sanyal Reveals Chanakya's Global Blueprint

[drnayar]

In 1950 India was about 4% of the world economy. Over the 1960s and 70s it shrank as a share of world economy. Now Indis is roughly back where it was at independence, about 4% of the world economy.

Yet India has much more weight in the world today than it did in 1947. How did this come to be? I wish I could give the best answer a prize; but all I can say is that I'll enjoy reading it.

Think of indias gdp in Ppp sense..

[Cyrano]

A lot of these GDP comparisons are based on current exchange rates of various currencies vs the USD.

The USD itself is a fake currency propped up by unquestioned printing, military threat, manipulation of global markets and colossal debt of the US.

If the exchange rates wrt to the $ change then the picture would change, so whatever we are seeing as India's share of world GDP today in nominal or PPP terms will significantly change in the future.

We need to keep this in mind, and not worry too much about 4% or whatever.

[A_Gupta]

While higher PPP is good for Indians who do the overwhelming bulk of buying things in India, imports are paid for in USD. PPP doesn't matter to anyone outside India.

I would request reflection on the thought that a reason why Chinese RNB can't be a reserve currency is because China has a huge trade surplus. (The US trade deficit leaves the world awash in dollars.)

Also, that apart from GDP, it is the set of national capabilities and the ability to exercise them that helps determine geopolitical weight. Developing a COVID vaccination, sending a spacecraft to Mars, having a startup that is trying to build rockets, navy that can rescue a pirated ship 2000 kilometers off the Indian coast - the equivalent capabilities appropriate to 1950 were not there in the India of 1950.

Thinking about this paradox that a 4% of India of 1950 was so much weaker than a 4% India of 2025 will IMO be useful in several ways. E.g., while it will take decades for India to catch up in terms of GDP, it need not take that much time in terms of developing capabilities.

[uddu]

The History Of The Indian Ocean You Didn't Know | Sanjeev Sanyal on The India Story EP 4

[ricky_v]

intriguing article, urge members to read in entirety

https://lawliberty.org/book-review/empi ... he-future/

Techno-futurists commonly believe that a totally human-made future will advance individual liberty. Bruno Maçães is doubtful, arguing in World Builders: Technology and the New Geopolitics that the future will more likely see us living inside a metaverse crafted by one of the superpowers. He foresees AI delivering “a radical increase in the centrality of sovereign power” and believes the goal of today’s geopolitics is a hegemonic second genesis where all reside in an artificial cosmos that will be either American or Chinese.

This is not fairyland stuff, argues Maçães, for recent events show that the great powers are trying to scale up the smart city. In the imperialism of the future, a superpower aspires to be “a global system administrator.” A case where, as Maçães puts it, “your opponent is playing a video game. You are coding it.” This will be the consummation of the history of empire, for peoples will live so immersed in a state power metaverse that government and ordinary life are utterly fused: “the culmination of ideological power: a will disguised as thing.”

World Builders opens with a quote from the Timaeus where Plato wonders about the model used by the builder of the cosmos. This philosophical topic sets the stage for Maçães’ inquiry into contemporary geopolitics where superpowers seek system control of a virtual world rather than miles of territory. “When your opponent is building a fully artificial or technological world that could eventually redefine your own reality, geopolitics becomes not merely existential but ontological.”

To create a new cosmos, microchips are basic. Microprocessing is the backbone of contemporary civilization. Banking, medical imaging and diagnostic tools, air travel, music and book creation, as well as security and weapons systems, all depend on microchips. Any power aspiring to global hegemony needs mastery of circuitry measured in nanometers. Maçães thus begins his argument by looking back to 2018 when the Trump administration identified microchips as a strategic security concern and sought ways to corner the market. Microchips require massive financial and human capital, and they are made in only a handful of countries. The security problem is evident once you learn that a single Javelin missile includes 200 microchips.

Trump’s actions were the first salvo in a “revolutionary process,” proposes Maçães, where the chief strategic insight was to see that “physical objects would be no more than `peripherals,’ hardware elements that collect sensor data and submit the collected data to the broader communications ecosystem.” Trump made the first move to take command of the building blocks of virtual worlds, but likely because China had signaled what was at stake in their manufacture.

Maçães cites a 2016 speech by Xi Jinping where the Chinese leader spoke of Internet core technology as the greatest “vital gate” of the supply chain; to secure this digital gate, he continued, “We must concentrate the most powerful forces to act together, compose shock brigades and special forces to storm the passes.” Citing the famed Naval Academy professor, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Maçães comments that Xi’s speech is a clear recognition that “chips play a major role in the new geopolitics. If straits and islands are the gates to the oceans, microchips are the gates to the virtual.” Appreciating the stakes, Trump set a policy of decoupling in a strategic area whilst trade otherwise continued.

The next brick was laid in 2020 with the return of industrial policy and the remaking of geopolitics. Covid showed that states could force their populations into completely new living circumstances. Governments sniffed possibility: “If the way the economy works can be recreated to eliminate the risk of a viral infection, then it can presumably be recreated for the sake of other, equally desirable social goals.” Covid was a “conversion moment,” claims Maçães, showing that the social and economic order is a virtual world responsive to government will: “Big data and the Internet made it possible for the framework conditions of human life to change practically overnight.”

In 2022, the first flex of the new virtual system thinking was applied to war. The West’s response to the Russo-Ukrainian war assumed that geopolitical struggle is now not about “oceans or mountain passes but telecommunication networks.”

To weaken a geopolitical rival, the US sought to embroil Russia, “in a succession of system wars ranging from a new form of technological warfare to the uses and abuses of the global energy, financial and trade systems.” In Maçães’s telling, the Russo-Ukraine war is a subtle American proxy war. “In Ukraine the United States has played less the role of combatant than the role of playwright or even programmer … Washington is not waging war against Russia. It has moved the game one level up. It is transforming the environment within which Russia must wage its war against Ukraine.”

The US has tried to shape the battlefield by commanding the larger system of war. To illustrate, Maçães points to the oil price cap. Russia bankrolls the war by meeting the hunger of energy markets. The Biden administration sought to tie off that supply. “The price cap was only possible because the Western allies have access to the chokepoints of the global energy system.” In this case, the choke point was maritime insurance; an industry dominated by just a few Western firms. The idea was that tankers could only be insured to carry Russian crude if the oil would be sold below $60 per barrel. Maçães thinks this a “remarkably creative solution,” since it prevented shock to global markets whilst starving Russia’s war chest.

Strategically, the ploy traded on an “understanding of the global system as an artificially created construct that can be used to defeat an opponent without the need for a direct clash.” However, as Maçães himself notes, it did not work. Russia made use of “a growing fleet of tankers with shadowy ownership and vessels that turn off their transponders.” The skeptic wants Maçães to further acknowledge that this is a significant analytical concession. His story posits “a radical increase in the centrality of sovereign power,” but the failure of the oil cap points away from state power to the reality that in much of the world, there is little to no obedience to state power. This is a point stressed by Robert Kaplan: “grey market” actors operate largely unrestrained within and around nations and city states, and they hobbled this first effort at a virtual system control of war.

Unfortunately, Maçães does not return to Mahan at this point. Mahan argued that steam made American control of Hawaii strategic. If America controlled the islands, then Asian nations would have no hope to resupply their steamers, making an attack on the west coast of the US virtually impossible. Mahan’s broader point is that like steam-powered war, every strategic venture requires an infrastructure of firm land, building, repairing, managing, guarding, and so on. A strategy will not prevail otherwise.

An illustration of the difficulties is the Biden administration’s strategic effort to “turn the ruble into rubble.” This ran headlong into the background reality of clean energy. “Events in Ukraine were a critical test case for the general theory advanced in this book,” grants Maçães, and indicative of the new system thinking were “historic sanctions” “to devastate the Russian economy as punishment for the world to witness.” The reality is that the US never stopped buying uranium from Russia for its power plants. In 2023 alone, the US contributed $800M to the Russian war chest. In May 2024, the US Department of Energy website published a blog post acknowledging that more than a third of the US supply for its nuclear infrastructure comes from Russia, the website owning, “we recognize that a transition away from Russian-sourced fuel will not happen overnight.” Three years into the war, America’s clean energy infrastructure is still tethered to a geopolitical rival, and world building is on hold.

Insightful is Maçães’s observation: “There is something I would call a `technological order’ that is deeper and more fundamental than political and economic orders, albeit less visible and often taken for the way nature presents itself.” Yet, he acknowledges that “almost by definition, the fully artificial worlds described in this book are ontologically fragile.” This suggests the great divorce from nature is not only not possible, but that nature has herself something to say about our freedom from her.

Maçães invokes Kant’s categorical imperative. “For Kant, as we know, the moral law is entirely emptied of content. Everything is allowed, provided it is coherent.” If you think human beings are detached from the Earth and able to impose their creative will, then world building on the scale imagined by Maçães will seem feasible. You might not like living in a state metaverse, but it may well be our fate.

Those attached to the older hylomorphic metaphysics of Aristotle, where reality is explained as a unity of matter and form, will be unpersuaded. Aquinas calls the human the “other animal.” Law is not thematized in World Builders, but in Aquinas rule of law is an ancestral inheritance. Right order is a sediment of natural law, a product of animal rationality with inescapable concerns for security, family, solidarity, and reverence. This philosophical anthropology is a roadblock to world building at scale, for geopolitics is then backward-looking, an analytical unpacking of our immersion in the abiding verities of land and sea that have, and will, make history.

[sanjaykumar]

I have to chuckle at such verbiage.

But there is no question of the primacy of technology.

China’s rapid advances and more importantly America’s seeming slowing down of technological innovation is troubling.

There is little question that given a competition between the two, America needs to win.

[vera_k]

Rate of technological innovation has slowed globally.
Where are the Nobel prize winners if China is suddenly surging ahead in tech?
Much of the Chinese tech industry cannot stand open competition.

[drnayar]

Rate of technological innovation has slowed globally.
Where are the Nobel prize winners if China is suddenly surging ahead in tech?
Much of the Chinese tech industry cannot stand open competition.

Chinese capability lies in iterative improvement, the technologies they beg borrow or steal are all improved and produced..in numbers., this drives entire system of ecosystems .. innovations are apparently closely guarded much within China, they dont seem to care about Nobel more than the money or capability they can build up !! China is a threat and seemingly the west incl US seemingly have no idea how to deal with. But the focus is on treasury bonds and financial markets esp the US Dollar.. this is increasingly coming under strain , more than actually being admitted publicly.

Trump and his billionaire friends has a plan, the MAGA is in fact the focus to contain China not per se for the american aam admi !! .. and , there is a huge likelihood the plan will fail, hence the need to court India as a hedge to build up supply chains

[vera_k]

Relevant article from yesterday with numbers that tie the decline of manufacturing in the US, and resultant rise of Trump to China's accession to the WTO. I haven't followed the author's other writings closely, so its possible this is coming from the perspective of one of the other foreign trade actors hurt by tarrifs.

However, China now is ready to manufacture in the US or Mexico (like with BYD). Yet divergence of political goals makes that unacceptable to the US.

Any manufacturing in India helps in two ways - by limiting further China manufacturing dominance, and by providing another location to maintain competition and minimize disruption.

Trump misunderstands the 'China' shock

[Vayutuvan]

Relevant article from yesterday with numbers that tie the decline of manufacturing in the US, and resultant rise of Trump to China's accession to the WTO.

IIRC, India recommended China to WTO at the urging of Chinese.Chinese wanted a favor from India. Then they turned around and denied Bharat entry into NSG.